From Elections to Democracy in
Central Europe: Public Participation
and the Role of Civil Society
Susan Rose-Ackerman*
The new European Union member states in Eastern Europe do not have fully
consolidated democracies. True, popularly elected legislatures are responsible
for lawmaking, and citizens can challenge the case-by-case implementation
of the law. But most statutes are not self-implementing. Before they can
be put into effect, governments need to issue general regulations and guidelines
that add specificity to the statutory scheme. At present, this type of government
policy making often is not democratically accountable. Procedures
inside government lack transparency and accountability, and organized civil
society groups that are engaged in advocacy and oversight are few in number
and often weakly institutionalized. The Central European experience has
lessons for countries further to the east that are poorer and less democratic.
Here, full-fledged public participation in the government rule making may
not be feasible, but other aspects of the transition to democracy in Central
Europe may provide relevant models—for instance, external pressure, government
oversight institutions, and grassroots democracy.
Keywords: democracy; public accountability; administrative law; Hungary;
Poland
Democracy means more than elections, political party organization,
and the protection of individual rights. It also means that
policy making is accountable to the public and that officials do
not use their offices corruptly for private gain. On one account,
East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 21, No. 1, pages 31–47. ISSN 0888-3254
© 2007 by the American Council of Learned Societies. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1177/0888325406297132
31
* Prepared for the Club of Madrid IV General Assembly, Prague, Czech Republic, 10-12
November 2005. Revised 12 December 2005. Final revisions 31 July 2006. This article is based
on some of the material in Susan Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy: Building
Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005). That book is part of the Collegium Budapest project on “Honesty and Trust: Theory and
Experience in the Light of the Post-Socialist Transformation.” Other publications related to the
project are Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Trust and Honesty in Post-Socialist Societies,” Kyklos 54
(2001): 415-43; Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Trust, Honesty and Corruption: Reflections on the
State-Building Process,” Archives of European Sociology 42 (2001): 526-70; János Kornai and
Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds., Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition (New
York: Palgrave, 2004); and János Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds.,
Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
democracy requires only a stable, competitive electoral system
with broad suffrage, institutionalized political parties, and alternations
in power.1
I challenge this definition and argue that full
democracy cannot be attained unless the policy-making process
is accountable to citizens through transparent procedures that
seek to incorporate public input. In a democracy, individuals and
institutions must justify the exercise of power over others, and
success in an election is insufficient to make this claim. Thus,
when policy is made inside the government and the bureaucracy,
those making the decisions must learn from individuals, firms,
and other organizations what is at stake. The transition process
in Europe has lagged in failing to provide transparent procedures
that seek to incorporate public input. The rush to pass statutes
after the transition produced many that are vague and unclear
and that leave difficult policy issues to the implementation stage
inside government ministries and the cabinet. Citizens and organized
groups should be involved at that stage by taking part in
the rule-making process with the government retaining the ultimate
authority to issue general rules consistent with its statutory
mandates.
During the first decade of the transition, little emphasis was
given to broader issues of popular control and government
accountability outside of the electoral process.2
This relative
neglect has been costly for these countries and deserves greater
emphasis as the transition proceeds. The costs are not primarily
economic. Rather, there is an increased risk of popular disengagement
from political life based on disillusionment and distrust
of the state and its officials.3
Democracy breeds partisanship, but a democratic state should
treat its citizens impartially and fairly. To be sure, the potential alternation
in power of different party coalitions does give incumbents
a reason to avoid certain blatant forms of corruption and self-
dealing.4
But rotation in power is unlikely to induce incumbents to
behave impartially. Winners want to help their supporters and to
hurt their opponents. They want to enhance their power so that
reelection is more likely. Neutrality in the interpretation and implementation
of laws is not what many politicians want. Accountability,
then, means two different things in a democracy.
32 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
First, it means that government agents, elected or appointed, are
responsible to their principals through systems of monitoring and
oversight. This involves internal procedures by which elected
politicians can control the career bureaucracy. But ordinary citizens
are the principals of these same elected politicians. For them to be
able to monitor their representatives, government must operate
with transparency, and the press must be free so the public can
hold government to account for both overall policies and the dayto-day
implementation of programs. If the law requires impartiality,
the citizens can, at least, observe if officials are following these standards.
If the rules single out particular groups for special treatment,
citizens can observe the practical effects. Under this aspect of
accountability, one takes policies as given, and the central issue is
performance. Call this performance accountability.
In contrast, policy-making accountability requires that the
policies themselves be a reflection of the interests and needs of
the population. Competitive elections and a competent legislature
are necessary but not sufficient. As anyone who has studied
the legislative process understands, statutes frequently leave many
difficult policy issues to the implementation stage.5
Governments
use different mechanisms to fill in these policy gaps. Elections
limit the power of individual politicians and political parties, and
they are designed to map citizens’ preferences and goals into
public policies. But as Robert Dahl and Guillermo O’Donnell
argue, they are only one step toward the construction of an
accountable and competent democracy.6
Policy-making accountability requires participation and oversight
by a range of interested actors, but it also requires that the
resulting policy be effective, transparent, and capable of assessment
by ordinary citizens. Institutional design, then, is a tricky
balancing act. How can public bodies be responsive to the concerns
of citizens and yet remain insulated from improper influence?
How can they perform both as competent experts and as
democratically responsible policy makers? This tension is fundamental
to all democratic systems, but it has particular salience in
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. These
countries inherited top-heavy bureaucracies that had lost legitimacy
in the eyes of their citizens.7
The initial temptation was to
East European Politics and Societies 33
dismantle, rather than reform, these structures. But after an initial
round of privatization, the state was left with the provision of
public services such as defense and public safety, education,
health care, and infrastructure. Furthermore, the state created
new bureaucracies to regulate the newly privatized industries
and to establish a legal framework for private economic and
social life. Now that many of the states in Central Europe have
reasonably well-established electoral systems and functioning
market economies, their citizens are beginning to criticize both
the poor quality of many public services and the lack of transparency
in much public decision making.
In my recent book, From Elections to Democracy: Building
Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland, I illustrate my
argument through the study of two post-socialist countries,
Hungary and Poland, that have made the transition to electoral
democracy but have relatively weak policy-making accountability.
They have made impressive progress in “rebuilding the ship at sea,”
but the task is not complete.8
This article summarizes the main
conclusions of my research and discusses its implications for the
relatively advanced countries that recently joined the European
Union and for the poorer and less democratic countries to the east.
The problem of state building in Hungary and Poland has two
sides. These polities need to confront the problem of creating
accountable governments that can competently handle the tasks
of the regulatory welfare state. But they also need to confront the
weakness of civil society and the seeming unwillingness of citizens
to engage in political action.9
Weaknesses on both fronts
mean that governing politicians in East and Central Europe have
often been able to run their governments in extremely partisan
ways.10
This produces a polarized electorate that only expects
good treatment from government if “their” party is in power. To
the extent such problems become entrenched, they present a
threat to the legitimacy of the underlying democratic forms the
population welcomed so warmly in 1989.
I first outline the policy-making process in Hungary and
Poland to highlight exisitng weaknesses. Next, I discuss the problems
facing civil society organizations seeking an advocacy role.
The article then discusses the benefits and risks of participatory
34 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
processes drawing on the experience of the United States.
Fundamental features of U.S. administrative law—notice, openness
to a wide range of opinions and expertise, transparent and
well-justified decisions, and external oversight—seem basic principles
that should guide public policy-making processes in all
democratic governments. I conclude with some thoughts on the
more difficult reform tasks facing other transition countries such
as Ukraine and Russia.
Public participation in Poland and Hungary11
In both Poland and Hungary, the government is held accountable
through such institutions as constitutional tribunals, nonexecutive
presidents, supreme audits offices, and ombudsmen. The
Europen Union membership process introduced certain accountability
requirements. However, over and above these factors,
there are few avenues for the direct incorporation of public and
interest group concerns into government policy making. The balance
between public input and bureaucratic competence has
been imperfectly achieved and is tilted toward the side of official
expertise and organized interest groups with economic agendas.
Poland. Under the Constitution, the only route for public
input at the national level is through elections for representatives
to the Sejm (Parliament) and for the nonexecutive president.
Ministry regulations can be issued without giving notice, holding
a public hearing, or providing reasons. Final regulations must,
however, be published. Statutes and rules can be referred to the
Constitutional Tribunal for a ruling on their constitutionality, but
a referral can only be made by a limited number of bodies; individuals
only have access if they can argue that their individual
rights have been violated. The administrative courts seldom deal
with the rule-making process. Although consultations with interested
parties do occur, the law does not generally require that
drafts be sent out for comments from political parties, associations,
citizens’ groups, or experts. The Constitution gives citizens
the right to obtain information from the state, and a 2001 Act on
Access to Public Information codifies that right. However, the
East European Politics and Societies 35
act’s impact remains unclear, and it only deals with access to
information, not process. “Tripartite processes” involving labor,
management, and the government exist. However, their democratic
value is questionable because no more than 20 percent of
the workforce are union members. Elsewhere, permanent institutions
of stakeholders comment on draft normative acts and on
petitions to improve regulations. The Constitution limits formal
regulations; thus, public entities often use informal methods.
Some statutes are difficult to implement effectively because binding
rules cannot be issued and others may be administered
through informal acts and case-by-case adjudications.
Hungary. The Constitution authorizes the issuance of government
decrees as long as they do not conflict with statutes.
The Constitutional Court held, in a case involving the regulation
of abortion, that a fundamental right cannot be regulated by an
executive decree. Hungary’s Law on Normative Acts permits
“citizens—directly or through their representative bodies—to participate
in the preparation and creation of legal regulations [i.e.,
normative acts] affecting their daily life.” Unfortunately, the act is
mainly hortatory, but it does, at least, express an ideal of broad
participation. A number of Hungarian laws in areas such as the
environment and education mandate advisory councils. These
are permanent bodies with shifting individual membership that
have the right to review government proposals and sometimes
initiate studies on their own. The government is under no obligation
to consult more broadly or to consider whether some interests
are poorly represented. Under the Constitution, citizens
have a right to learn about and disseminate information of public
interest. A 1992 act codified this right, and the Environmental
Protection Act also contains a freedom of information provision.
However, information is not always easily available and may
depend upon personal connections. There is no legal requirement
to publish proposed rules and statutes. Ordinary citizens
have access to the Constitutional Court for a range of issues, but
challenges to administrative procedures are seldom successful.
The government has made some moves in the direction of openness.
A few agencies post drafts on their Web sites and send them
to mailing lists with hundreds of names.
36 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
In spite of some salient differences, the Polish and Hungarian
governments face similar challenges. The difficulties they face fall
into four categories: public knowledge, open processes, government
justifications, and judicial review.
Neither government routinely publicizes drafts of regulations
and statutes. Even when plans and drafts are made public, few
laws require open-ended hearings or information gathering from
the public. Instead, consultation is limited to preset advisory
groups or to insiders. Neither country requires written justifications
for normative acts (regulations), and such justifications are
seldom prepared.
The judiciary has not required much in the way of open and
particpatory policy-making processes inside government. Neither
the Constitutional Court in Hungary nor the Constitutional
Tribunal in Poland has taken on these issues, although the Polish
Tribunal has struck down the administration of a few laws for violating
the Constitution. In both countries, the delays, costs, and
the small chance of winning keep lawsuits by civil society groups
at a minimum.
Thus, the policy-making process inside the government risks
being either an insular exercise carried out by ministers and their
top assistants or a limited cooperative process that involves a few
outsiders serving on advisory committees or associated with the
few groups with special access to the government. These procedures
make it difficult for those who feel excluded from the
process to do anything about it. They have no right to demand
to be heard or to insist that the government defend its polices
short of a claim of unconstitutionality.
The role of private groups12
Consultation procedures in Central Europe emphasize the
involvment both of “jurisdictional” organizations and of official
bodies that represent particular organized interests. The former
are mostly local and regional governments, but the category also
includes groups such as university students and government
agencies that will be affected by the policy in question. The latter
includes labor unions and employers’ associations that
East European Politics and Societies 37
participate in an official “social dialogue.” It also includes other
organized groups of economic interests.
Largely missing from official consultation processes are civil
society groups representing poorly institutionalized interests.
(One exception here is Hungary’s National Environmental
Council, one-third of whose members are from environmental
groups.) The development of civil organizations that can act
as advocates and gadflies is in its infancy in Central Europe, as
it is in other emerging democracies. My recent book illustrates
the limits of civil society participation through two contrasting
cases where organizations are relatively well established—
environmental protection advocacy in Hungary and student
groups in Poland.
Environmental advocacy organizations in Hungary. Environmental
activism in Hungary began at the end of the socialist
period with a core of activists able to mobilize large numbers of
people to protest particular issues. These mobilizations continued
into the democratic transition, but newer groups focus their
efforts on affecting policy using technical and policy arguments.
Even the most active groups, however, depend on the energy of
a few committed people, have few funds, and rely on short-term
grants. Relations with public officials are sometimes rocky, but
the groups’ access to the media and public sympathy for their
efforts have helped keep them in operation and given them
some influence. These nonprofits all have problems of (1) financial
and human capacity, (2) credibility, and (3) effective access to the
policy-making process.
Advocacy groups receive a large proportion of their funds
from government and foreign grants. As foreign foundation support
is phased out, these groups will become even more dependent
on government support unless they aggressively begin to
seek domestic private donations or develop eco-businesses to
generate revenue. This may limit their advocacy role.
In seeking credibiliy, the groups follow two broad strategies.
Some develop grassroots support and educate people about environmental
problems. Others provide expert opinions to public officials.
Both of these strategies imply that the media is independent
38 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
and willing to publicize actions that challenge government policy.
A free press is a key background condition.
Most established groups cultivate their public contacts although
some remain aloof. If access is denied or if a decision is opposed
to the group’s interests, the group can go to the courts either to
force greater openness or to challenge decisions after they are
made. This is not often a fruitful approach, but in the environmental
area, such challenges are sometimes worthwhile especially
to enforce the freedom of information act and to challenge
individual projects.
Student groups in Poland. Student and youth organizations in
Poland present a complementary case. The sector includes both
university self-governments and civil organization. One group is the
reincarnation of the official student organization under communism.
A second group was formed in the 1980s as a counterweight
to the official group and to protest regime policies. Other groups
are oriented to professional development, often in alliance with
professional associations. All these groups interact with the official
elected student self-governments. The National Students’ Parliament
includes representatives from the university parliaments but
lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many. Several groups are trying to
create an alternative nationwide roundtable, but funds are scarce,
and they struggle to find a credible and effective role to play.
Government provides programmatic funds, and the selfgovernments
distribute public scholarship funds and provide services
under agreement with the universities. The self-governments
are deeply entwined with the state and university administration,
a fact that may blunt their ability to act as independent voices.
The groups with political party allegiances obtain government
financial support, at least when their supporters are in power. All
groups rely on donations from private firms and foundations and
on the sale of services.
Student leaders struggle with the issues of how to reinvent their
organizations, further their own careers, and interact with other
types of organizations. This case is an example of the tendency of
the state in Central Europe to gravitate toward links with formal, official
bodies as the exclusive route for group influence. It illustrates
East European Politics and Societies 39
the weaknesses of that strategy when the official organization lacks
democratic legitimacy and becomes a source of conflict.
Thus, in a different country and in a very different policy area, we
see some of the same puzzles and problems that face Hungarian
environmental groups. How much should groups cooperate with
official bodies? What are the costs and advantages of close affiliation
or identification with particular political parties? How can funding
levels be maintained without compromising independence? How
should leaders balance the need for expertise against claims of
broad popular support? If a group’s leaders have privileged access
to policy makers and politicians, will they be a strong voice for
more open and inclusive procedures?
In both cases, the administrative process encourages the
development of a few “official” voices. In contrast, a process that
is more open-ended would encourage the development of groups
that are not part of existing hierarchies and that are excluded
from formal advisory councils. This would put a greater burden
on the government bureaucracy to manage public participation
in government policy making, but on the positive side, it would
avoid solidifying closed loops of consultation between government
and certain privileged groups.
Developing accountable rule-making processes13
The weakness of the policy-making process inside Central
European governments suggests a search for alternative models.
Unfortunately, the European Union, the most obvious place to
look, lacks publicly accountable procedures when it makes policy
under EU law. Another option is the U.S. administrative process as
reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).14
I focus on the
“notice and comment rule-making” provisions of the APA, where an
agency makes policy free of the strictures of a judicialized process.
The APA requires that draft rules be publicly announced, and the
agency must have a hearing open to anyone with an interest in the
subject at hand. Final rules must be accompanied by a statement
that explains the statutory basis of the rule and justifies the outcome.
Rules can be reviewed in court for conformity with the
underlying statute and with the Constitution and for conformity
40 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
with APA procedures. Frequently, rules are found wanting, but the
courts seldom correct the problems themselves; rather, the agency
is required to reconsider its decision or follow improved procedures.
There are many practical problems in the American rulemaking
process, but in principle, it tries to cope with the problem
of balancing expertise and bureaucratic rationality against popular
concerns for openness and accountability.
Of course, a major caveat may be the limited transferability of the
U.S. model. In using U.S. practice as a guide to reform in the postsocialist
countries, one must recognize the differences in political
structure and in the organization of society. Furthermore, partial
reforms may not have the expected consequences. For example,
the introduction of greater participation rights without effective
judicial review can lead to policy distortions. Adding notice and
an ability to comment may have little effect if agencies are not
required to give reasons and are not subject to judicial oversight.15
The introduction of notice and comment rule making may be
politically difficult to achieve. Both career bureaucrats and political
officials may resist increased participation and transparency on the
grounds that they threaten to delay action and to distort choices.
Critics argue that the problems with participation are delay, bias,
irrelevance, displacement to other methods, and curbs on agency
implementation. However, most appear to be the result of poorly
designed and biased procedures, not participation per se.
Of course, some delay is an inevitable counterpart of expanded
participation. Agencies must take the time and trouble to consult.
However, the extremely long time between proposed and
final rules in the U.S. experience seems to be driven more by
strategic considerations than by cost of the process per se.16
Some rule makings only attract the interest of a few groups that
submit comments. Examination of a random sample of forty-two
rule makings found that the median number of comments was
about thirty.17
The deadlines in Hungary and Poland seem too
short, but the U.S. process could surely be streamlined. Furthermore,
advances in communication and information technology
can speed up the comment process. Most U.S. agencies have
developed comprehensive and user-friendly Web sites, and many
permit comments on draft rules to be submitted via e-mail. Of
East European Politics and Societies 41
course, the agencies still need to be able to process comments in
an effective manner, but information technology can make the
processing of comments more cost-effective.
Displacement of agency activity to nonbinding guidelines and
to implementation through the adjudication of individual cases
occurs. However, neither seems to be a general problem given
the large number of rules that U.S. agencies continue to issue.18
In any case, the problem of displacement can be overcome if the
legislature includes rule-making requirements in statutes and if
the courts resist adding incremental procedural requirements.
The proponents of participatory processes need to consider the
actual workings of procedural innovations. Rigid, cumbersome,
and biased processes are obviously not an improvement.
The costs of the rule-making process ought to be balanced
against the benefits. In the well-functioning cases, the benefits
are of several kinds. The most important benefit is that officials
draft proposed rules in the light of the forthcoming public participation
processes. Even if they consult with a biased selection
of interest groups before the public hearing process, officials
must consider how their proposals will be greeted by the public
and the media when they are publicly posted and, later, when
they are subject to judicial review.19
Public hearing processes can raise the salience of an issue with
the public and increase public knowledge about a regulatory issue.
Furthermore, studies of the hearing process suggest that in the U.S.
bureaucrats are not the captives of well-funded groups.20
Successful
efforts at public involvement can lead to choices that better reflect
public values and are substantively strong, although, of course, fair
and open procedures cannot entirely overcome partisan biases.
Open procedures cost time and money, so emerging democracies
will need to make some compromises to avoid gridlock and to
ensure that processes are not just for show. Practical implementation
requires a realistic understanding of the trade-offs involved.
Lessons for lagging transition countries
Transition countries with lower levels of wealth and less wellestablished
democratic institutions cannot immediately reach
42 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
the degree of democratic consolidation present in Hungary and
Poland and other new members of the European Union. They
cannot implement the administrative law system recommended
here unless they first establish some of the instititutions that provide
a necessary background to the public participation
processes in Hungary and Poland.
In Hungary and Poland, outside pressure from the European
Union played an important role in setting the legislative agenda
in the runup to membership. In the case of countries farther
east, the World Bank and the IMF are the key external players.
However, the relatively undemocratic character of the European
Union makes it an awkward locus of pressure for democratic
reform, and that observation holds as well for the World Bank and
the IMF in the states of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
despite such problems, these institutions have acted as spurs
to those seeking to improve accountability and transparency.
European Union and World Bank experience, however, highlights
the risks of relying only on outside pressure in cases where
the institution itself lacks legitimacy inside the country. Pressure
from these institutions is probably a necessary goad, but domestic
actors need to ask themselves if the particular reforms proposed
will really be effective, given local conditions.21
Nevertheless, there do seem to be some basic framework institutions
where the burden of proof ought to be on those who
oppose their creation. I discuss the role of these institutions in my
longer study, but here I simply provide a list to provoke discus-
sion.22
They are a nonexecutive president, a constitutional court
that can review laws and rules for conformity with the constitution,
an independent audit office, an ombudsman who not only
takes individual complaints but can also initiate investigations, an
administrative court system, and an independent general prosecutor.
In addition, some countries have other institutions such as
a federal election commission, an agency to administer the freedom
of information act, an anticorruption or other prointegrity
branch, and a human rights commission. In a state with few civil
society organizations and serious problems of corruption and
political overreaching, they are all options that should be on the
table.
East European Politics and Societies 43
Finally, even when national government institutions are weak,
accountability can sometimes be obtained from the bottom up.
Even poorer, less democratic countries can experiment with
grassroots participation, modeling their efforts on those in such
countries as Brazil and India where ordinary people are becoming
involved in local policy making.23
These can be democratic training
grounds for citizens, and they can help prevent extreme distortions
in local public spending and corruption of local politics.
Conclusions and recommendations
Most emerging democracies need to improve policy-making
accountability inside the government. It is not sufficient to
strengthen parliaments and political parties, on one hand, and to
ensure that implementing officials in particular cases are competent
and honest, on the other. The important intermediate level
where policy is made under statutory mandates needs to be
opened to public scrutiny and input. My recommendations are
as follows.
In countries with established electoral institutions, policymaking
procedures inside governments, in the cabinet, and in
the individual ministries need to be transparent and open to
public input. One plausible model is to require that rule making
or norm setting involve public notice, open hearings, and reason
giving followed by limited judicial review.
The success of such structures of administrative law, however,
depends upon the existence of groups, in addition to labor
unions, business associations, and professional chambers, willing
and able to participate. Thus, the reform agenda must also
strengthen organized civil society through financial incentives
and legal rules that make it easy to create such organizations.
In poorer countries with weaker institutions, institutional
reforms inside government are a needed first step—for example,
ombudsmen, audit offices, and independent courts as well as
efforts to publish and make available all statutes and rules. In
addition, bottom-up participation in government decisions that
directly affect people’s lives may succeed even where national
institutions are weak.
44 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
My argument for deeper and more effective public participation
in government policy-making processes is based on a broad
view of the democratic project. It is an effort to strike a balance
between the obligation of governments to make technically competent
policy choices under statutory delegations and their obligation
to respond to the concerns of citizens and organized
groups. In a world with cross-cutting cleavages that do not map
neatly onto party labels and with statutes that do not specify in
detail how to deal with complex modern problems, consultation
procedures and judicial oversight are one route to policy-making
accountability. They are, to me, a necessary route, given the weaknesses
of the alternatives.
My basic claim is twofold. First, legislative texts cannot resolve
all the policy issues of interest to private individuals and groups.
Thus, the task of putting laws into effect is not just a technical,
expert enterprise but is itself deeply political. By “political,” I do
not mean political party involvement. Instead, I wish to signal
that in most policy areas the participants have policy preferences
and personal goals that they seek to further in strategic interaction
with other actors. Second, given the first claim, modern governments
cannot make policy under democratic principles
unless the law requires decision makers to consult broadly. A
government that tries to channel public input into permanent
advisory committees risks freezing out new groups, concerned
individuals, and emerging interests.
My proposals for the consolidation of democracy in Central
Europe are a reflection of how far these countries have come in
creating electoral systems and reforming the state and the economy.
The problems that remain are those of countries that have
democratic electoral and constitutional structures, secure borders,
no organized violence, and a functioning private sector.
They are not different in kind from those facing democracies
with much longer histories. True, the scale of the difficulties is
larger for some issues, and the existing institutions in the public
and the private sectors are fragile and untested, but no one
expects an imminent breakdown of the state. These observations
are not meant to breed complacency, but they do mean
that Central Europe can learn from experiences elsewhere. Its
East European Politics and Societies 45
politicians and policy makers can be in a productive dialogue
with those in wealthier, more established democracies as they
seek ways to create more accountable policy-making institutions
that can garner popular support.
Notes
1. This view of democracy builds on Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and
Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942), chap. 12. It has been most forcefully expressed in
recent years by Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions
and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2. For example, Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss, Institutional Design in PostCommunist
Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 110-11, mention three elements of the transition from socialism that the book
ignored in spite of their importance. Two of these are devices for interest articulation
besides political parties and the reform of the state administration.
3. Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design. See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Trust and
Honesty in Post-Socialist Societies,” Kyklos 54 (2001): 415-43; and Susan Rose-Ackerman,
“Trust, Honesty and Corruption: Reflections on the State-Building Process,” Archives of
European Sociology 42 (2001): 526-70.
4. Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as
Constraints on Corruption,” British Journal of Political Science 35 (2005): 573-606. The
exception here is a very unstable system where incumbents, if overthrown, do not expect to
reenter politics. In such cases, they may try to steal as much as possible before leaving office.
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and
Reform, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 113-21.
5. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public Law in
Germany and the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); and Bo
Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
6. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1971); and Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of
Democracy 7 (1996): 34-51.
7. Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design; Grezegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious
Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993 (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil
Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and
János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1992).
8. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable
Government in Hungary and Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The
quoted phrase is from the title of Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design. According to
Anna GrzymaÂa-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong, “Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from
Post-Communism,” Politics and Society 30 (2002): 529-54, at 544, Poland and Hungary in
2002 were “nearly consolidated democratic states.” They also place the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, and the Baltic States in that category. Anna GrzymaÂa-Busse, “Political Competition
and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 20
(2003): 126-51, argues that Hungary and Poland are similar in their relative success in establishing
a depoliticized bureaucracy. Graeme Gill, Democracy and Post-Communism,
(London: Routledge, 2002), 24-31, places Poland and Hungary alone in the category where
civil society forces emerged before the fall of the regime and were seen as appropriate negotiation
partners by the incumbent leaders. The result is a stable democracy where the former
Communist Party has transformed itself into a social democratic party.
9. Table 1.2 in Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, 10, reports on the low levels of
political activity other than voting in Central and Eastern Europe.
46 From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe
10. Linda Cook and Mitchell Orenstein, “The Return of the Left and Its Impact on the Welfare
State in Russia, Poland and Hungary,” in L. J. Cook, M. A. Orenstein, and M. Rueschemeyer,
eds., Left Parties and Social Policy in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview,
1999), 47-108; and Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society. On the Czech Republic, see
Milada Anna Vachudova, “The Czech Republic: The Unexpected Force of Institutional
Constraints,” in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern
Europe, vol. 2, International and Transnational Factors (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 337.
11. This section is based on Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, 126-62, which provides
sources for the material discussed here.
12. This section is based on ibid., 163-215, which includes references to published sources and
interviews with the leaders of environmental groups in Hungary and student groups in
Poland.
13. For a more comprehensive review of the literature on the U.S. case, see ibid., 219-233.
14. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) passed in 1946 is at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706.
It has been amended through 552 (Freedom of Information Act), 552b (Government in the
Sunshine Act), 561-570 (Negotiated Rulemaking Act), Appendix 2 (Federal Advisory
Committee Act).
15. The Taiwanese APA has notice and comment rule making with no requirement for reason
giving and limited judicial review. The act provides only limited public accountability. See
Wen-Chen Cheng, “Alternative Agenda[s] in Constitutional Reengineering: Ensuring the
Rule of Law and Political Trust in Taiwan” (Presented at the International Conference on
Constitutional Reengineering in New Democracies: Taiwan and the World, Taipei, Taiwan,
28-29 October, 2005).
16. Cornelius M. Kerwin and Scott R. Furlong, “Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of
Theory,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2 (1992): 113-38. A major
rule making at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) averages almost three years and
requires many hours of input from both bureaucrats and outside interests from industry
and the environmental community. Many rules are challenged in court before they go into
effect, introducing further delay. See Cary Coglianese, “Assessing Consensus: The Promise
and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” Duke Law Journal 46 (1997): 1255-1349.
17. William F. West, “Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness
in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Analysis,” Public Administration Review 64
(2004): 66-80.
18. Between 1992 and 2001, the number of final rules issued each year ranged from 4,132 in
2001 to a high of 4,937 in 1996. Of the 4,509 rules in the pipeline in October 2001, 149 were
major rules, defined as those with at least a $100 million economic cost. Clyde Wayne
Crews Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory
State (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2002), 11-16.
19. West found that a common reason for delay was agency lawyers’ efforts to withstand court
challenges (West, “Formal Procedures,” 72). In one rule that was substantially changed
after notice and comment, he quotes an official who claimed that the agency staff had
“failed to do their homework on this one” by neglecting to consider the interests of some
of the producers affected by the rule.
20. See, for example, Wesley A. Magat, Alan J. Krupnick, and Winston Harrington, Rules in the
Making: A Statistical Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior (Washington, D.C.: RFF Press,
1986); and Nina A. Mendelson, “Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
before a New President Arrives,” New York University Law Review 78 (2003): 557-666.
21. Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, 37-54.
22. Ibid., 55-99.
23. Case studies of several of these experiments are reviewed in Susan Rose-Ackerman,
“Governance and Corruption,” in Bjørn Lomborg, ed., Global Crises, Global Solutions
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 316-22.
East European Politics and Societies 47