ABUSE OF LAW BY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE HEADS OF
STATES
ARTUR OLECHNO
University of Bialystok, Faculty of Law, Poland
Abstract in original language:
In this presentation the author would like to indicate essential issues connected with the
problem of abuse of competence and powers by Heads of State in young democratic countries
of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries tend to adopt some specific constitutional
solutions. This phenomenon has been influenced by several negative factors that are
somehow typical of young democracies, such as, e.g., lack of parliamentary stability or
certain "over-legal" rules of conduct that have failed to develop (due to lack of time).
Key words in original language:
Abuse of law, competence, constitution, liability, democracy.
In my presentation I would like to indicate essential issues connected with the problem of
abuse of competence and powers by Heads of State in young democratic countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. These countries tend to adopt some specific constitutional solutions.
This phenomenon has been influenced by several negative factors that are somehow typical of
young democracies, such as, e.g., lack of parliamentary stability or certain "over-legal" rules
of conduct that have failed to develop (due to lack of time). These factors plus sometimes
deliberate abuse of entrusted powers have led to some kind of distortion of the institution of
Head of State resulting in the situation when legal provisions depart from the constitutional
practice.
In Poland, the untranslatable eponym "law falandization", i.e. a pejorative term describing
some attempts at interpreting law or justifying the authorities' actions that are teetering on the
edge of law, has become a commonly used term. It refers to "bending" the law or attempting
to interpret it in the interim interest of an interpreter. This term derives from the surname of
Chief of President Lech Walesa's (1990-1995) Chancellery ­ Prof. Lech Falandysz, who
insisted that President had the right to dismiss two members of the National Broadcasting
Council he had himself appointed. Law did not envisage any possibility of their dismissal but
at the same time neither excluded (nor banned) this. Therefore, this case was not
unambiguously determined by the rules of the law. Mr. Falandysz claimed that if someone
had the right to appoint a person to hold a post, then it was only logical he or she was also
entitled to dismiss them as well.
Polish Constitutional Tribunal has rejected this opinion many times. In one of many verdicts
thereon (W 7/94), the Tribunal ruled universally that ..."only one unequivocal conclusion
may be derived from both the constitutional principle of legality and the principle of a
democratic state of law, namely, if legal norms do not clearly stipulate powers of a State
body, such power must not be presumed, what is more, any intention that has not explicitly
been expressed by the legislator may not be attributed to him on the basis of any other kind of
power. The Constitutional Tribunal took a firm position on provisions concerning powers in
its jurisdiction, and ruled many times that provisions on competence and powers "are always
subject to strict literal interpretation, and it is not allowed to presume that some issues that are
not listed by way of , e.g., interpretation of purpose, may be covered by them."
A different approach may result in "acquiring" additional powers, and sometimes even
influence the constitutional position of President. Ukraine under the rule of Leonid Kuczma
may serve as an example here. The Ukrainian President fully subordinated central and local
units of executive power to himself, frequently surpassing the sphere of his own competence
and powers. Political disputes between the Head of State and Parliament proved that it was
the President who held real power and had final impact upon internal and external policy of
the State. The President won this dispute on the edge of law, which may be exemplified by
abuse of the right to veto. Exercising the right to veto, the President violated the provisions of
the Constitution many a time, and specifically, a 15-day period enshrined thereon to sign or
return a bill for revision. There were cases of bills returned on the 18th, 20th, and even 21st
day after they had been received1
. What is more, it was in breach of Art. 94 paragraph 3
thereon as well, which stipulated that after the lapse of a 15-day period, a bill shall be found
accepted and President shall be obliged to sign it. Moreover, some bills were returned to the
Supreme Council twice or even three times (!)2
.
Lack of a provision on President's liability in such cases and no reaction from other State
bodies, as well as the unfortunate provision itself, favor violation of law and the Constitution
in this respect. It seems here that a good solution would have been a clear statement of the
Ukraine's Constitutional Court in this matter, or at best a change of the Constitution, for
instance by crossing out a part of the provision" ".... shall be found accepted and thus must
be signed....", and replacing it with a new one which would mean that a bill shall be binding
after it has been re-passed by the Supreme Council without President's signature. Such a
solution has been adopted, e.g., in the USA.
For many years, lack of specific provisions in constitutions with regard to such issues as
impeachment procedure, counter-signature of presidential acts, or the above mentioned right
to veto, have been another problem not only in Ukraine. Bearing this in mind, constitutional
practice is becoming even more important. Such a situation, however, leads to an increase of
anti-presidential moods sooner or later, which means strengthening of opposition forces that
are proclaiming the necessity to weaken President powers, which as such is a threat to
democracy. After regaining independence, the authorities treated the law as a tool in the hands
of the rulers. New authorities' task, which was crucial in the process of the country's
democratization, was to recognize the law as a superior value, whereas observance of the law
­ as an absolute duty and obligation of State bodies. The authorities do not fulfil this
obligation regardless of a political option. Remaining with the example of Ukraine, after
defeating Leonid Kuczma, new elected President Victor Juszczenko already at the beginning
of his term of office followed in his predecessor's footsteps. New governors who had not been
accepted by the government were appointed on 4th February 2005 by the President in breach
of the Constitution. What is more, the President passed a decree changing competence and
1
The following Acts, respectively: Pro rachunkowu pałatu, Pro derżawni harantiji widnowlennja zaoszczadżeń
hromadjan Ukrajiny i Pro zupinenja spadu silskohospodarskoho wyrobnictwa ta prodowolcze zabezpeczennja
krajiny u 1997-1998.
2
E.g. the following Acts: Pro miscewi derżawni administracji i Pro osobliwostki priwatizaciji majna w
agropromysłowomu kompleksi, See also W. I. Hołowatenko Weto Prezydenta jak ważil zabezpieczennja
derżawno-prawowoji reformy w Ukrajani, Derżawno-prawowa reforma w Ukrajani ­ materiały konf., November
1997, Instytut zakonodawstwa WRU, 1997, p.137.
powers of Secretary of National Security and Defence Council even though the Constitution
grants him the right to pass decrees only with regard to issues that are not regulated in
legislation, whereas the Council's activity and the scope of Secretary's powers are regulated
by an appropriate Act. I am convinced many of us here could find similar examples in their
countries.
Efficient functioning of Constitutional Courts and the institution of constitutional liability
(impeachment) should be a counterweight for such conduct in a democratic state. At present,
the institution of impeachment, which mainly refers to President's liability, has been
introduced by most constitutions of democratic states, naturally including the countries of the
discussed region. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that it happened only after the
collapse of the so called Eastern Block since constitutions of socialistic countries had not
envisaged constitutional liability. A breakthrough happened in 1982 when Poland established
the institution of the State Tribunal, which somehow referred to pre-war solutions. Only the
collapse of the system caused that in newly passed Constitutions there was a place for
constitutional liability. The subject as well as object scope of the liability differs, however, is
has already become customary to include Presidents among those to be held liable for treason
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Lithuania), a breach of the Constitution
(Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine), a breach of the Constitution and Laws
(Poland and Hungary), or committing an offence (Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia,
Latvia, Russia and Ukraine). Whereas a choice of a judicial body most often resulted from
either a traditional political system or a reference to western democracies: Constitutional
Court (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria), parliament (Lithuania, Ukraine and
Russia), special court (Poland) or common courts (Estonia and Latvia).
A flaw in this institution, however, is its low efficacy. I would like to invoke here the
examples of Romania and Lithuania, so far the only case of President's impeachment.
Impeachment has already been instituted in Romania twice. In both cases Presidents were
charged with violation of the Constitution. For the first time in June 1994 against Ion Iliescu.
The opposition's motion, however, failed to win the support of the Supreme Court and did not
get required majority of both Houses. The procedure was more advanced in another case
though. In February 2007 the charges against President Trajan Basescu won the required
support of majority of Chamber of Deputies and Senate (322 v. 108). The President was
suspended in his duties, but despite his earlier declarations, he did not resign from his post
and waited for the referendum's results. On 19th May 2007, however, Romanians did not
accept Parliament's decision and President Basescu could return to his duties.
Lithuanian Constitution of 1992 sets forth President's liability for a breach of the
Constitution, faithlessness to Presidential oath or committing an offence (Art. 86).
Parliament itself decides about brining charges and the content of the verdict. If President's
quilt is proved, one-chamber Seimas may impeach him or her by majority of 3/5 statutory
number of members. Perhaps thanks to the straightforward procedure and the participation of
only one body, for the first time in the region Lithuania efficiently initiated the impeachment
procedure. In result of the procedure that commenced in December 2003, and with the support
of Constitutional Court, on 6th April 2004 Seimas impeached President Rolandas Paksas
under charges of revealing state secrets to third unauthorized parties, awarding Lithuanian
nationality in return for financing election campaign and interfering in private businesses
activity. On 13th December 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania annulled
the decision of the Court of Appeal and acquitted R. Paksas of the charges of violation of
state secret.
Among numerous solutions, and taking into consideration practices applied so far in the
discussed countries, it seems that Constitutional Court is the most appropriate adjudicating
body because of its professionalism and a lower degree of politicization than in other cases.
Whereas it goes without saying that basic punishment, although not necessarily the only one,
in case of proved charges must be dismissal of a person whose conduct contradicts the
importance and high standing of the office they hold. Moreover, consolidation of certain
appropriate conducts unfortunately requires time, which young democracies have simply
lacked so far.
Contact ­ email:
a.olechno@uwb.edu.pl