

The local allocation of EU funds in Slovakia: determinants of success in project submissions in 2014-2020

26th International Colloquium on Regional Sciences

June 14-16, 2023, Bořetice

This work was supported by the VEGA 1/0837/21.

Eva Výrostová - Tomáš Výrost*

Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice


*University of Economics in Bratislava

Motivation and objective

- **ESIF funds** are significant for **municipal investments**
 - After fiscal decentralization, the share of **personal income tax** is the most important revenue source for municipalities
 - **Local taxes** represent only around **11% of total income** (*Papcúnová, Hudáková and Beresecká, 2018*)
 - **48% of approved projects** in the 2014-2020 program period as of March 2023
- **Lower absorption, late start** of implementation
- **Differences among municipalities**
 - E.g., large cities typically have experienced staff, small municipalities depend on external consultants (*Šumpíková, Pavel a Klazar, 2004*)

What are the determinants of the success rate of submitted projects for European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) funding for municipalities in Slovakia in the 2014-2020 programming period?

Stylized facts on CP funding in Slovakia: absorption



Cumulative EU payments as a share of total allocation in 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 in Slovakia

Source: Data from EC (June 2023)

EU funds at the local level – literature review

- **Prior studies in member countries**
 - Poland (*Banaszewska and Bischoff, 2017*), Portugal (*Migueis, 2013*), Hungary (*Muraközy and Telegdy, 2016*), Slovakia (*Smékalová, 2018*), Romania (*Marin et al., 2023*)
 - Findings: Support not always aligns with social and economic development
- Economic criteria not the sole determinants of the allocation; the **political situation** and relations between various layers of governance are significant (*Bouvet and Dall'erba, 2010*)
- **Electoral incentives** and funding objectives vs ESIF grant allocation in Germany's local districts (*Dellmuth and Stoffel, 2012*)
- **Political motivations** and normative objectives (*Veiga, 2012; Muraközy and Telegdy, 2016; Migueis, 2013*)
 - Municipal grants increase during local election years
 - Grants favor municipalities with closely contested legislative elections and where the ruling party is supported.

Dataset

- Programing period: **2014-2020**, Slovakia only
- Data from **January 2014** to **March 2023**
- Official national database on proposals and management (**ITMS2014+**)
- Other data from the **Statistical office** of Slovakia and **INEKO** (NGO).
- **2 357** municipalities or city boroughs out of **2 929** eligible **submitted** a proposal
 - Bratislava and Košice are separate legal entities established by a special law
 - Bratislava and Košice, are the only cities divided into city boroughs
 - Applications submitted by both the individual city boroughs and the cities themselves analyzed
- Main dependent variable: **project proposal success rate**
 - ratio of the number of project proposals approved for financing to the number of submitted proposals

Explanatory variables

- Number of **submitted projects**, number of **inhabitants**
 - proxy for the municipalities' ability to submit quality projects, see Šumpíková, et al. (2004)
- **Unemployment rate, Share of inhabitants (15-64)**
- **Financial indicators**
 - Total debt per inhabitant
 - Investment intensity
 - Current liquidity
 - Profit/loss after tax per inhabitant,
 - Surplus/deficit per inhabitant,
 - Net assets per inhabitant
- **Political party alignment** with the ruling government coalition in 2014-2020
- **Mayor gender** (proxy by surname)

Methodology

- Descriptive **characteristics** and financial **indicators** on individual municipalities have been **averaged for three preceding years**, i.e., years 2011-2013
- Overall performance of each municipality – **the success ratio**
- **Fractional logistic regression**
 - Uses logistic **link function** to model ratios, accounts for boundary cases.
 - With a limited dependent variable constrained to the unit interval, **OLS** estimation should not be used
 - **Beta regression** of Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) is a highly versatile, but only suitable for data strictly within the unit interval (no 0 and 100% success rates)

Summary statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	N	mean	sd	min	max
Success rate	2 357	0.69	0.31	0.00	1.00
Number of submitted projects	2 357	4.97	5.94	1.00	65.00
Size (number of inhabitants)	2 357	2 466.31	11 727.65	12.67	414 130.67
Share of inhabitants (15-64 years)	2 357	0.70	0.04	0.42	0.84
Debt per inhabitant	2 356	73.06	94.70	0.00	828.94
Investment intensity	2 357	0.05	0.22	-0.93	2.30
Current liquidity	2 338	19.09	182.32	0.01	6 857.85
Profit/loss per inhabitant	2 357	20.52	89.09	-343.29	1 349.01
Surplus/deficit per inhabitant	2 357	15.60	83.88	-1 004.07	533.04
Net assets per inhabitant	2 357	1 857.83	1 851.13	0.00	45 285.83
2014-2020 ruling parties affiliation	2 357	0.32	0.43	0.00	1.00
Female representative	2 357	0.21	0.39	0.00	1.00
Unemployment rate	2 354	0.14	0.09	0.02	0.68


Note: N – number of municipalities or city boroughs that have applied for ESIF funds until the end of March 2023 and that have already been evaluated (approved or not-approved) without European Territorial Cooperation and technical assistance projects

Source: data from ŠÚ SR, INEKO (2023), ITMS2014+

Project applications and the success rates for municipal project financing requests

Operation programme (OP)	Number of submitted project proposals	Number of approved project proposals	Success rate	The ratio of approved to requested funds
OP Quality of Environment	3 667	2 012	55 %	55 %
OP Human resources	2 843	2 053	72 %	60 %
Integrated regional operational programme	2 670	1 827	68 %	68 %
Rural development programme	1 658	1 132	68 %	67 %
OP Integrated infrastructure	912	793	87 %	97 %
OP Effective Public administration	20	15	75 %	75 %
Additional contributions 2014-2020	7	7	100 %	100 %
Total	11 777	7 839	67 %	63 %



Number of inhabitants of municipalities vs. number of submitted project proposals





Source: own processing, data from ŠÚ SR, ITMS2014+, as of end of March 2023.

Spatial distribution of the success and unemployment rates, submitted projects and awarded funds



a) Success rate [%]





b) Unemployment rate [%]



c) Number of submitted projects



d) Awarded funds [million €]



	(1) Baseline model	(2) Extended model	(3) Baseline model before 2020 election	(4) Baseline model after 2020 election
<i>Project writing experience</i>				
Number of submitted projects	-0.0137*	-0.0147*	0.0188	-0.0571***
<i>Demographics</i>				
Size (number of inhabitants)	5.55e-06	5.96e-06	1.23e-05	7.68e-06
Unemployment rate	-1.823***	-1.671***	-0.522	-1.789***
Share of inhabitants (15-64 years)	-1.630	-1.584	-0.409	-2.649**
<i>Financials</i>				
Debt per inhabitant	-0.000664*	-0.000819*	-0.00127**	-0.000512
Investment intensity		0.166		
Current liquidity		1.82e-05		
Profit/loss per inhabitant		-0.000121		
Surplus/deficit per inhabitant		0.000293		
Net assets per inhabitant		3.69e-05		
<i>Other characteristics</i>				
2014-2020 ruling parties	-0.179*	-0.183*	-0.160	-0.228**
Female representative	0.129	0.137	0.0240	0.240**
Constant	2.325***	2.209**	0.791	2.582***
<i>Observations</i>	2,353	2,334	1,766	2,209

Note: Robust p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

Results

- **Number of submitted projects (-)**
 - Increase in submissions lowers the overall success rate
 - Main effect after 2020, that is, towards the end of the programming period
 - Slow in implementations of ESIF funds, a rush to spend the funds towards the end, with lower quality?
- **Unemployment rate (-)**
 - Cohesion policy objectives?
- **Debt per inhabitant (-)**
 - Less financially sound municipalities may have difficulties raising additional capital for ESIF funds
- **Political party alignment (-)**
 - On municipality level, the politics is different from parliamentary level
 - Mayoral candidates supported by several parties, including opponents on the parliamentary level
 - in 2018 municipal elections, many elected have not been affiliated with any political party
- **Female representatives (+)**
 - Particularly after 2020 election

Concluding thoughts

- We provide an **ex-post overview** of the municipalities' success in securing EU funding in the 2014-2020 programming period.
- **Further analysis needed** to answer the question of targeting EU funds for **EU cohesion policy goals**.
- Significant negative effect of the **productive age population** after 2020 might relate to EU fund allocations in economically **less active areas**.
- **Challenges** faced by municipalities with **high debt** per inhabitant.
- Open questions to **effective leadership** and **management styles**.
- **Municipal politics** in Slovakia are complex, and the model doesn't explore political affiliation's impact in depth.

The local allocation of EU funds in Slovakia: determinants of success in project submissions in 2014-2020

26th International Colloquium on Regional Sciences

June 14-16, 2023, Bořetice

This work was supported by the VEGA 1/0837/21.

Eva Výrostová - Tomáš Výrost*

Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice

*University of Economics in Bratislava