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Where Is Central Europe?

Lonnie R. Johnson



Historical memory, the presence of a past that is so remote that it bears little or no resemblance the so-called realities of the contemporary world, is an important Central European attribute. History in this part of the world is epic and tragic; small nations frequently have struggled against larger ones and have lost regularly. The past consists of inexcusable transgressions and missed opportunities; the present is filled with unfinished business from the past; and the future is a chance finally to rectify a historical record that has been inauspicious at best and unjust at worst. Developing a sense for what could be called the subjective dimensions of Central Europe—the (usually pretty good) stories that Central European peoples tell about themselves and the (usually pretty bad) ones they tell about their neighbors—is important to understanding the region. Some of the problems Central Europeans have with themselves and with one another are related to the fact that their history haunts them.

Several different criteria are used in the following chapters to define Central Europe as a region distinct from Western, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. The first is the relationship between religion and cultural orientation. Central Europeans consider themselves long-standing historical representatives of Western European culture because the various nations in the region were converted to Roman Catholicism, the Western form of Christianity, at the turn of the millennium. If one is willing to accept the Mediterranean world as the proverbial “cradle of Western civilization,” then Central Europe was drawn into the sphere of Western civilization relatively late. The Romans colonized only small portions of Central Europe west of the Rhine and south of the Danube, and the missionary work of the Christian churches in the early Middle Ages beyond the former frontiers of the Roman Empire proceeded from two different poles: Rome and Byzantium. The pagans of Central Europe were converted to Roman Catholicism, whereas the pagans of Southeastern and Eastern Europe were brought into the fold of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The differences between Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox ideas of “Christian dominion” led to fundamentally different societies and institutions in Central Europe than in Southeastern and Eastern Europe,¹ and Central Europe never really abandoned “the West” as a primary point of cultural orientation, although the formative impulses from Western Europe changed throughout the ages.

The frontiers of medieval empires and kingdoms provide a second criterion for defining Central Europe, and they correspond to a great extent to the religious frontiers between the Roman Catholic West and the Orthodox East. The “maximum” historical borders of this region date back to around 1500 and correspond to the western frontier of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the southern and eastern frontiers of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the eastern frontier of Poland-Lithuania. Central Europe is a dynamic historical concept, not a static spatial one;² therefore its frontiers have shifted throughout the ages. For example, Lithuania, a fair share of Belarus, and western Ukraine are in Eastern Europe today, but they were in Central Europe 250 years ago because they then were parts of Poland.

Multinational empires are a third characteristic of this region. Hungary and Poland, small and medium-size states today, were empires in their own right early in their histories. The historical kingdom of Hungary reached its territorial peak at the end of the fifteenth century, and until 1918 it was three times larger than Hungary is now. Poland was the largest state in Europe in the sixteenth century, but it virtually disappeared from the map of Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. Both these kingdoms housed a wide variety of different peoples, and the Habsburg and Russian empires that eventually swallowed them were equally multinational, too. The experience of multiethnicity—a patchwork of peoples with different languages, cultures, and traditions living closely together—and imperial subjugation—smaller nations being conquered and ruled by larger ones—are essential parts of the Central European historical experience.

Western Christendom's centuries-long confrontation with the Oriental and Islamic empire of the Ottoman Turks also helped define Central Europe as a cultural and historical region. The fact that much of the Balkan Peninsula became part of the Ottoman Empire during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and stayed under Ottoman rule until the nineteenth century enhanced the differences between Central Europe as a "Western European" region and Southeastern Europe, which not only was religiously Eastern Orthodox but also became part of an "Oriental" empire. (The Central European use of the term "oriental" can be confusing. It does not refer to the Far or the Middle East, but to the Near East and the Ottoman Empire that was established on the Balkan Peninsula. The nineteenth-century Austrian statesman Clemens von Metternich once pointed out that the Orient started southeast of the city walls of Vienna.)

Peculiar patterns of Central European development provide a fifth criterion for defining the region. After the Middle Ages, Western European polities, societies, and economies began to modernize at much more rapid rates than did Central European ones, and the gap between the levels of development in these regions increased steadily as time passed. Indeed, retarded development or "backwardness" became one of the structural characteristics of Central Europe. As a region it undoubtedly stayed ahead of Islamic Southeastern and Orthodox Eastern Europe (or Russia), but it lagged behind the West.³ It will have to suffice at this point to state that the impact of Western European economic revolutions—from agriculture in the early Middle Ages to industry in the nineteenth century—and political revolutions—in seventeenth century England and in late-eighteenth century France—decreased in Central Europe in an almost proportionate relationship to the region's distance from these epicenters. Why did ultimately more prosperous and more democratic societies develop in Western Europe than in Central Europe? How did Central Europe fall behind and stay there?

One of the purposes of this text is to acquaint readers with the different national stories, histories, and historiographical traditions of Central Europe. Each nation in the region has its own story to tell. Consequently there is no one definitive Central

European story but, rather, a number of conflicting national accounts colored by moral indignation, historical speculation, and nostalgic transfiguration. Central Europeans also have in their heads a number of different historical maps and milestones that are not particularly well known outside the region or necessarily respected by their neighbors, and they still regularly use them as points of orientation.

Furthermore, historians always have devoted more attention to the larger states and nations in European history, the "big players." Who knows much about the venerable traditions of Central European kingdoms like Poland-Lithuania, Bohemia, and Hungary and their valiant struggles for freedom? What does 1102 mean to Croats, 1389 to Serbs, 1526 to Hungarians, 1620 to Czechs, or 1772 to Poles? These are dates of world historical importance for these smaller peoples because they mark tragedies or defeats that led to the loss of national independence. Central Europeans sometimes expect other inhabitants of the so-called civilized world to know much more about their histories than they do. Many Poles, for example, assume that average Americans know something about the great American revolutionary figure Tadeusz Kościuszko. (Kościuszko was a "Polish Lafayette" who fought in the Continental Army against the British during the Revolutionary War. He finished the war as a brigadier general and an American citizen but migrated back to Poland, where he played a major role in a revolutionary uprising against Russia in 1792.)

Central Europeans also always seem to be able to find some remote historical precedent for an explanation of the present. They flash back from the present into the past—not in years or decades, but in centuries—and they flash forward with great facility from the past to the present. If you ask a Hungarian about the date of the most important *recent* event in Hungarian history, the chances of getting 1918 instead of 1989 are pretty good, and 1526 would not be out of the question in light of the fact that Hungarians look back on a continuous historical tradition that started in 896. Readers occasionally will be confronted with these kinds of jumps in the following chapters, too. Such leaps may violate the rules of chronological historical narrative, but they are important because they show to what extent Central Europeans think in historical terms, which points of reference they rely on, and how they deal with their own histories.

Moreover, Central Europe is a mode of self-perception. This voluntaristic definition may not be methodologically very sophisticated, but some people in this part of the world refer to themselves as Central Europeans, and others do not. Although Central Europeans may quibble among themselves about Central Europe, they generally agree on which peoples are to be excluded from this club: for example, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Russians.

Central Europe also may be defined by invitation. In April 1994 Czech President Václav Havel asked Central European heads of state attend a summit to discuss the region's future. At this occasion, Thomas Klestil from Austria and Richard von Weizsäcker from Germany posed for a picture in an Baroque palace in Litomyšl in front of a life-size portrait of the Habsburg empress Maria Theresia with their Czech

host and Lech Wafesa from Poland, Michal Kováč from Slovakia, Arpád Göncz from Hungary, and Milan Kučan from Slovenia.⁴

Many histories of Eastern or East Central Europe focus primarily on Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. This history of Central Europe has a somewhat broader focus and brings “West Central Europe”⁵ into the picture by treating Germany and Austria as integral parts of the region. Slovenia and Croatia, small nations and newly independent states, appear primarily in their historical capacities as parts of Austria and Hungary before 1918 or Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1991.

Despite the preceding criteria that justify treating Central Europe as one region, the concept of Central Europe can be confusing because it may refer to different things for different people. Its meaning changes in different national and historical contexts, or as Jacques Rupnik, a Czech-born political scientist from Paris, observed: “Tell me where Central Europe is, and I can tell who you are.” For example, when Germans start talking about Central Europe, *Mitteleuropa*, or their historical relations with “the East,” everyone starts getting nervous because this inevitably conjures up negative historical associations starting with the conquests of the Teutonic Knights in the Middle Ages and ending with German imperialism in the nineteenth century, World War I, the Third Reich, Nazi imperialism, World War II, and the Holocaust.

The Germans have not played an exclusively negative role in the region, however. The most important Western European impulses for East Central Europe, ranging from Christianity in the tenth century to industrialization in the nineteenth century, passed through the filter of the German-speaking world. The edifying, classical, nineteenth-century concept of enlightened German science and humanistic culture, *deutsche Wissenschaft und Kultur*, embraced all humanity and was the culture that most Central European Jews embraced during their assimilation in the nineteenth century. Cosmopolitan German-speaking Jews transcended the narrow confines of nationalism and became representatives of what many people would consider to be Central European culture at its best: liberal, innovative, critical, humane. Martin Buber, Sigmund Freud, Theodor Herzl, Franz Kafka, Gustav Mahler, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, just to mention a few, were assimilated Central European Jews from turn-of-the-century Vienna, Budapest, and Prague. However, between 1933 and 1945 the Nazi versions of *deutsche Kultur* and *Mitteleuropa* destroyed this kind of Central European culture. It ended in emigration for a fortunate few and Auschwitz for millions of ill-fated others.

Not only did the Third Reich drive out or destroy some of the most important carriers of Central European cultural traditions, but the defeat of Nazi Germany led to the establishment of the Soviet version of Eastern Europe, which divided Central Europe between East and West. Furthermore, Allied policy sanctioned the expulsion of well over 10 million Germans from their homes throughout East Central Europe. If the Jews and the Germans had been catalysts of Central European culture, they were, for the most part, gone after World War II, and the Soviet Union, an Eastern

superpower, imposed its version of Marxism, a Western European ideology, on East Central Europe. These events changed the entire cultural complexion of the region forever.

Some western Slavic versions of the concept of Central Europe also exclude the Germans from being Central European because they postulate smallness as the essential criterion for qualifying as a Central European nation. This version of Central Europe consists of a cluster of small, freedom-and peace-loving nations that have had the historical misfortune of living between two big, nasty ones, the Germans and the Russians. The histories of these smaller nations consequently have been chronicles of their heroic but futile attempts to defend their freedom against German (and sometimes German-Austrian) and Russian imperial transgressions. David versus Goliath is a recurrent metaphor in Polish history, and similar although less combative comparisons can be found in Czech national traditions as well.

There also is an Austro-Hungarian or Habsburg variation of this “small nations” version of Central Europe that lets the Austrians be good Central Europeans, too. According to this version of the story, the Habsburgs were benevolent or at least benign emperors compared with the German Hohenzollerns and the Russian Romanovs. The Habsburgs created and maintained a relatively progressive, tolerant, multiethnic, and religiously heterodox empire; indeed, the empire’s historical mission was to protect smaller peoples from German and Russian dominion. Given the course of events in the region after 1938, Emperor Francis Joseph and imperial Vienna were retrospectively much more pleasant points of orientation than Hitler and Berlin or Stalin and Moscow.

A relatively modern version of this Habsburg or Austro-Hungarian version of Central Europe reappeared in the 1970s. The Austrian federal chancellor, Bruno Kreisky (1970-1983), incorporated Austria’s glorious imperial history into Austria’s judicious foreign policy as a neutral state. Austria had a unique position in Cold War Europe after its proclamation of neutrality in 1955. Although Austria jutted like a peninsula into the Communist East, it was a Western democracy. However, its neutrality demanded at that time that it refrain from military and economic alliances; and so Austria was neither East nor West in this respect. Austrian neutrality plus its grand old “imperial history” allowed it to cultivate good relations with those Eastern European Communist states that had been part of the Habsburgs’ multinational empire before 1918, especially Hungary, and Austrian-Hungarian relations developed in such an auspicious manner during the 1970s that they became a paragon of East-West cooperation.

The stretch of the Iron Curtain between Austria and Hungary became increasingly permeable, and some people viewed Austrian-Hungarian cooperation as a model for the evolution of future relations between Eastern and Western European states. Austria was a small, neutral, social democratic, welfare state in the West, and Hungary, in terms of its human rights record and economic policies, was an increasingly liberal Communist state in the East. Since neutral Austria was not a

military threat to the East, it helped create an environment of trust which, in turn, promoted democratic reform in Hungary.

Extrapolated to European politics, this fortuitous type of bilateral relationship implied that if Western Europe were to become neutral, then Eastern Europe could become more democratic. In the long run, the two different ideological systems might structurally “converge” on the middle ground of neutral, social democratic welfare states. Neutral Austria and Sweden served as models for the denouement of the East-West conflict, and there were fears that the Soviet Union might succeed in neutralizing or “Fin-landizing”⁶ Western Europe. From this perspective, the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and West German neutrality were the prerequisites for German unification.

This was the type of Central European scenario that the post-1968 Western European Left loved—the Green-environmentalist-peace movement that emerged in the West Germany during the 1980s, in particular—and that the Soviet Union actively promoted: “Struggling for Peace.” The idea of Central Europe as a neutral, nuclear-free, and demilitarized zone was based on anti-Americanism and a faith in the reform potential of Marxism. NATO and “American imperialism” were the big problems. If the “American threat” receded, peace-loving Communist states would not only reform; they would also start exhibiting all those traits that made socialism organizationally and morally superior to capitalism.

This was a leftist Western European vision for Central Europe, but the vision that Eastern European dissidents and intellectuals had for Central Europe was fundamentally different and ultimately more important. They also were responsible for bringing the term “Central Europe” back into circulation and popularizing it.⁷ When the term “Central Europe” started to gain or regain currency at the beginning of the 1980s, it referred to a controversial and speculative cluster of ideas, not a European region. The bipolar order that was created in Europe after World War II—democracy versus Communism, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) versus the Warsaw Pact, the European Economic Community versus the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)—hardly allowed us to think of Europe in terms other than East and West, and these mutually exclusive and convenient concepts were more than sufficient for describing the division of Europe. Barbed wire, minefields, watch towers, and border guards with orders to shoot clearly marked the junction of East and West in the center of Europe. The Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall were symbols of not only a bipolar European order but also a global one.

Communism was a monolithic ideology and a global threat. Colors were more important than national borders on political maps. The Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union were one, big, uniform, red mass. Much to the consternation of those Eastern Europeans who believed in Western freedoms, most people in the West had accepted the division of Europe as a matter of fact and were convinced that sustaining the political and ideological status quo in Europe was essential to maintaining European

and global peace. Eastern Europe and Western Europe had coexisted relatively well for more than two generations, and there was no reason to assume that they would not do so for a third and a fourth. Communism was here to stay. The Berlin Wall, as some Germans commented after it came down in 1989, was in our heads, too.

Under these conditions, the term “Central Europe” implied that there was something in between East and West at a time when the old East-West conflict entered a new phase of escalation. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Ronald Reagan began the first of his two presidential terms in 1980 by referring to the Soviet Union as “an evil empire.” General Wojciech Jaruzelski squelched the Solidarity movement in Poland by declaring martial law in December 1981. American defense spending spiraled, and work began on the Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars,” program. The Cold War, the East, and the West seemed to be here to stay.

Central Europe was by no means a new concept, but it did provide an alternative to looking at Europe in exclusively bipolar terms. Judging by the standards of the professional policymaking communities in East and West, the initial proponents of the idea of Central Europe were a rather marginal and motley crew: poets, essayists, and dissidents in Eastern Europe, Eastern European émigrés in the West, and Western intellectuals and academics with East European backgrounds dating as far back as the 1930s but including representatives from every generational wave of Communist oppression in Eastern Europe since then: the initial period of postwar Stalinization, 1956, 1968, and 1981. However, there also were a few stray “real Westerners” who, for some odd reason, had specialized in the study of those small countries between Germany and the Soviet Union—and usually had a spouse from the region to enhance their insights (and partiality) and to prove how heartfelt their interest was. “Central Europe” was a biographical or at least a marital affair, and Central Europe was an Eastern European idea.

Hardened by four decades of confrontation, most professionals and experts in East-West relations dismissed the idea of Central Europe. For them it was merely a manifestation of the psychological problems that sentimental, artsy, and emigrant-immigrant eggheads have: an idea for those who lived in the past and could not let history go or preferred fantasies to the tough realities of the contemporary world. And given the realities of East and West, Central Europe was admittedly a fantastic idea. Its advocates appealed to the past to show that the division of Europe was illegitimate, and in so doing, they animated the present and provided a Utopian vision for the future. The proponents of the idea of Central Europe were not realists, and they initially refrained from defining Central Europe in real terms. They did not propose concrete policy options, and they avoided circumscribing it as a specific European region. Instead, Central Europe was an area somewhere between France and the Soviet Union, and the people who wrote and spoke about Central Europe did so in German or English or French. Central Europe was above all a memory, on the one hand, and “a kingdom of the spirit,”⁸ on the other.

These initial advocates of the idea of Central Europe dismissed the legitimacy of the post-World War II division of Europe—or “Yalta Europe”—by insisting that the nations that inhabited the Eastern bloc had neither historically nor culturally ever been part of the East but had been abandoned by the West to the new, expanded Russian-Soviet version of the East after World War II.¹⁰ If these Eastern Europeans were not Eastern Europeans in the Russian or Soviet sense of the word—and also not Western Europeans—they were Central Europeans: They lived in the long shadow of the East, historically had looked to and identified themselves with the West, but had ended up in the Soviet East after World War II. The idea of Central Europe at least gave people a choice. It was a means of questioning the legitimacy of the Soviet domination of the Eastern bloc, and the adherents to this idea legitimized their version of the region by appealing to culture, to history, and to Truth.¹¹

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the mid-1980s, he was greeted with a combination of skepticism and hope. There were basically two schools of Sovietologists in the West: the hard-liners or hawks, who believed that the system could not be reformed, and the soft liberals or doves, who believed that it could. There were two analogous schools of thought among Communists in the East: the hard-liners or representatives of the old Brezhnev era, who wanted to keep things just as they were, and the disciples of Gorbachev, who wanted to change them. Most of the Eastern Europeans, who believed in the idea of Central Europe because they were anti-Communists, sympathized with the predictions of the hard-liners in the West, not because they did not want more freedom, but simply because they had seen so many previous attempts to reform Communism fail. They said that Gorbachev would fail, too, and he did. But he failed at a much later date and under much more auspicious circumstances than anyone would have dared to imagine in the mid-1980s.

Gorbachev was prepared to let the countries of the Eastern bloc go their own ways, which he hoped would be his way, and after he retracted the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited sovereignty,” the specter of Soviet intervention disappeared. Central Europe suddenly had become a real political option. Gorbachev was going to let countries get out of the old Soviet version of Eastern Europe; the term “Central Europe” was suddenly in vogue. However, it appeared in confusing, different contexts and combinations: Central Europe, Central/Eastern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Eastern and Central Europe, East Central Europe. No one was really sure what the parameters of this region were, but if it meant getting out of the Soviet Empire, it was a good idea.

Left to their own devices, the peoples of the Eastern bloc each had their own revolutions in 1989: at different times, with varying objectives, and under dissimilar circumstances. The Berlin Wall fell, German unification suddenly appeared on the political agenda, and all sorts of confederative plans for the new democracies of Central Europe were in the air. Central European states would have to cooperate with one another to offset the influences of a unified Germany and the Soviet Union in the future. The region would come into its own.

Things in Central Europe have not turned out the way that many people expected during that heady and optimistic year of 1989. (This also is true for the newly independent states that emerged from the former Soviet Union after 1991.) Yugoslavia has deteriorated into a series of states and a series of wars, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are confronted with several Yugoslavias within their frontiers. Czechoslovakia has fallen apart. There has been no “Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe.” The transformation of planned economies into market economies is proving to be much more difficult than many Western economists assumed. Democratic institutions and traditions are weak in the “new democracies.” The ugliest forms of nationalism are resurgent not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also in the West. Too many people are thinking of solving the problems of the outgoing twentieth century with nineteenth-century ideologies.

The term “Central Europe” is used in two different contexts today. A broad historical definition of the region includes Austria and Germany; a narrower definition based on usage influenced by the former East-West division of Europe does not. For example, both Germany and Austria also readily define themselves as “Central European” states today, if this means that they are the easternmost representatives of Western Europe (or the European Union) or that they have special historical relationships with their eastern neighbors and obligations to help them. But if Western Europe is coextensive with the European Union, then the term “Central Europe” usually refers to those countries of the former Eastern bloc that have higher per capita incomes and are at higher levels of economic development than the “new democracies” on the Balkan Peninsula or in the former Soviet Union. Intergovernmental agencies like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Bank therefore distinguish in practice between “Central Europe”—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia—and “Eastern Europe.”¹² There seems to be a historical constant here; These Central European states are behind the West but still ahead of the East and the Southeast.

Certainly many of Central Europe’s current problems are the results of more than forty years of Communism, and in this respect, they are unprecedented. But it is equally important to recognize that many of the contemporary problems of Central Europe antedate Communism. These are *old* Central European problems under *new* Central European circumstances, and the problems, like the idea of Central Europe itself, have venerable traditions. Some of the smaller problems are just five or six decades old. The formidable ones might be at least five or six centuries old, and even if they are not, some Central Europeans at least *think* they are. It is time to go back and look at the beginning of the story.

NOTES

1. See Jenő Szűcs's seminal article "The Three Historical Regions of Europe," *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest) 29, nos. 2-4 (1983): 131-184
2. Using the longitudinal coordinates of the Atlantic coast of the Iberian Peninsula in the west and the watershed of the Ural Mountains in the east as well as the latitudinal coordinates of Sicily in the south and the end of the Scandinavian landmass in the north, the indisputable spatial center of Europe is 25 degrees east of Greenwich and 53.5 degrees north of the equator: approximately 62 miles south of Vilnius and 93 miles west of Minsk, the capitals of Lithuania and Belarus. In other words, the center of Europe as a physical region is on the eastern frontier of Central Europe as a historical region.
3. See Daniel Chirot, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics & Politics from the Middle Ages to the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
4. See the photo in Karl-Peter Schwarz, "Präsidenten-Small-Talk im Schlachtensaal," *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 18, 1994, p. 3.
5. Piotr Wandycz discusses the terminological history and peculiarities of the concepts of Western, West Central, East Central, and Eastern Europe in the introduction to his *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-11.
6. "Finlandization" was a pejorative term used by conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s to describe a scenario that anticipated a possible "alliance" between the Western European Left and the Soviet Union that could lead individual member states to abandon NATO for the sake of neutrality.
7. See Jacques Rupnik's "In Search of Central Europe," the introduction to his *The Other Europe* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1989), pp. 3-24.
8. See Timothy Carton Ash, "Does Central Europe Exist?" *New York Review of Books*, October 9, 1986, pp. 45-52, reprinted in his *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe* (Cambridge: Granta Books, 1989), pp. 95-108.
9. "Yalta" has two meanings in this context. First, it broadly refers to the post-World War II division of Europe, a long process that was not completed until the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955. Second, it insinuates that Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed to neatly divide up Europe at the Yalta Conference in 1945.
10. For this "classic" definition of Central Europe in the early 1980s, see Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," *New York Review of Books*, April 26, 1984, pp. 33-38.
11. See Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central Eastern Europe*, ed. John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1985), pp. 22-96.
12. Croatia is an exception because it understands itself as a Central European state, but based on the economic indicators that Western experts use to define the region and gauge performance, it has an "Eastern European" economy. This, in turn, is one of the consequences of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

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