1
Transformations of the EU Agenda in the Pre-Election Czech Press:
A Comparative Content and Discourse Analysis
Introduction
Public support for membership in the EU is dramatically declining in the Czech
Republic. The Pew research indicator “the EU favourable rating” showed that
support for the EU is lowest in the Czech Republic (Table 1). The EU has even more
support in Greece than in the Czech Republic. Since 2009 the belief that European
economic integration has weakened the national economy has increased by 22
percent in the Czech Republic. And, since 2007, the favourability of the European
Union as an organization has fallen by 20 percent in the Czech Republic.
Table 1: The EU favourable rating (%)
1. Poland 69% 5. Italy 59%
2. Germany 68% 6. Britain 45%
3. France 60% 7. Greece 37%
4. Spain 60% 8. Czech Republic 34%
Pew Research Center (May, 2012)
Besides the role of the economic crisis as one of the important variables
which emphasize these negative attitudes towards the EU, there are some other
deeper reasons which determine the fact that only one third of Czech citizens are
satisfied with membership in the EU. To explain this trend as traditional Czech Euroscepticism
is too vague. In our opinion, there have been two important variables
which have determined this weak identification of Czech citizens with the EU in the
long term. Firstly, there has been a general lack of concern by Czech political parties
in the EU agenda. Secondly, and as a consequence of the above, the mainstream
media accept the disinterest of the main political parties.
Our research project tried to continue in the relatively broad research field of
media representation of the EU agenda. However, there has been little research
dedicated to the representation of the EU agenda in the media coverage of the
national parliament (NP) agenda. This is where the present focus is situated.
The main objective of our research was to analyze trends in news media
strategies used in the last three NP election campaigns. We started with the 2002
campaign before the Czech Republic entered the EU, and compared this “zero
sample” with data collected in the 2006 and 2010 campaigns. In other words, we
tried to analyze how the media picture of the EU and its member states has been
transformed to see more clearly the change in the framing of the EU agenda. And
last but not least, we tried to analyze what role the Czech press has played in the
well-discussed process of Europeanization.
Theoretical background: the European public sphere, the process of
Europeanization and media representation of the EU
The mass media are considered to be the most important link between politics and
citizens, especially in the case of the rather remote and abstract EU politics (e.g.
paper připravený a odeslaný na konferenci XXII World Congress of Political Science, jež se pod záštitou
organizace International Political Science Association koná ve dnech 8.-12. července 2012 v Madridu
autoři: Marína Urbániková, Kateřina Kirkosová
2
Machill, Beiler, Fischer 2006). More specifically, the mass media can fasten and
deepen the European integration process by diffusing various ideas about
appropriate forms of political governance and portraying the EU as an important and
relevant entity influencing our everyday life, and by stressing the need for active
engagement and participation by citizens. In general, the research on agenda
setting, priming and framing shows that the mass media have a strong influence on
what issues people consider important and how they evaluate these issues, as well
as the actors involved (Shah et al. 2009). Moreover, almost two thirds of EU citizens
identify the media as their main source of political information about the EU
(Eurobarometer 2011).
Despite the crucial importance of the mass media in the process of political
governance at the EU level, the communication research unequivocally shows that
the EU agenda plays only a marginal role in media reporting (e.g. Machill, Beiler and
Fischer 2006, Peter and De Vreese 2004; Peter, Semetko and De Vreese 2003;
Leroy and Siune 1994). It comes therefore as no surprise that two thirds of EU
citizens claim that they are poorly informed on EU matters; in the case of the Czech
Republic it is even 70 % (Eurobarometer 2011).
Although the general conclusion of these studies is that the media coverage of
the EU agenda is rather poor, when looking closer at the coverage in specific time
periods, we come to a more differentiated picture. The analyses dealing with the
media representation of the EU in the national media can be divided into three main
groups: (1) an analysis of media coverage of the European Parliament elections (e.g.
Strömbäck et al. 2011; Peter et al. 2004; Kevin 2003; Leroy and Siune 1994; Blumler
1983; Siune 1983), (2) an analysis of media coverage confined to EU key events
such as the 1999 introduction of the euro (de Vreese et al. 2001), or crucial summits
of heads of government (Peter and de Vreese 2004; Semetko and Valkenburg
2000), and (3) an analysis of media coverage in non-key-event periods (Peter and
de Vreese 2004; Norris 2000). In general, the coverage of EU issues “tends to be
cyclical in nature, with coverage of the EU virtually absent from the news agenda
and then peaking around important EU events, to vanish off the agenda again” (De
Vreese et al. 2006: 481).
Theoretically, the interest in media coverage of EU issues is rooted in broader
concepts of democratic deficit and the European public sphere as one of its potential
cures. The European Union is based on the idea of democratic cooperation, which is
unthinkable without interaction between the member states and the engagement and
support of its people. However, it is often argued that the EU is inaccessible to
ordinary citizens, it lacks popular support, and its legitimacy is therefore at stake.
This democratic deficit can be perceived not only as a result of the EU institutional
design and its complex method of operating (Coultrap 1999, Kuper 1998), but also
as a result of a failure of communication between EU institutions and citizens, known
as the communication deficit (Meyer 1999).
More specifically, it is often argued that the EU is not sufficiently successful in
reaching its citizens and discussing political decisions because of the lack of the
European public sphere (e.g. De Vreese et al. 2006), or, in other words, because
of the public communication deficit (Schlesinger 1999). Ideally, political decisions
should be discussed within the public spheres, where “the public discussions about
the exercise of political power are both critical in intent and institutionally guaranteed”
(Habermas 1974: 50). The public sphere is a precondition for the realization of
popular sovereignty because it enables critical discussion without any limitations,
autonomous opinion formation, and empowers citizens to influence the decision
3
makers (Bruggemann and Schulz-Forberg 2009). However, it seems that the
European public sphere, conceived as a vision of an open forum of exchange among
citizens and political elites on matters of common interest that transcend the borders
of the member states, is only at the beginning of its development (e.g. Machill, Beiler
and Fischer 2006, Trenz 2004), or, according to some authors (Peter and De Vreese
2004; Peter, Semetko and De Vreese 2003), does not exist at all.
In the literature, the European public sphere is conceptualized in two different
ways (Machill, Beiler and Fischer 2006): it is perceived as a pan-European public
sphere independent of national states or as a sphere that emerges as a result of the
Europeanization of the national public spheres. The arguments against the first view
are clear: several crucial preconditions of the pan-European public sphere are
absent, especially a common language, and the existence of mass media with an
EU-wide reach (Machill, Beiler and Fischer 2006). The transnational media are
rather rare and do not reach broad audiences the way national media do
(Brüggemann, Schulz-Forberg 2009).
Therefore, the attention of the researchers is mostly focused on the second
view, conceiving the European public sphere as the result of a Europeanization of
national public spheres, most importantly the national media. The core idea builds on
Deutsch’s (1953) concept of transnationalization, referring to a process of
intensified interactions across borders as opposed to interaction within national
borders. Europeanization can be perceived as a form of transnationalization limited
to the member states of the European Union (Brüggemann and Kleinen-von
Königslöw 2009), specifically as a form of transnationalization of the reporting in the
national media.
Europeanization is not a homogenous process; in this sense, two basic forms
are distinguished: vertical Europeanization, which means paying closer attention to
the EU as a whole and its institutions and politicians, and horizontal
Europeanization, which means increasingly taking account of what happens in the
other member states of the EU. The interplay of the two ways of Europeanization
forms four different patterns of Europeanization (Brüggemann, Kleinen-von
Königslöw 2009): (1) comprehensive Europeanization, combining high levels of both
vertical and horizontal Europeanization; (2) segmented Europeanization,
characterized by the presence of vertical and the absence of horizontal
Europeanization; (3) Europeanization aloof from the EU, which means horizontal
without vertical Europeanization; and (4) a parochial public sphere with neither
vertical nor horizontal Europeanization.
Methodology
This study aims to analyze the hot phase (the last three weeks before election day)
of the last three Czech NP election campaigns (in 2002, 2006, and 2010). Unlike
previous studies, which concentrated either on a key-events period or routine
periods, this study focuses on the period which is from the EU perspective neither
strictly key-event nor routine, and which is at the same time a period of intensified
electorate/audience attention. To put it simply, the EU and its institutions plays an
increasingly important role in the political governance of the member states, and thus
also in the everyday life of its citizens. At the time of the NP election campaigns, the
EU agenda in general, and the attitude of the national political parties towards the
EU in particular, should have been an important part of the media coverage of the
campaigns. We are therefore interested in answering the question of to which extent
4
the EU agenda is present in the media coverage of the Czech NP election
campaigns.
The goal of this article is to contribute to the body of research on the
European public sphere and to explore the media coverage of the EU agenda in the
hot phase of the Czech NP election campaigns. More specifically, in order to detect
possible trends in development, the last three campaigns are examined – 2002
(before the Czech Republic entered the EU), 2006, and 2010.
The main research question goes as follows: How has the media coverage
of the EU agenda (i.e. the agenda of the EU and its member states) changed in the
last three Czech NP election campaigns? In particular, we focus on four specific subissues,
leading to the following four subsidiary questions.
Firstly, we are interested in the visibility of the EU agenda. The first
subsidiary research question is therefore as follows: What were the trends of the
EU agenda coverage in the last three Czech NP election campaigns? The question
is motivated by the assumption that the visibility of the EU in the media is a
precondition of public concern and participation in EU matters. Moreover, the greater
visibility of EU matters is related to knowledge gains about the EU (De Vreese and
Boomgaarden 2006). The visibility is given by the frequencies of the articles in the
selected time periods; besides this, we also examine the prominence of these
articles (number of words, page number, and genre composition).
We suppose that visibility is a condition sine qua non for the emergence of the
European public sphere; it is also necessary to take into account the content and the
meaning of the articles referring to EU issues. The second subsidiary research
question is therefore stated as: What are the thematic and meaning transformations
of the EU agenda? More specifically, we focused on the rhetorical means used for
denoting the EU, the actors of the articles on the EU agenda, the figures through
which the EU agenda is represented, the referred policy fields of the EU agenda,
and news frames (central organizing ideas) used by journalists in articles dealing
with EU issues.
Given the overall importance of the EU in both Czech and foreign politics, one
could expect that in the media coverage of the NP election campaigns, the leaders of
political parties would comment on the EU agenda, and present their stance towards
EU matters to the potential electorate. Moreover, the position of the political parties
towards the EU can potentially serve as an argument in the election battle, and a
means of their differentiation from each other. The third subsidiary research
question therefore is: To what extent does the EU agenda serve as a direct election
campaigns agent?
Last but not least, generally we will analyze the coverage of EU issues in
terms of the Europeanization of the Czech press media. Specifically, we evaluate the
results from the viewpoint of four different patterns of Europeanization (Brüggemann,
Kleinen-von Königslöw 2009), and examine to what extent the analyzed mainstream
press participate in horizontal or vertical Europeanization.
We focused on the quality press, specifically the nationwide dailies MF Dnes1
,
Lidove noviny2
, Hospodarske noviny3
, and Pravo4
. According to previous research,
1
This is the Czech quality newspaper with the highest circulation (with a circulation of 221,000 copies per day
in 2011). It is of a mainstream orientation and politically right-of-centre.
2
This is aimed at younger and better educated readers, and it is of a right-of-centre political orientation. In 2011
its circulation was over 42,000 copies per day.
5
EU issues are considered to be too complex and uninteresting for the media; the
journalists often claim that the distance between Brussels and newsrooms in the
member states creates a barrier, the EU decision making is too slow for the
television news format, and that it is too difficult to access EU institutions and get
inside its bureaucratic language (De Vreese 2003). D´Haenens (2005) also notes
that in today’s profit-oriented and downsized newsrooms, it is often difficult for
journalists to take the time to gather information on rather complex EU issues.
Moreover, increased competition has led to a tendency towards sensationalism and
trivialization, which further decreases the interest of the media in EU matters. The
quality press, which should be a storefront of critical discussion on serious matters,
should be discouraged by these obstacles and touched by these trends to the least
extent compared to other media segments.
In order to explore the coverage of EU issues, the relevant articles were
content analyzed.5
We conceptualized the EU agenda as content referring to the EU
as a whole and/or an agenda referring to the member states. The articles used in the
content analysis were selected on the following basis: by an article referring to the
EU agenda, we mean an article discussing the topic(s) related to the EU as a whole,
and/or to the member states, both in the case where it serves as a dominant issue or
a minor issue of the article. In the next step, since we were interested in the EU
agenda in the specific context of the Czech NP election campaigns, only the articles
with an explicit reference to the Czech domestic agenda were selected. According to
this multi-criteria selection we eventually analyzed 2668 articles. The time period is
restricted to the hot phase of the last three Czech NP elections campaign, i.e. the
three weeks before election day.
Consequently, a critical discourse analysis was performed using a selection of
these articles in order to further investigate the process of framing EU issues. All the
selected articles referred to the Greek economic crisis, which proved to be a
dominant6
sub-agenda of the election campaign in 2010.
Results and findings
The key trends in EU representation: declining visibility, increasing reflection
As a starting point for further analysis, we first investigate the main trends of the EU
coverage - more specifically, the visibility of the EU agenda and its prominence
(number of words, page number and genre composition). Visibility is considered to
be an essential basis for a sufficient knowledge of EU issues and a precondition of
public concern and participation in EU matters. However, in the case of the media
coverage of the Czech NP election campaigns, this precondition is not being fulfilled.
As can be seen in Table 2, the visibility of the EU agenda in the hot phase of the NP
election campaigns is rather low and has a clearly declining trend. In 2002, in each
daily issue of the four dailies, almost 15 articles dealing with the EU agenda were
3
This is a daily specializing in economic matters, also of a right-of-centre political orientation. In 2011 its
circulation was over 42,000 copies per day.
4
This is the only daily with a left-of-centre political orientation. In 2011, its circulation was over 119,000 copies
per day.
5
The content analysis was carried out by the team of 14 coders trained and supervised by the authors of the
research project.
6
More specifically, 21 % of the articles dealing with the EU agenda in 2010 referred to this topic.
6
published compared to 14 in 2006 and only 10 in 2010.7
In general, compared to
2002, the number of articles dealing with the EU agenda decreased by almost one
third in 2010.
This would suggest that the EU agenda, in spite of the growing importance of
the EU to national politics and the life of citizens, plays a marginal and weakening
role in the media agenda before the NP elections. Paraphrasing the description of
the EP elections as the second-order elections, we can say that the EU agenda is
the Nth order
NP campaign agenda, being more and more neglected over time.
Table 2: The frequency of articles in the Czech left-wing and right-wing
dailies
DAILIES 2002 2006 2010 TOTAL
Left-wing (Pravo) 255 (25%) 240 (25%) 147 (21%) 642 (24%)
Right-wing (MF Dnes,
Lidove noviny,
Hospodařské noviny)
748 (75%) 730 (75%) 548 (79%) 2026 (76%)
Total 1003 (100%) 970 (100%) 695 (100%) 2668 (100%)
There are almost no differences in the number of news stories between the
left-wing (rather “Euro-optimistic”) and the average of the right-wing (rather Eurosceptic)
dailies. As mentioned before, a sharp decline in the absolute number of
articles occurred in 2010, which can be seen both on the side of the left-wing and
right-wing dailies (by 28 % and 41 % respectively compared to 2002). In this year, a
significant difference can be seen between the dailies: the number of articles
published in the right-wing dailies is 20 % higher than the number of articles
published in the left-wing daily. This suggests the pro-EU voice is clearly weakening.
The mere number of articles dealing with the EU agenda is not the only
indicator of its importance to the daily broadsheet press: the two other indicators at
disposal are the average number of words per article, and the average page number
of the articles (both summarized in Table 3; for this analysis, only articles having the
EU agenda as their main topic were selected).
Table 3: The prominence of the articles with the EU agenda as their main topic
(N=2668)
Year 2002 2006 2010 Total
average
Left-wing
daily
average number of words per
article
375 305 328 332
average page number 8.2 12.2 12 11
Right-wing
dailies
average number of words per
article
336 379 495 419
average page number 9.6 11.9 10.5 10.8
Total average number of words per
article
356 342 411 376
average page number 8.9 12 11.2 10.9
7
The computation: 4 dailies (3 of them with 6 issues a week, 1 of them with 5 issues a week), three weeks,
altogether 69 issues per period; the average number of news stories concerning the EU agenda in 2002 was
(1003/69) = 14.5; in 2006 it was (970/69)= 14.1; in 2010 it was (695/69)=10.1.
7
They suggest that the right-wing media open space for longer texts, which
contradicts the general trends of the commercialization and tabloidization of the
press, which leads to the shortening of articles. However, the price for the increased
length of the articles is their shift to the back (less prominent) pages of the issues:
from 2002 to 2010, the articles moved back two pages. It seems to us that this move
to the back indicates a tendency to publish more analytical texts about the EU.
The trend of lengthening the articles and their shift to the back may have
something to do with the change in genre composition, more specifically with a
decrease in the number of news stories and an increase in the number of
commentaries. In general, this could mean a more reflexive approach to EU issues.
As summarized in Graph 1, at a time of an overall decrease in the number of articles
dealing with the EU agenda, the number of commentaries increased by more than
10 %. On the other hand, the number of news stories decreased by 40 %. As an
analytical genre, commentaries are usually longer than news stories and are placed
on the back pages of an issue, which would explain the already mentioned increase
in the average number of words per article and the shift of the articles to the back of
the issues.
Graph 1: Genre composition
Another indicator of the positions of the EU agenda in the Czech press is
whether this agenda plays a major or a minor role in the articles, i.e. whether it
serves as the major topic (the EU issue is the dominant issue of the article) or a
minor topic (the article contains rhetorical references to the EU or the member
states, but the EU issue is not its dominant issue). Graph 2 shows that the EU
agenda is most often mentioned as a minor topic (as it is in three quarters of the
articles in 2010). However, the ratio of these articles is changing: in 2002, out of all
articles referring to the EU agenda, 11 % mentioned the EU as a major topic, while in
2010, the proportion rose to 25 %. This suggests that in some sense the importance
of the EU and its agenda has slightly increased.
Graph 2: Contextualization of the EU agenda: the main topic or a minor topic?
Key: The percentages represent the proportion of articles having the EU agenda as their major/minor
issue from all the articles published in the given time period.
8
The EU agenda can be mediated to the readers either in the form of news
about the EU as a whole, in the form of news about the EU member states or a
combination of both. Most of the articles on the EU issues come to Czech readers in
the form of news on the member states, which suggests that the EU agenda enters
the Czech media somehow indirectly, through the backdoor. Although in 2002 the
analyzed dailies paid as much attention to the EU as a whole as to the member
states, in 2006 and in 2010 there were considerably more articles referring to the
member states rather than the EU as a whole. The absolute number of articles
dealing with the EU as a whole decreased by 40 % between the years 2002 and
2010.
Another indicator of media attention paid to the member states is the number
of articles which do not refer to any of them; it this respect, it seems that the visibility
of the member states in the Czech quality press increases. In 2002, 64 % (641 out of
1003 articles) of the articles dealing with the EU agenda did not refer to any member
state; in 2006 this proportion decreased to 53 % (517 out of 970 articles), and in
2010 it further decreased to 35 % (245 out of 695 articles).
From the viewpoint of their media coverage, who are the visible and invisible
neighbours of the Czech Republic? The results, reported in Table 4, are consistent
with the concept of news values. Attention is motivated by the value of proximity
(from all the member states, one fifth of the references point to the four Visegrad
countries), reference to elite nations (in the case of France it is 8 %, in the case of
the UK it is 6 %), negativity (reporting on a country in crisis, Greece – 15 % of all of
the references in 2010), and conflict (reporting on the German-Czech dispute – 34 %
of all of the references in 2002). Moreover, we can see with the example of Greece
in 2010 that the news value of negativity overrides the news values of proximity and
affiliation to elite nations.
Throughout the analyzed time periods, the most prominent position
consistently belongs to Germany: out of all references to the member states in 2002,
40 % were related to Germany; the proportion decreased to 21 % and 20 % in the
following periods. This drop may be explained by the massive attention dedicated to
the Czech/German relationship (specifically the issue of the Benes Decrees) in the
2002 campaign, and the abandonment of this topic in the campaigns in 2006 and
2010. In 2010, considerable attention was dedicated to Greece: this is related to the
presence of the strong Greek sub-agenda in the 2010 campaign. Relatively a lot of
attention was dedicated to the neighbouring countries of the Czech Republic, i.e.
Slovakia, Poland and Austria, as well as Hungary as the fourth country of the
Visegrad Group, and to France and the UK as traditionally significant EU member
states.
Table 4: Reporting on the EU member states: frequency and proportion
2002 2006 2010 TOTAL
Germany 227 (34%) 195 (21%) 178 (20%) 600
Greece 16 (2%) 15 (1%) 129 (15%) 160
France 58 (9%) 73 (8%) 65 (7%) 196
Great Britain 43 (6%) 69 (7%) 47 (5%) 159
V4 (Slovakia, Hungary, Poland) 36 (5%) 238 (25%) 200 (22%) 554
Austria 90 (13%) 77 (8%) 45 (5%) 212
Others 199 (30%) 272 (29%) 226 (25%) 697
Total 669 (100%) 939 100%) 890 100%) 2498
9
Who speaks in the name of the EU?
After an initial mapping of the terrain in terms of visibility and prominence of the
articles referring to the EU agenda, we looked more closely at the origin of the actors
who communicate the EU agenda in the analyzed articles. In short, our questions
were: “Who speaks in the name of the EU?” and “What and who is most often hidden
under the term ‘EU’?” Furthermore, in its media coverage, is the EU associated with
the EU institutions, EU policies, and EU politicians, or, alternatively, is it used just as
a label without any content and further specification? In this respect, according to the
results summarized in Table 5, it seems that Czech journalists have learned to report
on the EU agenda in a more structured way, and that they have incorporated the EU
institution in their journalistic routines. However, in its media coverage, the EU still
suffers from the invisibility of its representatives.
Table 5: What represents the EU?
2002 2006 2010 TOTAL
EU policies 240 (73%) 188 (65%) 177 (71%) 605 (70%)
EU institutions 254 (78%) 200 (69%) 219 (88%) 673 (78%)
EU politicians 38 (12%) 52 (18%) 32 (13%) 122 (14%)
Total number of articles 327 289 248 864
The EU is less and less often used as a blank term in the articles: the
proportion of articles decreased from 50 % in 2002 (304 out of 604 articles) to 34 %
in 2010 (130 out of 384 articles). In the case where the EU is not used only as a
blank term, it is most often associated with EU institutions (in 78 % of the articles),
and EU policies (in 70 % of the articles). However, the EU policies and institutions
are not personalized: the proportion of articles referring to EU politicians constitutes
only 14 %. This corresponds to the previous finding suggesting that the EU
representatives are not present in media coverage, which would turn the EU into a
representative democracy with invisible representatives.
In this sense, it seems that even after six years of EU membership, the Czech
press journalists had not got used to addressing and quoting EU actors, and so EU
politics appears faceless in its media coverage. As summarized in Table 6, the
actors representing the EU institutions constitute only a marginal fraction of all the
actors (8 %); the articles are clearly dominated by actors representing the Czech
Republic (more than three quarters of all the actors).
Table 6: The origin of the actors
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
Actors representing Czech
subjects
439 (70%) 562 (75%) 345 (69%) 1346 (72%)
Actors representing EU institutions 53 (8%) 57 (8%) 37 (7%) 147 (8%)
Actors representing member states 117 (19%) 98 (13%) 97 (20%) 312 (17%)
Actors representing other subjects 20 (3%) 29 (4%) 18 (4%) 67 (3%)
Total 629 (100%) 746 (100%) 497(100%) 1872(100%)
10
The number of actors from the member states is double that of the actors
representing the EU as a whole. The ratios of actors representing Czech subjects,
the EU institutions, the member states, and other subjects remain stable and do not
significantly vary in the inspected time periods. This suggests that the editorial
orientation of the Czech quality press is led by a rigid media logic and media
routines.
The EU agenda as a direct election campaigns agent?
After analyzing the visibility and the prominence of the EU agenda in the media
coverage of the Czech NP election campaigns, and the thematic and meaning
transformation of this agenda, we will continue by investigating the role the EU
agenda plays in the media coverage of the Czech NP election campaigns. Given the
overall importance of the EU in both Czech national and foreign politics, one could
expect that in the media coverage of the NP election campaigns, the leaders of
political parties would comment on the EU agenda, and present their stance towards
EU matters to the potential electorate. Moreover, the position of the political parties
towards the EU can potentially serve as an argument in the election battle and a
means of their differentiation towards each other.
In this section, we therefore look at the EU agenda from the viewpoint of its
use as a means for supporting or weakening particular political parties. In other
words, we are interested in the articles in which the EU agenda helps to differentiate
between the political parties. In this respect, it seems that the EU agenda plays only
a very limited role in the media coverage of the NP election campaigns, which is,
moreover, further decreasing. As depicted in Graph 3, this applies to both the leftwing
daily and the right-wing dailies. From 2002 to 2010, the overall number of the
articles in which the EU agenda is used as an argument supporting or weakening
specific political parties decreased by one half. Put in another way: while in 2002, 11
% of all the articles on the EU agenda used the above mentioned argumentation, in
2010 the proportion decreased to 8 %. The proportion is higher in the right-wing
dailies consistently throughout the analyzed periods, but we should keep in mind that
while among the Czech quality press there are three right-wing dailies, there is only
one left-wing daily. Overall, these results again lead to the conclusion that the EU
agenda is only a minor agenda in the media representation of the NP election
campaigns.
Graph 3: The use of the EU agenda as an argument in the election campaigns
Looking closer at the use of the EU agenda as an argument in the election
campaigns coverage, it can be noted that from the viewpoint of the attribution of
these arguments to specific parties, EU issues are largely neglected by both the
11
Euro-optimistic and the Euro-pessimistic parties, i.e. regardless of the parties’ stance
towards the EU. Moreover, the attention paid to the EU agenda has a decreasing
tendency in both camps. In the bloc of Euro-optimistic parties, the EU agenda was
used as an argument 50 times in 2010, while in the bloc of Euro-pessimistic parties,
it was only used 37 times. However, it should be noted that there are only two Europessimistic
parties and seven Euro-optimistic parties. From this point of view,
considering that there are just two Euro-pessimistic parties compared to seven Eurooptimistic
parties, their voice is more vociferous. Although being in the minority, they
are clearly not afraid of being isolated, and they speak out. Considering public
opinion formation and change, this does not create the conditions for a spiral of
silence (Noelle-Neumann 1974).
Political parties can use the EU agenda as an argument in election campaigns
in two different ways: in an anti-EU (Euro-pessimistic) way or in a pro-EU (Eurooptimistic)
way. In spite of the Euro-sceptic image of the Czech Republic, in the
media coverage of all the three NP election campaigns, the frequency of the pro-EU
arguments overrides the frequency of the anti-EU arguments. As summarized in
Table 7, the dominance of the pro-EU arguments is fairly significant: compared to the
anti-EU arguments, their frequency is twofold in 2002 and 2010, and even threefold
in 2010. Again, it can be noted that the use of the arguments, both pro-EU and antiEU,
has a decreasing tendency.
Table 7: Political parties: pro-EU and anti-EU arguments
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
Pro-EU 88 (62 %) 91 (73%) 49 (64%) 228 (66%)
Anti-EU 54 (38%) 34 (27%) 28 (36%) 116 (34%)
Total 142 (100%) 125 (100%) 77 (100%) 344 (100%)
Here there is the suggestion that the trend of overall decrease of the use of
pro-EU and anti-EU arguments in the media coverage of the election campaigns
goes hand in hand with the trend of homogenization and neutralization of political
arguments. In the media coverage of the election campaigns, the differences
between the parties which are considered Euro-optimistic and Euro-pessimistic are
diminishing and fading out, suggesting to the readers that firstly the EU agenda is
not worthy of attention and contestation, and secondly that the stance of the parties
towards the EU cannot serve as a criterion for their differentiation.
In general, it seems that the EU agenda serves the interests of the national
political representatives - the use of the conflict frame as well as the frequency of the
articles reporting on specific member states indicate that the decisive factor of EU
agenda coverage is the current interest of the Czech politicians in the specific subagendas
pursued in particular election campaigns.
Conspicuous criticism, inconspicuous acceptance: the thematic EU agenda
and its framing
After analyzing how EU visibility in the articles has progressed and the actors
communicating EU issues, we continue by investigating the reported policy fields of
the EU agenda. In other words we stay before the two key questions: “What are the
12
topics through which the EU agenda is represented?” and “How have Czech dailies
framed the EU agenda?” The answers are presented in the following tables and
graphs.
Firstly, Table 8 clearly indicates that the EU is increasingly being reduced to
the economic agenda. Out of all the policy fields mentioned in the articles in 2002, 32
% were economic issues, and their proportion rose to 51 % in 2010. This means that
every second mentioned policy field is economics, with a significant lead over all the
other policy fields. The opposite trend is visible in the issues of foreign/security
policy; the proportion of this policy field declined by two thirds from 2002 to 2010.
This drop could be explained by the high importance of the issue of the Benes
Decrees in the campaign of 2002.
We can understand these results as one of the indicators of the
economization of the EU agenda in media coverage, i.e. the reduction of the idea of
a common European Union as a community of values to a mere exchange of goods
and services. It is a de facto approval of the Euro-sceptic argument that the EU
makes sense only as a mutually profitable economic area so long as it does not
infringe national economic legislation.
Table 8: Issues of the EU agenda: policy fields
AGENDA 2002 2006 2010 TOTAL
Economics, monetary policy, euro, market/
competition, the EU funds
32% 42% 51% 41%
National politics 17% 15% 12% 15%
Constitutional and institutional affairs 2% 6% 4% 4%
Employment/social policy, health and consumers 7% 10% 6% 8%
Education/culture/sport, science and technology 10% 10% 8% 9%
Agrarian policy 3% 1% 1% 2%
Environment 1% 4% 4% 3%
Regional policy 2% 1% 2% 1%
Foreign/security policy 20% 6% 6% 12%
Other 5% 5% 6% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100 100
Besides the manifest content of the articles dealing with the EU issues, we
also focus on their less apparent aspect, specifically the frames. We understand
frames as the central organizing ideas of the articles and as tools which suggest how
the issues (in our case, EU issues) should be conceptualized.
At first, we explored the use of pro-EU and anti-EU frames, then we turned to
the frame interpreting the EU as “our” or “their” institution. Afterwards, we
investigated the use of frames conceptualizing the relation of the Czech Republic
with the EU as a whole and with the member states: the frames of comparison,
cooperation, and conflict.
In general, the overall tone of the articles is still rather favourable towards the
EU, although the pro-EU voice is rapidly weakening, as can be seen in Graph 4. The
number of articles with an pro-EU frame decreased by more than 40 % from 2002 to
2010; the number of articles with an anti-EU frame remained more or less the same
in spite of a general decrease in the number of articles dealing with EU issues. The
proportion of articles containing an anti-EU frame rose from 10 % to 13 % from 2002
to 2010. This indicates the strengthening trend of criticism towards the EU.
In further inspecting the use of the pro-EU and the anti-EU frames, what
specific benefits or weak points of the EU are accentuated in media coverage? The
13
results indicate, in accordance with our previous findings, the economization of the
EU agenda, suggesting that the EU is mostly portrayed as an entity whose greatest
asset is a pay-off (either economic or something other than strictly economic) to the
members. On the other hand, in its media coverage, the EU is depicted as an
organization which fails at solving problems, and moreover, which threatens national
sovereignty.
Graph 4: The number of articles with pro-EU and anti-EU frames
As shown in Table 9, the most frequent pro-EU frames are the frames of the
EU contribution to economic development (11 % of all the articles in 2010), and
something other than economic development (12 % in 2010). The usage of all the
pro-EU frames has a clearly declining tendency.
Table 9: Pro-EU frames
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
The EU contributes to peace 34(3%) 13 (3%) 18 (3%) 65 (2%)
The EU contributes to freedom 25 (3%) 13 (1%) 11 (2%) 49 (2%)
The EU contributes to economic
development
89 (9%) 73 (8%) 73(11%) 235 (9%)
The EU contributes to something
other than economic development
109 (11%) 74 (8%) 81 (12%) 264(10%)
Another pro-EU frame 82 (8%) 61 (6%) 28 (4%) 171(6%)
When considering the anti-EU framing of the EU agenda, it seems that in its
media coverage, the main points of criticism are that the EU threatens national
sovereignty, and that it is incapable of solving important problems. As summarized in
Table 10, the proportion of the articles framing the EU as a threat to national
sovereignty rose by almost 50 % from 2002 to 2010 (from 42 to 62).
Table 10: Anti-EU frames
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
Disability of the EU to solve substantive
problems due to bureaucracy
16 (2%) 34 (4%) 34 (5%) 84 (3%)
The EU as a threat to national
sovereignty
42 (4%) 39 (4%) 62 (9%) 143 (5%)
The EU suffers from a democratic
deficit
17 (2%) 7 (1%) 9 (1%) 33 (1%)
The EU is a propagandistic concept 11(1%) 9 (1%) 2 (<1%) 22 (1%)
14
Another anti-EU frame 82 (8%) 61 (6%) 28 (4%) 171(6%)
The number of articles framing the EU as an institution unable to solve
substantive problems due to bureaucracy more than doubled from 2002 to 2010
(from 16 to 34). An important frame indicating the extent of the Czech acceptance of
the EU in its media coverage is the conceptualization of the EU as “our” or a
“foreign” institution. In this respect, one can see a clear move to framing the EU as
“our” institution, as “us”.
As demonstrated in Table 11, in 2002 (i.e. before entering the EU) the EU was
framed as a “foreign” institution in more than twice as many articles as it was framed
as “our” institution. This ratio was reversed in the subsequent years: in 2010, the EU
was almost four times as often framed as “our” institution as a “foreign” institution.
This can be considered as an indication of acceptance of the EU in its media
coverage in the Czech press.
Table 11: The “us” versus “them” frame
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
The EU as “our” institution 69 (27%) 162 (72%) 113 (78%) 344 (55%)
The EU as “foreign” institution 183 (73%) 63 (28%) 32 (22%) 278 (45%)
Total 252 (100%) 225(100%) 145 (100%) 622 (100%)
After analyzing the overall stance towards the EU in its media coverage and
the extent of its acceptation, we focus on the frames conceptualizing the relations of
the Czech Republic with the EU as a whole and with the member states: the frames
of comparison, cooperation, and conflict. The use of these frames could be
understood as an indicator of the extent to which the EU and the member states are
taken into consideration during the NP election media agenda.
In general, as can be seen in Graph 5, the use of all these frames has a
decreasing tendency, which suggests that from the viewpoint of the Czech dailies,
the EU and its member states are still less and less worthy of being taken into
account. By 2010, the use of the comparison frame took over the use of the
cooperation frame, which was the dominant frame in 2002. This could mean that
according to the media, after the goal of entering the EU had been accomplished,
the Czech-EU relationship cooled, with the EU and the member states serving
mostly as a benchmark but not as partners.
Graph 5: The number of articles with the cooperation frame, comparison frame
or conflict frame
15
More specifically, the number of articles using the frame of cooperation of the
Czech Republic and the EU/member states decreased by almost 40 % from 2002 to
2010. On the other hand, in the time of the overall decrease in the number of articles
dealing with EU issues, the use of the comparison frame decreased only slightly,
making it the most frequently used frame in 2010. This indicates the high importance
of the EU as an economic, political, and cultural point of reference. The use of the
conflict frame decreased rapidly by more than 80 % from 2002 to 2010; supposedly,
this was caused by the fact that in 2002 an important sub-agenda of the 2002 NP
election campaigns was the conflictual issue of the Czech-German relationship,
more specifically the issue of the Benes Decrees.
The next step in the analysis was the further exploration of the use of the
comparison, cooperation, and conflict frames. When considering the comparison
frame, the results summarized in Table 12 indicate that in the media coverage, the
benchmark for the Czech Republic is increasingly constituted by the member states,
not by the EU as a whole. In 2010, comparison with member states was indicated in
three times as many articles as comparison with the EU. Among all the member
states, Germany serves as the benchmark most often (in 20 % of cases), followed by
the Visegrad Group and neighbouring Austria, and France and the UK as
traditionally important member states. These results are consistent with the already
discussed overall frequency of the articles reporting on the specific member states
(Table 2), motivated by the news values of proximity, affiliation to elite nations and
negativity. Having a closer look on the agendas of comparison, we can again note
the importance of the economy. The proportion of this agenda, out of all the agendas
in which the Czech Republic was compared to the EU/member state(s), rose from 25
% in 2002 to 33 % in 2010. The political agenda remained stable with a constant
proportion of 23 %. This could be understood as another indicator of the
economization of the EU agenda in its media coverage.
Table 12: The frame of comparison with the EU and the member state(s)
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
Comparison with the EU Count 121 (1003) 99 (970) 73 (695) 293
% 12% 10% 11% 11%
Comparison with
member state(s)
Count 184 (1003) 260 (970) 219 (695) 663
% 18% 27% 32% 25%
Unlike the case of the comparison frame, the articles using the cooperation
frame mostly cast the Czech Republic as cooperating with the EU as a whole, not
with an individual member state. As seen in Table 13, in 2010 the frame of
cooperation with the EU as a whole was used in twice as many articles as the frame
of cooperation with member state(s), although it was vice versa in 2002. It can be
assumed that “cooperation” with the EU in fact means benefiting from the EU; thus,
these results could suggest that the Czech Republic bonds with the donor but looks
up to other member states for comparison. In other words, the dailies frame our
relationship with other member states as an inconspicuous rivalry.
16
Table 13: The frame of cooperation with the EU and member state(s)
Year Total
2002 2006 2010
Cooperation with the
EU
Count 214 (1003) 93 (970) 123 (695) 430 (2668)
% 21% 10% 18% 16%
Cooperation with
member state(s)
Count 262 (1003) 175 (970) 65 (695) (2668)
% 26% 18% 9% 19%
Where the conflict frame is used, who are the “enemies” of the Czech
Republic? As summarized in Table 14, the Czech Republic is most often depicted as
being in conflict with Germany (in 50 % of cases in 2002 and in 2006, and in 41 % of
cases in 2010), followed by the EU (22 % of cases in 2002, 12 % of cases in 2006
and 27 % in 2010). Conflicts with Austria, present in 2002, gradually disappeared,
while the quantitatively small conflict frame of “Greece” emerged in 2010.
Table 14: The conflict frame: Who are the “enemies” of the Czech Republic?
(number of articles)
2002 2006 2010 TOTAL
Germany 79 21 9 109
EU 35 5 6 46
Austria 22 5 2 29
Greece 0 0 2 2
Other 23 11 3 37
Total 159 42 22 223
Generally speaking, we see the role of situational political context or specific
sub-agendas in the media coverage of the analyzed election campaigns, as already
stated. In 2002, the coverage of the election campaign was dominated by the
conflictual issue of the Czech-German relationship, more specifically the issue of the
Benes Decrees: 17 % of all the articles dealing with EU issues referred to this topic.
This led to the frequent use of the conflict frame in this time period and to the
frequent depiction of Germany as the country with which the Czech Republic is in
conflict. The use of the conflict frame in this time period could also be marked by the
issue of Austrian animosity towards the Czech nuclear power station at Temelin. In
2010, an important sub-agenda of the election campaign was the Greek economic
crisis: in this period, 21 % of all the articles dealing with the EU issues referred to this
topic.
In the following discourse analysis, we will show how the media used this
special agenda to delegitimize the EU and in some sense try to shape the behaviour
of possible voters. Our preliminary two theses are the following: the portrayal of the
economic crisis in Greece was one-sided and it served predominantly as a means to
criticize the EU.
The sub-discourse of the Greek economic crisis in commentaries
In a content analysis, one of the significant movements in the media coverage of the
EU agenda at the time of the NP election campaigns was the clear increase of news
articles referring to one EU member state, Greece (from 16 articles in 2002 to 129
articles in 2010) This could be brought about by an intercorrelation of two factors:
firstly, the situation of the deep economic crisis in Greece is “newsworthy” in terms of
one news values: negativity. Secondly, the issue was picked up by right-wing
17
politicians and was made into one of the fundamental themes in the respective NP
election campaign, serving almost exclusively the aim of discrediting left-wing
political opponents. In this part, we will try to explore what ideological effects both of
these preliminary observations could have and how they influence meaning
structures more broadly.
In our analysis, we draw on Fairclough’s view on discourse as social practice,
supposing that discourses “do not just reflect or represent social entities and
relations, they construct or constitute them” (Fairclough 1992: 3). The analysis as
conducted here does not fully comply with Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for
critical discourse analysis, mostly for the reasons of our different research aims. As
already mentioned, the CDA presented here was carried out to function as a case
study and this decision was based on the motivation to look in more detail at the
process of framing the EU agenda in the Czech quality press during the NP election
campaign. We specified the discourse under analysis as the “discourse of the Greek
economic crisis in the commentaries of Mladá fronta Dnes (MFD)8
during the NP
election campaign in 2010”. We will focus on three interrelated aspects of discourse:
the representation of reality, the identities set up for those involved and the
relationships set up between those involved (Fairclough 1994: 5). With the proposed
modifications of Fairclough’s original model of CDA, we need to reformulate these
three key aspects of discourse as well. In the first feature, the representation of
reality, we concentrate on events and the connection built between them. In its
second feature, we will draw on the identities of subjects directly acting in these
events (therefore, we have to marginalize the identities of the producer and reader in
a broader sense and background the processes of production, distribution and
consumption). Thirdly, we will look at the relationships between subjects identified
in the previous step (so similarly, we have to neglect the relationships between the
producer and reader in a broader sense). Our key aim was to analyze MFD
coverage of the Greek economic crisis and the representation of the EU in this
discourse.
The representation of reality
In the first step of the analysis, we focused on the ways reality is represented in our
subject matter, the discourse of the Greek economic crisis in the commentaries of
Mladá fronta Dnes during the NP election campaign in 2010. Firstly, we concentrated
on which events and processes represented in the analyzed sub-discourse were
foregrounded and which were backgrounded, and secondly, what connections were
constructed between those events and processes.
The most prominent event referred to was the Greek economic crisis. The
representation of this event is strangely reified: demonstrations in Athens and the
resentment of ordinary Greek people was the prevalent and almost only piece of
information the reader got about the contemporary situation in Greece. The wrath of
the Greeks was presented as irrational (these “raging crowds of people throwing fire
bottles, who do not even know whom they are protesting against”) and as illogical
because they evidently just “have to pay for the luxurious way of life they were used
to”.
8
The chosen daily, Mladá fronta Dnes, is the most widely read quality newspaper in the Czech
Republic and so with respect to its intermediate position in the dialectical movement between social
structure and social agents (Hall 1982), it can both reflect and influence the status quo.
18
MFD connected the Greek economic crisis agenda with the crisis in the EU as
a whole. The case of Greece was exploited by MFD as a means of talking about
something else, to vindicate a particular ideology while staying so well hidden. It is
claimed that it is time to realize that “we, Europeans, have become a dumb herd of
consumers” and that we have to become “responsible”, morally and economically.
Furthermore, we need to recognize that persuading the general public about these
facts will be no easy task for “too long, politicians have taught the people they have
rights and that they can demand [things].” However, as discourse strategies teaches
us, it is highly desirable (if not necessary) to overcome the contemporary “European
decrepitude of pseudo-social welfare”. Of course, it has to be done as soon as
possible because “the threat of the significant decline of the living standards of large
parts of the population, as has happened in countries governed by populists,” is too
dangerous to be neglected any longer.
Retracing the discourse strategies attentively, we can discern that the longterm
aim of the discourse is to delegitimize the European Union as such, its ideals,
institutions and overall politics. The main feature of critique of the EU is its
immoderately leftist political orientation. Saying this, we can draw attention to
another key aspect of the analyzed discourse: besides preferring right-wing political
ideology, it tends to be more Euro-sceptic.
The second foregrounded event was the ongoing restructuring movements
and growing perturbation in the eurozone and, conjointly with reference to the NP
election campaign, discussions about adopting the euro in the Czech Republic. We
can extend our observation about the tight connection constructed between the
European and Greek economic crisis by enhancing it with some further statements.
For instance, it is declared that in paying attention exclusively to the latter, “we
cannot see the whole of Europe burning”. Of course, for any reasonable person it
must be evident that the economic crisis in Greece is a “much deeper problem
affecting the whole of Europe”, or in other words, it has become “a question of the
existence of the eurozone”. As in the previous event, when the reader got the reified
image of furious Greeks demonstrating against enforced financial cuts, now the
picture is again simplified and one-sided. The key activity representing the whole
event is that the political leaders of the EU cannot reach a compromise about how to
proceed in the case of Greece9
and because of this lack of mutual understanding
their suggestions are sometimes “acts of pure desperation”. For these reasons,
which from the Euro-sceptic point of view serve as a small but satisfactory example
of the striking incompetence of the EU, it is not advisable to rave either about further
integration of the EU or about Czech entry into the eurozone. Furthermore, it is
claimed that:
People understand each year more and more that the euro is not a magic pill and that it
is not going to make them wealthier. On the contrary, they realize the risks and problems
introduced by the common currency more clearly. They see that the Czech crown works
well for us. However, nobody knows what the euro will bring about. Why then give up the
Czech crown?
This strengthens the positive portrayal of “us”, the negative representation of
“them” and the EU as a confused and incompetent organization.
9
And more importantly, “if Greece will finally get the financial help, it will not be because of solidarity and
Europeanism. It will be because of caginess for this help will be cheaper that failure of Greece as a debtor”. This
example clearly shows a discourse strategy to deny the relevance of the concept of a common European identity
and to persuade the general public about its mythic character. For the financial aid is not to help a “brother in
need”, but to lessen the risk of one’s own loss.
19
The third event set out as noteworthy was the challenge of opening a serious
discussion about the future political orientation of the EU. It is said that the
contemporary economic and moral crisis in Europe has a certain positive aspect,
which in a way mitigates all of those features which were deeply depressing and
disgruntling. It helps us realize the crucial fact that “Europe is at a crossroads”. So, it
gives us an opportunity to overcome narrow-minded and mostly bureaucratic
discussions about common EU norms for everything and to take a look at Europe
more attentively and more critically. The Euro-sceptic discourse predominant in the
analyzed commentaries starts the polemics over the future political orientation of the
EU with statements like “all today’s Greek problems are the result of a deeply
dysfunctional political system”, or “this is a live show of the crisis of the welfare state
of the socialist type in many European countries”. Furthermore, it is claimed that:
The effects even of the most sophisticated austerity measures will wear off if there
cannot be found a way to change the dynamics of the political system.
It needs to be admitted that the EU misapplied the concept of social welfare
and by doing this it contributed to the unprecedented spread of ideas of the
consumption society. Here, the case of Greece again serves as an apt illustration of
the overall situation in Europe, since:
The Greeks did the same as the whole Caucasian world. They lived beyond their means.
They borrowed money and did not care when and how they would repay their debts. This
is called the welfare state, solidarity, social justice. But these are just lies, leading not to
beneficent, but contemptible ends: to political corruption.
The fourth significant event was the setting up of a discursive struggle over
European identity. We could express the main features of this frankly by
proclaiming that “Europeanism ended in our own purses”. With the great help of the
representation of the EU as an organization puzzled and feckless at the moment of
its first more serious crisis, the view that the idea of a common European identity is
just a myth gets heavily promoted at this point. From now on, it seems that the
discussion about the EU becomes intensively economized. The argumentation goes
on as follows: because the EU is not based on commonly shared ideals, it is
reasonable to analyze the gains and risks of being a member state foremost
economically and rationally. It is declared that the EU is a political and financial
project – it does not fulfil some pre-existent idea of Europeanism; it is a matter of
business, not of passion. Thus, when its efficiency and sustainability becomes
doubtful, it should be replaced without false sentiment. To give an example of such
writing, see the following extract:
Union, it should have been happy terminal of history and nationalism. However, crisis
blew out this illusion as easily as candle. It showed that there is neither single European
identity and solidarity, nor something as commonly shared fate. Germans or Slovaks
logically do not feel they should pull Greeks out of their misery. Old sins like Second
World War and old prejudices as “those lazy Greeks” are forced out once again.
Altogether, the crisis took off European costume from Europeans – and not surprisingly,
there is still a national one beneath it.
To sum up what has been said so far, we can say the discourse of the
analyzed commentaries heavily bears on a wider Euro-sceptic discourse. Regarding
the notes on the first three events as particular fragments, we see they come to
some sort of synthesis at the point of setting up a discursive struggle over European
identity. A central ideological chain is created: being leftist means being individually
and financially irresponsible, which means being irrational through and through,
which means being addicted to empty formal structures, which means a tendency to
20
over-bureaucratization, which means contributing to the dissolution of human values,
which means supporting the consumption society, which means living in falsehood,
which means being evil, which means being leftist.
With respect to our key theoretical concept of Europeanization, we can set up
an assumption that the analyzed discourse tends to deny the relevance of vertical
Europeanization, leaving the question of horizontal Europeanization without a clear
answer.
Identities
In the second step, we focused on identities set up for those involved in the
commentaries. We identified four major actors: the EU, Greece, Czech Euro-sceptics
and ordinary people.
Let us start with the identity constructed for the EU. In the key metaphor, the
EU is portrayed as a dangerous and detrimental “weed”, or to be more precise, as
the indubitable source of it. As we can see from the following extract, this metaphor
is further elaborated by another one, the metaphor of “infection”:
The harmful weed has deep roots. You can cut off the sprouts with leaves, or even
extirpate the whole plant of the ground, but in spite of all your effort it will grow up again.
Our society probably does not have enough efficient antidotes to prevail over the weed
and destroy it.
Both of these metaphors, that of “weed” and that of “infection”, share some
basic aspects (their referents are unwished, dangerous, harmful, redoubtable, unjust
or almost invincible) and therefore, by combining them, their malignant effects are
underscored. What exactly is meant by the “weed” expanding from the EU to its
member states? Re-reading our analyzed text carefully, we can see that it is the
concept of the social state, represented in the discourse as seriously misapplied and
misused by the EU. This is consistent with our previous finding: the revelation of the
ideological chain in Euro-sceptic discourse. Subsequently, we would like to suggest
that the bundle of metaphors of “weed” and “infection” functions fairly well as the
centre of the ideological chain, guaranteeing its inner coherence and strengthening
the structural relations among its elements. But to explore the identity constructed for
the EU more thoroughly, we can set this aside for a moment and look at the
characteristics ascribed to the EU.
Firstly, the EU is depicted as a rigid bureaucratic organization. It has the
overwhelming apparatus of expendable office workers and bloodless politicians, but
no real charismatic leader, no relevant background idea which would legitimize its
actions (the idea of European identity is categorized as a false illusion, as we have
seen already). Roughly speaking, there is no good reason for its existence at all.
Furthermore, the European Union is an empty but still a powerful construction, which
heavily contributes to the debasement of true human values, for it teaches hordes of
“ordinary people” to behave irresponsibly and irrationally, quieting them down with
the statement that there will always be someone to save them (and pay their debts).
It is evident that:
Political and bureaucratic responsibility is declining the more centralist and more
estranged from real economic and social life it becomes. It pushes out the function of
individual responsibility and of reputation in regulation of good manners in society.
Secondly, the EU is represented as incompetent and sometimes even reluctant
to solve important problems. According to discourse strategies, this becomes evident
when judging the EU’s tragicomic attempts to reach some agreement on how to deal
21
with the contemporary economic crisis in EU member states and in Greece
particularly. The EU is criticized for dealing only with the corollaries of the crisis, not
with its roots. This leads to multiple pleas for redefining the political system, as we
have seen in the previous stage of analysis. In connection to this, it is claimed in a
relatively affected tone that the EU childishly “postpones Judgement Day” thinking
that everything will be OK again thanks to the “money we will print out in Frankfurt”.
Thirdly, it is claimed that the EU cannot be trusted because it does not respect
its commitments: it does not keep its promises and often it mystifies people, mainly
by distorting the concept of social welfare. In this respect, journalistic statements are
mostly general and vague, like “They [European politicians] cry out loudly: Solidarity!
And they mean: Corruption!”
In the analyzed articles we can see the successful completion of the process of
the ideological closure of the words “European politicians”, which point to leftist
politicians only and are added to the ideological core of discourse. Thus the negative
connotations of the collocation “European politicians” are heavily emphasized and in
conjunction with this, the preferred reading of the phrase gets much more visible as
well.
To sum up our findings about identity constructed for the EU, we can say that it
is represented as an organization which is bureaucratic, leftist, irrational,
irresponsible, incompetent or sometimes even megalomaniac. This is expressed
succinctly in the following extract:
Against the common sense and reason of every cogitative country woman, who knows:
when you make the debts, you have the debts, there is a scientific-political symphony of
blind men who did not see Greek crisis coming and do not see arrival of our crisis as
well.
One already given remark is important by now: the issue of the economic crisis
in Greece served predominantly as a means to criticize the EU, or to put it differently,
there is no evidence of intensified interest in Greece itself.
Relationships
In the third step of the analysis, we focused on the relationships set up between
subjects whose identity was described, that is between the EU and Greece.
The relationship between the EU and Greece is clearly asymmetrical: the EU
dictates conditions to provide financial help and Greece has to conform, “with evident
aversion and silent dissent”. In a metaphoric expression, Greece has to “be on
prescribed diet”, while the EU is in the position of the subject who controls and
punishes, although it is quite a restless and powerless doctor, as we have seen
when discussing the identity of the EU.
The relationship between the EU and “Greek politicians” is ambivalent: on the
one hand, they are treated as peers (both are in the position of political leaders), on
the other hand, “Greek politicians” are inevitably subordinated to the EU (they have
to conform to its mandate).
To clarify this point, we can look at the relationship between the EU and
“ordinary people”. Focusing on this already mentioned remark, there appears to be
a clear, although vaguely defined relation of subordination between Euro-sceptic
politicians and ordinary people. For example, a headline of one of the analyzed
commentaries says: “debts will catch you every time”. This taken-for-granted
knowledge of distribution of power continues with the delimitation of the participant’s
roles in the first paragraphs, where the reader (voter) is the one who asks questions
22
and the author (politician) is the one who wisely and authoritatively answers them.
We can see a similar pattern in description of the situation in Greece, where:
Most of them [ordinary Greeks] do not understand at all why the cuts are necessary and
no one of politicians does even try to explain the situation clearly.
We saw a similar relation of subordination and dependence between the
EU/leftist European politicians and ordinary people, where the EU was told to
influence people’s decision and value systems. So, while the EU’s leadership is
heavily criticized for demystifying and stupefying all citizens of EU member states, it
is all the more presumable that the Euro-sceptics, whose position is defined as a
contradictory one, do not really want to change this principle, the relationship of the
subordination of the “ordinary people”.
DISCUSSION
Let us now evaluate the results introduced in the previous sections (namely, the
visibility and the prominence of the EU agenda, the thematic and meaning
transformation of this agenda and the use of the EU agenda as an argument
supporting or weakening certain political parties) from the viewpoint of two different
forms of Europeanization and examine to what extent we can speak of the horizontal
or vertical Europeanization of the Czech quality press during the election campaigns.
We conceptualized Europeanization as a form of transnationalization limited
to the member states of the European Union (Brüggemann and Kleinen-von
Königslöw 2009), specifically, as a form of transnationalization of reporting in the
national media. It was assumed that as a result of the Europeanization of the
national public spheres, a European public sphere would emerge. Europeanization is
not a homogenous process. In this sense, two basic forms are distinguished:
vertical Europeanization, which means paying closer attention to the EU as a
whole and its institutions and politicians, and horizontal Europeanization, which
means increasingly taking account of what happens in the other member states of
the EU.
Considering the process of Europeanization in general, without distinguishing
its two forms, we can conclude that the decreasing visibility of the EU issues in the
analyzed dailies actually indicates a process of de-Europeanization. It can be
assumed that after the goal of entering the EU has been accomplished, media
attention towards the EU falls away.
A declining trend was also noted in the visibility of the arguments using the EU
agenda for supporting or weakening certain political parties. In spite of the
importance of the EU to the life of Czech citizens and Czech political governance,
the arguments by the political parties using the EU agenda can be found only very
rarely in the media coverage of the NP election campaigns. Moreover, the
differences in the use of pro-EU and anti-EU arguments between the parties which
are considered Euro-optimistic and Euro-pessimistic are diminishing and fading out,
suggesting to the readers that the EU agenda, firstly, is not worthy of attention and
contestation, and secondly that the stance of the parties towards the EU does not
serve as a criterion for their differentiation.
Another argument speaking against the process of Europeanization lies in the
use of the comparison, cooperation, and conflict frames. Based on their overall
decline, we can assume that the amount of attention paid to the EU and the member
states is decreasing, and that these entities are less and less often taken into
account. Besides this, it seems that Czech journalists avoid quoting actors from the
23
EU: the actors representing the EU institutions constitute only a marginal fraction (8
%) of all the actors of the articles. Thus, how could we speak of the process of
Europeanization if the EU’s representatives are almost invisible? Next, considering
the trend of the progressive economization of the EU agenda in its media coverage,
it seems that in the media, the idea of a common European Union as a community of
values is reduced to the mere exchange of goods and services. For instance, more
than one half of the articles on the EU agenda refer to the field of economics;
moreover, this field has a significant lead over all the other policy fields. Besides, in
case the EU is depicted within a pro-EU frame, it is mostly portrayed as an entity
whose greatest asset is a pay-off (either economic or something other than strictly
economic) to the members. And, the economic agenda is the most common agenda
in which the Czech Republic is compared to the EU/member states. From this point
of view, even if we could speak of some form of Europeanization, it would be a
Europeanization significantly reduced to the economic field.
On the other hand, although the quantity of the coverage of the EU issues has
decreased, when the EU agenda does find its way into the newspapers it is treated
in a more analytical way. There is a significant slant to a more reflexive approach to
the EU agenda: the frequency of commentaries rises and the articles are longer. At
this point, it could also be fruitful to carry on some further investigation because as
we saw in CDA, the commentaries are affected by trends of infotainment and
tabloidization. For these reasons, comparing the style of news stories and
commentaries could be interesting.
Another point supporting the thesis of Europeanization is the clear move
towards framing the EU as our institution, as “us”, instead of a foreign institution, as
“them”. This can be considered as an indication of the acceptance of the EU in
Czech media coverage. Also, the overall stance towards the EU in media coverage
is better than one would expect on the grounds of the low visibility and prominence
of the EU agenda. The tone of the articles is still rather favourable towards the EU,
although the pro-EU voice is rapidly weakening.
From the viewpoint of horizontal and vertical Europeanization, we can conclude
that the former clearly dominates. It seems that media attention paid to member
states dominates over attention paid to the EU as a whole. Taking the findings of the
CDA in account, this gives us a similar impression – the EU is under heavy attack
and indirectly so; the need for vertical Europeanization is marginalized. In reference
to horizontal Europeanization, the perspective discourse to be promoted remains
rather ambiguous and indistinct. In the content analysis, there is a variety of
indicators supporting the initial claim. Firstly, the EU agenda comes to the Czech
readers through the backdoor, mainly in the form of references to the member
states, not to the EU as a whole. In general, the attention paid to the member states
is rising, which cannot be said in the case of attention to the EU as a whole. While in
2002 the analyzed dailies paid as much attention to the EU as to the member states,
in 2006 and in 2010 there were considerably more articles referring to the member
states than to the EU as a whole. Also, the proportion of articles dealing with the EU
agenda which did not refer to any member state fell from 64 % in 2002 to 35 % in
2010.
Besides, when looking at the actors who communicate the EU agenda, the
proportion of actors from the member states is twice as high as the proportion of
actors representing the EU as a whole. The next indicator is the use of the
comparison frame: in the media coverage, the benchmark for the Czech Republic is
increasingly constituted by the member states, not by the EU as a whole. In 2010,
24
the comparison with member states was indicated in three times as many articles in
comparison with the EU. Considering the use of the conflict frame, the Czech
Republic is most often depicted in dispute with Germany, i.e. a member state, and
not with the EU as a whole, which again supports the assumption that horizontal
Europeanization prevails over vertical Europeanization.
In fact, the only indicator of vertical Europeanization is the use of the
cooperation frame. In 2010, the cooperation frame with the EU as a whole was used
in twice as many articles as the cooperation frame with member state(s), although it
was vice versa in 2002.
CONCLUSION
Initially we posed the question: How has the media coverage of the EU agenda (i.e.
the agenda of the EU and its member states) changed in the last three Czech
national parliament election campaigns? In this sense, the analysis brought several
interesting conclusions. Firstly, we assume that rather than the process of
Europeanization, our results indicate the analyzed dailies have helped to
trigger the process of de-Europeanization. It seems that after the goal of entering
the EU had been accomplished, media attention towards the EU fell away and the
visibility of the articles on the EU agenda clearly declined. In media coverage the EU
agenda is rarely used as an argument supporting or weakening certain political
parties, and the parties do not use this agenda as a mean for their differentiation.
On the other hand, although the quantity of the coverage of the EU issues has
decreased, when the EU agenda does find its way to the newspapers, it is
treated in a qualitatively and structurally different way. Firstly, the frequency of
commentaries rises in spite of the general decrease in the number of articles dealing
with the EU agenda; also the length of the articles is on the rise. Next, the EU is
usually framed as “our” institution, as “us”, and the tone of the articles is still rather
favourable towards the EU, although the pro-EU voice is rapidly weakening.
Even if we could speak of a process of Europeanization, it would be only
a partial and reduced form of Europeanization. Firstly, EU representatives are
invisible in media coverage, which forces us to ask how could a European public
sphere work if the political representatives are unknown and unheard? Secondly, in
the media coverage, the EU agenda is mostly reduced to an economic agenda,
which goes against the idea of the European Union as a community of values.
Our results suggest that the Czech quality press tends towards a
segmented Europeanization, characterized by the presence of vertical and the
absence of horizontal Europeanization (Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw
2009). It seems that the media attention paid to the member states dominates over
the attention paid to the EU as a whole. The EU agenda comes to Czech readers
through the backdoor, mainly in the form of references to the member states, not to
the EU as a whole, and it is communicated by the actors representing the member
states rather than by the actors representing the EU. Also, in the media coverage,
the benchmark for the comparison of the Czech Republic is increasingly constituted
by the member states, not by the EU as a whole.
Another interesting finding is that it seems the EU agenda serves the
interests of the local politicians - the use of the conflict frame as well as the
frequency of the articles reporting on the specific member states indicate that the
decisive factor of EU agenda coverage is the contemporary interest of Czech
politicians in the specific sub-agendas pursued in particular election campaigns (e.g.
25
the issue of the Czech-German relationship, more specifically the issue of the Benes
Decrees in 2002, the issue of Austrian animosity towards the Czech nuclear power
station at Temelin in 2002 or the issue of the Greek economic crisis in 2010). The
analysis of the last one was further elaborated in CDA and according to its findings
we can once again confirm the statement that Czech politicians use the European
agenda for their own specific interests and objectives. More particularly, in the case
of the Greek economic crisis, the issue was exploited by right-wing political parties
and was made into an ideological weapon not only against their Czech political
rivals, but also against the leftist political ideology as such and consequently against
the EU as the main source of it.
Considering the frames of criticism of the EU as stated by Habermas (2001), it
seems that three weeks before election day to the NP, the Czech quality press
suggests to the readers that the main problem of the EU is in its proper functioning,
resulting in a threat to Czech national sovereignty and an incapability to
address important issues. Based on the indicated overall economization of the EU
agenda, it could be assumed that the preferred solution would be the economic
analysis of the (in)profitability of the integration process. However, since membership
in the EU is still presented as rather enjoyable, mostly due to its economic
convenience, neither the problems of the EU nor their solutions are discussed in
greater depth.
REFERENCES
Blumler, J.G. (ed.)1983. Communicating to Voters. Television in the First European
Parliamentary Elections. London: Sage.
Brüggemann, M., Kleinen-von Königslöw, K. 2009. `Let's Talk about Europe':
Why Europeanization Shows a Different Face in Different Newspapers. European
Journal of Communication, Vol 24 (1), pp. 27-48.
Brüggemann, M., Schulz-Forberg, H. 2009. Becoming Pan-European?
Transnational Media and the European Public Spere. International Communication
Gazette, Vol 71(8), pp. 693-712.
Coultrap, J. 1999. From Parliamentarism to Pluralism: Models of Democracy
and the European Union’s “Democratic Deficit”. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol
11(1), pp. 107–35.
Deutsch, K. W. 1953. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the
Foundations of Nationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
De Vreese, C.H. et al. 2006. The News Coverage of the 2004 European
Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries. European Union Politics, Vol 7(4),
pp. 477-504.
De Vreese, C.H. et al. 2001. Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A CrossNational
Comparative Study of Frames in the News. Political Communication, Vol
18(2), pp. 107–22.
Eurobarometer 2011. National Report - Czech Republic. Brussels: European
Commission. At: europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion (accessed 10 July 2004).
Fairclough, Norman. 1995. Media Discourse. London: Hodder Arnold.
Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Habermas, J. 2001. Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review,
Vol 11(Sept–Oct), pp. 5–26.
Habermas, J. 1974. The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964). New
German Critique, Vol 3(3), pp. 49-55.
26
Hall, S. 1982. The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’: Return of the Repressed in Media
Studies. In M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran and J. Woollacott (Eds.), Culture,
society and the media. London: Methuen.
Jochen Peter, J., Semetko, H.A. and de Vreese, C.H. 2003. EU Politics on
Television News: A Cross-National Comparative Study. European Union Politics, Vol
4(3), pp. 305–327.
Kevin, D. 2003. Europe in the Media: A Comparison of Reporting, Representation
and Rhetoric in National Media Systems in Europe. London: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Kuper, R. 1998. The Many Democratic Deficits of the European Union. In Albert
Weale and Michael Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union, pp.
144–57. London: Routledge.
Leroy, P., Siune, K. 1994. The Role of Television in European Elections: The Cases
of Beligum and Denmark. European Journal of Communication, Vol 9(1), pp. 47-69.
Machill, M., Beiler, M. and Fischer, C. 2006. Europe-Topics in Europe's Media
Sphere. A Meta-Analysis of Media Content Analyses: The Debate about the
European Public. European Journal of Communication, Vol 21(1), pp. 57-88.
Meyer, C. O. 1999. Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the
European Union’s Communication Deficit. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol
37(4), pp. 617–39.
Noelle-Neumann, E. 1974. The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public
Opinion. Journal of Communication, Vol 24 (2), pp.43-51.
Norris, P. 2000. A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial
Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peter, J., De Vreese C.H. 2004. In Search of Europe News: A Cross-National
Comparative Study of the European Union in National Television. The Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol 9(4), pp. 3-24.
Peter, J., Lauf, E. and Semetko, H.A. 2004. Television Coverage of the 1999
European Parliamentary Elections. Political Communication, Vol 21(4), pp. 415-433.
Pew Research Center. 2012. European Unity on the Rocks. Greeks and Germans
at Polar Opposites. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
Semetko, H. A., Valkenburg, P.M. 2000. Framing European Politics:A Content
Analysis of Press and Television News. Journal of Communication, Vol 50(2), pp.
93–109.
Shah, D. et al. 2009. Framing and Agenda Setting. In R. L. Nabi & M. B. Oliver
(Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Media Processes and Effects (pp. 83-98). Thousand
Oaks: Sage.
Schlesinger, P. 1999. Changing Spaces of Political Communication: The Case of
the European Union. Political Communication, Vol 1 (3), pp. 263–79.
Siune, K. 1983. The Campaigns on Television: What Was Said and Who Said It. In
Jay G. Blumler (Ed.), Communicating to Voters: Television in the First European
Parliamentary Elections. London: Sage.
Strömbäck, J. et al. 2011. The Mediatization and Framing of European
Parliamentary Elections Campaigns. In Michaela Maier, Jesper Strömbäck and Linda
Kaid (Eds.), Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elections.
England/USA: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Trenz, H.J. 2004. Media Coverage on European Governance : Exploring the
European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers. European Journal of
Communication, Vol 19(3): 291–319.