Pergamon
Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 2344, 1991
0 1997 The Regents of the University of California
Published by Elsevier &XWS Ltd. Printed in Great Britain
0967-067X/97 $17.00+0.00
PII: SO967-067X(96)00021-9
Substance and Process in the Development
of Party Systems in East Central Europe
Jack Bielasiak
Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
What conditions in post-communism affect the rise of competitive political parties
capable of providing significant options to the electorate? The initial wisdom held that
numerous weaknesses of political society in East Central Europe impeded the
consolidation of a stable party system. More recently, two distinct schools emerged to
present a more structured view of political space. One relies on a substantive evaluation
of political cleavages, ideological posturing, and issue relevance to map party positions
and voter placements in post-communist politics. This approach concentrates on
emerging social and economic cleavages as the foundation of party systems. The second
approach focuses on a process perspective that looks to political mechanisms such as
elections and coalition formation that act as a funnel for the formation of new party
systems. This article combines the substantive and process understandings of political
choice to provide a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of party systems in
post-communist states. The concentration is both on the demand side of the electoral
process, i.e. the formation of cleavages among the electorate, and on the supply side, i.e.
the channeling of political options through institutional mechanisms. Together, the
process of party evolution and the substance of party differentiation help to define the
hegemonic, polarized, fragmented, and pluralist phases in the consolidation of party
systems in post-communism. 0 1997 The Regents of the University of California
Keywords: post-communism, parties, East Europe, transition
Democratic stability is predicated on effective political choice. The emergence of political
parties capable of facilitating such choice is an essential element for the consolidation of
democracy in former communist regimes. The formation of political parties and their structuring
into mature party systems is an institutional development required of all modem democracies.
Political parties allow for the representation and expression of different interests in society, for
the provision of alternative policy options, for the mediation of conflicts, and for the
implementation of accountable government.
The essential question, then, is what conditions in post-communism affect the rise of
competitive parties capable of providing significant options to the electorate. The received
wisdom from the study of Western systems is that democratic stability is a function of welldefined
social cleavages represented by political options through clear issue and programmatic
23
24 Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielmiak
definition, calling for strong identification between groups in the electorate and political parties
(Evans and Whitefield, 1993). The problem, of course, is that in the post-communist world, the
linkage between citizenry and decision-makers is weak due to the absence of strong
intermediary institutions of all types, including parties in political society.
The Weakness of Political Society
A variety of explanations has been offered for the difficulties in consolidating party systems in
the former communist states. We can best conceptualize this condition in terms of a political
market place (Mair, 1991), where the competitiveness of parties is both a demand and supply
function. On the demand side, electorates need to be well cognizant of collective interests and
identities so as to translate them into political choices. On the supply side, political actors need
to be well-placed along defined axes of competition, so as to provide alternative options to the
electorate. The difficulty in East Central Europe (ECE) is that the electoral market is wide open
on both sides. There is ample evidence that there were too many “suppliers,” i.e. political parties
chasing a share of the market, at a time when the consumers of politics, the electorates, were
largely uncertain of their various needs and interests (Bozoki, 1990; Friszke, 1990; Kostova,
1992). As a result, the electoral market of post-communism has been too open and
overextended, rendering the linkage between political parties and potential constituencies weak
and ineffective.
Several reasons have been advanced in support of this position. A basic one is the high degree
of uncertainty associated with the economic, social, and political transition from communism
towards the market and democracy (Bunce and Csanadi, 1993). Many individuals and groups in
society have difficulty in understanding the change, and in evaluating their socio-economic
positions in the emerging system. Interests in the transition are indeterminate, and serve poorly
as the basis of collective identity and social position. Outcomes of economic and political
change are highly contingent, making even more difficult the individual evaluations of political
programs and individual association with parties. The absence of a well-defined socio-economic
base, in short, results in a failure to produce the cleavages necessary to form strong group
identities as vehicles for party politics.
A similar argument looks to the scope of the post-communist transition. The systemic
reconstruction taking place in the ECE produces an overload of functions in the political, social,
economic, and cultural spheres. Questions of national identity, social position, cultural
expression, economic practice, and political legacy are part of the transition (Offe, 1991). The
consequence is a functional overload where many issues must be addressed simultaneously,
producing a chaotic environment with too many tasks, too many choices. Transformation
becomes a systemic property itself, defining the political life of the countries in question. In such
a context, it is difficult to form structured identities and interests and to turn to collective action
as a political demand. Moreover, since there are so many issues to be resolved, there is increased
opportunity for suppliers of solutions, culminating in numerous entrants into the political fray.
Many of these new actors lack defined positions and instead seek locations in political spaces
with a presumed high pay-off. As a result, there is too much crowding in particular spaces,
further adding to the confusion within society about party identities.
The focus of the third argument relates directly to the linkage between voters and parties. The
primary point here is that an organizational impediment exists in the post-communist world that
makes it difficult to form strong institutions accepted by the people. This situation is in large part
the social and political legacy of state socialism. The long-term hegemony of the communist
Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: .J. Bielasiak 25
party over many aspects of societal life prevented the development of an intermediary
metastructure, leaving instead a significant empty space between the household and the state
(Rychard, 1993). The task in the post-communist period is to create and integrate mesoinstitutions
into political life by establishing intermediary groups that facilitate links between the
citizenry and political parties.
A variant of the argument concentrates on the “antipolitics” culture fostered by the opposition
during its struggle with the communist regimes. A deliberate strategy to create a public sphere
outside the communist state structure, the antipolitics concept emphasized the formation of a
civil society through democratic discourse, voluntary associations, and grass roots participation
(Ost, 1990; Kiss, 1992). But such a vision of democracy downplayed the significance of the
“high” institutions, parties, parliaments, or government coalition, in building a democratic
political society. To this was added a strong suspicion, in the public mind, of political parties as
instruments of communist rule. “Party” had a bad connotation, so that many of the new
organizations during the founding moment of democratic politics in ECE preferred alternative
labels, such as movements, forums, confederations, or unions. The absence of viable
intermediary institutions and the antipolitics stance carried over into the transition period to
devalue the role of political parties in shaping competitive politics.
A final reason for the volatility of the party systems lies specifically on the supply side, in the
proliferation of political entrepreneurs who form political parties. This situation is due to the
extensive political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994) brought about by the collapse of the
communist regime. The removal of the prohibition on alternative political activity is sufficient
to provide incentives for numerous contenders to seek power, so that alongside serious political
forces there are many politicians who attempt to fulfill personal ambitions and advance pet
causes. Since the electoral market is unrestrained by past identities and rules of entry are
relatively lax, many of these aspiring politicians make their claims through the new parties.
While most of those mini-parties remain insignificant, they cloud political choices and, for a
while at least, impede the consolidation of an effective party system.
The nature of the post-communist transition (too uncertain, overloaded with too many tasks,
open to too many ambitions, and beset by weak institutions) bears directly on the assessment of
party system formation in ECE. In contrast to the evolutionary pattern in Western Europe, where
the rise of sequential cleavages served as a mechanism for the formation of parties along welldefined
competitive issues (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), the overarching nature of the “1989
Revolution” produced a distinctive pattern of party development that has been labeled as sui
generis (see Whitefield and Evans, 1994, p. 8) or tabula rasa (see Kitschelt, 1994, p. 1). Such
a party structure is closer to the experience of Latin America, where there is little connection to
the past and where party systems arise de novo after periods of authoritarian rule or
revolutionary activity (Dix, 1989). The tabula rasa hypothesis accentuates the lack of historic
cleavage dimensions, the chaotic social and economic environment, and the unrestrained
opportunities for popular mobilization by new political entrepreneurs. The argument is that the
numerous weaknesses of political society impede the formation and consolidation of a
structured party system capable of providing informed choices to the electorate.
Structuring Political Choice
The tabula rasa account of party systems in ECE has been challenged by analyses that present
a more structured view of the political space in the former communist states. Two distinctive
trends are evident in this challenge.
26 Drvelopmen~ of Purty Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak
One trend relies primarily on a substantive evaluation of political cleavages, ideological
posturing, and issue relevance to delineate party positions and voter placements in postcommunist
politics. The initial view was based on deductive reasoning that saw the primary
fault line as being between promarket, liberal versus state interventionist, authoritarian forces
(Kitschelt, 1992), or saw a multilevel political spacing taking in economic, national/ethnic, and
state security calculations (Evans and Whitehead, 1993). Since then, much of the substantive
placement of political parties and voters along the political spectrum has relied on opinion
surveys of the mass public (Toka, 1995; Markowski, 1995) and, to a lesser extent, of the political
elite (Kitschelt, 1994; Crowther, 1995).
The second approach focuses on a process perspective to give shape to party systems in ECE.
More tolerant of the original tabula rasa argument than the substantive school, the process view
concentrates on developments that help to transcend the initial conditions of the post-communist
transition and give way to a more structured pattern of political interaction. Making virtue out
of necessity, the focus here is foremost on political processes such as elections and coalitions
that configure the supply side of the electoral market, and less on economic and social
transformations that form even, more pertinent cleavages on the demand side. More than
anything, it is political action that shapes party systems. What begins as an open political arena
in the founding period, evolves through a dialogue between party elites and potential
constituencies and gives rise to political parties more representative of social divisions (Agh,
1994, p. 232; Lewis, 1994a, b).
The substantive and process approaches form two distinctive genres in current theorizing
about the emergence of political parties and the consolidation of party systems in the postcommunist
states. After an overview of the two perspectives, it is argued that a more useful
understanding of party systems in ECE can be attained by merging the two approaches,
appreciating both the content of political cleavages and the dynamic evolution of these divisions
into more structured, competitive party systems.
Theorizing Substantive Cleavages
The substantive definition of party structure in the newly emerging democracies of ECE relies
on the Lipset and Rokkan characterization of social cleavages as the basis of party systems. In
this view, the type, emergence, saliency, and sequence of social divisions are paramount factors
in the formation of parties and their interactions with voters. To explain the foundation of
Western political systems, Lipset and Rokkan concentrated on divisions created by the national
and industrial revolutions, producing four main cleavages-center-periphery, religious-secular,
urban-agrarian, and owner-worker (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Such a sequence need not be
repeated in the ECE context, although a configuration of cleavages is necessary to structure
party systems (Kitschelt, 1994; Whitefield and Evans, 1994).
Indeed, the absence of past cues and party loyalty as determinants of voting behavior
necessitate a novel determination of the issues that are most salient to the transition. To prove
the claim that parties in ECE represent distinct cleavages reflected in party spacing and voter
perceptions, numerous surveys have been undertaken (Zagorski, 1994; Butorova and Butora,
1995; Crowther, 1995; Miller et al., 1995; Whitefield and Evans, 1995). The primary strand
concentrates on the identification of the most relevant social cleavages among the electorate, as
reported by respondents’ self-placement on positional and ideological issues. Another, less
frequent, approach is to concentrate on the political elite. While there are no uniform findings
across the region, some general tendencies have been uncovered.
First, the tabula rasa claim that no discernible competitive axes exist in post-communism has
Development of Paq Systems in East Central Europe: .I. Bielasiak 27
been challenged by evidence of cleavages taking on political meanings. Several cleavages are
evident, with generally two issues in each country strongly salient for the politics of transition.
Moreover, the substances of the cleavages is not the same throughout the region, but varies
across the ECE democratizing sates. In that sense, at least, the tabula rasa position of multiple
divisions without discernible order may not be too amiss.
The search for social cleavages as political factors has turned to investigations of ideological
spacing or issue positioning among voters and elites. The results reveal a more complex picture
than either the tabula rasa or unidimensionality perception of transition politics. Instead,
ideological spacing is present, but differs across the ECE countries both in content and saliency
(Whitehead and Evans, 1994). At the same time, there is a temporal trend towards greater
significance of the left-right dimension around pro- or anti-market attitudes, suggesting that
over time the socio-economic transformation in ECE will structure the economic interests and
political positions of the citizenry. This conclusion is reinforced by links between the assigned
ideological placement of the parties and correct voter perceptions of the parties’ ideologies
(Whitehead and Evans, 1994, p. 8).
Support for identifiable positioning of political parties comes from surveys of political elites
and electorates on policy issues (Kitschelt, 1994; Toka, 1995). Party programs on several issues
are discernible to the elite and to the electorate, but are more evident at the elite level. Most
significant among both sets of respondents is the perception of coherent party platforms
distinctive from other party programs (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 23). The conclusion of these studies
is that linkages based on common program perceptions are being established between party
elites and potential constituencies, despite the absence of prior party identification or of strong
intermediary associations tying the voter to political organizations.
The surveys of mass and elite publics suggest the growth of identifiable political positions in
the ideological and policy space of post-communism, facilitated by the growing ascendency of
social cleavages during the transition. With time, the political space is becoming more structured
and more understandable to the public at large. Even so, there are still relatively weak political
identities among the electorate and party loyalty remains problematic, as seen in recent election
and public opinion swings (Millard, 1994a; Racz and Kukorelli, 1995). The organizational links
between constituents and parties are even weaker, for few parties are able to attract a large
number of members and supporters. More significantly, the evidence on the structuring of
political preferences leaves unanswered the question about the dynamics that lead to the
emergence of more viable political systems.
Theorizing the Process of Party Consolidation
The basic concern of the process argument is not the delineation of party ideologies, voters’
positioning on issues, or social cleavages at any point in time, but the developmental pattern that
shapes the political life of the post-communist states. Rather than substantive issue areas, it is
the dynamic properties of the transition that help define the formation of political parties and the
consolidation of party systems.
The emergence of a workable, meaningful political environment is a prolonged, complex
process beset by many challenges. The transformation of the economy, culture, and society
requires a variety of tasks that must be prioritized and that evolves over time as changes are
accepted or rejected by relevant audiences or the voting public. Moreover, choices are not only
voluntary and rational, but are often ad hoc responses to crises in the economy and society or
to political challenges from other actors. The process of party building is thus contingent, shaped
by the numerous socio-economic demands and political requirements.
28 Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak
Despite the contingency built into the transition, structuring of party systems takes place
through a series of political outcomes defined by tasks, choices, and responses. These outcomes
help to shape distinct stages in the process of party consolidation, each with a different mix of
societal, organizational, and policy characteristics (Agh, 1994). The path from communism
towards democracy can best be broken down into overlapping phases associated with the
collapse of communism, the emergence of a competitive political space, the ultrafragmentation
of that space, and an ensuing consolidation into a more effective political contest.
In contrast to the substantive definitions of ECE politics as reflective of socio-economic
cleavages, process theory continues to emphasize the vacuum around the societal dimension of
political parties. The latter lack sufficient roots among specific groups or strata, have little
historical appeal through party identification, and articulate social demands poorly (Agh, 1994,
pp. 230-31). Two major consequences emerge.
First, party formation is driven from above by political entrepreneurship located primarily in
election contests and in parliaments. Parties tend to be cadre configurations, not mass
organizations. Despite progress to date, parties and party systems remain weak and
unconsolidated (Lewis, 1994a, pp, 391-393). The strengthening of party systems in ECE
requires the grounding of political parties in an organizational capacity that forges established
links to mass memberships. Democratic stability is dependent on such institutionalization, and
not merely on substantive alignments along social cleavages or policy preferences. For that
reason, greater attention to organizational strength and institutional maturity is required in the
characterization of party systems in ECE.
Second, in an apparent paradox political parties are seen as weak, but their impact on the
structuring of transitional politics is described as dominant (Agh, 1994; Lewis, 1994a,b). The
development of party structure is driven by election contests and outcomes, and by
parliamentary gamesmanship in between elections (Olson, 1993a). Electoral and parliamentary
activities serve as a filter for the management of political space, acting as a screening device that
elevates some political contenders to prominent roles, marginalizes other party formations, and
eliminates altogether most aspiring parties (Agh, 1994, pp. 229-230). Process theories thus rely
on political mechanisms as sorting devices that reduce the parties to an effective number of
contenders, signal the ideological spacing of party positions, and test the policy effectiveness of
competing programs. The emphasis is on political filtering, rather than on the social and
economic transformation of society, as the catalyst for the consolidation of party systems.
Integrating Substance and Process
The distinction between the substantive and process explanations of party structure reflects the
different origins of the two schools. The substantive perspective looks more to the similarity
between the newly emerging ECE party systems and the Western European experience. It makes
use of standard social cleavages, left-right axis of competition, and political realignment to
measure the positioning of parties and voters through opinion surveys (Evans and Whitehead,
1993; Kitschelt, 1994; Rose, 1995). The process view is more concerned with historical events
rather than standard political science dimensions to formulate the patterns of competition in the
post-communist world (Agh, 1993; Lewis, 1994a). It represents ECE politics as more
undetermined, with multidimensional axes of competition relevant to the transition phase. The
posturing of political actors and the results of political contests serve to select out the most
relevant competitive dimensions, and relegate other axes of competition and the parties attached
to them to the dustbin of history.
Development ofParty Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak 29
There is also an obvious difference in the temporal dimension of the two perspectives. The
subtantive approach defines political dimensions and party locations at a given point in time. To
do so, it relies on survey instruments to arrive at party preferences among voters and elites along
the dominant axes of political competition. This method is primarily interested in the positioning
of parties and voters, and tends to overlook temporal changes in party structures, at times
coming close to a freezing hypothesis. As such, the timing of the survey provides the shape for
party systems in the newly democratizing states of Europe. In contrast, the process argument
stresses the evolutionary nature of party structures. From open, chaotic circumstances to more
defined programs by politicians, to the effects of electoral judgements by the public, to
parliamentary maneuvering that shapes the political contest among parties, a political system
matures.
Both approaches move beyond the perception of ECE as an unstable vortex of changes and
chaotic choices. The first stresses the existence of political identities, economic interests, and
ideological differences as substantive dimensions in the post-communist world. These are the
normal stuff of politics, and define political systems everywhere, even in the nascent
democracies of ECE. The second concentrates on systemic development as the stuff of politics,
looking to a growing maturity among political actors and the public to enhance the availability
of choices in the political marketplace. Both provide a valuable recourse to the condemnation
of former communist states as unstable political systems lacking the mechanisms to consolidate
democracy.
Indeed, it is the combination of the substantive and process understandings of political choice
that is bound to generate the most fruitful analysis of party systems in the post-communist states.
Half a decade after the collapse of communism, it is obvious that the transitions to democracy
in ECE are not static, but evolve in a manner that helps to define the political preferences of the
electorate and the options afforded by political parties. Just as obvious is that evolution does not
occur in a vacuum, bereft of values, interests, and identities. The challenge is to understand the
relationship between the process of defining choice and the content of choices afforded at
different stages of the development. The electoral market, in short, is defined by both the
transformation of the socio-economic environment that gives rise to more pronounced cleavages
in society, and the translation of the social divisions into politically salient forces through the
filter of party organization, elections, and parliamentary action. The use of each theory’s
strengths provides an interactive approach built around the dynamic and the content of party
systems in new democracies. Process theory tends to stress the sequential development of party
systems through an organizational focus on the number of contenders, their institutional
features, and their political relationships. Substance theory is more concerned with the
contextual make-up of social cleavages, the ideological and policy spacing of political parties
and voters, and the relative saliency of these positions in the political system. The approach
employed here builds upon both these theories to present a model of party development in ECE
that stresses sequential evolution as an interaction of organizational form and political content.
Further, the development of party systems towards a stable equilibrium does not occur in a
vacuum. On the contrary, the configuration of party systems in ECE moves along structured
pathways conditioned by both past institutional arrangements and social choices, and by designs
for the future. As such, political trajectories are established in the course of social action that
must be traced along a path-dependent sequence (Stark, 1992).
Neither the blueprint of a democratic vision, nor the engineering of political institutions is
sufficient to install stable political parties capable of ordering choices. But neither is the
transition a tabula rasa deprived of all economic interests or political priorities. The past has a
30 Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak
presence that must be taken into account. For that reason, political development is dependent on
initial conditioning that goes back to the nature of the communist regimes, the methods of
extraction from communist domination, and the adaptation of rules and institutions in the
founding period of the democratizing states. All of these provide the context that establishes
constraints on political choices and actions, and leave the institutional legacies for the new
arrangements in the political system. Path dependency rejects the notion of a chaotic
environment without substance or process, as well as the notion of social engineering as capable
of creating institutions according to the visionary plan of democratic liberalism (Stark, 1992, pp.
20-22). Instead it looks to the evolutionary character of democratic institutions, including party
systems, as consecutive stages that are not the wholesale displacements of the unwanted past,
but are reconfigurations that incorporate legacies from prior development phases.
The Transformation of Party Systems
The fluidity of party systems in ECE is self-evident, if only through the collapse of communist
domination, the founding of democratic institutions, and the consolidation of democratic
structures. The appearance and disappearance of political parties, the formation and breakdown
of governing coalitions, the rapid swings in voter support, all testify further to the evolution of
parties and party systems during the transition period (see Table I). There are important
variations among the individual countries of the region in terms of the pathways taken to build
a stable democratic order, although a common conceptual topology can be applied to understand
the stages of party formation and system structuring.
The path to democracy is a process built on the experience of the past. It is important, then,
to begin with an examination of the nature of the hegemonic party system dominated by the
ruling communist parties. The conditions contributing to the collapse of this system, and the
extent of political opposition, help to define the extractive mode and the emergence of a
polarized party system constituted along the poles of communist and democratic support. This
political bifurcation was more a reflection of the past than the future, and thus gave way to a
fragmented party system characterized by numerous political parties competing along several
dimensions of societal conflict. The unregimented, even chaotic, nature of such political
interaction was gradually reduced through political mechanisms and socio-economic changes,
leading to the pluralization of the party qwtem. These conditions create the potential to form a
stable, self-sustaining party environment along well-defined axes of competition, culminating in
a polyarchicnl party system. It is important to note that these phases are analytical tools rather
than step-wise temporal sequences, so that some cases may not exhibit a progressive evolution
along all stages, but may remain within a particular one for a prolonged period, while others may
bypass a particular phase altogether.
The transformation of the party systems in ECE is due to alterations in both the supply and
the demand sides of the electoral marketplace. The initial move was from a closed system
dominated by the monopoly of supply, i.e. the communist ruling coalition infused by ideological
domination, to an ogopolistic structure dominated by the communist and opposition movements
defined by value competition between the two. The path then led to an anarchy of the
marketplace with many potential political suppliers providing different identities, interests, and
values, and followed by a political environment characterized by fewer suppliers within a more
limited range of substantive competitive issues. At the same time, the demand, that is the
sociological, side of the electoral market was subject to intensive changes due to the major
transformations introduced after 1989 (Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1992). This opened up the
Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak 31
possibility of going beyond collective identities defined primarily through the “regime versus
society” value prism, ushering in new interests and values among social groups. In this manner,
the interactive model combines process and substantive changes to account for the dissolution,
formation, and consolidation of party systems in ECE. A closer look at each party system stage
will further delineate the forms of interaction between process and substance.
The Hegemonic Party System
The political identity of ECE is being recreated during the transition period. This process cannot
be separated from the nature of the political system that is being left behind by the efforts at
democratization. The ideology, structure, and identity of communism, or rather its variants in
ECE, continue to have a bearing on the nascent party systems.
Communism laid claim to a hegemonic ideological discourse that sought to ban alternative
political expressions within the official political space. While hegemony could not be attained
Table 1. Parliamentary elections in East Central Europe
Election
year
Lower
house District Vote nrnout
size type type %
Bulgaria
June 90 200
200
Ott 91 240
Dee 94 240
Czechoslovakia
June 90 150
Jun 92 150
Slovakia
Sep 94 150
Czech Republic
Jun 96 200
Hungary
Mar 90 176
152
58
May 94 176
152
58
Single Maj.
Multi PR 4%
Multi PR 4%
Multi PR 4%
Multi PR 5%
Multi PR 5%
Multi PR 5%
Multi PR 5%
Single Maj.
Multi PR 4%
Nation.
Single Maj.
Multi PR 5%
Nation.
90.7
83.9
75.2
96.0
84.6
75.6
39 4
41 3
48 5
22 8
41 12
i8 I
16 6
2.75 2.14
4.19 2.41
3.87 2.73
3.18 1.89
7.69 4.80
5.37 4.41
76.4 5.42 4 .15
62.8 54 6 6.16 3.74
68.9 34 6 5.54 2.89
Poland
Jun 89
act 91
Sep 93
460 Multi Maj.
391 Multi PR
69 Nation. PR 5%
391 Multi PR 5%
69 Nation. PR 5%
62
43.2
52.0
111 29 14.69 10.93
35 I 9.81 3.87
Romania
May 90
Sep 92
396 Multi PR 86.2 73 18 2.25 2.19
341 Multi PR 3% 76.2 74 7 7.04 4.75
Number Number Effective Effective
of of number number
party parties of party of party
lists elected votes seats
Sources: International Foundation for Electoral Systems; Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, Elecfions in Central and Eastern Europe (July 1990); Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Reports;
Open Media Research Institute, Transition; Zdenka Mansfeldova and Herbert Kitschelt, “Elite Strategies
in Building Party Alternatives,” Duke University, March 1995; Pravo, June 3, 1996.
32 Development of Party S~~stemsin East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak
fully, Marxism-Leninism became a ruling ideology that did not allow an alternative ideological
framework and was intolerant of open competition in the political system (Kennedy, 1995, pp.
12-13). To achieve these goals, real existing socialism sought to appropriate all space between
the individual and the state through a monopolistic organizational infrastructure. Intermediary
associations, political parties, and social movements outside the domain of the party-state were
defined as illegitimate. Instead, political space was filled with cultural, social, and economic
“transmission belt” associations meant to bind the citizen to the official structure of power.
In this ideological environment, politics was replaced by politicization. Under communism,
politics was not a competitive process based on voluntary participation, impartial rules, and
open-ended outcomes. Instead ideological and political norms came to politicize decisionmaking
and policy formulation (Bielasiak and Hicks, 1990). Under these circumstances, most
citizens did not see political participation as worthwhile, since the public had little opportunity
for “inputs” while becoming a recipient of “outputs” devised by the communist powers. In
response to the regime’s politicization, real politics could only take the shape of emotional,
moral reactions against an unjust political order.
The distinction between politicization and politics came to define the substantive arena of
politics. Political interactions were not based on the competition of public interests through
bargaining and compromise resting on the foundation of independent associations. Instead
political participation in the official world was ritualistic (Marody, 1992). Politics outside the
ideological and organizational hegemony of real socialism was identified with a normative
world of values and moral codes, and the basic political cleavage at the time was defined in
terms of association or opposition to the exising system of domination. The most significant
political divide was between the regime and society, between “us” the people and “they” the
communist elite. Other forms of identity or interest, whether social standing, class
consciousness, or regional affiliation, were blurred under this overarching distinction between
regime and society.
The intensity of the divide varied from country to country, becoming most pronounced where
the state was in severe crisis and where opposition emerged to offer a more open challenge. In
Poland, survey research in the 1980s showed that alongside a silent majority, the most
significant division among society was between proponents and opponents of the regime
(Adamski and Jasiewicz, 1989, pp. 2.50-255). In Hungary or Czechoslovakia, attempts to form
a “parallel polis” to the official one reflected a similar, but less visible, division. Elsewhere, the
regime and society distinction was hidden and muted, although silent “arts of resistance” (Scott,
1990) against communist domination were part of daily life. The political cleavage associated
with the period of late communism was bound closely to a normative world view centered
around values, and less on specific interests and identifies based on economic or social positions.
Yet the intensity and openness of the dominant regime-society division had substantial
variations in the ECE countries, bearing on subsequent events associated with the collapse of the
communist system and the birth of a democratizing process. In that manner, pathways beginning
with the structure and substance of political conflicts under communism influenced the mode of
extraction from the existing system of power.
The pathways were influenced to a large extent by the organizational set-up of real existing
socialism, on both the regime and the opposition side. In the former, the drive towards
ideological hegemony depended on the establishment of linkages to various strata of society,
through political and intermediary associations depicted as representative of social and
economic groups. Even in the political arena, this meant that in several communist states
ideological hegemony was compatible with a formal multiparty system, where other political
Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak 33
organizations functioned alongside the “leading role” of the ruling communist party, united in
people’s fronts to advance the cause of socialism (Furtak, 1990; Agh, 1994). The various
components of these fronts (the ruling communist parties, the allied parties representing the
peasantry, intellectuals, or regions, and the associations of workers, women, or youth) had
important membership, organizational, and financial resources. Despite the collapse of
communism, many of these resources were retained by newly reconstituted successor parties
and provided an important organizational benefit in the ensuing democratic competition. For that
reason, in most cases, the successor parties sought to schedule the first elections relatively soon,
so as to make use of this advantage.
Beyond the organizational framework of communism, there was to be no independent
institutional space under really existing socialism. One legacy of the communist system upon its
collapse was thus to leave a large organizational vacuum, with most segments of society devoid
of middle level associations or political parties as vehicles of representation. The exception were
the movements that had emerged in opposition to the communist system of power, reflecting the
regime-society political cleavage. The visibility, strength, and resource base of these
movements varied considerably, ranging from the mass appeal of Solidarity in Poland, to the
vocal dissident groups in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to the embryo of a political alternative
in the ecological movement of Bulgaria. In all instances, these movements were to emerge as
important political actors in the transition from communism to a democratizing political
system.
The hegemonic party system was a significant element in structuring the process of party
evolution after the collapse of real socialism. It did so by shaping the substantive cleavage in the
emerging system along the inherited regime-society division, muting for the time being other
political interests and aspiring political parties. Moreover, it gave an institutional frame to the
new political space. It did so through the organizational resources retained by the successor and
allied parties to the communist popular fronts, and through the value legitimation accorded to
opposition groups representing the society side of the dominant cleavage. Equally significant
was the large institutional void created by the collapse of the organizational structure of
communism, leaving an extensive open political society in the ruins of communism.
The Polarized Party System
The substantive divide between regime and society was carried over to the initial phase of postcommunism,
expressed foremost in the political struggle between the successor to the ruling
communist party and an umbrella social movement embracing various sectors of society. This
stage of political development corresponds to the “founding election” moment in the postauthoritarian
systems (Turner, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). In the case of the ECE
states, it first took the form of a plebiscite on the communist system. As such, it was essentially
a reflection on the past rather than a formation of a stable party system for the future. The
“founding” was in the creation of new institutional rules of governance that legitimized political
contestation and accepted the principle of electoral choice. In that sense, all political forces
rejected the hegemonic system formed around the “leading role of the party” principle,
including the successor parties to the ruling communists. Just like the opposition, they now
proclaimed their repudiation of political monopoly in favor of a pluralism of political ideas. The
founding elections were thus primarily ratifications of a systemic transformation from
communism towards democracy.
The specific content of who shall rule was left open to the uncertainty of the political contest
34 Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak
in the first wave of post-communist elections. The primary contenders in the rivalry reflected the
political cleavage of regime and society, albeit in a new organizational guise. The former
opposition was able to emerge into the open, as in Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia (Barany
and Vinton, 1990; Jasiewicz, 1991) or constituted itself into a political movement based on a
more amorphous public sentiment, as in Bulgaria or Romania (Ashley, 1990; Nelson, 1990). The
ruling communist parties had disbanded or reformed, to emerge as social democratic political
actors committed to the new system. In most instances, neither the new political parties nor the
electorate were able to devise clear policy programs and demands, nor establish symbolic links
that transcended the former regime-society divide. In substantive terms, this signified both the
perpetuation of the politics of the past, reflective of a world of values and norms around the issue
of communism, and the uncertainty of an alternative embracing a world of values around the
vision of a democratic, market society.
The political contest at the founding period was waged about normative judgments tied to
systemic evaluations, about the past and about the future. The criteria of politics rested more
within these normative constructions than in the more mundane evaluations of specific
advantages or disadvantages formed around the identities and interests of class, gender,
occupation, or region. The pull of the past, the hope for the future, and the uncertainty of the
present were too strong to transcend this political world.
The polarization in the substance of politics found resonance in the organizational form and
process of political competition. The electoral contest in the founding period was bifurcated
between a social movement representing the anti-communist alternative and the organization of
a reconstructed communist field. The first depended primarily on its symbolic virtue to attract
support, the latter hoped to translate its organizational heritage into a strong showing in the first
free elections.
For the opposition, its past struggle with communism, its commitment to a democratic
politics, and its political ethos were cause enough to stand above the divisiveness of politics and
proclaim a societal consensus founded upon the previous regime-society cleavage. The aim was
to form an “umbrella” movement that did not represent partisan identities and interests, but
sought rather to carry forth the solidarity of the struggle against communism. The purpose here
was to use unity derived from the past to build a better tomorrow, through the transformation of
the economy and the polity. The claim to the representation of the entire nation and to a
collective will dedicated to a common purpose was meant to facilitate the tasks of systemic
transformation.
Consensual politics was to be the mantle of the new politics forged by these umbrella
movements. In Poland, Solidarity had established such an identity during its decade of
scrimmages with the communist regime (Zubek, 1991). Elsewhere, consensus movements
emerged during the final struggle, for example the Civic Forum and Public against Violence in
Czechoslovakia, to create a common identity out of their oppositional activities (Bankowicz,
1991). In Bulgaria the movement was more explicitly a coalition of forces, the Union of
Democratic Forces, brought together to negotiate and compete with the communists (Petrova
and Kanev, 1992). The exception to the pattern was Hungary, where bifurcation never took hold.
Instead, a party orientation emerged from the start, including several competing opposition
parties. But even here, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats
attempted to define their political identity as the legitimate heirs to the anti-communist struggle,
and to emerge as “catch-all parties” with broad popular support across the socio-economic
landscape (Racz, 1991).
Noteworthy also is the continued identification of the umbrella social movements with the
Development of Party Systems in East Cenrral Europe: J. Bielasiak 35
“antipolitics” perspective, despite their engagement in electoral politics. Their very names, as
forums, unions, or alliances, defied the world of parties and politics. More importantly, their
identities were bound to the realm of values, not interests, so as to forge an affective attachment
between the public and the movement. Rather than build upon the particular interests of defined
social groups, and move forward with the organization of mass politics, the consensus
movements preferred to stand on a high moral ground to attract broad support from all sectors
of society.
On the other side of the polarized political system stood the remnants of the communist
regimes (Ishiyama, 1995). For them, there was no hope in an appeal to moral values and
collective solidarity. The path to political success lay rather in specific appeals to self-interest
among segments of society, and in the organizational and membership strengths retained from
the hegemonic phase. To that end, the first priority was to recast the ideological content through
an overt rejection of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. All the mainstream successor parties
abandoned the leading role of the party principle in favor of an open electoral contest. To signal
their new commitment and appeal to the voters, all the ruling communist parties were renamed
as social democratic or left parties (Bielasiak, 1992b). In most cases there was also no attempt
to mask the “party” label, which was part of the new identity, to attract support from former
members and social groups concerned with growing economic dislocation.
The outcomes of the polarized contest between the opponents of communism and its heirs
varied across the region. Where the opposition was visible and commanded the moral high
ground, it succeeded in claiming victory in the founding election. First in Poland, in a semi-free
election, Solidarity was able to claim virtually all seats subject to an open contest (Olson,
1993b). In Czechoslovakia, Civic Forum and Public against Violence obtained a substantial
plurality, as did the parties emerging out of the opposition movement in Hungary (Wightman,
1991; Racz, 1991). In those states where opposition was absent or weak during the days of
communism, the successor parties were able to retain power during the founding period, as in
Bulgaria (Zlatkov, 1992). The situation in Romainia was more ambiguous, as the National
Salvation Front claimed to represent the revolutionary opposition to the Ceausescu regime, but
was led by many former communist leaders (Gallagher, 1991).
Regardless of the outcome, the founding elections did not resolve the political dilemmas
faced by the new democracies of ECE. To a very large extent, the forces present at the time were
still imbedded in the former communist system and represented the regime-society divide of the
past. The main axis of political competition was defined in those “value” terms, and did not
address sufficiently the emerging problems and issues of the transition towards marketization
and democratization. Under the circumstances, the polarized political system had to give way to
new political cleavages and new political parties.
The Fragmented Political System
The increasing irrelevancy of the communist-anticommunist axis of political competition in the
face of systemic transformations led to a wide opening up of the political marketplace to new
claimants for power. There were two primary sources for the multiplicity of political actors in
this stage of party development, a period associated most closely with the time preceding the
second elections in the post-communist states. The first was due to the disintegration of the
umbrella movements, which could not sustain a unity based primarily on the “negation” of
communism, and thus split into competing political forces with different programs for the
future. The second came from the wave of new political actors that emerged to test the electoral
36 Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak
waters. The consequence was rapid fragmentation of the political space with a dozen aspiring
political parties and movements competing for a share of the popular support and vote.
Fragmentation was the natural response to the continuing confusion produced by changes in
the economic and social environment. The demand side of the electoral market, society at large,
was undergoing a profound process of economic and social transformation subject to
considerable uncertainty and chaos (Bunce and Csanadi, 1993). In this context, collective
political identities and interests were weak. The interest structure present under communism was
increasingly superfluous to the new economy, and the allocation of values through the “we”
versus “they” solidarities spoke of a past political struggle. In addition, the collapse of the
communist system left a substantial vacuum in the organizational life of post-communism. The
result was a low density of associations in the intermediary space of politics, precluding the
linkages between the public and political parties facilitated by social networks (Rychard, 1992).
Instead, the potential electorate remained largely unaffiliated, either through organizational ties
or political identities.
One consequence was to provide an open political space on the supply side of electoral
competition (Mair, 1991). The uncertainty of socio-economic interests and political cleavages
during the transition produced new opportunites for aspiring political actors. Since the market
for political allegiance was open, multiple entrants sought to gain a share of electoral support
around diverse issues (Jasiewicz, 1993; Korosenyi, 1993). Due to the lack of dominant axes of
competition, political parties could appeal to the voters on the basis of a variety of economic,
national, ethnic, religious, cultural, and political dimensions. The hope for each political entrant
was that it could define politics along its chosen issue, to render that dimension the primary axis
of competition, and so obtain a significant share of voter support on the basis of its issue
appeal.
To accomplish that aim, many political aspirants had to wage a struggle that moved beyond
the communist-anticommunist polarization. The latter space was already well occupied by
incumbents on both sides of the political divide. To make progress on the competitive front, new
political elites had no recourse but to challenge the dominance of the bifurcated axis of
competition. In this task, they were aided by the growing irrelevancy of the old divisions to the
new social and economic realities. The political contest had to be reconfigured away from the
value laden regime-society perspective to take into account new issue dimensions as the
defining modes of politics. The dilemma for all political actors, old and new, was that the
resolution of these issues was still highly contingent, and reinforced the uncertainty about the
ordering of substantive political competition.
Uncertainty about the emerging content of politics was reinforced by an open political space
characterized by low costs of entry into the electoral marketplace. On the one hand, a large
number of voters were not saturated by partisanship and loyalty to existing parties, providing an
uncaptured audience as targets for the new parties. On the other hand, rules for registration of
political parties and for electoral competition did not present significant obstacles to entry. The
consequence was to attract numerous competitors to the electoral contests, culminating in a
rapid fragmentation of the political space in ECE.
The sources for the new political parties and movements varied considerably, producing
dozens of registered political organizations in each country. One pattern was the dismemberment
of the umbrella movements which could not retain a cohesiveness built upon the “negative” task
of opposition to communism. Instead, divergence built around personal ambitions, program
tasks, and political strategies came to dominate the consensus movements and culminated in
their splintering in the wake of new elections. Solidarity in Poland, The Civic Forum and Public
Development ofParty Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak 31
Against Violence in Czechoslovakia, the National Salvation Front in Romania all splintered
along political and personal lines (Lewis, 1995; Kopecky, 1995). In Hungary and Bulgaria, the
ruling or oppositional coalitions and their component parties were also subject to factional
infighting that paralleled the diffusion of the umbrella movements (Lomax, 1995; Waller,
1995).
An even more pronounced fragmentation of the political space resulted from the revival,
reinvigoration, and formation of parties with roots along several dimensions of political
competition (Bielasiak, 1992b). Some emerged from the former satellite parties of the
communist era, reconstituted as independent political entities representing important sectors of
society, most notably the peasantry. Other sought to revive historical allegiances by reclaiming
the political identities of the past. Since these nostalgia parties sought to re-establish the natural
interests of constituencies from the interwar period, many reflected the circumstances of that
period: agrarian, Christian-democratic, and Christian-nationalist programs dominated, but
some also reflected liberal ideas of free enterprise and privatization. Further currents to emerge
upon the political scene at this time claimed nationalist and ethnic identities as the basis for
political organization and competition. In most countries, these presented strong appeals for the
collective identity of voters, either on the basis of minority status or in the name of an integral
nationalism. In contrast to these “old politics,” there were also entrants making claims to “new
politics,” primarily through appeals to ecological issues. Finally, one can point to a splintering
of the socialist political field, ranging across doctrinaire to social democratic parties, as an
additional source of fragmentation.
The sheer number and nature of these parties and movements testifies to a wide spectrum of
political space, open to competition along several substantive axes. But it was a space filled
primarily at the top of the system, with politics very much in command over socio-economic
competitive foundations. Most of the political competitors lacked any significant social base or
mass appeal. They consisted of elites seeking to attain political leverage without existing
constituencies, but rather through the projection of future visions built around “imaginary”
interests that were awaiting to emerge and shape the political space of the new democracies. As
such, these political entities had a low level of institutionalization, lacking both a membership
base and an organizational infrastructure that could be used to political advantage (see Sartori,
1976). The one partial exception was the successor parties to the ruling communists, which did
inherit important organizational resources. For the moment, however, these were handicapped
by a political inheritance which had negative repercussions for their institutionalization
capability.
The overall pattern, as a result, was a political overhang during the fragmentation phase of
party development. There were too many competing “sellers” with confusing identities, unclear
programs, marginal support, and few connections to society. The result was a dysfunction
between political supply and demand: an oversupply of political actors without roots in the
social fabric, and an underdeveloped socio-economic structure that could form a pattern for
collective political identities and establish links to party organizations. This condition created
the illusion of an open hand for political gamesmanship. Without strong institutional identities
or attachments to societal groups to act as a brake, political defections and reconstitutions were
perceived as relatively low costs. The consequence was further fragmentation of the political
system due to repeated dealignments and realignments among political parties and parliamentary
clubs. This only reinforced the difficulties in establishing meaningful, permanent identities
for the parties, by confusing the choices provided to the voters even more.
The political space in the electoral market was not only fragmented, but also chaotic. Political
38 Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: .I. Bielasiak
parties with weak identities were seeking the support of voters uncertain of the political
programs and of their own interests in a rapidly changing environment. The appeals of parties
for popular backing were along a diversity of dimensions, involving economic marketization,
national and ethnic identity, and political legacies. Such an extensively open political space
could not establish an equilibrium, much less maintain one. A sequence of elections helped to
define winners and losers, and moved the system to a more manageable scale of political
competition.
The Pluralist Party System
The pluralization of the party structure overlapped with the fragmentation phase, when the
competition for a place in the electoral system acted as a filter to define the significant political
actors and arenas of competition. The second wave of elections in ECE provided such a
screening, reducing the number of legitimate contenders for power and defining more visibly the
principal cleavages in society.
On the political “supply” side, the mechanics of the electoral process accomplished the task
of filtering parties to a more viable number. From the hundreds of quasi-party groups intent on
contesting the election in each country, several dozen were able to organize into formal entities,
and no more than about two or three dozen were able to register as parties with candidate lists.
The election outcome was a final arbiter, when many of the contenders were precluded from
entering the parliaments of ECE (Olson, 1993a, pp. 630-631). Parties capable of taking part in
decision-making were thus confined to a more effective number. When this was not the case, as
in the 1991 election in Poland that returned 29 party lists to the Sejm, the electoral procedure
for the subsequent round of elections was tightened, either through more compelling registration
demands or new voting thresholds for entry into parliament (Gebethener, 1993b). The
imposition of a 5 per cent minimum for the 1993 Polish elections had the effect of bringing
down the number of significant parties in the Sejm to six. In turn, the activities of the
parliamentary parties, by giving priority to specific issues, helped to define the political space
in terms of ideological dimensions and programmatic solutions.
The political process, then, acted as an important instrument in the ordering of political
competition, the consolidation of political parties, and the structuring of a more effective party
system. The winners in the electoral contests were able to claim representation of the dominant
axes of competition, and pursued policies that reinforced this dimension on the political scene
and in the public mind. The losers tended to represent political cleavages with less saliency, or
occupied a narrow political space that splintered the vote among several condenders with similar
programs. In either case, the election result forced the losing parties either to abandon hopes for
political support, forcing many to disband, or to seek re-entry into the political contest through
a redefinition of their program or consolidation with other parties. The end result of the political
filtering was a significant step beyond the previous chaotic fragmentation of the party system.
On the other side of the electoral market, the demand function among the public moved along
as well in consequence of the reform agendas and economic changes produced by the postcommunist
transformation (Whitefield and Evans, 1995). The sociological picture of society
began to be defined in more tangible terms, with more ordered aspirations and interests in
evidence. Under the impact of actual and intended changes in post-communist society,
individuals became increasingly aware of their place, status, and interest in the new system,
whether in terms of class position, ethnic or gender identity, or political ideology (Kennedy,
1995, p. 4). The emergence of collective identities and interests facilitated the formation of
Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak 39
intermediary associations and interest groups representing the new world of marketization and
democratization, rather than the former communist structure or the bifurcated world of
communism-anticommunism. The ordering of social interests and the political filtering
contributed to the emergence of more defined political parties. Political competition began to
move away from the former substantive world of values, where normative judgements tended
to be made in the absolute categories of right or wrong, to more specific interests defined by the
calculus of individual and group advantage or disadvantage.
Time was not only a factor in ordering societal interests but also affected the political
judgments of the electorate. Initial reliance upon the value dimension of regime-society or upon
“prospective” voting around the benefits and costs of a future capitalist order, gave way to a
more informed choice based upon “retrospective” voting as an evaluation of incumbent policies
and performance (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 25). Voters simply became more cognizant of their interests
in the changing socio-economic environment and of the way that political programs were likely
to affect their standing in the new society. This increase in cognitive capability allowed for the
appearance of a main axis of competion in the political arena, formed around economic issues.
The advent of the primary cleavage around the economic dimension is not surprising, in view
of the drive towards marketization and privatization in most of ECE. Individual positions in the
workplace and the market are profoundly affected by such changes, and must find an outlet in
political choices. The significance of economic reform as a defining issue in the political space
rests with the emergence of the left-right as a principal arena of competition. For some time,
the left-right spectrum under post-communism has been deformed due to the legacies of the
past and the visions of the future: the past because of the association of a left-defined program
with the abuses of the communist system, which made the public initially suspicious of leftist
ideology; the future due to the initial euphoria about capitalism and democracy, which produced
an utopian vision of the market among many sectors of society. The realities of the transition,
however, led to an obvious awareness that the transformation could not be painless. Under the
circumstances, issues about the role of the market and of the state in post-communist society,
about the provision of safety nets, and about social inequality, emerged as a concern for many
citizens (Mason, 1995). This trend restored the left-right cleavage to a normal place in political
contestation, expressed primarily around the question of the “welfare state.”
The emergence of the left-right axis into the forefront of post-communist politics did not
signify the elimination of other conflicts in the political arena. Indeed, other issues have
remained on the political agenda, albeit in most cases as secondary to the economic concerns
about the effects of marketization. Among these issues, ethnic, nationalist, and pan-European
identities as the basis for popular sentiments and party programs are critical in many states
(Shafir, 1994; Wolchik, 1994). In other countries, urban-rural, secular-religious, and
democratic-authoritarian cleavages remain as important political differences.
The establishment of a pluralist party structure is the outgrowth of socio-economic changes
and political choices that helped to reduce the numerous political cleavages to a manageable
number of salient issues, and to order the dimensions of political competition. The process of
electoral structuring helped to define the supply side of the political market by reducing the
number of viable contenders. The social and economic transformation helped to structure the
demand side of politics by better defining the interests of groups in society. Together these have
contributed to the coalescence of the substantive dimension of political cleavages under postcommunism.
Yet the transformation of the social and political systems has not translated into a
strong interrelationship between the two.
The connection between political parties and the public rests primarily in the realm of
40 Development ofParty Systems in East Central Europe: .I. Bielasiak
Table 2. Public opinion (%) on political parties in East Central Europe,
1993-1994
Vote for
Netparty Net party Largest Other Don’t
identification trust party parties know
Bulgaria NA -62 24 38 38
Czech Republic - 8 - 14 30 51 19
Hungary -33 -54 17 40 43
Poland -45 -64 23 61 16
Romania NA -44 18 64 18
Slovakia - 24 -42 20 55 25
Source: Richard Rose (1995) based on data from New Democracies Barometer
III, 26 November 1993- 14 April 1994 surveys.
perceptions, not organizational ties or loyalties based on historical attachment. Voters and elites
can define the ideological positioning of parties and the programmatic distictions among them,
but this has not led to the formation of strong partisanship among the electorate (see Table 2).
The roots of political parties to constituencies continue to be precarious, as the institutionalization
of political parties remains relatively weak (Rose, 1995). With few exceptions, primarily the
successor parties to the communist fronts of the hegemonic era, parties remain cadre formations
rather than mass organizations with large memberships and extensive infrastructures. They
function more in the area of parliamentary than constituency politics. In that sense, the
identification of cleavages among parties and voters is the reflection of political spacing, and not
of significant bonding that helps in the representation and articulation of identifiable interests in
society.
The continuing institutional underdevelopment of political parties in ECE affects the potential
consolidation of the party system (see Dix, 1992). Because they remain largely elite formations
that are only weakly bound to constituency preferences, the propensity to seek further support
contributes to the fluidity of political positioning. Similarly, it means that party leaders are not
firmly restricted by commitments, but can express ambitions and disagreements more openly,
without fear of being cut off from a strong support base. This factor helps to explain the high
degree of factionalism among many of the dominant parties in the region, as well as the
continued splintering of party factions into new political identities, the reconfiguration of old
into new political parties and coalitions, and the emergence of new contenders hoping to attract
constitutent support. The continuing fluidity also means that extraparliamentary parties which
have not attracted sufficient popular support to enter the legislative body retain the belief that
political circumstances are sufficiently flexible to allow them representation in the political
system at a future point in time. The factionalism of the parliamentary parties and the aspirations
of the extraparliamentary ones continue to plague the party structure of post-communism,
impeding a stable political equilibrium.
Conclusion
The movement from party fragmentation to a pluralist party system in ECE is evident, but not
complete. For that reason, it is more appropriate to talk about the pluralization of the party
system than to proclaim the stability of a polyarchical party structure defined by strong parties
Development of Parh, Systems in East Central Europe: J. Bielasiak 41
with roots in the constituency. The process of politics built around elections is an important new
accomplishment of the democratizing states. It has played an important role in shaping the party
system into a more mature, more tangible political space where voters can discern different
policy options. Similarly, the ongoing social and economic transformation of the former
communist states has with time introduced an understanding of new interests and new priorities.
Together, the process of party evolution and the substance of social differentiation have helped
to define the demands of the electorate on the political system and the main areas of political
competition. Old structures and old struggles are being left behind, and from a multitude of new
options, the political field is narrowing to a more manageable dimension. The stabilization of
this process, however, remains circumscribed by the continuing weakness of political parties as
organizations with close ties to relevant constituencies. The weakness of party institutionalization
prevents the final shift of the political structure to a consolidated equilibrium rooted in a
close interrelationship between society and polity. This final step is necessary to move the party
system away from its propensity to factionalism and fluidity, and towards a polyarchical
maturity characterized by stable party formations constrained in their maneuvering by the
interests of identifiable constituencies.
Still, we should not lose sight of the progress made in the structuring of party systems in ECE.
Stable democracy after all is about choice, a choice offered through a political society defined
by meaningful options. From the hegemony of communism, through the polarized worlds of
communism-anticommunism, through the chaos of fragmentation, the party systems have come
around to offer a more informed choice to the voters. After all, democracy is about choice, but
it is about informed choice. It is thus dependent on knowledgeable electoral consumers with
established identities and interests, and functioning social associations that provide the
necessary linkages to the party system. It is also dependent on the supply of meaningful
programs by political actors that represent the main cleavages in society and are able to compete
along well-defined axes of political competition. The political structure of ECE has moved in a
short period of time from no choice and too much choice, to a terrain where choice is more
meaningful because it is ordered both by the “supply” of political actors and by a more informed
public capable of articulating “demands” reflecting its new identities and interests.
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