

## ***Broader, European context***

### **Religion, multiple modernities and multiple secularities**

For a long time theorist of sociology of religion starting with Weberian “disenchantment of the world“ considered religion as vanishing due to the modernization of Western societies. The role of religion was supposed, if ever, to be restricted to private sphere of individual’s consciousness (see for example Berger 1967, Luckmann 1967, Wilson 1982). Secularization was (and in some contexts still is) seen as inevitable product of modernization process that is unavoidable for every society which is on the way of transition towards modernity. Secularization as part of modernization process was also considered, might not be even, to be the same everywhere. This equation - modernization equals secularization - has therefore other side too – religiousness equals tradition.

But these ideas of historical linearity, convergence and differentiation have been replaced by relativistic arguments. Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006) explicitly reject the mainstream secularization thesis and subscribe to a multiple-modernities perspective that assumes the continuing relevance of organized religion in its (European) multiple forms.

It was Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000) who came with the concept of multiple modernities which challenges the assumption that modernizing societies are converging and that Europe is the leader of this process. Concept of multiple modernities highlights historical contingencies and attracts attention to the role of social actors involved in these processes. It allows us to see the diversity as a part of modernity itself. New ways of thinking have also sharpened our understanding of normativity of classical secularization thesis. With regard to religion this means not only to reject secularization thesis and accept the continuing relevance of (organized) religion in its European multiple forms but also, together with Spohn (2009) to presuppose

the continuing salience of the religious realm in its manifold religious organizations and actors alone but also considered in its constitutive institutional and cultural role for the secular realm of politics, states, nations and collective identities and accordingly, the transnational EU regime and an emergent European identity (2009: 360).

There is no single model, no goal that European societies are, on different stages, reaching for. Instead there are various models existing next to each other, each of them with different understanding of European identity, unity and even modernity (Byrnes, Katzenstein 2006). Therefore we need to look closely on the construction of emerging European (secular) identity that is now in the middle of debate about integration of (religious) migrants.

### **European secular identity**

As Europe has undergone rapid process of change which has led into more diversified, multicultural and multi-religious societies, the questions concerning European identity and the role of Christendom in it has arisen. It was the process of European integration, eastern enlargement of EU, drafting of European constitution and questions around the accession of Turkey that have drew up the attention towards European identity (Casanova 2006). What constitutes Europe and its borders? And what role in this construction does religion play? First of all let me start with short overview of general position of religion in Europe.

Although European countries are considered highly secular, most of their inhabitants continue to identify themselves as “Christian”. Casanova (2006) and other sociologist of religion (for example Davie 2007, Hervieu-Léger 2006) therefore suggest to talk not about secularization but about unchurched in the sense of ceasing participation in traditional and institutionalized forms of religion. Davie (2007) offers the characteristic of general situation in Europe as “believing without belonging”. The characteristic is correct even when reversed as “belonging without believing” (Hervie-Léger 1998). First characteristic refers to growing subjective and individual religiosity, the second apply to people who do not consider themselves religious but acknowledge and price Christian values and norms.

This situation is a result of historical and political conditions. Historically the religious landscape of Europe is quite narrow with mostly Catholic or Protestant lands. European religious heritage was shaped as well with some other religions such as Judaism, Islam or Orthodoxy. And although their influence was always noticeable (even though sometimes belied), their position of ‘The Other’ in contrast of professed religion have created precedent for future perception of different religions.

Without much oversimplification we can draw a distinction between “Protestant” and “Catholic” Europe, both with different state-church relations.<sup>1</sup>

As Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2006) has pointed out these religious roots are present in form of symbolic and cultural codes that are still at work in all European countries not because religious institutions have retained any real power to set standards, but because “the symbolic structures which they shaped, even after official belief has been lost and religious observance has declined, still have a remarkable capacity to influence local culture” (pp 51). Even the very idea of secularism, as is repeatedly pronounced in Western European countries, is the product of the particular histories of these European nation-states (Wallach Scott 2007).

As we can see, “among most Europeans, “secular” and “Christian” cultural identities are intertwined in complex and rarely verbalized modes.” (Casanova 2006:24). And it is this Christian-secular identity shared (in different versions) throughout Europe that converts distinct experience of immigrants into a problem.

The debates around the European constitution has brought the question of whether the European shared identity should be defined in terms of Christian heritage and Western civilization or by its modern secular values of liberalism, human rights, political democracy and inclusive multiculturalism (Casanova 2006). But this distinction between Christian heritage and secular values is only illusory as secular values have their roots in history and institutions shaped by religion. As Wallach Scott (2007: 96) says “instead of posting religion as the antithesis of secularism (particularly its democratic forms), it’s useful to see that they also sometimes operate as parallel systems of interpretation.”

The problem, then, is that (Western) European countries perceive themselves as increasingly secular and at the same they draw the boundaries of Fortress Europe along Christian lines (Davie 2001). What do we have here is the tension between on the one hand the process of the homogenization of European religious landscape due to the influence of secularization and on the other hand the contradictory Christian identity. What is more is that the withdrawal of religion from public

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<sup>1</sup> Spohn (2009) recognizes three types of state-church relations<sup>1</sup> 1) the strict separation of state and church, mostly characteristic for traditionally Catholic countries such as France, 2) cooperation between state and church typical for confessionally mixed countries like Germany, Netherlands or Belgium, 3) the preservation of a state-church which remains in Protestant countries such as Great Britain or Scandinavia. Each European society is consequently characterized by its own specific religious roots that continue to affect their politics not only towards religion(s).

institutions is seen through the lenses of the secularization paradigm as something natural and normal, as a consequence of being modern and enlightened Europeans (Casanova 2006). This normative approach towards immigrants or new EU members carried out from supposedly superior positions defines the core of cultural integration mode and religious governance of the European Union.

As secularization of European countries is taken-for-granted in public and political discourse (and also among some scholars, see for example work of Steve Bruce), European societies have, according to Casanova (2006) great difficulties in offering a legitimate role for religion in public life and in the organization and mobilization of collective group identities.

### **Religious immigrants as the “other”**

Growing cultural and religious pluralism<sup>2</sup> is primarily associated with immigration and the long-term settlement of immigrants in host countries (Hervieu-Léger 2006). Confrontations with different religions and cultures, different patterns of modernization and secularization show us the important role religion is playing. It is here and now when the European cultural integration modes reveal its Western European, (Latin) Judeo-Christian and secular-humanist bases (Spohn 2009).

Mostly visible are these confrontations seen on the case of Muslim immigrants in Europe. But it is not only Islam who comes together with immigrants. There are other religions that are considered not to “fit” well in Europe – and Europe here represents Western Europe. This might be the example of immigrants from eastern European or more specifically from former Soviet Union countries who identify themselves as Greek Catholics or Orthodox. Their ways of being religious differ from those common in countries they migrate to.

But it is not only through immigration that (Western) Europe encounters different religions and religiosities. The question of Catholicism in his central-eastern form<sup>3</sup> and Orthodoxy has arisen as well with the eastern enlargement of European Union. The new eastern members of EU share, despite their difference (and with exception of Czech Republic and in some extend Baltic States, see Zrinščak 2004),

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<sup>2</sup> This is not to say that Europe was ever culturally and religiously homogeneous – in fact European countries were and still are pluralistic. Migration, especially from non-European countries, just broadens this pluralism and introduces new cultural and religious forms.

<sup>3</sup> Which is the case of Poland with its separation of state and church on the one hand and strong connection between national identity and Catholicism on the other.

the secularization patterns that might be characterized in general with limited secularization and religious revival together with strong ties between national or ethnic identity and religion (Spohn 2009). Martin (2006) refers to them as ethnoreligions to point their strong influence on formation of national identity.

The different manifestation of faith, different “rate” of religiosity and different understanding of modernity and secularization together with, in some cases, interconnected religious and collective identity challenge patterns of Western European cultural integration modes and religious governance. These differences also creates religious immigrant “other” who do not fit into European secularist frame of reference. One of the secular-humanist values, religious freedom, is guaranteed to all religions and many people fully agree with it as long as the public display of faith stays within this secular frame of reference.

## **Prologue: Diaspora or ethnic group?**

Scholars of migration tend to conceptualize immigrants in terms of ethnic groups. Immigrants from one country of origin are seen as members of an ethnic group with distinctive cultural framework and shared characteristics (see for example Portes and Rumbaut 2001). According to these researchers, it is shared ethnicity as the underlying cultural bond and trust, that links recently arrived immigrants to those who came earlier and facilitate the exchanges of social and other capital that lead toward successful integration into host societies. Religion, through its transnational institutional mechanisms, could broaden the outreach of the ethnic group by linking co-ethnic members across multiple countries.

There is somewhat different understanding of religion among diaspora researchers. They have argued that immigrants who participate in transnational religious networks could reconstitute themselves into a diaspora, a deterritorialized and voluntary group in which members are dispersed in many countries and are connected by a shared mission (Vertovec 1991). Diaspora scholars attribute religion different position in transnational movements. Diasporas, according to them, utilize religion in order to intentionally mark themselves as distinct from local societies.

The difference between ethnic group and diaspora is best seen when it comes to integration process. Religion evokes claims of universal human rights; hence religiously grounded diaspora could gain recognition and protection from states other than their host countries. Therefore, while ethnic groups are predicted to follow the trajectory of assimilation through religious participation (at least in American context), diasporas based on religion are motivated to institutionalize a deterritorialized community diverge from and, at times, in opposition to integration into host societies.

Simply put, diaspora strand of theory has argued that they could lead to the formation of a cross-border axis of identification ('diaspora') that is grounded upon universal human rights protection rather than citizenship to a particular country.

### *Ukrainian Immigrants – ethnic group or a diaspora?*

The question of whether Ukrainians immigrants in Czech Republic constitute ethnic group or diaspora remains unclear. Using the term ethnic group for all Ukrainians in Czech is precarious and misleading as there are several ethnic and subethnic groups in Ukraine. We might see trends suggest that Ukrainians

immigrants have some traits of diaspora because of their cross-border activities and their connections with religion.

Brubaker (2005) identifies three core elements that are widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora. First element is dispersion which can be broadly understood as any kind of dispersion in space, provided that such a dispersion crosses borders of states. Second, there must be orientation to a real or imagined homeland as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty. The last constitutive criterion is, according to Brubaker, boundary-maintenance. On most accounts, this third element is a crucial criterion of diaspora (see Safran 1991: 83, Cohen 1997: 24 etc.). Brubaker (2005: 6) states that boundary-maintenance enables one to “speak of a diaspora as a distinctive ‘community’, held together by a distinctive, active solidarity, as well as by relatively dense social relationships, that cut across state boundaries and link members of the diaspora in different states into a single ‘transnational community’”.

As Ukrainian immigrants in Czech Republic are concerned we might identify, to certain extent, all three elements within this group. Drbohlav, Jánková and Šelepová (2005?) point out Ukrainian “community” in Czech Republic shows considerable traits of transnationalization and are very often oriented toward homeland. Religion and religious institutions play an important role not only in creating connections with Ukraine but also as boundary-makers. Leontiyeva (2005) refers to the fact that religious organizations which Ukrainians in Czech visit are often the only consolidating forces.

However, using the label ‘diaspora’ is problematic as it brings about also the question of ‘groupism’ (Brubaker 2005, 2002), tendency to take groups of people as granted and real entities. As much as diaspora can be seen as an alternative to the essentialization of belonging, it can also represent a non-territorial form of essentialized belonging. (Brubaker 2005). To overcome these problems of groupism, Brubaker (2005) suggests thinking of diaspora not in substantial terms as an entity, a bounded group or an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact but rather as an idiom, a stance, and a claim. In this sense, I understand diaspora as a way in which identities and loyalties of a particular population are formulated and expressed. In my opinion (and as other researchers also suggest – see Leontiyeva 2005, Pavlíková & Sládek 2009) religion and religious institutions are one of the major resources Ukrainian diaspora draw upon. As I will show in next paragraph religion is (and always was) ready and willing to connect its members not only within communities

and on national level but also connect them transnationally. Thus, I will refer to immigrants from Ukraine as a diaspora.

### ***Seeing religion and migration transnationally***

Research on international migration underwent several paradigmatic changes in recent decades. Most of the scholars now acknowledge that many contemporary migrants and also their predecessors maintain various ties with their home country while they become integrated into the countries where they settled (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, Levitt 2007). Processes and social relations that emerge from these contemporary developments cannot be confined within the borders of nation-states. Instead, they can be regarded as transnational – a term which defines a relation over and beyond, rather than between, the nation-states. One of the first definitions of transnationalism is that of Basch et al. (1994):

We define “transnationalism” as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. (Basch et al., 1994: 7)

Increasingly, more and more aspects of social life take place across borders, even though the political and cultural salience of nation-states remains strong (despite of some predictions Waldinger 2006). It is therefore important to abandon the framework of nation-states as units of analysis for better understanding of the contemporary process. Critique of methodological nationalism does not deny the role and continuing power of nation-states but call for understanding of social processes that cross borders.

Looking at transnational migration is one way how to approach transnational perspective. Recent scholarship understands transnational migrations as taking place within fluid social spaces that are under constant re-construction thanks to migrants' simultaneous embeddeness in more than one society (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007). Transnational migrants are moving within different social fields that are not confined within nation-state containers. Migrants enter multi-sited, multi-layered arenas (Levitt 2003, 2004, 2007, Levitt & Jaworsky 2007) which allow them to create and sustain political, cultural or religious ties which link them with nonmigrants and across borders.



Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: STR) refer also to 'social fields' in this context, as "set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed."

One possible way how to enter in such transnational social fields is through membership in religious organizations and religious communities. Religion was always global phenomenon. With some exceptions, religions always crossed borders of state formations and welcomed new members. However, contemporary migrants extend global ties of religion(s) by transnationalizing everyday religious life (Levitt 2004). Transnational ties are not new but they have become more pronounced and of greater interest in recent decades. Thus, religion is increasingly viewed as transnational phenomenon and according to Levitt (2007) it is key social arena of transnationalism.

Although it exists in local communities and is distinctively influenced by a national cultural and political context, religion has connections with the wider world and is influenced by these relations (Wuthnow, Offut 2008). Levitt (2007) says that religious communities stand at the intersection between global and local. They are influenced by broader global political and economical trends as well as local conditions. They are also structured and operating across borders. Not only people move among them but religious communities also channel flows of ideas, rituals and values in both directions (Wuthnow & Offut 2008). Some structures simply connect immigrants with people in their homelands (Greek catholic church), others links them more to fellow believers around the world (Orthodox Church). Through membership in religious communities, migrants express their religious as well as national identities. As result, domestic religion is both nationally and transnationaly produced. Religious communities and organizations provide their members with already existing and transnational, ready-to-use strong, intricate and multilayerd web of connections that are perfect platforms from which to live globally (Levitt 2007).

As such, religious organizations are important institutions for immigrants. Pavlíková a Sládek (2009) considers them to be one of very few (or sometimes the only one) consolidating forces for migrants. For religious immigrants, religious institutions are sometimes the only familiar thing in his or her new surroundings. A lot has been written about integrating potential of churches but it is also truth that many

churches nowadays forms and further develop transnational connections which allow their members to live transnationally.

We may ask why what is distinctive about religion for migration and diasporas? To answer this question I am going to look closely at four main arenas in which religion operates and provides resources. They are, according to Knott (2011) context (space and movement), history (time and change), society (persons and groups) and culture (traditions, practices, beliefs and values). I will examine each of them with migration as the focus point to highlight the work religion does in each arena.

### *Cultural arena*

Religion provides its followers with instructive ways to live and die, with shared and transferable set of norms, experiential and emotional resources. To put it simply, religion offers emotional and spiritual dimensions to adherents' lives (Bradley 2009). It also situates its followers into a cultural framework. At the same time it is important to distinguish between culture and religion. Religion is not merely a part of broader culture but informs, shapes and challenges it as well (Peschke 2009). Culture and religion often goes hand in hand, carrying and reinforcing one another (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007). This might also constitute a challenge for migrant who are forced to disconnect religion from culture, often almost inseparably intertwined (Roy 2006).

Religion, like culture, supports and is itself transformed by all aspects of the migration experience – the journey, the process of settlement and the emergence of transnational ties (Hagan & Ebaugh 2003, Hirschman 2004). Religion and culture of both hosting and sending countries intersect very directly. In conditions of migration religion absorbs both cultures it encounters and influences religious institutions in both countries.

### *Social arena*

On the social level, religion allow its adherents to identify with particular group not only through space but also through time by letting them to feel part of a chain of memory which connects them with the past, the presence and the future (Hervieu-Léger 2000). It offers resources for making, maintaining and ordering community by linking people of one faith tradition together. As Levitt (2007) observes migration is very often as much about the people who stay behind as it is about those who migrate. In some cases such ties between those who left and those who stayed are

so strong that migration also radically transforms lives of individuals who stay home. They do not have to move to be part of migration. Their lives are influenced by the people leaving and coming back, money migrants send and also by so-called social remittances – the ideas, practices, social capital, and identities that migrants also send back into their homelands. Although they are not sharing the same physical/geographical space they occupy the same social space. Religion thus becomes an instrument and opportunity for migrants to develop and maintain transnational connections. Those links can moreover direct migration movements. Sometimes, decision where to migrate is made on the basis of particular religious links. On the other hand, as much as religion can create spaces of belonging, it can also serve as an isolating force (Peschke 2009), for those believers, whose religions are perceived as danger or are prohibited in the host country.

- coping with exclusion, pressure for assimilation, negative press and the emotional difficulties

#### *Historical and contextual arenas*

- Identification with past, expansion strategies
- Transnational reach, connections and communications
- developing diasporic stories of migration and settlement in a wider context of religious narrative.
- Organizational structure of religious organizations
- State-church relationship

## *From there to here – the history of Ukrainian emigration to Czech Republic*

Ukrainian emigration has quite a long history. Some authors (like Pawliczková 1994) estimate that there is around 20 millions of Ukrainian living outside of the country and consider them as one of the most migrating nations. Ukrainian diaspora also played and plays particularly strong role in political and social development of the country. In my opinion, it is important to mention this migratory tradition and different connection with Czech(oslovakia) Ukraine has to understand better the motivations of immigrants and also the role of social networks in their experience.

Many authors (see Drbohlav, Nekorjak, Leontiyeva 2005 apod. ROKY) understands Ukrainian migration in terms of economic theories of migration as (purely - Drbohlav) economical. I cannot deny economic reasons which push people to leave their country, although I believe that they are not the only one or the most significant for that matter. When I asked my informants about their reasons to leave Ukraine their answers were very similar – uncertainty, insecurity. They talked about corruption, impossibility to plan for future because of uncertainty. Some mention political situation as well.

We should also see personal reasons and motives to migrate in the historical context and even as result of social networks that developed through out the time.

### **Historical connections**

Ukrainian migration in Czech Republic can be traced back into 16<sup>th</sup> or 17<sup>th</sup> century but intensified after Galicia and Bukovina were attached to Hapsburg Empire with mostly soldiers of fortune and seasonal workers coming. At the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century the migration pattern has changed as Galicia's intelligentsia start coming because of political reasons. During the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century, Ukrainian Diaspora was very active in promoting the idea of political independency of Ukraine (Leontiyeva 2005, Zilynskyj, Kočík 2001). But German and Soviet occupation ruptured this connection. (Migrace v rozpětí 1948 -1989?)

Immigration continued after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Relative geographical and cultural (language) proximity together with the memories of pre-war migration made Czech Republic (or Czechoslovakia) an attractive goal for Ukrainians. First

Republic associational and public life of Ukrainian immigrants was renewed though not in the same extent.

Leontiyeva (2004) mentions the distinction between the “old” (before 1989) and the “new” incomers. Ukrainian diaspora shows certain ambivalence that manifest itself in the “old” immigrants keeping their distance from newcomers. Leontiyeva (2005) also points out that both groups has somewhat different characteristic. Old immigrants tend to associate more often either in cultural or religious associations whereas newcomers do not seek those activities which is mainly thanks to their time consuming jobs. This also mirrors in pure language skills of newcomers, which affect their job opportunities and legalization of their stay. This leads also to the abuse of newcomers from the client system (Leontiyeva 2005, compare Nekorjak ROK).<sup>4</sup>

### *Religion in Ukraine - Religious identity*

What is now known as Ukraine is situated on the borderland where three culturally different empires met. Prussia (Poland), Russia and Austria-Hungary empires fought over the territory with fluctuating results leaving their influence there. Gradually it was religion that became identifier for groups of people living there, the tool to distinguish “us” and “them”. Under the thread of different cultural domain religion proved to be a ready-to-use set for identity formation.

Religious situation in Ukraine is often oversimplified by dividing it into three regions according to religious affiliation of their inhabitants – the south-east region which is mainly Orthodox, the central region where three Orthodox churches<sup>5</sup> fight with each other and also with growing influence of Roman Catholic Church and then there is the western region which is predominantly Greek Catholic (Mitrokhin 2001, Krindatch 2001).<sup>6</sup> As Riabchuk (2009) argues such division along western Catholic/eastern Orthodox lines, very often taken for granted by Western scholars, proves a lack of understanding of the real situation by taking all Ukrainian Orthodoxy as one. Even though this division does not mirror religious situation clearly and in

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<sup>4</sup> For more about history of Ukrainian migration see for example Zilynskyj (2000), Zilynskyj, Kočík (2001).

<sup>5</sup> Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate and Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church.

<sup>6</sup> Ukrainian religious landscape is surely more diverse – there are growing protestant communities, Jews and Muslims and others. Here I will concentrate on those Churches that have majority of believers and therefore bigger potential to influence politics.

depth it can serve as a start here for it reflects some historical and social circumstances.

Looking back into the history Greek Catholic Church (GCC) occupied particular position in creating the idea of Ukrainian people. According to Mitrokhin (2001) it played important role in the development and sustenance of Ukrainian “national idea”. This is mainly due to historical, social and even geographical circumstances. It was GCC and its clergy which developed, consolidated and sustained the idea of Ukrainian (or at the time Rusyn) people in the absence of educated elite and under the rule of Austro-Hungarian Empire (Mitrokhin 2001). In the past it was Greek Catholicism that created group (and even geographical) boundaries. It differentiated its carriers from western Roman Catholics<sup>7</sup> (especially Polish) and from eastern Orthodoxy. Therefore Greek Catholic Church enabled its clergy to develop imagined community based on religion and culture. People from western Ukraine were those who played a fundamental role in the dissemination of the idea of Ukrainian statehood. By claiming themselves Greek Catholics and by celebrate mass according to byzantine rite they clearly marked frontiers. This also connected Greek Catholic Church thanks to historical development and also geographical location<sup>8</sup> with Ukrainian ethnicity making it ethnic church.

Nationalist movement was put down by Soviet authorities who were more fond of and therefore enforcing the idea of Soviet identity instead of particular national ones (Mitrokhin 2001). Between years 1946 and 1989 the Ukrainian Greek Catholics survived underground being persecuted by communist regime. But the ideas of Ukrainian nation stayed central to the church and they were also inseminated in its followers just to be call back after the regaining of autonomy.

Another source of Ukrainian national identity is Orthodoxy. As Wanner (2009) says Orthodox churches consider Orthodoxy a fundamental component of Ukrainian nationality. Significant exceptions are the very Greek Catholics who for historical reasons belong to the related national denomination. For Orthodox Churches identity is geographically defined and automatically inherited. All Ukrainians thus have religious identity whether or not they choose to act on it.

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<sup>7</sup> Even though Greek Catholic Church recognizes Pope as the head of the Church, they differ from Roman Catholicism in the way they celebrate mass – according to byzantine rite.

<sup>8</sup> There were very few parishes of GCC outside Ukraine (Krindatch 2003).

But the situation among Orthodox Churches is not simple. Under the communist regime Ukraine Orthodox Church of Moscow patriarchate was the only 'legal' church in Ukraine. After the Ukrainian regain of independence there were strong voices calling for independent (autocephalous) national Orthodox Church which eventually led to a split and creation of Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. There is also Ukrainian Autocephalous Church that came to existence in short period of Ukrainian independence in 1917 (Krindatch 2003). Agadjanian (2001) interprets these clashes between different religious denominations as conflict between modern secular state and religious nationalism. In religiously pluralistic state such as Ukraine we face the situation where political secularism is the only possible way how to avoid conflicts but we still cannot deny the religious component of the dominant ethno-national identity because this religious component happens to be included in the political process.

All the Orthodox Churches follow their own political projects and the split of Orthodoxy in Ukraine just demonstrates this case. But the popular perception of a choice between a national (belonging under the Kyiv patriarchate) or foreign (of Moscow patriarchate) faith is misleading as all religious communities are link together globally. They are thus force to negotiate the local and national contexts in which they situate themselves as well as to offer links to individuals, communities and institutions beyond the borders of Ukraine (Wanner 2009).

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