94 Laj os Izsák 16. Magdoína Baráth, "Az MDP vezetése és a rehabilitáció 1953-1956" [The Leadership of the MDP and Rehabilitation 1953-1956], Múltunk 44(1999) 4: 43. 17. Ivan Petó and Sándor Szakács, A hazai gazdaság něgy ěvtizeděnek tóríénete 1945-í985. I. Az újjáépités és a tervutasitás idószaka 1945-1968 [Four Decades of the History of the Hungarian Economy 1945 1985, vol. I: The Period of Reconstruction and the Planned Economy, 1945-1968] (Budapest, 1985), pp. 240-260. Jánoš Estók, Gyórgy Fehér, Peter Gunst and Zsuzsanna Varga, Agrárvilág Magyarországon 1848-2002 [Agrarian Hungary, 1848-2002] (Budapest, 2003), pp. 294-299. 18. Petó and Szakács, A hazai gazdaság něgy ěvtizeděnek torténete, pp. 265-290. 19. Izsák, ed., A Magyar Dolgozók Pártja határozatai, pp. 270-273. 20. MOL, 276.f. 53/175.ó.e. 21. A Magyar Dolgozók Pártja TU. kongresszusának jegyzokbnyve 1954. május 24-30 [Minutes of the 3rd Congress of the Hungarian Workers* Party, May 24-30, 1954] (Budapest, 1954), pp. 46-47. 22. Ibid., pp. 406-466. 23. MOL, 276.f. 52/27.o.e. 24. MOL, 276.f. 54/194.6.e. 25. MOL, 276.f. 53/206.o.e. 26. Szovjet nagykbveti iratok Magyarországról, pp. 212-213. 27. "'Konzultációk'. Dokumentumok a magyar és szovjet pártvezetók két moszkvai találkozójáról 1954-1955-ben" ["Consultations." Documents of the Two Moscow Meetings of Hungarian and Soviet Party Leaders in 1954- 1955], published by Jánoš M. Rainer and Károly Urban, Múltunk 37 (1992) 4: 124-149. Notes on the January 8, 1955, meeting on pp. 141-149. 28. MOL, 276.f. 53/21 l.ó.e. The resolution is published in A Magyar Dolgozók Pártja határozatai, ed. Izsák, pp. 324-327. 29. Szovjet nagykóveti iratok Magyarországról, p. 218. 30. MOL, 276.f. 534/216.ó.e. 31. Szabad Nép, February 20, 1955. 32. MOL, 276.f. 62/1.ó.e. 33. Izsák, ed., A Magyar Dolgozók Pártja határozatai. pp. 344-345. 34. MOL, 276X 62/1.ó.e. 35. MOL, 276-f. 62/l.ó.e. 36. Published by Izsák, ed., A Magyar Dolgozók Pártja határozatai, pp. 344-345. * *e center of Warsaw. The legend: "The Hungarians call for help. Photo by Andrzej Zborski. Jdnos Tischler POLAND AND HUNGARY IN 1956 It is well known that the Budapest demonstration of October 23, 1956, was organized initially to express solidarity with the Polish events of October. This was symbolized by the Petofi and Bern statues as sites of the demonstration as well as by the characteristic watchword that concisely summarized the basic demand of the Hungarians: "Poland gives us an example, but let us follow the 95 96 Jánoš Tischler Hungarian road!"1 Events in the two countries were interrelated i a real sense on October 24 in the Warsaw mass meeting of seve hundred thousand people, which was the high point of the Poliši events. Two dramatic actions symbolized the Polish-Hungarian relationship. First, several university student groups, who we informed of the Budapest demonstrations of the previous dajii marched to the square with Hungarian flags, receiving the full approval of the crowd.2 Second, more than two thousand people joined by several thousand on the way, "marched to the Hungaria Embassy" at the end of the meeting "to express their solidarity wit] the Hungarian nation." Finally, one of the demonstrating group! "convened a short meeting with the watchword 'Warsaw! Budapest-Belgrade'."3 The Polish and the Hungarian October: Identities and Differences Let us follow the course of events. On June 28, 1956, a workers! uprising took place in Poznan, in which the crowd of 100,00(1 demanded "bread and freedom." To suppress the uprising, 10,00 soldiers, 400 tanks, hundreds of armored military vehicles and eve aircraft were put into action against the unarmed crowd and sever! al hundred insurgents with handguns and petrol bombs. In the course of the battle more than 70 people were killed, of whom were members of the "forces of order." The average age of those killed was 26. About one thousand were wounded. 247 person were arrested for participation, of whom 196 were workers, "working intellectuals," 32 pupils and 5 university students. 567 persons were investigated; 94 of these were suspected of "armed activity," and 58 were charged, but following the events of Octobe all of them were soon released. Polish public opinion initially obtained information concern-* ing these events from reports of the official PAP news agency*! Poland and Hungary in 1956 97 stating that in Poznan "disturbances were caused by Western imperialist agencies and domestic reaction." In the evening of June 29 prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz made his infamous speech, which Poles still remember: "Each provocateur or madman who dares to raise a hand against the people's power can be certain that the people's power will cut off that hand with an ax." The Poznan events gave rise to an interesting reaction in Hungary. At the extraordinary session of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party on June 30 there was a joint agenda item on the press debates of the Petofi Circle, which had taken place several days earlier, and the Poznan demonstrations. First Secretary Matyas Rakosi summarized the two events: 'Two unexpected events took place recently, the Poznan event and the press debate." The commentary of Rakosi at the closed session did not differ from the tone of the "cutting hands off speech of Cyrankiewicz: "The Poznan provocation demonstrates that the enemy now uses every means to damage the results of the Twentieth Congress [the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of February 1956], in order to sow confusion between the Party and the working masses. According to the most recent information received, the Poznan provocation was connected with the presence of many foreigners at the international fair, and several days earlier the Americans had parachuted several armed diversionary groups into the border district."4 At this session a resolution was passed closing the Petofi Circle for the summer. Less than three weeks later the Soviet leaders decided to dismiss Rakosi, since not only was he unable to handle the Hungarian crisis, but he intensified it by his presence. He was "offered" an opportunity to depart to the Soviet Union, which he "accepted." He was replaced by Erno Gero, who was just as responsible for the past years' policies as the dismissed Party leader. It was a "change without a change." Poznan and the Petofi Circle were cited not only by Rakosi, but also by Anastas Mikoyan, who came to Budapest to 98 Jánoš Tischler Poland and Hungary in 1956 99 II dismiss Rakosi. At the meeting of the Central Leadership on July 17-18 Mikoyan spoke of the Petofi Circle as an "ideological Poznah."5 The Poznah workers' uprising sent a bloody message to the Polish Party leadership. The grievances had expanded to such an extent that the street demonstrations chanting only social slogans at the beginning had the potential to become a national movement repudiating the regime as a whole. The unambiguous message of Poznah indicating the necessity of change, coupled with the violent-expression of social dissatisfaction, accelerated the ongoing process of disintegration within the Polish United Workers' Party i (PUWP). The potential explosion created by the Poznah "black | Thursday" and the threat of anarchy "from the point of view of the Party," strengthened and made persuasive the position of those scattered voices who demanded the return of Wtadystaw Gomulka to power. Even those agreed with this step who had actively participated in his earlier removal and condemnation. In contrast to Imre Nagy, no Party opposition emerged around Gomulka. There were many reasons for this. An important one was the character of the two men. It was difficult to relate to Gomulka and to maintain confidential and personal relations with him. At that time the most important factor in the formation of a Party opposition, aside from related principles, was the personal element.6 Other reasons were to be found in the similar yet essentially different situation in Poland and Hungary. Gomulka was expelled from the Party in 1951, although he had fallen from grace in 1948. Party leaders or bureaucrats who sympathized with him openly shared his fate very soon. In 1956 he and his sympathizers expected to be rehabilitated. After 1951 Gomulka had no "secret" Party supporters, and he was excluded for years from the political arena. His popularity among Party members and especially in Polish society was not based upon his attempt to humanize the system or eliminate its most flagrant abuses, but upon his refusal, for tactical reasons, to accept the Stalinist Soviet model automatically 3t the time of the Communist takeover. It should be remarked, however, that prior to 1948, when he was still in power, he was not very keen on humanizing the emerging Communist regime. When the official central daily newspaper of the PUWP, Trybuna Ludu, published a brief notice on August 5, 1956, concerning the readmittance of Gomulka to Party membership, two separate Party groups attempted to obtain bis support. These loose party alignments were exclusively interested in maintaining their influence in Party affairs; they were in effect interest groups and consisted for the most part of people who were quite prominent in the Stalinist period. Both groups, however, attempted to loosen the tight Polish dependence on Moscow. They were also both interested in some vague form of democratic change, and both saw in Gomulka the key solution to their efforts. The views of the two groups differed only as to the degree of loosening ties with Moscow and the limits of the democratic procedures to be introduced. Aside from their motivation, it is their historic merit that, unlike their Hungarian comrades, they realized that it was indispensable to make substantial changes, and they were committed to making those changes. Even though they did not like Gomulka, they recognized that there was no other alternative. Simultaneously Edward Ochab, the first secretary of the Central Committee, and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, who advocated the necessity of reforms at this time, were of the opinion that the power of the Communist Party could be preserved in Poland only by implementing changes through Gomulka. Since Gomulka was an active player in this game, he was well informed and he was the one who stipulated conditions. When comparing the events of 1956 in Hungary and Poland, it is particularly striking that the conduct of Ochab and Erno Gero and that of Prime Ministers Cyrankiewicz and Andras Hegediis were quite unlike each other, even though they faced very similar 100 Jánoš Tischler Poland and Hungary in 1956 101 situations. While in Poland it was primarily due to Ochab ancfeS Cyrankiewicz, along with Gomulka, that no lives were lost in the confrontation of October 1956, in Hungary Gero and Hegediis were, largely responsible for the explosion claiming human lives andjl destruction. October 1956 arrived in an atmosphere filled with high tension and expectation. In early October the news spread that Ochab, with| a precise understanding of the Polish crisis, was willing to resign as first secretary of the Central Committee in favor of Gomulka. The latter had made it known that he was willing to return only on the; condition that he would receive the top Party position. This was the only episode in the history of East Central European Communis in which a Communist Party leader voluntarily resigned his position to allow another Party leader to take over. Gomulka decided to support the Party alignment favorin^ more comprehensive democratic changes. He also stipulated as a condition of accepting the Party position that all members of thej Political Committee and Secretariat, discredited in the pre-1956; regime, be replaced. This meant a complete personnel change both Party organizations. These momentous changes were sched uled for the Eighth Plenary Session of the PUWP Centra Committee. This was public knowledge. The conservative force the dogmatists, were ready to block these changes, with the suppo of Moscow and Soviet Marshal Rokossowski, the Polish ministi of defense since 1949 and a member of the PUWP Political Committee. As soon as the Soviet leaders were informed of these developments, they took immediate steps to prevent dismissals not previously cleared with the Soviet Communist Party or appearing toi involve a veritable anti-Soviet coup. Therefore on the day of the--opening of the Plenary Session a Soviet Party delegation, consist-! ing of Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, Minister of Defense Zhukov and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Arm^d Forces Konev, unexpectedly arrived in Warsaw. Khrushchev made threatening remarks on his arrival at the airport, stating that he did not exclude the possibility of armed intervention to prevent the intended changes in the Polish Party. These were not empty threats, as indicated by the activation of Soviet forces stationed in Poland and the movement of Polish forces under the command of Rokossowski towards Warsaw. As this news reached Warsaw, workers and university students in the capital mobilized, declaring that they would fight the Soviet troops. The Internal Security Corps declared its loyalty to the new Party leadership.7 The commander of the Corps, General Waclaw Komar, was rehabilitated in the spring of 1956 after being victimized in the Stalinist purges, and was appointed to his new post. It is therefore obvious why he declared his loyalty to Gomulka. It should be added, furthermore, that a series of events in the course of 1956 had shaken the foundations of the state security system. These included the secret speech of Khrushchev in February, which was openly distributed in Poland, the death in March of Boleslaw Bierut, the first secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, and the June workers' uprising in Poznah. These "blows" were intensified by a general political amnesty, which was regarded by the state security system as a "questioning and destruction" of their diligent efforts.8 In the course of 1956 all political prisoners, including non-communists, aside from a few exceptional cases, received a general amnesty. Then in October 1956 charges were dismissed against all participants in the Poznah uprising. In the light of the intensified conflict within the Party leadership after March 1956, state security leaders did not receive unequivocal signals regarding their continued political role. As a result, the morale of the organization declined considerably. The Poznah workers' uprising demonstrated an immense social hatred for the organization, whose representatives experienced severe physical reprisals, in part because their personnel's composition ji 102 Jánoš Tischler Poland and Hungary in 1956 103 had remained unchanged. Therefore the organization, with no othei-| alternative available, remained loyal to the Party, led by Ochab, then Gomutka. At the time of the Eighth Plenary Session the organization was characterized by passivity, lack of orientation and restlessness. On hearing of state security agents being lynched ini Budapest, its members were frightened. Consequently Gomutka^ faced little difficulty and no real opposition in reorganizing andi restructuring the organization in November 1956. Since the Hungarian State Security Authority, the AVH, in contrast to its Polish equivalent, remained unchanged, it appeared out of the question that it would have supported Imre Nagy against the Soviets at | the outbreak of revolution—either actively, as did General Komar, or passively, as did the Polish security apparatus. Concerning the events related to the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, it can be stated definitely that Soviet forces would not have faced substantial resistance in Poland. It is also questionable whether the population of the capital and Polish soci-1 ety would have been capable of an armed confrontation with immense losses of life and destruction, given the memory of close to six million people killed in World War II, and only twelve years after the Warsaw uprising, which had resulted in the complete destruction of the city and the death of several hundred thousand people. Nevertheless, in the event of an armed intervention Khrushchev would have been in a highly unpleasant situation. He would have been a hostage in the capital of the country against which an intervention was underway. In the case of the Hungarian Revolution he did not commit such an error, and nor did his successors in the coming decades. The Eighth Plenary Session convened as planned at 10:00 a.m. on October 19, and the Central Committee elected Gomutka to its membership. Then the session was adjourned. The original membership of the Political Committee, accompanied by Gomulka, then proceeded to the negotiations with Khrushchev. The negotiations continued with intermissions until dawn on the following day. At that time the Soviet delegation decided to halt their troops marching towards Warsaw. This decision of the Soviet delegation to revise its original intention and to express its readiness for a compromise was due in part to the unified conduct of the Polish Party leadership, the commitment of Party supporters to democratic changes, and the overwhelming public support for Gomulka by the Polish people. In the morning of October 20 the Soviet delegation returned to Moscow and the Eighth Plenary Session continued. At this time Gomutka delivered an address that received worldwide attention and was published in full in the October 23 issue of Szabad Nep, the Hungarian Party daily newspaper. It had a significant impact on events in Budapest.9 On the following day Gomulka was elected as first secretary of the Central Committee. Numerous factors contributed to the acceptance by the Soviet Party leader of personnel changes in the Polish Communist Party. While Ochab consistently supported Gomulka, the latter assured Khrushchev that he was a true friend of the Soviet Union and did not wish to leave the Warsaw Pact, and nor did he want the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. He expressed his conviction that the Polish Party had a greater need of the Soviet Union than the reverse.10 It is not known to what extent Khrushchev believed Gomutka. It is known that the Soviet leader did not favor the return to positions of power of rehabilitated Party members. It is certain, however, that when he Finally accepted Gomutka, he did not realize how fortunate that selection was, and contrary to his initial intentions, he proved to be an excellent "crisis manager." As became evident several days later in connection with Hungary, the Soviets were not at all prepared to handle such crises in the satellite countries. In a very short time they had to face two such crises. The events of the Hungarian Revolution demonstrated for Khrushchev that the political management of the Polish crisis had spared the Soviet Union many unpleasant consequences. 104 Jánoš Tischler Following the return of the delegation from Warsaw, the. Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party met on October 20 to dis-i cuss the Polish crisis, and it became evident that the members had, not definitely given up the idea of military intervention, in spite off their reluctant acceptance of the Polish proposals in Warsaw.11 Aj decision was made not to return Soviet troops in Poland to theii bases for the time being and to make preparations for the creation, of a "Polish counter-government." The Soviet leaders believed thatll they could control the course of events in Poland if "Rokossowskrj would stay"—then, they thought, "we do not need to hurry." On§ October 21 the highly unpopular Rokossowski, the symbol of dependence on Moscow, and unacceptable to Gomulka and his.; associates, was not elected to the new Polish Party leaderships Nevertheless, at the meeting of the Soviet Presidium on the samel day Khrushchev summarized the debate on the Polish situation asi follows: "Considering the circumstances, we must reject armed! intervention."12 Possibly the most important such "circumstance'^ was the position of the Communist Party of China. On October 19| the latter was informed routinely of plans for military intervention in Poland, but the Chinese Party leadership forcefully objected tc the Soviet plan. The Chinese Communists added an exposition of „ their position. They stated that China had to be treated as an equal! partner by Moscow and the Chinese view had to be seriously con-f sidered. The Chinese opposed intervention in Poland not becausef they sympathized with democratic procedures, but as a result oil political considerations pure and simple. They argued from the2 same point of view when the Hungarian issue was raised, but did! not object to the second Soviet intervention. Their position was that the events in Poland did not involve a disruption of the "people's; democracy," and therefore the crisis was manageable by domestic forces. In contrast, the prevailing system was rejected at an early' stage in Hungary, and therefore intervention was unavoidable. Poland and Hungary in 1956 105 During negotiations in Moscow on October 23 the Chinese delegation led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping proposed to {Khrushchev that he should cancel the intervention in Poland. This decision was finalized by the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution. At this point the Polish and Hungarian events were necessarily managed jointly by Moscow. Originally representatives of fraternal parties were invited to Moscow for a meeting on October 24 for the purpose of receiving information from Khrushchev on negotiations in Warsaw, but the agenda of that meeting included both the Polish crisis and the Hungarian crisis, with the Hungarian issue playing the leading role. On October 23 Khrushchev had agreed only reluctantly to send Soviet troops to Budapest, because he had not yet excluded the possibility of intervention in Poland.13 The "Polish disturbance," which was resolved peacefully in spite of a potential explosion, was followed instantly by the events of the Hungarian Revolution. In the light of the revolutionary elements of the Polish October, it is not surprising that a special relationship evolved between Poland and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as well as between Gomuika and Imre Nagy. The New Polish Leadership and the Hungarian Revolution The new Polish leadership and Gomutka personally followed events in Hungary with undivided attention, utilizing all available sources for obtaining accurate and authentic information.14 Along with the stream of information arriving from Budapest, Polish public opinion was equally a source of pressure on the new leadership, since Poles regarded the Hungarian Revolution as fully identical in its objectives with the "Polish Revolution"; to demonstrate that conviction people in Poland in large numbers donated blood to support their "Hungarian brothers." At the same time Polish leaders committed to reforms were seeking allies and supporters among Soviet bloc countries, in most of which the "Stalinist line" was I 106 Jánoš Tischler Poland and Hungary in 1956 107 dominant. They found this ally in Hungary. The Hungariai Revolution had another impact: the powerful political and partialhj military pressure of Moscow, previously focused exclusively on Poland, was now also directed at Hungary. This was an advantage to Poland, since Polish leaders could implement changes more ease ily, such as the dismissal of Rokossowski and the repatriation of Soviet officers and military advisers.15 ;• The PUWP Political Committee resolved at its meeting oib October 28 to issue an appeal to the Hungarian nation.16 This was| regarded as necessary, since the Polish leadership had observed!) silence in the days following October 23, due in part to the lack ofj accurate information on events in Budapest. But it could not remain! silent any longer, since the press in Poland, Party organs such as the| Trybuna Ludu and provincial equivalents, taking advantage of^ loose censorship procedures, generally welcomed the Hungarian^ uprising and expressed their support for it. Such an appeal was cal-l culated to seek Hungarian support for the Polish leadership, while| it was also hoped that it would benefit the Hungarian Revolution* and indirectly the stabilization of the Polish new course. In effect| the new Polish leadership perceived common elements between the! Polish and Hungarian movements and intended to strengthen the-; Hungarian-Polish relationship. ! On October 28 the Polish ambassador in Budapest, Adam Willman, received instructions to have the appeal translated immediately, since it was to be published in the Hungarian press on the following day.17 This was done. Willman then handed the Polish original and the Hungarian translation to Jánoš Kádár and Imre Nagy, who expressed their "deep gratitude" to the leaders of the Polish fraternal Party for the support provided to Hungary. They needed the support of Poland.18 On October 29 all Polish dailies and the Hungarian Party daily Sxabad Nép published the appeal of the PUWP Central Committee to the Hungarian nation, signed by Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, both members of the political Committee. The appeal first expressed their sorrow over the loss of human lives and the destruction in Budapest, and then appealed to Hungarians to "terminate the fratricidal fight." Then the message continued: We are well informed of the program of the Hungarian national government, of the program of socialist democracy, of the expansion of well-being, of the formation of workers' councils, of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and of Soviet-Hungarian friendship based on the Leninist principles of equality. It is not our intention to intervene in your internal affairs. We are of the opinion, however, that this program is in full accord with the interests of the Hungarian people and of the peace camp as a whole... We think that those who reject the program of the Hungarian national government want to lead Hungary away from the road to socialism... You and we stand on the same side—on the side of freedom and socialism... Let peace be restored in Hungary, peace and the unity of the people, which is vitally necessary to realize the comprehensive program of democracy, progress and socialism, which your national government has made its objective.19 The sentence approving of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary by the Polish Party leadership contains a singular contradiction in the light of their position that this was impossible in the case of Poland. In response to emphatic demands to that effect in late October, Gomulka asserted that the geopolitical situation of Hungary differed significantly from that of Poland, and that those who made such demands were inadvertently assisting internal and external reaction, which would be prepared to exploit the situation of Poland.20 Subsequently, following several political experiences concerning this matter, Gomulka was to utilize the formula "the state interests of Poland" as the basic explanation for his future policies. 1 108 Jánoš Tischler Poland and Hungary in 1956 109 On October 28 Gomulka sent a two-person delegation to Budapest for the purpose of gathering information and evaluating the Hungarian situation. They were also instructed to do their best, in the interests of the Polish Party leadership, to prevent a movement of the Hungarian Revolution to the right and to persuade ' Nagy and Kadar to terminate further changes. This was a good opportunity for the Polish leadership to assure the Hungarian leaders of their support and to condemn unequivocally the request of Gero for Soviet military assistance "to restore public order." The delegation consisted of Marian Naszkowski, deputy foreign minister, and Artur Starewicz, substitute member of the Central Committee, later the director of the Press Office of the Central Committee. They met and spoke with the Hungarian leadership, primarily with Nagy and Kadar, on the day of their arrival. The Polish delegates sent a coded report to Gomulka and Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki (a member of the Political Committee). Their report included a narrative of the events of the previous days and an analysis of possibilities for resolving the Hungarian crisis, as reported by their Hungarian partners. According to the Polish delegation, "no one in the Hungarian Party leadership could identify a single reactionary center, nor any facts concerning anti-communist or anti-socialist characteristics of the movement in the capital." At the same time, the Hungarian leaders agreed that "each" day, each hour of prolonging the confrontation results unavoidably in the emergence of reactionary and anti-communist elements as leaders of the insurgent movement."21 The two Polish delegates learned at first hand during their 1 Budapest visit that the peaceful resolution of the Polish crisis during the Eighth Plenary Session had saved Poland and the Polish Party from catastrophic events comparable to those in Budapest. They were fully aware of the potential consequences of a Soviet occupation of Warsaw, including a spontaneous uprising, which the PUWP would not have been able to control, as was the case in Hungary.22 An armed conflict in Poland would necessarily have involved a much larger conflict and would have revived the wounds and memories of war-tom Poland. Gomulka and his associates therefore frequently expressed their satisfaction with the political realism of the Polish people. On October 29 Starewicz and Naszkowski, while stopping at the Soviet Embassy, met the Soviet leaders Mikoyan and Suslov, who did not respond specifically to their questions concerning Soviet intentions, except to state that the question was whether the Nagy government would be able to control events.23 On October 30 the two delegates returned to Warsaw and reported their experiences at the meeting of the Political Committee that same day.24 It is significant that they informed Polish public opinion of the results of their mission. Shortly after his return Starewicz responded to the question of a Polish radio reporter on what he had seen in Hungary. He stated that in his opinion the program of the Nagy government could be implemented following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Budapest.25 In the morning hours of November 1, 1956, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov met a three-member Polish delegation led by Gomulka in Brest, at the Soviet-Polish border. The Soviet delegation informed them of the imminent intervention in Hungary, which was definitively decided upon on October 31 in Moscow.26 Although the Polish delegation expressed a "separate opinion," since they could not accept the principle of resolving an internal crisis by armed foreign intervention, they agreed that the danger of counter-revolution existed in Hungary 27 They did bring up the not very persuasive argument that the Soviet forces would face an extended guerrilla war in Hungary.28 They took note of the Soviet decision, since they had no other alternative, but they also considered it to be important to express their "separate opinion" in public. The Brest Soviet statement provided Gomulka with an important political advantage in the sense that he could then argue that it was 110 Jánoš Tischler in "Polish state interests" to accept the presence of Soviet troops i„ Poland, which guaranteed membership in the Warsaw Pact and th( permanence of the revised boundaries of 1945. He argued that dis regarding this principle would involve the tragic fate of Hunga_ for Poland, and therefore it was important that people should trus and support the PUWP. The November 1 meeting of the PUWP Central Committee issued a public appeal to the Polish nation in which this concep. was formulated and the "separate opinion" of the Polish Party delegation to Khrushchev was also included. The PUWP Centra Committee was convened several hours after the Brest meeting fo. the express purpose of discussing developments related to Hungary^ The Committee reviewed the Hungarian political situation and thai issue of Soviet intervention: "the Political Committee expressed a*i position condemning the armed intervention of the Soviet Union it Hungary." A resolution attached to the agenda stated that an appea to the nation expressing the position of the Party must be issued, according to which "in Hungary the people, not an external inters vention, must defend and maintain socialist achievements."29 The drafting of the appeal was assigned to an editorial coin mittee directed by Jerzy Morawski, a member of the Potitica Committee, and after approval by Gomulka it was published in the Polish press on the following day. Incidentally an additional objec-r tive of the appeal was to "pour cold water on excessively hot Polish heads."30 The section on Hungary condemned the Hungarian"'] Stalinist Party leadership, which pursued policies contrary to the; will of the working class and the majority of the nation, and instead of introducing democratic changes called in Soviet troops for assistance. The appeal emphasized the growing reactionary and counterrevolutionary threat, and pointed out the chaotic situation in Hungary, including summary trials by "reactionary gangs" and the barbaric murder of Communists. It condemned reactionary forces sweeping Hungary towards catastrophe and expressed the hope Poland and Hungary in 1956 111 that the Hungarian working class and all working people would unite and thereby defeat the "reactionary attack." The appeal then stated the resolution of the Central Committee on the disapproval of foreign intervention, followed by the statement that Soviet forces were stationed in Poland on the basis of the Potsdam agreement, in order to ensure communications with their forces in East Germany. Therefore their withdrawal was impossible until a peace treaty was signed with Germany or all four Great Powers simultaneously withdrew their troops from German territory. The presence of Soviet troops in Poland protected the Western frontier of the country against German revisionist agitation. The conditions and circumstances of their presence would be set forth in legal documents to be concluded with the Soviet government. The document then stated that in the light of international conditions the demand to withdraw Soviet troops was contrary to the most fundamental Polish state interests. The present, it said, was not a time for demonstrations and assemblies, but for calmness, discipline and a sense of responsibility: "this is the most important command of the moment."31 In spite of the impending Soviet intervention, the Polish Foreign Ministry instructed Ambassador Willman, in a note signed by Naszkowski, to reply to the request of Imre Nagy for support. The reply was to state that the Polish leadership hoped that its official position on Hungary, expressed in the appeal of the PUWP Central Committee of November 1, would be of assistance to the Hungarian government. That statement expressed the view that "in Hungary only the internal forces of the nation, and not an external intervention, can preserve the people's power and socialism."32 In the evening of November 2 a coded telegram arrived from Ambassador Willman to Foreign Minister Rapacki, stating the request of the Hungarian government that the Polish government give its consent to the proposal that "Warsaw should be the location of negotiations between delegations of Hungary and the Soviet I -41 I 112 Jánoš Tischler Poland and Hungary in 1956 113 Union for the purpose of reaching agreement on relations betwee, the two governments and especially the question of the stationinf of Soviet troops in Hungary."33 It was obvious that the principa issue of discussion was the Hungarian demand for the withdrawa of the Soviet army, a demand that the leadership of the PUWP _ completely rejected with regard to Poland less than a day earlier L_ an unequivocal manner. Nevertheless, within an hour and a half thai Polish response was dispatched to Budapest. If both parties agreed the Polish government was ready to grant the Hungarian request! that negotiations be conducted in Warsaw. The Polish government: intended to inform Polish public opinion of the proposed negotial tions as soon as the date of negotiations was known.34 Thus the PUWP Political Committee granted the Hungarian request and thereby it again expressed its "separate opinion of Brest." During the night of November 3-4 the telegram of Will reporting his conversation with Imre Nagy in the early afternoon of November 3 arrived in Warsaw. In spite of the hopeless situation the Hungarian prime minister attempted to utilize every possibilit for stabilizing the political situation. Since he assumed tha. Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty "might act in a reactionary manner," he requested the Polish government to intercede with Polish Cardina Stefan Wyszynski in the interests of "influencing Mindszenty calm the atmosphere of tension in Hungary."35 The events oj November 4, the next act of the "Hungarian tragedy," made this issue irrelevant. Gomulka considered the secession of Hungary from the direc Soviet sphere of interest to be inadmissible. This was in his ownf interests. But initially he had difficulty approving of the second. Soviet intervention, in part because Poland had faced an identical! danger two weeks earlier. In addition, in its October 28 appeal the PUWP Political Committee unequivocally disapproved of the Soviet armed intervention that had started between four and five, days earlier in Budapest. Therefore on November 4 Gomulkal declared that it was necessary to accept facts. The PUWP Political Committee, convened in the evening of November 4 to discuss the Hungarian issue, decided to vote against the US resolution in the United Nations condemning the Soviet intervention. The Polish delegate voted accordingly.36 The climax of the Polish crisis was the series of events at the time of the Eighth Plenary Session of the PUWP Central Committee. After that the new Party leadership attempted to stabilize political conditions, calm the tension and secure its own position. Gomulka, having experienced turmoil, was fully convinced of the realism of his statements to Khrushchev on October 19-20. It was quite clear to him that in spite of the genuine mass support that he received at that time, unprecedented in the Soviet bloc, the Polish Communist Party would be unable to preserve its dominant position without Soviet military presence. He planned to negotiate legal guarantees of the Soviet military presence with the Soviet Union in the form of a bilateral treaty, which was in fact signed in Moscow in mid-November 1956. He believed that only the Soviet Union guaranteed the western Polish borders approved in Potsdam in 1945. Aside from official propaganda, he considered German territorial revisionism to be a real threat to Poland. Gomulka utilized this threat as well as the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in the stabilization of his system in 1956. His policy was to preserve and if possible to expand a degree of "independence" provided by his eastern neighbor, to terminate the vestiges of Stalinism and to develop socialism according to national characteristics ("the Polish road to socialism"). By December 1956 the Polish leaders had worked out an evaluation of the Hungarian Revolution, which they consistently maintained in the next year and a half. This evaluation had two elements. First, they considered the Soviet intervention of November 4 to have been necessary, but "deeply regretted it." Furthermore, they thought that the intervention was an unavoidable evil, which i-il; m Mr if 114 Jánoš Tischler was necessary to prevent the "reaction" from assuming power in Hungary, since this represented a powerful danger for all other;; socialist countries. Their "deep regret" also meant that they expressed their opinion rarely, because "they did not wish to speak jj of unpleasant matters."37 The second element was a position directly opposed to that of other countries of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet \ bloc explained events in Hungary as the work of external and inter-j nal reaction. In the Polish view, however, the Hungarian explosion; •was precipitated by the criminal and distorted policies of Matyas Rakosi, and the tension had built up over a period of several years.* If others placed responsibility exclusively on the activity of external forces, they removed responsibility for internal errors from the misguided policies of the Party.38 Although Gomulka strongly disapproved of the political steps of Imre Nagy in the first few days of November, he resolutely \ objected to the kidnapping-of the Hungarian prime minister and his4 associates on November 22. He expressed these views in public. In| May 1957 he took a step that no other Communist Party leader! attempted: he interceded in defense of Imre Nagy at a meeting witb/j Khrushchev. His motive was not political agreement with Nagy, buti his fear of restoring the practice of physical liquidation of oppo--. nents, used in the Stalinist period. He personally nearly became aj victim of that practice. At the time that the Ninth Plenary Session { of the PUWP Central Committee announced the fight against ideological revisionism, a secret coded telegram arrived from Budapest, signed by Willman, with the message that Nagy was brought back to Budapest and preparations for his trial were underway.39 One week after receipt of the telegram a Polish delegation led by Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz traveled to Moscow to reach agreement on controversial issues related to the Soviet-Polish treaty of \ November 1956. In the course of the discussions the first secretary of the Polish Party brought up the topic of Imre Nagy. Although Gomulka considered Nagy to be a revisionist, he argued against the trial, pointed out the political damage that it would do, and the Poland and Hungary in 1956 115 anticipated international indignation, and stated that "Imre Nagy was certainly not an imperialist agent."40 In response to the negative reaction of Khrushchev, Gomulka attempted to defend the Hungarian prime minister, stating that even if he had been a traitor, he would have been unable to direct all activities and make decisions. Cyrankiewicz commented that in the event of the victory of the counter-revolution Imre Nagy would have been hanged.4' This intercession did not produce results. But Kadar was informed of it by Mikoyan, who had participated in the Soviet-Polish negotiations. Therefore he was quite aware of the position of the Polish leadership.42 After Gomulka turned down Kadar's invitation to visit Hungary, Gomulka's intercession on behalf of Imre Nagy in Moscow must have increased Kadar's unfavorable attitude towards the Polish Party leader. This incident could also be interpreted as an indication of the Polish view of Kadar's "independence" from Moscow. The official relationship of Poland with the Kadar government was somewhat different from the real Polish view. Polish foreign policy beginning in November 1956 pursued the objective of strengthening the position of the Kadar government by means of economic assistance and international support, while disregarding the issue of evaluating the Hungarian Revolution. Accordingly, at the request of the Hungarian government and in spite of difficult economic conditions, a decision was made on November 24, 1956, to provide economic aid in goods valued at 100 million zloty, without any obligation for repayment.43 At the same time the PUWP was highly reserved in its relations with Hungary, thereby clearly indicating to the Kadar government that it disapproved of the merciless reprisals and terror of the restored Hungarian Communist Party. As a result, Kadar had to wait a year and a half, until May 1958, for the official visit of Gomulka, providing some form of legitimacy to the Kadar government. The visit was preceded by lengthy negotiations, including guarantees with regard to verdicts in the Imre Nagy trial. if ■