

9. See Elvin Hatch, *Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1983).
10. See the title essay in Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars and Other Essays* (1983; London: Counterpoint, 1984), pp. 7-22.
11. Spykman, *Geography of the Peace*, p. 45.
12. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, p. 461.
13. *Ibid.*
14. A view endorsed strongly in A.E. Campbell, "Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional Surrender," in Langhorne, *Diplomacy and Intelligence*, pp. 219-41.
15. Kenneth Boulding usefully formalized the concept that power should diminish with the distance to its application as the "loss-of-strength gradient": *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 78-79, 245-47. Albert Wohlstetter challenged this traditional idea vigorously in his important article "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (Jan. 1968): 242-55.
16. Even at the level of general nuclear war, geographical and geopolitical relationships are far from irrelevant; see the essays by Ciro Zoppo, Desmond Ball, Albert Legault, and Hubert Moineville in Zoppo and Zorgbibe, *On Geopolitics*, chaps. 5-8. Professional soldiers understandably wax indignant when academic strategists prescribe ground warfare while ignoring such mundane factors as climate, terrain, distance, and their attendant logistic difficulties. Maps can deceive. An example of grand strategic conception and geographical absurdity was the Balkan project of 1944, dear to some British hearts. The idea was to effect a breakout from the Po valley to Austria via the so-called "Ljubljana Gap." If any Balkan option for Britain and the United States made sense in 1943-44, it was not an advance from northern Italy. See Michael Howard, *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), pp. 65-68; and Henrikson, "The Map as an 'Idea.'"
17. The most recent major foray of reinterpretation is Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985).
18. Daniels, *Russia*, p. 355.
19. See P.H. Vigor, "Doubts and Difficulties Confronting a Would-be Soviet Attacker," *RUSI Journal* 125 (June 1980): 32-38; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982-83): 139-66.
20. Parker, *Mackinder*, p. 203.
21. Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, p. 87.
22. An important study that emphasizes the harmful effect upon cohesiveness and continuity in policymaking of the rise of an ideologically committed professional elite, in place of traditional "establishment" people, is I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Touchstone, 1985), esp. chap. 2. The authors argue that the new policy "professionals" of both Left and Right are far more committed to the promotion of particular ideas in policy than to the conduct of the business of government per se.
23. "The Young Emperor William II and his advisers made their debut in foreign policy by refusing to renew the famous Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, an

agreement which was, in every sense of the term, the cornerstone of the Bismarckian alliance system": William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, 2d ed. (1935; New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 3. Though it would seem that the new Kaiser did not intend any shift in the substance of Berlin's policy toward Russia, the refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, closely followed by a marked warming in Anglo-German relations (Germany traded major claims in East Africa for the small but supremely strategic island of Heligoland), produced understandable feelings of isolation and vulnerability in St. Petersburg; these found expression in the Franco-Russian Military Convention of August 1892 and alliance of 1894. See *ibid.*, chap. 2; and Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance*. By 1894 anti-Russian rhetoric in Berlin and rumors (particularly out of Italy) that Britain might welcome some form of association with the Triple Alliance (of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—1882, renewed in 1887) had served to alarm both Russia and France.

24. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to condemn a policy of appeasement that seemed to many intelligent people at the time no more than a realistic recognition of the restoration of Germany's quite proper power position. In itself, German rearmament after 1933 was neither alarming nor surprising. It was the Versailles arms control restraints on the defeated Germany that were extraordinary and, many British officials believed, in need of amendment as Germany returned to the normal run of great-power diplomacy. This is not to exonerate the imprudence of British policy in 1938 but to suggest that the true monstrousness of the Nazi regime and the scope of its ambitions are infinitely plainer in the 1980s than they were through most of the 1930s. See Watt, "British Intelligence"; and Wark, *Ultimate Enemy*.

25. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 1, *The Gathering Storm* (1948; London: Reprint Society, 1950), pp. 178-79.

8. Organizing the Rimland

1. Gregory F. Treverton, *Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1985).
2. See the overview in Tucker, "Isolation and Intervention."
3. Historical perspective is provided in the brilliant essay by Michael Howard, "War in the Making and Unmaking of Europe," in Howard, *Causes of Wars*, pp. 171-88.
4. Notwithstanding the rapidity of U.S. demobilization in 1945 and the trivial scale of its atomic armament at the time, it seems probable that Stalin accepted a near-global U.S. hegemony—beyond eastern Europe—as a regrettable fact of life resting upon both U.S. warmaking potential and U.S. military technology. NATO was essential for the rational organization of military containment in Europe, but it is doubtful that it clarified Stalin's appreciation of his geopolitical problems and opportunities. "What the Second World War established was not a new British hegemony, but a Soviet hegemony over the Euro-Asian land mass from the Elbe to Vladivostok; and what was seen, at least from Moscow, as an American hegemony over the rest of the world; one freely accepted in Western Europe as a preferable alternative to being absorbed by the rival hegemony" (Howard, "Causes of Wars,"

p. 20). "Until well into the postwar period America did not have to concern itself with the balance of power, for it was by itself the balance of power" (Henry Kissinger, "The Long Journey," *Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1985, p. A19).

5. See Odom, "Soviet Force Posture," pp. 1-14; and John Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," *Washington Quarterly* 9 (Fall 1986): 117-37.

6. See Gray, *Wartime Influence of Sea Power*.

7. Not infrequently, the opinion is expressed in the U.S. defense community that NATO is essentially a U.S.-West German alliance. The critical nature of West German contributions is beyond question, but proponents of the Washington-Bonn linchpin theory should consider the strategic geography of a NATO without Britain. If a neutralist Britain were to tilt toward Moscow, the northern—and hence western—flanks of NATO-Europe would be uncovered; Norway would be isolated behind the Soviet strategic frontier; Soviet maritime and air power would have very much easier access to the North Atlantic sea lines of communication; and the United States could not fight in continental Europe unless it first neutralized an actually or potentially hostile Britain. A similar judgment pertains to the strategic necessity for the United States to neutralize Cuba as a base for Soviet military power at the outset of any armed conflict in Europe.

8. Steven F. Kime, "Warsaw Pact: Juggernaut or Paper Tiger?" *Air Force Magazine* 65 (June 1982): 67-69.

9. See the collection of essays in David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp, eds., *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984).

10. The merits of NATO are very well summarized in Morton H. Halperin, "Keeping Our Troops in Europe," *New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 17, 1982, pp. 82-84, 86-88, 93-97. On the troubles of the alliance set in historical perspective, see Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Winter 1982-83): 309-24; and Eliot A. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Winter 1982-83): 325-43.

11. See Laurence Martin, *NATO and the Defense of the West: An Analysis of America's First Line of Defense* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985), pp. 121, 126.

12. The maritime element of U.S. national security policy under President Reagan is intended explicitly to strengthen deterrence in Europe by the threat of a horizontal escalation to and in regions of comparative Western military advantage (see West, "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence"). There is no strategic novelty in this idea. Defending the "Carter Doctrine" of U.S. interests in the security of the Persian Gulf region (enunciated on January 23, 1980), Zbigniew Brzezinski has written: "In our private contingency preparations, I made the point of instructing the Defense Department to develop options involving both 'horizontal and vertical escalation' in the event of a Soviet military move toward the Persian Gulf, by which I meant that we would be free to choose either the terrain or the tactic or the level of our response": *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p. 445. See also Brzezinski, *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).

13. The most substantial broadside of recent years is delivered in Melvyn Krauss, *How NATO Weakens the West* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

14. Per capita defense expenditures for 1983 (in current U.S. dollars) were \$1,023 for the United States, \$272 for Belgium, \$439 for Britain, \$394 for France, \$363 for West Germany, \$172 for Italy, and \$300 for the Netherlands: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 170.

15. Martin, *NATO and the Defense of the West*, p. 121.

16. Brzezinski has defended the means-ends mismatch that characterized the strategic context for the Carter Doctrine: "As a practical matter there is no way for the United States to reach the conclusion secretly that the Persian Gulf is in our vital interest, then to build up our military forces in order to have the capability of responding locally, and only then to announce that the United States is committed to such a defense. In a democracy such as ours, only a public commitment is capable of generating the necessary budgetary support and the other decisions that are needed to implement a commitment. In the meantime, the very awareness in Moscow and elsewhere of America's engagement serves as the immediate deterrent" (*Power and Principle*, p. 446). Fortunately for the United States and for world peace, the Carter Doctrine was designed to cope with the Soviet Union rather than the Third Reich. Carter in 1980 and Chamberlain in 1939 were both in the business of political rather than military containment. In the words of Williamson Murray: "In the last half of March 1939 the Chamberlain Cabinet feared that war was at hand. It panicked and decided that it could deter the Germans by guaranteeing the independence of Poland" (*The Change in the European Balance of Power*, p. 366). While the "art of commitment" (Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chap. 2) has to be practiced differently in the face of an Adolf Hitler rather than a Leonid Brezhnev, and in the context of nuclear arms, the fact remains that the voluntary accumulation of security commitments far ahead of military capability for their protection is a dangerous enterprise. The outstanding brief treatment of the security problem posed by Hitler's purpose and style is Alan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War," in Hans W. Gatzke, ed., *European Diplomacy between Two Wars, 1919-1939* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972), pp. 221-46.

17. For AirLand Battle doctrine, see *Operations, FM 100-1* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1981); *Operations, FM 100-5* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1982); and *Airland Battle 2000* (Ft. Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982). The spirit of AirLand Battle is conveyed well in William S. Lind, "The Case for Maneuver Doctrine," and Huba Wass de Czege, "Army Doctrinal Reform," both in Clark et al., *Defense Reform Debate*, pp. 88-100, 101-20.

18. For the American rediscovery of the operational level of war, which is a key to AirLand Battle doctrine, see Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security* 5 (Winter 1980-81): 61-79. An excellent discussion of NATO-European reactions to AirLand Battle is Jacqueline K. Davis, "Europe's Edgy Approach to Strategy," *Air Force Magazine* 68 (Dec. 1985): 82-88.

19. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 446.

20. D.W. Brogan, *The American Character* (New York: Knopf, 1944), p. 150.

21. See Record, *Revising U.S. Military Strategy*.

22. A useful discussion is William T. Tow, "NATO's Out-of-Region Challenges and Extended Containment," *Orbis* 28 (Winter 1985): 829-55.

23. The defensive cast to French military doctrine in the 1930s was in part predetermined by French concern lest an offensive strategy discourage the British

from making a firm continental commitment. The strategic logic of the Maginot Line was "to incite the Germans to invade through Belgium" (Gen. Maurice Chauvineau, quoted in Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 114) and hence to structure a conflict geographically in such a way that British intervention would be well-nigh inevitable.

24. GNP for 1984 (in U.S. dollars): U.S.A., \$3,619.2 billion; U.S.S.R., \$1,672-\$1,920 billion; NATO-Europe, \$2,429.5 billion. Population: U.S.A., 239,600,000; U.S.S.R., 276,500,000; NATO-Europe, 373,177,000. NATO-Europe is NATO less the U.S.A., Canada, and Iceland. Source: IISS, *Military Balance, 1985-1986*.

25. With periodic variations in detail, the U.S. government has long envisaged approximately 60 percent of its ground divisions (17 percent of 28½, on mobilization) and tactical fighter wings (25 of 41) as having primarily a NATO role. Most of the U.S. Navy has been assigned, more or less directly, to North Atlantic SLOC protection, while the extended deterrence mission of the strategic nuclear forces has always been a major source of budgetary justification. See William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), p. 7. Comparative military effort among NATO countries is treated competently in Martin, *NATO and the Defense of the West*; and in Caspar W. Weinberger, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1986).

26. British historian Michael Howard has observed: "I do not believe that Western Europe ever could create for itself an independent centre of military power, and I emphatically do not believe that it should" ("War in the Making and Unmaking of Europe," p. 187).

27. See Krauss, *How NATO Weakens the West*.

28. Many Americans understand their having to pay a "leadership premium," but they wonder if they are underwriting a substantial fraction of the welfare state structures so generously entrenched in the budgets of their European allies.

29. See Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

30. Switzerland has been able to maintain a condition of heavily armed neutrality since the Napoleonic wars in good part because its terrain lends itself to territorial defense. Denmark and the Netherlands are less fortunate, geographically. Alfred von Schlieffen, in the design of his famous plan, seriously considered a "left hook" through Switzerland around the frontier defense that faced (then) German Alsace-Lorraine, but he judged the difficulty of the terrain to be too great.

31. The shocked NATO-European reactions to the Reykjavic, Iceland, summit of 1986 highlighted the tension between the enthusiasm of NATO-European (Atlanticist) elite opinion for nuclear deterrence and the absence of enthusiasm in elite and more popular opinion for actual nuclear use should prewar deterrence fail. European elites do not favor a conventional build-up that might diminish deterrence writ large. But in the event of war the absence of robust conventional defensive capability would inexorably propel NATO toward early nuclear use.

32. It is somewhat curious, though true in my experience, that of all the NATO allies France is the one that most often elicits admiration (privately) on the part of American officials and defense commentators. Despite its formal military with-

drawal from NATO and persisting residual doubts of French reliability in the event of war in Europe, France has bought, by its determinedly independent course, a quality of American respect that is unequalled for other European allies. A partial exception is the American view of the British armed forces and especially the British Army (in staggering contrast with World War II): notwithstanding the near-fatal technical inadequacies of the task force that Britain sent to the Falklands, American observers recognized behind the superior performance of the British light infantry in that campaign a unit cohesiveness and degree of tactical skill that are objectives for serious military reform in the United States.

33. Outstanding sympathetic American treatment of French strategic policy is David Yost, *France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe*: pt. 1, *Capabilities and Doctrine*, and pt. 2, *Strategic and Arms Control Implications*, Adelphi Papers Nos. 194 and 195 (London: IISS, 1984-85). A stimulating French perspective is Pierre Lellouche, *L'Avenir de la guerre* (Paris: Mazarine, 1985).

34. See Colin S. Gray, "Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures," *World Politics* 28 (Jan. 1976): 300-314.

35. In fairness, it should be noted that although NATO-Europe is disquieted by the U.S. enthusiasm for operational maneuver—both backward (*trading NATO territory* for time and better counterattack possibilities) and forward (waging part of the war on Pact soil)—and for deep strike against uncommitted Soviet armies, that disquiet rests on fears of an unduly rapid escalation and of military inutility. With respect to the latter point, some European officials have noticed that AirLand Battle and FOFA are designed to defeat a form of Soviet theater offensive and operational method that may be in the process of being discarded. The deep echeloning of armies was an important part of the Soviets' 1960s and 1970s answer to the threat posed by NATO theater nuclear forces to the massing of troops for World War II-style breakthrough operations. But M.A. Gareyev, *Frunze: Military Theoretician* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985) proclaims the obsolescence of the operational ideas that AirLand Battle and FOFA are designed to defeat. To summarize: while scarce NATO deep-strike assets (the purchase of which may shortchange NATO's direct battlefield support assets) were looking for Soviet second- and third-echelon armies, to destroy the timetable for their introduction into battle, a very much strengthened Soviet (and Pact-allied) first echelon would be attempting decisively and irreversibly to unravel the whole NATO defense. A nightmare vision for NATO planners is the possibility of a Pact offensive analogous to the Manstein plan unleashed by Germany on May 10, 1940: the Anglo-French (plus Belgian and Dutch) forces, though numerically superior and enjoying at least rough parity in quality of equipment, were defeated precipitately because they were often caught out of prepared positions in encounter battles (a form of combat in which the Germans excelled); they lacked strategic reserves (these were squandered in inactivity behind the Maginot Line and on an adventurous and strategically irrelevant foray into the south of the Netherlands); and they wasted their large air assets both in inactivity and in pitifully ineffective attacks against scattered German line-of-communication targets. AirLand Battle and FOFA could have disturbing potential similarities in action. On the actual and possible changes in Soviet theater doctrine, see Odom, "Soviet Force Posture." Also see Martin, *NATO and the Defense of the West*, esp. pp. 90-91, 117-19.

36. In practice, only the United States, Britain, Canada, and France have met

the 1978 goal of 3 percent sustained real growth. See IISS, *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, pp. 38-39, 168, 195-98; and *The Military Balance, 1986-1987* (London: IISS, 1986), pp. 55-56, 234-35.

37. See Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence," pp. 321-22.

38. The link between the targeting strategy appropriate for U.S. strategic nuclear forces and extended-deterrence ties is not as well appreciated as it should be. Useful analyses include Edward N. Luttwak, "The Problems of Extending Deterrence," in *The Future of Strategic Deterrence*, pt. 1, Adelphi Papers No. 160 (London: IISS, 1980), pp. 31-37; Earl C. Ravenal, "Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection," *International Security* 6 (Spring 1982): 26-43; Anthony H. Cordesman, *Deterrence in the 1980s*, pt. 1, *American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers No. 175 (London: IISS, 1982); and Earl C. Ravenal, *NATO: The Tides of Discontent*, Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 23 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1985), pp. 19-34.

39. Richard K. Betts has emerged as the apostle of the strategic virtues of the uncertainty principle: see his "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics* 37 (Jan. 1985): 153-79; "Security and Solidarity: NATO's Balancing Act after the Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces," *Brookings Review*, Summer 1985, pp. 26-34; and "Compound Deterrence vs. No-First-Use: What's Wrong Is What's Right," *Orbis* 28 (Winter 1985): 697-718. Betts on theater defense, much like Robert Jervis on strategic nuclear issues, has the rare distinction of being wrong for most of the right reasons. Unlike many American defense commentators, Betts understands how strategic improvements in alliance defense can undermine the political confidence in Europe that is essential for the very functioning of the alliance as an instrument of deterrence. But—a large and fatal "but"—his sophisticated analyses lead him to endorse a strategy and posture for NATO that would almost certainly fail militarily were it ever to be tested in combat. Betts's argument is clear, politically astute, but fundamentally irresponsible. The same judgment applies to Lawrence Freedman, "NATO Myths," *Foreign Policy*, no. 45 (Winter 1981-82): 48-68. Betts and Freedman should recall the price paid by all of Europe for the success of French grand strategy in the late 1930s (see Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, chap. 4): France succeeded in constructing a deterrent so inoffensive that Britain was again ensnared in a continental commitment—while the deterrent both failed to deter and proved incapable of defense.

40. See Henry S. Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," in Laurence Martin, ed., *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 131-56; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of the U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3 (Dec. 1980): 37-71; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981), esp. chap. 25; Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?" *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982-83): 31-60; Desmond Ball, *Targeting for Strategic Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers No. 185 (London: IISS, 1983); and the essays collected in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., *Strategic Nuclear Targeting* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986).

41. The point is stressed rigorously in Ravenal, "Counterforce and Alliance."

42. On this and related issues, see Colin S. Gray: "Nuclear Strategy: The Case

for a Theory of Victory," *International Security* 4 (Summer 1979): 54-87; and *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, chap. 9.

43. Thoughtful critics of the war-fighting school of deterrence theory have considerable difficulty praising discrimination and flexibility, while worrying that the search for more discriminating strategic capabilities may fuel aspirations for a chimerical military advantage. This tension pervades Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. In the heat of political debate, proponents of Reagan's SDI have endorsed the proposition that "offensive doctrines increase the probability and intensity of arms races and of wars" (Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 16). But some NATO-Europeans, contemplating an indefinite period of transition in U.S. strategic posture from offense dominance to defense dominance, worry that an American president would come to see strategic defenses as permitting bold offensive actions. On the offense-defense relationship, see the rigorous discussion in Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1832; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), bk. 6, chaps. 1-7; bk. 7, chaps. 1-3. The sins of the more thoroughgoing contemporary American critics of offensive doctrines have been well exposed in Scott Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986): 151-75.

44. Although reunification is nowhere in sight, the government of West Germany declines to take even modest defensive measures that might appear to symbolize a permanence to the inner-German boundary. Bonn has consistently refused to construct or permit construction of field fortifications in aid of the forward defense commitment of the alliance, upon the integrity of which it insists rigidly.

45. Soviet commentators can point to articles in the American press advocating one or another variant of U.S. military disengagement from western Europe. For a superior recent example, see Eliot A. Cohen, "Do We Still Need Europe?" *Commentary* 81 (Jan. 1986): 28-35.

46. See Jeffrey D. Boutwell, Paul Doty, and Gregory F. Treverton, *The Nuclear Confrontation in Europe* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1985).

47. See David Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," *Washington Quarterly* 7 (Fall 1984): 112-29; and Payne, *Strategic Defense*, chap. 10.

48. "Final Manuscript of the Farewell Address," reprinted in Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), p. 145.

49. Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction* (1957; New York: Collier, 1961), p. 17.

50. Cohen, "Do We Still Need Europe?" p. 34.

51. The theme is advanced in much more muted form in Betts, "Security and Solidarity," p. 32: "Incremental change is the alternative to fundamental change."

52. Cohen, "Do We Still Need Europe?" pp. 32-34.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

54. Spanish landpower never recovered from its smashing defeat at Rocroi on May 19, 1643. In that battle the young Duc d'Enghien (the Great Condé to be) inflicted irreparable loss upon the Spanish infantry.

55. See Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815* (London: Longman, 1983), chap. 1.

56. For speculation on this possibility, see Colin S. Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO," *Naval War College Review* 30 (Winter 1987): 8-19.

57. In 1904 Mackinder wrote: "Were the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region" ("Geographical Pivot of History," p. 264).

58. Spykman, *Geography of the Peace*, p. 43. However, as he made brutally plain, Spykman insisted that the United States required a condition of balanced power in Eurasia, allowing neither a superior Rimland nor a superior Heartland. In 1942 Spykman wrote: "If the peace objective of the United States is the creation of a united Europe, she is fighting on the wrong side. All-out aid to Mr. Hitler would be the quickest way to achieve an integrated transatlantic zone" (*America's Strategy in World Politics*, p. 466).

59. Cohen recognizes this point perhaps too generously: "Command of the sea is the sine qua non of successful American containment of the Soviet Union and its allies, but (as England discovered in each of its wars against Spain, France, and Germany) command of the sea can accomplish nothing without continental power" ("Do We Still Need Europe?" p. 29). The valid point lurking here is almost buried beneath the weight of excess in the claim. For example, British command of the sea in 1940—resting upon a contested dominion in the air—did preclude the feasibility of a German invasion. That is "something" in anybody's book.

9. The Course of Soviet Empire

1. See Paul A. Seabury, ed., *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1954); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Gilpin, *War and Change*.

2. See Ernest B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics* 5 (July 1953): 446-88.

3. In multipolar power systems there is a tendency to "buck-passing" and to the hope that other states will incur the major costs of balancing behavior. Recent scholarship includes Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38 (Oct. 1985): 1-24; and Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (Oct. 1985): 58-79.

4. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," pp. 260-62.

5. "Letters to the Editor," *London Times*, Dec. 30, 1985, p. 9.

6. Of course, the czars, and later the hierarchy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, achieved a fusion of religion/ideology and state that was not approximated in Byzantium, but "the Czarist concept of imperial power was that of Byzantium": Charles Diehl, *Byzantium: Greatness and Decline* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1957), p. 296. See also Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 340-56, on the Byzantine impact on Russia.

7. "From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence" (Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," p. 242).

8. Aaron Wildavsky, "America First," *National Interest*, no. 1 (Fall 1985): 117.

9. Such judgment is susceptible to influence by U.S. policy. The consequences of Soviet treaty noncompliance are at the discretion of the U.S. government, which to date has had policy regarding verification but not sanctions. For contrasting analyses, see Colin S. Gray, "Verification of Non-compliance: The Problem of Response," *Defense Science* 2003 + 4 (Oct.-Nov. 1985): 29-39; and Jeanette Voas, "The Arms Control Compliance Debate," *Survival* 28 (Jan.-Feb. 1986): 8-31.

10. See Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977); and Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Communist Societies* (1984; Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985).

11. See "X" [Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."

12. E.g., Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), chap. 9; and *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline* (New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 36-38.

13. In the vast literature on the Russian revolution(s) I have leaned heavily on Adam B. Ulam, *The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia* (New York: Macmillan, 1965); Robert V. Daniels, *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917* (1967; Boston: Beacon, 1984); Edward Crankshaw, *The Shadow of the Winter Palace: The Drift to Revolution, 1825-1917* (London: Macmillan, 1976); Harrison E. Salisbury, *Black Night, White Snow: Russia's Revolutions, 1905-1917* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978); Adam B. Ulam, *Russia's Failed Revolutions: From the Decembrists to the Dissidents* (New York: Basic Books, 1981); and Leonard Shapiro, *The Russian Revolutions of 1917: The Origins of Modern Communism* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

14. Lenin's blueprint for an elitist party of dedicated and, above all else, disciplined revolutionaries appears in his 1902 polemic *What Is to Be Done?* See the excellent discussion in Ulam, *The Bolsheviks*; It is interesting that, according to Ulam, "Lenin thought of himself and wrote as a humble disciple of Karl Marx. His orderly and prosaic mind would have rebelled at the idea that his vision of the Party was closer to that of a collective superhuman Nietzschean hero or some medieval order of chivalry than to that of a humdrum political association, which the Social Democratic Party was supposed to be" (p. 179). But as Ulam has observed elsewhere: "The dazzling success which Lenin's organizational and tactical blueprint was to bring him in 1917 and 1918 ought not hide the fact that its formulation in 1902 was a serious blow to Russian Marxism. The Bolsheviks' attempts to put this blueprint in effect between 1903 and 1914 were to bring them to the verge of extinction as a serious political force and did considerable harm to the unity of the Russian working class, as well as the cause of political freedom in Russia" (*Russia's Failed Revolutions*, p. 144).