9


Democratization

and political participation in Slovakia

Sharon L. Wolchik



In November 1989, citizens of Slovakia joined those in the Czech Lands in mass demonstrations that
brought about the rapid end of one of Central and Eastern Europe's most oppressive communist
regimes. With the end of the Communist Party's monopoly of political power, political life in
Slovakia changed radically. The proliferation of groups and voluntary associations that followed
was paralleled by the rapid repluralization of the party system in Slovakia as in the Czech Lands.

By the June 1992 elections, it was clear to most observers that the Czechoslovak federation would
not last. In January 1993, the federation was replaced by independent Slovak and Czech states. In
the Czech Lands, developments in both the political and economic realms continued to progress
smoothly. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Václav Klaus, Czech political leaders continued
their rapid reintroduction of a market economy. Czech political institutions also appeared to be
more stable than those in most other post-communist states.

In Slovakia, where political life differed in many important respects from trends in the Czech
Republic prior to the break-up of the federation and where the shift to the market caused far
greater economic hardship, political life after independence was more tumultuous. In contrast to
the situation in the Czech Lands, where public support for Václav Klaus and the move to the market
remained high, Slovak politics continued to be characterized by high levels of conflict among
political leaders. Evident in the acrimonious relationship between Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar
and President Michal Kováč, as well as between the members of the ruling coalition and within
Mečiar's political movement itself, these conflicts resulted in the ousting of the prime minister
as the result of a parliamentary vote of no confidence in March 1994. The grand coalition
government formed at that time included Political forces that spanned the left-right spectrum, but
nonetheless demonstrated a good deal of consensus in dealing with pressing public issues such as
privitization and minority relations. However, this coalition proved unable to cooperate in the
September-October 1994 elections, and Vladimír Mečiar once again became prime minister in December
1994 in coalition with the Slovak National Party and the newly formed Association of Slovak
Workers. Despite the high level of elite conflict, alternation of governments has take place
peacefully to date. There are also encouraging signs in terms of the development of other elements
of civil society, including non-governmental organizations.

As this brief recital illustrates, the effort to create stable democratic political institutions
has faced a number of challenges in Slovakia since the end of communist rule. The pages to follow
examine an important aspect of this process, the development of the party system and other
mechanisms for citizen participation in politics. As the experiences of other countries in
transition from authoritarian rule in other contexts indicate, the development of such mechanisms,
which both link citizens to the political system and provide feedback to political leaders, is an
essential part of creating and maintaining democratic institutions. The development of what has
often been called "civic society," that is, non-governmental, voluntary associations, as well as of
attitudes that support democracy, are also critical aspects of this process.^1

The chapter to follow examines the extent to which democracy has been consolidated in Slovakia.
After examining the factors that have influenced the formation of political groups and parties, it
turns to the development of voluntary associations and interest groups, political parties and the
party system, and popular perceptions of political leaders, institutions, and the political system.
It concludes with an evaluation of the impact of the party system and other mechanisms for citizen
participation on the way in which policies are made, citizen support for the political system, and
the con-solidation of democracy in Slovakia.


Factors influencing the formation of political groups and parties

The formation of political parties and groups in Slovakia has been influenced by many of the same
factors that have influenced the formation of such groups in other post-communist states.^2 These
include the impact of the communist era on the political attitudes and values of citizens and
leaders, and the impact of rapid and large-scale economic change on citizens' perceptions of
politics and political entities. The formation of such groups as well as broader trends in
political life have also been influenced by a number of factors that are specific to Slovakia.
These include its pre-communist history and political traditions; the interrelationship between
Slovak and Hungarian as well as Czech culture; the delayed industrialization of the

region; and the country's multiethnic composition. They also include the impact of the break-up of
the joint state with the Czechs and the tasks Slovak leaders have faced in state-building in the
post-communist era. To a larger extent than in many other countries, Slovak politics and the
development of the party system have also been influenced in important ways by the characteristics,
personality, and beliefs of a single dominant political leader, Vladimír Mečiar.^3


The pre-communist legacy

In Slovakia as in other post-communist countries, the development of political groups and parties
has been shaped in important ways by the pre-communist legacy of its people. Slovaks' sense of
national identity developed in reaction to Hungarian and Czech culture. Living in a multi-ethnic
region that was part of Hungary for nearly 1,000 years, Slovaks had very little opportunity for the
development of a national movement until the interwar period. In contrast to the situation in the
Czech Lands, where Austrian rule allowed the formation of citizens' groups that developed into a
mass based national movement, Slovaks experienced strong pressures from their Magyar rulers to
assimilate and to give up their national identity. These pressures became particularly strong in
the second half of the nineteenth century. Very few Slovaks (6 percent) were able to vote, and
Slovak representation in the Hungarian parliament's lower house (7 of 413 in 1906 and 3 of 413 in
1911) was very low.^4 Levels of illiteracy were high into the early twentieth century, and
educational levels among Slovaks were low. Slovaks also had few opportunities to be educated in
their own language. Again in contrast to the situation in the Czech Lands, which were among the
more industrialized areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovakia remained predominantly
agrarian.^5

These factors had an important impact on political life in Slovakia after the formation of the
Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Brought together with the Czechs, as well as sizeable Hungarian and
German minorities, for the first time in a common state, Slovaks entered the new state with
political experiences, levels of economic development and urbanization, educational levels, and
cultural orientations that were very different from those of the Czechs.^6 These differences soon
led to resentment and fed the growth of Slovak nationalism, as many Slovaks felt that Hungarian
rule had merely been exchanged for rule from Prague. Although Slovaks were able to and did
Participate in multiparty elections, many Slovaks became increasingly alienated from the political
system.

The growth in national identity and the politicization of ethnicity in interwar Slovakia reflected
a variety of factors that influenced the ability of ethnic Slovak leaders to mobilize the
population around ethnic issues. Efforts to promote the industrialization of Slovakia largely
failed during this period, in part as the result of the Great Depression. Economic hardship, which
fueled large-scale emigration from Slovakia, coupled with the perception that economic and
political decisions made in Prague did not really take Slovakia's interests into account, led to
widespread disaffection with the government and to growing support for political actors, such as
the leaders of the People's Party, who would articulate national grievances. At the same time,
although Slovakia's economy virtually stagnated,^7 the marked increases in educational levels that
occurred during the interwar period provided new resources for Slovak leaders to use to mobilize
the population. Voluntary associations developed, and Slovaks also organized a variety of political

parties.^8

Given the low levels of urbanization and education of Slovak society, Catholic priests emerged as
important political as well as spiritual leaders. As the interwar period progressed, Slovak
resentment grew and fueled support for extreme nationalist movements. Thus, Slovaks as well as
Czechs lived in a political system that was democratic for much of the interwar period. However,
because most Slovaks saw the interwar government as an instrument of Czech hegemony, this
experience did not provide the same grounding for the effort to recreate democratic political life
in Slovakia as it did in the Czech Lands.^9

The extent to which Czechs and Slovaks viewed the interwar government differently was evident in
the results of public opinion polls conducted in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. Czechs surveyed in
October 1968, for example, were most likely to identify the interwar republic as the most glorious
period of their history (39 percent), followed by the age of Jan Hus (36 percent) and the reign of
King Charles IV (31 percent). Slovaks, on the other hand, were most likely to identify the time of
L'udovit Stur, the 1840s (36 percent), the period after January 1968 (36 percent), and the Slovak
National Uprising, which occurred in 1944 (26 percent). Among Slovaks, the interwar republic was
perceived as the most glorious period by only 17 percent of respondents;^10 13 percent of Slovaks
ranked the Slovak state as the most glorious period." As Brown notes in a discussion of these
results, far more Slovaks regarded the Slovak state as the least glorious or most unfortunate
period for their nation (44 percent).^12 A 1992 survey found that most Slovaks also identified
figures important to the development of Slovak national identity, such as Stur, M.R. Stefanik, or
Alexander Dubcek as the most important personalities in Slovak history. However, 11 percent
identified Father Andrej Hlinka (founder of the People's Party that came to dominate Slovak
politics in the interwar period) and 5 percent Jozef Tiso (president of the Slovak state
established in 1939 under Hitler's aegis) as the most important figures. As in 1968, 11 percent of
respondents identified the period of the Slovak state as the most famous period in Slovaks'
history.^13

Although their numbers are not large, then, for certain Slovaks, the Slovak state created in 1939
was a more relevant symbol than the interwar republic. Given the nature of this state and the
actions of its leaders, efforts to link the post-communist government of Slovakia to it have been
extremely controver sial. Nominally independent, the Slovak state created on March 14, 1939
followed Nazi Germany's lead in almost all areas and in fact was largely a puppet of Hitler. During
its reign, anti-Jewish legislation increasingly restricted the rights of the country's Jewish
inhabitants. Beginning in the early 1940s, 70,000 Slovakian Jews were deported to death camps,
where they perished.^14 Although the country retained the form of a democratic government,
Slovakia's political life was dominated by the People's Party which ruled in an increasingly
authoritarian way. Some political groups, such as the Communist, Social Democrat and Jewish
parties, were banned in 1938. Others, with the exception of the National Party, which disbanded
voluntarily, were forced to merge with the People's Party, which became a means for mobilizing the
population to carry out the leadership's orders. As in other states under Nazi influence, freedom
of the press and other democratic liberties were suspended. Leaders of the Slovak state also
adopted laws that abridged the rights of the Hungarians and other minorities.^15

Discussions of the place of Jozef Tiso and Andrej Hlinka, as well as of the Slovak state itself, in
Slovak history have been heated. Apologists and critics alike note that the creation of the Slovak
state fulfilled the aspirations of many Slovaks for their own state, despite the way in which it
was created and its nature.^16 The experience of having a state of their own, however limited its
actual powers, also influenced Slovak views of the government after World War II when a joint state
with the Czechs was recreated.

It has been primarily the nationalist Slovak National Party's leaders who have tried to resurrect
Tiso and the Slovak state as honorable parts of Slovakia's history. Certain other nationalist
groups active in the interwar period have also been resurrected. These include Matica Slovenska, a
patriotic association founded in 1863 that existed for much of the Communist period, but operated
under many of the same restrictions as other organizations. After 1989, this organization once
again came to be active in pressing Slovak national claims, including the demand for Slovak
sovereignty.

The legacy of the interwar nationalist movement has also been evident in patterns of support for
political parties in the post-communist period. Support for the Slovak National Party and the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the most nationalist parties in Slovakia for example, has not
varied consis-tently by level of economic hardship. Rather it has been highest in those districts
in which support for the Slovak People's Party was highest in the interwar period.^17

The legacy of the interwar period has also led to problems in creating what has been termed a
"usable past," that is, a past compatible with democratic values and forms of politics.^18 Since
most Slovaks do not see the leaders and experiences connected with the interwar republic as
positive, it has been difficult for Slovaks who support democracy to find figures to use to help
create a democratic identity. The fact that most of the historical figures seen most positively by
Slovaks are associated with the Slovak national movement at various points in history also creates
problems for the effort to foster a sense of identity that is inclusive of members of other ethnic
groups. This problem is compounded by the fact that Hungarians in Slovakia also identify
individuals associated with the development of Hungarian history as the most important figures in
their history.^19

The pattern of relations between Slovaks and Hungarians during the interwar period was also an
important element of the pre-communist legacy. The Hungarians who found themselves in
Czechoslovakia after 1918 suffered from an abrupt loss of status; the citizenship status of many
was also unclear for some time. The constitution guaranteed those who could claim citizenship the
right to use their own language in schools and in court under certain conditions.^20 However, many
Hungarians felt themselves to be disadvantaged and welcomed the reincorporation of the southern
part of Slovakia into Hungary brought about by the first Vienna Award of 1938, which also allowed
Hungary to annex southern Ruthenia, also previously part of Czechoslovakia. Those Hungarians who
remained in Slovakia, along with other minorities, were subjugated to heavy pressure to become
Slovak.^21 These events and the exchange of Hungarian and Slovak populations after World War II
complicated ethnic relations during the communist period and continue to be reflected in the
attitudes of Hungarians and Slovaks toward each other in the post-communist period.^22


The communist legacy

The communist period left several important legacies in Slovakia. Many of these, including the
impact of a command economy on economic performance and the structure of the economy, the
widespread alienation of the population from the political system, distrust of political leaders,
lack of interest in joining political organizations, and the erosion of morality in the public and
private spheres that Václav Havel has described so eloquently, were similar in Slovakia and the
Czech Lands. Others, however, were peculiar to Slovakia and reflected the many ways in which the
two regions differed from each other at the outset of the communist period.

Several of these were particularly important. These include the impact of a unitary political
system on Slovak national aspirations and identity; the pattern of industrialization that occurred
in Slovakia during the communist era; the impact of the Communist Party's monopoly of power and
control of the .media on ethnic relations within Slovakia; and the different patterns the political
reforms of 1968 took in Slovakia and the Czech Lands and the resulting differences in the political
climate after their suppression.

The Kosice Government program which formed the basis of the Czecho-slovak state re-created in 1945
included guarantees of Slovak autonomy. However, these provisions were largely ignored after the
communists came to power in February 1948. As the Stalinist system was consolidated in
Czechoslovakia, Slovak national bodies such as the Slovak National Council lost much of their
authority and Slovak leaders, including Vladimir Clementis and Gustav Husák, were accused of being
bourgeois nationalists and executed or forced to leave political life during the purges. Promises
of autonomy were forgotten, and decision-making once again was centered in Prague. Due to the
party's monopoly of power and control of the media, Slovak leaders lost the ability to raise ethnic
issues. Several of the parties that had championed Slovak national causes during the interwar
period, including the People's Party, were banned after World War II. Others, such as the
Democratic Party which had been active in the period between 1945 and 1948, were abolished after
1948.

It was only in the context of the process of theoretical renewal that preceded the reform period of
1968 that Slovak leaders and intellectuals were once again able to voice Slovak national claims
openly. As the process of rethinking the nature of socialist society that took place at the elite
level spread, Slovaks began to question the unitary organization of the state and call for greater
attention to Slovak issues and needs. It was during this period that Slovak national organizations,
such as Matica Slovenská, were once again allowed to act as advocates of Slovak national interests.
In the context of the reform, Slovak leaders were also able to bring about the federation of the
country.^23

Many of the powers granted to the republic governments as the result of federalization, which was
one of the few elements of the reform agenda to survive the August 1968 Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia and subsequent "normalization" and which entered into effect in January
1969, were subsequently rescinded. The reduction in the powers of the republic governments,
especially in the economic area, in turn was reflected in the growing dissatisfaction among Slovaks
with the federation that became evident after November 1989. The change in the structure of the
state had an important impact on political developments in the late communist and early
Post-communist period. The lack of power of the republic governments was one of the factors that
fueled Slovak dissatisfaction with the notion of a federation and provided a rallying point for
Slovak leaders who wanted to see either a radical change in the state's structure or independence
for Slovakia.

As numerous analysts have noted, most Slovaks as well as most Czechs opposed the break-up of the
Czechoslovak federation, and the dissolution of the state was ultimately accomplished at the elite
level.^24 But while political leaders, particularly Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar, negotiated
the break-up without consulting the broader populations directly, large numbers of citizens in
Slovakia wanted to see some change in the structure of the state. It is telling, for example, that
only 8 percent of respondents in Slovakia surveyed in 1991 by the Institute for Public Opinion
Research were satisfied with the federation.^25 Most Slovaks wanted to see a "confederation;"
however, few were clear about what such an arrangement would involve. Many of those who wanted to
see a confederation also supported Vladimír Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in the June
1992 elections.^26

The concentration of decision-making power in Prague during the late communist period allowed
Slovak leaders to blame the Czechs for the ills the system created. The continuation of the
existing federal structure after the November 1989 revolution also allowed them to blame the Czechs
for the negative results of the introduction of the market in Slovakia. At the same time, the fact
that political life had been organized in a federal system for some time made it easier for
political leaders to agree to divide the country and to do so peacefully.

The timing of Slovakia's industrialization also had an important influence on political
developments in the post-communist period. Because most of Slovakia's industrialization took place
during the communist era, its economy was particularly vulnerable to the disruptions caused by the
transition to the market. The closing or downsizing of many of the large, inefficient enterprises
in the arms and other heavy industries contributed to rates of unemployment that were much higher
in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands prior to the break-up of the state. The proportion of families
living in poverty was also much greater in Slovakia than in Bohemia and Moravia. This situation fed
resentment against the federal government and the Czechs and increased support for parties that
called for a change in the strategy of economic change to better suit Slovakia's economic
conditions.

The impact of the leadership's approach to Slovakia's sizeable Hungarian minority during the
communist era was another important part of the communist legacy in Slovakia. Citizenship and other
restrictions on Hungarians after the end of World War II were lifted during the communist era.
Hungarians living in Slovakia also had an officially established cultural organization. However,
like other mass organizations under communist rule, this organization existed to mobilize the
population to do the bidding of the Communist Party rather than to articulate or promote the
interests of the Hungarian minority. There were also a number of schools, particularly at the
elementary level, that taught in Hungarian. Control of public debate by the Communist Party and the
inability of citizens to form independent groups meant that only a few activists gave voice to the
grievances of the Hungarian minority during the communist period. However, Hungarian resentment
over what many considered to be their second class status in Slovakia and lack of opportunity for
education in Hungarian, particularly at the secondary and higher levels, continued to grow. When
the communist system fell, then, the ground was prepared for Hungarian activists to mobilize
Hungarians living in Slovakia around Hungarian ethnic claims.

Finally, the formation of interest groups and parties in the post-communist period was influenced
by the impact of the reform period of 1968 and its aftermath in Slovakia. The 1968 reforms and
their suppression had a profound impact on political and economic life in Czechoslovakia. Due to
the Husák leadership's fear that any discussion of economic or other significant reform would have
political repercussions, it was virtually impossible to speak of reform in any area for much of the
rest of the communist period. The replacement of Husák by Miloš Jakeš in 1987 and the impact of
Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia led to some change in this respect. The
Communist Party adopted a new approach to economic issues in January 1987 that highlighted the need
for significant economic reforms, for example. Change in the composition of top party bodies was
accompanied by an increased willingness on the part of the population to challenge the regime by
participation in activities organized by dissidents, particularly in the Czech Lands. Dissent also
spread to groups previously not involved, such as young people and people in the official world.^27

In Slovakia, the end of the reforms of the Prague Spring reflected the nature of the reform process
itself. Although certain Slovaks supported the effort to create a more democratic system, many were
more concerned with national issues in 1968. The purge of supporters of democratization, therefore,
was not as deep in Slovakia as in the Czech Lands.^28 Intellectual life also was not as tightly
controlled after 1968 as in the Czech lands. As a result, many Slovaks who had they lived in the
Czech Lands would have been classified as dissidents by the regime were able to keep their jobs in
the official world while at the same time engaging in what Martin Butora, one of the founders of
Public Against Violence, has called "constructive deviance." In the late 1980s, activist
intellectuals were able to use officially approved organizations, such as the Guardians of Nature,
to organize and engage in activities to support the environment and other non-conformist actions.
The numbers of people who participated in these activities was not large; like their counterparts
in the Czech Lands they were for the most part intellectuals and developed few links to broader
groups within the population. Several of the leaders of this group became leaders in Public Against
Violence in 1989, and the informal networks created at this time continued to have an influence on
politics after 1989. At the same time, because they operated within the framework of official
organizations, leaders of these groups did not gain the experience that Polish and Hungarian
dissidents did in mobilizing large groups of people or openly engaging in politics, or the support
of large groups of citizens. Nor did their actions earn them the same moral authority as that of
many of the Czech dissidents. The primary exception to this pattern occurred in the case of a few
writers and philosophers, such as Milan Šimečka and Miroslav Kusý, and the growing numbers of
religious activists, such as Jan Čárnogurský who became more active in the late 1980s in
challenging restrictions on the freedom of religion. The actions of the latter included pilgrimages
to shrines, which grew from approximately 100,000 people in the early 1980s to an estimated 800,000
people in 1988.^29 A 1988 candlelight demonstration in Bratislava was a particularly important step
in the development of religious activism.

The impact of the communist period on levels of development in the Czech Lands and Slovakia also
affected ethnic relations and the development of the political system after 1989. Investment in
Slovakia succeeded in reducing many of the disparities between the Czech Lands and Slovakia during
the communist period. As I have demonstrated more fully elsewhere, these results were evident on
almost all indicators of development, including occupational structure; educational levels;
urbanization patterns; and living standards.^30 In 1948, for example, 59.8 percent of the labor
force was employed in agriculture in Slovakia, compared to 33.1 percent in the Czech Lands. The
difference between the two regions had decreased substantially by 1970 (23.6 percent in Slovakia,
14.6 percent in the Czech Lands), and continued to decrease throughout the rest of the communist
period. By 1989, 12.6 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture in Slovakia, compared to
8.4 percent in the Czech Lands.^31 Access to education in the two regions also became more equal.
In 1949, the ratio of students in higher education per 1,000 population between 20 and 29 years of
age was 0.70. This ratio was 0.93 in 1955 and, in the 1960s and 1970s, 1.13 to 1.41. The ratio
decreased somewhat to 0.91 by 1985 and 0.87 by 1987, but educational access in Slovakia was still
closer to that in the Czech Lands by the end of the communist period than at its inception.^32

A similar picture emerges if one considers average monthly wages in the socialized sector of the
economy (excluding agricultural cooperatives), which were slightly lower in Slovakia at the outset
of the communist period, but had reached 0.98 percent of those in the Czech Lands by the
mid-1960s.^33 Because a somewhat larger proportion of the population was employed in agricultural
cooperatives in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands, and average wages of cooperative members were
somewhat lower than those in the rest of the socialized economy, average incomes were still
slightly lower in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands in the 1980s. However, these differences did not
lead to great differences in standards of living in the two regions. Information about the
equipment of homes with consumer goods and automobile ownership, for example, indicates that
differences in the two regions had all but disappeared by 1980.^34 However, the near-equalization
of conditions in the two regions did not lead to a decrease in ethnic identity among Slovaks or
ethnic tensions in Czechoslovakia.



After 1989, political conditions allowed Slovak leaders to use the resources modernization created
to mobilize the population around ethnic issues.


The impact of the transition: the repluralization of politics

The sudden end of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, coupled with the tight political control
exercised by the regime until the end of the system, meant that Slovaks as well as Czechs were
faced with the need to respond rapidly to the unexpected after November 1989. As in the Czech
Lands, Slovaks could not rely on existing institutions or groups, such as Solidarity in Poland, to
take the lead in bringing about the end of the communist system and reorganizing of the polity and
economy. Rather, they faced had to create a new organization to deal with the rapidly changing
demands of the situation. In the Czech Lands, Václav Havel and other dissidents centered around
Charter 77 moved quickly to create Civic Forum and were the obvious choice to negotiate with the
government and coordinate the mass demonstrations that spread after the November 17 beating of
peaceful student demonstrators. In Slovakia, it was a loose coalition of the non-conformist
intellectuals discussed above, cultural figures, and people who had been involved in the old regime
but quickly came to support the call for its end who established Public Against Violence. As in the
case of Civic Forum in the Czech Lands, this umbrella organization included individuals with what
would prove to be very different ideas about how to deal with the tasks of the immediate
post-communist period.

The involvement of large numbers of ordinary citizens in the mass demonstrations that brought about
the end of communism was a positive resource for the new leaders in the Czech Lands and Slovakia.
However, this public support soon faded, to be replaced by skepticism about political movements and
parties and, in many cases, about political institutions and leaders. Because the old regime fell
so quickly, citizens in Slovakia had a limited opportunity to participate openly in politics prior
to the effort to recreate democratic political life. The transition therefore did little to
contribute to the legitimacy of the new government or create new symbols or myths that democratic
leaders in Slovakia could use to develop a political culture supportive of democracy. Because the
"Velvet Revolution" began in Prague and there was initially a high level of cooperation between
Czech and Slovak leaders, many of the Slovak intellectuals who led the movement to end communist
rule were vulnerable to being depicted as insufficiently dedicated to pursuing Slovak national
interests. The short period of the transition meant that citizens had little opportunity to become
familiar with those who would emerge as leaders in 1989. It also meant that there were few leaders
in Slovakia apart from those associated with the Communist system who had any experience in
negotiating with the Communist leadership, or in leading a mass based political party or
movement.^35

The end of communist rule in Slovakia, as in the Czech Lands, was followed by a rapid effort to
re-create democratic political life. Most of this effort focused in the immediate post-communist
period on removing those leaders compromised by their roles in the old system and reorienting the
style of work of existing institutions. Changes were made in the composition of the Federal
Assembly in December 1989 and early 1990 by coopting new people to replace those communist deputies
who resigned. Competitive elections, held in June 1990 and 1992 for Federal and Republic
legislatures and in September/October 1994 for the Slovak National Council as well as in November
1990, November 1992 and November 1994 for local offices were the primary means of selecting new
leaders.^36 The rapid repluralization of politics that occurred after the end of Communist rule
provided citizens with the opportunity to articulate their views and join or form voluntary
or-ganizations to defend their interests, advocate policies and pressure political leaders.^37

Electoral legislation and the timing of elections in Slovakia were influenced by the desire of
Czechoslovakia's new leaders to move quickly to legitimate the ad hoc personnel changes and changes
in government that occurred immediately after the end of the communist system; the need to take the
multiethnic nature of the country and its tradition of proportional representation into account;
and the desire to prevent an extreme degree of fragmentation of political forces in parliament.
Thus, a system of proportional representation with thresholds of 5 percent for the Federal Assembly
and the Czech National Council, and 3 percent for the Slovak National Council, was adopted. In
1992, the threshold for the Slovak National Council was increased to 5 percent. Political
considerations including the situation of the Hungarian minority have influenced recent discussions
of electoral districts.

In the June 1990 elections, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence emerged as the clear winners in
their regions. Public Against Violence gained 32.5 percent of the vote and 19 of the 51 Slovak
seats in the House of the People and 37.3 percent of the vote, or 33 of the 75 Slovak seats in the
House of Nations in the Federal Assembly. The movement also won 29.3 percent of the vote to the
Slovak National Council, which gave it 48 of the 150 seats in that body. The Christian Democratic
Movement was the second most popular party, with approximately 19 percent of the vote to the House
of the People and 16.7 percent to the House of Nations of the Federal Assembly and 19 percent of
the vote to the Slovak National Council. The Communist Party of Slovakia won 13.8 percent of the
vote for the House of the People and 13.4 to the House of Nations of the Federal Assembly; the
party won 13.3 percent of votes for the Slovak National Council. The Slovak National Party won
approximately 11 percent of the vote to the two houses of the Federal Assembly and 14 percent to
the Slovak National Council. A coalition of two Hungarian parties, Coexistence and the Hungarian
Christian Democratic Party, gained about 8.5 percent of votes to all three bodies. In addition to
these parties, which passed the 5 percent threshold required to seat deputies in the Federal
Assembly, the Democratic Party, with 4.4 percent of the vote and Green Party with 3.5 percent
passed the three percent threshold required to seat deputies in the Slovak National Council (see
table 6.2).



As in 1990, no party won a majority of the vote in the 1992 elections in Slovakia. Vladimír
Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia gained the largest share of the vote (33.5 percent to
the House of the People and 33.9 percent to the House of Nations of the National Assembly and 37.3
percent to the Slovak National Council). The Party of the Democratic Left, the successor to the
Communist Party of Slovakia, came in second with approximately 14 percent of the vote for all three
bodies, followed by the Christian Democratic Movement with approximately 9 percent. The Slovak
National Party won 9.4 percent of the vote for both houses of the Federal Assembly and 7.9 percent
for the Slovak National Council. In addition, coalitions of Hungarian parties gained approximately
7 percent of the vote and seated deputies in both the federal and Slovak bodies. The Social
Democratic Party, with 6 percent of the vote, also passed the threshold to seat deputies in the
House of Nations of the Federal Assembly. The Civic Democratic Union, however, the center right
successor of Public Against Violence, with 4.0 percent of the vote for all three bodies, did not
pass the threshold required to seat deputies at either the federal or republic level (see table
6.3).

Since independence, Slovakia has experienced early parliamentary elections brought about by the
parliamentary ouster of Vladimír Mečiar as prime minister in March 1994. In these elections, which
were held in September-October 1994, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia won the largest share
of the vote (34.96 percent). Common Choice, a coalition of the Party of the Democratic Left, the
Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, the Green Party of Slovakia and the Farmers Movement of the
Slovak Republic, was second with 10.41 percent; and the Hungarian Coalition was third with 10.18
percent. Unable to convince leaders of the Party of the Democratic Left to enter into a coalition
with him, Mečiar formed a coalition with the Slovak National Party which won 5.40 percent of the
vote, and the Association of Slovak Workers which won 7.43 percent. Together, the coalition holds
83 of the 150 seats, eight more than a majority in parliament (see table 6.4).


The break-up of the Czechoslovak Federation

The development of the party system and other forms of citizen participation in politics in
Slovakia was also influenced by the break-up of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1993. As I have
argued in greater detail in an earlier discussion of this issue, the end of the Czechoslovak state
was the reflection of a variety of historical, cultural, economic, and political/institutional
factors.^38 Cooperation between Czech and Slovak leaders after November 1989 soon gave way to
conflict over the division of labor between the federal and republic governments as well as to the
increasingly open expression of different views on the speed and extent of economic reform.






The inability of leaders to come to an agreement on the power-sharing issue and the much harsher
impact of the shift to the market in Slovakia, given the differences in the timing and nature of
industrialization discussed earlier, resulted in growing dissatisfaction with the federation in
Slovakia. As the results of the 1992 elections illustrate, this dissatisfaction, coupled with
psychological and historical factors, as well as with the differences in opinion among Czechs and
Slovaks concerning many of the most important issues of the day, led to the victory of a
center-right coalition led by Václav Klaus in the Czech Lands and a coalition of the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party led by Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia.

The actual process by which the common state ended was initiated by political elites and confined
to the elite level. The public, which continued to oppose the break-up in both the Czech Lands and
Slovakia even as their leaders negotiated it, was not consulted by means of a referendum. The
Federal Parliament eventually approved a plan for dividing the state, but it is clear that neither
the federal nor the republic legislatures played a significant role in the process.^39 At the same
time, the different perspectives of Czechs and Slovaks on issues such as the nature of the state
and the pace and extent of economic reform provided the background for these actions. Thus, among
those Slovaks who wanted to see a common state continue, most favored a "confederation"; however,
the nature of this arrangement was not clearly understood or specified.^40 Similarly, Vladimír
Mečiar's promise to find a road to the market that would take Slovakia's specific features into
account resonated with the desire of many Slovaks to see the state continue to play a larger role
than most Czechs wanted as well as with the lower levels of support among Slovaks for privatization
of large state enterprises. Differences in the perspectives of Czechs and Slovaks, then, allowed
political leaders, particularly in Slovakia, to mobilize citizens around these issues.

In contrast to the situation in the former Yugoslav federation, the break-up of Czechoslovakia
occurred peacefully. The peaceful nature of the end of the Czechoslovak state reflected the fact
that the Czech leadership was willing to

agree to Slovakia's independence after the June 1992 elections. It also reflected the fact that
Czechs and Slovaks had never slaughtered each other in mass numbers and the absence of a history of
violence between the two peoples. The concentration of settlement in the two regions was also an
important factor. In contrast to the situation in former Yugoslavia, the numbers of Czechs living
in Slovakia and Slovaks living in the Czech Lands was not large.^41

From the perspective of the development of the party system and other avenues of citizen
participation in politics in Slovakia, the break-up of the federation was significant in a number
of ways. Questions about the nature and future of the state played a dominant role in public life
in the first two and a half years of the post-communist era. Particularly as economic hardship due
to the shift to the market increased in Slovakia, those political leaders and political parties who
supported both reform and the continuation of the federation were doubly disadvantaged in their
efforts to gain electoral support. After the elections of June 1992 they were marginalized from
politics.

The fact that the split occurred peacefully was also important for the further development of the
party system as well as of other political organizations and institutions in Slovakia. In contrast
to the situation in former Yugoslavia, the leaders and citizens of Slovakia were able to continue
to engage in political life without the threat or presence of war after independence.


Social and ethnic cleavages in post-communist society

Ethnicity, which was one of the most important cleavages in Czechoslovakia during the interwar and
communist periods, continues to be the most politically salient cleavage in independent Slovakia.
Slovaks comprise 85.7 percent of the population. There are approximately 567,000 Hungarians
concentrated in the southern part of Slovakia; 17,200 Ruthenians; and 13,300 Ukrainians.^42 There
are also smaller Polish and Czech communities and a sizeable Romany, or gypsy community,
unofficially estimated to be between 100,000 to 250,000.^43 During the communist era, members of
the Hungarian minority as well the Ukrainians/Ruthenians concentrated in Eastern Slovakia were more
likely than Slovaks to work in agriculture.^44 However, most members of both groups were workers or
employees. The educational levels of Ukrainians/Ruthenians were substantially lower than those of
other citizens of Slovakia.^45

Political life after independence, just as it was before, is organized along ethnic lines.
Hungarian voters in particular vote for Hungarian parties. As a later section of the paper will
discuss, there are also important differences in the political perspectives of young and old
voters. Political values and attitudes also differ by educational levels, as well as by gender.

As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere,^46 there are important differences in the status of
men and women in Slovak society. As the result of policies adopted during the communist era,
women's educational levels have increased and now equal or exceed those of men, particularly in the
younger age groups. Most women are also employed outside the home. However, substantial
inequalities still remain in the workplace. Women are less likely to hold leading positions and
also have lower incomes. In the post-communist period, women's share of the unemployed has
generally been larger than their representation in the labor force. Women have also faced
increasingly open discrimination in the workplace and in society at large. The exclusion of women
from positions of political power has continued in the post-communist period.^47 Slovak society is
also becoming more stratified along economic lines as a result of the reintroduction of the market.


The shift to the market

At the end of the communist period, Slovakia's development level was nearly on a par with that of
the Czech Lands. However, because it took place largely during the communist era, the nature of
Slovakia's industrialization differed. Much of Czechoslovakia's arms industry was concentrated in
Slovakia, and more of Slovakia's industries were of the very large, inefficient type typical of
centrally planned economies. There were also large numbers of towns that were in effect
one-industry towns and thus extremely vulnerable once market conditions were introduced.^48

Slovak leaders agreed to the plan for the rapid reintroduction of the market , adopted by the
federal and republic governments in September 1990. However, given the timing and nature of
industrialization, the Slovak economy was more susceptible to disruptions caused by the shift to
the market. Unemployment rates soon reached 12 to 13 percent, rates several times higher than those
in the Czech Lands. Part of the source of Vladimír Mečiar's electoral victory in the 1992 elections
was his promise to adjust economic strategy to better reflect the specific needs and conditions in
Slovakia.

As in other post-communist societies, the impact of the economic transition has been
differentiated. Those who are young, better educated, and live in urban areas have benefited most
from the opportunity to establish or work for private businesses, increase their skills through
contact with foreign experts and travel abroad, or work for international corporations. They and a
larger group have also benefited from the ability to practice their professions or work in their
occupations without political or ideological interference.

For many Slovaks, however, the shift to the market has created a good deal of hardship. Unskilled
workers, older workers, and women have borne the brunt of the transition. Vulnerable groups in the
population, such as the elderly and single mothers^49 have been particularly hard hit. Workers in
the many one-industry towns and cities in Slovakia in which the main enterprises are not
competitive in the new conditions have also suffered high levels of unemployment and economic
hardship.^50 Different groups in society have had different experiences with privatization. Many
Slovaks benefited from their participation in the first wave of coupon privatization, which took
place before the break-up of the federation. Since that time, critics of the Mečiar regime have
charged that privatization has benefited largely those who support Mečiar and members of the old
apparatus.^51 Hungarian activists in particular have claimed that members of the Hungarian minority
are being systematically excluded from participation in privatization.^52 Economic Performance
began to improve in 1995, when the Slovak economy grew at the rate of 6.6 percent. However, as in a
number of other post-communist countries, progress at the macroeconomic level has yet to be
reflected in the living standard of many sectors of the population (see table 6.5).



Large-scale privatization virtually stopped after Vladimír Mečiar became prime minister in 1992.
The coalition government of Jozef Moravcik adopted plans to reinstitute coupon privatization in
1994, and the first sales were made prior to the September-October 1994 elections. The Mečiar
government formed in December 1994 as the result of the September-October 1994 elections
invalidated these sales, including several that had involved foreign investors. Under pressure from
the IMF, the government announced a new plan in June of 1995 to privatize large scale economic
enterprises later that year. However, this plan would provide citizens with bonds redeemable only
in five years. In addition, many enterprises were sold by means of direct sales.^53 In July 1995,
the parliament ended coupon privatization.^54 A December 1995 poll by FOCUS found that 40 percent
of respondents in a nationwide survey were critical of the government's privatization strategy.
Over 66 percent felt that privatization was not proceeding in the proper direction in Slovakia.^55

Despite the reluctance of the government to continue the privatization of state enterprises, the
private sector has continued to grow in Slovakia. By 1992, private enterprises accounted for 32.4
percent of GDP. This figure had increased to 58.2 percent by 1994 and 62 percent in the first half
of 1995.^S6 Approximately 40.5 percent of the labor force was estimated to be engaged in the
private sector by 1994.^57


The political evolution of society

Political parties and movements are the dominant political actors in Slovakia. As the section to
follow on political parties and the party system details, many new political parties were formed
after the end of communist rule. The Communist Party and other small parties permitted to exist
during the communist period also continued to exist and took steps to reform themselves in order to
compete electorally.

Other associations and organizations, including business groups, profes-sional and voluntary
associations, and trade unions, also took advantage of the new political conditions to organize and
attract members. The NGO sector grew particularly quickly after the end of restrictions on forming
new organizations. There were an estimated 9,800 NGO's in Slovakia in late 1995. This represents a
sizeable increase since 1993 when there were approximately 6,000 NGOs registered with the
government.^58 These figures compare to the approximately 16,000 associations that Mannova notes
existed in Slovakia in the interwar period.^59

Information on all of the NGOs registered with the government is not available. However, analysis
of data gathered by SAIA-SCTS (Slovak Academic Information Agency-Service Center for the Third
Sector) on 1,571 NGOs provides some insight into their fields of activity and focus. In 1995, the
largest category of NGOs registered with SAIA-SCTS worked in the area of education and training (59
percent); 58 percent worked with youth, 46 percent with children; 35 percent with charity and
social welfare; and 33 percent with disabled people. In addition, 25 percent focused on issues
related to the environment and 20 percent on issues related to business development. These
organizations encompassed approximately 380,400 volunteers in 1995.^60 Originally concentrated in
Bratislava, NGOs have increasingly spread to other parts of the country.^61

In March 1994, a Council, or Gremium, of the Third Sector was formed by sixteen people who
represented different areas of the NGO sector. In 1995, this group was expanded to include
seventeen individuals representing five areas of NGO activity. This body meets monthly and attempts
to influence legislation that affects the NGO sector.^62

A study of volunteerism conducted in Slovakia in April 1994 as part of an international study of
volunteering provides some information about the number and kinds of citizens who take part in the
work of voluntary organizations. In 1994, 11 percent of the 1,015 individuals surveyed indicated
that they had participated in some kind of unpaid work for a voluntary organization in the previous
year, and 12 indicated that they had done specific types of such work.^63 Of these over half (56
percent) did so at least once a month; 41 percent of those who regularly volunteer spent 10 hours a
month doing so. Fialova notes that these proportions, as those in other formerly communist European
countries, were considerably lower than those in countries such as Belgium (where 30 percent of
respondents volunteered), Denmark (28 Percent), the Netherlands (34 percent) and Sweden (32
percent). Volunteers in Central and Eastern Europe are more likely than those in the rest of Europe
to become volunteers through their work; they are also more likely to volunteer to provide
services. Levels of satisfaction with volunteering are also lower.^64

Equal proportions of men and women were regular volunteers; individuals with university education,
as well as those who are older than 35, were most likely to volunteer.^65 These figures correspond
to the results Zora Butorova, Jan Haiti, and I found in our December 1994 survey which found that
women were more likely to be active in non-partisan organizations than in Political parties.^66 Men
are more likely to volunteer for sports and recreation related organizations; women are more
frequently found as volunteers in groups that deal with health and social service issues.^67 In
addition to groups that focus on providing services and recreational groups, a wide variety of
other nongovernmental organizations developed that focus on  issues ranging from the environment to
feminism.   Religious denominations also expanded the groups they organized for youth, women, and
other groups of the population, as did political parties.

The introduction of the market and privatization have been accompanied by the formation of numerous
groups and associations by business people and managers. To a large extent, these groups focus
primarily on professional development and business related issues. However, a small party, the
Party of Businessmen and Tradesmen, was formed in 1990. This party, which favors the rapid
reintroduction of the market and creation of a positive environment for small and medium-sized
businesses, ran as part of the Democratic Union's electoral slate in the 1994 elections. The Party
also cooperates with business organizations abroad, including those in the Czech Republic and
Hungary. On August 1, 1994, the party began a regular column in the daily Sme to provide advice for
business people and information on issues that affect them.^68 Disagreement among the leaders of
the party led to a split in February 1995; a new party, the Union of Tradesmen, Businessmen, and
Farmers of the Slovak Republic, was formed.^69 In October 1995, the Party of Businessmen and
Entrepreneurs agreed to cooperate with Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.^70

In addition to these groups, there are also numerous business groups and associations that are
affiliated with international bodies. The Slovak Association of Employers Unions and Associations
represents employers groups in the Tripartite Commission, a body that brings together the trade
unions, employers and the government to negotiate wage and other agreements.^71

Privatization and the introduction of the market have also sparked efforts to organize on the part
of agricultural workers. As in the case of business groups, most groups have focused on issues
related to their members' occupations, such as agricultural production techniques. Agricultural
workers and farmers have divided their votes among a variety of different political parties. These
include the small Peasant Party that ran in the 1994 elections in coalition with the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia; the Christian Democratic Movement; and the Party of the Democratic Left.^72
The farmers movement, which formed part of the Common Choice coalition in 1994, also represents
agricultural interests. The end of communism has allowed trade unions to be more active protecting
the interests of their members. However, the action of the trade unions has been limited by their
participation in the deliberations of the tripartite commission. First established under the
federation, the tripartite commision that brings unions, employers and the government together was
continued after Slovakia became independent. Union representatives signed a General Agreement for
1994 designed to promote social peace in August !994 73  There have been few strikes  in Slovakia
since independence.

However, individual trade unions such as KOVO, the union of workers in mining, geology, and the oil
industry, staged protests against the government's social policies in 1995.^74 Dissatisfaction with
the government's effort to revamp social policies led representatives of the confederation to walk
out of the tripartite agreement discussions in September 1995.^75 There have also been
demonstrations such as that of 20,000 people in Bratislava organized by the Confederation of Trade
Unions to protest government policies.^76 Leaders of the Confederation have also accused the Mečiar
government of trying to break up the unions.^77

The military, which was rapidly downsized, has played virtually no role in the selection of
government leaders in Slovakia during the period between 1989 and 1993 or since Slovakia's
independence.^78 During the communist era, the army was unpopular as the result of its
politicization and subor-dination to the Soviet Union.^79 However, as in the former Soviet Union,
the military was subordinated to Czechoslovakia's political authorities and did not play an
independent role in politics. In the course of the reforms of 1968, steps were taken to reduce
political influence in the military as well as to increase the number of Slovak officers and reduce
discrimination against Slovaks in advancement.^80 The purge of reformist officers who supported the
political reforms of 1968, which involved almost all of the junior officers, resulted in the
dominance of officers who supported the repressive policies of the Hiisak regime, particularly
after Soviet support for Husák became clear. For the remainder of the communist period, the army
suffered from funding problems and demoralization.^81 The low educational levels of officers and
evident subordination of the military to the Soviet command were additional factors that led to low
public trust in the military and to the low prestige associated with military careers.^82

The army's role in the events that brought about the end of communism in Czechoslovakia is
disputed. As Barany notes, there is evidence that elements within the military as well as in the
political leadership contemplated the use of force against the growing number of demonstrators in
November 1989, but the resignation of the Communist Party's leadership prevented a decision about
this issue from being reached.^83 In October 1990, then Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek was
replaced when an investigation revealed that he had been a central figure in a November 1989 plan
to control radio and television broadcasting.^84

As in other post-communist states, the military underwent important changes in its size, staffing,
doctrine, and international links after the end of communist rule. Steps were taken to increase the
military's professionalism. A significant number (23.6 percent) of officers and other professional
soldiers left the military either because they did not pass competence testing or at their own
request.^85 Slightly over one-half of all generals and 23.6 percent of all professional soldiers
did not sign the new loyalty oath. Most of those who worked as political officers also left
military service.^86 The Czechoslovak government also established greater civilian control over the
military and took steps to eliminate the influence of foreign intelligence in the military.^87

The Slovak army which came under the control of the new Slovak Republic in 1993 is uninvolved in
political life. When the Czechoslovak federation brokeup, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to split
the army's assets and equipment on a two to one ratio. The division of the army was facilitated by
the redeployment of army troops from the Czech Republic's western borders, where they had been
concentrated during the communist period, to a more uniform distribution throughout the county.
Czech officers serving in Slovakia and Slovak officers serving in the Czech Republic were given the
option of remaining or returning to their own country when the federal state broke up. Most of the
Slovaks who returned to Slovakia were younger and less experienced than those who remained in the
Czech Lands. This factor complicated the task of creating a national Slovak army. As was the case
for numerous other institutions such as the foreign service, for example, Slovaks had to build new
institutions while Czechs could use federal institutions as a framework for the creation of Czech
institutions. The weakness of the military as an institution and the fact that it has been largely
preoccupied with its own internal affairs in Slovakia since independence, are additional factors,
then, that have limited the military's political influence.

The direct political role of the political or secret police also appears to have been minimal.
However, in Slovakia certain political leaders have allegedly influenced the decisions of their
opponents as to whether or not to seek office or to continue in office by using information
provided by the intelligence service or from police files. In these cases, the intelligence
services provided information used by political leaders rather than initiating action or playing a
role as independent political actors.

To date, violence has played a similarly limited role in the selection of political leaders in
Slovakia. There have been several changes of government that have occurred peacefully in Slovakia.
However, there are indicators that violence or the threat of violence may play an increasing role.
The beating of Frantisek Miklosko, Deputy Chair of the Christian Democratic Movement, in September
of 1995, is widely thought to have been politically motivated. The August 1995 kidnapping of
President Kováč's son, who was forced to drink large quantities of alcohol and taken across the
border into Austria, is another example of a politically motivated violent act.^88 President Kováč
has accused Ivan Lexa, the head of the Slovak Information Service, Slovakia's secret service, of
directing the kidnapping of his son.^89 Other opposition leaders, including Jan Čárnogurský, head
of the Christian Democratic Party, have also charged that the SIS was involved in the abduction.^90
Two police investigators on the case who had alleged that the secret service was involved were
removed from the case. The Director of the SIS filed criminal charges against the investigators as
well as a lawsuit against President Kováč.^91

At present, the process of selecting political leaders by democratic means is threatened more by
political factors than by the use of violence. Hungarian activists charge that the government
coalition's plans for redrawing the borders of Slovakia's districts threaten the ability of
Slovakia's Hungarians to elect Hungarian leaders, for example. Originally approved by the
government on March 22, 1996 and reapproved on July 3 after President Kováč's veto, the
administrative reform recreated eight regions in Slovakia. It reduced the numbers of districts from
83 to 79.^92 The Deputy Chair of Coexistence, one of the members of the Hungarian Coalition, notes
that the government plan incorporates the districts of two of the main centers of Hungarian
settlement, Komarno and Dunajska Streda, into three different regions. Other districts and
sub-districts with large Hungarian populations have also been separated and have become parts of
different regions.^93

The efforts of the Slovak National Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia to revoke the
mandates of Democratic Union deputies in March 1995 and the effort of the Mečiar government to
force President Kováč to resign are examples of the attempted use of non-electoral, but legal means
to influence the composition of the country's leadership. In January 1996, the Chair of the Mandate
and Immunity Commission of the National Council announced that the conclusions reached by the
earlier temporary mandate committee that the mandates of the Democratic Union deputies elected in
1994 were invalid was legally irrelevant because of procedural abnormalities in the temporary
committee's handling of the issue. This judgement relied on the Constitutional Court's ruling to
that effect in March 1995.^94 As the failure of both of those attempts illustrates, the ability of
leaders to use such measures has been limited to date by the powers of other institutions, such as
the Constitutional Court, despite the fact that the current government coalition holds a majority
of legislative seats. International pressure also appears to have served as a restraint.

As in other post-communist countries, rumor abounds concerning the influence of organized crime in
Slovakia. International criminal organizations, including "mafias" from Ukraine and Russia, have
moved into Slovakia in addition to Slovak criminal groups and networks. For obvious reasons, there
is little systematic data about such groups and their activities.^95 Public opinion surveys
indicate that Slovaks rank crime of all types second in importance after health concerns as a
public problem.^96 Public officials have enacted new laws designed to deal with organized crime.^97
They have also begun to cooperate with agencies of other governments, including the FBI, to combat
organized crime. However, in contrast to the situation in several post-communist countries, where
such groups appear to have infiltrated governmental bodies as well as economic institutions and
many new private businesses, the direct political influence of such groups on politics appears to
be small.

The greater threat to the persistence of democracy appears to come from antidemocratic actions on
the part of certain elements of the legitimate political elite, including remnants of the old
apparatus.^98 It is this influence rather than the influence of organized crime per se that appears
to have most impact on citizens' perceptions of political life and institutions. As the section to
follow illustrates, many citizens in Slovakia continue to be suspicious of the motives and actions
of people in positions of political leadership. They are also reluctant to get involved in politics
themselves, in part because of their belief that most people in politics are active in political
life primarily to enrich themselves rather than to promote the common good."

Since the end of communist rule, the media have developed into an independent source of information
and opinion in Slovakia. Several political parties have newspapers that are either affiliated with
them or favorable to their point of view. Efforts by the government to control newspapers have
occurred frequently and led in some cases to the formation of new, more independent, dailies. After
their 1994 electoral victory, Mečiar and his coalition partners attempted to change what they
perceived to be the hostile press and other media by a number of means, including the replacement
of the members of the board of governors of Slovak television and pressure on editors and
journalists. These changes were followed by more extensive personnel changes in the media. A
Council for Mass Media was also established in February 1995 to make sure that the media respect
the constitution.^100 Political influence has been particularly noticeable in the broadcast media.
Although there are several regional television stations and . private radio stations, these
stations cannot compete effectively with state owned channels, which remain more popular with
viewers and listeners. A survey conducted by the State Television Board in May 1995 found that
coalition parties and figures received markedly more coverage than the opposition or the
president.^101

The print media have not been as susceptible to measures to control them as the broadcast media.
However, the government has taken a number of steps to attempt to correct what its members see as
an anti-governmental bias in the journalism world. In February 1995, a law was discussed in a
parliamentary committee that would have imposed a very high VAT on all dailies that were partly
owned by outside investors. This measure provoked a common protest by thirteen dailies against what
they described as undue economic pressure designed to muzzle a free press, and the government
measure was shelved.^102 Opposition activists also see the removal of the license of the majority
shareholder of the publisher of Sme and the purchase of another independent journal, Pravda, by the
Harvard Investment Fund, which is closely connected to Ivan Lexa, head of the SIS, as efforts to
limit the independence of the press.^103 The law on the protection of the republic which Parliament
passed in December 1996 after President Kováč vetoed an earlier version of the law, calls for
sanctions against those who spread false news that endangers the security of Slovaks or damages its
interests, including those that are potential threats, and gives the government an additional tool
to silence its critics in the media and other areas.^104


Public support for democratization

Survey research conducted since the end of communist rule demonstrates that most Slovak citizens
support democratization in general terms.^105 However, there have been important changes over time
in the levels of this support, and there are significant differences in the degree of such support
among different social groups. In general, younger, better educated, urban males tend to be more
supportive of both the move to the market and the effort to recreate a democratic political
system.^106

As the survey results discussed below illustrate, a sizeable number of citizens in Slovakia
continue to be unconvinced that it was necessary to change the pre-1989 system. Prior to the
break-up of the Czechoslovak federation in 1993, Slovaks tended to be less favorable than Czechs
toward a rapid move to the market. They also were less willing to accept greater unemployment and
more fearful of a decline in the standard of living. Respondents in Slovakia were also less
favorable toward the privatization of large enterprises and more likely than those in the Czech
Lands to want the state to continue to play a major role in providing social welfare and security
for citizens.^107 In a November-December 1994 survey on which I collaborated with colleagues in
Bratislava and Prague, 41 percent of respondents in Slovakia (compared to 68 percent of those in
the Czech Lands) believed that extensive changes were necessary in the economy.^108 The less
positive attitudes of Slovaks toward economic reform and the introduction of the market can be
traced in part to the high levels of unemployment in Slovakia since the end of communist rule and
in part to the persisting legacy of certain values and expectations dating from the communist era.

Respondents in Slovakia also were less favorable toward the political changes that occurred after
1989. The proportion of those who felt that the current system had more disadvantages than
advantages increased from approximately 20 percent in May 1991 to 55 in October 1993. In December
1994, approximately 42 percent of respondents in Slovakia, compared to 20 percent in the Czech
Republic, felt that the present political regime had more disadvantages than the pre-1989 system.
Most citizens in Slovakia as well as in the Czech Lands, however, felt that the current system gave
their children advantages the previous system could not offer.^109

Citizen evaluations of political leaders and institutions have generally not been as favorable in
Slovakia as those toward the overall idea of democratization. A majority of respondents surveyed in
the Slovak Republic in November-December 1994, for example, disagreed with the statement that most
politicians act in an unselfish and moral way (approximately 76 percent). Approximately 91 percent
of respondents agreed with the statement that the powers that be do not care about the opinion of
common people.'^10

Trust in political institutions fluctuated in Slovakia after independence.^111 In early 1991, for
example, 57 percent of the population trusted the president of the federation; 48 percent the
Federal Assembly; 67 percent the Slovak National Council; and 77 percent the Slovak government.^112
In October 1993, 73 percent of those surveyed trusted the president of Slovakia; 43 percent the
Slovak National Council; and 41 percent the government of Slovakia. Levels of trust in the National
Council increased slightly during the period of the coalition government in Slovakia (May 1994),
while those in the government increased substantially (to 55 percent)."^3 In late 1994, trust in
the president had increased to 80 percent; and in the government to 61 percent. Trust in parliament
remained substantially lower at just under 40 percent."^4 As is the case for general attitudes
toward the transition, trust in political institutions, as well as in individual leaders, varies
considerably by the political orientations of respondents. In 1994 and 1995, those affiliated with
the opposition parties put more trust in the president, who has often opposed the policies of Prime
Minister Mečiar; those who voted for the ruling coalition were more likely to trust the government
and National Council."^5

Attitudes concerning political parties have tended to be negative in Slovakia as well as in the
Czech Republic. Thus, many citizens think that a strong leader is more important for democracy than
strong political parties."^6 Slovak respondents were also less likely than those in the Czech Lands
(15 percent compared to 27 percent) to be members of interest groups and civil associations, but
nearly equally likely (32 percent and 34 percent) to be members of trade unions."^7 Respondents in
Slovakia and the Czech Lands were equally unlikely to view at least two strong political parties
which compete in elections as the most essential feature of a democracy."^8

Many citizens in Slovakia feel that they do not understand politics. The majority of those surveyed
in 1994 also felt that they had little ability to influence government decisions that adversely
affect their interests at either the national (74 percent) or local level (50 percent). A majority
(55 percent) did not feel that parliamentary elections allow citizens to influence decision-making;
only a slightly higher proportion (58 percent) saw local elections as a way of influencing local
decisions."^9

As in the case of general evaluations of the process of democratization and the move to the market,
opinions on these issues vary considerably by social category and, particularly, partisan political
affiliation or sympathy. Supporters of parties that are in the government that was formed in late
1994 tend to be less supportive of a liberal conception of democracy and less favorable toward the
market. However, partisan affiliation does not differentiate among citizens with different
potentials for participation. Younger and better educated people, as well as students,
entrepreneurs, and professionals are more likely to indicate that they are willing to participate
in political activities than workers or retired people. Men were more likely to participate than
women.^120

Differences in attitudes and inclinations to take part in political action are particularly
noticeable between men and women. Women are less likely than men to feel that they understand
politics and far less likely to feel that they can influence political decisions at either the
national or local level. They are less often members of political parties and less often indicate
that they are likely to take part in the activities of political parties.^121

As the discussion above indicates, the economic transition has had a major impact on citizens'
attitudes toward the transition and their roles in it. In general, those who have benefited from
the shift to the market or have the ability to benefit from it in the future are more likely to
have a liberal concept of democracy. They are also more likely to indicate that they are active or
are likely to be active in a variety of forms of political action in addition to voting.

Political parties and the party system

Slovakia's party system shares certain features with those of other post-communist European
countries. Chief among these is the fact that there is still a good deal of fluctuation in both
political parties and popular affiliation with particular parties. These features are evident in
the changing roster of parties that have competed in each of the parliamentary elections held since
1989 and the number of new parties that continue to be formed; they are also evident m survey
research that indicates that a significant number of citizens are not firmly anchored to a single
political party but rather float among different parties in their electoral support and
choices.^122 Two of the seven parties that won enough votes to seat deputies in the 1994
parliamentary elections, for example, had been created after the last elections.^123 Another,
Common Choice, was a newly formed coalition of left of center parties including the Party of the
Democratic Left, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Social Union, and the Farmers' Movement
among others. Vladimir Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia also entered into coalition with
the small Peasant Party. (See tables 6.2-6.4 for the results of the post-communist parliamentary
elections.) There have also been a number of changes in political parties since the 1994 elections,
including a split in the Social Democratic Party.

Most parties continue to have small memberships. This tendency, which parallels the decline in
party membership in certain West European democracies, is compounded by low levels of party
identification among voters. As noted above, many citizens in Slovakia have rather low opinions of
political parties and are not convinced that they are essential to democracy. In reaction to the
communist period when party membership was required to advance in one's career or influence
politics, most citizens do not want to join any political party. Most of the respondents in our
1994 November-December survey did not participate in the work of party organizations. Thus, 8
percent of those surveyed in Slovakia, compared to 12 percent in the Czech Lands, were members of
political parties in late 1994. Men were more likely than women to be party members in both
countries. Both men and women were more likely to be involved in the work of nonpartisan voluntary
organizations.

As in other post-communist systems, many of the umbrella organizations and groups that united
people with a wide variety of political perspectives have fragmented in Slovakia. The split in
Public Against Violence in April 1991 that was followed by the formation of Vladimír Mečiar's
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the eventual formation and electoral demise of the Civic
Democratic Union was paralleled by the splits that occurred within the Christian Democratic
Movement, the Slovak National Party, and other political groupings.

However, the fragmentation of non-traditional movements has not been followed, as it has in the
Czech Republic, by the domination of political life by political parties that can be easily placed
on the left-right spectrum similar to those that exist in more established political democracies.
Vladimír Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, for example, has supported economic and
social policies often associated with leftist parties; however, its symbols and appeal to national
sentiments are more typical of radical right-wing parties.^124

There are some indications that party divisions are beginning to crystalize in Slovakia. This
tendency has been particularly evident among the Hungarian political parties, which saw the least
shift in their supporters in the 1994 elections. The Christian Democratic Movement has been the
most stable of the right of center parties.^125 However, there has been considerable fluctuation in
both the levels of support and individuals supporting most other political parties and movements.

The electoral laws adopted after the fall of the communist system have influenced the structure and
durability of political parties in Slovakia in important ways. Based largely on the electoral law
used for the 1946 elections, the electoral law adopted to govern the June 1990 elections, which
relied on a system of proportional representation with a threshold, was instrumental in both
ensuring that the various cleavages in Slovak society would be reflected in parliament and in
limiting the number of political parties that would be represented in parliament. Coupled with the
retention of the federated system of government, the electoral system, which required a party to
achieve a threshold in only one republic in order for deputies to be seated in one of the houses of
the Federal Assembly, also reinforced the division of political life and party formation by
republic.

The threshold requirement succeeded in limiting the number of competing political parties that
would be active in parliament to a manageable number. However, it also meant that there were a
large number of "lost" votes for parties that did not gain the percentage of the vote required to
seat deputies in the legislature. The increase in the threshold from 3 percent to 5 percent for
single parties in the Slovak National Council and the introduction of a 7 percent threshold for a
coalition of two or three parties and a 10 percent threshold for coalitions with more than three
parties further increased the number of parties that did not pass the required threshold.^126
However, it did succeed in reducing the number of lost votes from 23.8 percent in the June 1992
elections to 13.02 percent in the 1994 elections.^127

As Zemko notes, despite the impetus toward consolidation that threshholds might be expected to
create, most small parties did not unite with others but rather joined or formed electoral
coalitions of larger parties to ensure that some of their candidates would be elected to parliament
in the 1994 elections. As a result, of the approximately sixty political parties that existed in
Slovakia in the spring of 1994, eighteen parties and coalitions participated in the elections.
However, these included a total of thirty-one parties, organized into coalitions of one sort or
another.^128

As noted earlier, the structure of the state, as well as ethnic cleavages, had a major impact on
the organization of parties during the period in which Slovakia remained part of the Czechoslovak
federation after 1989. However, the existence of a unitary system within Slovakia after
independence has not decreased the salience of the ethnic division as a focus for political
organizing. This fact suggests that the form of the state has been less important in Slovakia than
underlying ethnic cleavages in influencing party formation. Analysts of other societies in
transition differ concerning the impact of parliamentary and presidential systems on political
stability.^129 The president in Slovakia is elected by parliament and has relatively limited formal
powers. However, as the role President Kováč's speech to parliament played in bringing about the
ouster of the Mečiar government in March 1994 illustrates, the occupant of the office can play an
important political role in certain circumstances. The close relations between the president and
the parties that participated in the broad coalition government in 1994 that became the opposition
after the September-October 1994 elections, however, did little to bolster the drawing power of
those parties in the 1994 elections.

The latter point illustrates a further factor that has been very important in influencing the
development of the party system in Slovakia as in other post-communist states: the role of
personalities and personal rivalries. The pivotal role of Vladimír Mečiar in Slovak politics since
1989 is the clearest example of this factor. Several new parties have formed directly as the result
of their leaders' conflict with Mečiar. Personal rivalry has been at least as if not more important
than policy or programmatic differences in the splits that have occurred and led to the formation
of other new parties in other political groupings. As noted earlier, Mečiar's dominant role and the
conflicts that have occurred between him and his former supporters, as well as between him and the
opposition have contributed to the polarization of political life in Slovakia.^130

Research conducted in Slovakia indicates that supporters of parties in the government and in the
opposition differ from each other in their commitment to pluralistic values, as well as in their
levels of belief in egalitarianism and nationalism. Differences in value orientations and attitudes
toward the institutions and principles of parliamentary democracy in turn are among the factors
that make compromise between the two groups unlikely.^131 Thus, supporters of the Democratic Union,
the Christian Democratic Movement, the Party of the Democratic Left, the Social Democratic Party of
Slovakia, the National Democratic Party, the Green Party of Slovakia, the Hungarian Christian
Democratic Movement and the Hungarian Civic Party have followers who tend to be supportive of
democratic procedures and the development of a more differentiated civil society. The commitment of
leaders and supporters of the three parties in the government coalition to democratic principles is
not as clear. None of these parties openly espouses the use of violence, although the leader of the
Slovak National Party has argued that all Hungarian political organizations in Slovakia are working
against the state and should therefore be banned. None is linked with paramilitary forces or with
forces outside the state that openly advocate the overthrow of democratic institutions.

Leaders of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party left office
peacefully in March 1994 when their government received a vote of no-confidence in parliament.
However, many of the supporters of these parties and the Association of Workers of Slovakia, do not
support many of the principles of democratic political life, such as tolerance, compromise,
negotiation, and the need to respect the rights of opponents and minorities.^132 The Slovak
National Party draws on many of the traditions of the Slovak interwar clerical movement. Survey
research indicates that its supporters, as well as those of the other members of the ruling
coalition, include sizeable numbers of individuals who do not have a strong faith in democratic
principles. SNS supporters also score very low on measures of ethnic tolerance. They differ from
supporters of their coalition partners in their strong pro-market orientation.^133

Leaders of these parties have engaged in efforts to limit the rights of expression of their
political opponents and tried to use legal means including their majority in parliament to change
the rules of the political game in a way that would ensure their continuation in power. As
discussed earlier, in October 1994, Mečiar and his coalition partners attempted to remove fifteen
deputies of the Democratic Union, a party formed in March 1994 by Josef Moravcik and several other
deputies who were originally elected to parliament as members of the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia, from Parliment. The coalition's supporters also have tried repeatedly to force President
Kováč from office. In addition to investigations into Kováč's role in Mečiar's ouster by parliament
in March of 1994, the parliament passed a nonbinding vote of no-confidence in the president in May
of 1995. The budget of the president's office has been severely cut, necessitating drastic staff
reductions and limiting the activities in which he can engage.^134 As noted earlier, in addition to
these actions which violate the spirit of democratic political life but are not strictly illegal,
political institutions and actors controlled by or affiliated to the government have been
associated with politically motivated violence in a number of cases since the 1994 elections.

The need to compete in competitive elections has clearly had an influence on the successor to the
Communist Party of Slovakia, the Party of the Democratic Left. Leaders of the party, which has
consistently earned more of the votes than its social democratic competition, have worked hard to
reorient the image and policies of their party. The party defines itself as a social-democratic
party, and its leaders participated in the broad coalition in power between March and December 1994
which included the Christian Democrats and other center-right parties. Public opinion data gathered
in late 1994 indicate that supporters of the coalition Common Choice which the Party joined in the
last elections see the parties affiliated with the coalition as the most leftist of the
parliamentary parties. However, in their opinions on economic issues, most supporters fall closer
to the center of the political spectrum. Coalition supporters tended in November and December 1994
to have views on economic and foreign policy issues closer to those of Vladimír Mečiar and the
other parties that joined his governing coalition in December 1994. However, their views on
democracy and other political principles, as well as on the Hungarian minority, were more similar
to those members of the political parties that were in opposition to Mečiar.^135 Most supporters of
Common Choice have higher educations and support social-democratic positions.^136

The formation of the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers by a former deputy of the Party of the
Democratic Left who broke away from the Party is another indication of how far the Party of the
Democratic Left has moved from hard-line leftist positions. In addition to the Association of
Slovak Workers, there is also a very small hard-line Communist Party of Slovakia which is not
represented in parliament. This party opposes privatization and most of the changes that have been
made since 1989. It is not a threat to democratic political life in Slovakia because it is so
small.

There is a strong ethnic dimension to Slovakia's party system. Two of the three Hungarian political
parties, the Hungarian Civic Party and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, are
differentiated primarily by their lay or religious character. Both are center-right parties whose
leaders and followers support the move to the market and democratic principles. Coexistence, the
third Hungarian party, which also includes Ruthenian/Ukrainian as well as Roma supporters, is less
well-defined. It is the primary example of a political movement that crosses ethnic lines, although
it is part of the Hungarian Coalition in Parliament and is generally viewed as a Hungarian
movement. Most Hungarians support Hungarian parties. In May 1994, for example, Coexistence was the
most popular party among Hungarian respondents surveyed (31 percent) followed by the Hungarian
Christan Democratic Movement (28 percent). The Party of the Democratic Left and the Hungarian Civic
Party had approximately equal degrees of support (9 and 8 percent respectively.^137 There is also a
Romany Civic Initiative which draws support from the Roma.

In addition to the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, the Christian Democratic Movement and
Christian-Social Union are religiously based parties. The strongest of these is the Christian
Democratic Movement. Supporters of the CDM, which defines itself as a center-right party, support
liberal economic principles and adhere to democratic political values. Almost all are
religious.^138


Conclusion: the impact of the party system on governmental efficiency and the consolidation of
democracy in Slovakia

The party system in Slovakia has not facilitated the formation of a government able to carry out
coherent public policies to date. In the period between 1990 and 1992, Slovak politics, as well as
that of the federation as a whole, was dominated by the issue of constitutional reform and the
future of the joint state. These issues complicated the process of economic reform and increased
citizen dissatisfaction with political institutions and leaders. In Slovakia, the June 1992
elections saw the marginalization of the liberal leaders of the former Public Against Violence and
the victory of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which endorsed economic policies at odds
with those adopted by the previous coalition and also attracted supporters dissatisfied with
Slovakia's position in the federation.

After Slovakia became independent, the divisions within the country that had been evident regarding
the issue of independence continued to color political life. Vladimír Mečiar's informal coalition
with the Slovak National Party was unstable; defections from his own party eventually made his
government a minority government. Coupled with Mečiar's conflict with the president, these problems
led to his ouster by parliament in March 1994.

The broad coalition government formed at that time made a good deal of progress in dealing with
Slovakia's problems and restarting economic reform. However, its leaders proved unable to form an
electoral coalition and Mečiar, as leader of the party with the largest share of the votes, was
once again able to form a coalition, despite the fact that his party did not gain a majority of the
vote in the September-October, 1994 parliamentary elections.

Political life also continues to be highly polarized in Slovakia. In late 1995-early 1996,
representatives of the Party of the Democratic Left flirted with cooperating with the Movement for
a Democratic Slovakia. However, party representatives indicated that one of the conditions of such
cooperation would be the removal of the Slovak National Party from the coalition. The prime
minister's coalition, which brings together the right of center National Party and the left of
center Association of Slovak Workers, has only a slim majority of votes. Disagreements within the
coalition or defections from the coalition parties could easily upset the balance that prevailed
through 1995 and early 1996. Significantly, the primary example of cooperation between the
opposition parties and the government in 1995 occurred in the passage of the language law, a
measure which threatens the interests of the Hungarian minority.

These factors call into question the extent to which democracy has been consolidated in Slovakia.
In formal terms, Slovakia has a democratic government. The Mečiar government formed in December
1994 reflected the results of free, open, and contested elections. To date, the actions of the
leaders of the coalition have remained within the framework of the law. However, as noted earlier,
leaders of the coalition have attempted to use their parliamentary majority to remove vocal
opponents of their policies from their positions and restrict the influence of the opposition. The
government has also used legal means to consolidate its power in the bureaucracy at the district
and local as well as central level and in the police forces. It has attempted to use legal means to
control the media and has taken actions to make the future of non-governmental organizations more
difficult. The sporadic violent attacks on and harassment of prominent members of the opposition as
well as of the president's son are widely attributed to the government. The law on the protection
of the republic which the government approved in December 1996, in effect subjects anyone who makes
a critical remark about the country or publishes information that is critical to possible
prosecution.

On the side of the opposition, the unity of the period of the coalition government in 1994 appears
to have been short lived, as the parties that participated chose not to form an electoral
coalition. There also appears to be little willingness among the lay center-right parties to put
aside personal and other differences to form a strong center-right party. Nor have these parties
been able to recruit or develop a leader who could match Vladimír Mečiar's ability to appeal to the
populace or challenge his position as the dominant personality in Slovak politics. The inability of
the governing coalition and the opposition to compromise or establish a system to institutionalize
and mediate the conflicts that separate them are further signs democracy has yet to be consolidated
in Slovakia.

The situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is also problematic from the perspective of the
consolidation of democracy, if consolidation is also understood to include the requirement that all
significant groups in society have a chance of having their interests heard. Efforts by the Mečiar
government in 1995 to assert greater central control over the selection of principals in local
schools and introduce so-called "alternative education," that is, education in Slovak in Hungarian
language schools, if parents request it further increased the distrust members of this group felt
toward the government. Parliament's failure to ratify the state treaty with Hungary signed in March
1995 in a timely way due to opposition from the Slovak National Party, and the passage of a law
making Slovak the official language and requiring its use in a wide variety of official, cultural,
and other contexts also increased tensions between the two groups.^139 In early 1995, Hungarian
activists gathered 45,000 signatures to protest the introduction of "alternative education," that
is, classes in Slovak in Hungarian schools. Hungarian representatives have expressed the fear that
the law will lead to the restriction of the use of Hungarian in official contacts, a right which is
guaranteed to members of national minorities by the constitution.^14' The difficulty of resolving
this situation is illustrated by the fact that most opposition deputies (apart from those of the
Christian Democratic Movement) supported the language law.

To date, most Hungarians appear to accept the boundaries of the state, as well as the need to work
within the framework of democratic institutions.^142 However, the policies discussed above may in
time lead to the perception among Slovakia's Hungarians that they are being systematically
marginalized and that there is little hope that they can achieve their aims or defend their
interests by using established institutions. Evidence of this possibility is found in the fact that
Coexistence, whose leaders have occasionally advocated more direct forms of protest and whose
supporters have demonstrated less support for democratic norms and values than those of leaders of
other Hungarian parties, has consistently gained the largest share of the Hungarian vote.

The progress of democratic consolidation in Slovakia will be influenced by many factors in addition
to the development of the party system. Despite efforts to restrict their influence, opposition
activists and intellectuals continue to have the possibility to publish, travel abroad, and
organize with others to criticize or question government actions. Citizens also are able to engage
in active protests, as occurred in the November 1994 and March 1995 demonstrations for democracy
and free speech.^143

The growth of the non-governmental sector in Slovakia is also positive. Many of these organizations
are dependent on foreign funding; most are small; and many consist largely of those who staff them
in Bratislava or other large cities. However, such organizations provide a ground for the
development and fostering of attitudes supportive of democracy among citizens. They also allow
citizens to organize independently of the existing political parties to protest government policies
and attempt to mobilize public opinion to bring new issues to the political agenda. The fact that
young people tend to be more supportive of democratic values than older people is also an
encouraging sign for the future.^144

The fate of Slovak democracy and the likelihood that democracy will be consolidated will also be
influenced by economic factors. The economic hardship many Slovaks experienced as a result of the
shift to the market in the early post-communist period was one of the factors, together with
national grievances, that fueled support for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. The growth in
the Slovak economy in 1994 and 1995 surprised many analysts. Despite the effective end of
large-scale privatization of state enterprises after the Mečiar government returned to power, the
private sector continues to grow in Slovakia. The improvement in economic performance has yet to be
reflected in a decline in the rate of unemployment or a widespread increase in the standard of
living. However, should it continue, ^11 may increase the number of individuals who feel they have
a stake in a market economy and a democratic political system. The political impact of a decline in
economic performance is perhaps easier to anticipate. As in the early 1990s, increased economic
hardship would in all likelihood increase support for parties, such as those in the ruling
coalition, that promise to buffer the population from the hardships of the market.

International factors will also have an important impact on the outcome of political developments
in Slovakia. The desire of Slovakia's leaders to be a part of the European club, to join the EU and
become a member of NATO, is one of the factors that puts certain limits on the extent to which the
government will infringe upon the rights of the opposition and of minorities. Demarches by the
United States and several EU ambassadors in October 1995 expressed concern about unsettling
political developments in Slovakia including the campaign to remove President Kovač from office and
called for greater attention to toleration of different views and for full respect for
constitutional rights.^145 The passage of the slaw on language and the protection of the republic,
despite the protests of the Hungarian government and the concern expressed by European institutions
as well as by representatives of individual governments indicates the limits of such influence.
However, as the signing of the treaty with Hungary in 1994 and the dropping of overt attempts to
force President Kováč from office illustrate, the actions of outside groups and the desire to be a
respected member of Central Europe can have a positive influence.^146

Outside support is also crucial for the development of the non-governmen-tal sector. Although such
support makes NGOs vulnerable, there are few alternative sources of support for such organizations
at present. Those groups that support activities to foster the development of civic values and
values supportive of democracy are particularly dependent on outside support. Until the private
sector develops in such a way as to generate more philanthropists within Slovakia, such support
will be a critical factor in determining the outcome of the transition from communist rule in
Slovakia.

As the pages above illustrate, the party system has contributed to the polarization of political
opinion that has occurred in Slovakia, as well to the bitter conflict among political elites in the
coalition and opposition that prevents compromise. But the instability of political coalitions and
volatility of political life in Slovakia since 1989 cannot be traced to the party system alone.
Rather, both the functioning of political parties and the conflictual nature of politics reflect
deeper social and attitudinal cleavages as well as the impact of the transition within the
electorate, and the lack of consensus on political values and the rules of the game among the
members of the political elite.

NOTES


I would like to thank the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), which funded part of
the research on which this chapter is based. I would also like to acknowledge the research
assistance of Nancy L. Meyers, Spencer Smith, and Jay Honigstock.

1    Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992).

2   See Herbert Kitchelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and
Society 20, no. 1 (1992), 7-50, for a general treatment of the development of party systems in the
region. See Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Repluralization of Politics in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia,"
Journal of Post-Communist Studies, no. 1 (1994), 412-31 for an early analysis of the development of
the party system in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. See also Zora Butorova and Martin Butarova,
"Political Parties, Value Orientations and Slovakia's Road to Independence," in Party Formation in
East-Central Europe: Post-Communist Politics in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, ed.
Gordon Wightman (London: Edward Elgar, 1994); Darina Malova, "The Relationship Between the State,
Political Parties and Civil Society in Post-communist Czecho-Slovakia," in The Slovak Path of
Transition to Democracy?, ed. Sofia Szomolanyi and Grigorij Meseznikov (Bratislava: Slovak
Political Science Association, 1994), pp. 111-58; David M. Olson, "Dissolution of the State:
Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies
26, no. 3 (September 1993), 301-14; and Carol Skalnik Leff and Susan Mikula, "Institutionalizing
Party Systems in Multiethnic States: Integration and Ethnic Segmentation in Czechoslovakia,
1918-1992," paper prepared for presentation at the convention of the American Political Science
Association, Chicago, September 1995.

3    Sharon L. Wolchik, "Slovak Politics Since Independence," paper presented at the conference
Fiinf Jahre nach der Wende - Bilanz in Mittel- und Sudosteuropa, Magdeburg, Germany, 11 June 1994.

4    Victor Mamatey, "The Establishment of the Republic," in A History of the Czechoslovak
Republic, ed. Radomir Luza and Victor Mamatey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp.
7-8.

5    Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976).

6   Sharon L. Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics and Society (New York:
Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp. 1-59. See also Owen Johnson, Slovakia in 1918-1938: Education and the
Making of a Nation (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985).

Zora Pryor, "Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar Period, 1918-1948," in A History of
the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 188-215. Martin Butora, "Volunteerism as a Multidimensional
Phenomenon," in Non-profit Sector and Volunteering in Slovakia, ed. Zora Butorova and David P.
Daniels (Bratislava: SAIA-SCTS and FOCUS, 1995), p. 15. See also Eva Broklova, Ceskoslovenskd
Democracie, Politicky System CSR 1918-1938 (Prague: SLON 1992).

9     Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition. In addition, see H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's
Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 49-56.

10    From data in tables 6.1 and 6.3, pp. 164 and 168 in Political Culture and Political Change in
Communist States, ed. Archie Brown and Jack Grey (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979).

11     Ibid., p. 118.

12    Ibid., p. 169.

13    FOCUS, Current Problems in Slovakia (Bratislava: FOCUS, 1992), pp. 25-26.

14    Ivan Kamenec, Po stopach tragedie (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Archa, 1991), p. 171.

15    See Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1939-1945 (New
York: East European Quarterly, 1976), p. 20. For more information on the history of the Slovak
state, see Kamenec, Po stopach tragedie, and Ladislav Lipscher, Židia v Slovenskom štátě, 1939-1945
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1990).

16    Edita Bosak, "Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence," in Czechoslovakia, 1918-88: Seventy
Years from Independence, ed. H. Gordon Skilling (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 65-81.

17    Vladimir Krivy, "The Parliamentary Elections 1994: The Profiles of Supporters of the
Political Parties, the Profile of Regions," in Slovakia and the 1994 Elections, ed. Sofia
Szomolanyi and Grigorij Meseznikov (Bratislava: Slovak Political Science Association, 1995), pp.
114-35.

18    See Andrew Michta's chapter in this volume for a discussion of comparable issues in the
Polish case.

19    Sandor Bordas et a!., Counter-Proof (Bratislava: Kiado Vydavatel'stvo Verlag, 1995), pp.
33-57.

20    C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences,
1919-1937(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 158 and 164, as cited in Paul Robert Magocsi,
"Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns," in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1988, pp. 106, 107, 127.

21     See Jelinek, The Parish Republic.

22    FOCUS, Current Problems of Slovakia, May 1993, December 1993, May 1994, and December 1994.
See also Bord&s et al., Counter-Proof.

23    See Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution.

24    See, for example, Zora Butorova, "Premyslene 'ano' zdniku CSFR? Image strdn a rozpad
Cesko-Slovenska očami obcanov Slovenska," Sociologicky casopis 29, no. 1 (March 1993), 88-104.

25    Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia," East
European Politics and Societies 8, no. 1 (Winter 1994), 179.

26    Ibid., p. 157. See also the analyses in The End of Czechoslovakia, ed. Jiff Musil (Budapest:
Central European University Press, 1995) and Fedor G&\ et al., Dnesni krize cesko-slovenskych
vztahu (Prague, 1992).

27    Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, ch. 1.

28    See Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution and Carol Skalnik Leff, National
Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988) for discussions of the reform era and its aftermath.

29    Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, p. 215.

30    Sharon L. Wolchik, "Regional Inequality in Czechoslovakia," in The Politics of Inequality,
ed. Daniel Nelson (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983). See also Leff, National Conflict.

31    Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 188-89.

32    Ibid., pp. 189-90.

33    Ibid., p. 190.

34    Ibid., p. 191; see also Wolchik, "Regional Inequality in Czechoslovakia."

35    See Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity," pp. 153-88 and The End of Czechoslovakia.

36    See Sivakova, "The New Slovak Parliament," and David M. Olson, "The New Parliaments of New
Democracies: The Experience of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic," in
The Emergence of East Central European Parliaments: The First Steps, ed. Attila Agh (Budapest:
Hungarian Center of Democracy Studies Foundation, 1994), pp. 48-54 and 35-47.

37    Wolchik, "The Repluralization of Politics in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia."

38    See Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity."

39    See Sivakova, "The New Slovak Parliament," pp. 48-54 and Jana Reschova, "Parliaments and
Constitutional Change: the Czechoslovak Experience," in The Emergence of East Central European
Parliaments, pp. 55-68.

40    Wolchik, "The Politics of Transition," in The End of Czechoslovakia, ed. Musil p. 225-44.

41    Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia," paper
presented at the Conference on the Breakup of Communist States and Nation/Statebuilding in
Post-Communist States, Cornell University, April 21-22, 1995.

42    Statisticky urad Slovenskej republiky, Statistickd rocenka Slovenskej republiky 1992
(Bratislava: Statisticky urad Slovenskej republiky, 1993), p. 47.

43    Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies,
Organization, and Parties (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 322. Official sources state that there
were 75,800 Roma in Slovakia in 1991, a figure equal to 1.5 percent of the population.
Statisticky urad, p. 47.

44    Ivan Corny, "Uspezne riesenie socialno-ekonomickych problemov a zivotnej urovne obyatel'stva
ukrajinskej narodnosti v CSSR," in Socialistickou cestou k ndrodnostnej rovnoprdvnosti (Bratislava:
Pravda, 1975).

45    Paul Robert Magocsi, The Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller,
1985).

46    See Sharon L. Wolchik, "Gender Issues During Transition," East-Central European Economies in
Transition: Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,
November 1994 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 147-70; Sharon L. Wolchik,
"Women's Issues in Czechoslovakia in the Communist and Post-Communist Periods," in Women and
Politics Worldwide, ed. Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1994), pp. 208-25; and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and
Eastern Europe," in Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies, ed.
Valentine M. Moghadam (New York: Clarendon Press, 1993).

47    Sharon L. Wolchik, "Gendered Democracy: Women in the Transition in the Czech and Slovak
Republics," in Trying Democracy: Women in the Transition in Latin America and Central/Eastern
Europe, ed. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
forthcoming); and Liba Paukert, "The Changing Economic Status of Women in the Period of Transition
to a Market Economy System: The Case of the Czech and Slovak Republics After 1989," in Democratic
Reform.

48    See Josef C. Brada, "The Slovak Economy After One Year of Independence," in East-Central
European Economies in Transition: Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress
of the United States, November 1994, p. 523.

49    Branko Milanovic, "Poverty and Inequality in Transition Economies: What Has Actually
Happened," in Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Bartlomiej Kaminski
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).

50    Jan Buncak and Valentina HarmadyovS, "Transformacia socialnej struktury," Sociologia 25, nos.
4-5 (1993), 389-402.

51    Sharon Fisher, "Privatization Stumbles Forward," Transition 1, no. 8 (26 May 1995), 44-49.

52    Interviews in Bratislava, April and June 1995; interview with leaders of the Hungarian
coalition, Washington, DC, June 1995.

53    See Vladimfr Tvaroska, "Priame predaje za 29 miliard," Pravda, 14 September 1995, pp. 1-2;
see also "Government Announces Privatization Principles," Hospodarske noviny, 7 June 1995, p. 7,
FBIS-EEU, 1 November 1995, pp. 13-17.

54    "Vo vcerajsom hlasovani NR SR rozhodlo 76 poslancov o ukonceni kup6nky na Slovensku," Sme, 13
July 1995, pp. 1-2.

55     "Obcania hodnotia privatizaciu kriticky," Sme, 1 January 1996, p. 2.

56    "WTO: Tempo privatz^cie je nfzke," Sme, 7 December 1995, p. 7.

57    European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1995: Economic Transition
in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1995 (London: EBRD, 1995) p. 4.

58    Martin Butora, "Volunteerism as a Multidimensional Phoenomenon," in Non-profit Sector, p. 27.

59    E. Mannova, "Spolky v obdobi socialno-politickych zmien na Slovensku 1938-1951. Analyza
spolkovych stanov," in Obcianska spoloCnost' na prahu znovuzrodenia (Bratislava: Sociologicky ustav
SAV, 1992), pp. 21-30, as cited in Butora, "Volunteerism as a Multidimensional Phenomenon," p. 15.

60    Zuzana Fialova, "Third Sector in Figures," in Non-profit Sector, p. 67.

61     Ibid.

62    Non-profit Sector, p. 83.

63    Fialova\ "Third Sector in Figures," p. 65.

64    Ibid.

65    Ibid.

66    Sharon Wolchik, Zora Butorova, and Jan Hartl, "Citizen Political Values and Attitudes Toward
Democracy in the Czech and Slovak Republics," data files from November-December 1994 survey.

67    Fialova, "Third Sector in Figures," p. 67.

68    Sme, 1 August 1995, p. 13.

(,9   "Novy politicky subjekt," Pravda (Bratislava), 11 February 1995, p. 2.

70    "Slovak Ruling Party Signs Agreement with Businessmen," OMRIDaily Digest, 13 October 1995.

71    Iveta Radicova, "Socialny potencial podnikavosti a prijimanie ekonomickej reformy,"
Sociologia 25, nos. 4-5 (1993) pp. 410-11.

72    Dusan Leska and Viera Koganova, "The Elections 1994 and the Crystallization of the Political
Parties and Movements in Slovakia," in Slovakia: Parliamentary Elections 1994, ed. Sofia Szomolanyi
and Gregorij Meseznikov (Bratislava, Slovakia: Slovak Political Science Foundation, 1995), pp.
86-102.

73    Slovensky dennik, 12 August 1994, p. 2.

74    "Odborari vystupuju tvrdsie proti vlade," Sme, 20 July 1995, pp. 1-2.

75    "Odborari dvere nezabuchli," Pravda (Bratislava), 31 August 1995, p. 2.

76    "Odborari demonstrovali proti zlej socialnej situacii, ale nie proti vlade," Sme, 25
September 1995, p. 1.

77    "A. Englis vini vladu, ze chce rozbit' odbory," Sme, 16 May 1995, pp. 1, 2. See also Malova,
"The Relationship Between the State, Political Parties and Civil Society," pp. 145-46.

78    Wolchik, "The Repluralization of Politics in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia."

79    See Condoleezza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain
Allegiance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Jifi Valenta and Condoleeza Rice, "The
Czechoslovak Army," in Communist Armies in Politics, ed. Jonathan R. Adelman (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1982).

80    Rice, Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, pp. 127-28.

81    Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," East European
Quarterly 26, no. 1 (March 1992) pp. 3-4.

82    Miroslav Purkrabek, "Politicka, socfalni a vojenska transformace CSA," Sociologia 24, no. 3
(1992), 137-43.

83    Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," p. 13.

84    Ibid., p. 21; and Martin Komarek, "Odvolan s plnou duverou," Mlada frontd dnes, 19 October
1990, p. 2.

85    Rotislav Valasek, "Atestace v plnem proudu," Rudeprdvo, 28 August 1990, pp.

86    Marie Konigova, "Doktrfna vecf nejen generalni," Rudeprdvo, 4 October 1990, p. 5.

87    Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, pp. 102-04 and Barany, "East European Armed Forces in
Transitions and Beyond," pp. 15-22; see also Purkrabek, "Politicka, socfalni a vojenska
transformace CSA."

88    See "Prezident SR pise Ivanovi Lexovi," Ndrodnd obroda, 15 December 1995, p. 2 and "Prezident
Kováč pise riaditel'ovi SIS," Sme, 15 December 1995, p. 2. See also "J. Čárnogurský sa strtol s
Oskarom F. zahranicf," Ndrodnd obroda, 8 December 1995 p. 2.

89    See "Prezident SR pise Ivanovi Lexovi," Ndrodnd obroda, 15 December 1995 p. 2.

90    "Čárnogurský Meets Oskar F., 'Convinced' His Claims Are True," CTK National News Wire, 1
December 1995.

91    Timea Spitkova, "Kováč Case Investigator Files Charges," Prague Post, 18 October 1995.

92   "Bude 8 krajov a 80-90 okresov," Pravda (Bratislava), 17 January 1996, p. 1; Ivan Samel and
Helena Budinska, "NR SR. S. Kozlik informovol o plnenl statneho zavereineho uCtu," Narodnd obroda,
6 July 1996.

93   Jozef Kvarda, "Counties as a Solution," Pravda (Bratislava), 26 January 1996, p. 4, FBIS-EEU,
31 January 1996, p. 13.

94   "Kauza harky DU: Sprava A. Poliaka kongtatuje protizalonnost' zaverov MacuSkovej komisie,"
Sine, 1 February 1996, p. 1.

95   "Horor takmer na prave poludnie," Pravda (Bratislava), 7 July 1995, p. 3 for a report on the
links between the car explosion in Bratislava and Mafia groups in Slovakia.

96   See FOCUS, "Aktualne problemy Slovenska, Maj 1994," p. 2 for an overview of change in the
importance attached to crime in surveys conducted since 1990.

97   "Poradime si s mafiami?" Pravda (Bratislava), 17 March 1994, p. 5.

98   See Sofia Szomolanyi, "Does Slovakia Deviate from the Central European Variant of Transition?"
in The Slovak Path of Transition to Democracy, pp. 8-39.

99   Wolchik, Butorova, and Hartl, "Citizen Attitudes and Political Values in the Czech and Slovak
Republics," 1994 survey.

100  See Sharon Fisher, "Slovak Media Under Pressure," Transition 1, no. 18 (6 October 1995), p. 7.

101   Fisher, "Slovak Media Under Pressure," p. 8.

102  See "Znepokojeni," Sme, 6 March 1995, p. 1.

103  Fisher, "Slovak Media Under Pressure," p. 9.

104  See Fischer, "Slovak Justice Ministry Prepares Draft Law on Protection of Republic," OMRI
Daily Digest, 5 March 1996 and Martin Krno, "Rozhodli Puptakovci," Pravda (Bratislava), 16 December
1996, p. 1.

105  See FOCUS surveys, 1990 to 1995.

106  Ibid.

107  Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, ch. 2; FOCUS, "Current Problems of Slovakia After the
Split of the CSFR," March 1993 (Bratislava: FOCUS, 1994); FOCUS, "Aktualne problemy Slovenska," May
1994 (Bratislava: FOCUS, September 1994); Wolchik, Butorova, and Hartl, 1994 survey results.

108  FOCUS, "Aktualne problemy Slovensky," May 1994, p. 27.

109  Results of Wolchik, Butorova, and Hartl survey, as discussed in FOCUS, "Current Problems of
Slovakia, December 1994" (Bratislava: FOCUS, 1994), pp. 1-2.

110  Ibid., pp. 35-37.

111   See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, ch. 2 and the results of public opinion surveys
reported in FOCUS, "Current Problems of Slovakia, December 1994."

112  Ivan Tomek and Václav Forst, "Postoje is. vefejnosti k zakladnfm politickym institucim," IWM,
February 1991.

113   "Aktualne' problemy Slovenska," May 1994, p. 77.

114  FOCUS, "Current Problems of Slovakia, December 1994," pp. 68-69.

115  Ibid., p. 68.

116  See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition, ch. 2 for references to studies illustrating these
tendencies.

117  FOCUS, "Current Problems of Slovakia, December 1994," p. 38.

118  Ibid., p. 54; see this source as well for a brief overview of other differences in conceptions
of democracy and kinds of political participation in the two countries.

119  Ibid., p. 35.

120  Ibid., p. 41.

121  See Wolchik, "Gendered Democracy."

122  FOCUS, 1993 surveys.

123  The Association of Slovak Workers and the Democratic Union.

124  Slovak analysts have noted that the party system in Slovakia differs from those which exist in
many other post-communist states in the importance that parties and movements that have no
connection to broader political movements and similar parties in other countries still have in
Slovakia. See Leska and Koganova, "The Elections in 1994 and the Crystallization of the Political
Parties and Movements in Slovakia," p. 90.

125  Ibid., pp. 93-6.

126  Milan Zemko, "Political Parties and the Election System in Slovakia: Retrospective on the Last
Three Elections to the Slovak National Council and the National Council of the Slovak Republic," in
The Slovak Path of Transition to Democracy, pp. 44-46.

127  Zemko, "Political Parties," pp. 46-49.

128  Ibid., p. 48.

129  See Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference," and
Alfred Stepan, "Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective," in The Failure of
Presidential Democracy, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994), pp. 3-87, 119-136; see also Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Presidency in the Czechoslovak
Federation and the Czech Republic," in The Post-Communist Presidencies, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

130  Wolchik, "Slovak Politics S ince Independence."

131  Ibid., p. 109.

132  FOCUS, "Current Problems in Slovakia, December 1994," pp. 59-60.

133  Ibid.

134  Sharon Fisher, "Prime Minister and President Grapple for Power," Transition 1, no. 11 (30 June
1995), 38, 42, 70.

135  FOCUS, "Current Problems in Slovakia, December 1994," pp. 63-64.

136  Leska and Koganova, "The Elections 1994 and the Crystallization of the Political Parties and
Movements in Slovakia," p. 91.

137  FOCUS, "Current Problems of Slovakia, May 1994" (Bratislava: FOCUS, 1994) p. 60.

138  Ibid., p. 63.

139  See The Hungarian Minority, ed. Pavel Fric, Fedor Gal, Peter Huncik, and Christopher Lord
(Prague: The Institute of Social and Political Science, 1993), p. 43. See also Ondrej Dostal, "Od
konfrontacie k rezervovanosti," Quo Vadis, Slovensko? (Bratislava: Open Society Fund, January
1995), pp. 101-26.

140 See Bordas et al., Counter-Proof

141 See Frantisek Buda, "The Language Law Has Many Pitfalls," Pravda (Bratislava), 29 January 1996,
pp. 1 and 4, FBIS-EEU, 7 March 1996, p. 12.

142  See FOCUS, "Current Problems of Slovakia," May 1994, p. 54.

143   "Vyhlasenie Studentov k 17. novembru," Ndrodnd obroda, 18 November 1994, p. 2. See also
"Milan Markovic: moc sa nal'akala smiechu," Sme, 10 March 1996, p. 2 and "Podl'a vyskumu pre
Europsku liniu 79% Slovdkov nesuhlasf s vyvojom demokracie," Sme, 10 March 1996, p. 3.

144  Marek Boguszak and Vladimir Rak, Czechoslovakia - May 1990 Survey Report (Prague: Association
for Independent Social Analysis, 1990).

145   "Juraj Schenk: Keby som mohol konzultovat' s prezidentom, mozno by sa
Q<[<s<\il\okomp\\kdiCi&m" Ndrodnd obroda, 31 October 1995, p. 1. See also Mim, "Podia ministra
Schenka obavy zo strany EU v prfpade Slovenska nie sii opodstastnene," Sme, 31 October 1995, p. 2.
See the following articles in FBIS-EEU, 31 October 1995: "Daily: EU Demarche Warns Mečiar to
Respect Kováč," p. 16; "Daily: Demarches 'Constructive,' 'Not Hostile,'" p. 17; "Commentary on
Demarches Urges Parlimentary Debate," p. 18; "Schenk Questions EU, US Attitudes Toward SR," p. 13;
and "US-EU Demarche 'Serious Diplomatic Step,'" p. 13.

146  Representatives of the European Commission noted in Brussels in early February that Slovakia
must allow greater freedom of the press and respect the rights of minorities if it wants to
participate in preparations for joining the EU, "EU: Slovensko musi pripustit' vacSiu slobodu tlaie
a reSpektovat' prdva menSin," Sme, 8 February 1996, p. 1.