Chapter 5 The Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler, 1918-33 17$ Dictatorship in Germany Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933. His rise to power and the decline of the Weimar Republic are sufficiently complex to justify a preliminary section relating the main developments up to that date before proceeding to look at explanations. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC AND THE RISE OF HITLER, 1918-33 The formation and development of the Weimar Republic, 1918-29 The Weimar Republic was bom of military defeat and revolution at the end of the First World War. Under the threat of military collapse the Kaiser's Second Reich was: transformed into the Weimar Republic during what has come to be known as the 'German Revolution'.1 This occurred in two phases. The first was a revolution from above as, early in October 1918, the military establishment handed over power to a civilian cabinet. The High Command, under ludendorff and Hindenburg, sensed the inevitability of defeat and tried to ease the way towards an armistice with the Allies by advising ■Kalsef Wiihetrfi II to appoint Prince Max of Baden as Chancellor, A powerful under-: lying motive was the army's desire to avoid any direct blame for Germany's surrender, when it came. The Allied response, however, was unfavourable; President Wilson argued that the German power structure was still intact and that he could deal only with a genuine democracy. Prince Max now prevailed upon the Kaiser to dismiss Ludendorff from his command and it seemed that, despite the Allies' reservations, the Second Reich had the most genuinely representative government since its formation in 1871. The second phase was a revolution from below which brought down the Second Reieh altogether. In late ©ctober and early November the sailors of the German fleet mutinied in Kiel and Wilhelrnshaven, while military discipline was also subverted in Hamburg and Cologne, Similarly dramatic events occurred in the south, as Kurt Eisner declared Bavaria an independent republic. Prince Max, fearing the complete disintegration of Germany, resigned on 9 November, to be replaced as Chancellor by the leader of the Social Democrats, Friedrich Ebert. On the same day the Kaiser and the lesser German rulers abdicated, and a republic was proclaimed by another Social 1919 Assembly 1920 1924 May 1924 1928 1930 1932 Juty 1932 Nov 1933 NSDAP - - 32 6.5% 14 3.0% 12 2.8% 107 18.3% 230 37.3% 196 33.1% 43.9% DNVP 44 10.3% 71 15.1% 95 19.5% 103 20.S% 73 14.2% 41 7.0% 37 5.3% 32 8.3% 52 6.0% OVP 19 4.4% 66 13.8% 45 9.2% 51 10.1% 45 8.7% 30 4.5% 7 ■ t.2% 11 1.9%. 2 : 1.1% . Zentrum ' 91 19.7% 64 13.6% 65 13.4% 69 13.6% 62 12.1% 66 11.8% .75: 12.5% 70 11.9% '74 11.2% 0VP - 21 4.4% 16 3.2% 19 3.7% 16 3.1% 19 3;0% sl% 20 3.1% 18 2.7% DDP 75 18.6% 39 8.3* 28 5.7% 32 6.3% 25 4,9% 20 3.6% : 4 1,0% 2-1.0% '5 0.9% SPD 165 37.9% 102 21.7% 100 20.5% 131 26.0% 153 29.8% 143 24.5% 133: 21.6% m 20.4% 126 : 18.3% USPD 22 7.6% 84 17.9% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% - , '■ KPD - 4 2.1% 62 12.6% 45 9.0% 54 10.6% 77 13.1% 89 14.3% 100 16.9% 81 12.3% Others 7 7.6% 9 3.0% 29 8.6% 29 7.6% 51 14.794 S2 13.9% 71 3.1%: IS 3.3% 7 1,6% figure 3 German parties and Reichstag election results 1919-33 ISO piccsttpi-ählp in :(3ermäriy The Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler, 1918-33 181 Democrat, Philipp ScheidemarM, from the balcony of the Reichstag building in Bertin; Scheidemahn's concludingwords were: 'The old and rotten - the monarchy - has broken down. Long live the new! Long live the German Republic.'2 Two days later, on 11 November, Germany signed an armistice with the Allies. But German Itevdlutioji was not yet complete. The country now experienced: a brief period of civi! war as rival groups of the left competed for power. The main contenders were the SocialDemocrats (SPD) and two more radical groups,; the; Independent : Socialists {USPD) and the Spartacists. At first a Provisional Government, Wasestablishediico^ and the USPD. The former^ however,: were- afraid that Germany might follow the example of Russia the year before, and that; the Provisional Government would be destroyed by a coup from the radical left, perhaps from the Spartacists. To prevent this, Chancellor Ebert made a controversial deal with the army commander. General Greener, to put down any Bolshevik-style: revolution which might occur. The test was not long in coming. In December the Independent Socialists withdrew from the government, while the Spartacists (who now called themselves Communists) demanded the 'sovietization' of Germany and the continuation of the revolution. The SPD put down subsequent Spartacist demonstrations in January 1919. and in the violence and bloodshed the two Communist leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were killed. A second Spartacist uprising was suppressed, with much greater bloodshed, in March, while, in April, troops were sent to overthrow the Republic of Soviets which had just been proclaimed in Bavaria. Moderate socialism now appeared safe from the far left, but the latter neither forgot nor forgave the experience of 1919. CENTRAL Appointed - STATE State governments Hoacad Ministers President Majority in State assemblies {Landtage] fijure 4 The Weimar political! system During this crisis amove was made towards establishing permanent institutions. Elections were held in January 1919 and a Constituent Assembly convened in Weimar, away from the street violence of Berlin. Three of the moderate parties formed a coalition government: the Centre Party (Z), the Democratic Party (DDP) and the Social Democrats (SPD). In opposition to the coalition were the parries of the right --the Nationalists (DNVP) and the People's Parry (DVP) - as well as the Independent Socialists (USPD) of the far left. The Communists (KPD) did not contest this election. Ebert now became the first President of the Republic, with Scheidemann his Chancellor until June 1919, Meanwhile, a constitution was being drafted by a special committee under the jurist Hugo Preuss. Eventually promulgated in August 1919, this embodied many advanced principles of democracy and borrowed freely from the experience of England, France and the United States. The main terms were as follows. The head of state was to be the President, elected every seven years by universal suffrage. He was given, by Article 48 of the constitution, emergency powers: 'In the event that the public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered, the Reich President may take the measures necessary for their restoration.'3 The head of the government was to be the Chancellor, appointed by the President and needing the support of the majority of the legislature, or Reichstag. The Reichstag, elected by universal suffrage by means of proportional representation, would be able to deal with legislation, defence, foreign policy, trade, finance and security. The last section of the constitution carefully itemized the various 'rights and duties of the Germans'.4 By the end of 1919, therefore, the republic had overcome pressures from the far left and had acquired a legal framework. The question now arising was: could it survive? Thenext fourteen years saw, in succession, a periodof instabilityand severe problems (;i9i9-23), a remarkable recovery and a period of consqhdation (1923-9) and, nnallyj: the crisis which eventually destroyed the republic (1929-33). The most serious obstacle to the new government in 1919 was the signing of the Treaty of Versailles with the victorious Allies. The German delegation was horrified: by {hejiarshness of the terms but the Allies were determined: not to make major modifications, In June, Scheidemann resignedasChancelbf in protest-but his suecesr sor, Bauer^eyeritually agreed to accept the treaty. Versailles Was to prove a millstone: around the neck of the republic, and had much to do with the second problem of this early period: inflation. The devaluation of the mark started during the war but was; aggravated by demobilization and by the stiff reparations imposed, under a provision in the Treaty 0f Versailles, in 1921. Speculation, massive ovejrpriiitiBg of paper money and the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 all completed the collapse of the mark :in November 1923 to 16,000 million to the pound. Savings were wiped[out overnight and, for a few weeks, barter unofficially replaced the use of coinage. During the same years, political challenges compounded the diffieulties of the republic. One example was the Kapp Putsch (1920), an unsuccessful but frightening attempt by the far right to seize power in Berlin; another putsch was tried by Hitler in Munich (1923) in circumstances described in the next section. Nevertheles$, the period 1923-9 saw a remarkable recovery and greater stability, This is generally known as the 'Stresemann era' because of the profound influence exerted by this leader of the DVP, first as Chancellor in 1923 and then as Foreign Minister until 1929, Vital economic developments included the stabilization of the 182 Dieutprshípurt Germany. The Weimar Republic and: tha rise of Hitler. .! 918-33 IJ83 currency in the form of the Rentenmark and an agreement on reparations with the Allies in 1924 known as the:Dawes Plan. Massive investment followed, mostlyitorn the United States^ which enabled: Germani industry to; recover almost to 1913 levels, despite the loss of resources and land in 1919, At the same time, Stresernann stabilized Gennaiiy's relations with the rest óf Europe, He followed the 1922 treaty with Russia :with another in 19.26, participated jn a catlecävedefencepactwithfotooÄer Countries atfcočarnó^ 1926. Underlying these achievements was. a period of relative political stability as coalition governments functioned more qřfešs effectively, lubricated by the political diplomacy of Stresernann himself. These halcyon years did not last Stresernann died in 1929, a year in which Germany was suddenly confronted by economic catastrophe. Meanwhile, lurking in the background, and preparing to take advantage of any such change of fortune, were Hitler and the Nazis. The early years of the Nazi movement, 1918-29 Many Germans were bitterly opposed to the revolution of 1918, blaming Jews, socialists, liberals and Catholics for the fall of the Second Reich and military defeat. Particularly resentful were the völkisch groups which sprang up all over the country and issued racialist and anti-liberal propaganda. One of these was the German Workers' Party (DAP), formed by Anton Drexler in Munich in January 1919. It was joined, in September 1919, by an Austrian with unfulfilled artistic pretensions who had fought in a Bavarian regiment in the German army throughout die First World War. Hitler blamed the republic for Germany's surrender and openly expressed his 'hatred for the originators of this dastardly crime'.5 He rose rapidly to the position of the party's theorist and chief propaganda officer, and his talent as a public speaker was apparent even at this early stage. In February 1920 he headed ä committee which devised the party's twenty-five-pointprogramme, consisting ofa variety of nationalist, socialist, corporativist and racialist principles: Meanwhile, the name was extended to 'National Socialist German Workers' Party" {NSÖAJP), comnionly abbreviated to 'Nazi '.Branches were organized beyond Munich arid support eame -from disbanded Soldiers and from some elements of the army,: or Reichswehr. The mouthpiece of the NSDAP was the People's Observer (Völkischer Beobachter), acquirediih 192Ö. The next stage was Hitler's rise to the leadership of the: party. By mid-1921 he was in dispute with the committee under Drexler over the question of: organizationi arid Strategy. Eventually he outmanoeuvred Drexler and: was elected Party thäimian in July. He immediately decided to demonstrate that the NSDAP was radically different from all traditional 'bourgeois' parties and to centralize everything, especially propaganda, on Munich. The movement was given teeth by the formation, in July 1921, of the Sturmabteilung (SA), a violent paramilitary organization intended, in the words of the newly named Völkischer Beobachter,'to develop in the hearts of our young supporters a tremendous desire for action'.6 The SA proceeded to intimidate opponents, disrupt other parties' meetings and engage in bloody clashes in the streets. Hitler developed a sense of irresistible power and overwhelming confidence, and was prepared to prove the Beobachters maxim that 'history does not make men, but men history'. I Mussolini, ft seemed, had demonstrated this in his March on: Ripme in 1922. Could !; Hitler do the same in 1923? The republic was experiencing.a.:many-sided;crisis at I least as serious as that confronted by the Italian monarchy. Hitler hopedtp march on j: Berlin with the support of the right-wing Commissioner of Bavaria, Gustav von Kahr; and ithe Bavarian: armed forces; the majority of the Reichswehr would then be: won over: In November 1923, 600 SAmen, under Hitler's command, tookover a meeting: beii^ addressed hyK^ one: of Munich's teg^ibwrhalis- Kahr, even at gunpoint, refused to support the putsch arid an SA street demonstration thefollowitig morning was dispersed by the Bavarian police. HiUer's attempt at power therefore ended in ignominious failure and he was put on trial for treason; He was, however, treated leniently by sympathetic judges, and was sentenced to five years;' imprisonment in Landsberg Castle, He served just over one year, in comfortable conditions which enabled him to write the first volume of Mem Kampf {My Struggle). On his emergence from captivity in December 1924 he found the NSDAP in total disarray; in his absence it had disintegrated into warring factions. Hitler was not displeased with this, as it guaranteed his own indispensability and meant that he was well placed to resume control. During his internment Hitler had time to develop a more systematic version of his ideas and aims. Up to this stage they had developed untidily over three main stages. During his early life in Vienna (1907-13) he had been profoundly influenced by anti-Semitic literature and the political utterances of Karl Lueger. He had also developed a deep hatred of the multi-ethnic empire of Austria-Hungary, identifying instead with the newer German nation. His experiences of the war and its immediate;aftermath £1914~19)Iefthim with a burning resentment,a drive for vengeanceanda deep hatred of the far left.The period 1920-4 saw thefusion of anti-Semitisitt; and anti-Cprnmudsm and the development of a vision of expansion by Germany against the -inferior races' t>f eastern Europe; this would follow the preliminary revolution andinternal reordering within Germany. According to Kershaw, 'By the mid 1920s, then, Hitler had developed a founded philosophy which offered him a complete view of theworld, its ills and how to overcome them. Its substance never changed down to his death.'7 This substance: is considered briefly in Chapter 2. When he refounded the NSDAP in February 1925, Hitler emphasized the need for a change of ^ could be overthrown directly. But the failure of the Putsch showed: that democratic government Was more resilient in Germany than in Italy. Hitler would therefore have to settle for a constitutional or 'legal* path to power. This did not mean a fundamental conversion to the principles of constitutional democracy^ on the contrary politics would be the means, not the end. Revolution was still the ultimate aim, but would now be the result of achieving power rather than the means by which power would be achieved. For the time being it would be necessary, in Hitler's words, 'to hold our noses and enter the Reichstag alongside Marxist and Catholic^deputies'. At the same time, he saw a continuing need for the SA and paramilitary influences. In fact, Hitler now led the Nazis at two levels. On the surface they were a parliamentary party, aiming at gaining electoral support at the expense of their rivals. Below the surface they remained a mass movement, committed to gaining mass support; Their chance would come in the future, after the victory of the 'legal' approach. !94 Dictatorship in Germany the Weimar Republic and the: rise of Wit!er, mS-SS 185 To accomplish this change of strategy it was: necessary to extehdthe Party's: appeal. The Nazi Party had to move away from its marrow working-class base. It could .not Hope to compete effectively for the working-class vote with a moderate SPD and a revolutionary RPD: iflsteadvHitierd^ided to reformulate parts; of the 192G Party progimnme so asto appeal to different parts of the population. This meant that he had to move away from socialism; in 1927 he told his economic adviser, Keppler, that the : economic goals of the original programme were now 'unusable'. By attacking socialism and the left. Hitler: began; to exercise more of an appeal to the middle classesand the ;right.; This: meant that HitleriiicreMed the emphasis on nationalism, on me 'stab in me back* and'Noyern^reriminals* myths of 1918 aMthe Versailles 'diktat" of 1919. Despite this new approach, the period 1925-9 proved exceptionally difficult for the Nazi Party and the movement. In the first place. Hitler was confronted by opposition front north German leaders, especially Gregor Strasser, who considered that the party's ideology should place heavier stress on socialism and the nationalization of key industries. Hitler eventually gained unquestioned ascendancy over the northern units of me party at the Bamberg Conference (February 1926) in which he out-argued Strasser and, by the force of his rhetoric, won over one of his arch critics, Josef Goebbels. (The latter had, only a short time before, demanded the expulsion of the 'petty bourgeois Adolf Hitler'!) The overall result of this victory was that Hitler tightened his control and established the monolithic structure he had always sought In the subsequent reorganization, cadres of dedicated activists were set up in the basic party units, the Gau, under the control of the officials, or Gauleiters, who were appointed by Hitler himself. The second and more intractable problem of this period was the stability of the: republic and the poor electoral perfonMneeof die NSDAP, In the Reichstag election of December 1924, for example, the NSDAP acquired only fourteen seats, making: if the leastsignificant of the national parties in terms of electoral support; its :;perfonraattoe::in 1928 was evea poorer, resulting in only! twelve seats. Yet:the party was nothing.:if:not resilient. It showed a remarkable capacity to survive these hard times and switched its campaign from the cities to the rural areas, which agricultural depression hadmade more volatile. The Wtkischer Beobachierobserved in May 1928:: 'The election results from; theruralareas inpartjcularhaveproved that with a smaller expenditureof' energy, money and:timer better results canbe achieved there than in the%d^ as Germany came: under the grip of economic recession. The years:of crisis-, 1929^33 The origins of the Great Depression are dealt with in Chapter I. Of all the industrial states, Germany was undoubtedly the: most vulnerable to a sudden downturn in economic conditions. Her industry was heavily dependent on foreign investment to the tune of 5 billion marks per annum by 1928. Her banking system was geared to the use of short-term Ipans for long-term enterprises and, as a result, was potentially very vulnerable. As the depression deepened, foreign loans were withdrawn and the banking system eventually eollapsed in 1931. Meanwhile, industrial output had to be cut back through; lack of investment and the contraction of overseas markets. The boom years of the late 1920s came to an abrupt end with a dramatic rise in the number of bankruptcies. The inevitable result was a; rapid increase: inuhemplöymer^rröm 2 million in 1929 to 3.5 million in 1930. 4.4 million in 1931 and oyer; 6 million in 1932. The: depression dealt a devastating blow to democracy iii Germany, Chancellor Mullet's coalition fell apart oil 27 March 1930 over the question of cutting dole pay-. mcnts. Since the powerof the: Chancellor depended on the support öftheKeichsiag and the economic crisis had made coH the:initiative now passed to the President. The republic's second President, elected ia 1925, was of the Second Retch, he had an authoritarian approach to politics; During the: stable: years he had had no option but to play an inactive role in the manoeuvring for power between the various parties. From 1930, however, he was able to fill the vacuum left by the sudden death of consensus politics. Under the influence of one of his main advisers, General Schleicher, Hindenburg appointed the Centre Patty leader, Brüning, as Chancellor. When Brüning tried to introduce a deflationary budget it was rejected by the Reichstag. Hindenburg sought to enforce it by presidential decree, under Article 48 of the constitution. The Reichstag objected to this course, with the result that Hindenburg agreed to Brüning's request for an election in September 1930. The results proved disappointing to Brüning and he was forced to carry on without the support of the Reichstag. He resorted increasingly to the use of presidential decrees so that, by the time of his fall in May 1932, parliamentary democracy had virtually disappeared. Meanwhile, the NSDAP was rapidly expanding the base of its support. It was geared to take full advantage of the republic's crisis, as Hitler arranged mass rallies, travelling: speakers and a flood of material from the propaganda department. The Reichstag election of 1930 was a triumph for the NSDAP. which secured 6.5 miHion votes andincreased its representation from 12 to 107 scats, thus becbmitig:the: second iärgest party In the Reichstag. Hitler capitalized on this success by: cultivating connections with the traditional right, including the Nationalists iDNVP), tearmy-industrialists like Thyssen, and agriculturalists; this alliance was formalized in the Harzburg Front of October 1931, directed against the republic's policies and record. In January 1932 Hitler made a direct appeal to German industriahstsm his Düsseldorf speech, denouncing parliamentary democracy and highlightingthe'Bölshevik threat': He was carefully establishing his credentials as an anti^revolutiptiary. Hitlers self-confidence was now at:^^ the: presidency, the 1932 election ran to two ballots. On the first, Hindenburg obtained 18.7 million votes (49.6 per cent of the total), Hitler 11.3 million (30.1 per cent) and: Thälmann, the Communist leader, 5 million (13 per cent). On the second ballot Hindenburg:secured an overall majority with 19.4 million (53 per cent) to Hitler's 13.4 million (26.8 per cent) and Thälmann's 3.8 million (10.2 per cent). This result was ä disappointment to Hitler, who had expended a massive effort to no avail. The only other possibility was now to try for the second most important office - the chancellorship. In this he was to prove more successful, and ultimately he came to power by the back-door methods of diplomacy and intrigue rather than over the threshold of electoral support. The process was highly complex, involving President Hindenburg, Genera! Schleicher and an aristocrat, Franz von Papen. 186 Dictatorship in :<3ermany 6 Paul Hind^nburg, 1347-1934 iPopperfoto) ÄSiHiiBii —— ■■'■f*' ii - ■.■!,.\ Tbe; first.stagg-was the collapse of Bruning's government in May' 1932, largely '.because it.had lost the support of those who: mattered, namely the-Pfesident and his • retinue-; 'Schleicher, .had been: alienated by Briining's decision to b'ah'Hitlers-SA; and: :Hindenhurg by-'-a proposal to take over bankrupt Junker estates for use'By landless: peasants, .Hmderibiirg therefore pushed Bruning into resignation: arid.;Papen was; installed: as ih&Ke'W'Chancellor, the first in the history of the repu3jHc:not:to havethe-basis of party sup-port'. Hitler agreed not to oppose: the new government in exchange-' for the removal of the. ban da the SA and new Reichstag elections. The. latter,. hekL in.July■•1952;.showed'-another sensational swing to the NSDAP, which now'became easily the largesfparty, with 230 seats arid 37.3 per cent of the popular vote. When Hitler was invited by Papcn to join his cabinet he demanded, instead, the chancellorship. This was refused, however, by President Hindenburg. Papen then tried to weaken the position of the NSDAP by calling yet another Reichstag election in November 1932. This time the NSDAP lost electoral support, declining to 196 scats in the Reichstag and 33.1 per cent of the vote, Clearly Hitler's popularity had peaked and it would have come as no great surprise if the Nazi phenomenon had faded to /-xp inil "n s* Lír so o H lc 197 it> en ! ">! *> n ih i e 1 íK 1 hi \ 5s da ■>" ti\ to i si h up v ire m ih,. i. ut tin in fail tii jilt n it. oi p t oi th ekt o tc is >• vi 11 knt tn1 rtimiďit i t i i i d oi the Kit- !r ad in \lj >>) the Pnissnn Mat _ rtt u ik it t ie 1 M«o ii bs b f ni ouidoor n eU nt, uJ p side s iktu wnh tin forms I he extent it i mm I \ of th Siv vs to be evident in 19*2 \uth i one mnut ui i u u^uil dietee il i."d b Fipen n ieiali/t (he s V V9 nlv. tudk p 1 r 1 1 l-1*} ">un1et ' st ,.et ir »t k ' hten^n 10 \u*ai tmne unif Mmtd S A t i f u nn m n r s I i n, i > P «t mp r in Lpp r 5 il s boun ti tutiun hit i dt th In tn subseqi em tout e c-e "h issutant v ere sen+enc- I to d< lth i d Hi 1 i3ni r pu ttKii lisil jood b\ lelnenrj in tmpusioiud vppe il ii leir st rp n N > t \r t ild I in tin leNvro* tii>t hi 1 not LďK íohii its -violent credentials- Before-1933.. But then e en, s \ in > b»tlc in Hnlei s i our Papet, proved incapil It o' 1 oldim po\ u f >r vlIv k nt the eiiu lloniup \eni to i h!ei<.hcr -v hn had min iged io c-mwnce Hm lenL i n t h c ild broaden the bise oi his sipprrf bv J iacbiti-, t iLinber- of die X sO \P n nn heir uppo 1 ro' íi der lithii fjileo Qi^ die enhNuiAho eentd mttieMtd tiihis ofi t-w is str^s ! h)\ isproni; ib tntovn oil ofdiepitrt ih k Pipet) ivlí s nfieiLiith ^lyhkdb -suhleithtrtc mtiigue a^unst mm wi li nt s. In Janu in, i* Fapen n^rsuuled Hind>.nbui_ ti upKsnt Hi kr a^ Chaiei sr n i toihtion go emment \ Inch wluSJ contain onh thtti. Nazis an j whieli\ uilu De t iretuih mcnitcnd b Pipen is Hitlei sdep it Schleicncr had ttiedto keep o^ n fOiv,nFiciii ihmt bv askinDln turthtr emeritně) pi vers Ihese hindenb r v i io pi pued io k m\ iince he n>v\ hid an lt^ttidtivt \ uhsu i<*d inti tne Tmu' Peici EXPLANATIONS OF THE RISE OF HIT.LEB The rise of Hitler involved distinct processes which; álthoiigh connected,-.did -nat-jead ■iiiRvitabiy from one to the other. One was thecoltapseof democracy wfll^/tha'Wamiar Republ ic and tlie deyelopmeht&Ser 1930 of anaujhoritaftanTégime'vvhiehvvas hostile ■to the whole basis of the republic. Another was the emergence of afl: entirely new ■form of right-wing movement which, under Hitler, eventually replaced- this-authoritarian system: with a -to'talitariari.regime. The- )áttet;.co.iil