Opening NATO's Door How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era Ronald D. Asmus A COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BOOK COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK 176 The NATO-Russia Endgame complete this project—and ample opportunity for mistakes and failure. The stage was set for one of the most dramatic plays in NATO's history. In April 1997,1 switched from being a RAND analyst and State Department consultant to being a fulltime American diplomat when I joined the Department's European Bureau as a political appointee responsible for NATO issues and European security. Within days, I was off to Moscow as part of the team helping Secretary of State Albright and Deputy Secretary Talbott negotiate what would become the NATO-Russia Founding Act. From the ceremony launching a new NATO-Russia relationship in Paris in late May 1997, we went directly to the Alliance's spring Ministerial in the Portuguese city of Sintra where, for the first time, the latent differences between Washington and some of its allies over the scope of enlargement and its future broke into the open. In the ensuing weeks, U.S.-French differences over who should be invited to join NATO would escalate into a dramatic diplomatic shoot out between Washington and Paris at the Madrid summit. Following the summit, President Clinton went to Warsaw where he received a jubilant welcome from more than 30,000 enthusiastic Poles. Even more dramatic was the President's reception in Bucharest where an estimated 100,000 Romanians turned out to cheer Clinton and Romanian President Emil Constantinescu—in spite of Washington's rejection of Romania's bid for immediate NATO membership. Clinton wrapped up this week-long tour with a stop in Copenhagen where some 80,000 Danes turned out to cheer him as well. I, in turn, was part of the team accompanying Albright on a tour of Ljubljana, St. Petersburg, Vilnius, and her native city of Prague for an emotional homecoming. Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen completed the Administration's grand tour of Central and Eastern Europe, traveling to Budapest and Sofia, to show the U.S. commitment to building a unified Europe. Nearly everyone on Clinton's national security team dealing with European security issues had read former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's memoir, Present at the Creation, in which he eloquently describes NATO's founding.2 We shied away from saying it publicly for fear of appearing pretentious, but there was a very real sense of being present at and participating in the birth of a new NATO for a new Europe. Madrid was the culmination of years of political and diplomatic work involving some of the most far-reaching changes in NATO's history. But it was not an easy birth. Ume six mtijiihó arecs fillfi! willi drama, diplomatic intrigue, and political confrontation—with the Russians as well as with some of our closest allies. Madrid W'ľ one a( ihc moü impurlani, and also one of the most contentious summits, in NATO's history. i. MADELEINE'S VISION President Clinton's commitment to NATO enlargement was underscored by his decision to nominate Madeleine K. Albright as Secretary of State for .".;: The NATO-Russia Endgame 177 ■= second term. Perhaps no one better epitomized the U.S. commitment to overcome Europe's Cold War divide. A naturalized American citizen born in Czechoslovakia, Albright had come to the United States at the age of eleven * after the communist coup in Prague that led her father, Josef Korbel, then the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Belgrade, to flee to the West. Albright was fiercely proud to be an American. Unlike many Democrats of her generation, her intellectual paradigm was Munich, not Vietnam. She did not harbor any doubts about using America's power to pursue U.S. diplomatic goals. Instead, she saw the U.S. as the "indispensable" nation when it came to advancing the cause of 1 peace and democracy.3 Albright knew firsthand Europe's tragic recent history. As a child she had wit-1 nessed first Hitler and then Stalin's occupation of her native Czechoslovakia. 1 Her academic training was in Soviet and East European studies at Columbia I University, where she wrote her doctoral dissertation on Czechoslovakia. Following a stint working as a legislative aide for Senator Edmund Muskie, she worked for Zbigniew Brzezinski's National Security Council staff in the second . half of the 1970s, where she was in charge of legislätive~ai^irs. From there she went to Georgetown University where she taught U.S. foreign policy and became the President of the Center for National Policy. In the mid-1980s, Albright ' started traveling back to Central and Eastern Europe where she met many of the dissidents in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest. She became a friend of and eventually an informal advisor to Vaclav Havel. Following communism's collapse, she was part of a team of experts that examined public attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.4 Few Americans knew the region better than she did. By the time she became Secretary of State, Albright had become an enthusiastic champion of NATO enlargement. She saw it as a historic opportunity to anchor a democratic Central and Eastern Europe to the West once and for all. "The purpose of enlargement," she said in her first statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 8, 1997, "is to do for Europe's East what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's West: to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery and deter conflict."5 Her goal, she once hand-wrote on a memo that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman had sent her, was to ensure that Europe's future was safer than its past: "Let's develop a 21st century better than the 20th—the bloodiest in Europe's history."6 Albright also viewed enlargement as a moral imperative. It was an opportunity to erase the lines drawn by the armies of Hitler and Stalin and accepted by the West at Yalta. Following the Madrid summit, Albright spoke in Prague about how NATO's Madrid summit had framed her life and her life's work. She (.liked ŕituut Ihtf rinčí. n,uim..,i jhdLi.ii.jpcTHiL.i...........rim-nrr,. Vrrrn r-nr-irj^. ment—her family's journey through war to the safe shores of America; Europe's 178 The NATO-Russia Endgame journey from total war and absolute division to the promise of a new unity; and the Czech nation's journey from independence in 1918 to subjugation in 1948 to taking what she described as "your rightful place in the family of European democracies—fully, finally and forever." NATO enlargement was "a moment of ■ injustice undone, of promises kept, of a unified Europe begun." This single sentence encapsulated the reasons for Albright's commitment to NATO enlargement.7 But Albright's commitment to enlargement also reflected her vision of a new . U.S.-European relationship. She believed that the U.S. and Europe remained natural partners in the post-Cold War world. NATO enlargement was important to make Europe's eastern half safe and secure. But it was also a stepping : stone to modernize the Alliance for a future in which a secure Europe would join the U.S. in dealing with new threats beyond the continent. In the spring of 1997 Albright was reading a biography of former Secretary of State p:;.w Acheson.8 In meetings with her senior staff, she often compared the period following the end of the Cold War to the early post-World War II period. In the late 1940s, Truman and Acheson had committed the United States to remain in Europe. They had created NATO as a security umbrella against the very real Soviet threat and as the framework within which European reconciliation and integration could take place. In so doing, they had helped to define fifty years of U.S. international engagement. The task the U.S. faced, she told us, was to build on that legacy and accomplishment. Sitting with Albright in her private office one day in the aping uj 1997, she said to me and other members of her senior staff: "The challenge we face is different than the one Truman and Acheson faced. Tiiaiii; God we. dun't face the threat that Stalin posed or the danger of World War III." "But," she continued, "in many ways die Ljutiihons jet still tlít *jiuf What shape will this new Europe take? What role will the U.S. have? Will *c cimtmue to wnnJf lugefhcr to solve the problems of the future?" There was little doubt in her mind what the answer should be. America was a European power. It had iuu^lil the Cold Wai nut uulv iij defeat coinmumsm but !o wrii Übe ljľjicc as well. We IplhÍ <±n JlLv toric opportunity to lay the foundation for a Europe whole and free in »Uniitf with the United States—and we had to use it. Albright firmly believed that America's interest and role in Europe transcended the Soviet threat, but that the Alliance had to be reshaped if it was to survive. She believed 1h.lt NATO needed 1o be transformeú and miHltrmzed lu meet the challenges of the next fifty years—and the U.S. needed to do so at \t time when many questioned whether it was needed at all or )f I he U-S. should even remain in Europe. "We have a window of opportunity in which ft> Tcc^it the foundation of this Alliance. l!~we ^et it ngiu, NATO will last (at another nil* tears. And wc will tiavii succeeded [use lite the tuuiiduig IsHjľjs ľjI [NATU did. If we don't, the U.S. and Europe are likely tu iluwiy drift apail ,mJ the Alliance The NATO-Russia Endgame 179 will atrophy," she once told me. The problem, she often repeated to us, was that too many people on both sides of the Atlantic were complacent and took the U.S.-European relationship for granted.9 In the spring of 1997, Albright delivered the commencement speech at Harvard University—on the spot where 50 years earlier Secretary of State George Marshall had launched the Marshall Plan. Albright invoked the vision of Marshall and her own life experience to underscore the role that America still had to play in Europe and around the world. She recalled sitting in a bomb shelter in London during World War II praying for American help. But she also recalled the price the West paid for not being vigilant in standing up early enough to Nazi aggression. America, she underscored, had to continue to lead. A new generation again had to make the choice to lead and shape a new world just as Marshall's generation had done in their time. "Today," she told her audience, "the greatest danger to America is not some foreign enemy; it is the possibility that we will fail to heed the great example of that generation, that we will allow the momentum towards democracy to stall, take for granted the institutions and principles upon which our own freedom is based, and forget what the history of this century reminds us, that problems abroad, if left unattended, will all too often come home to America."10 Critics would at times accuse Albright of pushing for too much change too quickly, and hectoring or riding roughshod over our allies. But Albright was convinced the U.S. had a window of opportunity in which to lay the foundation for a new and transformed trans-Atlantic relationship. The danger in her eyes was not that the U.S. was too ambitious, but rather that it would become complacent. She wanted the U.S. to take the lead in consolidating the global triumph of democracy and forging new alliances to keep the peace as effectively as those of the Cold War. "We have a responsibility in our time, as others had in theirs," she said in her Harvard speech, "not to be prisoners of history but\to shape history; a responsibility to fill the role of pathfinder, and to build with otriX ers a global network of purpose and law that will protect our citizens, defend our interests, preserve our values and bequeath to future generations a legacy as proud as the one we honor today."11 Albright's vision of a unified Europe included a democratic Russia. For Albright, the Cold War had been a fight against communism as an ideology, not againsi I lie Kussiun people Following her nomination as Secretary of State, the Russian press initially pomaved tiei as a disciple w J^rJigrilCw Buwr/juski jind nn unreconstructed anti-Russian Cold Warrior. They dubbed her Gospozha Stal or "Madam Steel"—a label she was actually fond of. But her commitment to bring Russia infu ilie Wesiurn community rjf naimni came as" a iuipiise lu sonm- iji hei Russia [i interlocutors.12 In her first meeting with Russian President Yeltsin in Ftbiuary, Albright told him that he should not view her as a former Cold Warrior, but as an American version of Primakov—a tough but pragmatic de- i8o The NATO-Russia Endemie fender of national interests who was committed to building a friendlier U.S.Russia partnership. When Yeltsin told her that she needed to recognize that there was a new Russia, she asked Yeltsin to recognize that NATO, too, had changed. "I would like you to think," she told Yeltsin, "that there is a new NATO, not one of we versus you or you versus us, but one where we are on the same side."13 Some six weeks later, Albright was back in Moscow for a final round of negotiations on the NATO-Russia Founding Act. She met with a group of Russian strategic intellectuals at the Carnegie Moscow Center. Albright made an impassioned plea for them to put aside Cold War stereotypes and bury their distrust of NATO.14 In the question and answer session, she talked about how both she and many of them had what she termed "Cold War libraries" filled with books on communism, arms control and the history of a divided Europe in the 20th century. "My library at home is a Cold War library. It is filled with books about totalitarianism, communism and arms control," she said. "I want to make it obsolete. I want people to look at these books and think they belong to ancient history because we have so changed our relations for the better."15 How important was Albright for NATO enlargement? Her role was critical for three reasons. First, her appointment was widely seen in Europe, Russia, and in the U.S. as confirmation of Washington's determination to see NATO enlargement through. While many conservative critics had openly questioned whether President Clinton was truly committed to enlargement, no one doubted her determination to seeing it through. She was the high-level champion on this issue the Administration needed at home and abroad. Second, while much of the conceptual work and diplomatic foundation was completed prior to her becoming Secretary of State, it was Albright who got the actual job done. Her relationship with Primakov helped broker the final compromises that made the Founding Act possible. She was critical in holding the line in favor of three candidates for NATO's first round at Madrid—and convinced skeptics that Washington's commitment to further enlargement was credible. To use an American football metaphor, she came in as the team quarterback in a red zone offense and put the ball in the end zone—a metaphor of the sort she teased her male colleagues for using. Third, Albright's passionate ability as a communicator made her the ideal spokesperson on NATO enlargement. 51 le became ihc public face selling tilt policy to the U.S. public, to the Europeans, and to the U.S. Senate. She en-\uycu lakmj; uii NATO enlargements cxiljca and n^lfiuiiijg why, in Inn mtpds, a bigger NATO was a better one.|!' She «Sold ftadi acrosi the aisle to conservatives in a way that other Administration officials could not. Republicans wSiu disliked President Clinton liked Albright, her patriotism and her defense of; America's role in the world—tn ■.tn r.m hv hti un-.: 4, lufti n ..inrjii hy i\u: ííľm..1ľ. A picture of her holding hands with Senator Jesse Helms became a i^puJar The NATO-Russia Endgame 181 poster during the Senate ratification campaign. While Albright's star as U.S. Secretary of State would subsequently fade as criticism of her and her policies grew, she was at the top of her game during the first years of her tenure when NATO enlargement was implemented. 2. CHANCELLOR KOHL COMES THROUGH On January 6,1997, Chancellor Helmut Kohl called Clinton with a firsthand account of his recent trip to Russia where he had met privately with Yeltsin at his country home in Zavidovo on January 4. It was Yeltsin's first meeting with a western leader since heart surgery two months earlier. Kohl had found Yeltsin looking older and frailer than previously. The Russian President had expressed his anger over what he referred to as the "monster" of NATO enlargement that "our friend Bill" had unleashed. Yeltsin appealed to Kohl to help him. "I have to be able to look my people in the eye and tell them that their interests are being protected," he said. "We can't keep cooperating with the West unless I can assure them ofthat."17 Kohl assured Clinton that he had stood firm on enlargement. But he described Yeltsin's position in vivid terms: "His position is quite clear; he is against it. He thinks it is unnecessary and fraught with enormous psychological problems. He is afraid that a new Cold War is imminent and that the people won't understand it." The Chancellor told the President he still supported NATO enlargement, but Western leaders had to deal directly with Yeltsin to reach an understanding and not rely on normal diplomatic channels or the NATO bureaucracy. Absent a deal with Yeltsin before the Madrid summit, he warned, there was a real risk of a breach in the West's ties with Moscow. The German Chancellor asked Clinton to send Talbort to Bonn to meet with him as soon as possible.18 Kohl's phone call came at a critical juncture. The wrestling match between Washington and Moscow over NATO enlargement was not over. Although Primakov had signaled to Washington in private that he recognized enlargement was going to happen, Moscow remained adamantly opposed in public. By this time, Yeltsin and Primakov had staked out such strong rhetorical and public opposition to NATO expansion that it was going to be difficult for them to back down without suffering political damage.19 Meeting with an American official in early 1997, Russian communist party head Gennady Zyuganov noted smugly that whereas in Washington there still appeared to be a range of views on enlargement, in Moscow there was only one view—everyone was opposed.20 That opposition continued to be accompanied by ominous hints at possible retaliatory steps. After a Kremlin meeting on NATO enlargement chaired by Yeltsin on January 6, anonymous Defense Ministry sources were quoted in the Russian press as saying that the Russian President's advisors all favored "tough i82 The NATO-Russia Endgame countermeasures" against NATO. "If NATO moves eastward, Russia will move westward," one Kremlin source was quoted as saying. Moscow was also reportedly considering creating an anti-Western alliance with China, Iran, and India. Even if it could not stop enlargement's first round, the same source concluded, Moscow would reserve the right to use "any means" to prevent the Baltic states from "joining the military orbit of the U.S. and NATO."21 The endgame was starting. The Madrid summit was scheduled for early July 1997. NATO had six months to try to finalize a NATO-Russia deal and complete preparations for enlargement. But the gap between NATO and Moscow was still large. By this time Talbott had concluded that the only way to induce Moscow to work seriously to bridge that gap was to make it crystal clear that enlargement was going ahead, irrespective of whether NATO and Russia came to terms or not. Only the absolute certainty that enlargement was coming would lead the Russians to shift away from attacking enlargement and instead focus on what kind of relationship they wanted to have with an enlarged NATO. In other words, American diplomacy had to convince Moscow that the timetable and outcome of the Alliance's enlargement plans were set in concrete—and that the real choice facing Russia was whether it would protect its own interests by seeking a closer and cooperative relationship with the Alliance or watch enlargement go ahead without it. For that strategy to work, Washington needed to be confident that its allies would not blink if negotiations with Moscow stalled. But the U.S. was still not sure how solid Western European allied support was. The Russians had spent almost four years trying to convince the Europeans that expansion would destroy Moscow's relationship with Europe. NATO Secretary General Solana had warned Ambassador Hunter in early November that European support for enlargement remained weak. Faced with conflicting choices, he said, some Europeans seemed prepared to choose Moscow as their first priority.22 Solana repeated that concern to Senator Bill Roth (R-DE) later that month. If the Europeans had to choose between NATO enlargement and conflict with Russia, the Secretary General said, NATO enlargement might just lose.23 The Administration faced a paradox. To get the allies on board it needed a NATO-Russia agreement—mr llir Al.....iľainl-|.LM: nur chine a mm .fill dh.-i. .hr, ^;\[ nľ tU iŕ Mľli..... hnkl H-« :j J,T-p ^n.l i the Americans would not listen." I The NATO-Russia Endgame 187 He did not want that to happen, Kohl added. "If NATO enlargement fails now, we will have a dismal situation for many years. Again the Americans will • be blamed and the President will be blamed. Certain circles will make much of the failure. Please tell Bill Clinton as a friend: I don't want that to happen. I want to use these four years to capitalize on American leadership." Kohl now told Talbott that the time to enlarge NATO had arrived, "We can't [ tell the Poles and the Czechs that they are not welcome [in the West] after what they did to survive communism." But NATO enlargement was also a question of German national interest, especially in terms of Germany's relations with neighboring Poland, Kohl added. "This is not just a moral issue," he said, "it's in our self-interest to have this development now and not in the future." Kohl was well known for his strong European credentials. European integration, he underscored, was of "existential" importance to Germany. Many in Western Europe, he added, were hypocritical about their support for Central , Europe, especially in the EU. "If there were today a truly secret vote among my EU colleagues, I am not sure we would have a majority for expansion." The Chancellor brushed aside arguments that EU membership could serve as a sub-■ stitute for NATO. "Even if the EU could manage expansion, it would not be enough to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe. My clear position is that EU is no substitute for NATO enlargement. It is important that you understand that this is our clear position." 'Time is running out," the German Chancellor continued. There were two kcvieascmp nvhy (hrr Alljiincc had lo act riiJW. The ňríľ w.is iliat Ircnds nl Russia were (Jüi u ting m the wrong direction. "The situation in Russia is getting more difficult all 'he H me, both concerning NATO and in other areas. New waves of jiatiDnahsiri are mounting in Russia." The problem was the psychology of the Jtiusian people trying to recover from the debris of seven decades of communion "You can make politics with a people's psychology—just look at 20th-ĽĽiiLiiry Germ any." The second reason was that it was not clear how much longer Yeltsin would be around. Yeltsin was"lhc best of lbe current pulihcai figures (hat might unni' tu jpnwci' in Russia—but not the only one imaginable. "I don't think Yeltsin will last writ his femi," Kohl said. He recalled how moved Yeltsin had been to see him and how the Russian President had confided in him that he had underestimated the seveiitv nf hii illncii .ind was nut sure hmv long tie won id live. Hi.( last 1 nee Dug with the Russian President in Moscow had been an emotional one. "I am no doctor but I believe we should make good use of the time remaining, if the ehíint-ei are gümg tu Im guad, it is now." !___ The Chancellor was flexible on the modalities for moving forward. The key llimir u-,- 1I1 if Win-r. m i, ,|iji i. ..iiii 1 *,hr.fifftt.-f in a small group with Yeltsin. i Hb uiniCiíĽured tire impurtiiiiĽe ot giving Fmnnc and Cľiirae n special role, but made it clear he was not opposed to using Solana as NATO's lead negotiator if i88 The NATO-Russia Endgame Moscow accepted that approach. The important thing was to move while Yeltsin was in office and make him feel included in the decisionmaking process. "We have to give priority to embracing Yeltsin in the positive sense of the word—and we have to do so before July, well before July. Time is running out on us." Yeltsin should be able to say afterwards, Kohl concluded, "that he played a special role in the process. He can say: 'I helped decide. I am a big guy.' That's very important to him." If Yeltsin knew that NATO would proceed with or without a NATO-Russia agreement, he would "join us rather than turning his back to us or letting himself be left behind as Europe moved forward without him."27 Talbott left Bonn relieved. The German Chancellor had endorsed the essence of Washington's strategy. Chirac and France would still require special handling, but Washington had enough support from Solana and key allies to launch the effort. The U.S. Deputy Secretary returned to Washington on January 16 to report to the President and his national security team in the Cabinet Room on his trip. Sandy Berger, now sitting opposite President Clinton at the cabinet table as the President's National Security Advisor, warned the President that the road ahead would be difficult. Managing the twin commitments to enlarging NATO and sustaining cooperation with Russia, he said, was going to be like Scylla and Charydbis and among the most difficult foreign policy challenges Clinton would face as President.28 3. THE ROAD TO HELSINKI Clinton and Yeltsin were scheduled to meet in Helsinki in March. Over the next two months a frenzied set of negotiations took place in Moscow, Brussels, and Washington. In late January Talbott and Gore's national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, visited Moscow for three days of intense discussions. "Our conclusion is that, after three years of fighting the problem of NATO, the Russians may finally be prepared to join us in solving it," they wrote upon their return. "This is partly because they seem to have realized that despite their opposition to enlargement and their best efforts to derail the process, Madrid is a fixed point on the horizon—and on the calendar—and they must navigate accordingly." Russian attitudes had not changed, Talbott and Fuerth noted. "From the Russians' perspective, what will happen in Madrid remains a thoroughly ugly fact. But they are no longer devoting quite so much energy to trying to talk us out of enlargement, or to split us from our Allies. Nor are they quite so baldly threatening to restart the Cold War in retaliation for enlargement." Instead, Moscow seemed to be groping for a way to insulate the U.S.-Russia relationship and its ties with the West from the fallout of enlargement. "The devil, however, is not just in the details—it's in the fundamentals," the memo continued. Moscow was still insisting on demands that were complete The NATO-Russia Endgame 189 iiuii-ataileri Left to their own devices, Primakov and Rodionov were unlikely to [iqgn liate -i deal 011 NATO's ti mil inc. They were too interested in haggling over LIlľ details, especially regarding the military details of enlargement. But the £ opment that their domestic political adversaries will characterize as a defeat and humiliation."29 Shortly thereafter, Yeltsin sent out the first feelers suggesting he wanted a tk-j I Ii 1 a leite r in i -li 11 lun u 11 1 ai luary 30, tbc Ruina n P rcí níc [1L u 1 ide 1 >eu 1 cd tfi e nĽcd to ensure that the U.S.-Russian partnership remained "irreversible." He jitiied ibar bnLli siúes were "deadlocked" on the issue of NATO expansion, but TEĽalleri Pitia j Jet J L CLijiiun'x pastilSSuniiites thai c n i urgenten t wŕiiitd be trained mit m n iasSiiuii not inimical to Russia's interests. "I believe you, and trust that . our justified concern will, as you said, not simply be noted but will be taken into account in a clear and precise form," Yeltsin wrote. "It would be best if this were done, as you yourself stated publicly, in the form of an official agreement between Russia and NATO."30 They were not the words of a leader about to break off relations with the Wat In ii elated imefifig in \bc Duma in auh Hitnuziy, Primakov stated that Mwcuw had decided tu try to negotiate a NATO-Russia deal in the hope that "the West will take into account our objective, serious concerns related to NAT O enlargement."31 When Chernomyrdin arrived in Washington in early February, lie took a rougli line at the official C(Jf." meetings, but was more con-i'ilinlory in private. Meeting with Clinton, Chernomyrdin made it clear that Mdscow Jid m>i want a can! ton tat ion wt(h trie West. But he underscored that ÜiecniriTniinist-lcdopijtisiÜDii in the Duma \vil] take advantage of anything" to try io "change ilie w'(n>\c regime."32 Flying to Chicago with Gore the next day, Chernomyrdin told him: "I understand that the decision [on enlargement] has been made; and we know you can't reverse it. But we need help on managing our own domestic politics on the issue." Gore responded: "Victor, we'll do that, so long as you can find a way to declare victory in what we can offer."33 It was now clear that Moscow wanted to negotiate with the U.S., not Paris or other European capitals. For all of his previous efforts to exploit divisions be-Iween Washington and its European allies, Primakov now referred to Solana and Washington's NATO allies with contempt. He would continue to talk to others, he told Talbott, but he considered Solana a "stool pigeon" and the role of countries like France "ornamental." Moscow knew who was making the real decisions. "That's why we'd rather talk directly with you. We're not so naive as to think that you don't call the shots. Sure, I'll keep talking to Solana, but just so we all understand that a deal depends on the U.S. and Russia coming to 250 Head-to-Head at Madrid Helmut Kohl for the role he played at the Madrid summit. In a meeting with German President Roman Herzog in Washington later that month, Clinton bubbled over with praise for the German Chancellor. "1 would do anything for Chancellor Kohl—even jump off this building—since he has done so much for the United States," the President gushed. Clinton said that some in Europe were criticizing the U.S. for the way it had handled NATO expansion, and that the French were feeding that feeling. "All that I can tell you," he said, "is that I have supported a strong European Union, a European defense identity within NATO, and the expansion of the European Union. On occasions, there will be differences, but I have no interest in trying to use the fact that, at the moment, we are doing well economically. I have to deal with an isolationist Congress but my goal is not to throw our weight around. I favor partnership," the President said. "Therefore, I invite you to treat us as friends with whom you can be honest and not to see us as a country that is trying to be both isolationist and arrogant at the same time. I regret how some of the issues played out, but please understand that I see our future in continued partnership, shared responsibility and shared decision-making."59 Book VIII THE POLITICAL BATTLE One major hurdle remained. NATO enlargement required ratification by all the allies. In the United States, this meant a two-thirds majority vote in the U.S. Senate. While the U.S. was the NATO ally most committed to enlargement, it was also paradoxically the country where enlargement was most vulnerable politically. The U.S. constitution, by requiring a two-thirds Senate majority, set a higher bar for ratification than that faced by most other allies. And the independent traditions of the Senate inevitably made the task even harder. At first glance, the Administration had several key advantages. Both Republicans and Democrats supported NATO enlargement in their party platforms and several votes on nonbinding resolutions on the Senate floor had produced a solid majority in favor of enlargement.1 The final 80-19 Senate vote suggested an overwhelming victory over enlargement opponents. But the actual political fight was closer and harder fought than those numbers suggested. The Administration's support was broad but often shallow and was not locked in until late in the game. One week after the final vote in the spring of 1998, President Clinton admitted to Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi that the final vote was "a little misleading" and that the outcome of the enlargement battle was closer than it looked. "A lot of people who voted with us were reluctant," the President said.2 252 The Political Battle The reasons were apparent. NATO enlargement to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland involved the biggest increase in the U.S. security commitment to Europe in decades. The Clinton Administration also insisted that the first new members would not be the last and that enlargement could eventually embrace countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This ambitious agenda was put forward at a time when foreign policy was seen as a less pressing national priority, and when the American public appeared skittish about new commitments abroad and Congress was less prepared to be deferential to the President. Generational turnover and the decrease in the authority of the key Congressional committees had also undermined the traditional levers for the Senate leadership to ensure building bipartisan support on Capitol Hill.3 While both Democrats and Republicans supported enlargement in principle, there were also important differences between them that needed to be reconciled. The Clinton Administration had embraced enlargement as part of a broader overhaul of the Alliance to help unify Europe and create a new trans-Atlantic partnership oriented toward new threats. It emphasized that enlargement was part of a broader effort to create a "new NATO" for a new era. In contrast, many Republicans were inclined to support enlargement as a geopolitical hedge against Moscow. They were suspicious of, if not opposed to, negotiating the NATO-Russia Founding Act. They were skeptical about NATO assuming new missions such as peace support operations and uncomfortable that the Administration put emphasis on such missions beyond NATO's borders. Lurking behind these questions was the broader issue of why the U.S. remained in Europe after the end of the Cold War and what NATO was for in the future. Partisan politics was also a factor—and increasingly so. The President's avoidance of the draft, his handling of gays in the military, and what Republicans perceived as his unsteady record on the use of force had all con-IfiLputicd In Kejjuúheaii uiiticisju u] (JLjuLľhi's ti3j idling ni Ijieiini atlam. i be bitter debates over Bosnia policy had also left political wm* uu Lullt nidcs. While the Monica Lewinsky scandal would not break until ca rly 19.9ti, the i ncrcasmglv bitter tenor of Washington uolihes made it fltihcull tu knit logelheT bipartisan cooperation in any area, including foreign policy. After the end of the CM War, politics no longer stopped at the water's edge, if it ever had. liven Republicans inclined to support enlargement nevertheless asked why uiľj-í] lyuld hdp trie Clinton Adnnm'itnitkxi achieve a ina\w to reign polity vicinry; Opposition to enlargement was also passionate. The opponents »lduricd many well-known and respected figures in the U.S. foreign policy ci-tarnfsrt-ment. George Kennan, ii key iirchileet y-f pnsi-WWtd War II ünniahinient policy, attacked the decision to enlarge NATO as "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era."4 John Lewis Gaddis, llm well-known diplomatic historian, wrote: "I can iu-u[] nu alhur nmnmnt in itlj_ iiwi- r-vprrT-iirr is a prirCTFing rmlrrrr-ii -11" wTTTf.-ii Hurrr.- v;m k'is riipporf, w'lnn The Political Battle 253 the community of historians, for an announced policy position."5 The New York Times issued one editorial after another opposing enlargement and urging Congress to do the same. Critics openly predicted that support would collapse once it was exposed to public scrutiny. Some suggested that enlargement would never be ratified. The stage was set for a major political battle. 1. CREATING A COMMAND POST: THE BIRTH OF S/NERO Recognizing the challenge the Administration faced, President Clinton and Secretary Albright decided to create a special NATO Enlargement Ratification Office to spearhead the ratification effort. Like everything in the State Department, it had to be reduced to an acronym—S/NERO—which in State Department-ese meant that it answered directly to the Secretary of State. But the acronym led to more than one quip about whether we truly wanted a name that many people associated with the hubris and fall of the Roman Empire. While located in the State Department, this office was to be the command post for coordinating the entire Administration's political effort to ensure enlargement's ratification. The Administration turned to Jeremy Rosner to head this office. Rosner had been a senior NSC aide in charge of legislative affairs and speechwriting in Clinton's first term and had written the President's January 1994 Prague speech on enlargement. After leaving the White House, he had gone to the Carnegie Endowment, a leading Washington-based think tank, to write a book on why some foreign policy issues become relatively easy successes on Capitol Hill and others fail.6 One of the first books Rosner read was Stull Holt's Treaties Defeated by the Senate which traced the history of the Senate's handling of treaties in ex-\ plaining the demise of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I.7 Rosner immediately saw parallels between the League of Nations' defeat and (he iowiiung bailie aver NAl'O enJaígĽinent. In both cases, the Administration was trying to push a treaty through the Senate involving a major new U.S. commitment following victory in a war but at a time when there were real pressures ti? retrench from international commitments and refocus on domestic issues. fkniiĽi was convinced cuJaTgcuienl ratification was a wiiinabJe proposition and that jjubltc support Junt tussled. Um triĽ nrntc ŕtusner 1 united at the parallel between the Lcngtic: ul Nations and NATO enlargement, the more ťiinvinced he bťĽHTTie din í tlie Adrrimisfraŕjoii euitld tnsc (ŕns liattle if it adopted a ''business ns usual" appiuach in the uncertain political environment of the post-Cold War em—a point he made in an article in Foreign Affairs and pressed with both Lake and Berger in private in (lie i;tll uf199Ď s r Rosner believed that the main political danger facing the Administration was r resolve final wording isíntui. When the White House sthed uletí postponed I lie Lnitinl signing date for rhc Charter, National Security Advisor Berger called in the three Baltic Ambassadors to reassure them that everything was on track. To everyone's surprise, he rtvcqled that hu BiítĽsLui were jtuuj Riga and t|uipped that lie w.u. die first Bnltic-American National Security Advisor of the United States. The Political Battle 277 In an emotional ceremony held in the White House on January 16, 1998, President Clinton and the Presidents of the three Baltic states met to sign the U.S.-Baltic Charter. Clinton pledged to the three Baltic Presidents that the U.S. would never consider Europe to be fully secure until they, too, were secure. He underscored the importance of NATO's open door policy and underscored that the United States was "determined to help create the conditions under which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can one day walk through that door."66 Albright turned to Grossman and me and said: "It doesn't get much better than this. This is what we all signed up for." At a reception at Blair House, conservative Republican supporters of the Baltics mixed with Democrats, another sign of the bipartisan support that was starting to emerge. At the same time, the Senate hearings from the fall and the public debate on NATO were changing. Increasingly, we were no longer confronted solely or even primarily with questions on the pros and cons of enlargement. Instead, the debate was shifting from the question of NATO's future roster to rationale—i.e., what was an enlarged NATO for and what would its future mission be? The question was not a new one. The Administration had fought bitter fights over whether the Alliance should intervene in Bosnia and whether U.S. troops should be deployed as part of a peacekeeping mission on the ground. More generally, the Administration had argued that in a post-Cold War world the Alliance had to be prepared to intervene beyond its borders to defend its members against new and different threats. This debate over NATO's future missions had been percolating in the strategic community. In early 1997 a group of RAND analysts published a book putting forth the thesis that the U.S. and Europe should embrace a new global partnership in which NATO should refocus on threats to common trans-Atlantic territory and interests that could come from beyond Europe in the form of weapons of mass destruction or terrorism. The argument was simple but controversial: as Europe became increasingly stable and the Russian threat continued to wane, the traditional U.S. role of defender of Europe was becoming less relevant. As opposed to viewing Europe as a place the U.S. had to defend, we needed to think of it as a partner with which we tackled new threats to our common interests together. This meant that NATO had to shift its focus away from Russia to the most likely military threats of the future—many of which were likely to be beyond Europe.67 Prior to joining the State Department, I was among those arguing for NATO's "double enlargement" of new members and new missions.68 At the time, such views were dismissed by many in the U.S. government as beyond the pale in terms of what the U.S.-European relationship could handle or our European allies would ever embrace. But Albright was open to this kind of rethinking. It resonated with her belief that we had to modernize NATO for 278 The Political Battle a new world in which we would confront very different threats than during the Cold War. That view was also shared by her new Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and my new boss, Marc Grossman, who had arrived to take up the reigns of the State Department's European Bureau that summer. Grossman had spent much of his diplomatic career going back and forth between diplomatic assignments in Europe and the Middle East. As Ambassador to Turkey, he had seen how events in one region increasingly affect the other, and how the neat bureaucratic distinction between European and Middle Eastern or Persian Gulf security often broke down in the real world and how events in one region increasingly affected the other. Within the State Department, Albright's new chief of Policy Planning, Greg Craig, was also pushing for a more radical rethink of NATO's core missions in conjunction with enlargement. Craig was one of the founders of the Committee to Expand NATO and had independently come to the same conclusion that NATO needed to be overhauled if it was to remain relevant.6' Grossman encouraged me to pursue my ideas in private, as well as in collaboration with Dan Hamilton from Craig's staff. A strong advocate of enlargement, Grossman nonetheless realized that size was not the same as purpose. Madrid had clarified NATO's future roster, but not its future role. Grossman wanted NATO to remain a strong and effective military alliance. He had started his career as the special assistant to NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington and had remained a staunch Atlanticist. One day he confided to me that his nightmare was that we would wake up in ten years and find that NATO had begun to look like the EU or the OSCE as it competed with these institutions for something meaningful to do. In the fall of 1997 and early 1998, Grossman and I exchanged a series of notes in which we debated those issues. Should the prime focus of U.S. policy be simply to continue the enlargement process eastward? Or was it more important to refocus the Alliance on addressing new threats of instability in the south, including potential threats from weapons of mass destruction coming from beyond Europe? Or should we try to do both in parallel? Grossman called it the "mega-question" in U.S. policy on NATO.70 We concluded that we needed a NATO that both helped to build a Europe whole and free that also served as a stepping-stone for a broader partnership. The question was how both to enlarge the Alliance and to reorient it to face the missions of the future—and prevent it from becoming a politically weak and militarily impotent organization as it grew in numbers. The best way to avoid this dilemma, Grossman believed, was to make sure NATO was focused on real military missions in a new post-Cold War environment. NATO, he emphasized, had to remain focused on what it did best—deterring and, if need be, fighting wars. If those threats came from new sources or beyond Europe, the Alliance had to reorient itself to meat them. The U.S., he The Political Battle 279 believed, should view NATO as "the institution of choice" when the U.S. and Europe would have to act together militarily. If the residual Russian threat continued to wane, NATO had to focus on the new threats to our territory and interests. This meant the Alliance had to rethink what Article 5 meant in a new era and prepare for missions that would take the Alliance beyond its own territory. But it had to do it in a step-by-step fashion that did not fracture the Alliance's consensus. At Madrid the Alliance had decided to rewrite its strategic concept. In the fall of 1997 the Administration was starting to define its own goals for this exercise. At first there was little appetite in the U.S. government for an ambitious rewrite of the strategic concept as it promised to be divisive with the allies. But Albright firmly believed that NATO had to start to tackle such issues as Saddam Hussein and his attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. At the December NAC, she publicly called on NATO to "start a discussion" on the challenge posed by the growing spread of weapons of mass destruction to the Alliance and the need to think about new threats to Alliance security that could come from beyond Europe. Those remarks dominated the headlines of the December 1997 Foreign Ministers' meeting but it was clear that most of our allies were not yet ready for such a discussion.71 Following our return from the December Foreign Ministers meeting, Grossman raised the need to focus on the issue of NATO's future missions in a memo to Albright.72 In parallel, he asked me to prepare a presentation for him to make at Albright's annual strategic retreat in early January.73 In making our case, we were joined by Craig. Grossman and Craig made their pitch to Albright on January 9,1998 at the Secretary's annual retreat with her senior advisors. Albright was supportive and asked us to develop our views further. On January 15, Grossman sent her a note suggesting the U.S. consider using 1999 to define a new U.S.-European bargain for the 21st century premised on the U.S. and Europe working together in an expanded trans-Atlantic framework to solve problems both in and outside of Europe. This would require a new NATO with expanded missions, the reorientation of US-EU relations to global challenges, and a retooled OSCE to promote democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. Grossman suggested using major summits that each of these institutions had scheduled for 1999 to push for this new U.S.-European bargain. He had a name for it—the trifecta. Albright wrote back on the note: "Good idea. Let's develop a 21st century better than the 20th—Europe's bloodiest."74 It was a green light to make this a top policy priority—but after the ratification vote. We wanted to avoid provoking a debate on this sensitive issue prematurely. In mid-December, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger sent President Clinton a memo laying out an endgame strategy for NATO enlargement ratification. It emphasized that the Administration was in good shape in the Senate, but pointed to the failure to obtain fast-track authority for a new free trade 28o The Political Battle round as an example of the need not to take things for granted. Even though a two-thirds majority in the Senate appeared increasingly likely, the memo warned that support for enlargement in the Senate was still tepid; the Administration would face battles over key amendments. It urged early Presidential involvement to strengthen the Administration's hand early in the endgame, generate political momentum, and create the solid victory that would strengthen Clinton's future prerogatives and those of his successor.75 President Clinton kicked off the campaign by highlighting his commitment to enlargement in the State of the Union address in late January. On February n, he officially transmitted the protocols of accession from the executive branch to the Senate. He was joined by the three Foreign Ministers and the Senate leadership for a ceremony in the ornate Franklin Room of the State Department. The President delivered his remarks in front of a full-size photo replica of the Berlin Wall, which Rosner had borrowed from the Pentagon for the event. As he finished his remarks, the President pointed to the display and said: "Behind me is a picture of the wall that for so long represented the false and forced division of the European continent. NATO cannot maintain the old Iron Curtain as its permanent frontier. It must and can bring Europe together in security, not keep it apart in instability." As they left the ceremony, Vice President Gore reminded Senator Biden that it was the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Yalta conference that had started to cement the original division of Europe—and that the West was now overcoming.76 Events were now breaking our way. In late January the AFL-CIO came out publicly in favor of the Administration's policy, following meetings between both Albright and Clinton with the organization's president, John Sweeney.77 A few days later, a group of sixty senior retired military commanders—including five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—endorsed enlargement in an effort organized by Steve Hadley of the Committee to Expand NATO.78 It all seemed almost too good to be true. On January 20, Polish Ambassador Jerzy Kozminski sat down to write a cable identifying what could still go wrong for Warsaw. He sketched out several scenarios in which NATO enlargement might still be derailed. The first was a crisis with Russia in the Balkans or elsewhere that would lead Western leaders to rethink enlargement. The second was a crisis in one of the candidate countries that might disqualify it or lead to new doubts about their qualifications. A third was something happening in the U.S. that damaged the President's ability to get enlargement through the Senate. The next day, January 21,1998, Rosner walked into my office with a copy of The Washington Post and pointed to a story alleging that President Clinton had had an affair with a young intern by the name of Monica Lewinsky and had tried to cover it up. We were probably the only people in the world thinking about the connections between Lewinsky and NATO enlargement. We were lucky that the President's im- The Political Battle 281 peachment hearings, as well as the war in Kosovo, did not unfold until one year later. Ratifying enlargement against that backdrop of either would have been much more difficult and perhaps impossible. The opposition had not given up either. In late January, we received reports about a new anti-enlargement group, the Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE). It consisted of political groups from both ends of the political spectrum, from the Free Congress Foundation and Eagle Forum on the right to the Union of Concerned Scientists and Council for a Livable World on the left. CANE's Founding Declaration claimed that NATO enlargement amounted to a "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution that would entangle the U.S. in ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe and soak the U.S. taxpayer of billions of dollars. Claiming that enlargement was being driven by Washington elites out of touch with the American public, they called for exhaustive hearings and an extensive floor debate with no vote before mid-1998, alleging that plans for an earlier vote were "railroading the issue."79 Similarly, we also picked up reports of growing internal debate and opposition to enlargement within conservative Republican circles and the board rooms of think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation who officially supported enlargement. Both ends of the political spectrum, it seemed, had their own Russia-firsters. Later that spring CANE was joined by the Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities (BLSP) whose President, Ben Cohen, was a co-founder of the Ben and Jerry's ice cream empire. BLSP was committed to shifting U.S. government spending from defense to domestic needs. It would fund a series of ads that opposed enlargement and showed the mushroom-shaped clouds of nuclear explosions and warned that NATO expansion could alienate Russia and rekindle Cold War tensions. They were focused in states where Senators had yet to announce their positions on NATO enlargement. But the opposition was unable to make significant political inroads—either in the Senate or in the broader public. They were not well organized politically, too disparate in their ideological composition, and unable to put together a broad-based coalition. Above all, they could not enlist a critical mass of political leaders, neither on Capitol Hill, nor more generally from the political center—which the Administration had assiduously cultivated. By this time S/NERO had become a kind of a political rapid reaction SWAT unit. Every time Rosner received a report that a Senator might be wavering, he immediately arranged for a phone call from the President or from Albright, Cohen, or Berger addressing his or her concerns. A team of senior officials was often dispatched to follow-up with a briefing for the Senator or staff. Rosner and I met regularly with the Ambassadors of the three invited countries over breakfast to compare notes and were on the phone several times a day with USCEN exchanging notes on how to counter the critics. Rosner joked it was like playing the game "whack-a-mole"—every time an opponent popped up, the Administration tried to bat down what it considered a bad idea. 282 The Political Battle But it was a two-front struggle. While waging the public battle, the Administration was also engaged in intense and at times contentious talks with the Republican staff from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the language of the resolution of ratification. It was the vehicle through which Senators could attach reservations or amendments that could constrain future Administrations or, in the worst case, force the Administrations to abandon the treaty. By mid-February we had had several difficult rounds of contentious talks but were finding common language on many key issues: Russia, costs and burden-sharing, the open door, CFE, intelligence sharing with new members, POWs, and Jewish property restitution. On February 19, Helms' staff sent him an updated draft resolution of ratification. Helms sent it back with his comment: "Looks good to me!" Two days later, Rosner and I sent our assessment to Talbott concluding that we could work with the SFRC draft as well.80 5. THE ENDGAME The SFRC was scheduled to hold the last in a series of seven hearings concluding the formal testimony record on NATO enlargement on February 24. The day before, February 23, we got the SFRC's latest draft of the resolution of ratification. We were narrowing the gap.81 That same day the results of a new poll on U.S. public attitudes on enlargement showed that public support was high and unchanged from the fall of 1996. It belied the argument of the critics that once Americans became more familiar with the issue support would fall. The poll showed that 61 percent of Americans supported adding the first three members, and 50-43 percent supported adding additional states after the first three. As Rosner underscored in an e-mail, virtually all the pro-enlargement arguments tested had gained support whereas nearly all the anti-enlargement arguments had lost support.82 The next morning Albright made her final appearance before the SFRC. In addition to repeating the Administration's arguments in favor of enlargement, she took aim at some of the proposed amendments that enlargement opponents were starting to circulate. The signing of the U.S.-Baltic Charter two weeks earlier had opened another line of attack from enlargement critics who now claimed the Administration's open door strategy was reckless. In a New York Times editorial in early February, four well-known opponents of enlargement-Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft, and Alton Frye—called for "a definite if not permanent pause in this process" after the first enlargement round.83 It was quickly embraced by Senator Warner in the form of an amendment.84 The Administration believed that a "pause" on enlargement was unnecessary because the U.S. already had a de facto veto over further invitations, and it was dangerous because it could undercut democratic reforms in the region. Albright, who was already on record opposing the amendment before Warner The Political Battle 283 officially offered it, wanted to lay down a marker that we were going to fight hard against Warner in her final testimony.85 She pointed out that NATO had already enlarged several times in its history and had become stronger, not weaker, each time. She insisted that an open door policy was "central to the logic" of a new Alliance that would help knit Europe together. "A mandated pause," Albright told the gathered Senators, "would be heard from Tallinn in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans."86 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened on March 3 to vote on the resolution of ratification. The vote was 16-2 in our favor. Rosner's "center-out" strategy had worked. We had the support of all but the most conservative and liberal Senators on the Committee—Republican John Ashcroft (R-MO) and Democrat Paul Wellstone (D-MN). But several Senators had made it clear that they were uncomfortable over where NATO was headed. In a memo to Albright that evening, Rosner and I wrote: 'Today's meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on NATO enlargement was intellectually and politically fascinating, and holds many lessons. The 16-2 margin clearly bodes well for the final tally. But the substance of the Committee's deliberations suggest the debate has gone beyond the merits of enlargement to these first three states, and has moved to broader issues: NATO's future orientation and new missions; future rounds of enlargement and the European security strategy beyond NATO." We warned Albright that a number of Senators still had concerns and were likely to try to use amendments to put their imprint on enlargement. 'Today's meeting," the memo stated, "does nothing to diminish our confidence that we will obtain the needed two-thirds vote. But it does suggest that if the ultimate vote is going to stand as a broad affirmation of our vision for NATO and Europe, we have work to do."87 The next morning, March 4, the USCEN issued an informal vote count that had 72 Senators voting yes, 13 opposing and 15 undecided. By this count, we had crossed the hurdle of 67 votes required for ratification. We could now focus on the endgame. In a subsequent memo we underscored: "How this ends—the final margin, the amendments that prevail, the post-mortems by the press—will all color our ability to pursue the next phase of policy toward NATO and Europe."88 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote was a major victory for the Administration. The critics were furious. The New York Times charged that, "Rarely has such an important matter seemed headed for approval with so little enthusiasm or attention."89 Tom Friedman accused the SFRC of putting on a "shameful performance." In a column in The New York Times, he complained, "Senators Jesse Helms, Joe Biden & Co. rolled over like puppies having their bellies rubbed when Clinton officials explained their plans for NATO expan- 284 The Political Battle sion by dodging all the hard questions."90 Other major newspapers, including The Washington Post, praised the SFRC vote.91 And on March 13, The Chicago Tribune reversed its previous position opposing enlargement and now came out in our favor—a reversal that followed an intense effort by S/NERO to get at least one major editorial board opposed to enlargement to change its position.92 Sensing that momentum was rapidly building on our side, enlargement opponents urged a postponement of the final Senate vote. Seventeen Senators sent Lott and Daschle a letter asking that the vote be delayed until June 1. Former Senators Sam Nunn and Howard Baker also wrote the Senate Armed Services Committee criticizing the SFRC resolution and calling for additional hearings and a delay in the vote.93 When Albright heard about their request, she rolled her eyes and reminded us that during the four years we had been debating enlargement the founding fathers of NATO had not only created the Alliance but also already enlarged it once. Pro-enlargement Senators countered with their own letter, and President Clinton weighed in with Lott to urge him to stick to the planned schedule.94 Helms, in turn, defended his handling of enlargement in an op-ed.95 The Senate floor debate on enlargement started on March 18 but then, faced with the need to address a pending education bill, Lott postponed it until after the Senate's Easter recess. While disappointed, this was a pause we could live with. With the final floor fight now scheduled for late April, we had a chance to step back and review the order of battle. The fight was now over amendments. More than a dozen Senators had signaled their intention to offer amendments, often more than one. The amendments we worried about most were those proposed by Ashcroft, Harkin, Hutchison, Levin, Moynihan, Stevens, and Warner. They were proposing amendments ranging from restricting bilateral assistance to new members, a cap on U.S. contributions to NATO budgets, limits on new missions, creating a new conflict resolution process within the Alliance for Central Europe, to a suggestion that we create a way to eject allies from the Alliance if they did not meet our standards.96 While the Administration was determined to fight each of them, two were at the top of our list of "must wins." The first was Senator Warner's "pause" amendment. The second was an amendment Senator John Ashcroft had announced to limit any future out of area role for NATO. The Senator from Missouri was considering a run for the Presidency and positioning himself as the candidate of the right wing of the Republican Party. He had launched a mean-spirited attack mischaracterizing Albright's views on NATO's new missions. Albright had written him explaining in detail why his characterization of her views was wrong, but Ashcroft had ignored her explanation and instead accused the Administration of trying to distort the intent of the Washington Treaty.97 But Ashcroft had his history wrong—and the consequences of his amendment were potentially far-reaching and dangerous. The Washington Treaty was The Political Battle 285 clear that NATO's collective defense commitment was limited to the North Atlantic area as defined in the treaty in geographic terms. But it had left open the option of NATO members coming together voluntarily under other articles of the Treaty to defend their common interests outside of that area. Acheson had made these points quite clearly in March 1949 in public interviews in which he had explained each Article of the Washington Treaty. We had dug the Department's summary of those interviews out of the archives and circulated it as part of our effort to defeat the Ashcroft amendment, which we feared would prevent NATO from being able to address new threats from beyond Europe in the future.98 On April 21 Albright met with the Democratic Caucus to shore up their support. She told the gathered Senators that the enlargement vote was one of the most important they would cast. It was a chance to truly end the Cold War—"to put it in concrete"—and to overcome Europe's divide. "I hope you would view it as an honor to vote for enlargement—to make these three countries part of the best Alliance in the world," she told them. Even at this late stage, however, it was clear that a number of Senators still had doubts centering largely on enlargement's impact on Russia and arms control. Albright went out of her way to address them: "I want you to know how committed the President and I are to making our relations with Russia work." The Russians did not like enlargement but they had accepted that it was going to happen, Albright said. There were still problems in U.S.-Russian relations, but it was a mistake to blame them on enlargement. "That's like blaming everything on El Nino," she quipped. A number of Senators said they were going to support the President—but without enthusiasm.99 On April 24, 1998 Senators Roth, Lieberman, and McCain sent around a "Dear Colleague" letter urging their colleagues to vote in favor of enlargement. They noted that enlargement enjoyed wide bipartisan support and had been endorsed by three former Presidents, eight former secretaries of state, seven former secretaries of defense, five former national security advisors and sixty former senior flag officers in the U.S. military. In addition, enlargement had been endorsed by 13 state Senates and House of Representatives, the U.S. conference of Mayors, the National Governor's Association, the Council of State Governments, the AFL-CIO, numerous veterans groups, and 26 ethnic, religious and humanitarian organizations. "These endorsements," they concluded, "are a powerful reflection of the broad consensus affirming that NATO enlargement is in America's national interest and deserves the full support of the Senate."100 The final floor debate opened on a slightly nervous note on April 27,1998. Only a few days earlier Senator Lott had publicly urged the Administration not to take anything for granted. "I told the White House for the third and last time, 'If you don't pay attention to this bill this thing could get away from us,'" the Mississippi Republican told reporters. "The odds are we're going to get over 70 286 The Political Battle votes, but there's not a lot of enthusiasm in here," he warned.101 The pro-enlargement forces were led by Senator Biden who took over the role of floor manager and became in many ways the key figure in managing the Senate debate. The opposition was de facto led by Senator John Warner. By the evening of the first day some fifteen Senators had spoken—ten for, five against and one undecided. Behind the scenes, the President, Albright, Cohen and Berger worked the phones to line up the votes to defeat the amendments the Administration was fighting. SACEUR General Wes Clark pitched in by calling a number of Republican Senators to explain why the Ashcroft amendment was damaging to NATO. The rest of us spent most of the day working with SFRC staff to answer the concerns of individual Senators and to field requests for last-minute phone calls to help get them on board. A Democratic whip count found that there was almost no support among Democrats for the Ashcroft amendment—but that there was support for the Warner "pause" amendment. Secretary of Defense Cohen met privately with Senator Stevens to convince him to withdraw his amendment. The first amendments came to the Senate floor for votes on April 28. Senator Harkin's amendment proposing limits on bilateral assistance to the new members was defeated 76-24. Senator Jon Kyi (R-AZ) offered an amendment suggesting guidance for the rewrite of the strategic concept which made clear that NATO's future missions would not be limited to peacekeeping. It was a vehicle to deflect support away from Ashcroft by allowing Senators to underscore their support for NATO's core mission of collective defense and to note their reservations about peacekeeping while keeping open the option of more ambitious out-of-area war fighting missions. The Administration eagerly supported it. It í passed overwhelmingly 90-9. We also enlisted the support of Zbigniew Brzezinski and senior Republican strategists to lobby against the Ashcroft amendment. In a memo written late on the evening of April 28, Rosner wrote: "Today was a good day." The political battle was now being fought on the editorial pages of the major j U.S. newspapers. The New York Times' ongoing opposition to enlargement was relentless.102 Anticipating that the Times would issue a final blast against the Administration on the day of the vote, Albright submitted her own editorial making the case for enlargement. On April 29th, we woke up to see the two con- j trasting editorials on The New York Times editorial page. As expected, the Times' editorial attacked enlargement as a mistake of historic proportions. "It is delu- ] sional," they wrote, "tu bil íľvľ thatNA'TOLAuaiiMuii i., nur at its ľuiľ ji i ,k-í thai RilKSI.i will rtyircl as ]ioililc"|u> Ln cmurjht, AibrigíiL enüileJ her ĽtiitoriaJ "Stup Worrying about Russia"- .md iirgeti her rejdem ŕoslcip viewing (.^nira! Humpe______ rtjL-Ligh the prism jf Riuťia bit? niťdftui tliink cjt thť.'Jť mimtriii: -ľí indupuinlĽ-i----------- iLujjuLii^Mu hsuiiLĽii tu t«: AmcLiij-ďi^IJica. £iiE»u£iiigNATO,shcargued, would______ The Political Battle 287 be a sign that we understood the world had changed and the Cold War was over.104 A group of us headed over to the Senate to help head off any last-minute surprise challenges before the final vote. A highlight came when Dan Fried, who had since moved on to become U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, phoned to tell us about an amusing incident he had experienced earlier in the day. While visiting the Jasna Gora monastery in southern Poland, the home of the famous Black Madonna icon, Fried had been approached by one of the Fathers—complete in white robe and cell phone—who said: "We know you are having some problems in the Senate." He then pointed to the ceiling and said: "We're willing to provide a little help." The day was filled with political skirmishing before the final vote. In the Senate, a series of last-minute maneuvers was underway. At one point enlargement opponents suggested that the vote be put off because Helms was scheduled to undergo surgery the next day. But Helms called their bluff by saying he was prepared to debate through the night if necessary. Lobbying by Biden along with Berger and Talbott helped convince Democratic Senators Leahy (D-VT) and Bingaman (D-NM) to withdraw amendments on CFE and the Baltic states. Biden and Helms urged their colleagues to fold as many other amendments as possible into a single manager's amendment to get to a final vote. But we still faced a number of potentially dangerous amendments, above all those being pushed by Ashcroft, Moynihan, Stevens, and Warner. When David Gompert, a senior NSC official responsible for European affairs in the Bush Administration, wrote an op-ed criticizing Ashcroft, we made sure it was faxed to every Republican Senator's office.105 Voting on amendments started at 3:30 P.M. There were now seven of them. Ashcroft and Warner had each asked that their amendments be considered last. It was an attempt to gather the protest votes of those Senators who had supported enlargement but still wanted to signal that their support of our policy was not carte blanche. But the momentum was now clearly on the Administration's side. Moynihan's amendment linking EU and NATO enlargement was defeated 83-17 in spite of an emotional warning from the New York Senator that the U.S. was re-creating the hair-trigger tensions that existed at the height of the Cold War.106 Senator Hutchison's amendment on a new conflict dispute resolution was defeated 62-37. Warner continued to argue against enlargement as committing the U.S. to a "blank check" for an ill-defined military alliance. "We'd be creating through this expansion a 911 organization," he argued claiming that NATO was in danger of becoming "Dial a cop, dial a soldier." But his "pause" amendment also went down to defeat, 59-41.107 Throughout the day Ashcroft bargained with Lott over how much debate time should be set aside for his amendment. Lott wanted to wrap up the vote that evening and became increasingly irritated with Ashcroft's demand for sev- 288 The Political Battle eral hours of debate at prime time when other Senators were getting much less. Finally, fed up with Ashcroft's tactics, he walked over to ask Senator Biden to move to table Ashcroft's amendment. It was a parliamentary maneuver to kill it before it even reached the floor. Biden agreed—but only if Lott would second his motion to make it clear that this was not a partisan move. After hesitating for a minute, Lott concurred. As Ashcroft walked back into the Senate chamber, he saw his amendment, which the Administration feared would be the most dangerous and closely-voted amendment, go down to defeat 82-18 without ever having reached the Senate floor. At 8:30 P.M. the final floor debate commenced. The vote started at 10:25 P-M-Senator Robert Byrd (D-WVA), invoking an old Senate tradition for votes on grave matters of state, insisted that the Senators remain at their desks and rise one at a time to have their votes registered. There was a hushed silence in the chamber as each Senator rose with his "yea" or "nay." The final vote was 80-19 with 45 Republicans and 35 Democrats in favor. Rosner was called into another room to take a congratulatory call from the President. Senators Lugar and Biden came over to congratulate us. Standing outside the visitor's galley in the corridors of the Senate, we saw the 84-year-old Jan Nowak walking toward us swinging his cane like a spry youngster with a big smile on his face. "I never thought," he said, "that I would live to see the day when Poland is not only free—but safe." The next day Secretary Albright issued a statement on the vote. "The Senate has done the right thing at the right time. For this is a moment of relative peace in Europe, a time when freedom is ascendant. Now we can be that much more confident that peace and freedom will endure." Albright underscored the broader implications of the vote for U.S. foreign policy. "Today's vote sends a message to our old and new allies that America will continue to defend its interest in the peace and security of Europe. It will reassure all of Europe's new democracies that we are not going to treat them as second class citizens in the future just because they were subjugated in the past. It is a signal that America will defend its values, protect its interests, stand by its allies and keep its word."108 CONCLUSION At NATO's founding on April 4,1949, President Harry S. Truman described the creation of the Atlantic Alliance as a neighborly act taken by countries deeply conscious of their shared heritage as democracies that had come together determined to defend their common values and interests from those who threatened them. The Washington Treaty was a very simple document, he noted. But it was a treaty that might have prevented two wars had it existed in 1919 or 1939. Its goal was to establish a zone of peace in an area of the world that had been at the heart of those two wars. Protecting this area, the President said, was an important step toward creating peace in the world. And he predicted that the positive impact of NATO's creation would be felt beyond its borders.1 Fifty years later, NATO decided to extend that zone of peace and stability from Western to Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. It opened its door to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as part of a strategy of uniting Europe and recasting the Alliance for the post-Cold War era. By underscoring that NATO's door remained open to other European democracies willing and able to meet the criteria set out in the Washington Treaty, allied heads of state affirmed their wish to extend that zone even further in the future. NATO enlargement, in President Clinton's words, was designed to ensure that the eastern half of the continent 344 6. The NATO-Russia Endgame BOOK VI. THE NATO-RUSSIA ENDGAME i. See Clinton's State of the Union Address, February 4,1997. 2. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969). 3. See "Statement By Secretary of State-Designate Madeleine Korbel Albright Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Wednesday, January 8,1997. 4. The study was commissioned by the Pew Trust and released in the fall of 1991. See Donald S. Kellerman, Andrew Kohut, and Carol Bowman, The Pulse of Europe: A Survey of Political and Social Values and Attitudes (Washington, DC: Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press). 5. See Albright's January 8, 1997 testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 6. See Albright's handwritten comments on Grossman's note to her entitled 'Thinking About 1999" and dated January 15,1998. 7. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Address to the People of Prague, Obecni Dum, "A Moment of Celebration and of Dedication," Prague, Czech Republic, July 14,1997, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970714.html. 8. The book was James Chace's Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created The American World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). 9. As Albright put it in her first speech as Secretary of State at NATO Headquarters in Brussels: "Today we are privileged to live in a time of relative stability and peace. But we know from history that we cannot take the extension of these blessings for granted. Peace is not a gift. It must be earned. And if it is to last, it must be constantly reinforced." See "Statement By Secretary Madeleine Albright At The North Atlantic Council Special Ministerial Meeting," NATO Headquarters, Brussels, February 18, 1997. 10. See "Commencement Address by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright at Harvard University," Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 5,1997. 11. Ibid. 12. In his memoirs, former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov writes that he was initially worried about Albright as U.S. Secretary of State but was pleasantly surprised to discover that she, while a vigorous defender and promoter of American interests, was committed to finding common ground with Russia as well. See Yevgeny Primakov, Gody v Bolshoy Politike (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1996), p. 272. 13. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "The Secretary's Meeting with President Yeltsin," February 21,1997. 14. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Opening Statement at the Carnegie Roundtable Discussions," Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, May 2,1997. 15. These quotes come from my notes from the meeting. 16. See Madeleine K. Albright, "Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, February !5> *997- 17. Kohl's National Security Advisor, Joachim Bitterlich provided a read out of the conversation to Talbott as well as to the U.S. charge in Bonn, J.D. Bindenagel. See 6. The NATO-Russia Endgame 345 "Kohl's Telephone Call with the President on January 6"; and "Kohľs suggestion on NATO-Russia Relations," Bonn 00102, January 6,1997. 18. The phone call took place on January 6, 1997. See Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, January !?. *997- 19. See "Report Card on Primakov: B Plus on Process, C Minus on Substance," Moscow 01151, January 17,1997. 20. See "February 21 Meeting with Communist Leader Zyuganov, State 032968, February 22,1997. 21. The article was written by the pro-communist Duma staffer and security expert Anton Surikov in the January 15 edition of Pravda Pyat. See "Duma Staffer Surikov Describes Recent Presidential Meeting on Response to NATO Expansion," Moscow 001403, January 22,1997. 22. See "SYG Solana on AFSourh, Ministeriais, Bosnia," USNATO 003863, November 5,1996. 23. See "Senator Roth's 11/26 Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana on NATO Expansion," USNATO 000307, January 31,1997. 24. See the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Clinton and Chirac from January 30,1997. 25. See "Deputy Secretary's 1/13 Meeting with Foreign Secretary Rifkind and Foreign Office Officials," London 000657, January 17,1997. 26. See Memorandum of the Conversation between Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and French President Jacques Chirac, January 14,1997. 27. See Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, January 15,1997. 28. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 224. 29. See Talbott and Fuerth's Memorandum for the President and Vice President dated January 24,1997. 30. See Yeltsin's letter to Clinton dated January 30,1997. 31. See "Primakov Publicly Commits to Negotiations with NATO," Moscow 003619, February 14,1997. 32. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Clinton and Gore with Chernomyrdin, entitled "Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin: March Summit, GCC Results, European security, START, Economics," The Oval Office, February 7,1997. 33. See Talbott, The Russia Hand, p. 233. 34. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 6,1997. 35. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "The Secretary's Meeting with President Yeltsin," February 21,1997. 36. See Henry Kissinger, "Helsinki Fiasco," The Washington Post, March 30,1997. 37. See Talbott's Note to Albright dated March 14,1997 and entitled "The NATO-Russia Charter as time-released medicine." 346 6. The NATO-Russia Endgame 38. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy of State Strobe Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Moscow, July 15,1996. 39. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 6,1997. 40. See the scorecard entitled "A NATO-Russia Understanding" dated January 27, 1997. See also the updated written version from February 8 entitled "From Helsinki to Madrid: A Scenario" which lays out internal U.S. thinking on how to bring NATO-Russia talks to closure in the run-up to the Madrid summit. 41. For background on how NATO strategy has evolved see Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993). 42. For an example of Moscow's attempt to define "offensive infrastructure" see "Russians Identify 'Infrastructure'," Vienna 001791, March 11,1997. 43. See Final Communique issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, December 10,1996. 44. See also NATO/CFE: Feb. 17 HLTF Agrees on NATO Position on Adaptation," USNATO 000509, February 19,1997. 45. This sentence went through a number of iterations. The version Vershbow wrote on March 5 is quoted verbatim from Talbott's memo to Albright from March 7, 1997. See "My Meeting with Primakov—and Yours," March 7,1997. 46. Ibid. See also the Memorandum of Conversation between Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 6,1997. 47. As quoted in William Drozdiak, "Poland Urges NATO Not to Appease Russia: The Smell of Yalta is Always with Us,' " The Washington Post, March 17,1997. 48. See "The Secretary's Meeting with Polish Foreing Minister Rosati," State 056869, March 27,1997. 49. Speaking before the press with Rosati, Albright underscored that Poland would be a full NATO member: "They will be full allies in every sense of the word. Every important decision which will be made by NATO's 16 allies is made in full consultations with our partners. And there will be nothing about you without you." See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, Remarks at photo opportunity, Washington D.C., March 13, 1997, . 50. See "Statement by the North Atlantic Council, March 14, 1997," . 51. See Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 15, 1997. This description also draws on Talbott's notes of the meeting. 52. See Talbott's typed up notes of the meeting between Berger and him with Mamedov on the morning of March 16,1997. 53. Obtained from Strobe Talbott's personal papers. 54. See Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov on March 17,1997. 55. See Talbott, The Russia Hand, p. 237. 6. The NATO-Russia Endgame 347 56. See the memcon entitled "Morning Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin: NATO-Russia, START, ABM/TMD," March 21,1997. 57. See Talbott, The Russia Hand, pp. 241-242. 58. See "Press Conference of President Clinton and President Yeltsin," Kalastafa Torppa, Helsinki, Finland, March 21,1997. Author's private copy. 59. See "Russian Reaction to Helsinki," Moscow 007281, March 25,1997. 60. Finnish President Ahtisaari briefed U.S. Ambassador Derek Shearer on his conversation with Yeltsin in Finnish-Russian talks the day after the U.S.-Russian summit had concluded. See "The Morning After: Russian/Finnish Post-Summit Bilaterals Focus on the Baltics," Helsinki 001550, March 26,1997. 61. Naumann was in Moscow March 23-26, 1997. See "NATO-Russia: CMC Chairman Briefs the NAC on his Russia Visit," USNATO 01212, April 14,1997. 62. See "Russia's Foreign Policy Malaise," Moscow 010483, April 25,1997. 63. See "SYG Solana's Debrief of His 4/15 Meeting with FM Primakov," USNATO 1231, April 15,1997. 64. See Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Random House, 1984). 65. See the paper entitled "A Menu of Scenarios for Your May Day in Moscow: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," April 25,1997. 66. Talbott called Albright from Moscow to convey this message to her during the flight. It is also contained in a memo drafted summarizing the first day of talks in Moscow and sent to Albright's plane. See Memorandum to the Secretary From Strobe Talbott in Moscow, April 30,1997. 67. See Talbott's "NATO-Russia Midnight Update" faxed to Albright on her plane en route to Moscow, April 30,1997. 68. See "Secretary's Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, May 1,1997, Moscow," State 084836, May 6,1997. 69. See Talbott, The Russia Hand, pp. 244-245. 70. See "Secretary's Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, May 1,1997, Moscow," State 84836, May 6,1997. The results of the Albright-Primakov conversation on May 2 are described in a confidential summary of their conversation. Albright also describes the meeting in a Night Note to the President sent later that day. See the Secretary's "Night Note" sent to the President on May 2,1997. 71. "Night Note," Ibid. 72. See "NATO/HLTF: May 6 HLTF Meeting-Allies Support Albright Primakov Paper on CFE," USNATO 085231, May 6,1997. 73. See "NATO-Russia: NAC Discusses NATO-Russia relationship Before SYG Meets Primakov," USNATO 1506, May 6,1997. 74. See "Deputy Secretary's Letter to DFM Mamedov," State 084033, May 6, 1997. 75. See "NATO-Russia: Debrief of May 6 Solana-Primakov Meeting," USNATO 1531, May 7,1997. 76. For the U.S. instruction to Hunter for the final NAC on May 13 see "NATO-Russia: Guidance on Section V for 5/13NAC, "State 088990, May 13,1997. 348 6. The NATO-Russia Endgame 77. See "Letter from the Deputy Secretary to DFM Mamedov," State 86892, May 9. *997- 78. See the Official Informal from Tefft to Talbott entitled "For Deputy Secretary Only from Chargé," May 12,1997. 79. See the guidance sent to Vershbow following the Vershbow-Edelman conversation entitled "NATO-Russia: Guidance to Close on March 14 Language/Flank Agreement." State 090106, May 14,1997. 80. See "Statement by the President on NATO Expansion," The White House, The Rose Garden, May 14,1997, . 81. See "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials," The Briefing Room, May 14,1997. Author's private copy. 82. See Yeltsin's letter to President Clinton from May 19,1997. 83. See Memorandum of Conversation of a Dinner Meeting Between Secretary Albright and Russian Foreign Mister Primakov, State 110688, June 12,1997. 84. See "Remarks by President Clinton at the Signing Ceremony of the NATO-Russia Founding Act," Paris, May 27, 1997, . 85. See "Remarks by Russian President Yeltsin at the Signing Ceremony of the NATO-Russia Founding Act," Paris, May 27,1997, . 86. See the Memorandum of Conversation of the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting held at the American Ambassador's Residence in Paris on May 27,1997. BOOK VII. HEAD-TO-HEAD AT MADRID 1. This did not mean that the U.S. had given up on Slovakia. In the spring of 1997 Albright asked Talbott to come up with a strategy to encourage Bratislava to return to a reformist track. See Deputy Secretary Talbott's memo entitled "A Strategy for Slovakia" dated April 21,1997. 2. In a memo to the NATO Ambassador in February, Solana wrote: "In order to avoid a prolonged public debate before the summit, there should be no formal discussion either in Council or at the spring Ministerial and no recommendations on which country or countries to invite at the summit to start accession negotiations with the Alliance. We should rather aim at a late and quiet process of consensus building between the Sintra Ministerial and the summit. I would be prepared, if you agree, to sound out nations individually by mid-June and present a consolidated overview to Permanent Representatives at a private luncheon or an informal meeting which would allow nations to consult bilaterally on different views. A few days before the summit we should aim to arrive, in an informal meeting, at unanimous recommendations to be submitted to heads of state and government. Any leak or advance notice to the "selected" countries or to the "non-selected" must be strictly avoided." See "NATO: Enlargement Preparations for the Madrid Summit, USNATO 000430, February 12, 1997. 3. At the NATO December 1996 Foreign Ministers Ministerial, the U.S. had been unable to gain acceptance of the relatively anodyne statement: "The first shall not be 7. Head-to-Head at Madrid 349 the last." See Hunter's assessment of the weakness of allied support for the "open door" policy in "NATO in 1996: Beyond Architecture to Action," USNATO 000056, January 6,1996. 4. Speaking before the NAC in Brussels on February 4, 1997, President Constantinescu said that his government had promised the Romanian people three things: democratic stability, economic prosperity, and Euro-Atlantic integration. He concluded his speech by saying that if any of these goals were not achieved, quoting Titus, "the day is lost." See "Romanian President Constantinescu Meets the NAC," USNATO 000426, February 12,1997. 5. But Chirac also noted that "the greatest difficulty" would be to convince the United States to support Romania's candidacy. See "Chirac Visit to Bucharest," Bucharest 001247, February 27,1997. For an internal assessment of French thinking on Romania in the spring of 1997 see "France and NATO: Plugging for Romania," Paris 010053, May 2,1997. 6. See "NATO in 1997," USNATO 001053, March 28,1997. 7. On Perry's trip to Ljubljana see "What A Difference Ten Months Makes: Secretary Perry's July 3 Visit to Slovenia," Ljubljana 000756, July 5,1996. 8. In order to avoid leaks, these meetings were kept smaller and less formal than normal Deputy Committee meetings and were referred to as "rump DCs." My description draws on my own notes from these meetings. 9. Since these meetings were not official DC meetings, an official "Summary of Conclusions" of the DC process was never produced. The rationale for the U.S. decision is nonetheless contained in the paper entitled "Principals' Checklist of NATO Summit Issues," May 20,1997. 10. See Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "NATO, Russia and Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century," The Atlantic Council, May 20,1997. 11. See Hunter's cable "The Sintra Ministeriais," USNATO 001804, May 26,1997. See also my note to Albright entitled "What to Watch Out for on Enlargement Issues" dated May 23,1997. 12. See "Talking Points on Small First Group," May 28,1997. 13. Albright emerged from the lunch somewhat shaken and angry that she had so little support. Talbott sent me off to draft a memo listing the reasons why we were still in good shape. See my note to Albright entitled "Thoughts on Your Lunch and Aftermath." 14. See Albright's Night Note from Sintra dated May 30,1997. 15. In a meeting with Italian Defense Minister Andreata, Cohen replied that if Slovenia had not been included by others with Romania, the U.S. decision might have been different. See "Defense Ministers Meeting at NATO HQ, Italian Bilateral, 12-13 June 1997," USNATO 002120, June 19,1997. 16. The conversation took place on May 22,1997. Clinton said: "The challenge at Madrid is to make sure the countries invited to join NATO can fulfill their obligations, so that it will be a credible alliance and not purely political." The two leaders agreed on the merits of such an approach in general, but did not discuss individual candidates. See the "Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of Germany," State 107309, June 7,1997. 352 y Head-to-Head at Madrid following his return from Bonn. The Romanian President said that he had told the Chancellor he didn't want Romania to become the focal point of dissension in the Alliance but that he needed a specific reference in the communique. Otherwise—in his words—"I will have achieved nothing. Romania will be in the same position as Bulgaria. And I will have failed as a leader." See "President Constantinescu's Meeting with Chancellor Kohl," Bucharest 004204, July 3,1997. 54. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana," July 7,1997. 55. For a summary of the opening plenary session see "NATO Summit—Plenary Discussion of NATO Enlargement," SECTO 021007, Ju'vlo> '997- 56. See "EAPC Summit, July 9," Secto 021020, July 14,1997. 57. See "Memorandum of Conversation: President Clinton's Meeting with Romanian President Constantinescu," State 144970, August 22,1997. 58. See "Remarks by President Clinton and President . 59. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and German President Herzog on July 24,1997," State 146743, August 6,1997. BOOK VIII. THE POLITICAL BATTLE 1. For example, in the summer of 1996 the Senate passed the "NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act" by a vote of 81-16. See Vote Summary, July 25,1996 on S.Amdt.5058 to H.R.3540, . 2. See "Memorandum of Conversation, Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy, May 6,1998,11:50 A.M.-i2:3o A.M., Cabinet Room." 3. On the changing role of the executive branch and Congress see Stanley Sloan, Mary Locke, and Casimir A. Yost, The Foreign Policy Struggle (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000). 4. See George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," The New York Times, February 5, 1997. 5. See John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement," Survival 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 145-151. 6. See Jeremy D. Rosner, The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995). 7. See William Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933). 8. See Jeremy D. Rosner, "The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (July 1996): 9-16. On public support for enlargement see Steven Kull and Jeremy D. Rosner, The American public, Congress and NATO enlargement, Part I: "Is there sufficient public support?" and Part II: "Will Congress back admitting new members?" in NATO Review 45, no. i (January 1997): 9-11 and 12-14, respectively. For the original Kull poll, see Principal Investigator Steven Kull, "Americans on 8. The Political Battle 353 Expanding NATO: A Study of US Public Attitudes Summary of Findings," Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), October 1,1996. 9. See Rosner's memo to Berger entitled "Legislative, Public Affairs and Diplomatic Priorities for the Next Six Months," January 16,1997. 10. See Rosner's memo to Secretary Albright, National Security Advisor Berger, Deputy Secretary Talbott, and Deputy National Security Advisor Steinberg entitled "Initial Thoughts on NATO Enlargement Ratification Strategy," February 26,1997. 11. Helms's then chief-of-staff, retired Rear Admiral Bud Nance, would play a key role in convincing the Senator to support enlargement. Nance had served at NATO SACLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. He often remarked to visitors that one lesson he had learned while serving at SACLANT was that NATO's role was not only to deter the Russians, but to keep the peace among the European countries as well. 12. See Trent Lott, "The Senate's Role in NATO Enlargement," The Washington Post, March 21,1997. 13. For a portrait of Julie Finley see Jill Abramson, "The Belle of the Soft Money Soiree," The New York Times Magazine, February 20,2000. 14. The U.S. Committee to Expand NATO was incorporated as a 501 (C) (4) corporation on November 1,1996 in the District of Columbia. Jackson's role as President and his ties to Lockheed Martin led to accusations that it was a front for the U.S. defense industry to sell weapons to the region. The Committee's article of incorporation and bylaws emphasized the pro bono nature of the organization and a prohibition against accepting contributions from corporations or foreign nationals in accordance with the belief of its founders that it was an organization of individual American citizens supporting NATO enlargement. For an example of accusations that the U.S. defense industry was a major supporter of enlargement see Katherine Q. Seelye, "Arms Contractors Spend to Promote an Expanded NATO," The New York Times, March 30, 1998. 15. On Jackson's views see Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, "The Conservative Case for NATO," Policy Review, no. 94 (April/May 1999): 45-57- 16. See Jackson's memo from March 1997 entitled "A Political Strategy for NATO Expansion" contained in the archives of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. 17. Interview with Bruce Jackson, August 16,2001. 18. Craig's fax went on to say: "You will be pleased to know that this morning I received a call from the Slovenian Ambassador who told me that his Foreign Minister would be in town next week and was free for dinner on Tuesday. I went ahead and scheduled him in—and then, to my shock, recalled that yesterday, I had told the Ambassador from Slovakia, whose Prime Minister is also in town next week, that Tuesday could be his night at the house. Fortunately, the Slovaks—being particularly eager to please—were willing to reschedule to Wednesday. And just now, I got another call, this time from the Estonian Ambassador who was so excited he could hardly get the words out. He wanted to tell me that half the cabinet of Estonia was coming to town, that they were eager to talk to the Committee about NATO enlargement, and that they were free for dinner late Thursday night." Craig's fax to Finley dated March 6,1997 is contained in the archives of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. 354 8. The Political Battle 19. See the memo from Jackson to the USCEN's Board of Directors dated June 9, 1997 summarizing the USCEN's activities November 1,1996-May 31,1997 contained in the archives of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. 20. See the transcript of the debate between Richard C. Holbrooke and Michael E. Mandelbaum endued "Expanding NATO: Will it Weaken the Alliance?" December 9,1996. 21. See also Richard Cohen, "Endangered Expansion," The Washington Post, December 12,1996. 22. As quoted in "NATO or Tomato?" The New York Times, January 22,1997. 23. See the notes from the meeting by Cameron Munter dated March 5,1997. 24. This idea came from RAND President Jim Thomson. See JimThomson, "Perspective on NATO; Back to Square 1 With Einstein," Los Angeles Times, March 21, !995- 25. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's Prepared Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "NATO Enlargement," Washington, D.C., April 23,1997, . 26. See Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on NATO Enlargement, Senator John Warner (R-VA), April 23,1997, . 27. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Held Hostage," The New York Times, April 28,1997. 28. See Henry Kissinger, "Helsinki Fiasco," The Washington Post, March 30,1997 and "The Dilution of NATO," The Washington Post, June 8,1997. 29. See Vaclav Havel, "NATO's Quality of Life," The New York Times, May 13, 1997. 30. See "Remarks By the President At The United States Military Academy Commencement," Michie Stadium, West Point, New York, May 31,1997, Office of the Press Secretary, . 31. See "Dear Mr. President" letter dated June 11,1997. 32. This account is based on Rosner's notes from the meeting. 33. See John Keegan's Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6-August 25,1994 (New York: Viking Press, 1982), Chapter Seven, 'A Polish Battlefield,' pp. 249-282. 34. For further details on the Judge Waters event see George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), pp. 109-112. 35. See Remarks by President Bill Clinton at Veterans' Event, "NATO Enlargement," The White House, The East Room, Washington, DC, July 3, 1997, Federal News Service (Washington, DC: Federal News Service Group, Inc., 1998). 36. See "The Open Letter to the President," June 26,1997, . 37. See "Center for Political and Strategic Studies News Conference on NATO Enlargement," Speakers: Richard Davies, IISS Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University; Stanley Rieser; Jack Matlock, Former Ambassador To The Soviet Union; Michael Mandelbaum, Professor, 8. The Political Battle 355 Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, National Press Club, Washington, DC, June 26,1997, Federal News Service (Washington, DC: Federal News Service Group, Inc., 1997). 38. See "Letter to the President" by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and others, June 25,1997. 39. See Senator Jesse Helms, "Enlarging the Alliance: New Members, Not New Missions," Wall Street Journal, July 9,1997. 40. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton's Folly," The New York Times, July 31,1997. 41. See the memo from John Isaacs from the Council for a Livable world dated July 14,1997, entided "Senate Vote Count on NATO Enlargement." 42. Memo circulated by the Committee to Expand NATO also warned that the Administration was in danger of losing key Republican supporters. See Jackson's memo entitled "The NATO Debate After Madrid," July 30,1997. 43. The letter was sent from Senator Lugar to Berger on July 28,1997 and included a 14-page memo entitled "Strategy for Securing Senate Ratification of NATO Enlargement." 44. See Rosner's memo of July 25,1997 entided "Update on NATO Enlargement Ratification." 45. See New Atlantic Initiative statement on NATO Enlargement, September 9, 1997. 46. See memo from Jeremy Rosner to Secretary Albright entitled "Strategy for Achieving Ratification" dated August 27,1997, and Rosner's outline for the meeting with Albright on August 28 entided "MKA Meeting: Road Ahead on NATO+ Ratification." 47. See memo from Steve Biegun and Beth Wilson to Senator Helms entided "Suggested Schedule of Hearings on NATO Enlargement, September 2,1997. 48. See the memo from Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson and Marc Thiessen to Senator Helms entitled "NATO Enlargement," September 8,1997. 49. See the letter from Senator Helms to Secretary Albright, September 17,1997. 50. See the fax sent from Steve Biegun to Jeremy Rosner dated, October 6, 1997 and contained in the S/NERO archives. 51. See Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee: "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival 38, no 3 (Autumn 1998): 5-26. See also Ivan Eland, "The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance," Congressional Budget Office Paper prepared for the House International Relations Committee, March 1996. 52. See "Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement, February 1998, . 53. The Madrid Communique stated: "Admitting new members will entail resource implications. It will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require.... We are confident that, in line with the security environment of today, Alliance costs associated with the integration of new members will be manageable and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided." See Madrid Declaration on Euro-Adantic Security and Cooperation as Issued by the Heads of State and Government, July 8, 1997, . 356 8. The Political Battle 54. See memo from Ronald Asmus and Jeremy Rosner to the Secretary, entitled "Strategy (and one-liners) for SFRC Testimony," October 3,1997. 55. See Madeleine Albright, "Statement of Hon. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State," The Debate on NATO Enlargement, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 7,1997,105 Cong, ist sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 6-39. 56. As quoted in Pat Towell, "Albright Argues NATO Expansion Would Buttress Democracy," Congressional Quarterly, October 11,1997, p. 24. 57. See statement of Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, October 9, 1997, 105 Cong., ist sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 72-89. 58. See Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO-Russia Relationship-Part I," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, October 30, 1997, 105 Cong., ist sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 183-206. 59. When U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jim Collins briefed senior Russian officials informally in late February on the Senate resolution of ratification they were furious about the language. See "Mamedov Reacts Strongly Against Senate NATO Document," Moscow 004932, February 28,1998. 60. Hickenlooper had asked Acheson whether, under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty in which the parties pledged via mutual assistance to help develop the capacity to resist armed attack, the U.S. was "going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries capacity to resist?" Acheson had replied that: 'The answer to that question is a clear and resolute 'No.'" To be fair to Acheson, this exchange took place at a time when the U.S. had no intention of forward deploying U.S. troops in Europe. It was not until a year later that NATO started to think of a unified command structure that could include U.S. defense forces. For Acheson's account see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 285. 61. Cohen's argument was buttressed by an op-ed that appeared the morning of this hearing in which UK Defense Minister George Robertson stated that London would pay its fair share of additional enlargement costs. See George Robertson, "Redesigning NATO," The Washington Times, October 21,1997. 62. See William S. Cohen, "Statement of Hon. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense," NATO Enlargement Costs, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, October 21, 1997, 105 Cong., ist sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 1, 30, 35-41. 63. See "Public Views on NATO Enlargement," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, November 5, 1997, 105 Cong., ist sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 261-330, 537-552. 64. See letter from Senators Helms and Biden, dated November 10,1997. 65. See "EUR Assistant Secretary Grossman's Remarks at Bergen Nordic/Baltic Foreign Ministers Meeting," Oslo 04013, September 5,1997. See also the memo from Grossman to Secretary Albright, "Our New Northern Strategy," August 27,1997. See also my public remarks on "The New Hanseatic League" delivered at a conference in Helsinki Finland on October 8,1997 sponsored by the U.S. Embassy and Nordicum. 8. The Political Battle 66. See President Clinton's "Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Baltic Nations-United States Charter of Partnership," January 16, 1998, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 34, no. 4 (January 26,1998): 85-86. 67. See David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., America and Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 68. See Ronald D. Asmus, "Double enlargement: redefining the Atlantic partnership after the Cold War," in Gompert and Larrabee, ibid., pp. 19-50. See also Ronald D. Asmus, Robert Blackwill, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Can NATO Survive?" The Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 79-101. 69. Craig view's are contained in a memo to Albright entitled "What Kind of NATO Do We Really Want?," January 8,1998. 70. See my memo to Grossman "Defining U.S. Interests: The Mega-Question" from September 8,1998. 71. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement at the North Atlantic Council," Ministerial Meeting, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 16,1997, . 72. See Grossman's memo to Secretary Albright entitled "Thinking About 1998," January 6,1998. 73. Grossman's briefing to Albright was entitled "NATO After the First Round of Enlargement: Next Steps?" 74. See Grossman's Note for the Secretary entitled "Thinking about 1999," January 15,1999. 75. See the memo from Samuel Berger and John Hilley to the President entitled "Strategy for Completing Ratification of NATO Enlargement" dated December 17,1997. 76. See "Clinton Letter Transmitting to the U.S. Senate Protocols to NATO Treaty," The White House, February 11, 1998, . Senator Biden would recall the discussion with the Vice President later that day in a statement on the Senate floor. See Congressional Record, February n, 1998, P.S076. 77. See AFL-CIO endorsement, "A Declaration of Support for NATO Enlargement," January 20,1998. 78. "The upcoming Senate vote," the statement read, "is fundamentally a test of whether the U.S. will remain engaged in the Europe of the 21st century. Since the end of World War II, our nation has extended an enormous effort to build a Europe of free and democratic states at peace with one another. For the first time there is a realistic possibility of achieving this goal. Now is not the time to turn our back on this great project." See Statement of 60 Retired Military Officers, February 3,1998. 79. See "Founding Declaration of the Coalition against NATO Expansion," Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Briefing Book on NATO Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, April 1998), pp. 69-72. 80. See the memo from Rosner and Asmus to Talbott entitled "NATO+ Resolution of Ratification" dated February 21,1997. 81. See Rosner's memo "Initial Comments and Issues on SFRC's NATO Enlargement Resolution of Ratification, Draft #2," February 23,1998. 358 8. The Political Battle 82. See Rosner's e-mail to Ron Asmus, Dan Fried, Jamie Rubin and others, entitled "New NATO+ pollings #s," February 23,1998. 83. See Howard Baker, Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye, "NATO: A Debate Recast," The New York Times, February 4,1998. 84. Senator Warner first indicated publicly his support for a "pause" amendment in a statement he put in the Senate record on February 10,1998 in connection with the NATO expansion amendment. See Congressional Record, February 10,1998, p. S584. 85. In her speech before the New Atlantic Initiative on February 9,1998, Albright had stated: "This Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate a pause in the process of NATO enlargement." See Albright's "Remarks Before the New Atlantic Initiative Conference: NATO Expansion." 86. See Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on NATO Enlargement," February 24,1998. 87. See our memo to Albright entitled 'Today's SFRC Hearing on NATO enlargement and the Road Ahead," March 3,1998. 88. See the memo from Rosner and Asmus to Albright entitled "Status of NATO Enlargement Debate," March 12,1998. 89. See "NATO Myopia," The New York Times, March 5,1998. 90. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Ohio State II," The New York Times, March 3, 1998. 91. See "The NATO Dispute," The Washington Post, March n, 1998. 92. The Chicago Tribune initially took a position opposing enlargement in an editorial on February 1,1998 entitled "A case of less is more with NATO." On March 13, it reversed itself. See "The Case for NATO Expansion," The Chicago Tribune, March 13, 1998. 93. See the letter from former Senators San Nunn and Howard H. Baker, Jr. addressed to Senators Thurmond and Levin. 94. See "Dear Mr. Leader" letter from President Clinton, The White House, March 14,1998. 95. See Jesse Helms, "The New NATO: NATO Expansion Has All the Safeguards it Needs," The Wall Street Journal, March 23,1998. 96. In early April Rosner noted that S/NERO knew of 23 potential amendments. See his memo entitled "Update on Timing of Amendments," April 6,1998. 97. Albright wrote Ashcroft on March 12 explaining her views and making it clear that Ashcroft had misrepresented her thinking. See Rosner's memo "Letter to Senator Ashcroft (and Contingency Letter to Senator Helms) on NATO Enlargement," March 9,1998. Ashcroft ignored the letter and instead continued to attack the Administration. Speaking on the Senate floor on March 19, Ashcroft stated: "I will be submitting an amendment for consideration by the Senate to make it clear that collective security will remain the heart of NATO, and that this is the only mission allowable under the treaty." See Congressional Record, March 19,1998, S2284. 98. See the memo from Asmus and Rosner to Secretary Albright entitled "NATO Enlargement and the Ashcroft Amendment," April 23,1998. See also the paper entitled "Why the Ashcroft Amendment is Harmful to the U.S. and NATO," which was circulated to both Senate staff and influential members of the foreign policy establishment. Conclusion 359 99. The description of this meeting is taken from Rosner's notes from the meeting. 100. See the "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Roth, Lieberman and McCain dated April 24,1998. 101. As quoted in Reuters, April 23,1998. 102. In the run-up to the final vote on April 30, Tom Friedman had dubbed enlargement "Gulf of Tonkin II" and likened enlargement to "a car with no brakes on a slippery slope to trouble." See Thomas L. Friedman, "Gulf of Tonkin II," The New York Times, March 31,1998. 103. See "NATO and the Lessons of History," The New York Times, April 29,1998. 104. See Madeleine K. Albright, "Stop Worrying About Russia," The New York Times, April 29,1998. 105. See, for example, David Gompert, "A Vote Against NATO," The Washington Times, April 29,1998. 106. See Senator Moynihan's statement in the Congressional Record, "Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic," Senate, April 27, 1998, p. S3610, . See also Senator Moynihan's speech entitled "Could NATO Expansion Lead to Nuclear War?" delivered to the lfiftieth Anniversary Annual Meeting of the Associated Press in Dallas, Texas on April 20,1998. 107. For the final vote totals on the amendments see "US. Senate Roll Call Votes," 105th Congress—2nd Session (1998) in Thomas, 52/vote_menu.html. >. 108. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright "Statement on the Senate Ratification to NATO Enlargement," Washington, D.C., April 30, 1998, . CONCLUSION 1. See President Truman's "Address on the Occasion of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman 1949 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 196-98.