ESF:DXE_HOPO Economic Policy - Course Information
DXE_HOPO Economic Policy
Faculty of Economics and AdministrationSpring 2014
- Extent and Intensity
- 24/0. 6 credit(s). Type of Completion: zk (examination).
- Teacher(s)
- prof. Ing. Antonín Slaný, CSc. (lecturer)
Ing. Petr Harasimovič (assistant), Ing. Miroslav Hloušek, Ph.D. (deputy) - Guaranteed by
- prof. Ing. Antonín Slaný, CSc.
Department of Economics – Faculty of Economics and Administration
Contact Person: Mgr. Jarmila Šveňhová
Supplier department: Department of Economics – Faculty of Economics and Administration - Timetable
- Wed 9. 4. 10:00–11:30 168, 12:30–14:00 168, Wed 16. 4. 10:00–11:30 168, 12:30–14:00 168, Wed 23. 4. 10:00–11:30 168, 12:30–14:00 168, Wed 30. 4. 10:00–11:30 168, 12:30–14:00 168, Wed 7. 5. 10:00–11:30 168, 12:30–14:00 168, Wed 14. 5. 10:00–11:30 166, 12:30–14:00 166
- Course Enrolment Limitations
- The course is only offered to the students of the study fields the course is directly associated with.
- fields of study / plans the course is directly associated with
- Economics (programme ESF, D-EKT4) (2)
- Finance (programme ESF, D-FU4) (2)
- Economic Policy (programme ESF, D-HPS4) (2)
- Business Economy and Management (programme ESF, D-EKM4) (2)
- Public Economics (programme ESF, D-HPS4) (2)
- Course objectives
- The goal of the course is to help students understand the economic motivation of economic policy-makers and to see the economic background (i.e. not only the consequences but also the causes) of political decisions, which economic context is not always obvious. Understanding economic motives of relevant groups of economic subjects helps better understanding of the relationship between economic variables and their interaction.
- Syllabus
- 1 Introduction to the course
- 2 Introduction to social choice theory (aggregation of individual preferences, Arrow impossibility theorem, possible solutions to AIT)
- 3 Theories of electoral competition (Downs' model, median voter theorem, probabilistic voting model, lobbyism)
- 4 "Agency problem" in politics (political rent and the commitment problem)
- 5 Partisan politics (ideological preferences)
- 6 General interest politics (welfare programs, pension system, unemployment insurance)
- 7 Special interest politics (interest groups)
- 8 Electoral systems (majoritarian vs. proportional systems – consequences for the size of political rent and the size and composition of redistributive policies)
- 9 Political systems (presidential vs. parliamentary democracy – consequences for the size of political rent and the size and composition of redistributive policies)
- 10 Dynamic politics (politico-economic cycle, public debt)
- 11 Dynamic politics (capital taxation, economic growth)
- 12 Dictatorial vs. democratic regimes
- Literature
- recommended literature
- PERSSON, Torsten and Guido TABELLINI. Political economics : explaining economic policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000, xix, 533. ISBN 9780262161954. info
- Teaching methods
- Lectures
- Assessment methods
- Written exam, to pass the exam the student has to achieve at least 60% score.
- Language of instruction
- Czech
- Further comments (probably available only in Czech)
- Study Materials
Information on completion of the course: seminární práce
The course is taught annually. - Information about innovation of course.
- This course has been innovated under the project "Inovace studia ekonomických disciplín v souladu s požadavky znalostní ekonomiky (CZ.1.07/2.2.00/28.0227)" which is cofinanced by the European Social Fond and the national budget of the Czech Republic.
- Enrolment Statistics (Spring 2014, recent)
- Permalink: https://is.muni.cz/course/econ/spring2014/DXE_HOPO