

misrepresent the relationship of estate managers, large-scale merchants, small-town burghers and professionals at this time, but historians now ascribe a bigger role to pre-1848 elements in the shaping of the later bourgeoisie than they once did. The number of state officials and professionals (excluding clergy and elementary teachers) is estimated to have risen in the Austro-Slav lands from some 17,300 to 36,775 between 1790 and 1846 and from 5,000 to 24,000 in Hungary over a similar period.

One result was to create the trained bureaucracy for which the Enlightenment had striven. From 1774 educational qualifications for various government grades were successively established but only after 1800 did they reflect practice rather than aspiration. New service regulations emphasised (as Joseph's exhortations had not) unquestioning obedience to superiors, while constantly revised academic programmes increasingly side-lined politically suspect theoretical and historical disciplines. Uniforms were made universal, even for the members of provincial diets. Conservative as it might be, however, the imperial bureaucracy retained the 1787 principle of advancement by seniority of service, not social rank. Between 1840 and 1870 only 10% of departmental secretariats were to be held by members of old established noble families. Hence, perhaps, in part, the bureaucracy's preponderant commitment to economic liberalism against traditional guild privileges and Francis's own preferences. Early nineteenth-century Austrian government was both continuator of the Josephinian project and its subverter.

How far Emperor Francis was aware of these contradictions is unclear. He appears to have been sustained by a belief in the special character of the Viennese, exempting them from the ills of the times. Yet in the midst of these seeming certainties he could retain an invincible paranoia. On Christmas Eve 1830 he ordered troops to ring St Stephen's cathedral in the capital, on reports that conspirators had timed an uprising for the midnight mass. For his part Metternich believed that hundreds of thousands of Italians belonged to secret societies. This furching in leading figures from complacency to paranoia exposed the inner uncertainties of a regime which claimed to be at the heart of Europe while sedulously keeping out European influences. For all that, Francis's Austria was not the Russia of Tsar Nicholas I. It is the very sense of its potential normality, in European terms, which makes the caution and unimaginativeness of the Franciscan era seem a chance missed.

### Industrialism Takes Root

This impression is increased when the economic fortunes of the Monarchy in the early nineteenth century are considered. Metternich's cyclical view of history overlooked the beginnings of irreversible economic change. The Austrian case lends support to Sidney Pollard's suggestion that European industrialisation should be seen as a single process, in which bursts of economic activity moved, not from one state to another, but from region to region across boundaries, as favourably endowed areas were drawn into a network of reciprocal relationships, at first dependent on forerunners' expertise but later able to open up fresh outlets of their own. The marked regionalism of Austrian industrialisation, the heavy reliance on English techniques and entrepreneurs, the role of proto-industrialisation in the growth of textile manufacture, the development of the iron industry: all this can be related to a wider pattern, particularly now that the Rostowian model of dramatic take-off to industrialisation is no longer seen as the standard path to this goal.

Growing interest in the Habsburg economy of the first half of the century reflects confidence that its scale in that period can now be at least approximately quantified. Whether it is Rudolph's estimate of 8.3% annual industrial growth between 1830 and 1845, based on quinquennial production figures, Komlos's annual index of 2.5% growth over the same period, Gross's deductions from accelerating coal consumption from the 1820s or Good's conclusion that industry advanced at 2.3% a year between the 1820s and the 1850s, a general pattern seems to emerge. It is one of a widely diffused and subsequently sustained upturn from post-war depression in the late 1820s. Forty per cent of industrial production was in textiles, with the mechanisation of cotton spinning gathering pace in the 1820s and that of wool in the 1830s. While the eighteenth-century staples, wool and linen, made limited progress, cotton production grew at 7% a year. Austria had 157 cotton mills in 1847 and more cotton spindles than the German *Zollverein*. She also by then made more pig-iron per head than Germany, Bohemia having doubled its output of iron and quadrupled that of coal since the 1820s. Of two thousand industrial enterprises in 1841, those with modern equipment were already producing three times as much as those without and craftshops combined. Though her tally of steam engines lagged far behind the French (550 to 4114 in the mid-1840s) her industrial output per capita was on a par and her percentage of