

Text byl vytvořen v rámci projektu specifického výzkumu „Proměny mediální reprezentace agendy EU v českých parlamentních volbách: místo pro euroskepsi, nebo eurooptimismus“, kdy byly zkoumány podrobeny články týkající se evropské agendy (tj. zprávy o EU a členských zemích), publikované v čtyřech celorepublikových denících (MfD, LN, HN, Právo) v období horké fáze předvolební kampaně do PS PČR (tj. poslední tři týdne) v letech 2002, 2006 a 2010.

Pro analýzu dat byla použita obsahová a diskurzivní analýza; následující text shrnuje dosavadní výstupy druhé z nich.

## **A TRAGEDY WITH NO CATHARSIS: DISCOURSE OF GREEK ECONOMIC CRISIS IN COMMENTARIES IN MFD**

In content analysis, one of significant movements in media coverage of EU agenda in time of NP election campaigns was clear increase of news articles referring about one EU-member state, Greece (from 16 articles in 2002 to 129 articles in 2010, which means increase of ...%). This could be brought about by inter-correlation of two factors: first, situation of deep economic crisis in Greece is “news-worth” in terms of one of news values, negativity. Noticing this conjointly with brief findings from browsing through news articles referring to Greece in two previous periods of NP election campaign, we could assume that this over-emphasis on “negativity” of event indicates processes of infotainmentization and tabloidization of Czech press. Second, the issue was picked up by right-wing politicians and was remade into one of fundamental themes in respective NP election campaign, serving almost exclusively the aim to discredit the left-wing political opponents. In this part, we will try to explore what ideological effects both of these preliminary observations could have and how do they influence meaning structures more broadly. Regarding such analysis as *pars pro toto* in respect to media representation of European agenda, it enables us a closer, although necessarily fragmentary look on processes of framing in news articles about the EU and its member states.

For these purposes, we have decided to use critical discourse analysis (CDA). The main strength of this approach to textual analysis lies in allowing the researcher to observe in-depth discourse structures of texts and various levels of meaning which may be neglected by quantitative content analysis. For CDA usually works with rather small number of texts, we had to delimit the range of news articles included in our original dataset. It seemed reasonable for us to apply CDA on such a sample where the articles would be associated together relatively tightly by a common “order of discourse” (Fairclough 1992). We presupposed this move would enable us to delimit more clearly particular media sub-discourse and to pick up its key features<sup>1</sup>. With respect to data from content analysis (CA) and one of trends it identified – rapid increase of news articles referring to Greece – we have defined four criteria of selection: chosen text should be from one particular period from those three which were under investigation in CA (so, texts chosen for CDA were published from 7<sup>th</sup> to 27<sup>th</sup> May in 2010), from one particular daily (Mladá fronta Dnes) and section (Opinions) in which they were published and finally, they should cover the same issue (“Greek economic crisis”). According to these criteria, 11 commentaries were selected.


In our analysis, we draw on Fairclough’s view on discourse as social practice, supposing that discourses „do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or constitute them“. (Fairclough 1992: 3) The analysis as conducted here does not comply fully with Fairclough’s

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<sup>1</sup> Bearing on preliminary assumption that the key features of discourse are not necessarily the most frequent ones for sometimes, they may exist as some “tacit knowledge” about social reality, which is already naturalized and taken-for-granted.

three-dimensional model for critical discourse analysis, mostly for the reasons of our different research aims. As already mentioned, the CDA presented here was carried out to function as a case study and this decision was based on the motivation to look in more detail on process of framing of EU agenda in Czech quality press in time of NP election campaign. To get back to Fairclough's original three-dimensional model of CDA, it applies that we will not investigate the relations of interdiscursivity<sup>2</sup> and intertextuality<sup>3</sup> at length. Similarly, we will not investigate rigorously the relations between analysed fragment of media discourse and wider socio-cultural context, but we will offer some assumptions and reflections which could be relevant and inspiring for future research.

To keep our analysis understandable despite of such a deflection from Fairclough's model of CDA, we worked out an adjusted conceptualization of discourse, which is broken down into two sequential steps. In the first one, we started with specifying discourse under analysis as "discourse of Greek economic crisis in commentaries of Mladá fronta Dnes in time of NP election campaign in 2010". We use this slightly complicated expression to draw attention to two important postulates. First, we conceive particular discourses to be a "jigsaw puzzle" of their own sort, layering on each other vertically and horizontally. In other words, besides its constitutive character, the next key characteristic of discourse is its fluidness and ability to join up with other discourses easily. Second, when discourses permeate each other, their orders of discourses do combine as well. The newly created order of discourse combines limitations of previous orders of discourses which have been conflated. So, working with discourse labelled as "discourse of Greek economic crisis in commentaries of Mladá fronta Dnes in time of Czech NP election campaign in 2010", we try to keep in mind all discourses which came together and furthermore, we try to give more valid, precise and understandable interpretation of our findings pointing to this foreknowledge of multiplied limitations encoded in order of discourse. This analytical dismemberment of discourse is shown in following scheme.



**Scheme 1: First step in conceptualization of discourse: breaking it down into separate pieces.**

As evident from Scheme 1, we did *not* capture *all* of the discourse features, only those which appeared to be relevant for our research aims<sup>4</sup>. Most strikingly, we neglected the institution of author.

<sup>2</sup> For example, we did not investigate relationships between political and media discourse.

<sup>3</sup> For example, we left aside possible comparison of news stories and commentaries in particular daily.

<sup>4</sup> The issue of "Greek economic crisis" was picked up as important because unlike in Czech NP election campaigns in 2002 and 2006, there was significant increase in news articles referring to Greece in 2010. Furthermore, tracing this issue can give us fruitful insights referring both to media routines (emphasis on one of news-values, negativity) and to strategies Czech political parties use in respect to EU agenda (making use of it as a bare instrument for their own objectives). Preferring the genre "commentaries" to "news stories", we expect the former one to be more reflexive, analytical and explanatory and thus, more affecting the attitudes of readers. The social institution of Mladá fronta Dnes is important because as the most widely read quality press in Czech Republic, it allows us to investigate the media discourse which could reach the biggest part of electorate. Also, it is interesting for its political ideology – the daily is right-wing oriented and so, it contributes to spreading opinions of Eurosceptic


We put aside styles of individual commentators, among which there were politicians, professional journalists or even one independent book publisher, supposing this will enable us to concentrate more strenuously on the discourse as a product of particular daily. The daily chosen, *Mladá fronta Dnes*, is the most widely read quality press in Czech Republic and so, with respect to its intermediate position in dialectical movement between social structure and social agents (Hall 1982), it can both reflect and influence the status quo.

The analytical decomposition of discourse enables us to do one more important move. Visualising discourses as fractals, we can zoom in or distance our perspective. Knowing that both getting closer or farther would require us to identify and analyse more bits of information, we can be sure that the initial structure of order of discourse is preserved – at the moment of analysis as stopped time-slot, of course. To put it differently, it allows us to zoom in or zoom out moving on the lines defined by our four nodal points: issue, genre, social institution, spatio-temporally axis. In such a way, the “discourse of Greek economic crisis” is relevant for “discourse of representation of Greece”, which is relevant for “discourse of representation of European agenda”. Similarly, the “discourse of *Mladá fronta Dnes*” is relevant for “discourse of Czech quality press” which is relevant for “Czech media discourse” and so on. We definitely would not like to suggest there is some clear hierarchy of discourses, or that the structural relationships are straightforward and linear. Such “freezing of discourse” is fruitful only for preliminary clarifying of our proceedings – for analytic purposes only.

Now, let us move beyond this analytic decomposition of discourse. From this step on, we can get back to fluid and constantly changing concept of discourse which is essential for our analysis, and we will focus on three interrelated aspects of discourse: representation of reality, identities set up for those involved and relationships set up between those involved (Fairclough 1994: 5). With proposed modifications of Fairclough’s original model of CDA, we need to reformulate these three key aspects of discourse as well. In first feature, representation of reality, we will concentrate on events and connection built between them. In its second feature, we will draw on identities of subject directly acting in these events (therefore, we have to marginalize the identities of producer and reader in broader sense and to background the processes of production, distribution and consumption). Third, we will look on relationships between subjects identified in previous step (so similarly, we have to neglect relationships between producer and reader in broader sense). This adjusted model is pictured in Scheme 2.

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political parties. These, although in fact are in a minority, are particularly loud and strongly influence the discussions about the EU. Finally, the definition of spatio-temporal axis reflects our period under research.



**Scheme 2: Second step in conceptualization of discourse: adjusting its three key features.**

As we can see, there is nothing as clear-cut “beginning” in discourse. The three aspects – representation, identities and relationships – are in fact inseparable and mutually refer to each other. What is pushed into core of discourse is particular ideological chain, or – to avoid the impression of linearity - cluster of few social characteristics, of multifarious sediments already melt together. In compressed form, the model designed in Scheme 2 gives preliminary overview of basic findings of our critical discourse analysis and so, besides serving as illustration of second step in conceptualization of discourse, it can be regarded as a map of special kind, as a mean for better orientation in analysis. Now, we are prepared to move to more detailed and profound description of these three features of discourse (representation of reality, identities and relationships).

## REPRESENTATION OF REALITY

In first step of analysis, we focused on ways reality is represented in our subject matter, discourse of Greek economic crisis in commentaries of Mladá fronta Dnes in time of NP election campaign in 2010. We concentrated on – first - which events and processes represented in analysed sub-discourse were foregrounded and which were backgrounded, and second, what connections were constructed between those events and processes.

The most prominent event referred to was **Greek economic crisis**. The representation of this event is strangely reified: demonstrations in Athens and resentment of ordinary Greek people, this is the prevalent and almost the only one piece of information reader gets about contemporary situation in Greece. Wreath of Greeks is presented as irrational (these “*raging crowds of people throwing fire bottles, who do not even know whom they protest against*”) and as illogical because they evidently just “*have to pay for the luxurious way of life they were used to*”.

Other actions of Greeks are backgrounded, should it be showing political will to envisage the actual situation, gratitude for financial help from EU or attempts to set out rational communication. It is no so probable that all the Greek people demonstrate all days for three weeks, but the discourse is sig-

nificantly silent about this. Re-reading carefully analysed articles, it becomes clearer why journalists get by with this simplified image of reality. Apparently, what is picked as important aspect of economic crisis in Greece is the single fact of deep economic crisis, not the country. The topic itself served as strong ideological weapon of right-wing politicians in respective NP election campaign<sup>5</sup>. To put it differently, the case of Greece is exploited as mean to talk about something else, to vindicate particular ideology while staying so well hidden. Consequently<sup>6</sup>, it seems that the main function of analysed discourse was on one hand, to legitimize position of right-wing politicians, and on the other hand, to delegitimize their left-wing political opponents. In this sense it appears brighter why it was desirable to underscore negative implications of Greek economic crisis – namely, profound and helpless desperation of ordinary Greek people frustrated by their deceptive left-wing governments – and to marginalize all the remaining characteristics. To give a short example of this powerful haunting:

Everyone who watches thrilling television reports from Athens and who reads headlines “Greece in ruins. Fires in streets and first dead people”, “Greece burning because of cuts” or “Europe is afraid of Greek infection”, must ask: What is going on in Greece? Is the situation really that serious? Yes, it is. It is even more serious than recently believed by many. Bankruptcy is not imaginary scarecrow, but a real economic and social threat which affects millions of people.

The economic crisis in Greece is connected with crisis in the EU as a whole. It is claimed that it is time to realize that “we, Europeans, became a dumb herd of consumers” and to become “responsible”, morally and economically. Furthermore, we need to recognize that persuading general public about these facts will be no easy task for “*too long, politicians taught the people they have rights and they can demand*”. However, as discourse strategies teaches us patiently, it is highly desirable (if not even necessary) to overcome contemporary “*European decrepitude of pseudosocial welfare*”. Of course, it has to be done as soon as possible because “*the threat of significant decline of their living standards of large parts of the population, as happened in countries governed by populists*” is too dangerous to be neglected any longer. Retracing the discourse strategies attentively, we can discern that the endeavour to discredit leftist political orientation is twofold. While the short-term aim of discourse is to delegitimize Czech left-wing political parties and to weaken them in upcoming elections, the long-term aim of discourse is to delegitimize European Union as such, its ideals, institutions and overall politics. The main feature of critique of EU is its immoderately leftist political orientation. Saying this we can draw attention to another key aspect of analysed discourse: besides preferring right-wing political ideology, it tends to be more Eurosceptic.

In these terms, it seems to be significant that the event of Greek economic crisis was further elaborated through connections with EU long hesitation with providing financial help to Greece and

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<sup>5</sup> ODS, the biggest Czech right-wing political party, relied heavily on argumentation like this: “*Řecko přivedli ke krachu socialisté*” and “*ODS nedopustí, aby se česká ekonomika vydala řeckou cestou*.” Although we can see from Graph 7 that arguments pro-EU and anti-EU were in fact in balance, this way of haunting voters was the most prominent one.

<sup>6</sup> As mentioned already, the political ideology of analysed daily and right-wing political parties is in many aspects almost identical.

subsequently, with growing anxiety in the financial sector<sup>7</sup>. This underscores negative framing of whole event and again helps to reveal its motivations, or to be more precise, discourse strategies.

Second foregrounded event was on-going **restructuring movements and growing perturbation in Eurozone** and, conjointly with reference to NP election campaign, discussions about adopting euro in Czech Republic. We can extend our observation about the tight connection constructed between European and Greek economic crisis by enhancing it by some further statements. For instance, it is declared that – paying attention exclusively to the latter one – “*we cannot see the whole Europe burning*”. Of course, for any reasonable man it must be evident, that economic crisis in Greece is “*much deeper problem effecting whole Europe*”, or in other words, it became “*a question of existence of the Eurozone*”. As in the previous event, when the reader got reified image of furious Greeks demonstrating against enforced financial cuts, now the picture is again simplified and one-sided. The key activity representing the whole event is that political leaders of EU cannot reach a compromise about how to proceed in case of Greece<sup>8</sup> and because this lack of mutual understanding, their suggestions are sometimes „acts of pure desperation”. For these reasons, which – from the Eurosceptic point of view - serve as a small, but satisfactory example of striking incompetence of EU, it is not advisable to rave either about further integration of EU, or about Czech entry to Eurozone. Furthermore, it is claimed that

People understand each year more and more that Euro is not a magic pill, and that it is not going to make them wealthier. On the contrary, they realize the risks and problems introduced by the common currency more clearly. They see that the Czech Crown works well for us. However, nobody knows what euro will bring about. Why then give up the Czech Crown? Considering the Czech do not want the euro, and Eurozone does not crave the Czech, why do we still insist on discussing adopting euro?

The risks and problems euro brings about are clear: having euro instead of national currency, Czechs would have to contribute to the European Financial Stability Facility. Again, the issue is used as pretence, felicitous occasion to express one's political ideology at length and to leave it well hidden at the same time. The discourse strategies are similar as in previous case: this time, Eurosceptic ideology seeps to the light through the very appeal to be careful adopting the euro. Although “*we promised to adopt the euro when we joined EU*”, this does not mean that there is some acute need to rush it (or maybe even fulfil the commitment). Because “*one cannot be certain the euro will be around in five years. The European politicians are still working towards its destruction*”. To mitigate these Eurosceptic aspirations to eschew duties affirmed in contracts (they could be perceived negatively, especially in the light of one of the most accentuated rightist values, individual responsibility), it is said that “*the demand for new members is significantly dropping in the Eurozone*” and that “*the Eurozone does not want to pay Polish, Hungarian or Czech debts*”. So on the one hand, it is not a good choice for Czech Republic to become a member of Eurozone, or more expressively “*discreditable Euroclub*”. The discourse naturalized the reasons why and works with them as with taken-for-granted, already-proven

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<sup>7</sup> To give examples of such arguing, we can mention statements like “*finanční trhy se třesou hrůzou*” or “*pohled na finanční trhy připomíná v posledních dnech obří požár*”. This argument is quite popular within Eurosceptic discourse and contributes heavily to its economization, as we will see later.

<sup>8</sup> And more importantly, “*pokud Řecko půjčku dostane, nebude to ze solidarity a evropanství. Bude to z vypočítavosti, protože půjčka bude levnější než selhání Řecka jako dlužníka*”. This example clearly shows discourse strategy to deny the relevance of concept of common European identity and to persuade general public about its mythic character. For the financial aid is not to help a “brother in need”, but to lessen the risk of one's own loss.

evidence. On the other hand, Czech eventual good will to enter Eurozone in spite of the clear risks it takes is maltreated by Eurozone which is said to be reluctant about accepting new members. After all, in the picture discourse pushes forward, it is not “Us”, Eurosceptics, who behaves childishly and rejects its declared commitments, but the EU. This again strengthens the positive portrayal of “Us” and the negative representation of “Them”, the EU as confused and incompetent organization.

Third event set out as noteworthy was **challenging to open serious discussion about future political orientation of EU**. It is said that the contemporary economic and moral crisis in Europe<sup>9</sup> has certain positive aspect, which in a way mitigates all of those features which are deeply depressing and disgruntling. It helps us realize crucial fact that “*Europe is at crossroads*”. So, it gives us an opportunity to overcome narrow minded, mostly bureaucratic discussions about common EU norms for everything and to take a look on Europe more attentively and more critically. Eurosceptic discourse predominant in analysed commentaries starts the polemics over future political orientation of EU with statements like “*all the todays Greek problems are the results of a deeply dysfunctional political system*”, or “*this is a live show of crisis of the welfare state of socialistic type in many European countries*”. Furthermore, it is claimed that

effects even of the most sophisticated austerity measures will wear off, if cannot find a way how to change dynamics of the political system.

This proposition could have signalized ambivalence<sup>10</sup> in discourse, but it is pushed away by its inner controlling mechanisms. To emphasize good characteristics of Eurosceptics, they are again shown as persons who are open-minded and willing to reach agreement. Therefore, it is declared that the idea of welfare state as such is not to be rejected: we just have to “*restore the original function of the welfare state which is aiding the unfortunate fellow-citizens*”. But before that, it needs to be admitted that the EU missapplied the conception of social welfare and by doing this, it contributed to unprecedented spread of ideas of consumption society. Here, the case of Greece again serves as apt illustration of overall situation in Europe, since

The Greeks did the same as the whole caucasian world. They lived beyond their means, they borrowed money and did not care when and how will they repay the debts. This is called the welfare state, solidarity, social justice. Jsou to jen lživé vějíčky k činnosti nikoliv bohulibé, nýbrž ničemné: political corruption

As we had already seen, it is stated that this sets up difficult situation to deal with because future political leaders of Europe have to convince their voters about the contrary to EU's motto “nobody has to be thrifty, *make cuts and tighten one's belts*”. In short-time period, this definitely will be painful. Hence, responsible politicians risk becoming misunderstood and thus, unpopular. We see that the qualities of right-wing politicians are underscored once more, now by exaggerating their will to “sacrifice” themselves – to do what is needed, although widely disliked at the same time.

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<sup>9</sup> It is claimed that “*Intelektuální a finanční bankrot evropského socialismu je zřejmý. Bohužel, ještě ne faktický.*”

<sup>10</sup> We talk about ambivalence because cited statement can delegitimize both right-wing and left-wing politic ideology. This is because it explicitly doubts the effects of solution emphasized by right-wing politicians and it also creates different opposition instead of this old one, namely the opposition between new political leaders, who could be trustworthy, and old politicians, who already lost their credibility, no matter whether they were left-wing or right-wing. This ambivalence in discourse could be demonstrated also on statement that “*stávající evropští politici důvěru ztratili*”. However, this one is milder, for we, captured by Eurosceptic discourse in analysed commentaries, are given clear instructions that words “European politicians” should be decoded as “leftist politicians”.

Fourth significant event was setting up **discursive struggle over European identity**. We could express the main features of this abruptly, by proclamation that “*Europeanism ended in our own purses*”. With great help of representation of EU as organization puzzled and feckless at the moment of its first more serious crisis, the view that the idea of common European identity is just a myth gets heavily promoted at this point. From now on, it seems that the discussion about the EU becomes intensively economised<sup>11</sup>. The argumentation goes on as follows: because the EU is not based on commonly shared ideals, it is reasonable to analyse gains and risks of being its member-state foremost economically and rationally. It is declared that the EU is political and financial project – it does not fulfil some pre-existent idea of Europeanism; it is a matter of business, not of passion. So, when its efficiency and sustainability gets doubtless, it should be replaced without false sentiment. To give an example of such writing, see following extract:

rádi jsme si namlouvali, že existuje jedna evropská identita a že nová doba potlačila to špatné, co dřímalo v Evropě národů. (...) Unie, to měl být takový konec dějin a nacionalismu. Jenže krize tuhle iluzi sfoukla jako svíčku. Ukázala, že neexistuje jedna evropská identita a solidarita ani cosi jako společně sdílený osud. Němci či Slováci logicky nemají pocit, že by měli tahat Řeky z jejich vlastní kaše, vytahují se staré hříchy, jako je druhá světová, a staré stereotypy typu - "ti líní Řekové". Sečteno, krize z Evropanů rychle stáhla jejich evropský dres, pod ním mají pořád ten národní.

We can see that national identity is strongly preferred to European one.

To sum up what has been said so far: we can say the discourse of analysed commentaries heavily bears on wider Eurosceptic discourse. Regarding the notes on the first three events as particular fragments, we see they come to some sort of synthesis when at the point of setting up discursive struggle over European identity. A central ideological chain, as shown in Scheme 2, is created: being leftist means being individually and financially irresponsible means being irrational through and through means being addicted to empty formal structures means tending to over-bureaucratization means contributing to dissolution of human values means supporting consumption society means living in falsehood means being evil means being leftist. This ensures the solid background of Eurosceptic discourse, predominant in analysed commentaries, while it holds true that some of the attributes mentioned are already fused together so tightly that they are almost inseparable. This influences the way of their decoding. As we could see from many examples, the meaning of word “leftist” is ideologically closed in circle of mutual reference between few concepts put together in ideological chain. Furthermore, with respect to our key theoretical concept of Europeanization, we can set up an assumption that the analysed discourse tends to deny the relevance of vertical Europeanization, leaving the question of horizontal Europeanization without clear answer<sup>12</sup>.

Taking media routines in account, we can say there is discernible inclination to infotainment, or tendency to conversationalization and marketization, in Fairclough’s terms (Fairclough 1995). The indicators of drawing on these trends are designing the commentaries as amusing stories, rather than as insightful analyses or using rather colloquial phrases and expressions. This is rather contradictory

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<sup>11</sup> The economisation of discourse does not imply its absolute inversion into some purely pragmatic and non-idealistic form. Although it rejects the idea of European identity, it heavily draws on the idea of nation state – this guarantees the “real” identity of a man. So the difference is, roughly speaking, mostly in scale.

<sup>12</sup> We could suppose that rightist “Eurosceptic discourse” will not be so inimical to horizontal Europeanization, drawing on its emphasis on national state. However, this assumption should be investigated further.



to our expectation built on basic features of genre, namely that commentaries should be reflexive, analytical and explanatory. So, although we are dealing with quality press, we see clearly it does not counter with trends of infotainmentization and tabloidization – on the contrary, it does adjust its content according to their principles.

## IDENTITIES

In the second step of discourse analysis, we focused on identities set up for those involved in commentaries. We identified four major actors: EU, Greece, Czech Eurosceptics and ordinary people.

Let us start with identity constructed for the **EU**. In the key metaphor, EU is portrayed as a dangerous and detrimental “weed”, or to be more precise, as the indubitable source of it. As we can see from the following extract, this metaphor is further elaborated by another one, metaphor of “infection”:

The harmful weed has deep roots. You can cut off the sprouts with leaves, or even extirpate the whole plant of the ground, but in spite of all your effort it will grow up again. Our society probably does not have enough of efficient antidotes to win over the weed and destroy it.

Both of these metaphors, that of “weed” and that of “infection”, share some basic aspects (their referents are unwished, dangerous, harmful, redoubtable, unjust or almost invincible) and therefore, by combining them, their malignant effects are underscored. What exactly is meant by the “weed” expanding from EU to its member states? Rereading our analysed text carefully, we can see that it is the concept of social state, represented in discourse as seriously misapplied and misused by the EU. This is consistent with our previous finding: revelation of ideological chain in Eurosceptic discourse. Subsequently, we would like to suggest that the bundle of metaphors of “weed” and “infection” functions fairly well as the centre of ideological chain, guaranteeing its inner coherence and strengthening the structural relations among its elements. But to explore the identity constructed for the EU more thoroughly, we can set this aside for a moment and look on characteristics ascribed to the EU.

First, the EU is depicted as **robust bureaucratic organization**. It has overwhelming apparatus of expendable office workers and bloodless politicians, but no real charismatic leader, no relevant background idea which would legitimize its actions (idea of European identity is categorized as false illusion, as we have seen already). Roughly speaking, there is no good reason for its existence at all<sup>13</sup>. Furthermore, European Union as empty, but still powerful construction heavily contributes to debasement of true human values, for it teaches hoards of “ordinary people” to behave irresponsibly and irrationally quieting them down with statement that there always will be someone to save them (and pay their debts). It is evident that

political and bureaucratic responsibility is declining the more centralist and more estranged from real economic and social life it is. Tím vytlačuje úlohu individuální odpovědnosti a reputace v regulaci společenského chování.

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<sup>13</sup> The discourse under investigation does not claim that the end of EU is rapidly approaching, at least overtly. Mostly, it gets by conclusions like “*jestli to EU smete, nebo povzbudí k záchrannému vypětí, není jasné*”. However, the first option is taken as more probable. And even if EU would survive, it will not be easy. Because “*kdo ty vládní dary bude chtít lidem brát, dočká se bouří, ohně a rozvratu. To povede k posilování vlád tvrdé ruky, různých druhů poloskrytých totalit, socialistického blouznění, polovojenských milicí a jiných neštěstí*.” And this is definitely not a pleasant vision.

The analysed discourse also works with absurd newspeak of EU officers. Exaggerating the gap between this form of speech and that one used by “reasonable” people, it relies on ironic sentences like: “*it is called monetization of state debts, srozumitelně česky je to tiskání nekrytých peněz*”.

Second, EU is represented as **incompetent and sometimes even reluctant to solve important problems**. According to discourse strategies, this gets evident when judging EU’s tragicomic attempts to reach some agreement how to deal with contemporary economic crisis in EU member states and in Greece particularly. We already dealt with those. The depression over striking EU’s incompetence is deepened by proclamations like this crisis is “*the worst one since the financial crisis between two world wars*”. Furthermore, the newspapers readers are reminded that this time it is caused “*by philistinism, not by war furies*”. So, it is underscored that the present crisis is without proper legitimation; in fact, it is unnecessary and much less understandable, especially in economised point of view. EU is criticised for dealing only with corollaries of crisis, not with its roots. This leads to multiplied pleas for redefining political system, as we have seen in previous step of analysis. In connection to this, it is claimed in relatively affected tone that EU childishly “*postpones the Judgement day*” thinking that everything will be ok again thanks to “*money we will print out in Frankfurt*”<sup>14</sup>. The only good thing about the misconception of guaranteeing financial help for Greece is that International Monetary Fund takes a part in it – because IMF, “*unlike EU, is capable of slapping the debtor to wake him up*”<sup>15</sup>.

Third, it is claimed that EU cannot be trusted because it **does not respect its commitments**<sup>16</sup>, it does not keep its promises and often, it mystifies people, mainly by distorting the concept of social welfare. In this respect, journalistic statements are mostly general and vague, like “*They [European politics] cry out loudly: Solidarity! And they mean: Corruption!*” This could indicate either ambivalence in discourse, in a sense which has been described already. Or, much more probably, it insinuates a successful completion of process of ideological closure of words “European politicians”, which point to leftist politicians only and are added to ideological core of discourse. So, the negative connotations of collocation “European politicians” are heavily emphasized and in conjunction with this, preferred reading of the phrase gets much more visible as well.

To sum up our findings about identity constructed for EU, we can say that it is represented as organization which is **bureaucratic, leftist, irrational, irresponsible, incompetent or sometimes even megalomaniac**. This is expressed succinctly in following extract:

Proti rozumu každé uvážlivé selky, která říká, když děláš dluhy, máš dluhy, stojí vědeckopolitická symfonie slepců, kteří neviděli příchod řecké krize a nevidí příchod naší krize.

It is noteworthy that sometimes, the censorious critique of EU and ruthless attacks against it get a bit different emotional accent. There is some sympathy with “that poor old fellow, EU” - to imitate the dominant colloquial style of commentaries. As we could anticipate with respect to up-to-now knowledge about discourse prevalent in analysed texts, this temporary benevolence does not turn into some

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<sup>14</sup> European Central Bank has its headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany.

<sup>15</sup> These mentioned findings corresponds to one of our pre-constructed EU-negative frames used in content analysis, namely that one where EU is presented as organization unable to deal with important problems and it is because of its over-bureaucratization, leaving alone other possible reasons.

<sup>16</sup> This is evident in following example, which operates with simple and straightforward causality between disobedience to obligations ratified in Maastricht Treaty and contemporary economic crisis: “*Tolik podepsaný papír. A skutečnost? Pravidla pro deficit byla změkčena už před lety v době, kdy je neplnily Německo a Francie. Dnes je neplní nikdo z celé šestnáctičlenné eurozóny.*”

general compassion with people of Europe. It is believed that there is nothing like European identity, so such a tendency would have to be irrational at least. It is more plausible to explain the mentioned sympathy as feeling based on strong conviction of Eurosceptics presupposing their own moral or intellectual supremacy over EU and “European politicians”.

Let us now turn to identities constructed for **Greece**. For we already have dealt with this aspect partially in first part of analysis, the characterization given now can be relatively brief. We can see that to some extent, characteristics attributed to Greek people draw on traditional prejudices. Greeks are represented as **irrational** (“*rozvášněné davy házející zápalné lahve, které ani pořádně nevědí, proti komu protestují*”), **lazy** (“*investoři nevěří, že Řecko dokáže držet naordinovanou dietu*”), **passionate** (“*Řekové zuří a patrně svou krásnou zemi potopí v Egejském moři*”), **careless** (“*blbí Frankové na dovolené vyžadují při půjčení motorky i helmu, Řekové však nechávají své vlasy vlát ve větru*”). It is noteworthy that the identity of Greece is sometimes segmented into separate subjects, which are opposed to each other. To be more precise, we can speak of special identity of “Greek politicians” and another one constructed for “Greek ordinary people”. We will deal with this more concretely when investigating third aspect of discourse, relationships.

To get back to common identity of Greece, it is obvious that the characteristics of Greeks are mostly negative. But before interpreting this observation, it is useful to put it in wider context. Two already given remarks are important by now: first, the portrayal of economic crisis in Greece is one-sided and quite simplified. And second, the issue of economic crisis in Greece served predominantly as a mean to criticize EU (or to put it differently, there is no evidence of intensified interest in Greece itself). Drawing on these comments, it could be stated that identities of Greek people are built on stereotypes because it was both the easiest and satisfactory way to give a description. From the point of view of strategies of Eurosceptic discourse, it would be useless to try to overcome them, for they serve only as an instrument which is to be thrown apart after the key “mission” of delegitimizing EU is completed. So interestingly, the discourse neglects the opportunity to explain the economic crisis with “intrinsic” character of Greeks<sup>17</sup>. Presumably, it was left behind because explaining the crisis through general incompetence of leftist politicians seemed to be more powerful and effective declaration with respect to on-going NP election campaign. Among other, it ensured process of smooth construction of ideological chain of Eurosceptic discourse.

It is admitted that hot-headed Greeks maybe speed up the process of decay, but economic problems had to appear any way. In is repeatedly said „*všichni dělají totéž, jen ne tak hloupě*“. Again, the discourse pushes forward the declaration that EU irreversibly failed in its function of leader of Europe. And moreover, it is not enough to search for new political leader to find a way out of economic recession. EU also contributed to distortions of human values and to remedy this is even more complicated task. In other words, following characteristic of Greeks which can hold true for hoards of European people, has to be chastened:

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<sup>17</sup> This strategy also occurred, in declarations of Czech president Václav Klaus who said: “Neviním Řeky. Každá země by mohla sama volit, zda bude žít na půl plynu, čtvrt plynu, nebo na plný plyn svých možností. Sama by mohla říct: my budeme víc hodin sedět ve stínu pod cypřiši a popíjet si ouzo, anebo víc pracovat. Jestliže se Řecko rozhodne, že bude více hodin věnovat ouzu nebo cypřišům, tak je to naprosto v pořádku. Nicméně nemůže vstoupit do měnové unie s Německem.” But this would be a different story, not compatible with our research aims and data in this paper.

Řekové se nikdy nemuseli vyrovnávat s jednoduchou pravdou, že žít dlouhodobě nad poměry prostě nelze; a i kdyby s tím nakonec nějak souhlasili, po dvaceti letech rozmařilého plýtvání už to přestává být pravda. Když můžete plýtvat dvacet let, proč by to nešlo třicet?

Identities of **proponents of Eurosceptic discourse** are in most cases, left implicit, but we can reconstruct them while deconstructing the picture of reality they try to push through by means of discourse. The discourse of Euroscepticism is strongly reified: its motivations and aims are not explained and the very need of such explanation is condemned in advance as inappropriate. In this respect, it is noteworthy that commentators do not offer any positive models and give no particular reasons and evidence why rightist ideology will be better than the criticised one, leftist. In fact, the Eurosceptic discourse is offered as a ready-made kit of opinions, completed and ingenious ideology. It heavily bears on naturalization of particular view of reality. To give an example, it is claimed that

Tohle není Evropa blahobytu a solidarity. Je to svět vulgárního utilitarismu, kolektivní nezodpovědnosti a rozvratu principů, kde si každý zpívá svoji klientelistickou písničku. A socialističtí populisté se svého drží za každou cenu.

Although this statement seems to be a rather extreme one, it is not so strikingly exceptional in analysed texts. What is backgrounded, or, what is made almost invisible, is the fact that the EU is not some dangerous nest of evil left-wing politicians from all Europe, it is not some totalitarian confederation. Right-wing politicians *do* have a role in it and therefore, they *do* have a share on confusion over economic crisis they criticize so eagerly. But the discourse is silent about this.

In connection with this, we see that Eurosceptics are, first, portrayed as **rational**. Among other reason, this characteristic is granted for non-emotional argumentation drawing heavily on economic analyses as discussed above. Second, Eurosceptics are represented as **responsible**. “*Je zjevné, že spolehnout se musíme především na sebe, na svoji odpovědnost. Zbývá jen tvrdá práce.*” Interestingly, there is quite weak emphasis on differentiation from “socialist” EU in question of bureaucratic apparatus needed for successful rule and furthermore, there is no evidence that Eurosceptics are really competent to solve both economic and moral crisis. We see that the identities of EU are much more elaborated than those of its opponents. In other words, the discourse relies more on discrediting its rival, not on offering clear positive alternative.

Finally, let us investigate identities constructed for “**ordinary people**”. This category is built on a bit different logic than the former ones and this is for reasons that discourse, in its essence, is fluid and dynamic which leads to permeability of subject identities. Category of “ordinary people” is based on one’s position in social structure and broadly speaking, it includes all those Europeans who are not politicians or powerful persons of this sort – for better comprehension, two axes around which subject identities are distributed are shown in Scheme 3, which will be investigated more closely when dealing with relationship. For now and with respect to discourse under analysis, we can get by with ascertainment that in this category, we can put Greek “ordinary people”, Czech “ordinary people” and European “ordinary people”. It has to be said that in analysed texts, this subject is mostly marginalized. Nonetheless, more detailed account of it could enhance our analysis of some fruitful insights.

The key characteristic of identity constructed for subject of “ordinary people” is **dependence**, caused by moral weakness, civic passivity or just some kind indolence<sup>18</sup>. They are said to rely on their political leaders nearly uncritically and are even happy to give up their individual responsibility in favour of legitimized authority. The EU as the bad and incompetent leader exploits this trust:

Obyčejní lidé se tak stávají ještě obyčejnějšími a čím dál tím víc závislími na tom, co vše jim kdo naslibuje. Zájmové skupiny vysávají produktivní vrstvy do takové míry, že se postupně rozmazává rozdíl mezi ctností a nectností.


As mentioned, the EU leads people into consumer society and contributes to dissolution of human values (honour, to name the most important one<sup>19</sup>). The dependence is not framed only negatively, as some striking disadvantage of people. Sometimes, it is vindicated by statement that one cannot be fully distrustful and sceptical to others and to overall social structure. Like in following example,

Laikovi, jako jsem já, se vkrádá do duše otázka: Řekl někdo Řekům před sedmi či devíti lety, co je logicky a nevyhnutelně čeká, jak to skončí? Neřekl.

Although we see that dependence is not always equated with simplicity or laziness, it is still remarkable that it almost looks like ordinary people are not treated as real partners in political discussion. To put it differently, there is no strong explicit appeal on voters: they may be the ones who vote, once in a while, but not the ones who do make decisions.

## RELATIONSHIPS

In third step of analysis, we focused on relationships set up between subjects whose identity was described, that is between EU, Eurosceptics, Greece and “ordinary people”. To make this point more graspable, the relationships are pictured in Scheme 3.



<sup>18</sup> The source of dependence of ordinary people is not perfectly specified: it just exists, as many other aspects of reality, which become naturalized in Eurosceptic discourse prevalent in analyzed commentaries.

<sup>19</sup> It is a concept of “authenticity” of one’s life, which stands for particular “human values”, destructed by EU and its politics of welfare state. And for the definition of this “authenticity”, it is “honour” which is presupposed to give satisfying explanation of the former one. With respect to nature of our data, we cannot explore the topic of authenticity in discourse of right-wing political ideology more fundamentally, although it could bring new insights into observation of Eurosceptic discourse. So, let us give a final short example: EU contributes to “úmyslná likvidace mezilidské autentické solidarity vytvářející vrstvy závislých na sociálních dávkách”.

**Scheme 3: Relationships in discourse of Greek economic crisis in commentaries of Mladá fronta Dnes in time of NP election campaign in 2010, portrayed in respect to distribution of power and political orientation.**

The **relationship between EU and Greece** is clearly asymmetrical: EU dictates conditions to provide financial help and Greece has to conform, “*se zjevnou nechutí a tichým nesouhlasem*”. In metaphoric expression, Greece has to “*držet naordinovanou dietu*”, while the EU is in the position of the subject who controls and punishes – although it is quite a restless and powerless doctor, as we have seen when discussing identity of EU<sup>20</sup>. When we remind the further division of identity of Greece resulting in two separate subjects, “Greek politicians” and “Greek ordinary people”, the relationship gets a bit more shifted and complicated at once. First, the relationship between the EU and “Greek politicians” is ambivalent: on the one hand, they are treated as peers (both are in position of political leaders), on the other one, “Greek politicians” are inevitably subordinated to EU (they have to conform its mandate). Interestingly, there is similar discourse strategy as explained in case of “European politics” – the expression is inseparably confused with leftist orientation. But are there really no right-wing politicians in Greece? The discourse silence about this gets pretty suspicious. In connection to overall strategy of Eurosceptic discourse it is intelligible: saying that right-wing politicians also took a share on Greek economic crisis would mean significant weakening of proposition that rightist political ideology can offer efficient “remedy” for crisis and thus, it would lead to lessening the difference between leftist and rightist politicians. This is evidently not desirable. As mentioned already, the issue is used as an ideological weapon of Eurosceptics and therefore, both its implementation in political struggle and adjusted interpretation has to be convincing. Taking into consideration the category of “Greek ordinary people”, we can designate it as powerless and subordinated both to “Greek politicians” (who never fulfil their election promises but cannot be punished for it) and to “European politicians/representatives of the EU” (who instruct ordinary Greeks to believe in consumption society, presented under label of social welfare). So, the power relations here are also rather asymmetrical.

When inspecting the **relationship between Greece and Czech Republic**, which subject is again divided into three separate ones, namely Czech Eurosceptic politicians, Czech Eurooptimistic politicians and Czech ordinary people, we see it is completely overseen. In respect to axis of power distribution, we can say that the subject of Czech Eurooptimistic politicians is by discourse strategies simply melted into category of leftist “European politicians” (which includes also “Greek politicians”, as we have seen) and subsequently, it is treated as evidently unimportant and irrelevant. Relationship between “ordinary people” from Greece and Czech Republic are not elaborated at all: the only common feature is their dependence on politicians. Here, we cannot conclude whether the power relations are symmetrical or asymmetrical, because they are practically non-existent.

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<sup>20</sup> Interestingly, this relationship also turns into story about how Greeks, ridiculing EU regarded as materialization of fairy-tale principle “*oslíčku, otřes se*” or as communion of “*blbí Frankové*”, were punished. However, the roles of the “bad” Greeks and “good” EU are more complicated than in fairy-tale. First, EU “*o kreativním řeckém účetnictví se přece po léta dobře věděla*” and this definitely does not contribute to its good image. Second, “*Atény zveřejňovaly chybné údaje ne proto, že by se snažily Brusel zmást či podvést, nýbrž proto, že neměly k dispozici vůbec žádné výchozí údaje*” – in here, EU failed in its role of controlling authority, which again does not contribute to its good image and mitigates the guilt of Greeks, portraying them as easy and careless people, not deceptive villains.

Considering the **relationship between the EU and Eurosceptics** we can base our observation on notion that the identities of EU are much more elaborated than those of its opponents and much more emphasis is laid on discrediting the former one than on presenting good characteristics of the latter one. Despite of this, the relationship is clear. First, it is pictured as in moment of radical change. It is declared that it could have been a relationship of friendship, or mutual respect at least, for "*rádi jsme si namlouvali, že existuje jedna evropská identita*". But this illusion is definitely over and it seems still more evident that "*ochota zodpovědnějších zemí a mezinárodních finančních institucí platit nezodpovědnost ostatních výrazně klesá*". So, it is declared that the relationship of competition between EU and Eurosceptics is much more apt for present situation. Second, judging the relationship from the point of view of power relations, the discourse gets ambivalent. On one hand, the discourse strategies aim to promote the view of Eurosceptics as intellectually and morally mature (against naïve and childish EU and all the leftist politicians). On the other one, it is worth to notice that in respect to the EU, Czech Eurosceptic behave much less superciliously than to their nearest political opponent (Czech Eurooptimistic politicians). Also, their endeavour to delegitimize the EU and legitimize own position instead implicates that in this case, it is more appropriate to speak of relation of power symmetry where the strength of both of the corrivals are balanced. To put it differently, the implicit and explicit meanings referring to this relationship are pretty discordant. This essential rupture in discourse enables us to see the structure it bears on as ideological rather than ingenious.

To clarify this point, we can look on the **relationship between the EU, or Eurosceptics respectively and "ordinary people"**. Bearing on already mentioned remark, there appears to be a clear, although vaguely defined relation of subordination between Eurosceptic politicians and ordinary people. For example, a headline of one of analysed commentaries says: "*dluhy vás doženou po každé*". This taken-for-granted knowledge of distribution of power continues with delimitation of participant's roles at the first paragraphs, where the reader (voter) is the one who asks questions and the author (politician) is the one who wisely and authoritatively answers them. We can see similar pattern in description of situation in Greece, where

většina z nich [obyčejných Řeků] vůbec nechápe, proč je šetření nezbytné, a nikdo z politiků se jim ani nesnaží situaci doopravdy vysvětlit.

We saw similar relation of subordination and dependence between the EU/leftist European politicians and ordinary people where the EU was told to influence people's decision and value systems. So, while the EU's leadership is heavily criticised for demystifying and stupefying all citizens of EU-member states, it gets still more presumable that Eurosceptics, which position is defined as contradictory one do not really want to change this principle, the relationship of subordination of "ordinary people". Again, it seems that the accentuated contradiction between those two subjects is just partial and illusory. Furthermore, it is more likely that Eurosceptic politicians prepare merely a substitution of political rulers and it is highly doubtless whether establishing their position would really mean an important turning point in redefinition of political system, which is so intensively propagated and promised to be put in practice under their government. Consequently, the one of key critical statements by which Eurosceptics try to delegitimize the EU, namely that of "the EU suffers from the democratic deficit", gets precarious and leads to a rupture in ideological surface of discourse, which seemed to be so

smooth and natural so far. From now on, we can underscore once more the finding that Czech politicians use European agenda instrumentally, for reaching their own specific goal because with discovering the first rupture in discourse, its ideology seeps gradually into the light.

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