

# 10

## The Role of Political Parties: Political Culture and Electoral Behaviour

Atilla Ágh

### Parties and party systems in democratic transition

Parties have been the chief actors of systemic change in its first two periods: in the pre-transition crisis and democratic transition. By now they have achieved a partial consolidation in East Central Europe and some stabilization in the Balkans. A more detailed analysis of the ECE parties gives us a point of departure for the description of the Balkan parties which have shown more 'infantile disorder' than those in the ECE region. The new democratic systems have been formed as multi-party systems. They have already made great strides from *polarized pluralism* to *moderate pluralism* and from *movement parties* to *cartel parties* in developments in East Central Europe and in the emergence of most relevant parties in the Balkans (see the list of all important parties in the ECE countries and the Balkans in the Appendix to this chapter).

There have been some very characteristic tendencies of political and electoral behaviour in the ECE states and, to some extent, in the Balkan countries (most markedly in Bulgaria), which may be summarized in the following:

- 1 Electoral and party fragmentation (Table 5.1).
- 2 High electoral volatility and protest voting.
- 3 The return of the 'post-communist' vote and parties (Table 5.2).
- 4 Growing abstentionism at elections (Table 5.3).
- 5 Declining confidence in parliaments and parties.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE 5.1 *Electoral and party fragmentation*

Poland	1989 6+0	1991 29+0	1993 6+9	1997 5+7
Hungary	1990 6+5	1994 6+4		
Czech Republic	1990 4+4	1992 8+1	1996 6+10	
Slovakia	1990 7+2	1992 5+4	1994 7+10	
Slovenia	1990 9+2	1992 8+2	1996 7+3	
Croatia	1990 4+12	1992 7+10	1995 10+18	
Serbia	1990 14+0	1992 9+0	1993 7+0	
Macedonia	1990 10+0	1994 7+2		
Bulgaria	1990 6+0	1991 7+0	1994 5+0	1997 5+0
Romania	1990 18+0	1992 7+4	1996 6+3	
Albania	1990 4+0	1992 5+0	1996 5+0	1997 3+3

The first figure given is the number of parliamentary parties and the second the number of relevant non-parliamentary parties.

TABLE 5.2 *Return of the 'post-communist' vote (per cent)*

Poland	1991 11.99;	1993 20.41	1997 27.1	
Hungary	1990 10.89	1994 32.99		
Czech Republic	1990 13.24	1992 14.05	1996 10.33	
Slovakia	1990 13.34	1992 14.70	1994 10.41	
Slovenia	1990 17.30	1992 13.58	1996 9.03	
Croatia	1990 33.8	1992 5.4	1995 8.93	
Serbia	1990 46.1	1992 28.8	1993 36.7	
Macedonia	1990 25.8	1994 48.3		
Bulgaria	1990 47.15	1991 34.36	1994 43.5	1997 22.2
Romania	1990 66.31	1992 27.71	1996 22.2	
Albania	1991 56.17	1992 25.73	1996 20.37	1997 53.4

These five tendencies are, however, the normal features of the party formation process leading to the emergence of a multi-party system. The first two tendencies indicate merely the temporary 'high temperature' of the political body in the first years of democratic transition. In the initial stage of democratic transition a 'hundred-party system' came into being which was reduced by the two or three consecutive free elections. The electoral and party fragmentation is, in fact, not that high; it has been sharply decreasing in the parliaments, and the largest two or three parties control the overwhelming majority of popular votes and parliamentary seats. The surprisingly strong wave of traditionalist conservatism and nationalism was also defeated in East Central Europe: these are great achievements in a few years. The traditional conservatism was the major cause for the high electoral volatility in the early 1990s, since when it has significantly diminished. The third tendency proves that the first period is already more or less over, that is, we are at the end of the beginning in the transition process. The return of a post-communist vote arises from very different causes in East Central Europe and in the Balkans. In the ECE countries these parties have gone through a fundamental reform and in the Balkans they have simply kept power, in most cases turning to national-communism. The reasons for the fourth and fifth tendency are much deeper, since they are connected with the drastic social transformation, as a cumulative effect of all economic, social and

TABLE 5.3 *Growing abstentionism (per cent)*

Poland	1989 37.68	1991 56.80	1993 47.94	1997 52.1
Hungary	1990 36.9	1994 31.1		
Czech Republic	1990 3.21	1992 14.9	1996 23.5	
Slovakia	1990 3.21	1992 15.8	1994 24.8	
Slovenia	1990 16.49	1992 14.16	1996 26.8	
Croatia	1990 15.53	1992 34.39	1993 36.24	1995 31.21
Serbia	1990 28.5	1992 30.3	1993 38.4	
Macedonia	1990 15.2	1994 22.7		
Bulgaria	1990 9.2	1991 15.9	1994 24.8	1997 41.9
Romania	1990 13.8	1992 23.7	1996 23.8	
Albania	1991 1.1	1992 9.7	1996 11.0	1997 35

TABLE 5.4 *Umbrella organizations and movement parties*

Poland	Solidarity
Hungary	Hungarian Democratic Forum
Czech Republic	Civic Forum
Slovakia	PAV – Movement for Democratic Slovakia
Slovenia	Demos (seven-party coalition)
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Community
Serbia	Serbian Renewal Movement – Depos, Together
Macedonia	Alliance for Macedonia (three parties)
Bulgaria	Union of Democratic Forces, Alliance of Democratic Forces
Romania	Democratic Convention of Romania
Albania	Albanian Democratic Party

political transformation or that of the high social price paid by the population for the political collapse and the following transformation. These tendencies will hold on until economic consolidation is reached, the first signs of which can be seen in most of the ECE countries. This leads us to the hypothesis about the ‘*early freezing*’ of the ECE parties (and to some extent the Bulgarian party system) as a partial consolidation of a partial system. The nationalist-populist based party systems have also consolidated, to some extent, in the Balkans, with their ‘charismatic’ leaders.

### From movement parties to cartel parties: party organization

1 The particular type of political organization which emerged in East Central Europe is the so-called *movement party*, and competition among the movement parties created the first multi-party systems (see Batt, 1991: 55-6). They represented to a degree the ‘original’ and ‘ideal’ unity of society and party, even though they were fragile and transitory political phenomena, not yet suitable for the roles of political parties in a competitive multi-party system. They had no stable and definite memberships, just participants in their actions. The cult of spontaneity was characteristic of them, since they tried to overcome the division between everyday life and politics, which brought also a domination of horizontal ties over vertical ones. Leadership roles were based on personal authority and not on the elected posts of the party hierarchy. The programmes were vague, emotionally supported and directly connected with such actions as mass demonstrations. These movement parties and their social movements played a big role in East Central Europe immediately before and after the collapse of the former system, but they had to transform themselves step by step into real parties. This turning point came in Hungary in late 1989, in Poland and Czech-Slovakia in 1990, It has not yet been fully achieved in Slovakia, where the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, as the biggest party, has tried to preserve the national-emotional features in order to maintain itself as a large populist

movement (see Szomolányi and Meseznikov, 1995: 99), close to the style of the Balkan parties (see Table 5.4).

2 In the early 1990s, however, the ECE parties collected some stable memberships, initially as networks and/or movement parties, and through this they took the first steps to becoming national organizations with party programmes. Prior to the first, founding elections the early political organizations were under pressure to decide whether they would or could become real parties instead of the previous ‘*travestita*’ or embryonic proto-parties. This was the honeymoon period for newly emerging parties, since the new legal regulations favoured parties over meso-political organizations, for example over organized interests and civil society associations. Therefore, many interest organizations opted for a party existence in order to be able to exert pressure upon politics; since then the border line between macro- and meso-systems, parties and organized interests, has remained blurred. Actually, all bigger ‘baby’ parties had already won some power, or at least political influence, through negotiating mechanisms between the government and the opposition. Their specific political strength, however, was still unclear before the elections. In the Balkans the former ruling parties have remained mass parties with membership continuity and many parties have become mass parties as movement parties.

The *overparticipation* process was already under way in this early period. Parties became the major actors of political transformation, and during their formation process they used and abused all their available resources. This is why virtually all socio-political forces sought to be organized as parties, otherwise they would have been left out of politics. Parties were, however, more successful outside than inside; that is, they succeeded in pushing out other actors from politics, but they were not very successful in organizing themselves. This organizational deficit was clear even in this dynamic period. The ECE societies were activated and overpoliticized, but the parties’ social ties remained minimal, since people did not join parties in great numbers and the national organizations remained weak. Therefore, the biggest difficulty for the parties in the early institutionalization process was to transform themselves from movement parties with loose organization and spontaneous action (which had the broad but diffuse support of the population), to organized parties with disciplined memberships, regular and formalized meetings, and extended party bureaucracy and professional leaderships. Even the most successful baby parties were only elite parties led by a small group of intellectuals, with a minimal and rather inactive membership. Actually, in the early 1990s the cultural or tribal wars led to the emergence of the first ‘real’, that is organized, parties but they emphasized first of all their ideological character. Therefore, the first ECE party systems can be characterized in Sartori’s term as ideologically based *polarized pluralism* (Sartori, 1976/1990: 328). The most characteristic features of this period are the reform and transformation of the post-communist parties in East Central Europe and their conservation in the Balkans. Obviously, the partyist ECE regimes are much more democratic than the facade democracies or elitist democracies in the Balkans.

3 The crucial turning point for the parties came after the first elections through power transfer and the start of the *parliamentarization* process. In this period the overparticipation was reinforced by the winners, the parliamentary parties, which acted aggressively to exclude both all the other socio-political actors and the non-parliamentary parties from politics. Their justification was based upon the particularistic nature of other organizations compared to parties, which represent more general, if not national, interests. The exclusion was also seen as protecting parliamentary democracy from the 'corporative' pressure of organized interests which were, supposedly, in most cases delegitimized by their participation in the former political system. At the same time, parliamentary parties concentrated all resources in political and public life on themselves, raising the 'entrance fee' into politics too high for the other parties. There was one historical occasion following the first elections when parties received big office buildings as their headquarters, along with many other privileges. The democratic institutionalization of macro-politics - parties, parliament and government - had to take place quickly, and its actors asserted their rights emphatically and aggressively.

The biggest challenge for the parties' organizational structure was certainly their participation in power with all its consequences. The parties were, even before the elections, organized from above by small groups of intellectual elites taking the initiative. After the elections this top-down organizational character became absolutely and shockingly quickly predominant. *Overparticipation* and *overparliamentarization* reinforced each other, and politics once again became a remote realm for people, but this time on a multi-party base. The size of party memberships first quickly increased in the parliamentarization phase, reaching a peak in 1991-2, and then began to decline slowly. Parliamentary parties re-mained relatively small - except for some post-communist parties with membership continuity - but still have monopolized the public scene by securing privileged access to the media for themselves. This cruel selection process among parties by the first elections was necessary and unavoidable, and it has mostly been successful. But the selfishness of the 'successful' parliamentary parties and their eagerness to become the only actors of the political game backfired and isolated the parliamentary parties even more from society. The parliamentarization of parties has played a positive role even in the presidential systems, where the parliaments have been weak and subdued.<sup>2</sup>

The political parties had to turn inside in order to organize themselves under the new, powerful pressure of parliamentarization. This occurred in two ways: in the parliament as party factions with their leaderships and expert teams; and within the party as a relationship between the newly 'parliamentarized' leadership and the whole membership. For some time, the parties had very few leading personalities and an even smaller group of experts. The leaderships of party and parliamentary factions merged very closely; therefore, the gap suddenly increased between the narrow party elite and rank-and-file members. In the early 1990s a special 'con-gressing' way of working among the ECE parties began. Since then they have very often convened

party congresses or national meetings to mobilize the membership and to give the activists a chance to participate and control the leadership, This 'congressing' has obviously been a substitute for everyday party life, missing so far because of the low density of party membership and low intensity of usual party activities.

The relative social vacuum in and around the new ECE parties was reinforced by the overparticipation in the parliamentarization stage in the early 1990s. It weakened their 'conversion' function, that is, they were not able fully to articulate and aggregate social demands into programme packages as political alternatives at the national level. The more effort they made to achieve an independent political profile of their own, the more similar they looked. They were indistinguishable regarding basic issues of social and economic policy. The genetic defect of the ECE party systems was that most parties claimed to represent the whole nation directly and without distinction or special preference for the particular interests of some social strata or classes. It should be noted, however, that there is a second group of parties which are still '*travestita* interest organizations', and they represent the highly particularistic interests of some social strata directly and rigidly. But these organized interests, in the form of parties, have been the exceptions, and 'national' parties have dominated on the political scene. Earlier these 'national' parties were exclusivist and overcompetitive, but as premature or pseudo catch-all parties they were yet faceless to the general population. They lacked a solid party *identity* of their own; consequently, their party *identification* was also very weak among their voters. Since they were so weak in the social wilderness, the parties relied more on their privileged political power existence, which created, by means of this vicious circle, more and more social alienation from politics.

There are three major tendencies which have undermined the organizational strength of the ECE parties:

1. The '*senilization*' of party memberships, that is, the growing age of the members with all of its consequences, since it is mainly the senior citizens or the elderly who have time and energy for political activities. The young and middle generations are too busy trying to earn a modest income in the circumstances of the economic crisis and, in general, the most active and talented people tend to avoid political careers. After a peak period the younger people usually left the parties, so that local party meetings, if any, resemble senior citizens' clubs, where those present put forward their individual frustrations and outdated ideas.
2. The '*law of small numbers*', meaning that even within the small memberships those with extremist and radical views tend to stay inside the parties and to dominate the party's grassroots activities. This leads to the 'fundamentalization' or radicalization of party memberships. Thus, a small number of true believers try to determine the party profiles from below. The radicalism of true believers usually creates a credibility gap between the party membership and its constituency, that is, between the 'inner' and 'outer' party. The small radical core in this way alienates the voters concerned and tries to take the party leadership hostage, making party democracy

more dangerous, if there is any wish at all on the part of the party elites to move in this direction.

3. The *top-down construction and truncated pyramid* are characteristic of the ECE parties, in contrast to the interrelationships of different levels of party existence and to the normal organizational pyramid of Western parties. First, in my view, parties exist in forms or levels of social existence (membership party and organization party) and political existence (programme party and power party). The political existence of the ECE parties is much stronger than their social existence, and within the political existence the power party is the dominant form. Therefore, the parties have been built from the top down; that is, from the power party down to the membership party. Second, concerning the internal organization of parties, among its five layers - top leaders, middle-level leaders, activists, members and supporters or voters - the first three are relatively large, but strangely enough almost equal in size. The membership layer, in turn, is very small compared to others, and even more so in comparison with the fifth layer, which is relatively too broad. This structure is similar to a truncated pyramid, but stands on 'moving sands', because the party identification of voters has been largely uncertain. Even with increasing party consolidation, the party support of about half the citizens has still been very volatile.

New organizational pressure appeared in the relationships of (a) the party elite and the basic party organizations, (b) the party and its original social movement, and (c) the party elite and the media. In these premature 'media democracies' the relationship to the media turned out to be vital for these new parliamentary parties in at least three respects.

1. The new party leaders were intellectuals and they had an extreme sensitivity and vanity concerning the press, the opinions of their former colleagues and those of their own former socio-cultural milieu.
2. The new parties were engaged in a cultural war among themselves because of their vague and over-ideologized programmes and 'tribal', sub-cultural political profiles. In this cultural war the media was crucially important for them.
3. Intensive media contacts compensated the party leaders for the organizational deficit and for the weakness of the national organization with its missing communication channels within the party. In fact, the media messages (or 'congressing') were substitutes for regular party meetings.

As this analysis shows, in the first half of the 1990s the ECE parties were not yet real, fully developed parties, since they were either above this level claiming to be the only 'national' party (state-party complex) or below this level being the barely concealed representatives of specific organized interests (interest organization complex). With all these setbacks, parties developed significantly in the

parliamentarization stage, first of all in an organizational-institutional aspect. There was a large structural differentiation inside the parliamentary parties among various party institutions, in the forms of special departments in the party headquarters, and in roles along the lines of the Weberian division of labour between political leaders, party administrators and special expert teams. Parties were the major actors also in the parliamentarization process but they were, at the same time, the most important products of this process, although still unfinished products with both institutional and cultural deficits. They developed, however, in this period toward a limited or *moderate pluralism*, in Sartori's terms, through the political learning process in the first coalition governments. The ECE parties reduced their internal heterogeneity ('many parties in one') to a great extent and created clearer party profiles (although not yet unambiguous in many respects), while the Balkan parties have been kept, at most, in the early parliamentarization stage.<sup>3</sup>

4 By the later years of the 1990s, however, the ECE parties and party systems entered a new - the fourth - stage of their emergence. The widening of politics has now become a vital necessity for the parties, although they have given up the monopoly of their political roles only with some hesitation. Yet, the opening up of the national political scene has begun, step by step, to include organized interests, local-regional self-governments and civil society associations, in terms of both an institutionalization of the pre-parliamentary stage in the decision-making process and as a manifest or covert political pressure on macro-politics. The low organizational level of the political meso-systems (the missing middle) and its fragility has always been the weakest point of the ECE political systems and it has been the missing link between parties and the population. There has been a lack of functional democracy which could provide the interest articulation and aggregation for the macro-politics, and this negative historical heritage has now to be overcome.

In the present period the ECE parties have turned into cartel parties under the external pressure of other actors and because of their own social weakness. They rely almost completely on the state for their resources, and share these resources exclusively among themselves (on cartel parties, see Katz and Mair, 1995). Similar moves can be noticed in all ECE countries where parties have common economic interests, drawing about 90 per cent of their incomes from state support. Consequently, the major contradiction in the ECE party formation process is that *the newly emerging parties, with many difficulties, switched very quickly, in a matter of years, from loose movement parties, representing some kind of spontaneous unity of parties and society, to rigidly organized cartels as power parties, expressing a new separation of parties and society - these being close to the traditional type of Central European hegemonic parties*. This analysis suggests that instead of the former hegemonistic or state party, a hegemonistic party system as a cartel of parties or a 'partyist' democracy may emerge in the ECE countries.<sup>4</sup>

## Towards a relative consolidation

The South European and then ECE developments have proved that strongly organized parties opt for strong parliamentary governments, while weakly organized parties in Latin America and the Balkans encourage presidential systems and personal leadership. This approach can explain the contrast between the Latin American and South European developments, but our concern here is only to show the relative closeness between ECE developments and the South European democratizations. The 'strong parties and strong parliamentarism' connection has increasingly characterized four countries in East Central Europe. The tyrannical majority has taken a presidential form only in Croatia, but in Slovakia it has had a purely parliamentary form. Democratic consolidation as the next step in the institutionalization process has to be prepared and accomplished by the consolidation of the party systems through a *'ruptura'* with traditionalism-provincialism and by promotion of Europeanization. In the case of individual party development, Europeanization means new types of linkage between parties and society, and a social dialogue, institutionalized also by the solid contacts between political parties and interest organizations. Thus, political party consolidation has at least two aspects. The first is the above-mentioned 'external' consolidation, that is, through social contacts and establishing firm relationships between macro- and meso-politics, parties and organized interests. The second aspect is, so to speak, internal, through a further and 'final' institutionalization process of parties in terms of a smooth and efficient working relationship between the major decision-making bodies, or, in general, between leadership and membership. The maturation of these two processes can pose arguments to the hypothesis of the *early freezing* of parties in East Central Europe.<sup>5</sup>

This first stage of maturation may be considered as only the partial consolidation of a partial system, but it is an important and necessary precondition of the final democratic consolidation of the entire polity. It means that the specific political profile of the individual parties and the whole structure of party systems have become almost completed and quasi consolidated. It has a long way to go to reach West European stability, and even after travelling some way, the ECE party systems will keep their regional particularities, as the South European party systems have kept theirs after their first phase of Europeanization. Therefore, we suggest a formulation of the early freezing hypothesis through Olson's statement, based on the findings of ECE analysts:

Parties now developing in Central Europe may very well evolve their own distinctive traits, not closely resembling those currently known in western democracies. The range of possible structure and behavior is much wider in the new democracies simply because they are starting anew... We are perhaps witnessing the 'freezing moment' of the new party systems of post-communist countries. (Olson, 1993: 620)

This hypothesis, seemingly, contradicts the mainstream argument regarding the relative social vacuum in and around these 'half-created' parties and party systems, but in fact it does not. There has been a rapid advancement of the ECE party systems in the past years. If we take all the international and domestic factors into account, we can see why this early freezing has occurred to the ECE party systems. The first determining factor is rather obvious: the ECE parties can survive internationally and domestically only if they fit into the West European party systems, into the party Internationals. These Internationals have given a mandatory framework for cooperation to all major types of ECE parties as their respective partners. They are ready to support and protect them, but only by forcing them through a political learning process. This is a multi-faceted process, in which the Euro-connection of parties, including both the demonstration effects of, and the organizational constraints from, Western parties have to be considered as milder or tougher forms of this forced cooperation. The Western parties provide informal channels for the practical operation of their ECE partners and make official declarations to protect their counterparts, also giving them moral and financial support in electoral campaigns. The snowball effect has been in force in this respect as well, inasmuch as these 'import' models have to be increasingly applied by the ECE parties as they compete vigorously with each other.

All in all, the EU expects ECE parties to meet the European model of individual parties and structure of party systems in order to be accepted as partners. There is therefore not much chance for latecomers, not having West European 'parents', or for the 'non-standard parties' as the Slovak political scientists call these 'outsiders' (see Meseznikov, 1995:106-8). But there is a strong chance of a further selection, fusion or disappearance of parties belonging to the same family of parties. The inner party structures may be fragile, and therefore some smaller parties can still emerge and/or disappear, but the major actors are already on the political scene and the future structural transformations in the ECE party systems (except for Slovakia and Croatia) will be only marginal. The 'election filter' has worked efficiently by eliminating the 'hundred-party system'; many smaller parties have already been removed from political life and/or been reduced to a mere formal existence. The ECE party systems are getting closer and closer to the balanced European model of a centre-left versus centre-right based multi-party system.

The second conditioning factor operates domestically and is much less obvious than the international one but still operates intensively. The existing bigger parties have already embraced the major political alternatives and occupied their political space; therefore, there is no longer any chance for a new party to gain a large constituency. Furthermore, currently, in the present stage of the party formation process not only are the parties looking for a solid social base but also the newly emerging social strata are seeking political representation by reconquering the parties and making them more and more suitable to represent their views. Thus, after the 'culturalization' phase the parties have entered now the 'socialization' phase, that of

socio-economic constraints and pressures which create closer commitments between some parties and their respective social bases. Both the individual parties and the party structures have become more and more arranged according to the cleavages of the Lipset-Rokkan model. After at least two general elections the parties have developed more capacity for social dialogue and particular preferences for the specific demands of social strata. There is still a long way to go to the well-established 'Rokkanian' parties and party systems, but it is mostly the same parties and the same party systems that have to go through the further maturation process.<sup>6</sup>

The final - and also very important - conditioning factor in this historical development from movement parties to cartel parties has been the creation of a *political class*. It has been one of the major functions in the party formation process. This political class has already emerged and become more or less consolidated. The parties have been the chief actors in democratic transition and they have played an almost monopolistic role in the creation of the new political elite, and beyond it, of the new political class. The *political elite* embraces only the top and middle ranking party leaders, so it is an eminently party and government elite (about 10,000 people in the ECE countries). But the political class includes all those elected in (national and local) politics and those employed in public administration who are 'state-dependent' and live from politics and for politics (altogether around 100,000 persons, including the political elite in the average small countries, more in Poland and less in Slovakia, Croatia or Slovenia). There has been a lot of debate on elite change, succession or continuity in East Central Europe. Cultural and social capital has undoubtedly played the dominant role in the emergence of the new professional elites, including the new political class, the formation of which is a very important factor in the stabilization of politics and the consolidation of party systems.<sup>7</sup>

The competitive party system has already produced this new political class in the ECE countries, with an increasing professionalization, but so far with a fusion of the economic and political spheres until the privatization process ends. This has been a very positive development on one side, with the creation of an active and relatively well educated political class, but a very negative one with regard to the merger of politics and economics on the other. The next few years will decide whether the ECE countries after the privatization period, which has made the clear separation of political and economic interests impossible, will take the 'Italian Road' as partyist democracies with the clientura system of structural connections between politics and business, or turn towards the 'Austrian Road', as some kind of neo-corporatist democracy, with more or less regulated relationships and articulated separation of these two worlds. The latter is more likely, since the tripartite institutions are already relatively well developed in all ECE countries. They have not worked properly so far because of the domination of privatization eagerness in politics, penetrating the entire political class (see Ágh and Ilonszki, 1996). Further consolidation of the ECE party systems can be expected at the end of the 1990s when privatization ends and laws on conflict of interest can be brought into play to achieve separation of the worlds of

politics and business.

### Party types: the party formation process

In the conventional literature on the ECE and Balkan parties the problems of party *systems* and *individual* parties have usually been treated without a careful distinction, creating many confusions. After having analysed party systems through four periods of development from movements to cartel parties, we deal here with the specific party formation process concerning only the main individual party types and their internal maturation processes.

There are several ways of characterizing the ECE and Balkan parties by using typologies. The following analysis outlines the most common typologies, adding my own functional and genetic approaches as well. This analysis of the development of the individual parties and their types will, hopefully, provide further arguments for the hypothesis of 'early freezing' in East Central Europe.

*Descriptive-quantitative typology* Parties may be characterized according to their size as far as membership or parliamentary seats are concerned. It is easy to conclude that the 'hundred-party system' still exists in the ECE and Balkan countries, since formally/legally there are more than one hundred parties everywhere, but actually the zones of the large, medium-sized and small parties have been differentiated sharply. The *small* parties still exist in great numbers, but they are completely marginalized politically and do not play any significant public/political role. Yet, we should not forget about them, because some are very aggressive small groupings on the extreme right and as 'happening' or 'performance' parties they sometimes produce a great deal of noise and public scandals. Most of the *medium-sized* parties have their own social, political and/or ethnic base by now, therefore their number in a country (usually below ten, close to five) and public / political role have already been consolidated. There are only two to four *bigger* parties in ECE countries, usually arranged around the centre-left and centre-right axis, which play the decisive role in public/political life, with 80-90 per cent of all members of parliament (Table 5.5).

*Functional typology* The party formation process in East Central Europe has produced typical functions for parties, among which two party types have proved to be predominant. The first and most characteristic party type of the emergence process, the *movement party* as an *umbrella organization*, has already been described. 'Popular fronts', so to speak, came back in the late 1980s in the ECE countries as movement-oriented parties, which at the same time were representative of the general interests of the whole nation, since they were above parties as 'fora' instead of following 'narrow' party interests. These umbrella organizations have disintegrated in the ECE



TABLE 5.5 Party concentration: the three biggest parties

Poland	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland; Polish Peasant Party; Union of Freedom 1991: 32.98 – 170 (36.8); 1993: 46.40 – 377 (81.7); 1997 48.2 – 251 (54.4)
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party; Alliance of Free Democrats; Hungarian Democratic Forum 1990: 55.01 – 292 (75.5); 1994: 64.47 – 318 (81.86)
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party; Left Bloc; Czech Social Democratic Party 1990: 66.85 – 143 (71.5); 1992: 50.31 – 127 (65.5); 1996: 66.39 – 151 (75.5)
Slovakia	Movement for Democratic Slovakia; Common Choice; Hungarian Coalition 1992: 59.38 – 117 (77.9); 1994: 55.55 – 96 (64.4)
Slovenia	Liberal Democratic Party; United List of Social Democrats; Slovenian Christian Democrats 1990: 44.8 – 37 (46.2); 1992: 51.55 – 51 (56.65); 1996: 45.6 – 44 (48.8)
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Community; Croatia Social Liberal Party; Social Democratic Party of Croatia 1990: 88.89 – 78 (97.4); 1992: 66.4 – 101 (84.1); 1995: 65.71 – 95 (74.79)
Serbia	Serbian Socialist Party; Serbian Renewal Movement; Serbian Radical Party 1990: 61.9 – 213 (85.2); 1992: 68.3 – 224 (89.8); 1993: 67.1 – 207 (82.8)
Macedonia	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia; Alliance of Reform Forces of Macedonia; Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia 1990: ?–71 (59.0); 1994: ?–97 (80.7)
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party; Union of Democratic Forces; Movement of Rights and Freedoms 1990: 89.38 – 378 (84.4); 1991: 75.05 – 240 (100.0); 1994: 73.1 – 209 (86.9); 1997: 81.9 – 214 (89.8)
Romania	Party of Social Democracy; Democratic Party of Romania (SDU); Christian Democratic National Peasant Party 1990: 68.87 – 275 (71.0); 1992: 57.90 – 242 (74.1); 1996: 66.1 – 266 (77.5)
Albania	Albanian Socialist Party; Albanian Democratic Party; Omonia 1991: 95.61 – 239 (99.6); 1992: 90.72 – 132 (94.2); 1996: 79.9 – 135 (96.3); 1997: 82.7 – 145 (93.6)

First figure gives the percentage of the vote, the second the number of seats and the figure in brackets the percentage of seats in the national parliament concerned. Further details can be found in the Appendix.

and Balkan regions, but their successor parties inherited the idea of representing the whole nation directly as ‘the party above parties’. Actually, all bigger parties more or less followed the pattern of the defunct umbrella organizations and determined their party profiles as national parties, that is, parties serving and concerting the interests of all important social strata. *These national parties, with their claim to represent ‘national interest’ directly, were in fact close to the type of state parties of the authoritarian periods, and this turn look place very quickly in the early 1990s from loose, action-oriented movement parties to rigidly*

*organized quasi state parties.*

This ECE ‘definition’ of parties above the ‘normal’ party level was accompanied by the other extreme, by the stubborn existence of some medium-sized parties below the party level, that is, too close to organized interests. (The ethnic parties are also typical middle-sized parties, but we discuss them later.) This *narrow interest party* is also an ‘archaic’ type from the party formation process, since in the early stages some interest organizations (for example, the peasant parties and the parties of entrepreneurs etc.) became parties in order to exert political pressure. There is still a grey zone between parties and interest organizations in which, to various degrees, the organizations appear legally as parties yet act politically as organized interests. This duality of national parties and interest parties, as two main functional types, is still – although decreasingly – an ‘infantile’ feature of ECE party systems, a point of departure for the parties’ further development. There is a tendency nowadays for national parties to be socially more selective, so that they can anchor themselves more in particular social strata and also for interest parties to open up beyond their direct constituencies. The early freezing process of parties is definitely going on, yet this duality is going to stay with us as a long-term functional feature: the bigger parties are usually national parties or premature catch-all parties competing for the votes of all strata, and the medium-sized parties as interest parties still rely more on the ‘automatic’ votes of their direct constituencies (Table 5.6).

*Genetic typology* Parties may be differentiated by the roles and places they had in the party formation process. In this respect, we can describe three major cleavages which originally arranged the types of the newly emerging parties with their twins or ‘anti-parties’. We have in this way six major types of parties, as discussed below.

The **first** cleavage line is between the former ruling, now *reformed post-communist*, parties and the *new opposition* parties. This confrontation through negotiations led to the formation of multi-party systems, and – with mutual deep transformations on both sides – these ‘first generation parties’ of both types are still the major players. They have mobilized the most talented people as well as the other resources, and have organized the most important parties along ideological lines most successfully. The former ruling parties disintegrated, but from among them successor parties have gone through a modernization process and in East Central Europe we now see everywhere new socialist/social democratic parties with a consolidated social and political background. The old opposition parties meanwhile have developed into the new leading parties in many cases, being the trendsetters of political development in the first years of democratization. Some of these have become parliamentary parties, eliminating or marginalizing the others from the parliamentary/political scene by politically and electorally outcompeting them. What looked like an ‘original organizational chaos’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was in fact a quick and cruel natural selection process on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. As we realize now, the most important parties established a place for themselves at a very early stage of the

TABLE 5.6 *Functional typology: 'national' and 'interest' parties*

<b>National parties</b>	
Poland	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland; Union of Freedom
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party; Alliance of Free Democrats; Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party; Czech Social Democratic Party; Left Bloc
Slovakia	Movement for Democratic Slovakia; Christian Democratic Movement
Slovenia	Liberal Democratic Party; United List of Social Democrats
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Community; Croatian Social Liberal Party; Social Democratic Party of Croatia
Serbia	Serbian Socialist Party; Serbian Renewal Movement
Macedonia	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia; Alliance of Reform Forces in Macedonia
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party; Union of Democratic Forces
Romania	Party of Social Democracy; Democratic Party of Romania
Albania	Albanian Democratic Party; Albanian Socialist Party
<b>Interest parties</b>	
Poland	Polish Peasant Party; Solidarity Trade Union
Hungary	Independent Smallholders Party; Christian Democratic Peoples Party
Czech Republic	Society for Moravia and Silesia; Agrarian Party
Slovakia	Workers Association of Slovakia; Agricultural Movement
Slovenia	Slovenia Peoples Party; Socialist Alliance of Slovenia
Croatia	Croatian Peasant Party; regionalist parties (IDS, DA, RDS)
Serbia	(Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina; Albanian Democratic Party)
Macedonia	Socialist Party of Macedonia
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Agrarian National Union; Bulgarian Business Bloc
Romania	Christian Democratic National Peasant Party
Albania	(Omonia)

For details of parties, see Appendix.

transition process. In the later stage, they have only further transformed internally, but there have been no newcomers among the bigger parties since the beginning. The first cleavage line determined the broad landscape of the party system, on both sides, although immediately after the collapse of the former system it seemed as if the ruling parties or their successors might be completely eliminated. Just the contrary has happened to the reformed leftist parties. With a relatively quick social democratization - the degree of which varies tremendously from country to country -

the reformed post-communist parties in the ECE countries have been able to survive any delegitimizing efforts of their competitors and to articulate the demands of the larger society for a renewed leftist perspective.

At the same time, in the first period the original opposition parties had the legitimacy of fighting against the one-party system. They also benefited from the early mobilization of the masses, and attracted the most talented leaders and activists as well. Although the transitional political elites are already gone to a great extent in all ECE countries, these 'priority birth rights' remain valid. The reformed leftist parties and the most important former opposition parties have captured both the largest memberships and the most skilled professional politicians, remaining the leading parties since the beginning. These two types of parties have been connected, as twins, by the same formation process described above. Both types are successor parties in some ways, since most of the former party members joined the newly emerging opposition parties in this succession process. Therefore, not only the formal/legal continuity matters in the reformed post-communist parties but also the continuity of mentality, membership and organizational principles between the old ruling parties and the newly emerging opposition parties. These two types of parties have converged in their major features, becoming national parties or early, premature catch-all parties. When the early movement parties left the stage, not only the 'legal', post-communist successor parties, but also the new parties inherited the model of the quasi state parties to a great extent.<sup>8</sup>

The former big opposition parties, seizing power after the first free elections in East Central Europe, became the new ruling parties and showed sometimes more resemblances in this period to the features of the former ruling parties than did their legal post-communist successors, since the latter were forced into opposition. Political life became over-ideologized, above all because these new parties emphasized first of all their ideological confrontations against the former political system with a loud anti-communist rhetoric, but also because the new leading parties built up clientelistic organizations rather similar to the old state parties. Thus, for various reasons, this original *dominating* cleavage between the reformed versions of the previous ruling parties and the newly emerging parties mostly lost its force and validity in East Central Europe as the 1990s wore on, although some new larger parties still try to keep and reinforce it for electoral and political advantages, as a delegitimizing device against the reformed leftist parties; and it is still the dominant cleavage in the Balkans (Table 5.7).

The **second** major cleavage between the ECE party types has been the confrontation between the *old* and *new* parties. The old, 'pre-communist' parties usually reactivated themselves only after the first new parties had emerged and were formed as 'second generation' parties; the small 'third generation' parties woke up even later. In that situation a strange contradiction came to the surface of political life, namely, soon after their emergence the new parties received both subjective and objective resources and tried to monopolize them. The belatedly arrived 'historical'



TABLE 5.7 *The early rivalry: post-communist and post-opposition parties*

<i>Poland</i>	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland vs UF, LU and Fatherland etc.
<i>Hungary</i>	Hungarian Socialist Party vs Hungarian Democratic Forum (and Alliance of Free Democrats)
<i>Czech Republic</i>	Left Bloc vs Civic Democratic Party
<i>Slovakia</i>	Common Choice vs Movement for Democratic Slovakia
<i>Slovenia</i>	United List of Social Democrats vs Christian Democrats and Liberals
<i>Croatia</i>	Social Democratic Party of Croatia vs Croatia Democratic Community
<i>Serbia</i>	Serbian Socialist Party vs Serbian Renewal Movement (Depos)
<i>Macedonia</i>	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia vs Alliance of Reform Forces
<i>Bulgaria</i>	Bulgarian Socialist Party vs Union of Democratic Forces
<i>Romania</i>	Party of Social Democracy vs Christian Democratic National Peasant Party (Democratic Convention)
<i>Albania</i>	Albanian Socialist Party vs Albanian Democratic Party

In Hungary and Slovenia there have already been governing coalitions across this divide (Hungary: HSP–AFD; Slovenia: LDP, ULSD, SCD, SDPS)

For details of parties, see Appendix.

parties, however, protested against that and wanted to get back their former party fortunes. They hoped to play a dominant role in political life as in good old times, that is in the ‘pre-communist’ period. This belated attempt at political takeover by the historical parties failed in all ECE and Balkan countries. The historical parties as second generation parties have usually been relegated to the lower positions of party politics (the Czech Social Democratic Party can be considered the only exception). They have been dwarfed, or at least significantly reduced in size, in both their social and political forms of existence and most of them have survived only as medium-sized interest parties of secondary importance. Originally these historical parties were connected to particular social strata, and to their values and interests as social democratic, Christian democratic or peasant parties which led to their ‘automatic’ revival in some cases, but only in a reduced form. In addition, because of their archaic style and outdated programmes, and primarily of their old and senilized leaderships, they have sometimes not even been competitive enough as interest parties. Hence, some new interest parties have been formed, or otherwise some trade unions or business interest associations have functioned as new interest parties. In such a way, the contradiction between the old and new types of parties has been reproduced at the level of interest parties, although not among the national parties. Altogether, the (non-communist) historical parties have some continuity and relevance in East Central Europe, but much less in the Balkans (Table 5.8).

TABLE 5.8 *Party generations: historical and new*

**Important historical parties**

<i>Poland</i>	Polish Peasant Party; Democratic Party
<i>Hungary</i>	Independent Smallholders Party; Christian Democratic Peoples Party
<i>Czech Republic</i>	Czech (oslovak) Social Democratic Party; Czechoslovak Peoples Party
<i>Slovakia</i>	Democratic Party (62 per cent of votes in the 1946 Slovak election)
<i>Slovenia</i>	Slovenian Christian Democrats
<i>Croatia</i>	Croatian Party of Rights; Croatian Peasant Party
<i>Serbia</i>	Serbian Radical Party (chetniks)
<i>Macedonia</i>	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
<i>Bulgaria</i>	Bulgarian Agrarian National Union
<i>Romania</i>	Christian Democratic National Peasant Party; National Liberal Party
<i>Albania</i>	None

**Dominant new parties**

<i>Poland</i>	Union of Freedom; Social Democracy of Republic Poland; Labour Union
<i>Hungary</i>	Alliance of Free Democrats; Hungarian Socialist Party
<i>Czech Republic</i>	Civic Democratic Party
<i>Slovakia</i>	Movement for Democratic Slovakia; Common Choice
<i>Slovenia</i>	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia; United List of Social Democrats
<i>Croatia</i>	Croatian Democratic Community; Social Democratic Party of Croatia
<i>Serbia</i>	Serbian Socialist Party
<i>Macedonia</i>	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia; Alliance of Reform Forces in Macedonia
<i>Bulgaria</i>	Bulgarian Socialist Party; Union of Democratic Forces
<i>Romania</i>	Party of Social Democracy
<i>Albania</i>	Albanian Democratic Party

For details of parties, see Appendix.

The **third** cleavage is between ethnically and or locally/regionally based parties on one side and nationalist parties on the other. The ECE and Balkan countries are multi-ethnic societies where ethnic rights and interests have been traditionally oppressed and their organizations banned or paralysed. These interests have come back with a vengeance in the democratization process through the formation of ethnic or regional parties trying to represent these national minorities at the highest level, that is, at macro-political level. At the same time, there has been the phenomenon of rising nationalism even in those ECE and Balkan countries that have not produced any significant extreme right-wing, nationalist-populist, ‘single issue’

parties like in Hungary or Albania. The only political issue for them is the representation of the interests of 'true' Polishness or Slovakness etc., against the international and/or domestic 'conspiracy' of other ethnicities, that is, their own national minorities and/or the Jews (see Bugajski, 1995a; Hockenos, 1993).

There is no doubt that the ethnically based parties sometimes overdo their legitimate cases because they are single issue parties, formulating almost exclusively ethnic or regional demands without a differentiated ideological and political stance. But to a great extent they have been forced to do so, because it is about the general understanding of democracy as a confrontation between its 'majoritarian' and 'consociational' varieties. The new ECE democracies are not yet ready to protect vital minority rights by incorporating the ethnic-regional interests in some ways into the national policy-making process. The ethnically based parties are also medium-sized parties, like some interest parties, receiving electoral support almost 'automatically'. Opposing them, there is at least one small or medium-sized extreme nationalist party in each ECE country. These extreme nationalist single-issue parties, however, have a very limited electoral support, and their political strength varies greatly from country to country. The nationalist-populist parties in East Central Europe may also be considered phenomena of the political transition, expressing the frustration and disappointment of some groups in the population, and as a reaction to Europeanization and modernization. They emphasize only the nation as a symbolic pre-modern community, the promotion of which will definitely solve all the other social and political problems. It has been much worse in the Balkans where nationalism has become the major organizing principle for almost all parties and the nationalist-populist parties of different kinds have been dominant, in most cases the new ruling parties are ultra-nationalistic and the ethnic parties are defensive (Table 5.9).

The party systems of the ECE and Balkan countries consist of these six major types of parties, as three couples or pairs of twins. The predominance of the first cleavage line characterized the early stage of the party formation process but from the very beginning it has also shown a rather quick maturation process. Therefore, by now this early feature has mostly been abandoned, although the parties still bear the signs of their particular emergence from different party 'families'. Yet, nowadays the first two cleavage lines already play a less and less decisive role, and the parties have been arranged more or less according to the Europeanization-traditionalism and left-right axes. The significance of the third cleavage has not yet been diminished; its two party types will stay with us for longer because, first, the issues of minority rights and representation even in the ECE countries are still unresolved, and secondly, the socio-economic crisis and difficulties of the European integration have produced new tensions facilitating the survival of the nationalist-populist parties, and even giving them a new push in their extravagant activities.

At the same time, this genetic party typology also shows the huge difference between the ECE and Balkan parties. First, there is a genuine, although unfinished,

TABLE 5.9 *The deepest divide: (ultra-)nationalist and ethnic-regionalist parties*

<i>Poland</i>	Confederation for Independent Poland and Fatherland vs German minorities, represented in parliament (no ethnic party)
<i>Hungary</i>	Independent Smallholders Party vs National Roundtable of Minorities (no ethnic party)
<i>Czech Republic</i>	Republican Party vs Society for Moravia and Silesia (no ethnic party)
<i>Slovakia</i>	Slovak National Party and Movement for Democratic Slovakia vs Hungarian Coalition (three parties)
<i>Slovenia</i>	Slovenian National Party vs minority representation in parliament (small ethnic organizations)
<i>Croatia</i>	Croatian Democratic Community and Croatian Party of Rights vs Serbian Democratic Party and regionalist parties (minority representation in parliament)
<i>Serbia</i>	Serbian Socialist Party, Serbian Radical Party and Serbian Renewal Movement vs the Albanian parties and Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina
<i>Macedonia</i>	IMRO-DPMNU vs Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia
<i>Bulgaria</i>	Union of Democratic Forces vs Movement for Rights and Freedoms
<i>Romania</i>	Party of Social Democracy, Party of Romanian National Unity and Greater Romania Party vs Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
<i>Albania</i>	Albanian Democratic Party vs Omonia

For details of parties, see Appendix.

social democratization process of ECE leftist parties, but the successors to the former ruling parties in the Balkan countries have simply changed the facade by renaming themselves 'socialist' parties, when in fact they are mostly 'national-socialist' parties. Secondly, the historical parties have revived as significant parties in the Balkans to a lesser degree than in East Central Europe, but the former communist parties, as special 'historical' parties of the Balkan region, still dominate in their slightly changed forms against the newly organized parties. Thirdly, both the nationalist and ethnic parties are much stronger in the Balkans than in East Central Europe. The national and ethnic issues clash in the Balkans in a violent way, producing hidden or open civil wars, while these clashes are rather minimal and peacefully controlled in the ECE countries.

*Ideological typology* The conventional Western typology describes the party families first of all as liberal, conservative or Christian democratic and socialist or social democratic etc. This approach has been most frequently applied from the very beginning to the ECE parties as well, and the ECE parties have been categorized according to those headings available in West European countries. This typology is

evident and almost unavoidable but it was misleading because of two manifest limitations. First, ideological labels such as liberal, conservative etc. could not be directly transferred from the West to the ECE region, and much less to the Balkans. These terms are rather blurred even in the West and their local meanings are absolutely idiosyncratic. Secondly, the basic information from the countries concerned was not easily available and the profiles of the ECE parties were not clearly demarcated. Nevertheless, in the ECE countries these broad party families may be observed, and the parties are moving closer to the West European types.

There are, however, also some further complications, given the fact that the information on parties has been contaminated with the ideological prejudices of either the local survey teams or those of Western analysts – in most cases both. This approach is still fruitful and necessary, however, and there have also been some very instructive studies which have identified 10 types of parties (communist, socialist, ecologist, liberal, religious, conservative, farmer, nationalist, ethnic and other) and this typology has offered deep insights into the party dynamics of both East Central and East European countries. The typology of ideological families was originally very arbitrary and misleading, but nowadays it is increasingly correct and meaningful, not only because the theoretical and empirical analysis of the ECE parties has developed a lot, but primarily because these parties themselves have developed and changed a great deal. Therefore, after many mergers and splits and internal transformations, they are closer now to the Western types. It is one of the most characteristic signs of the early freezing and maturation process that the major ECE parties by now have acquired rather clear political profiles and they can be more or less unambiguously identified along these ideological lines and labelled as member parties of the European party Internationals. They are not completely along the lines of the parties of Western Europe, and they still have a long way to go to become really Christian democratic, social democratic or liberal parties. The Balkan parties have kept their idiosyncrasies, and no significant similarity can be observed between them and the Western parties.<sup>9</sup>

Summing up the different typologies, we can conclude that, first, the genetic approach – combined with the functional one – gives us the most correct description of party types, since it appears the selection of major parties was decided very early in the party formation process. Later on, after this first turning point or rather solid point of departure, the ECE parties have come closer and closer to the West European party types, and now they can be seen more or less as proper members of the ideological party families. They have become mostly ‘standard’ parties, as Slovak political scientists term them, because in Slovakia they still have some bigger ‘non-standard’ parties, that is, those without Western parallels or counterparts, such as the Democratic Movement for Slovakia, and in this spirit the whole Balkan region can be considered as ‘non-standard’. The second turning point came in the mid-1990s, by which time the first crisis of the ECE parties along the lines of Europeanization versus provincialism, modernization versus traditionalism had been solved to some

extent. The parties with a clear engagement for modernization cum Europeanization gained the upper hand at least in Hungary, the Czech lands, Poland and Slovenia.

Secondly, after having overcome the crisis of the nationalist-traditionalist deviation, the West European roles of centre-right and centre-left parties (or party alliances) have manifestly emerged and have stabilized among the ECE parties. Thus, the early freezing means that the ECE parties have been significantly Westernized from outside, but still much less so from inside. The parties’ places and roles, as institutional frameworks, are already defined in the ECE countries, but the parties as both social networks and political organizations are still underdeveloped and immature. Yet, some ECE parties have progressed also in this field, and their success in the internal transformation, through a snowball effect, will force other parties to speed up their internal changes as well, in order to remain competitive with the most successful ones. In the Balkan region the parties have been less developed and important in the presidential systems, and yet still have played a central role in the lopsided development, that is, in both the paralysis and progress of democratization. The former ruling parties have usually kept their places in the Balkans and there has been an acute contradiction between the ‘tyrannical’ nationalist parties and the defensive ethnic parties.<sup>10</sup>

## Notes and further reading

1. The Appendix illustrates the high volatility in the first period. In the Appendix, as throughout the following chapters, the full names of the parties are given in their English version and generally I use their English abbreviation (e.g. Hungarian Democratic Forum, HFD); but when I refer to a party for the first time, I also give the abbreviation in the original (e.g. MDF - Magyar Demokrata Fórum), these being italicized for clarity in the Appendix. There are no comparative figures about the declining confidence in parties and parliaments, just in selected countries; two cases are given below:  
I (see Wyman et al., 1995: 540) - Czech Republic: 24-29%; Hungary: 11-22%; Slovakia: 16-21%; (Russia: 6-12%).  
II (see Plasser and Ulram, 1996: 16) - Czech Republic: 24-32%; Hungary: 11-23%; Poland: 8-24%; Slovakia: 16-22%; (Russia: 14-12%).
2. Wyman et al. (1995) present very rich data about parties and party behaviour in some ECE countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) compared to the countries of Eastern Europe proper (Russia and Ukraine), although in attempting to give a common picture about ‘post-communist Europe’, they make sweeping overgeneralizations, which reflect usually the EE situation. Yet, the data describe fairly well the party formation process concerning the ECE countries: (1) the party membership in these three countries is around 2 per cent of population (trade union membership is 20-39 per cent); and (2) trust in the parties (11-24 per cent) has been the lowest among all social and political organizations (22-29 per cent for the parliaments and 32-45 per cent for the media). These data suggest that the overwhelming majority of the ECE populations accept the multi-party system. It is striking, however, that supporters of the governing parties are much more willing to ban opposition parties than vice versa. The depth of party identification, of course, remains

weaker than in Western Europe: still 82-89 per cent of the ECE populations favour at least one party, which is the beginning of the consolidation of individual party identifications.

3. The Civic Democratic Party was considered to be one of the stablest parties in the Czech Republic, yet there was a Czech saying that the CDP was a conservative party with social democratic politics and with a Bolshevik leadership style on the part of Václav Klaus; or it was a 'liberal party of Leninist type'.
4. In 1996 the Hungarian parties negotiated about giving property 'forever' to all parliamentary parties and to the bigger non-parliamentary parties and sociopolitical organizations. The parties have to publish their budget every year in the *Official Gazette*; based on those documents, we can show their dependence on the state budget, which is between 85 and 95 per cent. The tendency is clear - state support has continuously grown and the membership fees have usually declined, in some cases drastically, so that Hungarian parties have relied more and more on state support in their activities.
5. In this respect, Pridham emphasizes: 'Consolidation through parties is characterized, above all, by the organization and expansion of the party structures and the party system as a whole, which is then able to control and, if needs be, moderate and integrate all forms of participation.... Clear, long term alignments between parties and social groups are established. Identities and rules of internal competition among the party elites are formed' (Pridham, 1990: 37). Parties consolidate themselves 'incrementally through piecemeal changes', as Haggard and Kaufman suggest: 'Party-system consolidation can be encouraged through a number of different institutional reforms... Party systems, of course, often reflect social and cultural cleavages that will persist even after the implementation of changes in electoral rules. Even so, such changes can make a considerable difference in reducing party-system instability' (Haggard and Kaufman, 1994: 15).
6. There have been some regular sociological surveys in Hungary on the stabilization of relationships between the political parties and their respective social bases, see Ferenc Gázsó and István Stumpf, 'Pártbázisok és választói magatartás-típusok' (Party support and types of voters' behaviour)', in Sándor Kurtán et al., *Political Yearbook of Hungary 1995*, Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 1995. These data, by the way, show much less volatility among Hungarian voters than the data in Wyman et al. (see note 1). The only larger change between the 1990 and 1994 election results is between that of the HSP and HDF (which is an eminent case of high volatility or a 'substantial pendulum swing' for some analysts, see Wyman et al., 1995: 537, 546). Otherwise, the other four parties had almost the same results twice. But even this change between the HSP and HDF proves that electoral behaviour is stable and consistent, as the HDF presented itself to a great extent as a leftist movement party in 1989-90 and only later became a centre-right party instead of a large umbrella organization. Thus, leftist voters cast their vote in 1990 mostly for the HDF and in 1994 for the HSP. This is the only 'change', which shows, in fact, a remarkable consistency of rational voting behaviour.
7. First, although the transition from 'cultural' politics, based on subcultures and values, to 'political' politics, based on social strata and their interests, has been very positive, cultural and social capital even now still plays a great role, much more than 'physical' or economic capital. Second, Ivan Szelényi argues in his latest writings and interviews (see for example, Szelényi, 1995) that a managerial capitalism has emerged in East Central Europe, at least in Hungary, in which cultural and social (network) capital is the most important vehicle to get coopted.
8. As to the membership continuity of all parties, Wyman et al. write that, 'Just who were the

party members?... One of the most striking features of our survey is that in each of our countries they are also overwhelmingly former members of the communist party. In other words, it is largely the same people active in politics now as were active in the communist period' (Wyman et al., 1995: 538-9).

9. There have been several classifications of party families, e.g. Michael Smart has identified eleven 'party streams': communist, independent socialist, social democratic, liberal radical, liberal conservative, centre-Christian democratic, conservative, nationalist, extreme right, ethnic, regional, and ecologist (see Smith, 1983: 329-31).
10. The key issue is, indeed, the emergence of balanced centre-left and centre-right parties which has taken place in most ECE countries, but the degree and character of which varies from country to country. In Hungary and Poland the centre-left is well organized, but the rightist parties are fragmented and un-consolidated to a great extent; in the Czech Republic and Slovenia the centre-right is well organized and the leftist parties are fragmented to some extent; in Slovakia and Croatia both sides are still weak and fragmented.

### Appendix: The most important political parties of East Central Europe and the Balkans

The first figure given indicates the percentage share of the vote, the second the number of seats and the third (in brackets) the percentage of seats in the national parliament concerned. 'Lost vote' is the vote cast for parties not gaining parliamentary representation. Note 1 above gives details of the system of abbreviations.

#### *East Central Europe*

##### **Poland**

In the 1989 semi-free election 65 per cent of seats were reserved for the **Polish United Workers Party** (PUWP; *PZPR*) and its allies (United **Peasant Party**, **Democratic Party** and three small Catholic satellite organizations). Among the Catholic organizations, **Pax** had 10 seats in the contractual parliament and was organized later as **Christian Democracy**, but after 1991 these three organizations had no parliamentary representation. On 28 January 1990 the PUWP was dissolved and the **Social Democracy of the Republic Poland** (SDRP; *SdRP*) was organized, creating an electoral coalition with the Confederation of Polish Trade Unions (OPZZ) and smaller leftist groups, called **Democratic Left Alliance** (DLA; *SLD*); membership 60,000.

1991: 11.99 - 60 (13.0); 1993: 20.41 - 171 (37.1); 1997: 27.1 - 164 (35.6).

**Polish Peasant Party** (PPP; *PSL*), organized on 5 May 1990 from the United Peasant Party (*ZSL*) and from other peasant organizations; membership 250,000.



1991: 8.67 - 48 (10.4); 1993: 15.40 - 132 (28.6); 1997: 7.3 - 27 (5.8).

In the 1989 election **Solidarity** gained 35 per cent of seats (161), all of those contested; it organized the Civic Parliamentary Club which disintegrated in parliament into smaller groups. The biggest ones were as follows. In May 1990 the Centre Alliance (PC) - or **Citizens Centre Alliance** (POC) - emerged to support Walesa and in July 1990 the **Citizens Movement for Democratic Action** (ROAD) emerged as the liberal wing, which was organized in December 1990 into the **Democratic Union** (DU; UD) and the **Christian-National Union** (CNU; *ZChN*) (first organized in October 1989 inside Solidarity). Between 1990 and 1993 a dozen post-Solidarity parties emerged which split and rejoined each other, more or less following a left-right, conservative-liberal, nationalist-European and religious-secular orientation (see the major ones below).

**Freedom Union** (*UW*), formerly the Democratic Union (DU; UD), organized on 2 December 1990, joined by the Liberal Democratic Congress, merging in 1994 to UW; membership 15,000.

1991: 12.32 - 62 (13.4); 1993: 10.59 - 74 (16.0); 1997: 13.8 - 60 (13.0).

**Labour Union** (LU; UP) from June 1992, formerly Solidarity of Labour (SP), which was organized on 4 August 1990; membership 8,000.

1991: 2.06 - 4 (0.8); 1993: 7.28 - 41 (8.9); 1997: 4.9 - 0.

**Fatherland** (*Ojczyzna*), its predecessor in the 1991 election was the Catholic Electoral Action (CEA; *WAK*); it emerged as an electoral coalition in 1993, the main force behind it being the Christian-National Union, formed from Solidarity in 1990.

1991: 8.74 - 49 (10.6); 1993: 6.37 - 00 (one seat in the Senate); 1997: 5.6 - 6 (13).

**Liberal Democratic Congress** (*KLD*), organized on 15 February 1990; after the 1991 elections it was represented in the Sejm by the **Polish Economic Programme** (PPG) and **Polish Liberal Programme** (PPL) as parliamentary factions, but it failed to get into the parliament in 1993. After this failure the Liberal Democratic Congress joined the Democratic Union and they formed the Freedom Union together (see above).

1991: 7.49 - 37 (8.2); 1993: 3.99 - 00 (0).

**(Citizens) Centre Alliance** (CCA; PC-POC) organized behind Walesa but turned against him. Almost defunct in 1992, since two groups left: the right wing formed the Movement for Republic (*RDR*), while the liberal wing joined the Polish Liberal Programme.

1991: 8.71 - 44 (9.7); 1993: 4.42 - 00 (0).

**Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reform** (NBSR; *BBWR*), organized by Walesa before the 1993 election.

1993: 5.41 - 16 (3.4).

**Solidarity Trade Union** (*NSZZ*), the trade union wing of Solidarity Organized by Marian Krzaklewski, the leader of Solidarity after Walesa. It is a trade union party, that is, its organization has been based on the trade union network in working places, its membership is about 1.8 million. In 1996 it established the **Electoral Action of Solidarity** (AWS) for the centre-right parties.

1991: 5.05 - 27 (6.0); 1993: 4.90 - 0 (0); 1997: 33.8 - 201 (43.7).

**Peasant Accord** (PL), the peasant wing of Solidarity.

1991: 5.47-28 (6.2); 1993: 2.37-00 (0).

**Confederation for Independent Poland** (*KPN*), a third party family, neither post-communist, nor post-Solidarity, organized in September 1979; membership 25,000.

1991: 7.50 - 46 (10.2); 1993: 5.77 - 22 (4.7); 1997: 0.

Electoral threshold: in 1993, 5 per cent for parties, 8 per cent for coalitions; the 5 per cent threshold to get seats from the national list (69 seats) was raised to 7 per cent from 4 per cent in 1992.

Participation: 1989: 62.32; 1991: 43.20; 1993: 52.06; 1997: 47.93 per cent.

Lost vote: 1989: 0; 1991: 0; 1993: 35.14; 1997: 11.8 per cent.

## Hungary

The former ruling party, the **Hungarian Socialist Workers Party** (HSWP; MSZMP) was dissolved in October 1989 and the **Hungarian Socialist Party** (HSP; MSZP) emerged, with no membership continuity between HSWP and HSP; membership 37,000 (2,500 basic organizations and about 300 party employees).

1990: 10.89 - 33 (8.5); 1994: 32.99 - 209 (54.1).

**Hungarian Democratic Forum** (HDF; MDF), membership 25,000 (587 basic organizations and 136 party employees).

1990: 24.73 - 165 (42.7); 1994: 11.74 - 38 (9.8).

**Alliance of Free Democrats** (AFD; SZDSZ), membership 32,000 (740 basic organizations and 102 party employees).

1990: 21.39 - 94 (24.3); 1994:19,74 - 71 (18.5).

**Independent Smallholders Party** (ISP; FKGP), membership 60,000 (1,700 basic organizations and 76 party employees).

1990:11.73 - 44 (11.4); 1994: 8.82 - 26 (6.7).

**Alliance of Young Democrats** (Fidesz), in 1995 added the name of **Hungarian Civic Party** (MPP); membership 15,000 (300 basic organizations and 45 party employees).

1990: 8.95 - 22 (5.7); 1994: 7.02 - 20 (5,2).

**Christian Democratic Peoples Party** (CDPP; KDNP), membership 27,000 (750 basic organizations and 24 party employees).

1990: 6.46 - 21 (5.4); 1994: 7.03 - 22 (5.7).

Electoral threshold: 4 per cent in 1990, 5 per cent in 1994.

The biggest non-parliamentary party is the **Hungarian Socialist Workers Party** (now **Workers Party**, WP; MP), vote 1990: 3.68; 1994: 3.19 per cent.

Participation: 1990: 63.1; 1994: 68.9 per cent.

Lost vote: 1990: 10.99; 1994: 9.97 per cent.

## Czech Republic

**Czechoslovak Communist Party** (CCP; KSC) or later **Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia** (CPBM; KSCM) (organized on 31 March 1990), after the first elections turned into **Left Bloc**, but separated from it for the 1996 elections; membership 200,000.

1990:13.24 - 16 (8.0); 1992: 14.05 - 35 (17.5); 1996:10.33 - 22 (11).

**Civic Forum** (CF; OF), organized on 19 November 1989 and split in 1991 into **Civic Democratic Party** (CDP; ODS), organized on 20 April 1990, membership 22,000, and **Civic Movement** (CM; OH), organized on 27 April 1990; membership 30,000 -but this latter party has lost its membership and significance. In the 1992 elections the Civic Democratic Party was in electoral alliance with the **Christian Democratic Party** (ChDP; KDS); it was organized already in 1989, but this small religious party could survive only in alliance with the CDP and in 1996 the two parties merged.

Civic Forum: 1990: 49.50 - 127 (63.5).

CDP-ChDP: 1992: 29.73 - 76 (38.0) of which CDP: 66 (33.0), ChDP: 10 (5.0); 1996:

29.62-68(34.0).

Civic Movement: 1992: 4.49 - 00 (0).

**Civic Democratic Alliance** (CDA; ODA), was organized as a small rightist group before the November events, became a party in December 1989, and later joined Civic Forum in a 1990 election alliance. With the disintegration of CF it became an independent party again. It tries to be the competitor of the CDP from the right; membership 2,500.

1992: 5.93 - 14 (7.0); 1996: 6.36 -13 (6.5).

**Society for Moravia and Silesia** (HSD-SMS), left the Civic Forum as a regionalist party in January 1990.

1990:10.3 - 22 (11.0); 1992: 5.87 - 14 (7.0); 1996: 0.42 + 0.27 - 00 (0).

**Christian Democratic Union** (CDU; KDU), membership 80,000; organized on 3 December 1989 with Christian Democratic Party (KDS) in an effort to form a federal party with the Slovak counterpart; in 1992 and 1996 in electoral alliance with **Czechoslovak People's Party** (CSL), the latter was founded in October 1918, and survived during the state socialist period as a member of the National Front. It combines a rural orientation with the Christian Socialist traditions.

1990: 8.42 - 19 (9.5); 1992: 6.28 - 15 (7.5); 1996: 8.08 - 22 (11.0).

**Czech(oslovak) Social Democratic Party** (CSDP; CSSD), founded in 1878, reorganized in December 1989, a historical party as the leading force of the Europeanizer left; membership 13,000.

1990: 4.11 - 00 (0); 1992: 6.53 - 16 (8.0); 1996: 26.44 - 61 (30.5).

**Liberal Democratic Party** (LDS), organized in November 1898 from the Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative (1987) and ran in the 1990 election with the Civic Forum; the **Liberal Social Union** (LSU) was organized after the 1990 election as a coalition of the **Czech(oslovak) Socialist Party** (CSS), the **Agrarian Party** (CSSZ) and the **Green Party** (SZ); membership 11,000.

1990 (separately): 10.89 - 00 (0); (together) 1992: 6.52 - 16 (8.0); 1996: 0 (party disbanded).

**Republican Party-Alliance for Republic** (RP; SPR-RSC), formed in December 1989, in the 1990 election ran with the Civic Forum, then separated as **an extreme** right, nationalistic party; membership 55,000.

1990: 0000-00 (0); 1992: 5.98 - 14 (7.0); 1996: 8.01 - 18 (9.0).

The parliamentary data refer to the Czech National Council.

Electoral threshold: 5 per cent for parties; in 1992 7 per cent for **coalitions** of

two parties, 9 per cent for three parties.

Participation: 1990: 96.8; 1992: 85.1; 1996: 75.7 per cent.

Lost vote: 1990: 18.11; 1992:19.11; 1996: 11.15 per cent.

## Slovakia

**Communist Party of Slovakia** (CPS; KSS), renamed on 20 October 1990 as the **Party of the Democratic Left** (PDL; SDL) and decided on a re-registration of members in January 1991; it organized an electoral coalition called **Common Choice** (SV) for the 1994 election, joined by the Green Party, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia and the Agricultural Movement; opposed by the Workers Alliance of Slovakia, representing the close CPS tradition; membership 48,000.

1990:13.13 - 22 (14.6); 1992:14.70 - 29 (19.3); 1994: 10.41 - 18 (12.0).

**Public Against Violence** (PAV; *VPN*), emerged on 20 November 1989 as an umbrella organization, it ceased to exist in the original form in March 1991 as a result of a split between the pro-federation PAV and the emerging anti-federation Movement for Democratic Slovakia .

1990:29.34-48(32.0).

**Movement for Democratic Slovakia** (MDS; *HZDS*), founded by Meciar on 6 March 1991 and organized as an independent party on 22 June 1991; the MDS has become the biggest Slovak party, although it has had some further splits; membership 34,000.

1992: 37.26 - 74 (49.3); 1994: 34.96 - 61 (40.6).

**Civic Democratic Union** (CDU; *ODU*): the remaining PAV members formed another party (PAV-Civic Movement, then CDU); it could not survive but it is one of the precursors of the Democratic Union of Slovakia.

1992:4.03-0(00).

**Democratic Union of Slovakia** (DUS; *DUS*), emerged from the split in the MDS, joined also by the residual CDU; membership 2,000.

1994:8.57-15(10.0).

**Christian Democratic Movement** (CDM; *KDH*), founded in December 1989; the ultra-nationalistic elements were pushed out in March 1992. Solid conservative party; membership 27,000.

1990: 19.20 - 31 (20.6); 1992: 8.88 - 18 (12.0); 1994: 10.08 - 17 (11.3).

**Hungarian Coalition** (HC; *MK*), composed of the **Coexistence** (*Együttélés*, organized in February 1990), **Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement** (*MKDM*, organized in March 1990) and **Hungarian Civic Party** (MPP, organized in January 1992); membership 36,000.

1990: 8.66 - 14 (9.3); 1992: 7.42 - 14 (9.3); 1994: 10.18 - 17 (12.0).

**Slovak National Party** (SNP; *SNS*), organized in February 1990; membership 7,000.

1990: 13.94 - 22 (14.6); 1992: 7.93 - 15 (10.0); 1994: 5.40 - 9 (6.0).

**Democratic Party** (DP; *DS*), founded in 1944 as the Party of Slovak Renewal (gained 62 per cent in the 1946 Slovak election and was liquidated in 1947-48); reorganized in December 1989 as DP, formed an alliance in 1992 with the **Civic Democratic Party** (ODS), which is a small Slovak party and has no connection with the big Czech party under the same name.

1990: 4.39 - 7 (4.6); 1992: 3.31 - 00 (0); 1994: 3.42 - 00 (0).

**Green Party** (SZ), in 1994 electoral coalition with the Common Choice. 1990: 3.48 - 6 (4.0).

**Workers Association of Slovakia** (WAS; *ZRS*), emerged before the 1994 election as a split-off party from the Party of the Democratic Left; membership 20,000.

1994: 7.34 - 13 (8.6).

The parliamentary data from 1990 and 1992 also refer to the Slovak National Council.

Electoral threshold: 3 per cent in 1990; 5 per cent for one party, 7 per cent for two-three party coalitions and 10 per cent for more than three parties in 1992 and 8 per cent for two parties in 1994.

Participation: 1990: 96.8; 1992: 84.2; 1994: 75.2 per cent.

Lost votes: 1990: 7.65; 1992: 23.81; 1994: 13.06 per cent.

## Slovenia

The **League of Slovenian Communists** (LSC; *ZKS*), renamed on 7 February 1990 as the **Party of Democratic Renewal** (PDR; *SDP*) and organized as a coalition for the 1992 election as the **United List of Social Democrats** (ULSD; *ZLSD*) jointly with the Workers Party, Social Democratic Union and Democratic Party of Pensioners (DSP).

1990: 17.3 - 14 (17.5); 1992: 13.58 - 14 (15.55); 1996: 9.03 - 9 (10.0).

**Demos** (Democratic Opposition of Slovenia), seven-party coalition organized for the 1990 election, disintegrated in late 1991 (SCO, SDPS, GS, SDA, SFP - see below; Democratic Party of Pensioners and Party of Craftsmen).

1990:54.4-47(58.7).

**Liberal Democratic Party** (LDP; *LDS*), organized on 10 November 1990; on 12 March 1994 organized a bigger liberal party coalition as **Liberal Democracy of Slovenia** (*LDS*), joined by the Democratic Party and the Greens.

1990: 14.5 - 12 (15.0); 1992: 23.46 - 22 (24.44); 1996: 27.01 - 25 (27.7).

**Slovenian Christian Democrats** (SCD; *SKD*), historical party, reorganized on 10 March 1989.

1990: 13.0 - 11 (13.7); 1992: 14.51 - 15 (16.66); 1996: 9.62 - 10 (11.1).

**Slovenian Farmers Party** (SFP; SPL) - later **Slovenian Peoples Party** (SPP; SLS), organized on 12 May 1988.

1990: 12.6 - 11 (13.7); 1992: 8.69 - 10 (11.11); 1996: 19.38 - 19 (21.1).

**Slovenian Democratic Alliance** (SDA; SDS), later **Democratic Party** (DS), organized on 11 January 1983; in 1994 joined the LDP but ran again independently in the 1996 elections.

1990: 9.5 - 8 (10.0); 1992: 5.01 - 6 (6.66); 1996: 2.68 - 0.

**Greens of Slovenia** (GS; ZS), organized on 11 June 1989; in 1994 joined the LDP, but ran again independently in the 1996 elections.

1990: 8.8 - 8 (10.0); 1992: 3.70 - 5 (5.55); 1996: 1.76 - 00 (0).

**Social Democratic Party of Slovenia** (SDPS; SDSS), reorganized on 16 February 1989 and became a rather right-wing party.

1990: 7.4 - 6 (7.5); 1992: 3.34 - 4 (4.44); 1996: 16.13 - 16 (17.7).

**Socialist Party of Slovenia** (SSS), organized on 9 June 1990.

1990: 5.4 - 5 (5.75); 1992: 2.8 - 00 (0).

**Slovenian National Party** (*SNS*), organized on 17 March 1991 from a faction of SFP as an ultra-nationalistic party.

1992: 10.02 - 12 (13.33); 1996: 3.22 - 4 (4.4).

The parliamentary data in 1990 refer to the socio-political chamber which was the main chamber of the three former chambers (it had 80 seats) and has become the parliament (with

90 seats). Sixteen parties participated in the 1990 election and 9 became parliamentary parties, 26 and 8 in 1992, 20 and 7 in 1996 respectively.

Electoral threshold: 2.5 per cent in 1990; 3.4 per cent (3 seats) in 1992.

Participation: 1990: 83.51; 1992: 85.84; 1996: 73.2 per cent. Lost vote: 1990: 8.0;

1992: 17.69; 1996:11.29 per cent.

## Croatia

**The Croatian League of Communists** (CLC; *SKH*) became the **Social Democratic Party of Croatia** (SDPC; SPDH). In 1990 the **Socialist Party of Croatia** (SSH) had both common candidates with SDPC and separate ones (here counted together). The SDPC in 1992 received also three Serbian seats (not counted here).

1990: 34.97 - 20 (25.00); 1992: 5.40 - 3 (2.50); 1995: 8.93 - 9 (7.08).

**Croatian Democratic Community** (CDC; HDZ) as an umbrella organization was formed on 17 June 1989; it split in 1993 and the **Croatian Independent Democrats** (*HND*) left, but gained only one seat in 1995.

1990: 41.93 - 55 (68.75); 1992: 43.72 - 85 (70.84); 1995: 45.23 - 75 (59.05).

For the 1990 election a four-party coalition was formed under the name of **Coalition of People's Agreement** (*KNS*), but one member of the coalition, the Croatian Democratic Party (HDS), also ran separately and had one seat (here counted together and these figures are repeated below at CSLP).

1990:15.34-3(3.75).

**Serbian Democratic Party** (SDS), organized on 17 February 1990 as an ethnic party and later pushed into the background during the war; the **Serbian National Party** (SNS) was organized as a party loyal to the Croatian government but not representative. In 1992 the three seats it received as an ethnic party were given to SDPC. In 1995 the Serbian minority received three seats.

1990:1.62 - 1 (1.25); 1992:1.06 - 00 (0); 1995: (-) 3 (2.36).

**Croatian Social Liberal Party** (CSLP; HSLS), organized on 20 May 1989; a member of the four-party coalition in 1990 (see above).

1990:15.34 - 3 (3.75); 1992: 17.33 - 13 (10.84); 1995: 11.55 - 11 (8.66).



**Croatian Party of Rights** (CPR; HSP), historical party from 1861, reorganized on 25 February 1990, ultra-nationalistic.

1990: -; 1992: 6.91 - 5 (4.17); 1995: 5.01 - 4 (3.14).

**Peoples Party of Croatia** (PPC; *HNS*) organized on 31 January 1991. In 1995 joined an electoral alliance with the Croatian Peasant Party and regionalist parties.

1990: -; 1992: 6.55 - 4 (3.34); 1995: (18.26 - 21 (16.53)).

**Croatian Peasant Party** (CPP; HSS), founded in 1904, reorganized on 20 November 1989; in 1995 joined electoral alliance with the PPC and regionalist parties.

1990: -; 1992: 4.16 -3 (2.50); 1995: (18.26 - 21 (16.53)).

**Coalition of Regionalist Parties**, the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS, Pula: February 1990), the Dalmatian Action (DA, Split: December 1990) and Democratic Alliance of Rijeka (RDS, in early 1990). In 1995 joined an electoral alliance with two other parties (PPC, CPP).

1990: -; 1992: 3.11 - 6 (5.00); 1995: [18.26 - 21 (16.53)].

Electoral regulations: very complicated and arbitrarily changed several times by the CDC tyrannical majority. For 1990 only 80 seats of the socio-political chamber which has become the parliament are counted; in 1992 only 120 seats, because 18 other seats (for minorities) were distributed by the Constitutional Court. In 1995 there were 127 seats (108 elected in Croatia - both on party lists and in single member individual districts - 12 in diaspora and 7 given to minorities). In 1995 28 parties ran for the election and 12 parties gained seats in the parliament (five of them only with one seat). In some ways all opposition parties formed electoral coalitions against the CDC, both on party lists and in the single member individual districts.

The Coalition of People's Agreement was organized in 1990 by the Croatian Social Liberal Party, Croatian Christian Democratic Party, Croatian Democratic Party and Social Democratic Party; in the 1992 election several party coalitions were formed; in 1995 all opposition parties organized resistance against CDC in some ways, but the CPP, the PPC and the regionalist parties formed a direct electoral coalition.

Participation: 1990: 84.47; 1992: 75.61; 1995: 68.79 per cent.

Lost vote: 1990: 3.1; 1992:11.8; 1995: 0 per cent.

## *Balkan parties*

### **Serbia**

**Serbian Socialist Party** (SSP; SPS), formerly **League of Serbian Communists** (LSC; *SKS*), reorganized on 16 July 1990 with full organization and membership continuity.

1990: 46.1 - 194 (77.6); 1992: 28.8 - 101 (40.4); 1993: 36.7 - 123 (49.2).

**Serbian Renewal Movement** (SRM; SPO), began during 1989 as **Serbian National**

**Renewal** (SNO); organized in January 1990 and turned by the charismatic writer and orator Vuk Draskovic to SRM as a party in August 1990. It follows the line of ultra-nationalism for Greater Serbia but formed an alliance of Depos (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) against Milosevic in May 1992 with the Democratic Party of Serbia (DOS; DSS), the Serbian Liberal Party (SLP; *SLŠ*), the New Democracy -Movement for Serbia (ND-MS; ND-PS) and the Peasant Party (PP); the 1992 and 1993 figures indicate the results of the Depos bloc.

1990: 15.8 - 19 (7.6); 1992:16.9 - 50 (20.2); 1993:16.6 - 45 (18.0).

**Serbian Radical Party** (SRP; SRS) began from the SNO-SPO line but Vojislav Seselj founded a new ultra-nationalist party in January 1990. As a follower of Cetnik tradition it has been the most militant nationalist party, sponsored and bolstered by the Milosevic regime as a shield for its own nationalist policies, but it turned later against Milosevic.

1990: -; 1992: 22.6 - 73 (29.2); 1993:13.8 - 39 (15.6).

**Democratic Party** (DS), founded on 3 February 1990, middle-sized Europeanizer rightist party.

1990: 7.4 - 7 (2.8); 1992: 4.2 - 6 (2.4); 1993:11.6 - 29 (11.6).

**Democratic Party of Serbia** (DOS; DSS) - small, pro-monarchist party; in May 1992 left the Democratic Party and joined Depos for the 1992 elections.

1990: -; [1992:16.9 - 50 (20.0)]; 1993: 5.1 - 7 (2.8).

**Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina** (*VMDK-DZVM*), Hungarian ethnic party organized on 31 March 1990, later splitting on the question of autonomy and the more conciliatory **Organization of Hungarians in Vojvodina** (VMSZ) was created.

1990: 2.6 - 8 (3.2); 1992: 3.0 - 9 (3.6); 1993: 2.6 - 5 (2.0).

**Albanian Democratic Party**, a small pro-Serbian party in **Kosovo**; ran only in the 1993 elections.

1993:0.7-2(0.8).

Participation: 1990: 71.5; 1992: 69.7; 1993: 61.6 per cent.

Lost vote: 1990: 10.8; 1992:14.0; 1993:13.9 per cent.

## Macedonia

**Social Democratic Union of Macedonia** (SDUM; SDSM), renamed in 1991), formerly **League of Macedonian Communists** (LMC; *SKM*) (founded in 1943) and later **Party of Democratic Transformation** (PDP; *PDT*) (organized in 1989), led by Kiro Gligorov; for the 1994 elections an electoral coalition, Alliance for Macedonia, was established.

1990: - 31 (25.8); 1994: - 58 (48.3).

**Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization** (IMRO; *VMRO*), organized originally in 1894 as a pro-Bulgarian movement to attach Macedonia to Bulgaria. Reorganized on 17 June 1990 in Macedonia as a populist-nationalist party, adding the party name **Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity** (DPMNU; *DPMNE*). Very militantly nationalistic and anti-Albanian, yet still split in January 1991 when an even more pro-Bulgarian and anti-Muslim group left (*IMRO-DP*). In the spirit of Macedonia only for (*pravoslav*) Macedonians, the IMRO has opposed the consolidation of the present Macedonian state.

1990: -38 (31.6); 1994: did not run.

**Alliance of Reform Forces of Macedonia** (*SRSM*), emerged during the first multi-party elections, later on adding the name of **Liberal Party** (LP; LS) as well; urban based liberal party.

1990: - 17 (14.1); 1994: - 29 (24.1).

**Socialist Party of Macedonia** (SPM; SPM), grew out from **Socialist Alliance** (*SS*), founded on 28 September 1990; advocates socialist and ecological values.

1990:-5 (4.1); 1994:-7 (5.8).

**Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia** (PDP; *PDP*), ethnic Albanian party, organized in April 1990, at the first multi-party elections in electoral coalition with the other Albanian party, the **National Democratic Party** (NDP; *PDP*, organized in early 1990), adopting more radical positions.

1990: - 23 (19.1); 1994: - 10 (8.3).

Participation: 1990: 84.8; 1994: 77.3 per cent.

Lost vote: none (majoritarian system, single member districts with two rounds).

## Bulgaria

**Bulgarian Socialist Party** (BSP; BSP), the **Bulgarian Communist Party** (BCP; *BKP*, founded in 1891), changed its name to BSP in April 1990, with full institutional and membership continuity. In the 1997 election ran as **Democratic Left** (DL; DL).

1990: 47.15 - 211 (52.7); 1991: 33.14 -106 (44.2); 1994: 43.5 -125 (52.0); 1997: 22.2 -57 (21.6).

**Union of Democratic Forces** (UDF; SDS), organized from 16 political groups by Zhelju Zhelev on 23 November 1989 as a member organization including BANU (see below). It has become a national-conservative party; the liberal democrats left, organizing the UDF-Centre and the UDF-Liberals for the 1991 elections. In the 1997 election ran as **Alliance of Democratic Forces** (ADF; ODS) with BANU-NP (see below).

1990: 36.20 - 144 (36.0); 1991: 34.36 -110 (45.8); 1994: 24.2 - 69 (28.7); 1997: 52.2 -137 (55.7).

**Bulgarian Agrarian National Union** (BANU; *BZNS*) - the great historical party, organized in 1900. It split in late 1989, with the more radical wing separating and taking the name of the post-war leader Nikola Petkov (BANU-NP). This wing separated again in 1994, when one group joined BSP (the Stamboliyski wing), and the other the Popular Union (see below).

1990: 8.03 - 16 (4.0); 1991: 3.86 + 3.44 - 0; 1994: [6.5 - 18 (7.5)]; 1997: -.

**Movement for Rights and Freedoms** (MRF; DPS), the ethnic Turkish and/or Muslim party, founded on 4 January 1990 by Ahmed Dogan. In the 1997 election ran as Union for National Salvation (ONS).

1990: 6.03 - 23 (5.7); 1991: 7.55 - 24 (10.0); 1994: 5.4 - 15 (6.2); 1997: 7.5 - 20 (12.5).

**Popular Union** (*NS*) emerged before the 1994 elections from the liberal wing of UDF and BANU.

1990: -; (1991: 3.20 + 2.81 - 00 (0)); 1994: 6.5 - 18 (7.5); 1997: -.

**Bulgarian Business Bloc** (BBB; *BBB*), pro-Western entrepreneurial party.

1990: -; 1991: -; 1994: 4.7 - 13 (5.4); 1997: 4.9 - 12 (5.0).

Participation: 1990: 90.79; 1991: 84.1; 1994: 75.23; 1997: 58.1 per cent.

Lost vote: 1990:1.69; 1991: 34.95; 1994: 15.59; 1997:12.3 per cent.

## Romania

**National Salvation Front** (NSF; FSN), organized by Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman on 22 December 1989, based on the decomposing **Romanian Communist Party** (PCR). Before the 1992 elections there was a split between the traditionalist and modernizing wings, the former with Iliescu adopted the name of **Democratic National Salvation Front** (DNSF; FSNF), later on the **Party of Social Democracy in Romania** (PSDR; PDSK). The modernizing wing with Roman kept the original name (NSF) and first merged with the Democratic Party and later on with the historical Romanian Social Democratic Party.

1990: 66.31 - 263 (67.9); 1992: 27.71 - 117 (35.5); 1996: 22.2 - 91 (26.5).

**Democratic Party of Romania** (PDR), organized on 27 December 1989 as a pro-Western democratic party, merged after the 1992 elections with the NSF of Petre Roman. Before the November 1996 elections this new party merged with the small historical Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR) and Petre Roman founded the **Social Democratic Union** (SDU; USD) which became a member of the Socialist International at its New York conference in September 1996.

[1990: 66.31 - 263 (67.9)]; 1992:10.18 - 43 (13.2); 1996:13.7 - 53 (15.4).

**Christian Democratic National Peasant Party** (CDNPP; *PNT-td*), one of the great historical parties, founded in 1869, refounded in 1895, banned in 1947, reorganized on 26 December 1989. Originally a peasant-populist party, although somewhat modernized recently, it has kept the inward-looking peasant orientation. It was the major force behind the **Democratic Convention of Romania** (DCR; CDR), the umbrella organization of the opposition in the 1992 and 1996 elections. The figures for 1992 and 1996 indicate the DCR results.

1990: 2.56 - 12 (3.1); 1992: 20.01 - 82 (25.4); 1996: 30.2 - 122 (35.5).

**National Liberal Party** (NLP; PNL), the other great historical party, originally founded in 1876, disbanded in 1948, reactivated on 30 December 1989. A more urban based, liberal oriented party, with a series of split and mergers. There have been almost a dozen successor parties with the name 'liberal'. As a junior partner, it participated in the 1992 and 1996 elections in the Democratic Convention of Romania.

1990: 6.41 - 29 (7.2); [1992: 20.01 - 82 (25.2)]; [1996: 30.2 - 122 (35.5)].

**Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania** (DAHR; RMDSZ-UDMR), the Hungarian ethnic party, organized on 21 December 1989.

1990: 7.23 - 29 (7.2); 1992: 7.45 - 27 (8.1); 1996: 5.8 - 25 (7.3).

**Party of Romanian National Unity** (PRNU; PUNR), an ultra-nationalist party, emerged before the May 1990 elections, based on the socio-cultural nationalistic organization

**Romanian Cradle** (*Vatra Romaneasca*), headed by Gheorghe Funar.

1990: -; 1992: 7.71 - 30 (8.9); 1996: 3.7 - 18 (5.2).

**Greater Romania Party** (GRP; PRM), established in May 1991 by a group of journalists of the newspaper *Romania Mare* (*Greater Romania*) (created in June 1990), headed by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, as an ultra-nationalist party, it competes with the PRNU.

1990: -; 1992: 3.89 - 16 (5.1); 1996: 4.1 - 19 (5.5).

Participation: 1990: 86.2; 1992: 76.28; 1996: 76.11 percent.

Lost vote: 1990: 0; 1992: 20.02; 1996: 20.3 per cent.

## Albania

**Albanian Socialist Party** (ASP; PSS), formerly **Albanian Workers Party** (AWP; PPS); changed its name to ASP in June 1991.

1991: 56.17 - 169 (70.4); 1992: 25.73 - 38 (27.1); 1996: 20.37 - 10 (7.1); 1997: 53.4 - 118 (76.1).

**Albanian Democratic Party** (ADP; PDS), formed by Sali Berisha on 19 December 1990.

1991: 38.71 - 65 (27.2); 1992: 62.09 - 92 (65.7); 1996: 55.53 - 122 (87.1); 1997: 25.3 - 24 (15.4).

**Unity Party of Human Rights** - formerly **Omonia**, the ethnic Greek party. 1991: 0.73 - 5 (2.0); 1992: 2.90 - 2 (1.4); 1996: 4.04 - 3 (2.1); 1997: n.a.

Participation: 1991: 98.92; 1992: 90.35; 1996: 89.0; 1997: 65.2 per cent.

Lost vote: 1991: 4.11; 1992: 1.79; 1996: 0; 1997: 0 per cent.

In: Ágh, Attila: *The Politics of Central Europe*. London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi: SAGE, 1998. pp. 101-139.