Cold War, Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution1
Csaba Békés
Former Fellow
International Center for Advanced Studies
New York University
Senior Research Fellow
Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
Director
Cold War History Research Center
Budapest
Working Paper: #7
September 2002
The Cold War as Global Conflict
International Center for Advanced Studies
New York University
2
2
Recent historical research provides us with increasingly convincing proof that the fate
of East-Central Europe until the fall of communist regimes was determined by the
status quo that the allies set up in 1945. Both superpowers that controlled the bipolar
world order after World War II—namely the United States and the Soviet Union—
attributed a pivotal role to this tacit agreement in the East-West relationship, despite
the fact that it has never been recorded in any official document. Their mutual consent
started to work as an automatic rule of thumb in the chilliest years of the cold war era,
and afterwards, when they sought to subdue sporadic East-West conflicts.
I. THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN 1953 AND 1956: A REINTERPRETATION OF THE COLD WAR
It is more and more obvious that several set ideas about the Cold War have to be
reassessed or rectified, as so far hidden archive sources became accessible in Western Europe
in the 1970s and 1980s, and likewise in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the
beginning of the 1990s. A complete survey being impossible here, I will point out a few
problems that might be reconsidered and amended, putting the history of East-West relations
in a different context, which is a key factor of post-war international relationships. I strongly
hope that it will help us understand the role that East-Central Europe and Hungary in particular
played in the political changes of the last few decades.2
Caesuras
3
3
The landmark that started the détente in East-West relations is traditionally associated
with Stalin’s death in March 1953. Nonetheless, the analysis of long-known and recently
revealed historical sources alike suggest that both in the Soviet Union and in the East-Central
European communist states there were numerous tendencies that initiated the breakdown of
complete isolation from Western Europe and aimed at relieving Cold War anxiety, even before
1953. Stalin himself asserted in an interview for Pravda in February 1951, barely half a year
after the outbreak of the Korean war, that a war between the two military blocs was not
entirely unavoidable.3
Even though his statement had no direct influence on the excessive
development of war industry in the Soviet bloc, it certainly was an important message for the
‘other side’: it signalled that the Soviet Union, despite all the misgiving of Western states, was
not interested in provoking a third world war. However strange it might seem at first sight, in
fact Stalin’s above statement became the basis of the policy that later, in the 20th
congress of
the Soviet Communist Party, was announced as the policy of peaceful coexistence.
In March 1952, in his famous note, Stalin once again proposed to his former allies the
idea of a unified and neutral Germany. Western powers, however, declined the suggestion,
reasoning that it was merely a false manoeuvre so that the Soviet Union can hinder the
rearmament of West-Germany and its admission to NATO.4
In international historiography,
however, the debate has been continually going on ever since whether Western states simply
missed the opportunity of forming a unified Germany. Even though recently revealed Soviet
sources do not provide us with relevant answers, it is quite likely that restarting East-West
negotiations could have hastened the advent of the détente process, which finally happened
after the death of Stalin.5
Research studies seem to prove that the economic policy of the
Soviet Union and the East-Central European countries, focusing on the development of the war
industry from the late 1940s, lost its potential as early as 1952. Certain signs of the coming
crisis were noticeable in various aspects of social life.6
It is most likely that the Soviet
leadership would have been compelled to somehow reform their previous policy both in the
Soviet Union and in the so-called satellite states, even if Stalin had not died in March 1953.
An international conference on improving East-West economic relations organised in Moscow
4
4
in April 1952 can surely be interpreted as an investigative initiation towards the West and of
course an attempt at thus improving domestic economy.
It is not unprecedented in Hungary either that the authorities made attempts even
before 1953 at restoring as best as they could the country’s economic relationship with the
West, which had been terminated in 1949. The Rákosi administration had secret negotiations
with the British government between January 1952 and March 1953. The stakes were high:
abolishing the trade embargo and restarting commercial and financial negotiations, which were
terminated by the British in 1949 as a way of denouncing the imprisonment of British
businessman Edgar Sanders at the time. The Hungarian government were willing to release the
prisoner in return.7
The Hungarian leadership, however, were keen to keep up appearances so
they wanted to disguise the transaction for the public as an exchange of prisoners. In return
for Sanders, they asked the British to release a Malaysian communist called Li Meng, who was
sentenced to death for terrorism in his own country — a colony of the British empire. The
British government flatly refused the suggestion and the negotiations terminated in March
1953. One of the first strategic decisions of the government of Imre Nagy in foreign policy
was that they unconditionally released Sanders from prison in August 1953. He left for
England immediately. That done, the British administration lifted the embargo and then
promptly started diplomatic preparations for resuming Hungarian-British financial and
commercial negotiations. The preparation started in the autumn of 1953 and it became longer
than expected: it ended with a Hungarian-British financial and trade agreement in June 1956.
Interdependence and compelled co-operation
The era between 1953 and 1956, after Stalin’s death, is still a controversial issue
regarding its importance in world politics. Public opinion holds that controversial political
events and tendencies mark this era, such as the beginning of détente, a promising attempt at
relieving the tension between East and West: the “spirit of Geneva”, and the 20
th
congress of
the Soviet Communist Party, an event of historical importance on the one hand; serious crises,
5
5
such as the 1953 Berlin uprising, the rebellion of Poznan in June 1956, the October events in
Poland, the Hungarian revolution and the Suez crisis on the other hand. As spectacular and
palpable results (agreements) were not achieved in the East-West relationship during these
years — apart from ending the Korean war and concluding the Austrian state treaty — while
there were plenty of extraordinary events, it is usually presumed that something certainly
started after 1953 but the logic of the Cold War was prevailing until and even after 1956, so
real détente started only in the mid- sixties. This very opinion explains why so many think
even today that the West abandoned and betrayed Hungary in 1956. According to the rules of
the Cold War game, the American government, who declared themselves the “liberators of
enslaved states” well until October 1956, had to look no further to find a better occasion to
fulfil their promise than the Hungarian revolution. Nonetheless, the biggest paradox of this
controversial era was that Eisenhower and Dulles announced this policy just at the very end of
the classical Cold War era, in the framework of the presidential campaign in the autumn of
1952. This policy or rather propaganda certainly contributed to the Republican victory and
then at the beginning of 1953 it was accepted as official government policy, which rendered a
markedly different situation and conditions in world politics. Beyond the fact that the
“peaceful liberation of enslaved nations” as Eisenhower imagined it meant nothing more than a
moral obligation that the United States would fight by peaceful means, i.e. with words, or with
exerting political pressure at the most, in the favourable international climate after Stalin’s
death the authorities of both superpowers were interested in relieving cold war paranoia and,
more tangibly, keeping down the gallop of the armaments race. The large scale arms race
started in the late 1940s and — though neither party were ready to attack the other — not only
had it exhausted the scarce internal resources of the Soviet Union, but it seriously curtailed the
sources intended for the development of infrastructure and domestic consumption in the just
emerged American welfare state, not to mention England and France, hardly recovered from
the ruins of the war.
The analysis of documents that have been recently revealed in Eastern and Western
archives and mostly issued by the highest level of executive bodies makes it more and more
6
6
obvious that the most important trend between 1953 and 1956 was — despite any disturbing
event or propaganda — the mutual and gradual realisation and understanding of the fact that
the two prevailing political-military blocs and ideologies had to live side by side and tolerate
one another in order to avoid a third world war, which would certainly lead to total
destruction. The appreciation of this meant such a decisive change in the East-West
relationship that it is not too far-fetched to distinguish two radically different phases of the
Cold War: before and after 1953. In fact we could call them Cold War I and Cold War II. I
consider the period between 1953 and 1956 — in lieu of what many think even today — not
only a promising but misfired attempt at realising the policy of détente but a major landmark,
after which the Cold War meant something else than before. The general assumption has been
that the key to the Cold War was the bipolar world order based on the opposition and
competition of the United States and the Soviet Union all along. In my opinion, however, the
main characteristic in the relationship of the conflicting superpowers after 1953 was —
despite the ever increasing competition — the continuous interdependence and compelled cooperation
of the United States and the Soviet Union while immanent antagonism remained.
This model started to take shape from 1953, especially in 1955-1956, then produced more
spectacular results from the mid-sixties, developing into a sometimes near-cynical cooperation,
which time to time was disturbed by real and more often apparent crises that caused
some temporary tension in East-West relations —sometimes not even that — before the
mechanism of compelled co-operation was restored again.
This means that, in spite of what the traditional interpretation holds, dating the
“classical Cold War” era between cc. 1947 and 1962,8
I assume that this early stage, based on
the idea of total confrontation, lasted only until 1953. What came after that can be described,
regarding the logic of the relationship, as the era of peaceful coexistence, a term generally
used for characterising East-West relations in the period beginning in the mid-nineteen-
sixties.9
Following the above argument this term should be rather changed to compelled
coexistence.
7
7
Crises: real and apparent
Another important problem that needs to be revisited is the character of the crises
occurring during the Cold War era. The multinational archival evidence now available for
scholars proves convincingly that not at all every crisis which occurred during the Cold War
era was attributable to the Cold War as far as its main character is concerned. After World
War II, and especially until the mid-sixties, both Eastern and Western public opinion was
determined by an ideological and strategic East-West opposition, thus automatically labelling
all major internal crises within the Eastern bloc as well as other conflicts of the East-West
relationship without differentiation as East-West, i.e. Cold War crises. This pattern has been
more or less followed by scholarship as well, incorporating all these conflicts into the general
history of the East-West relationship. Today it should be made clear, however, that most of
these conflicts were not real crises in this sense because they did not exceed the above
outlined co-operation framework of the superpowers, in spite of what their propaganda said,
namely, they did not cause real threat to the interests of the opposing political-military bloc.
Thus, in fact, they did not challenge the post World War II European status quo and
consequently did not disturb the East-West relationship in the long run. Such apparent EastWest
crises that had their effect only at the level of public opinion and propaganda were the
1953 Berlin uprising, the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and finally the Polish conflict in 1980-1981.
These were, of course, serious internal crises both in the countries where they
occurred and within the Soviet Bloc per se. Although these conflicts were rooted in the
domestic situation, they were not isolated from international impacts. In fact they happened in
a Cold War constellation and thus their initiation and course was partly effected while their
outcome was basically determined by the Cold War. They were also perceived as real
conflicts between East and West by contemporary public opinion (but not by policymakers)
both in the East and the West and this evaluation has survived in public memory even after the
8
8
end of the Cold War. In this sense (and only in this sense) they could be called Cold War
crises, but, as pointed out above, they were not crises of the East-West relationship.
The Suez crisis in 1956 has to be mentioned together with the above, a serious conflict
which happened parallel with the Hungarian revolution but did not have an effect on the EastWest
relationship. It was rather a conflict within the Western alliance10
, as the Soviet
leadership assessed the situation realistically and decided not to be involved in it, not willing
to directly confront the West in the defence of Egypt.11
Basically different were from the above conflicts those crises, which did create a
serious clash of interest between the East and the West and some of which raised the
possibility of a general East-West military confrontation. Such real Cold War crises were the
two Berlin crises, (in 1948 and then between 1958-1961), the Korean war, the Chinese off
shore islands crises in the mid-and late fifties12
, the Cuban missile crisis, the war in Vietnam
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These crises represented real threats to World peace
and they had a long-lasting effect on East-west relationships both in their own time and in the
long run, as opposed to the above mentioned apparent crises.
Similarly, this new interpretation of the essence of Cold War could explain a
contradiction which is seemingly difficult to unravel: why is it that the most outspoken and
direct military threat of the whole era (the ‘missile notes’ of Soviet prime minister Bulganin)
happened during the Middle-East pseudo-crisis in 1956,13
while the most recent sources reveal
how restrained in fact the leaders of the superpowers were, showing a strong sense of
responsibility and well-meaning, when it came to rectifying the Cuban crisis, the largest ever
threat to global peace to date.14
Détente and European Status Quo
When evaluating the international conditions of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, I
hasten to note that the era between 1953 and 1956 truly had a major impact on what happened
afterwards but one has to remember that the “indissoluble” basis of the co-operation of
9
9
superpowers, which started in 1953 and significantly increased in 1955-1956, was the
European status quo, established at the end of World War II i.e. accepting that the Soviet
Union conquered East-Central Europe. From time to time in the course of East-West
negotiations after 1953 western politicians tried to raise the question of the independence of
the so-called satellite states — predominantly to soothe their own conscience and satisfy the
public opinion in their countries. All the same, they had to face permanent and definite refusal
from the Soviet leaders, so western decision-makers tried to find alternative solutions that
would make it possible to get rid of the problem which posed an increasing threat to the
otherwise promising development of East-West relations with minimising the loss of prestige.
That the United States had no concrete plans to liberate the satellite states became apparent
from the decision of the National Security Council (NSC No.174) as early as December 1953.
The next document recording the United States’ East-European policy was the decision of July
1956 (NSC 5608), which openly accepted, as a result of the détente process, that there was no
chance of restoring the independence of the satellite states in the near future, so the first step
towards total freedom in these countries should be the forming of a national communist
government, which has to be supported and assisted.15
The attitude of the British government in the issue was all the way characterised by
quite a degree of pragmatism and initiative drive. Prime Minister Churchill, hardly a month
after Eisenhower’s announcement of a peace offensive, held a speech in the House of
Commons in May 1953, suggesting a summit meeting among the Great Powers’ leaders, at the
same time giving an explicit nod and accepting the right of the Soviet Union to maintaining
their East-Central-European security zone. The British authorities continued to make every
effort to resolve the conflict between East (i.e. the Soviet Union) and West, and to bring about
political détente. As early as July 1954, Churchill suggested to Soviet leaders that he would
be willing to go to Moscow. His successor, Eden, was prepared to present a security plan of
the reunification of Germany at the Geneva summit, in July, 1955 which basically would have
meant the consecration of the existent European status quo – for the rest of the continent - by
heeding to the mutual security interests.16
Such a concession, however much in principle, was
10
10
unimaginable for the Americans at the time. Not to mention that the government of the
Federal Republic of Germany also vetoed the idea, so the Eden plan could never be officially
presented in Geneva. The suggestion, however, certainly proves that western politicians
started to realise that the de facto acceptance of the status quo necessarily had to be
superseded by its legal acceptance, de jure, in order to relieve cold war tension and strengthen
the security of Europe, as early as the mid-fifties. These years not only fostered several ideas
and suggestions in order to further develop the East-West relationship, some of which would
later be realised in practice (i.e. Eisenhower’s‘ Open Skies’ proposal) but even the roots of
the most important result of the policy of détente, the 1975 Helsinki Agreement go back to
1955.
After all, the passivity of the West at the time of the Hungarian revolution is not so
surprising and incomprehensible as contemporary public opinion in Hungary regarded it. The
Hungarian uprising was not merely inconvenient for the western powers but it totally
contradicted their policy which was aiming at a compromise with the Soviet Union through the
mutual acquiescence of the existing status quo.
II. THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE SUPERPOWERS:
IMPROVISATIONS AND DECISIONS OF HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE
In the following paragraphs I intend to have a closer look at the international
relevance of two significant elements of the Hungarian revolution: the reaction of the two
superpowers. My analysis focuses on two particular aspects: firstly, to what extent could the
Soviet and American authorities make sensible decisions in such an inordinate situation, and
secondly, whether their decisions were the right ones in defence of their political interests.17
News of the Hungarian revolution, contrary to what many expected, caused some
havoc in Washington. The American government had no firm concept and strategic scenario,
should such an unlikely event happen. Suddenly the Eisenhower administration had to face the
11
11
fact that despite their massive liberation propaganda in Eastern Europe, the United States,
virtually the world’s largest military power, had a very limited potential of intervention in the
Soviet sphere of interest in case of an anti-Soviet uprising. To maintain their political
prestige, though, it was most important for the United States to conceal their inadequacy as
best as they could from international public opinion. This delicate situation prompted those
improvisational steps that the American administration made as a reaction to the Hungarian
revolution. One of these spectacular steps was that, initiated by the Americans, three Western
Great Powers officially asked the UN Security Council to put the question of Soviet
intervention in Hungary on the agenda of its session on 28 October.18
From a historical perspective, however, it proved to be more important that the
American government, which already reassessed its policy towards the satellite states in July
1956 for “internal use”, was now compelled to do the same for the general public as well.
Nonetheless, the above mentioned No.5608 decision of the National Security Council was
preceded by a long and meticulous preparation, with the participation of experts, there was no
time for such accuracy in those stormy days at the end of October, so the new directives were
formed in the midst of ad hoc negotiations of the highest authorities and on the basis of hasty,
improvisational decisions.
Following a suggestion on 26 October by Harold E. Stassen, the president’s advisor on
disarmament, it was decided that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in his canvassing
speech for a Dallas audience the following day, would incorporate a message for the Soviet
Union, suggesting that if the East-European states achieved freedom and independence, it
would not jeopardise the security of the Soviet Union, because the United States would accept
that these countries receive a neutral status, similarly to Austria, and never become NATO
members. In the very last moment, however, both the neutral status and the ban on NATO
membership were excluded from the speech, so the famous declaration eventually conveyed no
more than the following: “We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies.”19
It
is small wonder, after all, that in the current situation this emphatically defensive and topical
12
12
statement was interpreted in Moscow as the United States’ confirmation that they would
refrain from intervention in the interest of both Poland and Hungary.
The above cited declaration, however, was of historical importance even in this
radically amended form — despite the fact that usually only its role in pacifying the Soviet
Union is emphasised. All previous official statements of the Eisenhower administration
regarding the satellite states were based on the assumption that should these states become
independent one day, they would automatically be part of the western world, which in this
context includes NATO membership at the same time.20
Declaring that the United States do
not consider these states as potential military allies, practically meant the repudiation of their
former position, i.e. a significant change of paradigm in American foreign policy. In this way
the Hungarian revolution and its subsequent suppression — reluctantly acknowledged by the
Americans — became a catalyst in a process that started in the summer of 1956 and lasted
until the mid-sixties, and which resulted in a new, more pragmatic American foreign policy
towards Eastern Europe. The new principle was gradually leaning towards the de jure
acknowledgement of the European status quo, and instead of liberating the satellite states although
in a historical perspective this hope was never given up, - it aimed at softening and
liberalising the prevailing communist regimes, primarily through exerting economic pressure
on them. The historical irony is that while the ideologically driven “liberation policy”, relying
on every nation’s innate right to independence, failed to positively influence the state of the
region, the subsequent “defeatist” US policy of self-restraint contributed effectively to the fall
of communist systems in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Sooner or later after suppressed revolutions and uprisings the question often arises:
could it have happened otherwise; was the defeat unavoidable or was there the slightest chance
of victory, had it not been for the unlucky turn of internal and external conditions? Hungarian
society has not been able to come to terms with the fall of the 1956 revolution — placing the
event in amongst other historical traumas of the nation. Until recently, the public have
assumed that the historic chance was missed because the western states eventually failed to
deliver the expected assistance. Accordingly, when subsequently re-estimating the chances,
13
13
the focus of attention was always what the West and particularly the United States could and
should have done in order to help the Hungarian cause. Although contemporary public opinion
had every reason to expect genuine western support on the basis of American liberation
propaganda, especially from a moral point of view, today we cannot disregard the above
mentioned international conditions that fundamentally influenced the outcome of the
Hungarian revolution. The facts reveal that the United States actually had no political means
at its disposal to force the Soviet Union to give up on Hungary. Moreover, it is most likely
that any form of military intervention could have resulted in a direct conflict between the
superpowers, from which the outbreak of the third world war would have been just a step
ahead.
This all means that the outcome of the Hungarian events in fact depended not so much
on the western attitude as on how Soviet leaders could handle the political crisis that started
on 23 October 1956. It is well-known that Tito in his speech delivered in Pula on 11
November 1956 considered the first Russian intervention a mistake, yet it is surprising how
much neglected the fact is that the Soviets alone (and no one else) were in an exclusive
situation to decide on 23 October 1956, that is they could have decided differently then and
there. There was nothing to prevent that the Soviets use the Polish scenario in Hungary. More
than that, at the meeting of the CPSU Presidium in the evening of 23 October, a distinguished
member of the leadership, Mikoyan, who was most familiar with the Hungarian situation,
clearly outlined the alternative solution: “Without Imre Nagy they can’t get control of the
movement, and it’s also cheaper for us. (…) What are we losing? The Hungarians themselves
will restore order on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send troops.”21
Mikoyan’s suggestion was practically the only sensible alternative in the given situation, yet
he was alone with his opinion at the Politburo meeting. The Soviet leaders, who showed a
pragmatic approach towards the main issues of world politics after 1953, who managed to give
up on the idea of military intervention in the last moment when resolving the Polish crisis —
an intervention which would have been prompted by the ideological and emotional motivation
of cold war reflexes — were unable to exercise the same policy of self-restraint when it came
14
14
to the Hungarian uprising. In this way Khrushchev and his companions made the worst
possible political decision from their own point of view as well, starting a process — virtually
the only anti-Soviet freedom fight in the history of the Cold War22
— the uncomfortable
consequences of which they thought to avoid by resorting to an imminent military campaign.
Of course it cannot even be guessed how the situation was to have developed in Hungary, had
the Hungarian government and its military forces been entrusted with the task of pacification.
It is more than likely, though, that in such a case there would have been a slight chance of
consolidating the situation and, similarly to Poland, of establishing a promptly introduced but
firmly controlled and limited reform policy, which the Soviets would later accept as a passable
solution that does not jeopardise their fundamental strategic interests. In this case, however,
we would rather talk about the victory of the reform communist movement instead of the
Hungarian revolution of 1956. Having said that, it is just as conceivable that the government
of Imre Nagy would have been unable to cope with the conflict gradually slipping in an
increasingly radical direction, and the Soviet Union would have had to subdue the uprising
with military intervention in a few days or weeks. In the latter case, however, they could have
said that they really did everything in their power to bring about a peaceful solution and it was
not their fault that they failed.23
It is therefore not too farfetched to say that in handling the
crises of East-Central Europe between 1953 and 1981, 23 October 1956 was the only occasion
when the Soviet leadership made a totally wrong decision — considering their own imperial
interests — which resulted in a situation directly opposed to their original intention. At the
same time, it means that the invasion of 4 November, 1956 was a logical and unavoidable
consequence of a principally wrong political decision. The first Soviet intervention propelled
such a dynamic impetus in the Hungarian events which after a certain point could not be
handled by political means within the framework of the system any more, unlike in Poland.
Consequently, by the end of October the rapid collapse of the communist system became more
and more apparent, which in turn posed a genuine threat to the integrity of the Soviet bloc. By
that time there was no alternative decision that the Soviets could make: their only reaction was
to be armed intervention.
15
15
While it is so rarely emphasised or even realised in old and recent analyses of the
subject how decisive the first Soviet intervention was, the general reinterpretation of Soviet
policy towards the Hungarian revolution has recently received a new impetus, following the
disclosure of the so-called Malin notes.24
These notes give a non-verbatim, often fragmentary
yet immensely informative account of debates about the Hungarian crisis in the Soviet
Politburo giving an insight for the first time into the polemics of the highest echelons of
Moscow, which eventually led to the decisions we know all too well. These documents
confirm those earlier presumptions that there were serious, often heated debates in the Kremlin
about the right policy to follow. Researchers have widely different opinions about what was
actually at stake in these debates, even in the light of the lately disclosed historical sources.
Basically two different points of view can be identified. According to the first one,
the Soviet authorities were more open towards handling the crisis than we have thought so far,
and consequently the final suppression of the uprising was not the only alternative. Had the
events taken a more favourable — and usually not specified — turn, there would have been a
fair chance for the revolution to be victorious. Going one step further, some presume that the
liberation of East-Central Europe could have happened 33 years before the actual event —
1989 and 1990. According to the second, directly opposing opinion, the message of the Malin
notes does not contravene our previous assumption about Soviet policy in the issue, what is
more, it generally confirms what we could only guess before. The debates within the
presidential body were indeed serious and perhaps more heated than one could imagine, the
real aim of the dispute between “liberals” and “conservatives”25
, however, was not at all giving
up on Hungary (i.e. realising the triumph of the revolution) as merely deciding what
compromises and sanctions could be granted to the government of Imre Nagy in the given
situation, so that they could consolidate the situation within the framework of the communist
system. Although I hasten to add that I personally represent the latter theory,26
it is worth
conducting a brief survey to find out what kind of facts and information seem to confirm the
idea that the Soviets would have been ready to give up Hungary if need be. It might sound
surprising but in the minutes of Politburo meetings between 23 October and 4 November 1956
16
16
there is only one really important but vaguely decisive piece of information which could be
utilised for such an interpretation: on 30 October the Presidum — under pressure from the
Chinese delegation who came to Moscow27
— unanimously (!) declared that Soviet troops
should be withdrawn from Hungary. Nevertheless, the key to the interpretation of the often
fragmentary Malin notes is that new information had better be construed in view of all known
and recently disclosed information on the one hand, and in the global context of world politics
and East-West relations on the other hand.28
In this respect, it is more than obvious that the
potential of such favourable decision from the Soviet authorities depended by no means on
their disposition to “give up” Hungary as such; just opposite: it would have been the maximum
political concession that Soviet leaders were willing to make — to avoid what even they
thought would be the worst possible solution: military intervention — had the government of
Imre Nagy been able to consolidate the situation without jeopardising the communist regime
and the integrity of the Soviet bloc. There are several concrete examples in the Malin notes in
this regard, proving that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would have been possible only if
these two conditions had been met. Suffice it to mention two specific, poignantly expressed
and documented examples. Foreign Minister Shepilov, who took part in the debates mostly as
the representative of the “liberal alternative”,29
said the following when supporting the above
decision: “With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops.
We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time.”30
That is the
well-calculated consequence of their step was by no means the restoration of the capitalist
system but the consolidation of a situation similar to that of Poland, i.e. the formation of a
well-defined communist system, which could operate with more autonomy, yet loyal to
Moscow and within the framework of the Soviet bloc.
Typically, it was Mikoyan who expressed most clearly the necessity of keeping up the
status quo by hook or by crook, even though he always represented the most liberal opinion in
terms of Hungary all along: “We simply cannot allow Hungary to be removed from our camp,”
he said at the Politburo meeting on 1 November, one day after the decision was made about the
need for intervention, while he tried to convince the others that there were still political means
17
17
to find a solution, and they should wait another 10-15 days before launching an intervention.31
The irony of fate is that while on 23 October Mikoyan was the only one who assessed the
situation sensibly, pushing the strategy of wait and see then, on 1 November the same position
meant that now he was the only one in the leadership who could not understand (or accept) that
the Hungarian events were indeed beyond the scope that the Soviet Union could tolerate.
Today it is generally accepted that by the very end of October Hungary experienced such an
irreversible democratic transition, which undoubtedly could have resulted in the complete
elimination of communist dictatorship, had it not been for outside intervention. The events
between 1 and 3 November only reinforced this opinion; it was not incidental that at the
Politburo meeting on 3 November now it was Mikoyan himself who suggested János Kádár for
heading the new government.32
All in all, we can conclude that the Malin notes do not contain any fact or information
which would imply that anyone in the Soviet leadership was willing to accept the changes in
Hungary, together with the more and more apparent consequences, i.e. the emergence of a
democratic system. Come to think of it, it is not that surprising. Allow me to refer once again
to a well-known fact: it has been common knowledge for long that Tito himself agreed to the
plan of Soviet invasion on the night of 2 and 3 November on the island of Brioni, in order to
save the communist system in Hungary. More than that, he later officially declared that the
second invasion was unavoidable. Having said that, it is beyond doubt that other than Tito
there was no one more interested in the victory of national communism, that is in the success
of the Imre Nagy administration in this particular case. Consequently, if at the beginning of
November even Tito thought -- despite his fundamentally positive disposition, and rightly —
that the communist dictatorship in Hungary was in intractable jeopardy, it would have been
most peculiar if the Soviet leaders, who had conceded even more moderate changes within the
political framework of communism only under the pressure of a serious crisis, had shown more
compliance than the Yugoslav authorities.33
After the intervention of 4 November it seemed that the proposal made by the CPSU
Presidium at their meeting on 30 October, which did not concern fundamental issues but was
18
18
of historical importance nevertheless, lost its relevance once and for all. Paradoxically,
though, out of all the East-Central European states it was Hungary — the Kádár leadership,
which came to power in those days and consolidated their supremacy rapidly with the dual
strategy of stick and carrot — who could stretch the boundaries of Moscow’s tolerance at all
times, and achieve a relatively independent internal development for decades after 1956.
Paradoxically, a relatively independent foreign policy, just about tolerated by the Soviet
Union, was achieved by Romania, a state whose internal system was in many respect more
retrograde than the post-Stalinist Soviet system.
In my opinion, the lost historical chance of 1956 - if there was any - can be defined as
follows: had the Imre Nagy government been able to miraculously stop the democratic process,
which spread with an extraordinary rapidity, the Soviet leadership would have been willing to
withdraw their troops from the country, making a compromise more significant than in the
resolution of the Polish crisis, where this possibility was not even mentioned seriously. It
means that Moscow was ready to grant the privilege of relative internal and external
independence at the same time to one particular satellite country, that is Hungary.
Khrushchev and his colleagues were leaning towards such a complex concession in the critical
situation, which the Soviet authorities would never again accept in the following decades. The
relatively independent internal and foreign policy in any allied country was considered too
dangerous from the point of view of imperial interests.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION
In the following paragraphs I intend to give a sketchy outline of the significance of the
Hungarian revolution in the further development of the East-West relationship, in the détente
process, and how the events of 1956 later influenced Hungary’s position and diplomatic
elbowroom in international politics.34
19
19
The détente process that started after 1953 was temporarily disturbed and arrested but
definitely not terminated by the Hungarian revolution and its suppression; moreover, the
revolution did not influence the future of the process either. The tension caused by western
objection to Soviet intervention was in fact expressed in the field of propaganda,
predominantly on the forums of the UN, while both the Americans (together with the British
and French) and the Soviet authorities were willing to negotiate as before. The spring of 1957
brought about the rekindling of international dialogue, and a new East-West summit was under
preparation from the end of the year.
The most direct effect of the revolution was that the great western powers, through
their attitude, expressed undoubtedly that the West acknowledged the European status quo of
1945 and did not want to question its relevance, despite all the propaganda stunts. Naturally it
satisfied the Soviet leadership more than anyone else, because instead of a tacit agreement now
they got a firm guarantee that in resolving future conflicts within the boundaries of their
empire they would not have to consider the point of view of western states, not even when they
resort to the most drastic means. In this respect the Hungarian revolution certainly provided
the Soviet Union with a much more favourable position, as the uncertainty threatening — in
actual fact only at the level of propaganda — the security of the East-Central European region
by the United States with psychological warfare (see “liberation of enslaved nations”) was
over after 1956.
This guarantee of security policy, gained in 1956 and lasting until the collapse of the
Soviet Union — together with scientific results in missile technology and space research in the
late 1950s — contributed to the strengthening of the international position of the Soviet Union
and gave a boost to the self-confidence of Soviet leaders. Later it would indirectly influence
the strengthening of two completely opposite tendencies: the elaboration of Khrushchev’s
adventurist foreign policy, the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis in the short
run. In the long run, however, the increasing self-confidence strengthened the emancipation
tendency, which made the Soviet Union a superpower on a par with the United States from a
military and strategic pint of view by the end of the 1960s. However, it indirectly helped the
20
20
deepening of the classical détente policy from the end of the sixties, contributed to the signing
of the Helsinki Agreement (1975) on the basis of de jure accepting the European status quo,
and helped realising the practice of “peaceful coexistence”.
The revolution influenced in a peculiar way Hungary’s later role in the East-West
relationship, and her position in international politics. Learning from their experiences in
1956, the Kádár regime, to say the least, did not strive for a more or less independent foreign
policy; moreover, they openly proclaimed both in Hungary and abroad that they rigorously
followed the directives of Moscow at all times. In less spectacular and more disguised spheres
of foreign policy (such as the economic relations with the West, secret missions at mediating
in the Vietnam war and in the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, etc.) there prevailed a cautious but
firm tendency all along, which aimed at utilising the available political leeway most effectively
but without drawing much attention.35
This practice was directly the opposite of the Romanian
strategy, which proclaimed both for their domestic public and abroad that they dissented the
Soviet line from the mid-sixties on, eager to prove the existence of a truly independent
Romanian foreign policy, while in fact the country, - as far as the basic interests and aims were
concerned - similarly to Hungary, remained a solid member of the Soviet system of alliance.
On the basis of official and spontaneous social reaction in the West to the suppression
of the revolution, and the commitment of the UN General Assembly to the issue of Hungary,
many might have thought that the Kádár regime would not be able to consolidate its
relationship with the West ever or at least for a long time. Nonetheless, the defeat of the
Hungarian uprising rather prompted western politicians to carry on with the policy of
reinterpretation, which meant that after 1956 they completely did away with the theory of
liberating enslaved nations; from then on, the new goal was “softening” and liberalising the
communist regimes of East-Central Europe. In this respect the Kádár administration, aiming at
the systematic rehabilitation of the communist regime after November 1956, i.e. trying to
organise a system that works effectively, proved to be a most promising partner.36
Having said
that, it is not surprising that the British declared their intention to stabilise relations with
Hungary as early as the Spring of 1957 — true enough, they did it only for “internal use” for
21
21
the time being, given the circumstances. Discretion was necessary, as the Kádár regime
wanted to accomplish a specifically Hungarian variation of the post-Stalinist system parallel
with the inconceivably brutal and widespread retaliation campaign after the revolution, to
which western politicians responded with morally righteous indignation. Thinking sensibly
and considering the security interests of the Soviet Union they admitted the necessity of
pacification and restoring law and order, nonetheless, partly under pressure from public
opinion on home ground, they expected the Hungarian government to forgive the “delinquents”
and “deviants” just as magnanimously as pragmatically they intended to win over the majority
of the population for their policy. Perhaps we can risk the presumption that should the West,
and primarily the United States, have exerted pressure on the Hungarian government — to
make them moderate the zeal of political retribution — directly, by means of secret
negotiations, as it happened later in 1960-1962,37
instead of appealing to the widest public,
such as the diplomatic forums of the UN, they might have forced more serious compromises
from the Hungarian government much earlier. This would have resulted in not only what
happened years later — namely that the Hungarian case was taken off the agenda of the UN
General Assembly in December 1962, in return for which Hungary granted amnesty to the
majority of those convicted for their participation in the revolution — but the retribution
campaign itself could have been influenced, mitigating its austerity and thus directly saving
dozens of human lives.38
What makes it all plausible is that the main objective of the Kádár
regime in their foreign policy right after 1956 was to break out of the almost complete
diplomatic isolation and to prove that even from a western point of view the new system,
although its conception was far from being immaculate, is no worse, or even better than other
communist regimes. Apparently the West registered this attempt quite soon, but the recurring
issue of Hungary in the UN was so instrumental, especially for the United States, in the
struggle of superpowers for the influence over the third world, that direct negotiations with the
Hungarian authorities only became possible once the UN debate had obviously exhausted.39
In this way in Western policy Hungary only gained the status of bloc normal — i.e. the
same recognition as the other communist states — after the amnesty of 1963. Having said that,
22
22
Hungary became a favourite straight away, together with Poland. The peculiarly Hungarian
variation of the post-Stalinist system — worked out by the mid-sixties, relying mostly on the
lesson of the revolution — created a more flexible and liberal communist model of its own
kind, which happened to align with the goal of American foreign policy after 1956: a policy
that abandoned the rhetoric of liberation for good. Paradoxically the Hungarian revolution of
1956, striving for the principle of universal human freedom, was totally out of tune with the
actual objectives of western politics — even though many thought that the uprising renders the
conditions of “liberation”. The Kádár regime, however, with their pragmatic approach,
managed to align with western expectations of the time more than any other country of the
Soviet bloc for decades after 1956
NOTES
1
An earlier version of this paper was published as: Hidegháború, enyhülés és az 1956-os
magyar forradalom, Évkönyv V. 1996-1997, 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1997, 201-213.
pp. This working paper was finished during my fellowship at New York University
where I spent the 2001/2002 academic year as a Center Fellow of the Project on the
Cold War as a Global Conflict at the International Center for Advanced Studies. While
the tragedy of September 11 hindered my work in an indescribable way for a long time,
the excellent working conditions provided by the staff of ICAS, Director Tom Bender,
Project Director Marilyn Young, Project Co-Director Allen Hunter and Administrator
Jeryl Martin Hannibal eventually gave me ample compensation. Similarly, the
extremely stimulating company of my fellow-fellows and the larger community of the
Friday seminars’participants helped me a lot to prevail over my initial depression. I am
23
23
especially grateful for the comments and observations of my colleagues during the
discussion of the manuscript of this paper, particularly for those of Mario del Pero,
John Prados and Carolyne Eisenberg.
2
Parallel with revealing new sources, - especially from archives of the former Soviet Blocinternational
historiography, mainly in the United States, has been reinterpreting the history of
the Cold War since the early 1990s. It is worth noting a few important works of the already
bulky collection of new interpretations: Richard H. Immerman (ed.): John Foster Dulles and
the Diplomacy of the Cold War. Princeton, N.J.., Princeton University Press, 1990; David
Holloway: Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956. New Haven,
1994; Melvyn P. Leffler, Davis S. Painter (eds.): Origins of the Cold War. An International
History. London—New York, Routledge, 1994; Vojtech Mastny: The Cold War and Soviet
Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York, 1996; Vladislav Zubok — Konstantin Pleshakov:
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev. Harvard University Press, 1996;
John Lewis Gaddis: We Now Know. New York, 1997; Marc Trachtenberg: A Constructed
Peace.The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963 Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999. See also Bulletin (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Cold War International History Project, Washington D.C. — hereinafter called CWIHP
Bulletin), Nos.1-12/13. and CWIHP Working Papers
3
William H. Hyland: The Cold War. Fifty Years of Conflict. Times Books, 1990. p.59.
4
Cf. Rolf Steininger: The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of
Reunification. Trans. Jane T. Hedges. New York, 1990. The history of the note was studied by
Stein Bjornstad on the basis of Moscow archive materials in Soviet German Policy and the
24
24
Stalin Note of 10 March 1952. Hovedoppgave, University of Oslo, Department of History, Fall,
1996.
5
Cf. Jim Hershberg: “Germany and the Cold War: New Evidence from East Bloc Archives”.
CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 4, Fall, 1994.
6
The importance of the year 1952 as a landmark was first pointed out by Melinda Kalmár, in an
analysis of literary policy in Hungary. Cf. Melinda Kalmár: A politika poetikája.
Irodalomideológia az ötvenes évek elsô felében. [Poetics of Politics. Literary ideology in the
early 1950s.] in Holmi, No.5, 1993. The economic crisis that started in 1952 is pointed out by
Károly Urbán: Sztálin haláltól a forradalom kitöréséig. A magyar-szovjet kapcsolatok története
(1953-1956). [From the Death of Stalin to the Outbreak of the Revolution. The History of
Hungarian-Soviet Relations (1953-1956).] 1996, manuscript. A less specific reference to the
same issue was made by the so-called Fact-finding Committee set up by the HSWP CC in July,
1988 in one of their reports. Cf. Történelmi utunk. A Munkabizottság állásfoglalása a jelen
helyzet kialakulásának okairól. [Our Historical Route. Some Notes by the Committee about the
Basis of our Present Situation.] In Társadalmi Szemle, special issue, 1989, p.26.
7
Hungarian National Archive, XIX-J-l-j, Foreign Ministry, Great Britain, Top Secret
documents, 00183/13/1953. It is worth noting that the Hungarian negotiators, expecting that the
British were in a difficult situation, tried to have the ban lifted on some articles from the
COCOM list, which restricted the export of certain strategic items to communist countries.
8
This chronology is generally used in international historiography.
9
The term “peaceful coexistance” was originally used by Lenin and then reinvented by the oldnew
Soviet leadership right after Stalin’s death. For a long time, however it remained a Soviet
category, since the Western powers, especially the US were unwilling to accept this concept.
This happened only gradually from the mid-nineteen-sixties.
25
25
10
While the view that the Suez crisis was basically a conflict within the Western alliance is
quite generally accepted in Western scholarship, interestingly enough, in the former Soviet Bloc
countries it is still widely regarded a serious East-West conflict. This contradiction itself
suggests that the further examination of the nature and the contemporary and retrospective
perception of the crises during the Cold War era would be beneficial not only for history
writing but for other disciplines like sociology, anthropology and political science as well.
11
A fine example of this pragmatic Soviet opinion is Khrushchev’s announcement at the
meeting of the CPSU Presidium on 31 October 1956, hastening an armed intervention in
Hungary: “If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English and
French - the imperialists. They will perceive it as weaknesses on our part and will go onto the
offensive.... To Egypt they will then add Hungary.” Namely, the possibility of backing
president Nasser was not even considered, the Soviet leaders gave up on Egypt at the very
moment of the Israeli-British-French attack. Cf. The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary
and Poland, 1956. Mark Kramer ed. CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 8-9. p. 393.
12
Communist China started to shell the offshore islands of Quemou and Matsou,
occupied by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan in 1954. Although it
became never clear what the real motives of the Beijing leadership were (as eventually
they did not invade the islands) these attempts potentially posed a continuous danger
of “hot war” between the two military alliances in the mid- and late fifties because of
an US security guarantee defending the territorial integrity of Taiwan. The historical
importance of this crisis, however, has been generally and unduly underestimated in
public memory both in the East and the West. For a recent account on this crisis see:
Chen Jian:Mao’s China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill and London, 2001,163-204 pp. For the fascinating minutes of
26
26
conversations between Mao and Khrushchev discussing also this issue in 1958 and
1959, see: Vladislav Zubok: The Khrushchev-Mao Conversations, 31 July-3 August
1958 and 2 October 1959, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 12/13, Fall/Winter 2001, 243-272
pp..
13
Once it became apparent from the reaction of American leaders that the Israeli-British-French
coalition would be forced to retreat by the United States, the Soviet Union came up with the
biggest ever political bluff of the Cold War era: Prime Minister Bulganin sent telegrams to his
British and French colleagues on 5 November 1956, demanding an imminent cease-fire,
otherwise he indirectly threatened both states with a missile attack against Paris and London. At
the same time, in a telegram sent to the Israeli government, there was a clear reference to the
potential questioning the very existence of Israel as a state.
14
For the latest research on the Cuban crisis, see CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 1 (Spring, 1992), 3
(Fall, 1993) and 5 (Spring, 1995). See also The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, a National Security
Archive Documents Reader, Washington D.C.
15
For the East-European policy of the American government, see Bennett Kovrig: Of Walls and
Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe. New York, New York University Press, 1991;
and The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 1941.
Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1973; Marchio, David James: Rhetoric and
Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953-1959. University
Microfilms International, 1992. For a recent assessment of East-West relations in these years,
see Csaba Békés: The 1956 Revolution and World Politics. CWIHP Working Paper 16.
Washington D.C. 1996. The author’s analysis of this topic is largely based on his extensive
archival research in the following collections in the US and Great Britain: Seeley G. Mudd
27
27
Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, Dulles. A. W.: Papers,
Dulles. J. F.: Papers. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, Eisenhower D. D.:
Papers as President of the United States. (Ann Whitman File) Eisenhower, D. D.: Records as
President. White House Central Files. Confidential Files, Jackson. C. D.: Papers, White House
Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpastor, L.
Arthur Minnich. and Christopher H. Russell, White House Office. National Security Council
Staff: Papers, Dulles, J.F. Papers, National Archives, Washington, D.C. National Security
Council Reports, RG 273. Department of State, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, Records of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 330, Papers of Admiral Radford, RG 218, Records of U.S.
Department of State. Office of Public Opinion Studies, RG 59, United Nations Archives, New
York, N. Y. PSCA Confidential Notes, Chronological Summary regardig Hungary, Andrew
Cordier File, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. Public Record Office, London, Kew,
Cabinet meetings, Prime Minister A. Eden papers, Foreign Secretary S. Lloyd papers, Foreign
Office, General Correspondence.
16
Brian White: Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations, London—New York, Routledge,
1992. pp.55-56. On the Eden Plan see: Sacki Dockrill: The Eden Plan In: Cold War Respite: The Geneva
Summit of 1955, (eds) Günter Bischof, Saki Dockrill, 117-154. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 2000.
17
Generally about the policy of the superpowers see Bence Kovrig: “Liberators: the
superpowers and Hungary in 1956”. In Hungary and the Superpowers in the 20
th
century. Ed.
Ignác Romsics. Budapest, László Teleki Foundation, 1995; Csaba Békés: The 1956
Hungarian Revolution in World Politics. About the reaction of the individual great powers,
including the decisions of the Soviet Union, see the articles of János M. Rainer, Viatcheslav
Sereda, Vladislav Zubok, Mark Kramer, Leonid Ghibiansky, Chen Chien, Raymond L.
28
28
Garthoff, Ronald Pruessen, Vitaly Afiany and Daniel Calhoun in a forthcoming volume of
essays on the 1956 Revolution to be published by Wilson Center Press. For the most up to date
account and documentation on the revolution see: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History
in Documents. A National Security Archive Documents Reader (eds.) Csaba Békés, Malcolm
Byrne and János M. Rainer., Central European University Press, 2002.
18
For the UN debate on the Hungarian issue, see Csaba Békés: A brit kormány és az 1956-os
magyar forradalom. [The British Government and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.] In Évkönyv
I. Budapest, 1956 Institute, 1992. And by the same author: A magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben és a
nyugati nagyhatalmak titkos tárgyalásai 1956. október 28. - november 4. (Brit külügyi
dokumentumok) [The Hungarian issue in the UN and the secret negotiations of the Western
Great Powers 28 October – 4 November 1956. (Documents of British foreign affairs).] In
Évkönyv II. Budapest, 1956 Institute, 1993. László Borhi: Rollback, Liberation, Containment or
Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s. Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume I,
Number 3, Fall 1999.
19
An abridged version of the speech is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-
1957. Volume XXV. Eastern Europe. Washington, United States Government Printing Office,
p. 318.
20
This thesis is indirectly proved by the reluctance showed by the US in accepting the idea of
Austria’s neutrality prior to the conclusion of the Austrian state treaty in 1955. The above
mentioned fact, i.e. that in the last minute the reference to the ban on NATO membership and to
neutrality were omitted from the speech of Dulles on October 27, 1956 seems strongly
supporting the idea that up till that moment the potential incorporation of the East-Central
European countries into NATO had been a serious intention of the US leadership.
29
29
21
The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956. Mark Kramer ed. CWIHP
Bulletin, Issue 8-9. p. 389.
22
In this context I disregard the partisan warfare in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation,
because of the peculiar circumstances of the invasion.
23
Typically enough, although the Soviet leadership was well aware of the rapid escalation of
Hungarian events, at the Politburo meetings after 23 October no one cared to attribute it to the
wrong decision. Moreover, with the exception of Mikoyan, they all assessed it as a wise step
afterwards.
24
These notes have been published in several studies since their disclosure in 1995: Döntés a
Kremlben, 1956 [Decision-making in the Kremlin, 1956] János M. Rainer, Viatcheslav Sereda
(eds.) 1956 Institute, Budapest, 1996, Istoritchesky Archiv, (Viatcheslav Sereda, ed. ) 1996,
No.2, 3.; The Hungarian Quarterly, 1996, No.142, 143. (János M. Rainer, ed. ); The Hidden
History of Hungary 1956: A Compendium of Declassified Documents. Csaba Békés, Christian
F. Ostermann, Malcolm Byrne (eds.). Budapest—Washington D.C., The Institute for the
History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution — The National Security Archive, 1996; CWIHP
Bulletin, Issue 8-9, Winter 1996-1997 (Mark Kramer ed.)., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A
History in Documents.
25
Cathegories used by János M. Rainer. Cf. Döntés a Kremlben, 1956 [Decision-making in the
Kremlin, 1956.]
26
For the first publication of this view see: Csaba Békés — Melinda Kalmár: Optimizmusra
szükség van - de illúziók nélkül. Volt-e esély 1956-ban? [Optimism is a must have — but
without illusions. Was there a chance in 1956? ]. Népszabadság, 22 October 1996.
27
For the ambiguous role of the Chinese leadership see Chen Jian: op.cit. Chapter 6
28
Just as important, yet often overlooked by scholars is the significance of so-called negative
information; i.e. the analysis of what party leaders did not talk about. On the basis of this, it is
30
30
apparent that Soviet leaders were not afraid of western intervention in Hungary, because there
are no important contributions of this issue recorded in the notes. If they had reckoned with
such an exigency, they would not only have had to put it on the agenda for discussion but
immediate security measures would have been taken (e.g. total mobilisation of the armed
forces, etc.)
29
A category used by János M. Rainer. Cf. Döntés a Kremlben, 1956 [Decision-making in the
Kremlin, 1956.]
30
The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956. Mark Kramer ed. CWIHP
Bulletin, Issue 8-9. p. 392.
31
ibid. p. 394.
32
ibid. p. 397.
33
About the Yugoslav opinion on Soviet intervention new information has been disclosed in
recently published Soviet sources: according to these, in the course of negotiations with Soviet
leaders in November and December 1956, Yugoslav leaders, Tito among them, expressed that
Yugoslav troops would have intervened to subdue the Hungarian uprising, had the Soviet army
not marched in on 4 November. Hiányzó lapok 1956 történetébôl. Dokumentumok a volt SZKP
KB levéltárából. [Missing Pages from the History of 1956. Documents from the Archive of the
Central Committee of the Former Soviet Communist Party.] Compilation, notes and foreword
by Viatcheslav Sereda and Alexandr Stikalin. Budapest, Móra, 1993. p.249; Top Secret.
Magyar-jugoszláv kapcsolatok 1956-1959. [Top Secret. Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations 1956-
1959.] Documents. Ed. József Kiss, Zoltán Ripp, István Vida. Budapest, Committee on the
Contemporary History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1997. p.99. This surprising fact,
which has not yet been confirmed by Yugoslav sources, was first published by Swiss historian
Pierre Maurer: Az 1956-os magyar forradalom helye a szovjet kommunista rendszer
összeomlásában. [The contribution of the 1956 Hungarian revolution to the collapse of the
31
31
Soviet communist system.] Minutes of the international conference, 13-15 June, 1991,
Budapest, National Széchényi Library. Manuscript. Ed. Csaba Békés. Budapest, 1956 Institute,
1993. p.53. On the role of Yugoslavia see Leonid Gibianskii: Soviet-Hungarian Relations and
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 10, March, 1998, 139-148 pp.
34
For more detailed recent analyses on the aftermath and effect of the revolution see Péter
Kende: Mégegyszer a magyar forradalom világpolitikai jelentôségérôl. [Once again on the
significance of the Hungarian revolution and world politics.] In Évkönyv IV. Budapest, 1956
Institute, 1995. pp.7-23; Csaba Békés: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution in World Politics,
Chapter III.
35
About Hungarian foreign policy after 1956, see Charles Gati: Hungary and the Soviet Bloc.
Durham, Duke UP. Chapter 7; András Felkay: “The Relationship of Hungary and the Soviet
Union in the Years of the Kádár Regime, 1956-1988.” In Hungary and the Great Powers in the
20
th
Century, pp.215-227; Jungwon Park: “Conformity and Relative Autonomy in the Soviet
Bloc: Hungary’s Westward Policy Since the 1956 Revolution”. Ph.D. thesis, manuscript.
Budapest, 1994; Békés Csaba: A Kádári külpolitika 1956-1968. [Kádár’s foreign policy 1956-
1968.] Rubicon 1998. 1.
36
Instead of the terms “restoration” and “consolidation” commonly used -- with opposite
political bias -- for describing the reconstruction period following 1956, in recent scholarship
Melinda Kalmár introduced a term much more appropriate for an academic analysis:
rehabilitation. Cf. Melinda Kalmár: Ennivaló és hozomány. A kora kádárizmus ideológiája.
[The ideology of the early Kádár era.] Budapest, Magvetõ kiadó, 1998.
37
On Hungarian-American secret negotiations see János Radványi: Hungary and the
Superpowers. The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik. California, Hoover Institution Press
Stanford, 1972.
32
32
38
The number of those, sentenced to death because of their participation in the revolution was
incredibly high: altogether 229 people were executed.
39
Cf. Csaba Békés: A magyarkérdés az ENSZ-ben. [The Hungarian question in the UN.]
Rubicon, 1996. 8-9.