\
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1918-1935
llY
FELIX JOHN VONDRACEK, A. :M.
A11sooiate Pt·ofUMW" of History
Uni~ty of North Dakota
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILME~'T OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCl'OR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE
FACULTY OF POUTICAL SciENCE
CoLUMBIA UNIVERsnv
NEW VORK
1937
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1918-1935
BY
FELIX JOHN VONDRACEK, A. M•
.A880t:i.ate ProfuBOr of History
Unit.oemty ofNortl Dakota
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILME!I.'T OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILf?SOPHY
IN THE
FACULTY OF POUTICAL SCIENCE
CoLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
NEW \'ORK
1937
CoPYRIGHT, 1937
BY
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Puss
l'lliNTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
lto
MY WIFE
OLGA MARIE VONDRACEK.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ALTHOUGH it is not possible to mention individually all
who have assisted in the preparation of this work, the writer
wishes to express his gratitude particularly to certain
members of the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia
University, to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, to the late
Professor Parker Thomas Moon, under whose direction the
work was begun, and to Professor Walter Consuelo
Langsam, under whom the work was completed. In addition,
the writer desires to thank also the various members of
the Czechoslovak Consulates-General at New York and
Chicago~ and of the Legation at Washington, D. C., who,
periodically for over a decade, have generously placed at his
disposal materials not readily accessible to the general reader.
Similar appreciation is felt for many favors received from
the Svornost (Chicago) and from the Congressional Library,
the library of Columbia University, and those of the Universities
of Chicago, Iowa, and North Dakota.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ••
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE
General Considerations • • • • •
The New Government ••.•••••
Peace Conference Preliminaries .
The Territorial Settlement . .
Other Peace Conference Problems • • •
CHAPTER II
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
Interdependence of Foreign and Domestic Policies • • •
Financial Policy • • •
Economic Policy • •
Social Reform •
Religious Policy •
CHAPrER III
THE GREAT PowERS, 1918-1923
Objectives of Foreign Policy
Germany. • . •••
The Western Powers . •
The League of Nations .
rhe Russian Problem . •
The Sib~rian Campaign •.
Intra-Slav Cooperation 'liS. a" Western Orientation"
The Genoa Conference
The Rapprochement with Russia • • . . • • . . . .
CHAPTER IV
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE, 1918-1923
PACK
7
13
14
24
27
43
6o
6o
76
8g
9I
!)8
98
100
105
113
114
129
139
144
Benes' Central European Objectives . 147
Boundary Disputes with Poland • . . 148
The Formation of the Little Entente 162
9
10 TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Problem of Austria • . . . . • •
The Attempted Rapprochement with Poland • • •
Friction with Hungary • • • • • . • . • •
Central European Economic Cooperation
The Reconstruction of Austria • • •
Early Little Entente Conferences . • . •
The Reconstruction of Hungary • . . . .
CHAPTER V
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926
" The Treaty of Mutual Assistance " •
The French Alliance . . . ·
France, Italy and the Little Entente •.
The ltalo-Czechoslovak Treaty . . . •
The Praha and Ljubljana Conferences .
The Geneva Protocol
Locarno .
Security to the East •.
CHAPTER VI
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE NEW STATUS Quo
Commercial Treaties . • . . . . . .
The Debt Settlement with the United States •.
The Catholic Question •
Fascism ......••...•••.
Minority Reconciliations • • •
Better Relations with the Soviet Union
Friendship with Poland • • .
Franco-Italian Rivalry ••..
"Irreconcilable Hungary" . •
The Austrian Problem Again . . +
Little Entente Conferences, 1925-1929 ••
Germany and the League of Nations • • .
Peace, Security and Disarmament • • . .
CHAPTER VII
THE DEPRESSION
Economic Conferences • • • • • ·• • • • • •
The Proposed Austro-German Customs Union •••
Politics vs. Economics within the Little Entente .•
Hungarian Revisionism •.••
Italo-C1:echoslovak Friction . . . . . . . . . . . .
·.
PAGE
173
178
181
ISQ
192
197
205
209
2II
220
224
226
227
229
241
247
248
249
257
258
259
263
265
271
2]8
288
297
299
305
312
318
326
330
TABLE OF_ CONTENTS
The Ur S. S. R. and Poland
Revisionism 11s. the Status Quo .
Reparations and Debts •
CHAPTER VIII
THE NAZI CRISIS
The Causes and Importance of Hitlerism. ;_ ••
Strengtbenhig the Little Entente •
Italy and Poland , • • • • • • • • • • • •
1933 Little Entente Conferences • • • • • •
The Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact •
Disarmament Negotiations ••••••
The Germano-Polish Rapprochement •
Debt Default ••••••..•••
The Revival of Hungarian Revisionism
Austria • • • . . . • ••••
Friction with Germany . . .
Attempts to Isolate Germany . •
The Henlein Movement • . • • •
GOring's Balkan Tour~ .••••
Amplification of the Modus Vivendi ••
Solidarity of the Status Quo Bloc • •
Renewed Friction with Poland
Italy vs. Ethiopia •.•.
Masaryk's Resignation •
BIBLTOGRAPBY
INDEX ••••
.....
II
PAGE
334
336
341
351
356
300
364
368
369
373
376
377
38o
383
J86
407
4Il
412
413
418
420
423
426
445
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE
GENERAL CONSIDERA,TIONS
AT the beginning of her independent existence, Czechoslovakia
faced numerous problems inherent in her new status
and the post-war conditions. The young state would require
,many years of peace in which to consolidate its position and
complete the development of its resources. Hence, from the
outset, its leaders appreciated that, viewed from the point of
self-interest, a policy of preserving the post-war status quo
would become a vital necessity. Extreme nationalism*
would react, ultimately, against Czechoslovakia, which ought
to adopt at least a generous if not an altruistic policy. Her
geographic position between the recently-defeated Central
Powers, with Germany on the one hand and with Austria and
Hungary on the other, together with the close ties, particularly
economic, that still bound her to these countries, created
for her a precarious situation that could permit stability only
when it existed to some degree also within the territories of
her immediate neighbors. Nevertheless, a far-sighted foreign
policy would be exceedingly difficult to put into effect, for the
intense nationalism and hatred engendered by the recent
struggle precluded the possibility of the late enemies seeing
.eye to eye even on matters of common interest, until bitter
experience alone should teach them what measures must be
adopted for their mutual advantage.
The problems that faced Czechoslovakia were complex,
involving almost every aspect of human activity. Not only
• The term " nationalism " is used in the American sense, specifica11y as
defined in C.]. H. Hayes' Essa3•s on Nationalism (New York, 1926).
13
14 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1956
were there a large number of questions concerning the
foreign relations of the new state that de~anded almost
immediate solution, but there existed domestic problems,.
perhaps even more vital, that brooked still less delay. Thus,
while Czechoslovakia was attempting to clarify her relations
with different individual friends and foes and to obtain a
peace settlement that she deemed indispensable to her existence
and safety, she was forced also to set her own house in
order, to establish a government and to determine her future
policies. These various problems had to be solved by newly
elected or appointed officials, most of them with little previous
experience in the higher governmental activities.
Under such conditions, some mistakes and misunderstandings
were inevitable, yet, on the whole, few steps had to be
retraced.
The New Government
The question that demanded foremost attention was the
creation of the new government. During the War, two
Czechoslovak governments had been created, at Paris and
Praha (Prague) respectively. The former, the Czechoslovak
National Council, was the work of Czechs and Slovaks
residing in Allied countries, led by Masaryk/ Bene5 2
and
1 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was born of poor parents at Hodonin
(GOding) in Slovakia on March 7, x8so:" Obtaining an education after
a severe struggle, he became Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Praha. For many years he was unpopular because he sought to teach his
people to make Bohemia great in the present rather than merely to glorify
the past. Shortly after the outbreak of the War he went voluntarily
into exile, and from headquarters at Paris directed the Czechoslovak
revolutionary struggle. As President of the National Council, he made
trips to England, Russia and the United States on behalf of the revolutionary
cause.
2 Edward Bend, after obtaining his doctorate at Paris in 1909.
became Professor of National Economics at the Czech Business Academy
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 15
Stefanik,28
whereas -the latter was the product of a movement
inspired by Kramar.• The Paris government, after
receiving de facto recognitions from the Allied Great Powers
and the United States, proclaimed Czechoslovak independ~
ence on October 18, 1918.' The revolutionists at Praha,
taking advantage of Austria's growing weakness, actually
established Czechoslovakia by a· bloodless uprising of
October 28!'
Many uncertainties that had existed as to the political form
of the new state at earlier periods of the revolutionary
struggle were dissipated by 1918; even ardent former
monarchists had been converted to the idea of a Republic.•
The two Czechoslovak governments were merged without
friction. The consolidation was effected at Geneva on
and was active in the national movement. In 1914, when only thirty
years of age, he was entrusted with the leadership of the domestic
revolutionary movement after Masaryk's departure. During the following
year he came to the conclusion that he, too, could best serve the cause
abroad. Hence he also went to Paris where he became General Secretary
of the National Council. and, with Masaryk, a co-founder of the Czechoslovak
Republic.
2B Before the War, Milan R. Stefanik left his native Slovakia to become
an explorer for France. Subsequently, as a French general, be
played an influential part in obtaining the wpport of the Western Powers
for the revolutionary eause.
a Karel Kramar, the most prominent Czech leader who was not an
exile, led the domestic movement against the Dual Monarchy, and, during
the early years of the War, eclipsed Masaryk in popularity. The growing
conviction that independence had been won through Masaryk's conversion
of the Western Powers to the Czechoslovak cause brought about
an eventual decline in the inftuence of Kramar.
"Benes, E., My War Memoirs {New York, 1!)28), pp. 415-427.
o Opoeenskj, J., The Collapse of the Austro-Hungaritm Monarchy and
the Rise of the Czechoslovak State (Prague, 1!)28), pp. 93-147.
• On the question of republic vs. monarchy, cf. Masaryk's memorandum
to the Allies of February, 1916, in Masaryk, T. G., Svltova rewluce 64
valky o ve vdlce, 1914-1918 (Praha, 1933, hereafter referred to as Svitov4
Revol11ce), pp. 476-478; Benes, op. cit., pp. 444-445; Bielsky, E. (Edward
Bend), "Ceskoslovenske zeme republikou", Ceskoslovenska Somostamost,
vot iv, p. 25, November 20, 1918.
16 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
October JI, by the Declaration of Geneva/ drawn up by
delegates representing both groups. Masaryk became President;
Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers;
Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Stefanik, Minister
for National Defense. On November 14 the first units of
the Czechoslovak Legions returned from France and Italy.
Masaryk hastened from the United States to assume his new
duties, reaching Praha on December 2 I, where he was duly
inaugurated.8
The revolutionary leaders had to determine also the composition
of the Provisional National Assembly, the body
into which the National Council had enlarged itself. It was
imperative that the National Assembly organize itself
promptly; consequently it was not. the product of elections,
but an emergency body summoned hastily to conduct affairs
during the period of transition. Therefore, when it met for
the first time on November 14, its membership was based,
proportionally, upon the number of votes polled by all existing
Czech parties during the last elections, those of I9II to
the Austrian Abgeordnetenhaus. Its personnel was appointed
by the executive committees of the various parties concerned.9
Of the total membership of 270, the 54 Slovaks
had to be selected arbitrarily, by the Slovak National Council,
for no better method of selection existed, since the Slovaks
had had virtually no representation in the Hungarian parliament.10
In his inaugural address, Kramar proclaimed the
'f Declaration of Geneva, in leaflet form (in Czech); reprinted also in
Capek, T., Jr., Origins of the Czechoslo'l!(Jk State (New York, 1926); cf.
also, OpocenskY, oP. cit., pp. sS-62; Benes, op. cit., pp. 44o-443.
s Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 383-384.
e C/. Haskins, C. H. and Lord, R. H., Some Problems of the Peace
Conference (Cambridge, 1920), pp. 233-236; Graham, M. W., New Governments
of Central Europe (New York, 1924), p. 275·
to For details of the composition of the Provisional National Assembly,
cf. SedivY", K., Sept annees de palitique interietwe tchecoslovaque, I9I8I925
(Prague, 1925), pp. 7-8.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 17
establishment of the-Czechoslovak Republic and the dissolution
of all ties with the House of Habsburg-Lorraine. He
also invited the Bohemian Germans to participate in the
government, but both they and the Magyars refused to cooperate
with the Czechs.11
These refusals were discordant notes in the establishment
of the new government: although eipected, they indicated,
nevertheless, the dangers to which the new Republic would
be .exposed from the hostile minorities that would, in
all probability, be incorporated after the Peace Conference
had established definitive boundaries. By contrast, they
indicated also the necessity to the Czechs of the support of
the other Slavic groups within the state. The support of
the Slovaks had been pledged as early as October 30,12
thus
strengthening the ties already created by the Pittsburgh
Agreement.18
Similarly, during November, the Ruthenes
organized three National Councils at Presov, Uzhorod and
Chust, which soon merged. On May 8, 1919/~ the consolidated
Ruthene National Council approved the action
'11 Papanek, ]., LtJ TchicoslOfltJquie, histoire politique et juridique de StJ
creatiot~ (Prague, 1922), pp. 69-7o; Borovicka. ]., Ten Years of CzechoslOfltJk
Politics (Prague, 1929), pp. 29-54u
LoubaJ. F., "Slovenski declarace z 30 i-ijna 1918 s hlediska mezinirodniho
", Zahranilnl Politika, vol. ii, pp. 1435-1440; Haskins and Lord.
op. cit., pp. 237-238; Capek. op. cit., appendix. C/. also, OpoeenstcY,
op. cit., pp. I5J-I68. On October 30, by the Declaration of TurcanstcY
S~. Martin, the Slovaks associated themselves with the uprising in Praha
two days earlier.
1a On June 30, 1918, Masaryk climaxed his earlier revolutionary activities
in America by signing the Agreement of Pittsburgh between. the
Czechs and Slovaks, whereby, in the Czechoslovakia-to-be, the latter were
guaranteed their own assembly, courts and administration. C/. the Pittsburgh
Agreement, reprinted in Palickai-, S. ]. and BroZ, A.. " Czechs
and Slovaks at Odds", CuN"em History, vol. xxii, p. 788; Masaryk.
oJI. cit., PP. 255-257.
1•Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 295-296; Mercier, M., LfJ Fonnation d~ fltat
lchlcoslovaque (Chartres, 1g:a2), pp. 103-104-
18 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
taken in the preceding October by the American Ruthenes
during the Philadelphia Congress of the oppressed nationalities
of Central Europe, in favor of union with
Czechoslovakia.15
During November and December, 1918, Czech forces
occupied the German and Magyar areas that Czechoslovakia
hoped would be included in her boundaries-to-be. Several
skirmishes took place in towns with German majorities,16
and the resulting agitation did not abate until checked by
President Masaryk's conciliatory Christmas speech,17
which
promised equal treatment to both Czechs and Germans.
Similar difficulties were encountered in Slovakia, from which
were driven numerous detachments of Hungarian soldiers.18
In an attempted defense of this region in January, 1919, the
Magyars established a so-called Eastern Slovak National
Council, which soon collapsed when repudiated by the Slovak
deputies at Praha. An interesting sidelight was the fact
that, throughout the occupation of Slovakia, the Czechs took
care to curb anti-Semitic agitation, in spite of the fact that
many of the purveyors of anti-Czech propaganda were Hungarian
Jews supposedly subsidized by the government of
u The Amerik:anska Narodni Rada Ugro-Rusinov plebiscite at Philadelphia
·resulted in seventy percent voting for union with Czechoslovakia,
twenty percent for union with the Ukraine, nine percent for complete
independence and only one percent for ;'emaining with Hungary. For
full details, cf. Svornost, January 12, 1919. ·
u Cf. Molisch, P., Die Sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den ]a/wen
1918-19 (Vienna, 1932), for a complete account of the German agitation
in Bohemia during 19I8-I919.
17
Prager Presse, December 26, 1918.
18 On December 4. the Allied Powers authorized the Czech occupation
of Slovakia and the expulsion of Hungarian forces. Cf. Le Temps~
DecemberS, 1918; or Street, C. J. C., SlO'VakiG, Past and Present (Lon.don,
1928), p. 33.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 19
Bela Kun at Budapes£19
The new Slovak provincial government
was actually inaugurated on February 1, 1919.20
The dangers to which Czechoslovakia was exposed indicated
also the need for a comprehensive military policy.
As a temporary measure, the government called ·to the colors
on Novemb~r 22, 1918, reservists of the classes of 1895-99,21
and thereby raised many of the forces needed immediately
upon the Hungarian frontier. In a newspaper interview of
January 12, 1919, Kramar made a fervent plea for a large
army to protect the Republic against threats emanating from
Germany and Russia.22
Masaryk, ordinarily an anti-militarist,
expressed the same opinion to Professor Ernest
Denis.28
On January 28, 1920, the Czechoslovak government
announced the creation of a peacetime army of 8,000
officers and 141,910 conscripted men.2
• Vaclav Klofac, the
Minister of National Defense, was largely instrumental in
bringing about the adoption of the Defense Act of March
19, 1920. Upon that date, the National Assembly approved
unanimously the second and third readings of the bill. By
its provisions, a two-year period of universal military service
was made compulsory for the next three years.25
For the
lfl Graham, op. cit., p. 276; Sedivj, op. cit., pp. Io-n.
2G For full details, cf. Seton-Watson R. W., The New SIO'UG-kia
(Prague, 1924).
:Ill Svornost, November 28, 1918.
"Le Temps, January 12, 1919; Svornost, January 16, I9I!).
:aa Svomost, May 3, 1919a•
Ibid., N6rodnt Listy, January 29, 1920.
111 When the bill had been presented for the first time by Klofac to the
National Assembly on January 25, 1920. the sole opposition to it had been
voiced by the Social Democrats who had desired four months' military
service rather than two ~ars'. However, when representatives of the
other parties pointed out the inadequacy of so short a period, the Social
Democrats withdrew their objections. In time of peace, the ages of
service are twenty to fifty years, and in time of war, seventeen to sixty.
Cf. N6rodm Polmko and N6rodnl Listy, January 26, 1920; S'l.IOnlOsl,
February 1, 1920.
20 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
subsequent three years the period of service was reduced to
eighteen months. At the expiration of these six years, if
the number of trained militia would be deemed still insufficient,
further periods of fourteen months' service each
would be instituted. The control of mobilization and the
summoning of trainees was vested in the National Assembly.
Special additional resolutions of the National Assembly
welcomed more publicity regarding military activities and a
greater measure of civilian influence at the War Ministry.
In this manner was the Republic provided with an adequate
army, one which, in a major emergency, would number more
than a million men.26
The concluding step requisite to the establishment of the
Czechoslovak government was the adoption of a constitution.
Wisely, the leaders refrained from attempting to
draw a permanent one too hastily; therefore, a provisional
constitution was put into effect on November 13, 1918/1
and a permanent one deferred until the general situation of
the Republic would become more clarified and the more
pressing of its problems solved. Thus it was that the
definite constitution was left to be framed and enacted by the
first regularly elected National Assembly on February 29,
1920.28
2s Narodn£ Listy, Narodni Polwika, Prager Presse, March 20, 1920;
Svornost, March 24. 1920; cf. also, Borevicka, op. cit., pp. ¢-97.
21 For an analysis of the Provisional Constitution, cf. Graham, op. cit.,
pp. 279-281.
as Graham, op. cit., pp. 292-313; Hoetzl, J. and Joachim, V., The Con.stitutitm
of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague, 1920); Broz, A., Three
Years of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague, 1921), pp. r8-z1. It is
beyond the scope of this work to attempt more than a superficial analysis
of the Czechoslovak constitution, which is one of the most democratic in
the world, imbued with the principle that the people are the sole source
of authority. Every regulation attempts to express the popular will
through the legislative bodies, cabinet and president. Although protecting
racial minorities, it seeks foremost the unhindered expression of the
will of the majority by permitting a three-fifths majority in parliament
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 2I
The method of conducting foreign affairs is a vital matter
in any study concerning foreign policy. The provisional
constitution of Czechoslovakia provided specifically for the
responsibility of the ministry to the National Assembly, a
policy continued in the permanent constitution. Thus, to
expedite matters, in actual practice, the Foreign Minister is
required periodically to give reports of his_activitiesto the
Foreign Affairs Committees of the National Assembly.
Article 64, Section I, a, states that the President
shall represent the State in its relations with other States, shall
negotiate and ratify international treaties. Commercial treaties,
and treaties which for the Stare or its citizens entail financial or
personal burdens, especially military burdens, as well rus treaties
affecting the territories of the State require the affirmation of
Parliament. The affirmation of Parliament takds the focm of a
·Constitutional Law (article I of the introductory law).
Czechoslovakia was particularly fortunate that Masaryk
and Bend were President and Foreign Minister, respectively,
for so long after the establishment of independence. This
assurance of continuity and consistency of policy was further
enhanced by the close personal friendship of the two men.
The conduct of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy is replete
with instances wherein the major decisions were arrived at
only after a conference between these founders of the new
state.29
. ·
to accomplish almost anything-a prudent and necessary measure in view
of the fact that thereby the Czechs and Slovaks have a sufficient margin of
safety whereby they need not fear the obstructionist tactics of hostile Germans
or Magyars. While universal suffrage was conceded, the conservative
nature of the new regime was also assured by a bicameral parliament
-a Senate of ISO members and a Chamber of Deputies of 300 members
-and by a seven-year term for the president who is not eligible for more
than two terms except for Masaryk, who was made president for life.
211 Cf. N6rodnt Shrorml&den{ Ceskoslownskl v pnm!m roce Re/>ubliky
(Praha, 1919): Jolly, E., Le Pouvoir legislatif dans Ia Rlpubliqw
Tchlcoslovaque (Paris, 1924).
22 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Czechoslovakia also faced the problem of obtaining a peace
settlement that would guarantee her future stability and
safety. Her prestige was high, because of the help afforded
the Allies by her legions 30
in France, Italy and Russia, and
because her leaders, particularly Masaryk and Benes, had
shown, by their actions and predictions, the most accurate
understanding of Central European conditions and needs.
Perhaps even more to the point was the fact that Czechoslovakia
had already obtained the promise of a seat at the
coming Peace Conference.31
Thus, certain of a sympathetic
audience, she hoped to realize all her major contentions.
Before the Peace Conference met, Czechoslovakia was
destined to suffer a considerable diminution of prestige
because of the inexperience of her government. At the
outset, the Provisional National Assembly attempted to
direct foreign policy by appointing from its own members
a foreign committee of sixteen to whom Bend was required
to send regular reports. It took little time to discover that
this system was unsatisfactory. Not only was a committee
of sixteen too large to work effectively, but it was found that
many of the members, in their inexperience, were so naive as
to inform foreign diplomats of internal affairs in which they
so At the end of the War, the Czechoslovak army included 92,000 men
in Russia, 12,000 in France, 24,000 in Italy and 54,000 in the Italian socalled
home guard, a total of I&il,ooo men. According to statistics compiled
in 1923, these forces had suffered 11 loss of 4,500 men killed (sic) ;
Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 331-332. Later revised figures give slightly different
totals; cf. Svornost, August 29, 1928. In the course of a trip through
Vienna, Praha, Laibach and Trieste, Decem'ber 28, 1918-]anuary 14, 1919.
to establish a United States courier service through Central and Southern
Europe, Major A. J. Peaslee asked if Allied troops should be sent to
Czechoslovakia to curb Bolshevik influences, protect the mines and give
tangible evidence of Allied support. Masaryk stated that "be would not
oppose it", but preferred rather to have the .Czechoslovak troops sent
home from Allied countries. C/. Miller, D. H., My Diary at the Conference
of Paris (n. p., 1926), vol. iii, pp. 32o-3'2'I.
81 By the treaty of September :28, 1918, with France.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 23
should have no concern. As an example, when Father
Hlinka 82
organized his anti-Czech campaign in the rural
non-partisan organization of the Czechoslovak Catholics in
Praha, and was seconded by speeches of Juriga and
Kordac,88
information of which leaked out through members
of the committee of sixteen, there came to Paris, about the
middle of January, 1919, alarming· rumors about the condition
of the Republic, which was reputed ready for anarchy.
Much was made of the friction between Kramar and other
members, several of whom were alleged to be ready to resign.
The fact was also brought out that Benes wished to cooperate
with the committee, but feared it was too often influenced
unduly by party considerations. Things came to such a pass
that he was finally compelled to protest that the domestic
squabbles were creating an unfavorable foreign situation.
His protest was heeded; two smaller units, the Foreign ·
Affairs Committees of the Senate and of the Chamber of
Deputies, which often met as one body (the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the National Assembly), were created to receive
his reports, and he was given a much freer hand in the
conduct of foreign affairs!&
82 Father Andrew Hlinka was an able, patriotic and popular Catholic
priest who, during the War, was almost invaluable for his work in leading
Slovak opposition to Hungary. After the War, neither he nor the other
Slovak.leaders were treated by the Czechs with the recognition they deserved.
As a result of the neglect which his people suffered, he became
embittered and began a campaign to free the Slovaks from the
"oppressive" Czech rule. Cf. also, infra, p. 95·
as Juriga and Kordac were two Slovak members of parliament.
8& Hru5ovslcy, I., " Pet let zahranicni potitiky ceskoslovenske za vedeni
Bene5ova ", Anon., Dr. Ed-var4 Benes, spoluzakladatel rwvl svobody t1
tvurce zahramlm politiky leskoslO'UfflSke (henceforth referred to as Dr.
Edvard Benes, Praha, 1924), p. 126. For a comprehensive account of the
organization of the foreign service, cf. Anon., Deset let leskoslqwJtSkl
zahra~~icnl politiky (Praha, 19z8), pp. 98-u8.
24 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Peace Conference Preliminaries
Benes had not gone to Praha while the new government
was in the process of formation, but had re~ained in Paris,
maintaining contacts with the leading Allied diplomats.
Before the Peace Conference opened, he had already secured
important promises from the Great Powers. The exact
methods by which the various Allied promises to further
Czechoslovak claims were obtained have not been disclosed,
but the results speak for themselves. In addition to the
French promise of September 28, rgr8, to attempt to obtain
for Czechoslovakia her German-inhabited borderlands, and
similar British and Italian commitments of January 7, 1919,
Bend obtained, by a note of December 20, 1918, a further
French promise to support Czechoslovakia's claims on the
Austrian frontier.85
Thus fortified, he awaited with confidence
the approaching Peace Conference.
In the course of the deliberations, questions of procedure
became vexatious. One of the earliest problems was the
point at which the small states were to enter the negotiations.
Immediately after the Armistice, most of the proposals
submitted by British and French statesmen regarding
the Peace Conference specified that only the Great Powers
could participate in the peace negotiations/6
a viewpoint that
was opposed by the small Powers and ·by the United States.
This dissenting opinion was voi<;ed best by D. H. Miller
(November 22, rgr8),81
who recommended the participation
of all the victor states in the negotiations. From the view-
85 The best account of these activities of Bend, while still inadequate
as to specific details, is to be found in VochoC, V., "Dr. Benes a mirova
konference pafizski ", Dr. Edward Benes, pp. 85-92.
86 Cf. Binkley, R. C., "New Light on the Paris Peace Conference",
Political Science Quarterly, vol. xlvi, pp. 339-350; Baker, R. S., Woothow
Wilson and the World Sett-lement (New York, Ig22), vol. iii, pp. 56-63;
Miller, o·p. cit., vol. ii, pp. 14, 22-23, 81, 8+
81 Miller, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 32-33.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPE,ND.ENCE 25
point of the small states, this proposal was generous and fair,
but it was open to criticism in that it excluded the defeated
states from any voice in the deliberations. The question of
representation was finally decided after an exchange of
British and French opinions, December II and I3, I9I8, by
an agreement that each Great Power would be allowed five
delegates; the lesser Allies, three each; the.new states, two;
states in the process of formation, one; neutrals, one; and
that there would be no enemy representatives.118
Subsequently,
during January 12-17, 1919, procedure was modified
further by a decision that the states with universal interests
were the five Great Powers, and that all others had merely
regional interests. The former might attend every session
of the Conference, but the latter only those sessions in which
their special interests were concerned.119
Objections to this
procedure on the part of the small Powers proved to be of
no avai1."0
Czechoslovakia was admitted to the first plenary session
of January 18, 19I9.41
None of the new states had any
better status than she: Yugoslavia was recognized as Serbia
only; Albania, the newest pre-war state, was not granted
any representation; and even Poland experienced greater
initial difficulties because of internal friction between the
8& Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 295-2¢. Cf. ibid., vol. i, pp. 379-446, for a list of
all the delegates to the Peace Conference. ·Czechoslovakia sent a dele.
gation of forty-six members, which included expert and technical advisors
and other staff members.
8o Miller, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 274<lOJbid.,
vol. iv, pp. 68-77; Vochoe, loc. cit., p. 85; House. E. M. and
Seymour, C., What Really Happened at Paris (New York, 1921), pp.
16-17; Temperley, H. W. V., History of the Peace Conference at Paris
(London, 1920), vol. i, pp. 236-278. Cf. also Baker, op. cit., vol. i, pp.
177-·180, for Allied fears that President Wilson and the small states would
control the Peace Conference if equal representation were conceded.
n France promised such recognition in Article 3 of the treaty of September
zS, 1918.
26 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Warsaw government and the Comite National Polonaise at
Paris.43
In view of the chaos in Central Europe,· which was the
scene of many small actual, if not official, wars, the Supreme
Council, on January 24, 1919, issued a solemn warning to
the world that no country should attempt to obtain its
territorial claims forcibly, but should await a decision by the
Peace Conference in every instance.43
This warning was
intended for the benefit of the victor, as well as the vanquished,
states. For Czechoslovakia, having friction over
prospective frontiers with Hungary on the south and Poland
on the north, this warning meant a temporary reliance upon
provisional agreements with the Allied High Command, an
unsatisfactory procedure which kept the frontiers in a state
of turmoil. Benes stressed the point that the Czechoslovak
question fitted into the framework of the new Europe. The
sooner it was settled the better it would be for all concerned.
As early as December, 1918, he had prepared a memoir 4
"
on the Czechoslovak program, and, early in February, 1919,
had others ready in more detail on special questions.'45
These
u VochoC, lac. cit., pp. 91-92; Temperley, ojJ. cit., vol. iv, p. 131. The
scope of this work does not permit more than a general discussion of only
those aspects of the Peace Conference that are of particular interest to
Czechoslovakia. The general uncertainty that still prevails today concerning
the intimate workings of the Peace Conference can .perhaps be
best appreciated by a perusal of Binkley, R C., " Ten Years of Peace
Conference History", Journal of Modern History, vol. i, pp. 6o7-629.
Cf. also, Miller, D. H., The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928,
vol. i, discussion; vol. ii, documents).
~ Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 132:; Thompson, C. T., The Peace
Conference Day by Day (New York, 1920), pp. 137-139·
4<l Peace Conference Delegation, I9I9, Memoirs (Official claims of the
Czechoslovak Delegation, Paris, 1919); Miller, My Diary at the Conference
of Paris, vol. xiv, pp. 21u-225.
u By February I, 1919, only Czechoslovakia, and Greece, in part,
had submitted official territorial claims. Cf. Miller, ojJ. cit., vol xiv,
p. 161 et seq.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 27
memoirs contained· a general account of the place of the
Czechoslovaks in the framework of the world, the reasons
for their territorial demands, detailed accounts of the problems
of the Germans in Bohemia, of Tesin (Teschen), of
Slovakia, of Ruthenia, of the Sorbs of Lusatia, of the
corridor between Austria and Hungary to Yugoslavia, of
the region of Kladno (Glatz), of the southern frontier, and
a statement of Czechoslovakia's rights in the matter of
reparations. In presenting these claims, Benes' chief concern
was that, because of her newness, Czechoslovakia might
have less weight than her power and resources would normally
entitle her to have/8
a difficulty that was being experienced
by the other Succession States as well.
The Territorial Settlement
After receiving a· tentative report on Czechoslovakia's.
boundaries on January 21, 1919," the Big Ten took up the
question officially on January 27,u and four days later
authorized an Inter-Allied Commission for Tesin •s ·because
of the complex nature of that particular dispute.· On
February 5, the Supreme Council granted Benes a hearing,110
as a result of which there was created a special territorial
commission for Czechoslovak affairs.61
With regard to the
boundaries of Czechoslovakia, the Conference came early to
definite conclusions, usually favorable to the new state. It
was soon found difficult to compel the other parties concerned
to abide by the awards, for the disappointed states
felt that they could not lose more by contesting unfavorable
decisions.
48 Ceskoslot~enska Korespondence, February 25, 1919.
4T Miller, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 23o-232.
"VochoC, loc. cit., pp. ¢-98.
49 Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 132.
so Ibid., vol. i, p. 503.
atJbid., vol. iv, p. 132: vol. i, p. 257: Binkley, loc. cit., p. 536.
28 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
When the historic and linguistic boundaries were not
identical, which factor should prevail, history or ethnography?
The former Kingdom of Bohemia was an excellent
illustration of this conflict of principles, with the center inhabited
by Czechs and the entire northern and western
frontiers peopled by Germans. The strong mutual antipathy
between the two races, productive of almost incessant friction
for centuries, had been intensified as a result of
the War. Should peoples whose relationship had been so
exacerbated be compelled to live together in the new Republic?
In spite of the general Wilsonian principle that,
whenever possible, political and linguistic boundaries should
coincide, Bohemia was recognized as an exception, as an
instance where history was deemed more important than
ethnic purity.52
Bohemia proper was an economic and
geographical unit, strategically protected in part by nature.
To deprive her of her mountain frontiers would be tantamount
to handing her over to Germany which would control
all the mountain passes and be within thirty miles of Praha.
The Czechs contended that the Germans had been installed
artificially in Bohemia either as colonists, officials or bureaucrats,
a contention that they had deemed proved even before
the War, by the fact that there had become manifest, as an
evidence of the economic interests that bound the country
together, the phenomenon of a uech counter-colonization
of these same German regions.58
52 Cf. Hazen, C. D., Europe since IBIS (New York, 1923}, vol. ii, pp.
812-814; Haskins and Lord, dfJ. cit., pp. 212-222; Scott, A. P., An Introduction
to the Peace Treaties (Chicago, 1920), pp. 213-215.
58 House and Seymour, op. cit., pp. 103-104; Pichon, J. E.," Les Frontiers
de l'etat tcl:~coslovaque ", Questions europeennes, Travaux du
comite d'etudes, tome ii, pp. 107-H6 (Rapport presenre a Ia seance du
7 mars, 1919) ; Peace Conference Delegation, I9I9, Memoirs, no. J, "Le
Probleme des Allemands de Boheme".
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 29
Sh~rtly after the hearing of February 5, 1919, the Czechoslovak
territorial demands were submitted in detail to the
Conference. Originally, Benes' plans had contemplated strict
adherence to the historic Bohemian frontiers, but later they
were modified for economic, military, political or strategic
reasons. Within Czechoslovakia there existed differences
of opinion as to what the frontiers ·should be with Saxony
and Prussian Silesia, whether to demand all Glatz or merely
the southwestern portion." The frontier rectifications finally
requested by Czechoslovakia included in Prussian Silesia
a line incorporating HlubCice, Ratibor, Rybnik and Tesin,
with the right bank of the Oder, and in Saxony, in the
Krusne Mountains and along the Elbe, changes of two or
three kilometers in seven places. For relinquishing Glatz,
compensation was suggested in northern Opava, and a
portion of the Rumberk salient was offered for an increase
in the Frydland salient.611
Immediately after its organization in February, 1919, the
territorial commission on Czechoslovakia began its labors;
in common with other similar commissions, its verdict was
to be announced by March 8, but it did not present any
report until early in April.68
As early as February 28, Le
Temps announced that the question of the Bohemian
Germans was settled, and by March I was positive that
Czechoslovakia would obtain the historic frontier. The
requested changes in the historic frontier were then considered,
particularly the cession to Germany of Cheb up to
Falknov in order to obtain Glatz and a portion of Upper
.,, VochoC, loc. cit., p. 101.
65 Peace Conference Delegatitm, 1919, Memoirs, no. 2, "Les Revendic:ations
territoriales de la Republique tchecoslovaque "; no. 9, "Le
Probleme de la region de Glatz " ; Benei, E., Problemy fWf!l Ewopy 11
sahranilm politika leskosloven.sk6 (henceforth referred to as Problemy
JWV1 Evropy, Praha, 1924), pp. 16-21; VochoC, loc, cit., pp. IOI-100.
u Cf. Miller, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 43-52 (date uncertain).
30 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-19!15
Silesia on the left bank of the Oder, the right bank having
been refused by the commission. After due consideration,
the territorial commission conceded the principal requests of
Czechoslovakia, rectifying in her favor the frontier at Glatz,
Hlucin and Hlubcice.57
This report of the commission,
approved on April 2 by the four foreign ministers and the
American Secretary of State, was shortly afterwards rejected
by the Council of Four which refused to change the historic
frontier without further examination, for the reasons that
the old frontier was the simpler and easier to maintain, would
avoid friction with Germany, and would require no delimitation
commission.58
Even the Council of Four finally permitted
some changes in favor of Czechoslovakia. On April
I 7, she was granted Hlucin and Hlubcice on the alleged
grounds that these regions formed an awkward salient into
Czech Silesia from Upper Silesia, which had recently been
awarded to Poland.59
On the whole, the problem of the Bohemian Germans had
caused much less grief to the Czechs than they had anticipated.
Great Britain, France and Italy had already arrived
at an understanding to create a Czechoslovakia with easily defensible
frontiers and substantial economic resources, regardless
of the fact that such a program necessitated the inclusion
of large minorities.80
The three Powers envisaged Czechoslovakia
as an Allied rampart against the resuscitation of
Pan-Germanism and desired to stre'ilgthen her by establishing
direct contact with Rumania.61
Benes appreciated that
any possible objections on the part of President Wilson to
57 Ibid., vol. xvi, pp. 11-16.
58 House and Seymour, op. cit., p. 100.
58 Tem;perley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 267-270; Miller, op. cit., vol. vi,
p. 353; Vochoe, loc. cit., p. 104-
80 Miller, op. cit., vol. xvi, pp. n-16 (April I, 1919).
e1 Ibid., vol. xvii, p. 94-
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 31
the violation of the principle of national self-determination
would arise only if the Bohemian Germans could create their
own state and if Czechoslovakia could exist without them.62
Since such an alternative was manifestly impossible, the
United States approved the Allied program. Consequently,
when Austria proposed a plebiscite for German Bohemia, the
Allies reiterated their intention to ·main4J,in the historic
frontiers to the greatest possible degree.68
On the Austrian frontier, Czechoslovak requests included
the railroad at Gmiind, the Czechoslovak minorities at Postorna
and Valcic, and the river systems of the Morava and
its tributary, the Dyje. Although the Big Four had arrived
at a definite decision concerning the Austrian frontier as
early as May 13, 1919, the terms were not made public until
June 2. Czechoslovakia obtained most of the desired areas
in Vitorazko and Postorna, with the right bank of the
Morava, but in Gmiind was restricted to the station and
railway across the Valcic."
Another Czechoslovak request was for a narrow corridor
between Austria and Hungary to establish direct territorial
contact with Yugoslavia. Although some Slav minorities
did exist in this region, the motivation for the request was
strategic. Of all the Powers, France alone favored the
creation of the corridor, for military reasons; the others
objected with equal frankness: the United States, for ethnographic
reasons; Great Britain, because of the indefensibility
of the corridor in time of war, and Italy, as prejudicial to her
own interests. Hence, the project was rejected first by the
61 Ibid., vol. xvi, p. 12 ; VochoC. loc. cit., p. ros.
ea House and Seymour, op. cit., p. 97; cf. also, Baker, op. cil., vol. iii,
pp. 249-252, for Oemenceau's note of March 31, 1919. to Wilson, in reply
to Lloyd George's note of March 26, asking for normal frontiers for
Czechoslovakia (i.e. to include the German-speaking areas).
66 Miller, op. cit., vol. xvi, pp. 234-235, 272; Tempertey, op. cil., vol. iv,
p. 267 ; Vochoe, loc. cit., p. 105.
32 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
territorial commission and later by the Council of Four.
Czechoslovakia was granted a small bridge-head " on the
right side of the Danube, as consolation and as a partial protection
for Bratislava, but with the explicit condition. that
no fort~cations were to be constructed on the southern side
of the river.88
Two other extreme Czechoslovak requests were special
pleas for the Czech minority in Lower Austria and for the
Sorbs of Lusatia. It was evident that neither minority
could be annexed, and doubtful what degree, if any, of
· autonomy would or could be conceded by Austria and Germany
respectively. According to the Austrian census of
1910, the Czechs in Lower Austria numbered 122,329
(Io2,ooo in Vienna), but the Czechs claimed fully 400,000.
A compromise was finally reached when Articles 62 and 69
of the Treaty of St. Germain protected the rights of this
minority. Czechoslovakia fared worse when she urged that
the 16o,ooo Sorbs in the districts of Cottbus and Bautzen
be removed from the respective jurisdictions of Prussia and
Saxony, and autonomously united with the latter. The
request met with an outright refusal.8
'
Czechoslovakia was no more consistent than other claimants
in the arguments she advanced : in determining her frontiers
with Germany and Austria, she had appealed to the
doctrine of historic frontiers,· but in the case of Hungary,
she argued against the same doctrine in order to obtain·
·Slovakia. In the realization that Hurigary's claim to
Slovakia was over a thousand years old, Czechoslovakia
appealed instead to the right of national self-determination.
Although separated for more than amillennium, the patriots
.. e11 Four square kilometers.
88. Temperley, op. cit•• voL iv, pp. 273-274•
. sf Ibid., vol. iv, pp. 27'5-276; P1tJCe Conferenee Delegation• .X9.19,
Memoirs, no. 7, "Les Serbes de Lusace ••.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 33
among the Czechs of Bohemia and the Slovaks of Hungary
had never forgotten their common origin, nor the fact that
they spoke practically the same language.68
Few peoples in
all Europe had resisted more tenaciously efforts at assimilation
on the part of their neighbors. Many of the leaders
of each deemed the War an opportunity for. freedom and
union, and realized that union was essential to both; otherwise,
each would be so weak numerically and so exposed
geographically as to be unable to maintain independence, even
if acquired. These leaders came to regard Slovakia as an
integral part of the new Republic.611
The northern boundary of Slovakia, between Galicia and
Hungary, was well defined both by history and by natural
mountain barriers, but the southern boundary remained in
serious doubt. Here, strong arguments could be advanced
against any line that might be suggested; many decades of
attempted Magyarization had left no well defined ethnological
boundary. Since the armistice of November 3, 1918,
with Austria-Hungary had drawn no southern boundary for
Slovakia, Benes was anxious to establish one as soon as
possible. To this end, he began to negotiate with France.
In response to his request, a temporary military boundary
was drawn a month later by the Allied High Command along
the Danube to the mouth of the Ipel, along it to Rimavska
Sobota, then to the mouth of the Uha, and along it to the
Uzok.10
However, Benes still deemed this boundary insufficient,
and, in January, 1919, requested instead the
Danube to Vacov and a southeastern frontier along the
heights of Matra, Buk and Tokaj, and the Bodrog and Uha
&s C/. Dominian, L., The Frontiers of Language and Nationality iK
Europe (New York, 1917), pp. 150-ISI.
69Cf. Stanoyevich, M. S., Slavonic Nations of Yesterday and Today
(New York, 1925), 'PP· :267'-322.
70 Svornost, December 29. 1918..
34 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
rivers.71
The territorial commission pointed out that this
line would include large Magyar minorities and would still
leave considerable Slovak minorities in Hungary.72
Before the question of the Hungarian boundary came up
for consideration by the Peace Conference in May, I9I9,
the situation was made more complex by Hungarian resistance.
Czechoslovakia found herself compelled to wage
actual war if she were to hope to retain Slovakia. To recapitulate,
the armistice of November 3, 1918, had been drawn
primarily with Italian interests in view, hence was incomplete
in its provisions for the future. To remedy this defect,
another Military Convention for Hungary, signed on
November I 3 at Belgrade, provided for the occupation of a
specified region in Hungary 73
and for the demobilization of
all Hungarian forces except two cavalry and six infantry
divisions.14
Serbia was thus protected, but Rumania and
Czechoslovakia were neglected.
On December 3, 1918, the Peace Conference requested
that Count Karolyi, who came into power in Hungary at
the time of the armistice, evacuate Slovakia, and five days
later Czech troops occupied northern Slovakia as far as the
demarcation line, half-way between the Carpathians and the
Danube. Since the Czechs claimed all Slovakia, they announced
they would not observe this line any longer on
December I 3, and advanced to the Danube. The advance
was aided by the arrival of French troops at Presov and
Kosice on December 28. On New Year's Day, the French
gave over Bratislava to the Czechs, who occupied all Slovakia.
The final step was taken, apparently, with the drawn
Peace Conference Delegation, 1919, Memoirs, no. S, "La Slovaquie--le
territoire revendique en Slovaquie".
'i:IHouse and Seymour, op. cit., p. 105; Vochoc, loc. cit., p. 102.
Ta By, the agreement, this region might also be extended, if necessary.
T4 BeneS, My War Memoirs, pp. 459-466; Temperley, op. cit., vol. i,
pp. 351-3,52.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 35
ing of the southern· boundary by the military authorities 75
on February 13, 1919. Thus far, in obedience to Karolyi's
orders, the Hungarians had attempted no resistance.'~'•
In the meantime, Hungarian affairs came to a crisis that
resulted in the overthrow of Karolyi and the .establishment
of a Soviet government on March 31, with Garbai the nominal
President, but with Bela Kun acti.tally in control.n The
new government proclaimed an alliance with Russian Bolshevism.
It also proceeded to utilize the services of numerous
unemployed officers of the former German and
Austro-Hungarian armies. Although these officers probably
abhorred communism, they apparently grasped eagerly at the
idea of using it as an excuse for armed resistance and as a
tool with which to recover lost territory.78
However, the
new forces were for many weeks quite ineffective. The
Rumanians took advantage of this fact in April to advance
to the Theiss River, beyond the lines permitted them.711
Similarly, the Czechs advanced southward and occupied
Salgo-Tarjan and Miskolcz. On May 1, at Cap, the Czech
n By Foch and Weygand, who were in consultation with Benes, Pichon
and Berthelot.
"' OpoCenstcy, op. cit., pp. 193-214; Benes, op. cit., pp. 472-483; Masaryk.
op. cit., p. 486; HrusovskY, loc. cit., pp. 143-145.
n Cf. Temperley, op. cit., vol. i, p. 353· An Allied demand of March 19
that all Hungarian forces be withdrawn for temporary military reasons
behind a line representing Rumania's extreme claims was inter·preted by
Karolyi ·as a claim for frontiers impossible for Hungary to accept, and
as the basis for his resignation, particularly after news arrived the following
day of the cession of Transylvania to Rumania. Baker, op. cit.•
vol. ii, pp. 29-30; cf. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 261-264, 273-275 and 279-28o
for the various studies and investigations of the Supreme Council on the
Hungarian situation during March, 1919-
78 Cf. Kaas, Baron A. and Lazarovics, F. de, Bolshevism in Hungary
(London, 1931), pp. r;o-173; ]aszi, 0., Revolutio~ and Counter-Revolution
iH Hu11gary (London, 1924), p. 153; Huszar, K.. Proletarier Diktatur i11
Un.garn (Regensburg, 1920), pp. I8o-I84.
711 Kaas and Lazarovics, op. cit., pp. 184-185; Temperley, op. cit., vol. i.
p. 354·
s6 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
left wing established contact with the Rumanian right. The
imminent joint advance, which gave great promise of success,
was prevented by the Supreme Council's 'orders that the
Rumanians must not advance beyond the Theiss. Thus
protected, the bulk of the Hungarian army was transferred
from the Rumanian front to Slovakia, where the Czech
forces were scattered over large areas difficult to defend.
In the estimation of Bela Kun, the prospects were favorable :
a successful offensive in Slovakia would consolidate. his
domestic position, regain the valuable mining areas of SalgoTarjan
and Miskolcz, separate Czechs and Rumanians,. and
possibly open the way for a Russian advance across the
Carpathians. In this crisis, the Supreme Council displayed
little energy. Instead of ordering Bela Kun to evacuate
Slovakia, and of promising an equivalent Rumanian with,
drawal, it ordered Rumania to withdraw beyond a new
frontier that had been drawn secretly without her consent.
As might be anticipated, Rumania refused to obey, whereupon
the Powers again confessed their weakness and indecision
by making no attempt to coerce her.80
During the struggle for Slovakia, one of the greatest
handicaps of both contestants was the shortage of ammunition.
The Skoda works had not, as yet, resumed full operation,
whereas Hungary had no munition works of her own,
but was dependent upon purchases from Italy. The Czechs
demanded that the Austrian g{;vemment tum over war
material then in Vienna, and, after an initial refusal, Austria
was compelled to yield the 6o,ooo shells in question under
the threat of a stoppage of the coal supply. Nevertheless,
by the end of the first week in June, 1919, the position of the
Czechs had become critical : the front had been pierced at
several points, over one-third of Slovakia had been lost,
80 Temperley, op. cit., vol. i, p. 355; Dillon, E. J., The Inside Story of
the Peace Conference (New York, 1920), p. 217. ·
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 37
Kosice was evacuated as a result of an uprising of the
neighboring Hungarian minority, the Czechs were in full
retreat on the whole front, and even Bratislava was in jeopardy
and was falsely reported to have fallen. Then France
saved the day; her generals 81
assumed command and by
June II had regained several points. However, the Hungarians
still retained the valuable mineral and industrial
areas, particularly the coal fields which they deemed vital for
Hungary's existence.82
As Czechoslovakia's prestige continued to decline, Bend
sent three appeals to the Peace Conference for help.83
By
early June the Powers were disgusted with the situation; to
them every Central European problem appeared as a menace
to general peace and as a verification of the Balkanization of
Europe. Since something had to be done, the Big Four, on
June 9, sent Bela Kun an ultimatum demanding an immediate
cessation of hostilities in Slovakia. To make the ultimatum
more acceptable, they added a promise of " provisional recognition
,. in return. Bela Kun temporized, his hesitation
being interpreted as a refusal both by the Powers and by
the " White " Hungarian counter-revolutionists. Four days
later, as Bela Kun was attempting another advance in Slovakia,
he received a second ultimatum which ordered again
a cessation of hostilities against the Czechs and a withdrawal
within Hungary's own frontiers under a threat of a French
n Pelle, Mittelhauser and Hennocque.
u Temperley, o/'. cit., vol. i, p. 355; Kaas and Lazarovics, o/'. cit., p. I go.
n On March 8, 1919, a letter from Benes requested the Allied and Associated
Governments to send an energetic protest to Budapest and Vienna
to cease military activities and propaganda hostile to Czechoslovakia
(Miller, op. cit., vol. xv, pp. 315-320). On March 24. 1919, Benes requested
the Inter-Allied War Council to hold Hungary to its decision of
December 21, 1918, to evacuate Slovakia (Miller, op. cit., vot. xvii, pp.
435-437). On April 9, 1919, Bene& requested Allied support to recover
the locomotives the Hungarians had taken from Slovakia (Miller, op. cit.•
vol. xvii, P· 435).
08 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
and Rumanian advance from Arad. This time Bela Kun
yielded, as gracefully as circumstances permitted, since, in
any event, a withdrawal would have been forced under the
pressure of successful Czech counter-attacks and of counterrevolutionary
uprisings in western Hungary. As a forlorn
hope, the Hungarians, before withdrawing, set up a Slovakian
Soviet Republic which endured only a few days.84
At this point the center of interest shifted to Rumania,
which was disgusted by the indifference of the Supreme
Council to Hungarian Bolshevism and by her own treatment
by that august body. Rumania refused to abandon the line
of the Theiss River before Hungary had demobilized according
to Article 2 of the Convention of November 13, 1918.
For once, her attitude met with the approval of the Allied
military leaders, who admitted that Bela Kun had violated
that agreement. Thereupon, the Supreme Council took the
first active step for the suppression of Hungarian Bolshevism
on July 17, 1919, when General Franchet d'Esperey
threatened military intervention if the Soviet government
did not resign and yield to a government freely elected by
the people.85
To render effective this Allied threat, Marshal
Foch drew up a plan of campaign against Hungary whereby
Rumania was to furnish 120,000 men; Yugoslavia, so,ooo;
and Czechoslovakia whatever she could spare, about 8s,ooo.86
On July 20, one day before these preparations were to be
begun, Bela Kun succeeded in surprising the Rumanians and
driving them across the Theiss with a loss of seventy-five
field guns and thirty-six heavy guns. If the Hungarian
reports were correct, the Rumanian line was broken on a
st The Times (London, henceforth referred to as The Times}, July 2,
1919; New York Times, June 13, 14. 16, 18, 21, 25 and 26, 1919; Tentperley,
op. cit., vol. i, p. 355.
ss Temperley, qp. cit., vol. i, p. 356.
ss Dillon, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 39
front of from fifteen to thirty-five kilometers.8
'~' Again the
Supreme Council lost heart: instead of adopting actively
Foch's plan, it sent agents to exhort the Hungarians to
eliminate Bela Kun. As might be expected, these efforts
availed nothing. More belligerent was the spirit of
Rumania : vigorous counter-attacks were ordered, and the
initial successes were followed by a-general advance which
did not halt until August 8, at which time -all Hungary east
of the Danube was in Rumanian hands. Rumania dictated
a new armistice whereby she recovered much of the property
she had lost during the War. Bela Kun did not await the
end, but fled on August I. Bolshevism collapsed, the
"reds", after a brief interlude of Social Democrat rule
under Peidl, being succeeded by " white " counter-revolutionists
led by Horthy. One reign of terror was succeeded
by another.88
In all this, Rumania had learned to disregard _
the orders of the Powers, and, instead, confronted them with
the fait accompli.88
'
Throughout this struggle, Czechoslovakia had not been
at war with Hungary officially, but de facto. Officially, the
fiction of peace between the two countries had been maintained;
the struggle had been regarded as a defense of
Slovakia against the incursions of bands of irresponsible
irregulars, of outlaws, whose attacks necessitated the employment
of the armed forces of the Republic, but did not
require a formal declaration of war against the country
from whence they came. The Czechoslovak government
realized that final triumph had been attained by the aid of
Sf The Times, July 21, 1919ss
Cf. Graham, op. cit., pp. 218-236 for further details of the regime of
Bela Kun, and pp. 236-238 for the counter-revolutionary movements; also,
Kaas and Lazarovics, op. cit., pp. 294-315; Jaszi, op. cit., pp. uo-152
(Bela Kun) and 177-2U (Horthy).
1111 T/Je Times, August 4. 1919; Temperley, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 356-357;
vol. iv, pp. 487-490; Dillon, op. cit., pp. 222-242.
40 FORI#GN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
friendly Powers, and that the struggle had revealed many
defects in the military establishment that had to be remedied
as soon as possible. An integral province of the Republic
had been retained, and an external Bolshevik invasion had
been repelled, yet the attendant circumstances had ·served to
confirm the conviction of the Czechs that Bolshevism had
been used by Hungary merely as the weapon of the moment.
Although the sympathy of Russia for the success of Hungarian
Bolshevism had been clearly manifested, Czechoslovakia
still retained a suspicion that the war for Slovakia
owed its inception to Budapest rather than to Moscow.90
While the issue of the armed struggle still hung in the
balance, the Peace Conference had continued its efforts
to determine the various frontiers of Hungary. On June
I I, the foreign ministers listened to the final arguments of
Bratianu for Rumania, Pasic for Yugoslavia, and Bend for
Czechoslovakia, and on the following day, drew a boundary
favorable to Czechoslovakia. The question was difficult because
of the absence of any clearly-defined linguistic frontier.
In spite of the fact that the census of I9IO had given Bratislava
3I,705 Magyars, 32,790 Germans and only II,673
Slovaks, the city was granted to Czechoslovakia because the
rural districts were solidly Slovak to its walls and because
of the principle that a city should not be separated from its
hinterland.91
To the east, as far as the mouth of the Ipel, practical
considerations made the Danube the boundary. Much more
debatable was the granting to Czechoslovakia of the Grosse
110 Cf. Kadlec, K., " Magyars and the Czechoslovak Republic", The
Czechoslovak Review, .vol. iv, pp. 58-64- Cf. also, Miller, up. cit., vol.
xviii, pp. 40-49, for Inter-Allied Investigation Commission's report on
Austrian, German and Hungarian plotting within Czechoslovakia. One
of the best accounts of the struggle is Chaloupeckj, V., Zapas o Slovensko
(Praha, 1930).
91 Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 270.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 41
Schutt, the extensive and fertile island extending almost
from Bratislava to Komorno. Here again, in spite of a
Magyar majority, because of economic dependence upon
Slovakia and because the southern channel of the Danube
would make almost an ideal frontier, the island was included .
with Slovakia. This decision was reached after a severe
struggle. France desired to award- the whole island to
Czechoslovakia, whereas the United States believed that
Hungary should retain it. Ultimately, the American dele··
gates gave way when it was pointed out that a strictly
ethnical line, as far as it could be determined, would create
additional economic hardships by the manner in which it
would cut across all the railways, and when Hungary was
promised a more favorable frontier line further to the east.92
In the course of the deliberations, it was stated also that
Masaryk had promised the South African delegate, General
Smuts, that he would not claim the Grosse Schutt if Czechoslovakia
were conceded a bridge-head to protect Bratislava.
The French delegate, Pichon, induced one of his colleagues,
Laroche, to state that Benes had informed him that Smuts
had "completely misunderstood" Masaryk.98
Miller points
out that Laroche allegedly obtained, via Benes, Masaryk's
denial of ever having countenanced such a proposition.86
Eastward from the Ipel, Czechoslovakia received considerably
less than she requested. Her extreme claims to the
predominantly Magyar towns of Miskolcz, Sarospatak and
Vacov, to the coal mines of Salgo-Tarjan and to the vineyards
of Tokaj were disallowed, in spite of the fact that
these areas did contain Slovak minorities. Similarly, Hungary
was granted Satoralja-Ujhely, but the railway station,
a mile distant, and the junction of the railways from Cap
u:a Nicolson, H., Peacemaking (New York. 1933), p. 275·
98 Ibid., p. 324-
9<1 Miller, of!. cit., vol. xvi, p. 216.
42 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
and from Kosice were left within Czechoslovakia for strategic
reasons, in order to establish direct communieations
with Rumania, via Subcarpathian Ruthe~ia.S">
Bend requested Ruthenia on the grounds of national selfdetermination.
His request was supported by a Ruthenian
delegation to which the Czechoslovak promise of the greatest
degree of autonomy compatible with the unity of the Republic
appeared favorable. What were the alternatives?
Subcarpathian Ruthenian independence was out of the
question because of numerical weakness. A union with
kinsmen in either Poland or the Ukraine, on the opposite
side of the Carpathians, would be unnatural geographical1y.
The Supreme Council feared particularly a union with
Russia, that would not only add to the area controlled by
Bolsheviks, but which would expose the small states of
Central Europe to a serious strategic danger, if Russia ever
obtained a foothold to the west of the Carpathians. Most
of the Ruthenian leaders did not desire a union with alien
Rumania, and, above all, sought to escape from Hungary.
As Slavs, they had already expressed their desire to unite
with their Czech and Slovak kinsmen. Hence they not only
gladly accepted the liberal concessions promised by Czechoslovakia,
but, of their own accord, came to the Peace Conference
to add their plea to that of Benes. On the other
hand, to Czechoslovakia, Ruthenia would be a welcome economic
asset and would establish iinmediate territorial contact
with friendly Rumania.$8
In view of ali these factors, the
Supreme Council agreed to the union on May 12, 1919.
9
"
115 Baker, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 313; Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, p. zn;
Miller, op. cit., vol. xii, pp. 201-ZI4i vol. xvi, pp. 2IS-2I7, ZZ9-2JI, 274-
275; also cf. ibid., voJ. xvii, p. 134. how Italy and the United States
stressed ethnology, and Great Britain and France, geography and military
strategy, in drawing the frontiers of Slovakia.
es Cf. Chmelar, J., Klima, S. and Neeas, J., Poflkarpatska Ru$ (Praha,
1923).
It' Temperley, ~- cit., vol. iv, pp. 272JZ73; Miller, o/1. &it., voL xvi, pp.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 43
There still remained the question of the boundary with
Poland in the districts of Tesin, Orava and Spis, the most
difficult of all the boundary disputes and the one that required
the longest time for final settlement. The Inter-Allied Commission
created by the Peace Conference to solve the problem
encountered many unexpected obstacles. For many
years, until a compromise satisfactory to both parties could
be attained, the friction engendered by this dispute threatened
to cause war between Czechoslovakia and Poland.118
Czechoslovakia was successful in realizing her cardinal
contentions on boundary questions. Even if some of her
minor and more extreme demands had been disallowed, she
had met with more than adequate recognition of her territorial
needs. Henceforth, a satiated power territ~rially, she
became one of the most ardent supporters of the maintenance
of the status quo and of the inviolability of the Peace
Treaties.119
Other Peace Conference Problems
Czechoslovakia had other problems at the Peace Conference
besides those connected with her frontiers. In addition
to trying to obtain war materials against Hungary, as has
already been mentioned, Bend, after the death of Stefanik,100
271-272. Cf. also, ibM., vol. xvi, .pp. 386-387 for drawing of Czeehoslovak-Rumanian
boundary on June 12, 1919.
us For· full details, cf. infra, pp. 148 et seq.
1111 For the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, cf. Articles 27, 81, 82, 83 and
87 of the Treaty of Versailles; Articles 27, 53 and 91 of the Treaty of
St. Germain; Articles 27, 48 and 75 of the Treaty of Trianon; and
Articles 1-.2 of the Frontiers Treaty of 5evres; also La Casette tk
Prague, August 4. 1920- Poland lost the Silesian plebiscite, hence
Czechoslovakia failed to benefit as she had expected from Article 83
of the Treaty of Versailles.
100 Milan StefAnik, Czechoslovakia's first Minister of War, was killed
in an aeroplane accident on May 4. 1919, en route from Italy to Czecho-
slovakia.
# FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1985
negotiated with the Allies, particularly with the United
States, for the return of the Czechoslovak forces from
Siberia/~1
with France for the training of the Czechoslovak
army, and with Hoover for provisions.1
il
2
Then there were
·the questions of disarmament, minorities, the Anschluss, or
union between Austria and Germany, reparations, and of
obtaining for Czechoslovakia outlets by ri~er and by rail
across the territories of her neighbors.
The Great Powers feared lest the development of too much
" individualism u by the new states injure their own prestige
and interests. Thus, the initial plan on disarmament, prepared
on May 23, 1919, by a commission of Inter-Allied
generals, provided that all the Succession States would have
to agree to armaments limited proportionally to those of the
defeated states.108
This plan was opposed by all the Succession
States, on the grounds that such armaments would
not be sufficient and because they believed a distinction should
be drawn between vanquished and victor states. There
followed the so-called American plan which met these objections
in part. This new plan, which was negotiated
partially by Bene5 and Wilson in person and which allowed
Poland 8o,ooo men and Czechoslovakia 50,000, also failed
of general acceptance on June 5, 1919. One of the deplorable
aspects of the failure of these initial attempts to limit
armaments was the belief prevalent in Paris regarding the
ease with which all the evils of the "Balkanization of
Europe " were to be avoided. Acceptance of the principle
of disarmament combined with· demands for more arms for
the time being, because of a general lack of faith in the
1ro. For full details, cf. infra, pp. TI4 ef. seq.
"~~2 Cf. Vochoc, loc. cit., p. 99. ·Hoover was Food Relief Administrator.
108 Baker, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 403-404· Germany was. allowed 100,000
men; Austria, 15,000; Hungary, x8,ooo; Bulgaria, xo,ooo; Greece, 12,000;
Czechoslovakia, :22,000; Yugoslavia, :zo,ooo; Rumania, 2:8,ooo; and Poland,
44,000.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 45
immediate efficacy of-the League of Nations, meant nothing
of practical value.104
The minorities treaty for Czechoslovakia had been projected
as early as May 22, 1919, but was not signed by
Benes and Kramar until September 10. Bene5. signed without
hesitation, for he realized that the treaty safeguarded the
rights of the majority also, whereas Xramif required persuasion
to sign, for he preferred to amend certain clauses so
they would apply equally to all members of the League of
Nations.105
Article 14 of this treaty placed all the preceding
Articles under the guarantee of the League, which was
thereby made responsible for certain obligations, of which
the most important were the following:
I. These Articles, not the minorities, were put under the
guarantee of the League of Nations.
2. These Articles might not be modified without the consent
of a majority of the Council.
3· The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and
Japan agreed not to withhold their assent to modifications
approved by a majority of the Council.
4. Any member of the Council might set the machinery
in motion by calling attention to an infraction or to danger
of infraction, but a minority itself was unable to do so.106
Identical treaties were signed by Poland, Austria and
Yugoslavia on the same day. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia and
1o4 Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. IJ6-IJ7: Vochoc, loc. cit., pp. 87-88;
Baker, oJ!. cit., vol. i, p. 406. Cf. also, ibid., vol. iii, pp. 218-224. the confidential
report of April n, 1919, of Major General F. J. Kernan to
President Wilson on conditions in Central Europe and on the armies of
Poland and Czechoslovakia.
105 House and Seymour, o/J. cit., pp. 211-215; Miller, o/J. cit.. vol. ix,
pp. 256-26o, 263; vol. xiii, pp. 23-25.
us Nouveau recueil gbtbal de traites et autre.s actes rela.tifs au·
rapports de droit international (henceforth referred to as Nouveau recwil),
iii serie, vol. xiii, pp. 512 el seq.
46 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Rumania, although signing, made almost identical protests
against such limitations upon their sovereignty, particularly
since Italy was not required to bind herself similarly.101
Even Czechoslovakia was not entirely satisfied, and, in the
Third Session of the Assembly, stressed the point that minorities
disloyal to the state should lose all right of appeal
for protection to the League, regardless of the fact that
some other state, friendly to them, might make an appeal
in their behalf. She argued that the act of signing a minorities
treaty should not bind a state any further, but that
any subsequent arrangements that might be adopted should
be made to apply equally to all League members without any
discrimination whatever.108
In conclusion, to demonstrate
her good faith, Czechoslovakia, which had already been
questioned in advance by the Peace Conference concerning
the measures she intended to adopt towards the Bohemian
Germans, submitted in detail a liberal program which conceded
far more than had been demanded by the treaty, which,
in the last analysis, had been intended merely as a minimum
program.109
In most of the Succession States, the agitation on behalf
of the Minorities Treaties had been led by the Jews.
Within the Republic, they increased in importance from west
to east, numbering I .27 percent of the population in
1or Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 138. ,
'los Benes, Problemy no'Ve E'Vf'a/JY, pp. 2oo-201 ; . Hajn, A., " Ochrana
narodnostnich mensin-otazkou mezinarodni ", Zahranicni Politika, vol. i,
pp. 88-92; cf. also, Kellor, F. A., Security against War (New York, 1924).
vol. i, pp. 70-79.
109 Fouques-Duparc, J., La Protecticn des MinoritJs (Paris, 1922), p.
179; Pergler, C., "Minorities in Czechoslovakia", Current History, vol.
xvii, pp. J10·JII; Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 403-407· Cf. also,
Thompson, op. cit., pp. 386-387, for joint protest of May 31, 1919. of
Bratianu, Trumbic, Dmowski and Kramar, against minority clauses in
the treaty with Austria, alleging unfair discriminations against their
countries.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 47
Bohemia, 1.57 per cent in Moravia, 1.78 per cent in Silesia,
5·3 per cent in Slovakia and 16.2 per cent in Rutheniar
Politically, the Jews were divided into three factions: Zionists,
Nationalists and Assimilationists, who desired, respectively,
an independent Palestine, autonomy and assimilation.110
The Czechoslovaks, although much more tolerant
and generous in their treatment of the. Jews than the
Poles or Russians, have, nevertheless, been unable to forget
that in the past the Jews favored the dominant races.
However, to Czechoslovakia the Jews were a secondary problem,
not to be compared in importance with her German and
Magyar minorities, a fact which was recognized when the
Peace Conference did not require any pledge for them, for
the minorities treaty would safeguard their rights also. The
confidence in the tolerance of Czechoslovakia implied by the
Peace Conference in this omission was duly appreciated by
Bene5.111
Subsequent events have amply justified this confidence.
Most Jews have cooperated harmoniously with the
Czechoslovaks. ·
Another problem of vital concern to Czechoslovakia was
Anschluss. Czechoslovakia was opposed to such a union:
should it be consummated, her fourteen million people
would be surrounded on three sides by sixty-five or
seventy million hostile Germans, and her existence would
be threatened. The incorporation of Austria would more
than make good Germany's losses in the World War, would
re-establish direct contact with Hungary, would give Germany
control of the Danubian area, would hamper to a
still greater degree Czechoslovakia's already indirect access
to France and Italy, and would foster irredentism among the
Germans of Bohemia and the Magyars of Slovakia. Thereno
Mercier, op. cit., p. 18o; House and Seymour, op. cit., pp. 218-219"111
C/. Benes' speech of September 30, 1919. Prager Abendblatt, October
I, 1919-
48 FO~EIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
fore, from the Czechoslovak viewpoint, an independent
Austria had to be maintained at all costs.112
The Czechoslovak contentions concerning Anschluss, supported
in toto by France, helped convince the Peace Conference,
which, late in April, 1919, determined to prohibit the
union of Austria and Germany. The Treaty of Versailles,
approved in the plenary session of May 6 and signed on
June 28, stated, in Article 8o, that Germany recognized the
independence of Austria as inalienable except by the consent
of the League Council Article 88 of the Treaty of St.
Germain bound Austria to a similar pledge to abstain from
any act, direct or indirect, which might compromise her own
independence. It may be pointed out that, since the decision
of the Council has to be unanimous and since France has
permanent representation in that body, these Articles might
as well have stated "with the consent of France". One
further obstacle had to be removed before Anschluss
could be deemed absolutely prohibited. The new Weimar
constitution was. distrusted by Czechoslovakia and France
inasmuch as Article 6r provided for the admission of Austrian
Deputies to the Reich. The Allies applied pressure to
Germany which was compelled to eliminate Article 6r as
contrary to the Peace Treaty and to reaffirm her adherence
'112 C/. Orbach, C. L., "Czechoslovakia's Place in the Sun", Current
History, vol. xiv, pp. 944-945; also Miller, op. cit., vol. ~ii, pp. 534-549.
for correspondence from the Austrian government concerning the relations
of German Austria and Czechoslovakia, March-April, 1919, as transmitted
to the Peace Conference by the Swiss Legation at Paris. In
contrast, c/. Kleinwaechter, F. F. G., Self-Determinatio~ for Austria
(London, 1929), pp. 34-42. Austria deemed Anschluss justifiable
politically as a question of life or death to -her 6,soo,ooo people. Mutilated
Austria, no longer a self-contained economic unit, did not believe
herself capable of sustained independent existence. Vienna, a city of
almost 2,ooo,ooo, resembled a head with no body to support it. The
loss of statehood entailed by a union with Germany would be easier to
endure than the economic misery of continued independence.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 49
to Article 8o of the Treaty of Versailles.113
·In this manner
were the dangers of Anschluss averted, permanently as
Czechoslovakia hoped, but only temporarily, as the sequel
was to show.114
Still another problem of the first magnitude was that of
reparations, an issue to which the Supreme c·ouncil turned
after drawing definitively the Austrian boundaries on May
13, 1919. The Czechoslovak desires were ably presented to
Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference, by a
letter of Bene$, of May 16, which requested decisions on
the questions of the pre-war and war debts of Austria-Hungary,
on state property within Czechoslovakia, and on the
Austro-Hungarian banknotes, that had been rendered almost
worthless by reckless inflation.116
The agenda suggested by
Bene$ was not adopted by the Peace Conference, with the
result that Czechoslovakia was compelled, later, to force a
solution of most of these problems on her own initiative.
The Great Powers considered the small states of Central
Europe as having been at war only with Austria-Hungary,
and, hence, as not entitled to share in German reparations.
The contention of these small states that bankrupt and ruined
Austria-Hungary could pay little, if anything, was not
heeded.116
In the belief that the question threatened to develop
into a struggle more severe than the territorial one,
Czechoslovakia objected because no distinctions were being
made bet~een Allied and enemy states.117
In order to enable Czechoslovakia to evade, juridically, the
reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the Comwl
Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 391-394; The Times, September 3,
1!)19.
1u Cf. infra, pp. 173 et seq.
1111 Miller, op. cit., vol. xviii, pp. 328-329.
na Baker, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 386.
uT Ceskoslovensk6 KorespondeHCe, May 20 and z;, l!)I!); VochoC.
loc. cit., pp. II3-ll4-
50 FOREIGN .POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
mission on Reparations decided that she became independent
by her own efforts on October 28, 1918. On that date she
was at war with Germany for the first time, and, accordingly,
was a belligerent when the War terminated. Her independence
had been recognized formally by identical Articles : by
Germany in Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles, by Austria
in Article 53 of the Treaty of St. Germain and by Hungary
in Article 48 of the Treaty of Trianon. Her status was
above question. The Great Powers decided also that the
enemy states should not pay for the entire cost of the War,
but merely for the damages caused by it. This decision
wrecked the plans of certain Czechoslovak circles, led by Dr.
Rasin, the Finance Minister, who had understood that
Czechoslovakia would assume her proportional share of the
Austro-Hungarian pre-war debt, but who had also expected
large reparations. In spite of Bend' stressing of the point
that the Czechoslovaks had been hostile to the Dual Monarchy
throughout the War and had been granted an Allied
status, neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland, which was in a
similar situation, could obtain any reparations for war claims.
The two states bitterly resented this discrimination, which
they maintained was owing solely to the fact that they were
both new states. On the other hand, Italy maintained that
all the Succession States, and not merely the mutilated remnants
of Austria and Hungary, should pay the war loans.
Austria's entire debt was divide<( adecision which made no
substantial distinction between enemy and Succession States.
The new states had expected to pay a share of the pre-war
debt, but refused to be responsible for the war debts or for
the notes issued by the Bank of Austria-Hungary, and objected
to turning over to the Allies the crown property within
their new boundaries.118
ns Vochoc, loc. cit., pp. II4-IIS.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 51
Bankruptcy faced ·Austria and Hungary, which could
never pay such enormous sums. In recognition of this
obvious fact, the Allies pointed out that the Succession States
would be better off than the Great Powers, if they were freed
from these obligations, and stressed the fact that, since the
War had been fought by all, its burdens should be shared
by all. In ·reply, Bend stated that Czechoslovakia should
not be penalized for having aided the Allies, that she would
pay her pre-war share, but no more. If the Great Powers
feared that Austria and Hungary could not pay for both war
debts and reparations, then,· similarly, the new states could
not pay for the war loans that had been floated in their territories.
These war loans on Czech property were the greatest
internal financial problem of the Republic. The crown
property had belonged originally to the Kingdom of
Bohemia. Austria, which had taken it, was not entitled to
any payment for it. If Czechoslovakia could not collect war
damages, she could not help pay Austria's war debts.1111
If
this viewpoint of Benes was to be regarded as radical, public
opinion in Czechoslovakia was even more so: many of the
leaders considered the problem cynically as void of principle,
as merely a question of how much each small state could be
made to contribute to the Allied international fund.120
In the midst of these differences of opinion, on June 16,
1919, Austria introduced a new and important point into
the discussion, namely, that her Republic was new and consequently
not responsible for the obligations of the former
Dual Monarchy, nor had it ever waged war against the Allies.
While Austria expressed her willingness to assume a share
of her war debt, she declined to consider herself responsible
1.111 Ibid., pp. u6-rr8; Peace Conference Delegation. I9I9, Memoirs,
no. u, " La Republique Tchecoslovaque et son droit ala reparation des
dommages de guerre ".
ue CeskoslMJenskti Korespomlence, May 27, rgrg; Vochoe, loc. cit., pp.
n6-n8.
52 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
for it alL If her contention were accepted, she would be
the least heavily burdene~ of all the Succession States, since
her new Republic was the weakest of them all.121
Although the Allies had fought the whole Dual Monarchy,
they encountered, at this point, juridical difficulties in identifying
it with the new Austrian Republic. The greatest
Allied fear was that, as long as any doubt remained regarding
the conclusiveness of the abdication of Emperor Charles,
he might·retum to rule Austria. Since he would have no
rights over a new state, the new contention of Austria as
to her existing status would afford security to the new status
quo that the Allies were attempting to establish. Therefore,
they accepted in part the Austrian contention and regarded
her as a state with a new government, dating de facto recognition
from May 22, when the credentials of the new Republic
were accepted by the Peace Conference, and de jure
recognition from September 10, 1919, when the Treaty of
St. Germain was signed. To all appearances any waiting
for Austrian ratification of this treaty was deemed un-
necessary.u%
In·the face of the common financial threat, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland decided on joint action,
but their fears failed to materialize. On May 29, 1919,
Le Temps announced unofficially that the Succession States
would not be compelled to pay the war debts of AustriaHungary.
In the definitive treaty with Austria, they assumed
merely their proportional shares of the pre-war debt,
and were not required to pay for crown property within
their borders. Czechoslovakia was permitted, in addition.
to recover certain historical articles which, in the past, had
been carried off to Vienna.123
1n Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 395-397.
12% Ibid., vol. iv, pp. 398-400.
12a VocboC, loc. cit.. pp. II9-I20.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 53
The .Austrian Reparations Commission was composed of
two members each from the United States, Great Britain,
France and Italy, and one representing the combined interests
of Greece, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
The total amount of Austrian reparations was to be determined
at some later date.124
Italy was granted a special
status. Her contribution was apportioned according to the
revenues formerly collected in the Austro-Hungarian provinces
she received. In addition, the other Succession States
were compelled to pay "costs of liberation", which were
:fixed at 1,soo,ooo,ooo gold francs. Of this amount,
Czechoslovakia was not to pay more than half.1
u All payments
were postponed to 1926, at which date the total amount
of these costs, in bonds, was to be turned over to a commission
that was to be designated by the four Great Powers.
As these bond payments would mature, the states in question
might liquidate them by surrendering equal amounts
due them in reparations. All debts prior to July 28, 1914,
were shared, but all subsequent indebtedness devolved upon
Austria and Hungary alone. Similarly, all notes issued by
the Bank of Austria-Hungary after October 27, 1918, were
declared invalid.128
In this manner the Great Powers solved
some of the financial problems of the Danubian area and
created others, particularly did they arouse the resentment
of the smaller Succession States by their concession to Italy.
The incomplete nature of the financial settlement left Central
1:M League of Nations Treaty Series (henceforth referred to as Treaty
Series), vol. ii, pp. 22-47; vol. iii, pp. 261-262.
1ll5 The Austrian pre-war debt was finally divided 36 per cent for
Austria, 22 percent between Yugoslavia and Italy, and 42 percent for
Czechoslovakia. For additional details cf. Piot, A., La CouronKe tchicoslovaque
jusqu'au morl de Ra.iin, 1918-1923 (Paris, 1923), p. 236;
Pasvolsky, L., Economic Nationalism of the Dantlbian States (New
York, 1928), pp. 45-47; or infra, p. 341.
lH Ternperley, op. cit.. vol. v, pp. 14-24-
54 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Europe open to the full play of selfish nationalism which
was to retard greatly any return to "normaJcy."
Distinct from these primarily financial problems was the
final set of Czechoslovakia's Peace Conference questions,
those essentially economic in nature. Of particular interest
and importance was the establishment of economic outlets
for the new state. The large surplus of manufactured goods
which began to accumulate after the termination of the War
had. to be exported, yet Czechoslovakia's position rendered
the problem difficult, since all outlets of any commercial significance
lay across the territories of her former enemies.
The problem required a series of special agreements. Since
the question was of vital concern to all Central Europe, the
Peace Conference, at its plenary session of January 25, 1919,
created a Commission on the International Regime of Ports,
vVaterways and Railways, and granted to it the rights of
investigation and recommendation.127
Between February
and the end of April, 1919, this Commission formulated a
group of agreements, but its Polish and Czechoslovak delegates
were not satisfied with the progress that was being
made, and, on March 8, inquired with considerable indignation
why their states " were not treated on the same moral
footing as the other States ".128
Following the bad precedent·
established by their colleagues who represented the
Great Powers, they also refused,to consider the advantages
of reciprocity. Czechoslovakia demanded the internationalization
of the Danube, Elbe, Oder and Vistula Rivers, and
of the railroads that connected Bratislava with both Trieste
and Fiume, and Praha with Strasbourg via Furth and Niirnberg.
In defense of these demands, Kramar argued,
" When only two States were riparian, it might nevertheless
be very desirable to bring about a wide internationaliza-
127 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 94.
12a Baker, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 309.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 55
tion; for instance, in the case of the Elbe, Oder, or Vistula.
If that were not done, newly formed States might find themselves
forced to deal alone with a State like Germany." 129
On the next day, March 9, in response to Polish and
Czechoslovak complaints of having been ignored, France
suggested to the Commission that the former enemy states
be compelled to grant Allied traffic over their lines terms and
service equal to those granted their ownnationals.130
Belgium
and Czechoslovakia demanded that their former enemies be
forbidden also to cut rates over lines in areas that were
served by shorter lines within Allied territory.181
No immediate
action was taken on these requests. On April 26,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia proposed that any Allied
states should be given the right, for twenty-five years, to
build railways through the former enemy states.182
. This
demand was not only unwarrantable, but failed to take into
account many practical questions. For instance, how were
the enemy states to be compelled to operate such railroads,
and who would pay for their costs? The sponsors .of the
plan certainly did not intend to finance it themselves, but
hoped to place the whole project under the supervision of
the League. France, whose assistance to the Succession
States might ordinarily be taken almost for granted, failed
to show interest in this undertaking, which, in consequence,
received no consideration because of a lack of adequate
support. On August 13, Benes who had succeeded Kramar
on the Commission, was informed that Czechoslovakia was
not to run her own trains across Austria and Hungary,
because such humiliation of the vanquished states was both
"unprecedented" and" unnecessary ".188
1211 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 440-
180 Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 444·445.
181 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 445·
111 Miller, op. cit., vol. ix. pp. 212-213.
1aa Ibid., vol. xi, p. 154-
56 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKJA, 1918-1935
In spite of this rebuff, Czechoslovakia, on the whole, was
treated generously by the Commission. Though she was
not granted any special privileges for her traffic across Germany
to France, because this traffic was regulated by Article
356 of the Treaty of Versailles, she did receive, in Articles
322-324 of the Treaty of St. Germain and in Articles 305-
306 of the Treaty of Trianon, respectively, free railway communications
with the Adriatic via Budjovice-Linz-Klagenfurt.o.Trieste
and Bratislava-Sopron-Fiume. The support of
Italy was influential in obtaining for Czechoslovakia these
privileges.134
Despite the objections of Poland, the Oder was internationalized
from Opatovic. Czechoslovakia's plea for the
Vistula was denied, on the ground that it would lie entirely
within Poland after the Tesin decision that then appeared
most probable. In July, 1919, the Morava and Dyje were
also internationalized. By Article 339 of the Treaty of
Versailles, to the great satisfaction of Czechoslovakia, the
Elbe, together with the Vltava from Praha, was placed under
the jurisdiction of an International Commission. Czechoslovakia
received also, on a ninety-nine year lease, the use
of certain so-called free zones within the ports of Hamburg
and Stettin.18
s
There still remained the question of the most important
river of Central Europe, the Danube. Prior to the War,
there had been six riparian states!:......Germany, Austria-Hungary,
Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia--of which all,
except the last, had had direct access to the sea. Hence,
1841 Temperley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. uo; vol. iv, p. 274; Miller, op. cit.,
vol. xi, pp. 40-41.
185 Anon., " In the Matter of the Cessions by Germany to Czechoslovakia
under Article 339 of the Treaty of Versailles", A,nerican Journal
of International Law, vol. xviii, pp. t86-I91); Baker, op. cit., vol. ii,
p. 446; Miller, op. cit., vol. xi, pp. 71, 87, 97-98. 138. 147, I7G-I72, 177
and 193-1g8.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE 57
the authority of the-European Commission of the Danube
had been restricted to the delta below Galatz. The care of
the Iron Gates, where the channel up to Braila is dangerous,
was entrusted to Austria-Hungary by Article 57 of the
Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878. During the War, the
membership of the Commission, thanks to the expulsion.
of the Allies, had been restricted to Germany, Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria and Rumania, or, as stated in Article 24 of
the Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918, to " States situated
on the Danube or the European coasts of the Black Sea".
After the Allied triumph in the War, the situation was reversed,
and, by Article 346 of the Treaty of Versailles,
membership was restricted to Great Britain, France, Italy
and Rumania.
In the new Europe, there had been created seven riparian
states, of which three-Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia-had
no direct access to the sea. Since none of them
was a Great Power, the Supreme Council had insisted upon
international control from Galatz to Ulm, the upper limit of
navigation, and, below Galatz, the authority of the European
Commission of the Danube was reestablished by Articles
346-353 of the Treaty of Versailles. In spite. of the fact
that, because of the mutual hostility of the riparian states,
international control had worked to their advantage, none of
them were satisfied without actual membership in the Commission.
However, patience had to be their lot; although
the Danubian question was brought up during the Peace
Conference, it was not settled definitely until much later; to
be exact, on July 23, 1921. On that date the new statute
was signed by all the Allied states except Poland and Portugal,
and by all the former Central Powers except Turkey.
Forty-three articles granted equal rights of navigation to
all, apportioned duties, improvements and revenues propor-
58 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
tionally, and sought to cover every possible contingency.1116
On June 30, 1922, when ratified by all, the new regime
became effective.1
n ·
It appears also that the Great Powers were aware of the
economic ills to which Central Europe would be exposed as
a result of the "Balkanization" of that area by the Peace
Treaties. In an effort to create an economic substitute for
the Dual Monarchy, the Peace Conference paved the way
for a Danubian Confederation.138
Article 222 of the Treaty
of St. Germain specified that, for a five year period, Austria
might conclude special accords with both Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. Because of mutual hostility, no immediate
attempt was made to take advantage of this privilege.139
It was evident that Czechoslovakia had succeeded in winning
her major contentions at the Peace Conference. Such
reverses as had been her lot were, on the whole, to be expected
and were received on minor and extreme demands. The
136 Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube (British
White Paper} Cmd. 1754 of 1922.
181 For detailed accounts of the Danubian question, cf. Chamberlain,
J. P., The Regime of the International Rivers: Danube and Rhine (New
York, 1923}, or The Danube (Washington, 1918); Avennier, L., "Mezinarodni
pravo Heni a reiim na Dunaji ", Zahranicni Politika, vol. i,
pp. 1o6-no, 189-1194. 294-300; or Pinon, R., "La Reconstruction de
!'Europe danubienne ", Revue des deus nwndes, vi periode, tome li, pp.
557-582. Cf. also, League of Nations Official Journal (henceforth referred
to as Official Journal), FebruarY. 1927, pp. 138, 15o-152, for the
agreement of Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania upon the competence
of the European Commission of the Danube. On September 8,
1924. Czechoslovakia ratified the convention and statute on the regime of
navigable waterways of international concern, cf. Official Journal,
November, 1927~ p. 1510. .
us Cf. Svornost, January 3, 1919, for rumors that Great Britain,
France and the United States had agreed to create a Danubian Confederation
led by Czechoslovakia.
18 9 For full details of subsequent attempts to form a Danubian Confederation,
cf. infra, pp. 278 et seq.
THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE
59
broad bases for her-future well-being had been established;
there remained to be decided the specific ways and means.uo
In common with the other Succession States, Czechoslovakia
was to find her chief future obstacle in her own
nationalistic attitude. Shortly after his return from the
Peace Conference,u1
in his speech of September 30, 1919,
before the-Foreign Committee of the Senate, Benes pointed
out Czechoslovakia's victory, and showed how she had been
left with fewer unsolved international problems than any
of the other new states.u2
On November 3, 1919, when
the Treaties of St. Germain with Austria and Versailles
with Germany were submitted to the National Assembly for
ratification, Bend, in the discussions that followed, was
asked to explain his actions. Four days later, at the plenary
session, he explained the goal of his future foreign policy.
His statement-that Czechoslovakia would strive to maintain
the status quo as established by the Peace Treaties, and
by an extensive system of new agreements would endeavor
to establish friendly and cordial relations with all her neighbors-was
heartily approved, as the first announcement of a
new political system in Central Europe.us ·
1..o For further details, cf. Broz, A., The First Year of the Czechoslowk
Republic (London, 1920); Butter, 0., and Ruml, B., La Republique
tchicoslowque (Prague, 1921); Eisenmann. L., La Tchlcoslowquie
(Paris, 1921); Dedecek, V., La Tchicoslowquie et les Tchecoslovaqtu:s
(Paris, 1919).
u1. Cf. Narodm Politika, Se];)tember zs, 1919, for the ovation received
by Benes upon his return to Praha after four years abroad.
ua Prager Abendblatt, October 1, 1919.
ua Benes, Problemy nove Evropy, pp. 33-34-
CHAPTER II
DoMESTIC STABILIZATION
INTERDEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
THE post-:-war foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, as foreshadowed
by Benes' speech of September 30, 1919,1
was,
of necessity, to rest upon two bases. As a prelude to a
foreign policy of conciliation and peace, the new Republic
would be compelled to set its own house in order; before any
reconstruction could be hoped for throughout Central
Europe, each state would have to complete first the solution
of its own internal financial, economic, social and religious
problems. Thus, while Czechoslovakia, during the first five
years of her ind~pendent existence, 19I8-1923, found that
her chief foreign problems revolved around the reconstruction
of Central Europe, she discovered also that her own
future well-being would depend upon the thoroughness with
which she solved her own domestic problems during the same
period.2
Financial Policy
Czechoslovakia conceived her most vital domestic problem
to be that of finance. In order to appreciate the difficulties
of the situation, it should be remembered that the territories
that comprised Czechoslovakia had formerly been dependent
financially upon Vienna, and, to a lesser degree, upon Buda-
1 Cf. Prager Abendblatt, October I, 1919; or supra, p. 59·
2 This chapter makes no pretense of an exhaustive treatment of
Czechoslovakia's internal difficulties, but concerns itself only with those
phases of the financial, economic, social and religious problems that
concern, more or less directly, the f_oreign policy.
6o
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 61
pest. In these two centers had been concentrated the
financial and economic activities of the provinces. In view
of such a development, it was only natural that the first bank
in Praha, established in 1857, had been a branch of the
Vienna Austrian Discount Bank and Credit Institute. In
1863 there was established, by German banke~s and manufacturers,
the first independent bank in Praha, the Bohemian
Discount Bank. In 1867 there followed the Agricultural
Credit Bank for Bohemia and Moravia. By the close of
1872, Praha had nineteen joint-stock banks, but the panic
of the following year demonstrated their weakness, for only
four survived. The next quarter century witnessed the
establishment of several branches of Vienna banks throughout
Bohemia, but no more joint-stock banks in Praha.
However, the immediate pre-war period was marked by a
great banking revival; between 1898 and 1914 about twenty
new banks were started and the older institutions expanded
their capital also. Patriotic Czechs may well have experienced
satisfaction from the fact that most of these. new
banks were founded by Czechs, with the object of seeking
to wrest financial supremacy from the Germans. In ·this
financial struggle, the Czechs received no assistance whatever
from the Slovaks, who were practically helpless in the grip
of Budapest:8
It would, perhaps, have been questionable when, if ever,
the Czechs, in the normal course of events, could have become
dominant financially over the German minority, which
received, directly and indirectly, assistance from the government.
In view of this fact, as well as because of their own
economic and financial weakness, the Czechs had faced a sera
For further details of this financial struggle, cf. Karasek. K.,
"Banking", in Gruber, J. (ed.), CsechoslOfJakia: A Survey of Ecorwmic
mu:l Social Conditions (New York. 1!)24), pp. 166-169; Pasvolsk:y,
op. cit., pp. 7-32; or Brailsford, H. N., "Prague and Vienna", New
Republic, vol. :xxxi, pp. 223-226.
62 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935.
ious struggle. Although they had made marked gains in the
decades just prior to 1914, they were still far short of their
ultimate goal when the World War broke out. Thus, for
them, the War was a blessing in disguise. It brought them
independence and ended German financial and economic
supremacy. During the course of the War, the Czech banks
lost little, and subscribed to the various war loans only under
compulsion. On the other hand, deposits continued to increase
and the inflation brought about by the War enabled
both banks and industries to realize enormous profits. The
securities of the various Czech industrial concerns increased
rapidly in value and were bought up eagerly.4
In the midst of all this apparent prosperity, the Czechs
realized keenly the dangers inherent in the situation because
of the reckless inflation of Austrian currency. The disproportion
of Austrian revenues and expenditures, which had
been notorious at different periods in the past,5
became even
greater during the \Var. Beginning in 1892, Austria had
attempted to attain financial stability and create a gold
reserve by covering the circulation of her banknotes up to
forty percent by gold which had been withdrawn from circulation
and placed in the reserves of the Bank of AustriaHungary.
This policy had been quite successful; on July
23, 1914, the gold reserve had been fifty-eight percent of the
paper circulation. During the COl)rse of the War, Austria
found it impossible to maintain a sufficient gold reserve:
her circulation, which had been, on July 23, 1914, 2,129,ooo,ooo
paper crowns, had been increased, by October 26,
1918, to 30,679,000,000 paper crowns.6
In substance, this
• Rasin, A., The Fimmcial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First
Year of its History (Oxford, 1923), pp. 16-17; Piot, op. cit., p. 20.
5 Cf. Piot, op. cit., pp. 9-14. for a summary of Austrian finance from
t8n to 1914. -
6 Mildschuh, V., "Currency Conditions", in Gruber, op. cit., p. 176.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
paper money no long~r represented notes of the Bank, but,
instead~ notes of the government of Austria-Hungary.
Attempts of the government to maintain their value proved
futile.' The sequel-an inevitable panic-was welcome to
the "patriotic" Czechs, who contributed their bit towards
making it worse by presenting for immediate p~yment their
war loans.8
.
Vigorous steps were necessary if Czechoslovakia was to be
protected from the evils of Austrian inflation. The earliest
suggestion came from Dr. Alois Rasin, the first Minister of
Finance.9
Shortlyafter his appointment, Ra5in, in November,
1918, proposed to the Supreme Council, by means of his
country's spokesman, Benes, that all the Succession States
create International Commissions of Control, patterned on
those for the Bank of Austria-Hungary or the German
Reichsbank, to represent them until they could develop independent
currencies of their own. This plan was a practical
method of bridging over the necessary period of transition,
while the financial separations from Austria were taking
place, but was brought to nought because the Great Powers
failed to appreciate adequately the financial dangers that
threatened the Succession States.10
After this initial rebuff to his contemplated plan of
financial cooperation with the Great Powers, Rasin proceeded
on his own initiative, as he thought best. His chief
immediate concern was to prevent any possibility that
Czechoslovakia be compelled to guarantee a large portion of
7 Cf. Piot, op. cit., p. 14, for a chart of the fluctuations of Austrian
exchange, 1914-18; RaSin, op. cit., pp. 13-15; Chanal, E., ManMie ef
icon.omie natioMle en Tchicosl()fJ(lquie, 1918-1928 (Paris, 1929), pp. 67-'/I.
8 Piot, 0 p. cit., p. 21. The writer means "patriotic,. to the concept o{
the Czechoslovakia-to-be.
11 For a brief biography of Rasin, cf. Chanal, op. cit., pp. 63-66.
to Rasin, op. cit., pp. 16-17; Piot, op. cit., p. 29-
64 FOREIGN POLiCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1986
the Austro-Hungarian war bonds, which, at the termination
of the War, amounted to 50,736,838,soo crowns. His fear
was based upon the fact that the holders of these bonds were
permitted to present them to the Bank of Austria-Hungary,
which was compelled by law to advance seventy-five percent
of their nominal value upon such collateral. In addition, the
Bank was protected from all possible loss from this source
by a guarantee of an indemnity by Austria-Hungary, should
it ever become necessary. Rasin's first move was obviousa
request that the Bank discontinue the granting of loans
based upon war bonds as a security, and, when this request
was refused, his second move was to prohibit all branches of
the bank in Czechoslovakia to honor war bonds. As a result
of this prompt handling of the situation, the banks within
Czechoslovakia became obligated only for the relatively small
amount of 412,000,000 crowns of the war bonds.11
Thereupon, in December, 1918, while Austria was still
following the pathway of inflation, Czechoslovakia resorted
to a Liberty Loan of soo,ooo,ooo crowns. This appeal to
the patriotism of her people produced startling results: in
the course of five days 1,072,000,ooo crowns were subscribed;
despite nine disastrous precedents of depreciated
Austro-Hungarian war loans, the Czechoslovaks in this
manner again demonstrated their faith in the future of their
country. In contrast, regardless of the fact that Austria's,.
request for a new loan had been rejected J:>y the Bank Commission,
the Bank of Austria-Hungary, which still continued
to operate despite the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, on
December 31, 1918, loaned Austria 3,soo,ooo,ooo crowns
and Hungary I,soo,ooo,ooo crowns. The Bank also issued
200,000,000 crowns of new notes, printed only on one side,
which Austria had authorized on the eve of the armistice.
1'1 Rasin, op. cit., p. 17; Piot, op. cit., p. 30; Chanal, op. cit., pp. ?I-74-
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
In this emergency, before Czechoslovakia could be flooded
with these new notes, Rasin refused to honor them, except
for notes of one and two crowns, which were printed at the
same time and which were needed especially in view of ·a.
temporary scarcity of small change. The resulting financial
distress convinced many Czechoslovaks of the need of
establishing a new currency as soon as possible.12
Since Czechoslovakia was the first of the Succession States
to come to this conclusion, she had no precedent to follow,
and had to work out her own method. There existed three
p~incipal views as to the best procedure. The first view, that
of Dr. Jaroslav Preiss, the head of the Commercial Bank of
Praha, was the most radical-that the currency issued by the
Bank of Austria-Hungary be repudiated. The second view,
that of Professors Brdlik and Kolousek, advocated that the
old currency be retained as notes of Czechoslovakia, but that
it be devaluated. Still more moderate was the third view,
that of Rasin, who maintained that the Czechoslovak crown
be established at a value equal to the pre-war parity of the
Austro-Hungarian crown by a process of gradual deflation.
Rasin did not pretend to be able to foresee the ultimate result
of the measure he proposed, but he was convinced that it
would involve the least economic dislocation, would attain
financial stability in the safest way, and would avoid many
obvious difficulties that would be present if either of the other
two alternatives were adopted-in short, he felt his method
was the sole means of averting immediate disaster.18
n Rasin, op. cit., pp. I!)-ZI; Piot, op. cit., pp. 32-33 >Mildscbub, Zoe. cit.,
p. 177.
u For the details of the rival plans of Preiss, Kolou5ek and Brdlik,
and Rasin, cf. Rasin, op. cit., pp. 37-38; Piot, op. cit., pp. S4-SS > Chanal,
op. cit., pp. 74-83; Pasvolsky, op. cit., pp. 205-200; or KolouSek, J.,
Ralinovd reforttUJ meny (Praha, 1921). For technical studies of the
whole Czechoslovak currency problem, cf. Rasin, A., Mu.j finanbti Platt
(Praha, 1921); InjUJ,ce a de/lace (Praha, 1922); Schmidt-Friedlander, R..
Die Wiihrungspolitik der Tschechoslowakei (Reichenberg, 1929).
66 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Before putting his project into effect, Rasin introduced a
series of preliminary measures intended to curtail the
transfer of crowns in either direction across the frontier, in
order that the amount of capital within Czechoslovakia might
be determined accurately. The branch banks were not permitted
to withdraw their current accounts from the Bank of
Austria-Hungary, nor to pay for the Bank's reserve bonds
without a special permit from the Ministry of Finance. In
addition, gold francs were required for the payment of
customs duties, tourists could bring out with them only
limited amounts of crowns and no capital in crowns might
be exported.1
4.
By February 25, 1919, Rasin had his plan completed. To
ensure success, secrecy was maintained; the National
Assembly held a secret session oi half a day's duration in
approving the project and .all newspapers were censored.
The essential provisions of Rasin's plan required that all
notes circulating in Czechoslovakia be stamped, that half of
the notes be retired and held as a forced loan bearing one
percent interest for which non-transferable certificates were
to be issued, and that, within three months, everyone who
resided in Czechoslovakia as much as one month a year be
compelled to declare all his property, personal or otherwise,
at home or abroad. As the process of actual stamping was
taking place, March 3-9, 1919, first in the banks, then in the
rural communities and finally in fhe cities, troops guarded the
frontiers, enforced the suspension of most business and
closed the post-offices in order that no more notes be imported.
Stamping was restricted to notes of 10, 20, 50, 100
and 1,000 crowns, whereas those of lesser denominations
were retained, unstamped, in circulation temporarily. During
the last half of 1919, 30o,ooo,ooo new notes which had been
printed in the United States replaced the stamped ones which
14 Piot, op. cit., pp. 58~59.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
were permitted to remain in circulation until June 20, 1920,
and which lost all value on August 1, 1920. In this manner
was the currency of Czechoslovakia separated from that of
Austria.16
The secrecy and speed with which Rasin's plan had been
carried out produced both at home and abroad reactions
which demonstrated the timeliness of ·his measures. Within
Czechoslovakia, after the initial feeling of stupor had passed,
the peasants began to hoard the notes, particularly the small
change, whereas the merchants proceeded to invest their
money in valuable and easily salable merchandise whose price
began to soar immediately. Abroad, CzechOslovakia's example
proved contagious to the other Succession States which
proceeded to stamp all Austro-Hungarian notes within their
borders also.18
In the meantime, Austria blamed Czechoslovakia as the
source of the evils which she, Austria, would be required to
face as the result of having to bear alone the brunt of her
wartime inflation. As soon as she ascertained the .full
import of Rasin's preliminary measures, Austria, . on
February 15, 1919, prohibited the importation of crowns
from Czechoslovakia in order that the latter would be compelled
to retain as many crowns as possible/7
and, on
February 26, protested formally against Rasin's measures of
the day before as an unwarrantable attack upon the rights
and privileges of the Bank of Austria-Hungary. The next
day, Austria closed her own frontiers, stamped her own notes,
lli Rasin, The Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year
of its Hfsiory, pp. :26-28; Piot, op. cit., -pp. 66-?I; Chanal, op. cil., pp.
83-89; Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. 206; Mildschuh, loc. cit., p. 178.
1t1Yugoslavia, November IJ, 1919; Poland, March 26, 1919; Rumania
in April, 1919 (in Bessarabia), and between June and July, 1919, in the
other provinces; and Hungary, March 17, 1920, the delay being caused
by Bolshevism.. Even Germany adopted the process during August, 1919.
n Piot, op. cit., p. 59-
68 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
and by way of further retaliation, discriminated against her
Czechoslovak creditors by paying claims that antedated
February 26 in old crowns and claims of a 'tater date in new
Austrian crowns.18
Austria's objections were answered ably by a note 19
of
Rasin's in which he pointed out that the Bank of AustriaHungary,
a mere agent of the Austrian government, had no
right to complain against his measures, inasmuch as it had
not observed Article 83 of its own statutes, with regard to
issues of new notes. By granting loans to the other Succession
States, it had violated its own specific promises to
Czechoslovakia. It still maintained the practice of advancing
seventy-five percent of the nominal value of the war
bonds; whose actual value was but sixty percent. Moreover,
it was subject to the caprices of the Austrian government,
and had demonstrated its incompetence as a regulator of the
economic life of the Succession States. Czechoslovakia had
been willing to protect the common currency, but had received
no cooperation, and therefore, in self-defense, had
been compelled to adopt measures against a systematic depreciation
of the currency.
In spite of the fact that Rasin's note had demolished the
Austrian contention, Austria submitted her cause to the
Peace Conference, where it was received with little consideration.
In substance, Au;;tria was condemned and
Czechoslovakia vindicated by Article 206 of the Treaty of
St. Germain, which ordered stamping in each Succession
State within two months of ratification of the treaty and
replacement by new money within a year of ratification. By
the same article, the final step in the respective currency
separations was to be the sending of the retired notes, within
18 Ibid., pp. 72-73; Rasin, op. cit., pp. 2g, 40·
19 For the actual text of the note, cf. Rasin, op. cit., p. 30; cf. also,
Piot, of!. cit., pp. 73-74·
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 69
fourteen months of ratification, to the Reparations Commission,
which, in return, would issue certificates that were to
represent shares in the division of the resources of the Bank
of Austria-Hungary.
Despite the approval of her financial program: by the Peace
Conference, Czechoslovakia, because .of internal conditions,
was unable to put it into full effect immediately. The process
of deflation was retarded by many exceptions ·to the
retirement of the notes: for instance, amounts below 250
crowns were entirely exempt, as were all public funds and
one quarter of all salaries; moreover, Tesin and Ruthenia
were not included because, as yet, their exact frontiers
remained in doubt. Originally, Rasin had intended to withdraw
from circulation eighty percent of the notes, but, in
response to fears expressed in the National Assembly, declared
himself satisfied with fifty percent.20
Actually, of the
total of 7,436,ooo,ooo crowns, only 28.6g percent was withdrawn
from circulation immediately, and on June 15, 1919,
when the Kramar government fell, and after Rasin lost his
post, eighty-five percent of the original amount was restored
to circulation.21
Rasin was not permitted to carry through
his program personally because his brusqueness had gained
him many foes, whereas his integrity and ability were not
always apprt>,.;-~TJ----:-
_.t, a coalition of Agrarians 22
and
· ....... -. . _ speech of February 28, 1919. before the National Assembly,
c/..Prager Pre.sse, March I, 1919, or Rist, C., La Deftatio• ""
pratique (Paris, 1924), p. 107.
s1 Piot, op. cit., p. 79: Pasvolsky, oJI. cit., p. 207; Mildschuh, loc. cit.•
pp. I78-I79. Cf. also, Piot, op. cit., pp. 86 and 100; Chanal, op. cit., pp.
89-97; or RaSin, op. cit., pp. 43-47 for the means whereby Czechoslovakia
established a gold reserve.
112 The Agrarian party, formed in xgo6. became the most important
numerically after 1925· Composed of agriculturists and peasants, it
worked effectively for land reform and for the elimination of speculation
70 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Socialists 23
headed by Tusar, was interested primarily in
social questions rather than in finance. Rasin's immediate
successors, Horacek and Sonntag, in power respectively for
brief periods, failed to follow his policy of economy. On a
deficit of 4,905.591,293 crowns in the budget of 1919, Rasin
had brought about demobilization and the return of
prisoners, the occupation of Slovakia, unemployment relief,
a solution of the food shortage crisis and the renewal of
operation of the mines and railroads.24
In contrast with
this excellent record, his successors had produced, in the I 920
budget, almost as great a deficit-4,851,926,238 crownswhile
revenues had increased tremendously. In self-defense,
they alleged the great costs of the war with Hungary and the
occupation of Ruthenia, but failed to cite the main items of
increase-salaries and equipment.26
Nevertheless, they deserved
credit for avoiding inflation. Instead, they resorted
to new loans 26
which availed little, because both Slovaks and
in cereals. It is known also as the Republican party.. Cf. Hoch, C., The
Political Parties of CzechoslO'lJ(JkW (Prague, 1936), pp. 17-20.
23 The Social Democratic party, formed in 1896, was the most important
numerically until 1925, since which time it has held second place.
Composed primarily of laborers, it agitated for social reform. Somewhat
similar in composition and program is the National Socialist party which
holds third place among Czechoslovak parties. Ibid., pp. 2o-27.
~ Like his successors, Rasin had attempted to meet the deficit by
negotiating loans. He had obtained frOJD Hoover $54,000,000 for food
supplies, but a second loan had been refused by the United States. On
May 24, 1919. a day before the time set for signature, Italy had cancelled
a treaty for a 6o,ooo,ooo lire loan for raw materials. Later negotiations
of Rasin with Switzerland and of the Bank of Praha for a 25,000,000
franc loan in France also failed. Cf. Piot, op. cit., p. 131; or Chanal,
op. cit., pp. 97-99·
25 Excluding the army, salaries increased, between January, 1919, and
January, 1920, from 1,939,000,000 crowns to 3.445,000,000 crowns and
equipment from I,147,ooo,ooo crowns to 3,336,000,000 crowns. Cf. Rasin,
op. cit.,'p. 88; Piot, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
as After the first Uberty Loan, they had attempted to meet the deficit
by two subsequent loans, late in 1919 and early in 1920, which were only
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 71
Germans failed to subscribe. In the crisis that followed,
public confidence could be restored only by a financial expert.
In the spring of 1920, a man of the hour was found in
the person of Englis, Professor of Economics at the University
of Brno (Briinn), whose services in stabilizing the
crown have never received the recognition they deserve.
The financial situation was desperate : to all appearances both
prices and the rates of exchange had failed to respond
favorably to either the absence of inflation or the process of
deflation, but had been influenced unfavorably by the many
uncertainties that still existed in Czechoslovakia's financial
situation. The chief difficulty lay in the fact that the total
amount of Czechoslovakia's indebtedness had not been, and
perhaps, at the time could not be, determined with exactitude.
Its chief items included a foreign debt of 9.988,004,000
crowns, a domestic. debt of 4,58o,oso,ooo crowns, reparations
costs of 9.750,ooo,ooo crowns and 6,4J3,02o,ooo
crowns which represented Czechoslovakia's share of the
Austro-Hungarian pre-war debt. The Conference· of
Brussels, in October, 1920, estimated Czechoslovakia's debt
at thirty-five billion crowns, but EngliS, early in 1921,
thought forty billion crowns a closer estimate.27
At the time of the appointment of EngliS to the Ministry
of Finance, the two chief financial problems concerned a
fourth domestic loan and the war bonds. Public opinion was
divided. Rasin opposed the honoring of the war bonds on
the ground that the Treaty of St. Germain had absolved the
Succession States from such burdens. On the other hand,
Englis felt that future domestic loans would obtain no
support from the racial minorities, particularly from the
wealthy Germans, as their indifference to the recent loan had
partially successful in that they produced about half of the total of the
first loan.
21 Rasin, ofJ. cit., p. 121; Piot, op. cit., pp. tSJ-184.
FOREIGli'POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
indicated, unless some concessions were granted to the
holders of the war bonds. He considered the two financial
problems inextricably linked together, and the only adequate
solution a compromise. His compromise measure, adopted
on June 24, 1920, provided that, for each war bond of a
nominal value of 100 crowns and an additional 75 crowns in
cash, the ·.bearer was to receive bonds worth 150 crowns in
the new loan.28
Since the Austrian crown was being quoted
at about one-fifth of the value of the Czechoslovak crown by
the rates of exchange prevalent during the period assigned
for .this operation, Augrist 2-December 15, 1920, this
measure meant that Czechoslovakia was presenting the holders
of the war bonds with a substantial gift. The transaction
'also risked increasing materially the already enormous public
indebtedness, since about 4.400,ooo,ooo crowns · of the
appro;Ximately 6,ooo,ooo,ooo crowns of war bonds that had
been issued originally in Czechoslovak territories were still
outstanding. Regardless of the financial merits or demerits
of Englis' compromise, which produced a yield of approximately
soo,ooo,ooo crowns, a sum greatly needed to finance
the Republic until the budget could be balanced, and which
resulted in about 2,ooo,ooo,ooo crowns of the war bonds
being turned in, its success as a conciliatory measure was
questionable : many of the Czechoslovaks resented the granting
of concessions of such magn'itude to their former foes,
2 1! Republika Ceskoslovenska, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisno;isecki
spr&ey o schusich Poslanecke SnimD'Vn:y N6rodnfho Shrotndidem Republiky
Ceskoslownski, 10 meeting, June 19, 1920, pp. 490 el seq.•
I session; Republika Ceskoslovenska, Senat, Tisno;isecki spr/t.vJ o
schAskh Seftlitu Ndrodniho Shrom6idin4 Republiky Ceskoslownskl,
to meeting, June 24, 1920, pp. 394 et seq., I session. Henceforth, these
documents will be referred to as Zpraey (Postanecki Snemovna) and
(Senat) respectively. Similarly, another set of documents will be referred
to as Tfsky.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 73
whereas many Germans still remained dissatisfied and refused
to consider the question of the war bonds solved.lUI .Czechoslovakia
also had Englis to thank for her budget of
1921, the first that was nearly balanced-at appro;amately
eighteen billion crowns. In spite of the extraordinary expenses
necessitated by the mobilization of October, 1921,
against the attempted return to power in ·Hungary of the
ex-King Charles,30
this long-sought-for financial equilibrium
had been brought about through an increase in taxation and
by means of a new and drastic financial law whereby all expenditures
of the various ministries above the original budget
estimates were to be allowed only by special permission from
parliament.111
The status of financial equilibrium was of brief duration.
The budget of 1922 produced another deficit, totalling g88,ooo,ooo
crowns, which was caused primarily by the inclusion
in the budget of the hitherto uncovered deficits of the
provincial administrations.42
Still another loan became
necessary if the printing of more paper money was to be
again avoided. Englis met the emergency, in the spring of
1922, by negotiating a foreign loan for 3,300,000 pounds
sterling and $14,000,000 at Amsterdam, London and New
York. The fact that a foreign loan could be negotiated was
owing to the increased confidence felt abroad because of
Czechoslovakia's efficient mobilization and favorable trade
balance of 4,877,ooo,ooo crowns in 1921. Nevertheless, the
terms were severe: the interest rate was set at 8.3 percent;
• Englis, K., "Government Finance", in Gruber, op. cit., p. 195;
Piot, op. cit., pp. 185-186; Dumont-Wilden, L., "Les Difficultes interieures
de Ia Tchecoslovaquie", Revue politique et Uttlroire, vol. lix, pp. 156-159.
ao For full details, cf. infra, pp. 184 el seq.
81 For additional details, c/. Englis, loc. cit., p. 195 or Chanal, op. cit..
pp. 104-118.
811 C/. Englis, loc. cit., p. 1¢.
74 FORElGN POLlCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
as security, Czechoslovakia was compelled to pledge the receipts
from her customs and tobacco monopoly; and the
League of Nations was entrusted with protecting the
interests of her creditors.38
Meanwhile, the exigencies of domestic politics again
changed the financial policy of the state. The Petka (Quintumvirate),
a coalition of five political parties which had
been formed late in 1920 upon the basis of mutual concessions
and which had become, subsequently, the dominant
political bloc, gained actual power on October 5, 1922. By
this move, Rasin became Minister of Finance for the second
time, after an interval of more than three years. Immediately
there arose rumors that the crown would rise to its
par value. In view of Rasin's open hostility to the great
industries, he was accused of seeking to bring about their
ruin by a policy of speedy deflation.u While protesting
against the veracity of such rumors, he refused the chief
request of his critics, a reduction of the tariff, for the reason_
that the state could not afford to reduce radically its revenues.
He admitted that Czechoslovakia could not thrive upon isolation
and deplored the existence of an excessive economic
nationalism. Constructively, he advocated a merging of the
financial and economic foreign policies, particularly the
negotiation of new commercial treaties abroad and the enforcement
of strict economy at home. Of these suggestions,
he was able to enforce immediately economy in domestic·
expenditures; but, despite an increase of 688 percent in
88 Official Journal, August, 1922, pp. IOOO-IOOI; Z[J-r6vy (Poslanecki
Snemovna), IJI meeting, March 29, 1922, pp. 25 et seq., S session; Piot,
op. cit., pp. 2oo-202; cf. also, Pasvolsky, o/J. cit., p. 264, for Englis' own
statement concerning foreign loans and how they should be spent.
a~ For full details, cf. the various Praha newspapers during October,
1922, particularly the attacks inspired, to all appearances, by the German
industrialists in the German newspapers, such as the Prager Abendblatt,
Prager Presse and. Prager Tagblatt.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 75
revenues since the first year of independence, and in spite of
every economy, there still remained, for 1923, a deficit of
566,ooo,ooo crowns. The chief items that contributed to this
result were a reduction of 8oo,ooo,ooo crowns of revenue
because of a lower duty on coal and because of an ad valorem
tariff reduction, concessions which he had granted despite
his opposition to a general tariff reduction; and an increase
of 711,ooo,ooo crowns in interest payments because of the
recent foreign loan. Finally, Rasin recognized the war bonds
at the liberal rate of seventy-five percent, on condition that
the holders subscribe to the fourth liberty loan which was
being quoted at eighty-one at Amsterdam. In this last
move, he was bound by the promises of Englis, but, throughout
his operations, he fostered a world-wide and ever growing
confidence in the financial stability of Czechoslovakia.85
In the actual course of events, it was discovered that
Rasin's original plans could not be followed in every detail.
Though his successors had continued his policy for a graduated
deflation and had avoided inflation, circumstances
beyond their control had prevented any deflation sufficiently
rapid to permit revaluation of the crown at its pre-war value.
Consequently, the immediate restoration of parity had been
abandoned tacitly in favor of definite stabilization at a lower
figure. During the latter half of 1922, there developed a
rapid increase in the value of the crown, owing largely to
artificial circumstances, followed by rumors that stabilization
could not be maintained. A " flight from the crown "
produced abnormal speculation in foreign exchange, but this
tendency was halted by drastic measures of the government,
before the value of the crown was once more reduced. The
Bll Piot, op. cit., pp. 229-236; Chanal, op. cit., pp. lSI-154; for summaries
of the discussions in the Chamber of Deputies on October 31, 1922, on
Rasin's projected financial measures, r/. Narod"'t Polilika or Narodnl
Lists, of November I, 1922 (each twice daily).
76 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-19S5
crown was stabilized at $.03 (.0296375). The time for
permanent stabilization and for. parity had not yet arrived.
Such a step would necessitate first a " return to normalcy "
in Central Europe and a settlement of the debt in notes that
Czechoslovakia had inherited. Her claims against the Bank
of Austria-Hungary for notes, bonds and current accounts
totalled I0,097,000,000 crowns, the actual value of which
was doubtful.86
Ciechoslovakia acquired prestige because of her relative
financial soundness amid general Central European instability.·
As the result of a severe business depression, her
success seemed to be obtained at the cost of prosperity, yet
even prosperity was destined to return when foreign trade
recovered from its temporary decline. The chief credit for
the inauguration and successful completion of the program
of financial independence and stabilization was owing to
Rasin, who, in his hour of triumph, was shot on January 5,
1923, by a young anarchist, Soupal, because he had reduced
wages generally. At first hopes were held for his recovery,
but he died on February 17.87
Rasin's martyr's death enhanced
his already great fame; patriotic Czechoslovaks felt
convinced that other states, with equally able leadership,
might also have attained financial stability as early as
Czechoslovakia.88
Economic Bolicy
The second grand division of Czechoslovakia's extensive
program of domestic stabilization revolved around the
formulation and maintenance of constructive domestic and
foreign economic policies. Primarily an industrial country,
se Pasvolsky, op. cit., pP. 208-215; Piot, o'fl. cit., pp. 237-241; Englis,
loc. cit., p. Ig8.
81 Pasvolsky, op. cit., pp. 215-217; Piot, op. cit., pp. 249-253.
88 For evaluations of Rasin, cf. Le Temps, January II, 1923 and ZtrM/7
(Senat), ISO meeting, February 21, 1923, pp. 1040 ef seq., 6 session.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATIOh 77
she realized the vital significance, to her trade, of the economic
changes created by the War. Although her territories,
except for certain regions in the Carpathians and for
Slovakia in 1919, had not been the scenes of actual warfare
and had escaped more or less systematic devastation, they
had, nevertheless, been greatly impoverished by the repeated
requisitions of both Austrians and Magyars. As a result,
the end of the War witnessed a great shortage of all raw
materials--of leather, textiles, minerals, fuels, fats, foodstuffs,
domestic animals and even of natural fertilizers. The
scarcity of the last had caused her soil to lose much of its
productivity. ·
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia was fortunate both in the
extent and in the diversity of her resources; within her
borders there existed an abundance of the wealth necessary .
to establish and maintain a stable and prosperous state. Her
territories had produced 16.1 percent of the wheat, 39 percent
of the rye, 47.1 percent of the barley, 37·5 percent of
the oats, 37·4 percent of the potatoes, 26 percent of the beef
and 18 percent of the pork of the defunct Empire-King-
dom.89
She had also inherited the lion's share of the Dual
Monarchy's industries: 95 percent of the malt factories, 92
percent of the sugar factories, 90 percent of the glass industry,
So percent of the building and ceramic industries, 75
percent of the chemical industry, 70 percent of the leather
and paper industries, 65 percent of the breweries, 50 percent
of the liquor industry and most of the textile industry.40
Her forests (33.16 percent of her area),u her abundance of
89 Piot, ofJ. cit., p. 38; Pasvolsky, ofJ. cit., p. 36; cf. also, Brdlik, V.,
"Agriculture", in Gruber, op. cit., pp. 12-32.
.o Piot, op. cit., p. 38; Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. J6; cf. also, Franzl, K.,
"Industries" in Gruber, o/1. cit., pp. 89-109.
n Cf. Siman, K., "Forestry", in Gruber, op. cit., pp. 33-42.
78 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
water power 42
and her mineral resources, particularly her
coal/8
represented other enormous sources of national
wealth that awaited only further development.
While the Czechoslovaks were duly appreciative of the
potential wealth of their country, they were also aware of the
economic problems that confronted them because of the fact
that their new state comprised only 140,485 square kilometers
(54,241 square miles) and contained only 13,613,172
people, according to the census of February 15, 1921, or,
respectively, 22 percent of the area and 26 percent of the
population of the former Austria-Hungary." Their whole
foreign economic policy had to be based upon the fact that
such a relatively small proportion of the area and population
of the former Empire-Kingdom had inherited the great
majority of the industrial plants. The excess of production
over domestic consumption would insure an eventual favorable
'balance of trade and an influx of gold which would
improve the financial situation, but such results could be
accomplished only after all Central Europe had been stabilized
and had established commercial contacts with Czechoslovakia.
The new international boundaries that had been
created by the War within the former Dual-Monarchy represented,
to Czechoslovakia, just so many barriers that her
trade would have to surmount. If she were to utilize the
industrial equipment that the several preceding decades had,.
created within her borders, she would have to become an
importer of raw materials, an exporter of manufactured
goods, and, primarily, an industrial state whose prosperity
would be dependent upon foreign trade. Under the stimulus
4ll Cf. Zimmler, E., "Water Power", in Gruber, op. cit., pp. 76-88.
411 Cj. Peters, J., "Coal", in Gruber, op. cit., pp. 67-75.
"Cj. Bohac, A., "Population", in Gruber, op. cit., pp. I-II; also,
Resultat.s preliminaire.s du recensement de la population du I5 fevrler,
I92I (Prague, 1921).
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
79
of such conditions, Czechoslovakia, whether motivated solely
by clearly defined self-interest or also by a measure of
altruism, felt herself destined to become the balance-wheel
that was to stabilize Central Europe.
It was no easy task to put into effect so _enlightened a
foreign economic policy, one that would dove-tail so perfectly
with Benes' conception of what the ~cope of Czechoslovakia's
entire foreign policy should be. Since the attainment
of independence, many Czechoslovaks had aspired to
realize their pre-war dream of a Republic that would be
entirely independent in every respect, not only politically, but
financially and economically. The same spirit that had won
political, and later, financial independence, :was introduced
too far into the economic sphere; clear-cut economic facts
were obscured by political and racial issues and prejudices.
There arose, domestically, a struggle in which the politically
dominant but economically weak Czechoslovaks sought to
wrest economic supremacy from the Germans. This same
struggle was carried over into the question of a foreigneconomic
policy: fear of a restoration of the economic power of
Vienna demanded a policy of economic nationalism that
tended towards isolation. So bitter was the feeling that, as
has already been indicated, Rasin himself had been accused,
falsely, of deliberate plotting to ruin German industrialists
by means of his monetary policy. To all appearances, the
majority of the Czechoslovaks failed to appreciate clearly
the contradiction between the internationalist policy apparently
demanded by Czechoslovakia's economic position and
the policy of isolation dictated by economic nationalism.45
The day of the attainment of independence, October 28,
1918, had witnessed the inauguration of a provisional system
of strict control of all imports and exports, a step deemed
u Cj. Rist, op. cit., p. 109; Chanal, op. cit., pp. 132-138; Pasvolsky,
op. cit., pp. 265-266.
So FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
necessary because of the scarcity of all the necessities of life.
On November 22, 1918, this function was assumed by the
Czechoslovak Import and Export Commission, which, as a
branch of the Ministry of Commerce, issued special permits
regulating foreign trade. Precautions were taken to reduce
exports temporarily; for instance, only limited amounts of
coal and manufactured goods, and no foodstuffs nor raw
materials, were allowed to leave the country. The motive
for such drastic procedure was to' assure the Czechoslovaks
against any unnecessary hardships caused by insufficient
supplies, but, regardless of its justification at the time, it
served as a beginning for a policy of economic nationalism.46
Similarly, in order to create the smallest possible adverse
trade balance, the Commission forbade the importation of all
luxuries and goods that were obtainable in local markets.
Further coordination between Czechoslovakia's financial and
economic policies was assured by the creation of a Central
Exchange Bureau which was to receive from the exporters
all their foreign currency which was reassigned, by special
permits, to the purchase of other necessities. In this manner
not only was foreign trade regulated, but tl;le financial status
of the state was rendered more secure.47
The law of February. 20, 1919, established independent
customs duties for Czechoslovakia to replace the old AustroHungarian
rates which had been effective until that date. In,.
view of the indeterminate status of the frontiers at the time,
the former customs frontier was retained against Germany,
and a new line, based upon the probable territorial decisions
of the Peace Conference, was established gradually against
Austria, Hungary and Poland. While new customs frontiers
were drawn within the former Dual Monarchy, the old
46 Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. 27'5; cf. also, Peroutka, F., " The Commercial
Policy and the Tariff", in Gruber, op. cit., p. 128.
4T Peroutka, loc. cit., p. 129.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 81
organization and mef:hods were preserved. The initial rates
were .based on the Austro-Hungarian tariff of 1906, but, in
an emergency, the Minister of Finance, with the consent of
the Ministers of Agriculture and Commerce, might temporarily
reduce or abolish duties on certain necessities. Subsequently,
animal products, cattle, fats, flour, grain, seeds and
various raw materials were placed upon the free list, but
pre-war rates were continued for semi-manufactured goods,
whereas surtaxes of 200 and 220 percent were imposed, respectively,
upon all other products and luxuries. Because
of the fact that the currency was far below par, and because
the duties were specific, the tariff was, in reality, lower than
the pre-war one.u
Procedure was modified further by the law of February
26, 1919, whereby some of the powers of the Commission
were assigned to industrial syndicates in order that domestic
industry and trade might enjoy a measure of economic independence
free from governmental paternalism. In practice,
this step led to unfair discriminations. The law of June 24,
1920, deprived the syndicates of these powers which were
granted to a Foreign Trade Bureau that resumed the earlier
license system by revising the system of permits, by issuing
lists of goods that might be exported freely, by liberalizing
the regulations for imports and by continuing to cooperate in
controlling foreign currency.49
Throughout the year 1919, Czechoslovakia encountered
many obstacles to her foreign trade. Trieste was the sole outlet
by sea until May, when Germany allowed transit privileges
by way of the Elbe, according to Article 339 of the Treaty
of Versailles. Until then, the proceeds of the liquidation of
Czechoslovakia's war materials in France were applied to the
"Ibid., pp. 127-128.
4& Ibid., pp. 129-IJO; Zprlfvy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 8 meeting, June
16, 1920, pp. 372 et seq., 1 session.
82 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
purchase, in Italy, of the first raw materials and semi-manufactured
products that were imported into Czechoslovakia to
relieve the needs of her textile industry.. Throughout the
Republic, trade was hampered by a shortage of freight cars.
This shortage was relieved by a more efficient organization
and by special privileges on Rumanian and Yugoslav railroads,
which, after the ratification of the Treaty of St.
Germain, became new outlets for goods that had formerly
been exported via Hamburg. The best outlet-the Danube
-required development of its facilities. The natural advantages
of Czechoslovakia's leading port, Bratislava, could
not be utilized until after July, 1920, when 228,5oo,ooo
crowns were allowed for the construction of a new harbor.
Czechoslovakia's eagerness to develop new commercial contacts
was again made manifest by her participation, in
August, 1920, in the fair at Lyons. Subsequently, she held
her own first fairs at Praha and Bratislava.50
As conditions within Czechoslovakia had begun to change,
there evolved gradually a less extreme economic foreign
policy. It came to be realized that the newly-won political
and financial independence could be maintained without
creating a state that was economically self-sufficient. Complete
economic independence was an impossibility. Much
more advantageous would be a condition of economic interdependence
which would enable Czechoslovakia to reap the
maximum advantage from her-: highly organized industrial
system. In the course of this economic evolution, there
came to light psychological as well as purely economic
factors. A vital necessity of the political situation was a
so-called " Western orientation ", if independence was to be
safeguarded.51
At the same time, the financial situation
demanded a similar policy-Czechoslovakia felt herself com·u
Peroutka, F., "Foreign Trade", in Gruber, op. cit., p. 120.
51 For full details, cf. infra, pp. g8, 100 et seq., 129 et seq.
DOMESTIC STABIL!ZATION
pelled to seek markets whose purchasing power was based
upon a more stable currency than was. that of her own
immediate neighbors. As a consequence, her trade had to
adapt itself to world conditions and markets, and her competitive
position in this trade became a matter of vital
concern.5
2
Within Czechoslovakia there had developed two conflicting
viewpoints concerning the question of industrialization:
whether it would be best to curtail manufacturing and
develop agriculture, or maintain and even expand her industrial
activities.68
The dense population, particularly in
the western portions of the Republic, rendered any curtailment
of manufacturing possible only at the cost of aggravating
the already pressing problem of unemployment,
whereas it was doubtful if agriculture could be expanded
considerably. The problem was rendered more acute by the
fact that Danubian areas, formerly within the Empire-Kingdom,
were now world markets. Because of the great postwar
growth of manufacturing in these formerly distinctly
agricultural regions, the difficulty of retaining even her
former domestic markets was enhanced for Czechoslovakia.
Some reorganization of her industrial system became imperative.
The ultimate solution was a compromise whereby she
reduced those industries which encountered the strongest
international rivalry and expanded those in which competition
was.less keen.u
Up to 1920, Czechoslovakia had followed a negative
foreign economic policy: she had not attempted to increase
her exports. Her supplies had been so depleted by the War
that she desired no further drain upon her resources. The
as Cf. Chanal, op. cit., pp. 1,38-I,¢.
68 Cf. Pasvolsky, op. dt., pp. 268-269u
Ibid., pp. 271-273.
84 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
resulting near-balance between imports and exports might
be maintained by a purely agricultural country, but not by
a primarily industrial one; however wise such a policy might
have been immediately after the attainment of independence,
it could not be continued long without inviting economic
disaster. This fact was appreciated by Hotowetz, the
Minister of Foreign Trade, again one whose services have
not been properly appreciated. Hotowetz wished to remove
all restraints upon production and trade and encourage
the greatest possible development of industry. To this end,
he had helped to create the Foreign Trade Bureau and to
publish a free list on July 27, 1920.
55
Thanks to his efforts,
Czechoslovakia became converted to a more liberal foreign
economic policy.
In her system of trade restrictions, Czechoslovakia's initial
device-special import and export licenses-had been supplemented
by a series of tariffs which became increasingly prohibitive.
After several revisions during 1920 and 1921, the
tariff law of May 21, 1921, the most drastic to date, created
a system of surtaxes after the fashion of the post-war tariff
of France. The basic or nominal rate was multiplied by
varying coefficients that had been predetermined: for instance,
the coefficients for luxuries and specially protected
articles ranged from ten to sixteen; for manufactured goods
and articles with lower protective rates, seven; and for goods
whose importation was favor;d, one to five. Later in the
year, because of the rapid depreciation of the German mark,
even this tariff was deemed an insufficient protection against
German competition. A new tariff, passed on December 18,
I921, and enforced from January 1, 1922, increased the
55 Piot, op. cit., pp. 168-.174; cf. also, Cisar, J. and Pokorny, F.
(Comps.), The Czechoslovak Republic (London, 1922), pp. 167-171;
Caldwell, R. J., The Economic Situation. in. CzechoslO'Uakia in. I920
(Washington, 1921).
DOMESTIC STABIUZATION
coefficients for manufactured goods between ten to fifteen
and for specially protected goods between twenty to thirty.
This revision, coupled with the rapid appreciation of the
crown during the early part of 1922, doubled, and, in some
instances, even trebled the pre-war rates.66
Although the initial motive for Czechoslovakia's elaborate
trade restrictions had been the need for a temporary conservation
of her essential commodities and for a temporary
check upon the importation of non-essentials, later developments
demonstrated other possible advantages that might be
derived from this system. It became a powerful protector
of the currency and was continued because of its valuable
services in furthering financial stabilization. By 1921, its
value became still more marked as a " bargaining " possibility
in the negotiation of commercial treaties. In view of
these advantages and because of the intense feeling of economic
nationalism then prevalent, Hotowetz appreciated the
difficulties that confronted any attempted abolition of such a
system, but he realized that, surrounded by unstable currencies,
Czechoslovakia dared not rely upon customs duties
alone for sufficient economic and financial protection. He
deemed a " Western orientation " abnormal economically
and considered the· Succession States Czechoslovakia's
natural customers. To develop better commercial relations
with these neighbors, he invited Austria, Hungary and the
other four Succession States to a conference at Bratislava
in December, 1920, but the project failed because of a lack
of interest in the other states. In spite of this failure,
Czechoslovakia, as she came to perfect her tariff system,
abandoned gradually some of her restrictions on foreign
trade. Although she still retained her license system on
some commodities, a practice which caused her considerable
u Peroutka, "The Commercial Policy and the Tariff", loc. cit., pp.
IJS-IJ6; Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. 277.
86 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
embarrassment in negotiating commercial treaties, by 1921
she had turned definitely towards economic freedom by
abolishing the central controlling agencies ·for products such
as alcohol, meat, sugar, etc.67
In the meantime, the post-war industrial boom had run
its course in Czechoslovakia and was succeeded by a period
of depression which enhanced the need for foreign markets.5
8
The industrial situation that resulted was largely responsible
for hastening the adoption of the new policy of industrial
freedom. When the " Western orientation " failed to produce
the anticipated economic results, Czechoslovakia was
compelled to turn again to the markets of Central Europe.
She could cover her domestic needs with from thirty to
thirty-five per cent of her industrial output and the surplus
had to be exported. At the same time, little provision had
been made for hard times: financial deflation and the heavy
taxes necessary to reduce the annual deficits of the early
years had created an unhealthy economic situation. There
were 329 bankruptcies in 1921 and 26g8 in the following
year. This lesson of the evils resulting from a lack of
proper economic outlets was costly, but was well remembered,
even amid great economic distress. Much consolation
was derived from the fact that the larger agricultural industries,
particularly sugar, thanks to cheap labor and to raw
materials close at hand, continued to thrive.69
,.
61 ZPraey (Poslanecka Snemovna), 30 meeting, December 3, 1920, pp.
1049 et seq., 3 session; cf. also, Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. 276; Piot, op. cit.,
p, 18o; Chanal, op. cit., pp. 157-159.
68 It is beyond the scope of this work to furnish statistics on the foreign
trade of Czechoslovakia. The best source for such information is
Mesicm prehleo zahranilniho obchodu (Monthly survey of foreign
trade) published monthly at Praha by the Government Statistical Office.
59 For detailed accounts of the economic trend within Czechoslovakia,
I92o-'192J, cf. Lockhart, R. H. B., "Central Europe and Czechoslovakia",
Edinburgh Review, vol. ccxxxvii~ pp. 209-229; Mildschuh, loc. cit., pp.
179-191; Chanal, op. cit., pp. 182-216.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 8]
After her conversion to the doctrine of economic freedom
through the influence of Hotowetz and of the depression,
Czechoslovakia pursued ardently a policy of economic cooperation
with her neighbors, and, despite the lack of adequate
support for this ideal from the other Succession
States,80
continued independently along the course she had
charted for ·herself. Although confronted by the conflicting
necessities of protecting her domestic industries, of stimulating
her exports, and of maintaining some system of trade
control as long as it was maintained by her neighbors, she
abolished the Foreign Trade Bureau on January 19, 1922,
and transferred its powers, which were also greatly reduced,
to the Ministry of Commerce. On September 9, 1922, there
followed a tariff revision that reduced the coefficients, in
many instances by as much as one-fourth. In this manner
Czechoslovakia set the example for an economic · foreign
policy contrary to the highly nationalistic tendencies that
were prevalent throughout Central Europe.61
There remained for Czechoslovakia the necessity of rendering
effective her new foreign economic policy by the conclusion
of a series of commercial treaties. By this means
she hoped not only to recover Bohemia's pre-war position
in world markets, but to establish upon a secure and permanent
basis a still greater volume of foreign trade. Immediately
after the armistice, the artificial barriers to trade seemed
insurmountable. There arose on every hand mutual prohibitions
and state control of commerce. The trade of
Czechoslovakia suffered when Austria applied against her
the tariff of 190() and gave Germany a better rate, when
Italy prohibited the importation of glass-ware, and Great
so For full details of Czechoslovakia's efforts to obtain the cooperation
of the other Succession States in stabilizing Central Europe. cf.
infra, pp. 18g et seq.
111 Peroutka, we. cit., PP. I35-IJ7.
88 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Britain prohibited the importation of hops. As a result of
such restrictions and because of the unstab~e conditions that
prevailed throughout Central Europe, the region where in
normal times Czechoslovakia found her chief markets, no one
desired any long-term commitments. Therefore, Czechoslovakia's
early commercial treaties, particularly those negotiated
between 1919 and 1921, were not only temporary in
character and binding for brief periods of time, but were
characterized by more or less reciprocal " quotas ", based
upon the transfer of stated amounts of specified commodities.
Although such treaties soon proved inadequate, they only
gradually assumed the form of ordinary commercial treaties.
Czechoslovakia did not begin to negotiate treaties for the
adjustment of tariffs until 1923, until which date her tariff
remained autonomous and the most-favored-nation clauses
of her early treaties inoperative. The reasons why the negotiations
for mutual adjustment of tariff rates were so long
delayed were obvious. The tariff rates of Germany, Austria,
Hungary and Poland were even less stable than those of
Czechoslovakia because of fluctuations in their currencies.
France and Italy were interested primarily in import permits.
Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark and Holland desired to
retain their own respective tariffs, which they saw no reason
for surrendering without equal advantages in return.62
The
drive for tariff agreements, which was inaugurated during
the struggle for domestic stabilization, 1918-1923, became
involved also with so many non-economic Central European
problems that, at first, it was relatively easier to reach agreements
with more remote states. Czechoslovakia realized
that time was required to enlarge her commercial horizon
and persevered in her efforts to create a comprehensive
63
Ibid., pp. 134-135; Chanal, op. cit., pp. 159-164.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
system of commercial treaties even after her economic stabilization
had been attained.88
Social Reform
The third major aspect of the struggle for d.omestic stabilization
concerned social reform. The abnormal conditions
prevalent throughout Europe at the time pf the establishment
of the Czechoslovak Republic had been reflected in
wages, prices, unemployment and general social distress.
The ensuing misery had been aggravated by an inheritance
of social evils and inequalities from the defunct EmpireKingdom:
of such questions, that of land reform was the
most urgent. The general let-down which follows every
post-war period became marked: the exhaustion and misery
of the masses, the increase in materialism, and the weakening
of moral ties had prepared the way for a favorable
reception of the revolutionary doctrines emanating from
Russia. To Czechoslovakia, the question of furthering her
domestic stabilization through a comprehensive policy of
social reform became merged with the more elusive problem
of combating Bolshevism within her own borders.
The intense nationalism of Czechoslovak labor prevented
the communist agitators from making much headway in
trying.to further their extreme demands. Nevertheless, the
influence of the Russian social revolution was felt keenly,
even if· it did lack sufficient force to shatter the economic
foundations of the Republic. The preaching of Bolshevism
BB In a work of this scope it is impossible for the writer to analyze in
detail every commercial treaty negotiated by Czechoslovakia. The most
important ones, those that played conspicuous parts in Czechoslovakia's
general foreign policy, will be discussed in detail subsequently in their
proper setting. The best single collection of complete texts of these
treaties, up to 1928, is Obchodnf smlouvy mezistatnE, 3 vols., edited by
J. Dvoracek and Z. Konecny. A complete series of texts will be found.
of course, in the League of Nations Treaty Series. Cf. also, infra, pp.
247-248.
90 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
complicated relations with Russia,64
and, to some extent
perhaps, weakened the spirit of domestic enterprise, but
failed to check domestic consolidation. · Czechoslovakia
adopted a comprehensive scheme of social reform both as
a form of domestic insurance against the outbreak of Bolshevism
and as a solution for one major phase of her
problem of domestic stabilization. Since this program concerned
primarily Czechoslovakia's domestic rather than her
foreign policy, the scope of this work permits merely a
mention of the various laws, such as the eight-hour-day law
for labor; state aid to demobilized soldiers, war invalids,
unemployed, poor, widows and orphans; sickness and accident
insurance; the housing reform; the creation of local
miners' and of factory councils; the regulation of work
in home industries; a property tax; public works ; and
agrarian reform.65
The great majority of these laws were
in effect by 1921, but the program they initiated is far from
being completely realized even at this writing; however, it
was a potent factor in helping bring about the stabilization
of the Republic during the early years of its existence, and,
added to from time to time, it continued to remain a weapon
against the efforts of both Bolsheviks and Fascists.
Land reform, one of the major items of the new social
policy, assumed an international aspect when it involved the
break-up of large estates formerl;r belonging to the Crown.
It became a factor in .the general question of the post-war
64 For full details of Czechoslovak-Russian relations, cf. infra, pp.
II3 et seq.
65 The best account, in English, of this labor and social legislation is
to be found in a compilation of articles by leading Czechoslovak government
ministers, professors and business men in Gruber, op. cit., particularly
"Land Reform", by A. Pavel, pp. 43-66; "Labor Legislatiolll", by
E. Stern, pp. 201-209; "Social Welfare Policy as Shown in the Assistance
to the Unemployed, the Care of the War Sufferers and Social Insurance",
by J. Brabec, pp. 21o-2I9; "Child Welfare", by J. JanovskY,
pp. 22o-226; "The Housing Question", by H. Kubista, pp. 227-238; and
"Crime", by A. MiriCka, pp. 239-248.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 91
financial settlement, ·which has already been discussed: but
it .also developed into a religious question when it concerned
the property of the Catholic Church. Consequently,
the question of land reform became involved in the fourth
major phase of Czechoslovakia's domestic stabilization, the
adoption of a definite religious policy.88
Religious Policy
Within Czechoslovak lands, the Protestant minority had
regarded opposition to the Catholic Church as a national
heritage from Hussite days. This feeling had been strengthened
by the Concordat of 1855 between Emperor Francis
Joseph and Pope Pius IX, whereby it had been decreed that
the State should preserve the Roman Catholic religion," with
all its rights and prerogatives according to God's order and
the Church's laws". Thereby the Church had been granted
control over all matters pertaining to marriage, morals and
education. Such action on the part of the government, at
a time when the Czechs were in the midst of their nationalistic
revival, was considered by such leaders as Havlicek,
Rieger, Safarik, and by the historians, Palacky and Tomek,
as a State-Church conspiracy to destroy Czech nationalism.87
During the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the
apparent alliance between the Catholic Church and the
Austro-Hungarian government continued to grow more and
more distasteful even to those Catholics who were also patriotic
Czechs. Throughout the lands of the Bohemian Crown
88 C/. Kfovik, R, Vilny uk~zovatel k ztikonu a naiizenim o pozemkovl
re/orme (Praha, 1922) ; c/. also, Kueera, B., "Ceskoslovenski pozemkov&
reforma s blediska mezinarodniho prava ", Zahranicnl Politika, vol. iii,
pp. 444-454-
6'1' It was perhaps natural for the leaders of the nationalistic revival to
bold such opinions, since they were Protestants, and since their movement
was receiving practically no support from the Catholics. Cf.
Liscovi, Mrs. M., The Religious Situatio,. i,. Csechoslovakks (Prague,
1925). p. 32.
92 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
there became more widespread the belief that the Catholic
Church, in its desire to strengthen a loyal Great Power,
opposed the various nationalistic movements· that sought to
disrupt the Dual Monarchy. Masaryk had come to hold
such a belief early in life; although born of Catholic parents,
he had soon left the Church, and, at one time,.had considered
seriously studying for the Protestant ministry. Throughout
his whole career, his opposition to Catholicism had never
wavered, a fact that had been attested by his consistent attitude
in old Austria, and even by his inauguration of the
campaign for Czechoslovak independence at Geneva on July
6, 1915, the semi-millennia} anniversary of the death of John
Hus.68
During the course of the War, as the Czechoslovaks
came to accept Masaryk's viewpoint on the question of independence,
an increasingly influential minority also came to
accept his religious conclusions. These facts explained
Masaryk's lack of popularity with the Clericals even after he
became President. Anti-Catholic sentiment became so violent
that, in the course of the Czechoslovak revolution, a
Praha mob, on November 3, 1918, destroyed many Catholic
monuments and forced the prince bishop to take refuge
abroad.69
The attempted papal reconciliation of November
8 70
had little effect upon the anti-Clericals.
6!1 Masaryk, T. G., The Making of a State (New York, 1927), pp.
44-46; Svetova Revoluce, pp. 66-67.
69 The New York Times, November 4, 1918.
7o For the Pope's letter of November 8, 1918, to the Nuncio in Vienna,
which instructed the latter to enter into friendly relations with the
Succession States, cf. Arbeiter Zeitung, November 8, 1918; Loiseau, C.,
"The Vatican and the New States of Central Europe", New Europe,
September 25, 1919, pp. 241-247; or Buell, R L., "The Vatican and the
New World", Current History, vol. xvi, pp. 977-984- As a contrast to
the Czechoslovak viewpoint concerning the attitude of the Vatican, cf.
Ryan, J. H., "The Vatican's World Policy", Current History, vol. xvii.
pp. 429-438, which states that the Pope was neutral and suspended judgment
during the War; or Ausset, J., La Question Vaticane (Paris, 1!)28).
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION
93
Since most of the inhabitants of the Republic were Catholic,
and since many of the chief nationalist leaders were
Protestant or anti-Clerical, the religious problem centered in
the fact that the nationalistic intellectuals who had seized
power through the revolution represented the nationalism but
not the religion of the masses. After the attainment of independence,
there developed in Czechoslovakia strong Catholic
and anti-Catholic movements : the former demanding the
establishment of formal relations with the Vatican; and the
latter, the establishment of a new Czechoslovak National
Church which would embody the reform measures advocated
by the religious radicals. Friction was engendered between
the two groups, but both appeared to hesitate before precipitating
hostilities after the initial revolutionary ferment had
once subsided. Matters came to a crisis on December 25,
1919, when the radicals insisted that mass be celebrated in
Czech.71
In anger, the radical clerics, who had already
created a club of reforming priests, voted, on January 9,
1920, by 140 to 66 with 5 not voting, to effect a separation
from Rome and to create a Czechoslovak National Church.72
Thereupon, the Pope, on January 15, 1920, issued a bull of
excommunication against the radicals, condemning in particular
their proposal that Czechoslovak priests be released
from the obligation of celibacy.'~
3
The Papal Bull merely added fuel to theflames. For a
time a Hussite revival appeared imminent as the radicals continued
to gain ground. They called a national religious
meeting at Praha during the week of February 13, for the
purpose of either confirming the vote for separation from
the Church or for continued adherence conditional upon the
acceptance by the Church of specific reforms, such as a
n Prager Abendblatt, December 26, 1919.
n Ibid., January 9, 1920; Svorrwst, January 10, 1920.
'lB Prager Abendblatt, January 16, 1920; Svorrwst, February 2, 1920.
94 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
national liturgy, the election of bishops by their own clergymen,
the abolition of celibacy and the reversal of the sentence
upon Hus.74
The action of the radical~ received added
impetus from the fact that the government was known to
favor a division of the Church lands and the replacement of
German and Hungarian bishops and other high Church
officials by Czechoslovaks. Of the nearly· fourteen million
people in Czechoslovakia, over ten million were Catholics,
but, it appeared, many of them only nominally so,"5
hence the
radicals had high hopes of success. Although the result
failed to justify their anticipations, separation was confirmed.
The chief supporters of so radical a step were to be
found among the parish priests who had left the Church to
accept positions with the new government; from their
number, there was selected a committee of twelve to organize
the new Czechoslovak National Church. Throughout this
agitation, the chief argument of the radicals had been that a
separation from Rome would liberate Czechoslovakia from
the bonds of a foreign culture.76
The new Czechoslovak
National Church, which thus began with about 250,000
adherents, decreed a separation of Church and State and
approved both civil marriage and divorce. There remained
the question of the status of the new clergy : since the Catholic
Church refused to consecrate the new bishops, contacts
were established with the Serbian Orthodox bishops, by
whom the necessary ceremonies ;ere performed, thus theoretically,
according to the Catholic view, at least preserving
intact the line of apostolic succession from St. Peter.77
'~• Seton...Watson, R. W., "The Czechoslovak Republic", Contemporary
Review, vol. cxix, pp. 31o-321.
n The census of 192'1 listed I0,3&4,833 Catholics and 990,319 Protestants.
Cf. also, Liscovi, op. cit., pp. 36-6o, for statistics and descriptions
of the various religious groups within Czechoslovakia. This work represents
the viewpoint of a Protestant who attempts to be impartial.
Til Pravo Lidu, February 15, 1920.
'l'l' Stanoyevich, op. cit., p. 291.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 95
Regardless of whether any agreement upon a thoroughgoing
reform would have been possible, the separation from
Rome was precipitate. The Free Thinkers, perhaps the most
influential of the radical religious groups, prevented any real
compromise by alienating the extreme Clericals; and, whatever
might have been said in defense of such a policy within
Czech lands, its results in Slovakia were unfortunate. There,
to the already great problems of administration and reconstruction,78
was added that of religion. Even if the great
majority of the Slovak intellectuals were Protestants, and if
the verdict of history had been that the Catholic Slovaks had
had a Magyar orientation, the Free Thinkers were still in
error when they failed to recognize Father Andrew Hlinka,711
whose loyalty, suffering and services on behalf of the cause
of independence had merited high rewards. This neglect,
added to Hlinka's almost fanatical loyalty to the Catholic
Church and to the influence of Father JehliCka, an alleged
agent of Hungary, so embittered Hlinka that he undertook
a journey to Rome and Paris, under a forged Polish passport,
to plead for absolute Slovak" autonomy" from Czech rule.80
After the failure of this mission, Hlinka accepted his fate
and reaffirmed his loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic, but
his ill-advised journey had cost him considerable prestige.81
Both the Free Thinkers and the Clericals realized that
they had been too hasty: as a result, the moderates became
more influential within each group. Nevertheless, after the
Hlinka episode, friction between Church and State appeared
to increase rather than decrease. The government was
n Cf. PalickdJ, S. ]. and Broz, A., "Czechs and Slovaks at Odds",
Current History, voL xxii, pp. 784-788.
79 Cf. also .mpro, p. 23.
so Cf. Svonwst, October 25, 1919.
11 Young, R. F., "Czechs and Slovaks", Neu~ Statesman, vol. xiv,
PP· ISS-156.
')6 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
anxious to sever and the Church to retain that intimate
connection that had been their mutual heritage from prewar
days. Masaryk's opinion that a separation would
strengthen both failed to convince the opponents of such a
measure. The religious radicals were anxious to terminate
religious instruction in the schools which were still under a
large measure of Catholic influence. Similarly, they sought
to purge the Church from what they deemed excessive German
and Magyar influences. On the other hand the Clericals
opposed strenuously the application of agrarian reform
to the estates of the Church. Finally; after several minor
concessions on the part of the Vatican failed to have any
effect, the Pope, on September II, 1920, consented to the
separation of Church and State within Czechoslovakia, but
requested that the matter be not discussed in the legislature.82
This move of the Pope was timely in averting an immediate
religious crisis within Czechoslovakia, but was far from
representing a permanent solution of the many issues that
were at stake: it merely indicated the general conciliatory
trend of papal policy, and the many details still remained to
be determined. The government of the Republic was not,
at this time, in the mood to meet concession with concession.
During 1920, the various elements in the comprehensive
scheme of domestic stabilization were making marked progress
and the authorities had no intention of interfering with
the general program, certainly trot to the degree that would
have been necessary to effect a definitive religious compromise.
The main Catholic demand at the time-exemption
of Church lands from the policy of land reform-would
probably not have been granted. The government was aware
of the dangers inherent in the religious situation-that it
could ill-afford any undue friction with the Slovaks over
religion at a time when stabilization was the key to both the
82 The New York Times, September II, 19010.
DOMESTIC STABILIZATION 97
domestic and foreign policies of the state. Although the
vital points of the policy of domestic stabilization were maintained,
moderation became the . keynote of the religious
policy.83
During the first five years of the Czechoslovak
Republic, less was accomplished religiously than financially,
economically and socially.84
Nevertheless, in spite of the
absence of any definitive religious settlement,85
the success of
the drive for domestic stabilization in other aspects was so
successful that, certainly by 1923 if not earlier, Czechoslovakia
came to be regarded generally as the most stable state
in Central Europe.
sa Cf. Ridl, E., La Question religieuse en TcMcoslO'Ilaquie (Prague,
Ig22).
8' Cf. Anon., Piehled Cinnosti za prue petileti Republiky CeskoslO'IIenski
(Praba, 1923).
8s For full details regarding the religious settlement. cf. infra, pp.
249 et seq.
CHAPTER Ill
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 1
OBJECTIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY
CzECHOSLOVAKIA's policy of domestic stabilization during
thefirst five years of independence, 1918-1923, went hand in
hand with her foreign policy which aimed at the reconstruction
of Central Europe and the maintenance of friendly
relations with the Great Powers, particularly with the victors
of the World War. Nevertheless, during these early years,
Czechoslovakia hoped to remain free from their domination
and their feuds. In other words, she hoped to preserve her
diplomatic independence. At the same time, another cornerstone
of her foreign policy was a "Western orientation",
which, because of Russian instability, she deemed vital to
her continued itldependence. Thus, in her contacts with the
victorious Western Powers she had to preserve a delicate
balance if both friendship and freedom of diplomatic action
were to be maintained.
Germany
Since Czechoslovakia's frontiers with Germany were the
longest, and since the Elbe River furnished the best outlet
by water for the new Republic, future relations between the
two states became a matter of concern to the former.
The latter also desired to avoid friction. With both accepting
the results of the War, and in view of their close economic
ties, it was almost inevitable that their first important
1 The next chapter, "The Reconstruction of Central Europe, xgr&-1923",
will explain in detail additional aspects of Czechoslovakia's relations with
the Western Powers.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-19M
99
question should have been that of trade. The traffic that
had developed across their mutual frontier after the War
had been hampered by many disputes and by the absence of
any commercial treaty. This trade was stabilized by the
treaty of June 29, 1920, which clarified the ·questions of
customs duties, finance, transit, transportation, etc. A special
clause provided for mutual termination of ·national control
of the exportation and importation of certain specified commodities:
by Germany, of chemicals, dyes, pharmaceutical
products, iron, steel, toys, machinery, tools, agricultural implements,
musical instruments, automobiles and photographic
appliances; and by Czechoslovakia, of chemicals, beer,
baskets, lumber, mineral waters, furniture, toys, leathergoods,
musical instruments, pottery, porcelain, glassware,
lace and semi-precious stones. Another clause specifically
permitted the exchange of Bohemian lignite and Upper
Silesian coal. The most important clause specified reciprocal
most-favored-nation treatment. Any third Power might
obtain similar advantages. Further clauses provided vaguely
for mutual good will. The treaty was declared effective
for three months after notice of its cancellation had been
given by either state.2
Even a casual perusal of Czechoslovak
newspapers during late June and early July, 1920,
would reveal the general satisfaction that resulted from this
treaty, which was interpreted as indicating conclusively the
absence· of any immediate designs on the part of Germany
against the integrity of Czechoslovakia.8
Thus, the establishment
of cordial relations with the most powerful neighbor
proved surprisingly easy.
a Treaty Series, vol. xvii, pp. 69-137.
a It is interesting to note that the cordial note in Czechoslovak newspapers
during the period in question was reflected generally in such
German newspapers as Vorwaerts, Vossische Zeitung, Prager Presse.
Prager Tagblatt, Pra{Jer Abendblatt, Allgemeine Zeitung and Deutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung.
100 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
The Western Powers
Although the World War solved many questions and
terminated several old feuds, it also created new problems.
Among the post-war antagonisms, perhaps none was a
greater potential threat to the maintenance of European peace
than was FrenCh and Italian rivalry. This quarrel between
the Latin rivals, which had been bridged temporarily because
of common enemies before and during the War, in its revived
post-war form had many aspects: psychological, colonial,
naval and Continental. In its Continental phase, it threatened
to divide Europe again into two armed camps.
Czechoslovakia desired to remain friendly with each of the
three Western Powers and deplored any friction among
them; nevertheless, should she ever be forced to make a
definite choice, she probably would choose France. As will
be shown subsequently, not only were the ties she had created
with Paris closer than those with London or Rome, but
almost every other reason would indicate the choice of
France. For Continental purposes, France was not only the
strongest in view of mere material force, but had shown the
greatest interest in the welfare of the Slavs. There existed
practically no friction between Slavic and French interests,
whereas such was not the case between the Slavs and either
Italy or Great Britain! Moreover, France sought compensation
for her pre-war Russia~ alliance in friendship with
the lesser Slav states, whereas Italy deemed some of them
potential rivals. Against Germany, Czechoslovakia would
find France a powerful and a willing ally; Great Britain,
relatively weak as a Central European force, even if she
could be induced to enter into any such conflict; and Italy,
a dubious military quantity.
Czechoslovakia felt grateful for French assistance in attaining
independence; to Great Britain and Italy, both of
• For example, Italy vs. Yugoslavia, Great Britain vs. Russia.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 10I
which followed cautiously the trend of French policy, any
such feeling of gratitude would be owing only in lesser
degree. In view of Great Britain's insularity and traditional
aloofness from Continental questions, Czechoslovakia felt
correctly that London would have slight interest in and direct
influence upon Central European problems. Similarly, while
feeling gratitude for the assistance that the United States
had so unselfishly granted, Czechoslovakia realized that
future American direct inte~<est or intervention in purely
European affairs would be doubtful. Russia was Bolshevik.
Therefore, the only Great Power that might rival France in
the affections of Czechoslovakia would be Italy. Nevertheless,
in spite of the fact that the feeling of friendship for Italy
might be termed secondary, it was sincere, as even a casual
examination of Czech newspapers from November, 1918,
to April, 1919, would indicate. Strict censorship prevented
the Czech press from criticizing Italy for her armistice of
November 3, 1918, with Austria, an armistice which the
Czechs deemed selfish, despite the fact that it was drafted by
the Allied War Council, following an extensive correspondence
between Austria-Hungary and Wilson, and that it was
signed by the Allies, rather than by Italy alone.11
During
April and May, 1919, there ensued a change for the worse in
Czech public opinion regarding Italy. Again the censorship
prevented the feeling of hostility from assuming any open
form other than the almost entire omission, in Czech newspapers,
of any mention of Italy. Correctly or incorrectly.
Czech public opinion considered Italian influence as thrown
on the side of Hungary during the war over Slovakia.
Tension was increased by the tragic death of Stefanik and
the destruction of his papers as the result of an aeroplane
crash on May 4, 1919, on the way home from Italy.
11 Cf. Glaise-Horstenau, E. von, The Collapu of the Austro-Hungtwia,.
Empire (London, 1930), pp. 302-317.
102 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
The wisdom of the government in preventing any open criticism
of Italy while the fate of Czechoslovakia's boundaries
was being decided by the Peace Conference was obvious. In
contrast, Czech gratitude for active French aid against the
Hungarian Bolsheviks was all the more deep-seated.6
The agreement signed on November 4, 1920, between
Czechoslovakia and France, Czechoslovakia's first general
commercial treaty, marked a further advance in the friendship
between the two countries. In contrast with the earlier
limited commercial treaties negotiated by Czechoslovakia,
this compact marked a new tendency. For mutual benefit,
exceptions were made regarding respective monopolies: thus,
France sent Czechoslovakia 30,000 tons of Algerian phosphates,
in spite of a general prohibition of such an export,
and received in exchange 50,000 tons of sugar. The most
important single innovation was the division of imports into
four categories, each of which received different privileges,
the most favored group--raw materials, farm produce, metal
and chemical products-being admitted free. France agreed
either to reduce her general tariff rates or to apply her minimum
tariffs against certain specified Czechoslovak goods..,
This treaty, intended merely as a temporary measure, remained
in force until the conclusion of a definitive commercial
and tariff agreement on August 17, 1923.
8
While France continued to support Czechoslovakia in
every emergency, Czechoslovak r~lations with Italy continued
11 As a result of the censorship and of a deliberate policy on the part
of the Czechoslovak government, in its own obvious interest, to minimize
the hostility felt against Italy, the writer has found it difficult to produce
conclusive evidence for all these statements. His investigations and conversations
with individuals near the scene of events have led him to the
conviction that early Czech antagonism to Italy is a topic deserving of the
attention of a later and perhaps more successful investigator.
"Obchodni smlouvy mezi.statnt, vol. i, pp. 24-157·
s Treaty Series, vol. xliv, pp. 21-I:i!S.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 103
to remain strained. ~ The Italian belief-that the bloc then
in the process of formation, the Little Entente, was essentially
a Pan-Slavic anti-Italian creation-was not correct;
nevertheless, because of this misconception, no Italo-Czechoslovak
rapprochement was possible until after the ItaloYugoslav
treaty of Rapallo, on November 12, 1920.9
In the spring of 1921, Italo-Czechoslovak relations improved
when Benes took advantage of the diminution of
friction between Italy and Yugoslavia to make a visit to
Rome and inaugurate negotiations for a definitive commercial
treaty. The new treaty, concluded on March 23,
1921, met the Italian demand for privileges similar to those
that had been granted France. It was to remain effective
until December 31, 1925, and was renewable automatically,
barring a year's advance notice of its cancellation by either
party. For one year, both agreed partially to abolish restrictions
upon imports and exports. While providing for reciprocal
maximum advantages and for reciprocal protection
of the liberties and interests of the respective citizens,
neither country cared to bind itself to too definite a tariff
policy. Each reserved the right to abolish the tariff clauses
whenever either state should desire to abolish such clauses in
its commercial treaties with all other states. In the last
analysis, Italy was concerned primarily with exporting raw
materials and foodstuffs, and Czechoslovakia with exporting
manufactured goods. Italy annually was to export wine,
fish, fruit, macaroni, early spring potatoes, vegetables, tangerines,
figs, oranges, dried fruits, rice, cooking salt, soup,
perfumes, raw silk, Venetian pearls, automobiles, motorcycles
and electrical appliances in return for automobiles,
motorized plows, furniture, toys, pianos, glassware, woolen
carpets, lace, embroidered linen, coffee substitutes, 100
e For full details concerning the early relations of Italy and the Little
Entente, cf, infra, pp. 167 d seq.
104 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
wagon-loads of paper, 20,000 tons of sugar and 50,000
bottles of liqueurs.10
On the same day, a second treaty conceded Czechoslovakia
special transit privileges via Trieste, where there was established
a Czechoslovak Customs Office to facilitate the required
customs formalities in cooperation with Italian authontles.
Henceforth, Czechoslovak imports landing in
Trieste would be routed directly to their ultimate destination
without requiring any customs inspection on the Czechoslovak
frontier.n
A third treaty of the same date provided for the adjustment
of claims, debts and business relations between firms
in the two countries. Italy also received payment from
Czechoslovakia for foodstuffs and other goods already
received.12
Although these three treaties did represent satisfactory
solutions of mutual economic, financial and juridical
questions, renewed friction over rival plans for the reconstruction
of Austria 13
prevented Czechoslovakia and Italy
from exchanging ratifications until March I, 1924.u Any
true Halo-Czechoslovak rapprochement was delayed until
after the signing of the Austrian Protocols on October g,
1922, when Benes journeyed to Venice to confer with
Schanzer, the Italian Foreign Minister. The resulting pourparlers
15
produced a more tolerant attitude within both
countries, as each came to realize that cooperation, rather
than rivalry, in reconstructing Central Europe was to their
mutual advantage.
1o Treaty Series, vol. xxxii, pp. 183:.Z39.
'11 Ibid., vol. xxxii, pp. 241-259.
1 3 Ibid., vol. xxxii, pp. 261-279J.l!
For full details, c/. infra, pp. 193-195.
'14ZJJraVJI (Senat), 201 meeting, April 24, 1924, pp. u6 et seq.•
9 session.
u Cf. The New York Times, October II and 13, 1922; or Bene§.
Problemy nove Evropy, p. 214. For full details, cf. infra, pp. 195-1g6.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 105
While strengthening the ties with Italy, Benes did not
neglect the more vital question of relations with France.
Although interested primarily in the maintenance of the
status quo as established by the Peace Treaties, he wished
to be prepared for any eventuality. France had introduced
the question of security at the opening of the Peace Conference
and had continued to urge, at every possible opportunity,
a solution of this problem. After the withdrawal
of the United States from direct participation in European
affairs, France continued to importune Great Britain for
some specific pledge in the event of another emergency.
Repeated British refusals to become committed led to a series
of exchanges of views between the two countries between
1919 and 1922,18
after which date security became one of
the principal questions confronting the League of Nations.u
The League of Nations
Benes, in his desire to avoid having to make a choice between
Great Britain and France, believed that their differences
regarding the problem of security could best be adjusted
by referring the question to what he regarded as the proper
agency, the League. At the same time he hoped that membership
in the League might also solve Czechoslovakia's own
problem of security, further her policy of a" Western orientation"
and prevent her from becoming a mere satellite of
one of the Great Powers.18
Benes' faith in the League coin-
1e C/. Papers respectittg NegotiatioM for aiJ Anglo-Frnu:IJ Pod
(London, 1924); Docu.mettts diplomatiques relatives aus negotioliottS COIIcernattt
les garattties de securite contre wre aggression. de rAllefft091te
(Paris, 1924) ; Selsam, ]. P., The Attempts to Form «m Anglo-Frmclt
Alliance, I9I9-1924 (Philadelphia, 1936), pp. 1-58.
1'1 For full details, cf. in.fra, pp. 209 et seq.
11 Bend, E., The DiploffttJtic Struggle for EtWope«m SectWit;y Gild the
Stabilization of Peace (Speech of April I, 1925, before the Foreign Com..
mittee of the Senate), pp. 7-9.
106 FOJ?.EIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
cided with the expectations of his people. Alarm was general
over what might be termed international anarchy. The
League was received with acclaim and its defects were deplored.
Wit4 her composite population and her peculiar
geographical position, Czechoslovakia eagerly welcomed this
new promise of security. A satiated state, such as she,
almost completely encompassed by hereditary enemies, needed
every possible assurance of permanent international political
stability and of a long-enduring peace during which she
could develop internally and solve the more urgent of her
domestic and foreign problems. As the result of such a
viewpoint, it was almost inevitable that Czechoslovakia
should become an active and enthusiastic member of the
League.
BeneS regretted what were in his estimation several imperfections
in the League of Nations as it had been constituted
originally. Although realizing that the organization could
not insure permanent peace, he deemed it a noteworthy step
in the right direction and a fundamental part of his political
conception of Europe. He wished to preserve whatever
procedure might be necessary to give it a high prestige. At
the same time, while he advocated certain reforms, he
opposed any changes that might be sufficiently radical to
vitiate its purposes. Benes believed that the most beneficial
reform would be the elimination of incompetence and inefficiency.
To that end, he proposed that the Council be relieved
of matters that did not require discussion by having such
matters handled by its chairman and by the Secretary-General,
and that other matters be voted by roll-call. To avoid
the danger that reports of the Permanent Secretariat might
be accepted without proper consideration, he suggested that
each state on the Council divide the agenda among several
experts. Benes wished that disagreement on the part of one
member of the Council might postpone any question to the
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923
next session, so that the session might be reserved for matters
that required attention to details. He advocated that the
Secretariat be urged to prepare its reports with greater speed,
in order that the members of the Council might have better
facilities for obtaining the necessary advance information
upon the questions that they would have to consider. The
principle behind all these proposals of Benes was that it was
more important for the Council to act well than to act speedily.
If he had any ulterior motive, it was to render more
difficult the adoption of a selfish or opportunist policy on the
part of the Great Powers which had permanent representation
in the League Council.19
Even though Czechoslovakia had accomplished little in
the First Assembly of the League of Nations, she became
active in the Second, where she was represented by Dr.
Stephen Osusky. The chief issue involved Article 21
of the League Covenant, which concerned " regional understandings
". Bend, as vice-chairman of the Revision Commission,
grasped eagerly at the opportunity of effecting
another reform by strengthening Article 2 I and, at the same
time, of furthering Czechoslovakia's problem of securitY by
obtaining League recognition for the Little Entente. Since
the League of Nations lacked sufficient means of coercion,
he felt the need of supplementing Article 21 which stated
that international agreements, such as arbitration treaties
and regional understandings which furthered peace, would
not be considered incompatible with any article of the Covenant.
There followed a clash between China, which desired
to delete " regional understandings " from the Article, and
Czechoslovakia, whose amendment " would encourage
regional conferences or conventions as an essential compte-
1.9Zpr6vy (Poslanecki Snemovna), 25 meeting, November 24. 1920,
pp. 469 e1 seq., 2 session; cf. also, Krcmaf, ]., "Dr. Bend ve svazu
narodu n, Dr. Edward Benes, pp. 159-169.
108 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
ment to universal agreements which must necessarily be very
general and ill-defined in scope ".20
The Revision Commission finally decided to retain the
original text of Article 21, but suggested also that all agreements
among League members, concluded to clarify or
supplement existing treaties or preserve peace, should not
only be approved by the League of Nations but should be
negotiated under its auspices.21
Although the Second Assembly
failed to incorporate specifically in Article 21 the
amendment proposed by Czechoslovakia, its principle was
emphatically approved when the Second Assembly pointed
out that all such supplementary agreements contributed
toward the realization, by the League, of its practical objec-
tives.22
The Little Entente was considered not only as a
collaborator with the League, but as one means of rendering
effective the principles of the latter. League approval of the
Little Entente became a source of gratification not only to
Benes, as furthering Czechoslovakia's security, but to another
of its founders, Take Jonescu of Rumania, who had maintained
that the Little Entente was a small League of Nations
within a larger one, and that the same love of peace had
inspired the creation of both organizations.28
Czechoslovakia found it impracticable to divorce her activities
within the League of Nations from the problems of
security and of her relations with the Great Powers. She
discovered that, from 1920 to f923, her own security, as
well as her friendly relations with Italy, were again threatened
by a revival of agitation over the question of minorities
which she had considered definitely settled by the treaty of
2o League of Nations Monthly Summary (henceforth referred to as
Monthly Summary), April, 1921, pp. 3-4.
Zl.Ibid., July, 1921, p. 30.
22 Ibid., October, Ig2I, p. II4.
28 Cf. Le Temps, October 27, 1920, for Take Jonescu's speech at the
Sorbonne two days earlier.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 109
September 10, 1919~u The whole question of minorities
was reopened by Tittoni, the Italian delegate to the League
Council, whose report, which was adopted on October 22,
1920, led to a lengthy series.of modifications of the original
method of procedure. Henceforth, since the minorities
question was considered international, no longer only members
of the Council, but any member of the League of
Nations, might invoke the aid of either the Council or the
Permanent Court of International Justice in rendering effective
the protection that had been guaranteed to minorities.
Nevertheless, the privilege of calling attention to the infraction
or threatened infraction of minority rights was reserved
to members of the Council alone: the minorities themselves
or states not represented in the Council were permitted
merely to present a report or a petition, an act which would
not force the Council to take legal cognizance of the matter
. .and intervene. The resulting distinction between guaranteeing
a clause in a treaty and actually protecting a minority
was unfortunate, as was a further rule, adopted on October
25, 1920, to the effect that any petition or report concerning
minorities, which had been brought before the Council,
should be duly investigated by the president and two members
appointed by him in order to determine whether the clauses
of the minorities treaty had been violated or were in danger
of being violated.u
As soon as the new method of minority procedure, as
.advocated by Tittoni, had been given an adequate trial. there
resulted almost identical protests from Poland on June 3,
1921,26
and from Czechoslovakia a day later." Both states
u Cf. supra, p. 45.
~s 0/ficiallournal, November, Ig20, p. 8.
11c Askenazy (The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Drummond
(Secretary-General of the League of Nations), June 3. 1921, reprinted in
Official Joumal, September, 1921, p. 7W·
llf Bend to Drummond, June 4o I9ZI, ibid., September, 1921, p. 796-
110 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
based their objections upon the fact that the Permanent Secretariat
of the League had injured their prestige by circulating
numerous minority petitions inspired. by questionable
sources. Even when such petitions had been dismissed as
baseless, the publicity and investigations that necessarily followed
had subjected the two states to much annoyance. The
Czechoslovak note objected particularly to the publicity which
had been given by the Secretariat to the memorandum of
the President of the " Austrian Association for a League of
Nations", in which a private organization had attacked
bitterly President Masaryk and the Czechoslovak Republic
for alleged disregard of the rights of the German minority~
The Czechoslovak government deemed it beneath its dignity
to enter into any controversy over a memorandum which it
considered inspired by "a hatred of everything not German ".
Bend admitted that the Secretariat had acted in strict conformity
with Tittoni's resolution, and hence, if a repetition
of such occurrences was to be avoided, this report had t<>
be amended.
Tittoni's resolution was amended on June 27, 1921, by
the adoption of several Czechoslovak-Polish amendments.
which specified that all minority petitions that did not originate
with League members were to be communicated immediately
to the state concerned; that the state concerned was
to have three weeks within which to inform the SecretaryGeneral
whether it intended to make any comment upon the
subject; that Tittoni's procedure was to be followed if
neither answer nor comment was received from the state
concerned within three weeks; that two months' time was ta.
be granted a state which desired to comment upon the matter,
whereupon the Secretary-General would present both petition
and comment to the League members; that, in exceptional'
and extremely urgent cases, the Secretary-General should
inform the state concerned of the petition before informing-
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 III
other League members; that these amendments should become
effective immediately upon all affairs that concerned
Czechoslovakia and Poland; and that other states which had
accepted the Minorities Treaties might have the same procedure
applied to them if they so desired.28
In spite of a certain success attained by the CzechoslovakPolish
amendments, Benes still harbored doubts whether
annoyance had been eliminated. On April 5, 1923, he suggested
further amendments regarding the procedure with
minority petitions. He maintained that the right to address
minority petitions or reports to the League was not restricted
merely to the minorities themselves, but was held by every.one.
He pointed out that the Minorities Treaties had not
created organizations to act or speak on behalf of minorities,
but had made the members of the Council responsible, and
therefore that petitioners had no legal basis for claiming or
referring to any authority allegedly derived from the minorities
themselves. Minority petitions had been submitted
frequently by professional propagandists, not for the benefit
of the minority at all, but for the furtherance of political
aims far removed from the alleged objective. Therefore,
Benes proposed that the Secretary-General be authorized to
reject all petitions of a propagandist nature.211
Czechoslovakia had been particularly annoyed by receiving
a large number of propagandist petitions, to all of which
she had had to reply. After three years of such experiences,
the Czechoslovak government reached the limit of its
patience, and, again supported by Poland, succeeded, on September
5, 1923, in having the Council adopt a further amendment.
Henceforth, it was decreed that the petitions must
have in view the terms of the Minorities Treaties, must not
28/biJ., September, 1921, pp. 749-750.
llll[bid., July, 1923, pp. 117-718.
112 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
seek a severance of political relations with the state in which
the minority existed, must emanate from an authentic
source, must abstain from violent language, 'and must contain
facts or information which had not been recently the subjects
of a petition submitted to ordinary procedure. In addition,
the President might extend the two months' period for
comment if he deemed it reasonable or feasible, governmental
communications should be restricted to members of the
Council, a special Council resolution was required for communications
to non-members, and the special Committee of
Examination was granted merely the power to determine
how many members were to call the attention of the Council
to the matter in question.30
·
The various changes of minority procedure that had been
adopted at the behest of Czechoslovakia and Poland were
open to criticism, particularly to the charge of being reactionary.
The new routine did not deprive the minorities of
the right of effective appeal to the Council or of recourse to
the public opinion of the world. Before one condemns
Czechoslovakia for her action, one should remember that
her motive was largely defensive. Because of the character
of her minorities, some restriction of procedure was necessary
in order to protect herself from annoyance. Then, too,
the ·minorities within Czechoslovakia had relatively little
basis for complaint, for the goyemment, on the whole, did
treat them fairly. The policy of tolerance which had been
adopted prior to the Minorities Treaty had been confirmed
again by the Czechoslovak Constitution. Articles 106-127
branded as a crime any act which discriminated against any
nationality or which attempted forcible denationalization, and
Articles 128-134, the Bill of Rights for National Minorities,
guaranteed absolute equality before the law, and the same
so Ibid., November, 1923, pp. 1290-1294.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 II3
civil and political rig_hts to all Czechoslovak citizens regardless
of language, race, or religion.3l.
It is always easier for criticism to be destructive than constructive.
In view of the misuse to which the letter of
Tittoni's proposals had been subjected, Czechoslovakia's
amendments were perhaps more constructive than reactionary.
Regardless of their characterization, what else remained
to be done? In choosing what he· regarded as the
lesser of two evils, Bend had demonstrated one of his card:inal
virtues, an ability to compromise. Throughout his
career, he has rarely been unbending; only in the gravest
emergencies has he found it necessary to employ an outright
negative; usually, even from the most adverse alternatives,
he has managed to extract some benefit for his country.
Czechoslovakia's election in 1923 to the League Council was
a great triumph for Benes personally. In the discussions
that took place at Geneva in September, 1923, he deplored
the pessimism prevalent as a result of the Greco-Italian crisis
over the Corfu incident: he favored neither party, but was
interested primarily in preventing the small states from·losing
faith in the League, whose basic principles he sought to
save as the sole defense of the small states against fait
accompli tactics and a return to the former system of
alliances.82
The Russian Problem
The trend of events within Russia seemed to Benes additional
justification for a "Western orientation". To
Czechoslovakia, as to the rest of Europe, the rise of Bolshe-
81 For detailed discussions of minorities procedure, cf. Macartney, C. A.,
Natiofllll States anti Natiofllll Minorities (London, 1934); Stone, J.•
Intentatiofllll Guarantees of Minority Rights (London, 193:a); Kellor,
op. cit., vol. i, pp. 70-79- For further details regarding Czechoslovakia's
treabnent of her minorities, cf. Broi, A., Three Y eors of the CBecho.slovak
Re'public, pp. 21-30; Graham, op. ci.t., pp. 292-299••
Bend, Problemy novl EwoP,, pp. 199. 26s.
I 14 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
vism presented many new problems, the chief of which was
the question of future relations with Russia. In Czechoslovakia
the idea of intra-Slav cooperation was yet strong,
and, in spite of the collapse of Russia, there still existed, after
1918, a strong minority that continued to regard her as the
natural friend, protector and leader of the smaller Slav
nations. The almost universal sympathy for Russia took
many diverse forms : the rank and file, which deemed Bolshevism
as just one more evil that Russia was compelled to
endure,33
advocated a " hands off " policy; a few extreme
radicals sought to follow her into Bolshevism; whereas a
larger minority, which sought to save Russia from herself,
demanded armed intervention. Amidst these diverse opinions
stood out the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevism were
repugnant to most Czechoslovaks, who viewed communism
with distaste. As the Bolsheviks sought to carry out their
avowed purpose of overthrowing the established social order
throughout Europe, Benes found himself on the horns of a
dilemma: how was he to combat the spread of Bolshevism
within Czechoslovakia and yet remain friendly with Russia
whom he still considered as a natural friend and ally, and
what was perhaps of even greater importance, as one of the
largest potential future markets for Czechoslovakia's surplus
of manufactured goods?
The Siberian Campaign,.
Before Benes dared even contemplate. the future, he had
to solve the immediate problem of extricating the Czechoslovak
army in Russia, lest it become enmeshed and perhaps
overwhelmed in the Russian domestic chaos. The friendship
that had been engendered originally between the Czechoslovaks
and the Bolsheviks because of mutual cooperation
~a Ibid., ·PP· 28, 123-126. r6o-162; Gibbons, H. A., Europe since I9II1
(New York, 1923), p. 270-
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-19!3 IIS
against the Central Powers," soon gave way to friction as
the agreements of March 26, 1918, whereby the Czechoslovaks
had been guaranteed every assistance in their long
journey across Siberia in return for Masaryk's promise to
disarm, were not being carried out. Czechoslovak reluctance
to disarm, Bolshevik apathy, and the deterioration of the
railroads were perhaps equally to blame for the delay.
Seemingly endless halts were being made at station after
station, with the result that, by May, 1918, only three regiments
had reached Vladivostok.811
At the same time, the official attitude of the Bolsheviks
also became less favorable; in fact, as early as March 30,
1918, the Czechoslovaks had intercepted a telegram from
the Omsk Soviet to Moscow which had requested their complete
disarming and routing via Archangel.88
After receiving
many similar requests from other local Soviets, the
authorities at Moscow finally acquiesced. The Czechoslovaks,
against their better judgment, agreed to disarm partially
and to return the equipment they had received from the
Russians.117
However, the Czechoslovaks distrusted the·
Russians to the extent of hiding at least one rifle, and other
weapons, apiece, as the Bolsheviks, to their dismay, were to
discover later. At this time, the attitude of the Czechoslovaks
was motivated largely by fear that they would be
expected to abide by Article 5 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
u Cf. Kratochvil, J., Cesta revoluce (Praha, 1922), pp. 42-46, or
Baerlein, H., The Ma,.ch of the Sevmty Thousand (London, 192()), pp.
99-103, for Czechoslovak-Bolshevik military cooperation against the
Central Powers at Kiev bridge, February 20, 1918, and at BachmaC,
March 2, 1918.
u Cf. Fischer, L., The Soviets in World Affairs (New York, 1930),
vol. i, p. uo.
ae Baerlein, op. cit., p. x6o; Stewart, G., The White A,.mies of Russia
(New York, 1933), p. 106.
ar Ceskoslovenska Samostalnost, vol. iii, p. S, February 27, 1918;
Fischer, op. cit., vol. i, p. NJ.
116 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
of March 3, 1918, which had promised the Central Powers
that "Russia will without delay carry out the complete
demobilization of her army, inclusive of the forces newly
formed by the present government ".88
Partial disarming was followed by a demand for complete
disarming and for a surrender of control over part of the
Trans-Siberian railroad. In refusing this new demand of
the Soviets, the Czechoslovaks became convinced of the
wisdom of remaining armed on the eve of a five-thousandmile-march
through a region teeming with German and Hungarian
prisoners of war and with possibly hostile Russians.5
9
On April 21, the Bolsheviks promised the Germans that all
German prisoners in Russia would be sent westward to be
incorporated in the German army.40
In comparison, the
eastward movement of the Czechoslovaks was regarded as
unimportant, and the Germans were granted priority in the
use of the railroad. The former resented such treatment as
fresh evidence of the powerful influence of Count Mirbach,
the German Ambassador at Moscow. The months of waiting
had produced further tension between Czechoslovaks and
Bolsheviks. Although many of the former were Socialists,
they were also nationalists. On the other hand, the latter
deemed them fools to wish to go to France to become involved
again in a capitalistic war rather than demand peace
at any price. The Russians also distrusted the maintenance
of discipline as an indication of counter-revolutionary tendencies,
whereas the Czechoslovaks considered Russian desertion
of the Allied cause treasonable. Consequently, the outbreak
of hostilities awaited merely some overt act.u
as Translation from the German, The Times, March 3, 1918.
89 Kratochvil, op. cit., p. 59·
40 Ibid., p. 6o.
41 Zmrhal, K., Vlada Sovetu a Ceskoslovaci (Praha, 1919) ; or Williams,
M. 0., "The Fighting Czechoslovaks", Asia, vol. xviii, pp. 722-728.
Cf. Fischer, op. cit., vol. i, p. III, for the statement that no documentary
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923
As the Czechoslovak Legions proceeded eastward by
detachments via Kursk, Tambov (where they were delayed
a whole month), Penza and Samara, they became more convinced
that the Bolsheviks were conspiring with the Germans
to destroy their army.42
The Legions eventually reached
Celjabinsk (Tcheliabinsk), where, on.May 14, 1918, there
ensued the celebrated incident that precipitated hostilities.
At this station a Czechoslovak detachment met a trainload
of Magyar ex-prisoners that was moving westward. A
Czechoslovak was injured by a missile thrown from the train.
In the riot that was precipitated, the offending Magyar was
put to death. When the Czechoslovaks would not permit
the local authorities to investigate, the Bolsheviks retorted
three days later by imprisoning the Czechoslovak guard that
should have intervened. After a Czechoslovak delegation
that had been sent to protest was also imprisoned, the Legions
seized the town, disarmed the Bolsheviks and freed their
comrades.••
The attempt of the local Soviet to enforce its authority
was supported by Trotsky, the Bolshevik Commissar of
War, who, by a telegram relayed from station to station
along the line of th<; railroad, ordered once more the complete
disarming of the Czechoslovaks. On May 21, he
ordered also the arrest of Maxa and Cermak, the leaders of
the Russian branch of the Czechoslovak National Council
at Moscow.44
The Legions replied a week later at a congress
held at Celjabinsk, where they decided to surrender
.no more arms or ammunition, but to continue to Vladivostok,
proof exists regarding German pressure on the Bolsheviks to disarm the
Czechoslovaks.
•• Nosek, V., Indt!pendent Bohemia (London, 1918), pp. 97-98.
•aJbid., p. 98; Kratochvil, op. cit., p. 68.
u Masaryk, Svitot.'li ,.evoluu, p. 317.
I 18 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
by force if necessary.45
They deemed such a course their
only alternative, inasmuch as they were still determined to
try to abide by the advice that Masaryk had given them at
the time of his departure from Russia-that they abstain
from all interference in Russia's internal affairs.46
Initially, the sole objective of the Czechoslovaks was to
get out of Russia as soon as possible. Because of the danger
of further hostilities with the Reds, General Sokorov, the
commander in the Volga region, went so far as to forbid
specifically any aggressive (westward) movement. The
various detachments, often incompletely armed and equipped,
and scattered over enormous distances, experienced difficulties
in maintaining contact. On May 2 5, the Czechoslovaks
were diverted from this passive policy and committed to an
entirely new course. Captain Gajda seized Novonikolajevsk,
thereby changing the war from a purely defensive
journey out of the country to an active offensive-occupation
and the holding of the region against the Bolsheviks. In
this manner, this hitherto unknown captain, on his own
responsibility, caused international complications of a serious
nature.4
'~' As will be shown subsequently, Gajda played into
the hands of Great Britain and France, with the result that
45 Nosek, op. cit., p. 98; for contrasting Czechoslovak and Bolshevik
versions of the affair, cf. Papers Relating ,f!o the Foreign Relations of the
United States, I9I7-I9I8, 1918 (Rus~a), vol. ii, pp. 248-26o, for letter of
July 4 1918, of Thompson (United States Col.l5ul at Omsk) to Lansing
(Secretary of State).
46 Masaryk, op. cit., p. 216.
41 Kratochvil, op. cit., p. 82. Radula Gajda (Rudolf Geidl) had a
spectacular career. At the outbreak of war, he served in the Austrian
army (for conflicting accounts of his career in the Austrian army, cf.
Kratochvil, op. cit., p. 8z; Stewart, op. cit., pp. 104-105; Baerlein, op. cit.,
pp. 131-133). After being taken prisoner by the Russians, he enlisted in
the Czechoslovak forces where he attracted much attention and was
rewarded by rapid promotion because of his ability, daring and love of
the spectacular. For his later career, cf. infra, pp. 257-258.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 II9
the C~echoslovak authorities at Paris were forced into ac-.
ceptance of a situation entirely beyond their control
The Legionaires numbered about 70,000 men;'8
the only
disciplined force within Russia. Consequently, the seizure of
much of the railroad, together with a wide area on both
sides, became surprisingly easy. Before the end of May,
they captured Penza after a three ruiys' struggle, and then
in tum seized Sysran, Kazan, where their efforts were rewarded
by the arms within a well-stocked arsenal, and Simbirsk,
important strategically as the junction of the railroads
to Celjabinsk and Petrograd. The Czechoslovaks were not
content merely with control of th.e railroad, but occupied
the best part of the Volga region, the granary of Russia.
In Siberia, they seized Udinsk and ·won two victories, at
Krasnojarsk and Omsk, over a large force of GermanMagyar
ex-prisoners. On June 25, General Diderichs, at
the head of 15,000 inen, seized Vladivostok after a perfunctory
resistance. The eastern Legions, with the help of
Allied troops, forced the Bolsheviks and German ex-prisoners
to retreat to Charbarovsk, and, by September, completed
the junction with other Legions from Irkutsk and western
Siberia, thereby ensuring control over the whole railway.••
The Czechoslovak offensive threatened the existence of the
Soviet government by wresting from its control the Volga
4B Estimates vary from 50,000 to 70,000.
411 Kratochvil, op. cit., pt). 83-105; O'Higgins, H. J., March of the
CzechoslOflakl across Siberia (New York, 1918); Bend, My War
Memoirs, pp. 364-372; Chopin, J., "Les Tchecoslovaques en Russie ",
Revue de Paris, vol. xxv, pt. iv, pp. 777-icfi. Cf. also, Graves, W. S.
(the officer commanding the Expeditionary Force of the United States
in Siberia), America's Siberitm Ad-venture (New York, '1931), p. 66, for
his cable of September 8 to the War Department, "Practically all organized
resistance, in Siberia, has disappeared". For further details of
Czechoslovak-Bolshevik early clashes, c/. Papers Relating Ito the Foreig11
RelaJicm.t of the United States, 1917-1918, 1918 (Russia), vol. ii, MI.
177-224 and 227-323.
120 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
region, the Urals and the whole of Siberia, areas which
became the centers of various White or anti-Bolshevik movements.
Germany was dealt a severe blow by being denied
access to the raw materials and foodstuffs of Russia and to
the thousands of her prisoners of war interned in Siberia.
It remained to be seen whether the Czechoslovaks could
maintain successfully the advantageous position that they
had won.
Czechoslovak need of Allied assistance became increasingly
apparent. An army of seventy thousand men, no matter
how efficient, could not hope to control the Trans-Siberian
railroad indefinitely. At best, such a force could remain in
temporary possession until the Bolsheviks could muster an
army sufficient to overwhelm it. The Allied Great Powers
would have to decide whether they wished the Czechoslovak
exodus to continue or if, in view of the recent developments,
the Czechoslovaks were to be requested to remain as the backbone
for an attempted Allied resurrection of the Eastern
Front against both the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers.
In either event, prompt Allied assistance was imperative if
the Czechoslovaks were to extricate themselves from the
toils of the Russian Revolution.
Initially, the United States opposed Allied intervention in
Russia. Two notes of President Wilson to the Allied Ambassadors
at Paris, of February 28 50
and March s,n 1918,
opposed Japanese intervention 1n Siberia, but expressed, diplomatically,
confidence that Japan would act only for the best
interests of Russia. On February 2 and March 3, Colonel
House stated further his belief that Japanese intervention
would throw Russia into the arms of Germany.52
On
50 Seymour, C. (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New
York, 1!)26), vol. iii, p. 419.
51 Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 419-420.
5lll Ibid., vol. iii, pP. 391 and 392.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 121
March 11, Wilson expressed the sympathy of the United
States with the misfortunes of Russia, and four days later
received in return the appreciation of the Congress of
Soviets,68
but such amenities decided nothing. On March
26, Great Britain suggested a compromise which called for
inter-Allied, rather than solely Japanese, intervention.5
6
The
British viewpoint was ably presented to Colonel House on
May I by Sir William Wiseman, the Chief of the British
Secret Service, who pointed out to the Allies four alternative
lines of action: ( 1) to take no action, which would be
almost unthinkable since it would leave the Germans free to
act as they wished in Russia; (2) Allied intervention as the
result of a Bolshevik invitation, which would be the best
course, but which would be almost impossible to obtain; (3)
an invitation to intervene from the exiled Kerensky; and
(4) intervention without any invitation.65
Before the exchange of Anglo-American viewpoints had
resulted in any definite decision, and before France and Italy,
both of which were vitally interested in the crises on their
own fronts during the 1918 German offensive, could join in
any common line of action, these four Powers, on June 4,
agreed, as an initial step, to protest to the Bolsheviks that
the disarming of the Czechoslovaks would be considered by
their governments as a hostile act, since the latter were Allied
troops under the protection and care of the Entente.1111
In
reply, ·Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, denied the right of the Entente thus to interpret the
act, which he maintained was only what any neutral nation
would do to armed foreign troops within her territories.
He requested the Entente to censure the Czechoslovaks " for
58 Cj. ibid., vol. iii, p. 420, for both Wilson's note and the Soviet reply.
H Ibid., vol. iii, p. 402.
u Ibid., vot. iii, pp. 42o-422.
&e Russian-AmericaN Relations, March, 1917-l.!arch, 1920, pp. 224-226.
122 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
their brazen and unmistakable interference in the internal
affairs of Russia".57
When no satisfaction could be obtained from Moscow
upon the question of the disarming of the Czechoslovaks,
the United States concurred in active inter-Allied intervention
in Siberia.5
8
On August 3, the United States and Japan
agreed to send troops to Siberia to help the Czechoslovaks.
President Wilson granted them $7,ooo,ooo credit, whereas
France had already loaned them I I ,ooo,ooo rubles and Great
Britain, 3,6oo,ooo rubles.59
The reason for the American
attitude was stated, officially, to be the necessity for helping
the Czechoslovaks extricate themselves from a dangerous situation
which had been created as the result of a change in the
attitude of the Russian government. Intervention for the
purpose of interfering in Russian internal affairs was specifically
disclaimed. Both Japan and the United States promised
to withdraw their forces immediately upon the realization
of the limited objectives of the intervention. When
Chicherin protested that Russia never intended to deliver the
Czechoslovaks to the Austrian and German prisoners of war
or to their governments, but that the measures against the
Czechoslovaks were legitimate measures of defense against
the counter-revolutionary movements within Russia, and
stated that the Czechoslovak conspiracy had been organized
by France and supported by her financially, and that the
United States failed to realize tlie gravity of its action upon
57 Izvestia, June 13, 1918.
os Cf. Seymour, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 4o8, for Masaryk's luncheon of June
I3 with Colonel House to discuss Russian affairs; and ibid., vol. iii, P.
415, for Wilson's letter of July 8 to Colonel House in which he stated his
fears tha.t the Japanese might not leave Siberia if allowed to intervene
alone. Cf. also, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, I9I7-I9I8, 1918, (Russia), vol. ii, pp. 241 et seq. and 262 et seq.
for proposal of Supreme War Council and United States' acceptance.
119 Fischer, op. cit., vol. i, p. IIO.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 123
its future relations with Russia, President Wilson remained
unmoved.60
The Powers were delighted at the prospect of having
created a new Eastern Front. Thanks to Czechoslovak distrust
of the Bolsheviks and to Gajda, they. now obtained
easily what Masaryk had formerly refused-the use of the
Czechoslovak army in Russia. Masaryk and Benes seem to
make out a good case that, except for a somewhat noisy
minority led by Kramar, most Czechoslovaks were opposed
to intervention in Russia at any time.61
However, the appeals of Kramar for intervention and the
temporary enthusiasm of the Legionaires for Gajda, before
they sobered sufficiently to realize how they had been dazzled
and led to the brink of ruin, coupled with the more or less
enforced silence on the part of the responsible Czechoslovak
leaders, had led to many misunderstandings. The motives ·
of Gajda were attributed erroneously to the Czechoslovaks
as a whole, a general misapprehension that did Czechoslovakia
much damage and which was perhaps encouraged
by the stories that were sedulously but unofficially circulated
60 Seymour, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 416-418; "Reply of President Wilson
to a Senate Resolution concerning the American Troops in Siberia, June
26, 1919 ", State Department, Russian Series, number iv, p. 5; United
States Congress, Senate, 65 Congress, 1919. "Hearings on Bolshevik
Propaganda before a Sub-committee of ·the Judiciary", p. 24; Russia,.,_
Americmt Relations, March, 1917-March, 1920, pp. 235-240, 258-270, 343-
346; Papers Relating to the Foreig,. Relations of the United States, 1917-
1918, 1918, vol. ii, pp. 67-68, Polk (Acting Secretary of State) to Morris
(American Ambassador to Japan), March 5, against intervention; pp.
324-325, Ishii (Japanese Ambassador to the United States) to Polk,
August 2, on the motives of Japanese intervention in Siberia; pp. 328-329,
Polk to Morris, August 3, on American motives for intervention; Scott,
J. B., Official Stateme114s of War Aims aJJd Peace Proposals, December,
1916 to November, 1918 (Washington, 1921),pp. 359-,362; Vinacke, H. M.,
History of the Far East i,. Modem Times (New York, 1928), pp. 411-
414; BeneS, My War Memoirs, pp. 390-397.
61 Benes, op. cit., pp. 352-364; Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 215-218; Kratochvil,
cp. cit., p. 109.
124 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
by the Allies throughout their newspapers during the months
of June and July, 1918;
62
Even Masaryk was accused falsely
of desiring a war against both the Germans and the Bolshe-
viks,63
whereas, in reality, the Czechoslovaks were merely
tools of Allied militarism, and-, at first, unconscious tools at
that.64
ea For a summary of such stories, cf. Ross, E. A., The Russian. Soviet
Republic (New York, 1923), pp. 127..,136.
63 Fischer, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 1()9-IIO, quotes Masaryk as having stated
(October 9, 1917} that ·he had" explicitly agreed with Dukhonin that our
army would be used only against the foreign enemy ", i. e. the Central
Powers. After another quotation pointing out Czechoslovak financial
dependence upon the Allies, Fischer again quotes Masaryk " I had
thought of the war against the Bolsheviks and against Russia. I would
have attached myself and our corps to an army which would have been
strong enough for a struggle against the Bolsheviks and the Germans,
and which would have defended democracy.•.. There was only one
possibility for the fight against the Bolsheviks.-the mobilization of the
Japanese".
6 "lbid., vol. i, p. II2. Fischer, vol. i, p. IU, also mentions the presence
of Russian " White " officers in Czechoslovak ranks as an evidence of the
counter-revolutionary tendencies of the latter. To prove that the
motives of the Czechoslovaks were misinterpreted, the writer, in addition
to referring to the actions and statements of Masaryk and Benes, wishes
also to call attention to the following statements: Ross, op. cit., .p. 126,
states, " There is no question but that to get to France was the sincere
desire of the Czechs and there was no suggestion .that the force could
be or desired to be used in Siberia". Cf. Graves, op. cit., p. 66, for the
belated information contained in his cable of September I!), 1918, to the
United States War Department, ''The French and English are, undoubtedly,
trying to get the Allied forces committed to some act which wilt
result in the establishment of an Eastern Front". The fact that the
Czechoslovaks were not acting entirely upon their own initiative, but
largely in response to orders received from the Powers .that were financing
them, was indicated by the cipher message received by Gray (American
Consul at Omsk} on July 22, 1918, from the American Consulate at
Samara. Gray was directed to inform the Czechoslovaks "confidentially'•
that " pending further notice, the Allies will be glad, from a political
point of view, to have them hold their present position. On the other
hand, they should not be hampered in meeting the militazy exigencies of
the situation. It is desirable, first of all, that they should secure control
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 125
The Czechoslovak- authorities at Paris, confronted with a
fait aecompli, were forced to acquiesce reluctantly to a condition
of affairs beyond their control For their own best
interests, while the recognition of Czechoslovakia and its
future boundaries hung in the balance, they were compelled
to abstain from any adverse criticism of the use that the
Great Powers contemplated for their eastern army. Being
practical diplomats, they sought to wrest future advantages
from their present distress by. simulating acquiescence or
even enthusiasm regarding recent Russian developments.
Above all, the Czechoslovaks could not afford to leave, in
the minds of influential Allied statesmen, any doubts whatever
regarding the sincerity with which they entered into the
Russian venture. Therefore Gajda was promoted and the
seizure of the whole Trans-Siberian railroad was ordered.
Speedy indeed was the reward of the Czechoslovaks. Their
national objectives· received the endorsement of the United
States at the end of May/5
and of Great Britain, France and
Italy on June 3.86
Thus, at a price, was Czechoslovakia's
future assured, but the skill with which Czechosiovak
of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and second, if this is assured, at the same
time possibly retain control over the territory which they now dominate.
Inform the French representative that the French Consul-General joins
in these instructions." Cf. Stewart, op. cit., pp. II4-II5. Stewart also
points out, ibid., p. 135, that " The ~s whose whole future national
existence depended upon an AIIied victory were willing to perform any
service ·for the Allies even to risking their lives in the Siberian melee".
On p. :zg6 he states that the Czechoslovaks "rigorously abstained from
all participation in Russian internal affairs, save to protect themselves ".
Finally, cf. Papers Relation to the Foreign Relatims.s of the United States,
I9I7-I9I8, 1918 (Russia), vol. ii, pp. 265-267, for Caldwell (American
Consul at Vladivostok) to Lansing, July 8, 1918, on Czeohoslovak communication
of June 25 as to their official motives.
85 Cf. Papers Relating to the ForeigK RelatioM of the United States,
I9I8, supplement i, vol. i, pp. 795-8o9, for the actual diplomatic correspondence
on the subject between Lansing and American representatives abroad.
88 The New York Times, June 6-7, 1918.
126 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
diplomats fell in with Allied wishes disguised their distaste
for the whole Russian imbroglio to such an extent
that their reluctance to participate has not· been adequately
appreciated. In view of his oft-repeated advice to abstain
from interfering in the internal affairs of Russia, there can
be no doubt that Masaryk deplored greatly the new turn of
affairs. Although Bend made no direct statement regarding
the matter, there can be little doubt that he felt similarly,
but could gain nothing by any outright condemnation of
Allied objectives. However, it may safely be assumed that
the object lession of being a cat's-paw was not lost upon
Benes and had a marked influence in causing him to advocate
a policy whereby Czechoslovakia could maintain her diplomatic
independence, free from the orbit of any of the Great
Powers.
Meanwhile, in the regions held by the Czechoslovaks, there
sprang up several counter-revolutionary movements, the most
formidable of which was led by Admiral Kolchak in Siberia.
In this movement, Japan saw an opportunity to further her
own interests and occupied positions as far west as Lake
Baikal. At first the Czechoslovaks fought well against the
gradually increasing strength of the Bolsheviks, but soon
awoke to the realization that they were being employed to
fight the battles of others and that continued hostilities would
profit them nothing. They became dissatisfied to remain
mere pawns in the game of inte£national politics, with the
result that their discipline relaxed and mutinies took place.
As soon as the news of the armistice reached Russia, the
Legionaires demanded to be sent home as soon as possible,
for they no longer had any reason for going to France. In
their distress, they requested the guiding hand of some safe
politicalleader.67
Consequently, during the winter of 1918-
1919, Stefanik visited Siberia together with General Janin,
6'1 Kratochvil, op. cit., p. xog.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 127
whom France had se~t to command all the Allied forces in
Siberia, but his trip resulted in no improvement in the condition
of the war-weary troops.88
The dangerous situation of the Legions did not escape
the watchfulness of Bend, who exerted himself to the best
of his ability to try to extricate them without open friction
with the Allies. As early as April I, 1918, he had been the
recipient of a memorandum from the British-War Ministry,
which had applied pressure to induce him to retain the troops
in Russia. In response, as soon as he could leave temporarily
his pressing duties in Paris, he made a flying trip to
London, where, on May 10 he had a conference with Balfour
and another, five days later, with Lord Robert Cecil, the
British Minister of Blockade.89
In all probability, Bend
agreed to let the Czechoslovaks fight the Bolsheviks, or at
least remain in Russia. The results of two conferences have
not, as yet, been made public. Judging from the fact that
the question was left in abeyance for over a year by both
BeneS and the British, there must have existed a wide divergence
of viewpoints. On June 25, 1919, Great Britain reopened
the discussion by suggesting that the Czechoslovaks
cooperate with the right wing of Kolchak. Benes agreed to
order 30,000 men to 3:dvance via Viatka and Kotlas to Archangel,
and that the remainder should go to Vladivostok. Both
detachments were to be repatriated as soon as possible, by
the fall of the year at the latest. The contemplated plan was
deemed to produce a four-fold advantage: to effect a Czechoslovak
junction with Kolchak and with the British in the
north, to establish Kolchak's "Government of Northern
88 For details of the remainder of the campaign, cf. Jani11; General M..
"Fragments demon Journal Siberien ", I.e Monde slav, December, 1934.
pp. :UI-2140; March, 1925, pp. 339-JSS; April, 1925, pp. 19-24; "Au
G. Q. G. Russe", I.e Monde slav, January, 1926. pp. 1-24; May, 1926.
pp. 16I-185.
89 Cf. Fischer, op. cit., vol. i, pp. I14"'1IS.
128 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Russia .. upon a self-supporting basis after the Allied with"drawal,
to relieve the dangerous situation in central Siberia
which was caused by the presence of discontented Czechoslovaks,
and to strengthen the Praha government by a return
of the eastern army.70
Thereupon, in August, Benes ordered
General Syrovy to concentrate the Legions at Vladivostok,
preparatory to evacuation, but nothing was done at the time.
The Allies still continued to plead that the Czechoslovaks
were needed as the core of the forces in Russia, but Czechoslovak
discipline was lax, cooperation with Kolchak proved
impossible because of divergent objectives, Bolshevik
strength was increasing, and Allied transports failed to
appear at either Archangel or Vladivostok.n
After all, the Czechoslovaks were a mere handful in comparison
with the Bolsheviks, and it was a bitter realization
that most of their heroic efforts had been in vain. The
Legions did not desire to fight against the Reds; in fact,
they sympathized with the peasants, who were brother Slavs,
rather than with foreign Allies or with the counter-revolutionists
who ravaged the country.72
As the Reds continued
to increase in strength and sweep eastward, Czechoslovak dissatisfaction
mounted correspondingly. When the Reds captured
Omsk,73
thus threatening the whole position of the
Czechoslovaks, there remained only evacuation or destruc- .
tion. With the eastward retreat of the Czechoslovaks, the
counter-revolutionary movement fell, in spite of all the
70 Cf. Miller, op. cit., vol. xvi, pp. 458 and 47o-473 for letters exchanged
between Lloyd George and Winston Churchill that relate the story of the
pourparlers with BeneS.
'11 Kratochvil, op. cit., p. 489; Chamberlin, W. H., The Russian
Re~lution., I9I'l-I92I (New York, 1935), vol. ii, p. 182; cf. also, Graves,
op. cit., 277-278, for Czechoslovak announcement of November 16, 1919.
of their desire to return home.
n C/. Ross, op. cit., pp. 2'Io-zn, how on November 24. I9I9, five
Czechoslovak regiments refused to obey Gajda's order to advance on Perm.
n The Times, November 18, 1919.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 129
efforts of Kolchak and Gajda, for it had no real support
from the Russian people. Kolchak was killed by the Reds
at the capture of Irkutsk, February 7, 1920, soon after the
Czechoslovak evacuation.74
The trend of events convinced
the United States that continued military interv~tion would
lead to exactly the opposite result from what had been intended.16
Benes took advantage of this turn.of sentiment to
negotiate with the United States and Great Britain for the
transports that the Legions needed.76
On the day of Kolchak's
death, February 7, 1920, at the small railway station at
Kujtun, a definitive peace was signed by the Czechoslovaks
and Bolsheviks, whereby prisoners were to be exchanged,
evacuation was to proceed unhindered, and all equipment was
to be returned by the Czechoslovaks, who promised to observe
the strictest neutrality among the various Russian factions."
The first Czechoslovak transport left Vladivostok as early as
December 9, 1919, the General Staff arrived in Praha on
June 17, 1920, and the evacuation was completed on November
30, 1920.n
Intra-Slav Cooperation vs. a" Western Orientation"
While the Czechoslovak troops were still in Russia, Bend'
diplomatic ability was taxed severely as he attempted to maintain
a happy balance between two policies that threatened to
clash-intra-Slav cooperation and a" Western orientation".
After the armistice, French interest in the· Czechoslovak
n Kratochvil, ofJ. cit., p. 657.
n The New York Times, January 17, 1920 (statement of Secretary
of State regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Siberia.
January 16, 1920).
T6 RussitJ~~J-AmericaJt RelatioM, March, I9I7-March, 1920, pp. 356-357.
"Steidter, F. V., Ceskos'towMkl hJt.uti Ha Rusi (Praha, 1921), pp.
I07-1o8•
.,a Ibid., pp. 96-99, 1 u. Cf. Cizmar, J., Ruskl a rwle vojsko " revolwci
(Brno, 1926) ; Beaumont, A., Heroic Story of the Csechoslowk LegiOIIS
(Prague, 1919); Htinky, J., RrtskNII a Sibiri ( Praha, 1922).
130 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Legions increased rather than decreased: France hoped to
use them against the Bolsheviks after the War as much as
against the .Germans prior to the termination of that conflict.
Furthermore, she desired to create in Central Europe
a " cordon sanitaire " of small states to prevent the westward
spread of Bolshevism. On March 28, 1919, Marshal Foch
proposed armed intervention in Russia, which was to be
carried out, under a French commander, by a general Central
European mobilization, but his project, thanks to the efforts
of President Wilson and Lloyd George, was rejected by the
Peace Conference.79
Within Czechoslovakia, all the leaders of the various political
parties were agreed upon the necessity of insuring the
state against domestic Bolshevism by the adoption of a comprehensive
policy of social reform 80
prior to the adoption of
a definite foreign policy concerning Russia, and as the Republic
grew more and more stable, with one exception, took
a definite stand against a policy of armed intervention.
Kramar alone continued to importune Benes to become an
active member of the contemplated " cordon sanitaire " by
continued intervention in Russia, if for no other reason than
to prevent Poland, which was posing as the guardian in the
East, from obtaining an advantage at the Peace Conference
over Czechoslovakia in the boundary disputes 81
then rife
between the two countries. However, war-weariness was so
acute within Czechoslovakia tha.t Kramar could muster little
support for his project.82
79Baker, R. S., What Wilson Did at Paris (New York, 1920), p. 4ii
Thompson, C. T., The Peace Conference Day by Day (New York, 1920),
pp. 272-273; cf. also, Svorno.rt, June 20, I9I!).
80 Cf. supra, pp. 8g-gr.
8 1 For a detailed account of the boundary disputes between Czechoslovakia
and Poland, cf. infra, pp. 148 eb seq.
u HrusovskY, loc. cit., p. 126. For Kramar on Russia, cf. Kramar,
K., Die russische Krisis; Geschichte und Kritik des Bolschewismus
(Miinchen, 1925).
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 IJI
The Russian questien was vital to Czechoslovakia, which,
because.of Russia's unsettled internal condition, had to adopt
a policy of reserve. The internal affairs were no concern
of Czechoslovakia, but the general trend of Russian policy
had to be ascertained and established before she.could adopt
any decided attitude. Czechoslovakia asked nothing better
than to remain on good terms with the Russian people, for
the time being she preferred a united democratic federated
Russia with Slavophil ideals. Praha, as another Slav
center, hoped above all that it would never be necessary
to take up arms against Russia,88
and it was regrettable
that Bolshevik Russia failed to understand Czechoslovak
desires any better than Czarist Russia had done earlier.Bl
Because of this fact, the Russian question tended to occupy
in Czechoslovakia a position similar to that of Pan-Slavism
before the War, and, just as the course of the War had
destroyed the pre-war Slav policy and had demonstrated that
Pan-Slavism was a premature ideal, so was any new policy
threatened similarly with destruction by Russian intninsigeance
because of a lack of understanding!15
The official attitude
of the Czechoslovak government was perhaps best eminciated
in a book of Masaryk's, 0 BolJevictv£,86
wherein he
regarded Bolshevism, and particularly the program of Lenin,·
as trade unionism in a form which violated Karl Marx's basic
principles, inasmuch as the latter had sought a high de-
81 Cf. Mowrer, P. S., Balkanized Europe (New York, 1921), pp. 204••
Cf. Anon., "La Russie tsariste et la question tchicoslovaque ",
Le llfonde slaTJ, November, 1924. pp. 124-138.
8G BeneS, Problemy twvi Ewopy, p. 28.
88 Masaryk, T. G., 0 Bo/SevictvA (Praha, 1921), is perhaps best known
in its French translation, Sur le Bolchevisme, Geneva, Sonor, 1921.
Masarrk expressed the same beliefs in an address commemorating the
first anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic, c/. Narodn& Listy, October
29, 1919.
132 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
gree of economic and social development, whereas the former
envisaged a primitive development upon the level of the illiterate
Russian peasant. Masaryk held 'that Russia should
help herself and that Bolshevism could not be overthrown by
military intervention, but only by a comprehensive system of
social reform and political education. He felt convinced that
Bolshevism was a temporary condition in the evolution of
Russia, but warned against using such a belief as a justification
for reaction. To him, Bolshevism represented merely
an abortive form of socialism.
Thus, Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, after November
30, 1920, eschewed intervention in Russia. Bend personally
had a strong conviction that armed intervention would
have meant a continuation of the World War and another
subversion of the status quo, rather than the reconstruction
of Europe upon which his heart was set. An invasion
of Russia would be a greater undertaking than the
Allies cared to attempt, and history had shown repeatedly the
difficulty of carrying out successfully such a project. The
expeditions to Archangel, Siberia and the Caucasus had given
an indication of the vast expenditure of effort that would
be necessary. To Benes, therefore, it was not a problem of
Kolchak, W rangel, Denikin, Yudenich or any other "White"
reactionary: he had no faith in any of them, whom he considered
all as militarists of the old regime, incapable of
creating a new state. Consequently, he adopted a distinctly
negative foreign policy with regard to Russia, and became
more concerned in what Czechoslovakia would not do, rather
than in what she would do.81
Although Bend sought to prove conclusively that Czechoslovakia
would not intervene in Russia, he wished also to
leave no doubt as to his fervent hope that conditions there
81' Bend, E., Problemy no.;,e Evropy, p. 292; Five Years of Czechoslovak
Foreign Policy, p. 21.
THE GREAT POWERS; 1918-1923 133
would soon become stabilized sufficiently to permit the reestablishment
of normal relations with the rest of the world.
Without Russia, he deemed European peace and politics alike
impossible, and maintained that a blockade and the ensuing
prohibition of all intercourse would tend to prolong hard
times within Russia, to aggravate the suffering of her people,
postpone her participation in European politics, and result in
further injury to all concerned. He hoped to prevent war
between Russia and any other Slav state. Apart from its
own merits, this policy of Benes was also motivated in part
by his desire to save the lives of the prisoners of war, which
included not only the Legions, but also many others scattered
throughout Siberia who had been unable to join this force.
As a result, nearly all were eventually repatriated. In fact,
Benes went so far as to state that, initially, his Russian policy
was guided more by his desire to rescue these prisoners than
by Czechoslovakia's economic interests, which, at the time,
were limited as far as Russia was concerned.88
Since severe fighting during the later phases of the Russian
campaign had led to the capture of many Czechoslovaks, this
problem of repatriation became important and led to discussions
of other problems. As early as January, 1919,
there took place, between Moscow and Praha, an exchange
of notes whereby Czechoslovakia's independence was recognized
by Russia, but, at the same time, the latter protested
against the arrest of certain of her agents within the territories
of the former.811
A Russian Red Cross mission, in
charge of Hillerson, was sent to Praha to cope with the problem
of repatriation, but, from the moment of its arrival,
sa Benes, Five Years of CBeclwslO'llak ForeigrJ Policy, p. 22: Problemy
nove Ewopy, pp. 292-293.
•• Cf. Dennis, A. L. P., The ForeigrJ Policies of Soviet Russia (New
York, 1924), p. 398.
134 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
propaganda among local communists became so violent as
greatly to alarm Czechoslovak leaders.90
On January 31, 1920, Benes announced formally his
Russian policy to the foreign committee of the Senate. He
deplored the fact that there still remained two marked instances
of friction between Slav states: Bulgaria-Yugoslavia
and Russia-Poland. Czechoslovakia hoped to draw all the
Slav states into friendship with one another and with herself,
but did not seek to be involved in their internal affairs.
She did not concern herself with Magyar propaganda regarding
eastern Galicia, and felt that Poland should similarly
disregard Hungarian agitation over Slovakia. Likewise, she
did not wish to intervene in Russia, and asked merely that
Russia cease agitation within Czechoslovakia. Benes promised
to continue his policy of non-intervention even if there
should be any truth in current rumors of Russian designs
upon Estonia and Latvia.91
Having all faith in Russia's
future, he believed that Russia should be left to the Russians.
Nevertheless, Russia would have to terminate her reign of
terror, cease her threats of foreign intervention and of a
world-wide social revolution, and establish economic contacts
with the Western Powers before she could hope for
recognition.112
The salient feature of this new Slav policy of Benes
was its restraint. In spite of Czechoslovak-Polish friction
over boundaries,118
Benes refused to increase the existing intra-Slav
tension by taking advantage of Poland's distress
oo For the fears expressed by Masaryk, cf. Naro~£ Listy and Narodnf
Politika, October 13, 1920.
Ill Benes, E., The Foreign. Policy of Czechoslovakia (speech of January
z;, 1921, before the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies), p. zg.
oa N arodm Listy, February I, 1920; Benes, Problemy nove Evropy, pp.
43-51, 123-126; cf. also, Benes, E., '' Les Slaves et l'idee slave pendant et
apres laguerre", Le Mom:Je slav, March, 1!)26, pp. JZI-381.
118 Cf. infra, pp. x·48 et seq.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 135
during the summer of 1920, when the Russian armies were
at the gates of Warsaw. He continued to remain neutral
despite pressure exerted by an Allied military mission which
visited Praha on July 22, 1920, on its way from Paris to
Warsaw. His policy received the support of President
Masaryk, who also sympathized with Russia, but who likewise
agreed to decline France's request to aid Poland.11
"'
Perhaps BeneS could best be interpreted as a· middleman who
desired to bridge the gap between Russia and the Western
Powers, but whose services were desired by neither.115
Nothing came of an appeal, on December 24, 1919, of the
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Women to the " Women of
all Nations " against the blockade which was bringing misery
and starvation to millions of Russian women and children.118
None the less, Bend' statement of policy of January 31,
1920, helped bring about a renewal of negotiations with
Russia. On February 8, the Social Democrats in the
Czechoslovak National Assembly drafted a resolution
which called for political and commercial recognition of
Soviet Russia,117
but again no rapprochement resulted.
. Chicherin hoped to utilize these advances by a note of
February 25, 1920, to Bene5, of which extracts are as
follows:
. . . Deceived by worthless intriguers, the Czech soldiers
turned their sw01rds against their Russian brothers; they did not
know that the Russia of the workman and tlie pearsant is the
only state that desires to be a true friend of small natio.n&nations
who until 1110w were subservient to the leadership and
supervision of the mighty • • . The war with the Czecho"
D'Abernon, E. V., The Diary of an AmhassaJo,. (New York.
1929), vol. i, p. i'4; cf. also, any Praha newspaper of July 23, 1920.
95 Cf. Fischer, ot. cit., vol. ii, p. sos.
ee Soviet Russia, vol. ii, p. 181.
91 The New Yo,.k Times, Svornost, February g. 1920-
136 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Slovaks was a murderous tragedy. After untold sacrifices and
sufferings the Czecho-Slovak sdldiers, those who were fortunate
enough to escape death in Siberia, recognized the ga-eat error
of which they had been victims, and closed an aga-eement 98 with
the Soviets, which guarnnteed them a free pa!Ssage-a thing they,
of course, could have had long before.
. . . The Rll'SISian G<>vernment is fully convinced that there
exists no !Serious obstla.cle in the way of renewing peaceable and
f:riendly relations with both Republics, and send, therefore,
today to the Government of all the nrutioll!S of the Czechoslovak
Republic a formaJl proposal to begin negotiatioos for the pw-pose
of esta!hlishing peaceable relations and a peace agreement between
both countries. We are convinced that commercial relations
between the two cou!lltlries would result in the greatest
mutual benefit f.or both States, and that permanent friendship
will come to life, beneficial to bo:th countries. We would request
the Czech01Slovak G<>vernment to inform us regarding their
wishes as to the place where our delegates could meet the delegates
of Czecho-Slovakia.911
A second note from Chicherin two days later expressed
the hope that the working masses of Czechoslovakia would
prevent a war with Russia.100
On March II, in reply to a parliamentary interpellation
before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly,
Benes stated the goal of his subsequent Russian
policy. It appears that an e*planation was demanded of
Benes because the governments of France and Italy had
requested a clarification of his intentions. Benes expressed
a conviction that Czechoslovakia must neither anticipate
events nor lag behind other Powers. His policy regarding
Russia must await the action of the Great Powers with whose
98 The Treaty of Kujtun, February 7, 1920, already discussed.
99 Soviet Russia, vol. ii, pp. 615-616.
'1oo Ibid., vol. ii, p. 4'1.2.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-19ZS 137
foreign policies his own was associated.101
On April 2, he
stated, further, that the Czechoslovak government was ready
to open negotiations with Russia " along with other Allied
Powers ''.102
In this manner, while expressing a willingness
to subordinate his Russian policy to a " Western orientation
", BeneS made clear to the Great Powers the fact that
Czechoslovakia's cooperation did not ·inean subservience or
the loss of diplomatic independence.
BeneS replied to Chicherin by a note of April 14 that he
was ready to negotiate, and that only the resumption of
normal relations between Western and Eastern Europe could
relieve the unbearable situation in which Europe found itself.
He was delighted because of the safe return of the Legions
and because of the prospects for future friendship.108
Bene5'
optimism was premature, for no advantage was taken of
Chicherin's offer; in fact, direct negotiations were abruptly
discontinued. Except for Benes' statements of March I 1
and April 2, there is no direct evidence that Bene5 was
compelled to make a choice between his eastern and western
policies; however, if such were the case, it would he to
the best interests of Czechoslovakia to attempt to conceal
the fact. There were many anti-Russian influences that
might have brought.pressure on Benes. . In Czechoslovakia
public opinion in general, as well as the Kramar and Agrarian
blocs, opposed too hasty a rapprochement with Russia,
particularly after the Legionaires arrived to relate their
experiences. Then, too, there should be remembered, in addition
to the ever-powerful influence of France, the fact that
Czechoslovakia was on the eve of the formation of the Little
101 N6rodnl PolitikG, Narotlni Listy, March n, 1920; Svonwst, March
IS, 1920.
102 N4rodnf Politika, N6rodni Listy, April 2, t92(); Svornost, April
3. 1920.
1oa Stntiet Russia, vol. iii, pp. 52-53; Pr6vo Lidu, May n, 1920-
138 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Entente/04
the other members of which, Yugoslavia and
Rumania, particularly the latter, were on bad terms with
Russia, and that, in view of this fact, Czechoslovakia could
hardly afford to risk their distrust by appearing too friendly
with the Bolsheviks.105
Neverili;eless, certain Czechoslovak individuals and organizations
still attempted to draw the two countries closer together.
Representatives of the Czech Consumers' League
left for Russia in order to open relations with the Russian
economic organizations.106
On March 22, 1920, an official
Czechoslovak mission had a long session with Lenin regarding
prisoners of war and the establishment of agricultural
relations, but, although the immediate objectives of the
mission were attained and although mutual expressions of
good will were plentiful, the incident did little to better relations
generally.107
Another futile gesture of Czechoslovak
good-will was the telegram of greeting from committees of
the Social Democrat party and from the trade unions of
Praha to a mass meeting of English workers, scheduled for
August 22, which declared their solidarity with the latter in
their refusal to participate in any act hostile to Soviet
Russia.108
This act was followed by a Czechoslovak delegation
of trade unionists which visited Petrograd and
Moscow October 15 and 17.109
In response, a delegation of
Russian laborers visited Bmo to examine Czech methods of
104 Cf. infra, pp. 16z et seq.
1 05 The writer is aware that the inference that Benes was faced with
a choice is more or less speculative; but in view of the general methods
of Benes, and particularly the unusual generalities in his speech of January
27, 1921, to the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies, The Foreign
Policy of Czechos&ovakia (pp. 2&-32 on Russia), bhe theory of a choice
appears the best explanation for the abrupt termination of negotiations.
'106Prage:r Tagblatt, February 29, ·1920; Soviet Russia, vol. ii, p. 342·
· 107 Soviet Russia, vol. ii, p. 6zz.
1os Pravo Lidu, August 20, 1920.
'1119 Soviet Russia, vol. iii, p. 493·
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 139
organization and welfare of the working dasses.110
Yet,
relations between the two countries grew more and more
strained, for, as soon as Russia realized that a rapprochement
was impossible, she resumed her former tactics of
spreading propaganda by accusing Benes falsely of favoring
reaction in Russia and by urging the Czechoslovak proletariat
to attack hiin.111
In spite of this renewal of agitation within Czechoslovakia,
the Bolsheviks came to realize gradually that such tactics
were doing their cause more harm than good. During 1920
and 1921, they turned gradually to a policy which they hoped
would terminate their isolation. Czechoslovakia felt some
of its effects. Despite the allotment of large sums of money
to Hillerson, the campaign for world revolution fell off
rapidly within the Republic, a fact which could not be accounted
for solely by the effect of the Russian famine upon
the minds of Czechoslovak radicals. In July, telegraphic
communication was opened with Soviet Russia, but, during
the summer, there followed also an exchange of unofficial
missions between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine.112
.
The Genoa Conference
As early as the latter part of 1919 there had been indications
of a change in European viewpoints and policies towards
Russia. The successive collapses of the various
counter-revolutionary movements had demonstrated that the
Bolsheviks could neither be beaten nor starved; yet, on the
other hand, how was trade to be resumed? Could the world
continue to remain part communist and part capitalist?
Could the Bolsheviks be trusted? The French policy of the
" cordon sanitaire ", except for Poland, was weakening
gradually, and the British were averse to the continuation of
no Ibid., vol. iii, p. 6o6.
'111 "Burtsev and Benes ", ibid., vol. iii, pp. 48.2-483.
1111 Dennis, ot. cit., p. 399·
140 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1995
expensive and useless armed intervention. By 1920 all concerned
were seeking some other solution of the problem.ns
The Russian leaders, realizing the necessity of relieving the
famine and general distress that was then prevalent in Russia,
proclaimed the New Economic Policy. The resulting
abandonment of strict communistic practices was confirmed
by the trade agreement of March 16, 1921, with Great
Britain, the first of the Allies to recognize Russia de facto.m
The general economic crisis of 1921 gave birth to the idea
of an international economic conference to settle definitively
the problems of Europe as a whole. At the reparations conference
of December 10, 1921, Briand and Lloyd George
discussed the project and the conference of the Supreme
Council at Cannes on January 6, 1922, was called primarily
with this object in view. ·At this latter meeting, Lloyd
George succeeded in arranging for a conference at Genoa,
which was to meet from April 10 to May 16, 1922, to
attempt to solve in particular the problem of Russia. There
arose marked differences of opinion as to the provisional
agenda, and Poincare, who had succeeded Briand as the
spokesman of France, insisted that the Peace Treaties and
the question of reparations be excluded specifically from any
discussion. Consequently, the agenda was composed of the
questions of peace, prosperity, order, credit, exchange and
transportation for all Europe, Russia induded.111
;
Although the Little Entente cmd Poland were directly concerned
in the questions that were to be discussed at Genoa,
the problem of Russia was regarded quite differently by
1u Ibid., pp. 377-378; Buell, R. L., Europe: a History of Ten Ye<Jrs
(New York, 1929), pp. 272-275; Temperley, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. JII-324-
1'16 Temperley, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 325·
1'15 Resolutions Adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January
I922, as the Basis of the Genoa Conference (London, 1922); Temperley,
op. dt., vol. vi, p. 326-328; Cosma, A., Jr., La Petite Entente (Paris,
1!)26)' pp. 84-86.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923
Praha, Belgrade, Bucharest and Warsaw.118
Since all four
states were interested in preventing the reopening of the question
of reparations and any revision of the Peace Treaties,
they eagerly adopted the French thesis of the inviolability of
the latter. They wished to remain in accord with the Great
Entente and with one another. To collaborate in a common
policy, they held their own Conference at Bucharest,m· February
2o-24, and a later Conference at Belgrade,118
March
9-12, in which they prepared a specific program for Genoa.
Bend, in the realization that it was merely a question of
time before his negative Russian policy would become positive,
welcomed every opportunity for European cooperation
in a common policy towards Russia; in fact, he was one of
the pioneers in advocating a European conference regarding
her.119
To this end, before the Genoa Conference met, he
visited London 120
and Paris 121
to present the viewpoints of
the Little Entente and to ascertain those of the Western
Powers. At the same time he became the intermediary
through whom a compromise was reached upon the points
still at issue between Great Britain and France,122
for he realized
how important to Czechoslovakia was the solidarity of
the Western Powers. He obtained the support of France
regarding the inviolability of the Peace Treaties and also that
of Great Britain regarding de facto recognition of Russia.
In the estimation of Benes, the Genoa Conference should
ns For full details, cf. infra, pp. 197 et seq.
111 Le Temps, February 28, 1922; Cosma, op. cit., p. 87; :Mousset, A.,
La Petite Entente (Paris, 1923), pp. 82-83.
us :Mousset, op. cit., pp. 83-85; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 91-93.
1111 Cf. p,·ager Presse, December zs, 1921, for Benes' statement on
behalf of Russia.
no Cf. The Times, February 16, 1922.
1.21 Cf. Le Temps, February 23, 1922; also Danubius, La Petite En-tente
et fOrient, Un Cri tfAlarme (Paris, 1922).
na Cf. Correspond-ence Between His Majesty's Government awl the
French G01.1ernment Re$/ech'ng the Genoa CO'!t/erence (London. 1922).
142 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
have three main objectives: the reconstruction of Russia and
the renewal of economic contacts with her; the stabilization
of economic relations among other states· by individual internal
reforms; and the abolition of the distinction between
victor and vanquished states, whereby the latter were to be
granted, for the first time since the War, a voice in the
deliberations. He realized that the first objective might be
the most difficult to realize, but he hoped to effect its consummation
by supplementing it with a series of acts aimed
specifically at the reconstruction of Russia, particularly by
providing relief for Russian refugees,128
by some concessions
regarding Russia's repudiated debts, and by leaving open the
possibility that the Western Powers, should they still distrust
Russia, might exact further special guarantees from her.1
u
The last two objectives of the Conference-a general stabilization
of economic relations and the reintroduction into the
"Concert of Europe" of the former enemy states-had been
championed by Czechoslovakia for three years.12
G
The Genoa Conference opened optimistically on April 10,
1922, and, at its first plenary session, the twenty-nine states
present, in addition to those within the British Empire, decided
to appoint four Commissions : on politics, finance, economics
and transportation. Since the burning issue was the
renewal of relations with Russia, the first, or Political Commission,
dominated the entire Conference. It was perhaps
an error to stake the success of,.the entire Conference upon
this question.128
On April 16, the world was stunned by the
announcement of the Treaty of Rapallo, whereby Russia and
Germany agreed to cancel all debts unless Russia paid other
creditors and to make a separate trade agreement. This new
us Official Journal, March, 1922, p. 274; April, 192'2, pp. 338-340.
1 Z4 Benes, Problemy nove Ewo'fr:y, pp. I65-I70; Cosma, op. cit., p. 87.
us Cf. Srom, J. E., "Sovetske Rusko a Janov ", Zahranicn£ Politika,
vol. i, pp. 429-434uo
Cf. D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. i, p. 331.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 143
alignment aroused the fears of the Western Powers and of
Poland.12
' It was declared to have vitiated the efforts of
the Political Commission and rendered futile its comprehensive
agenda, which included such questions as the recognition
of the Russian pre-war debt, Bolshevistic propaganda in
foreign countries, and the repayment of the Rumanian gold
which had been sent by the Rumanian National Bank to
Moscow in 1916, under Allied guarantee during the German
occupation of Rumania, and which had been confiscated by
the Soviet. No general improvement seemed possible without
a comprehensive debt agreement, which was a concession
that Russia refused to grant. The Russian proposal regarding
a comprehensive anti-war pact, and the question of dis.
armament, despite the support of the states of the Little
Entente, were similarly doomed because of the opposition of
the Western Powers. Consequently, in view of the solidarity
between Germany and Russia, although the life of
the Conference was prolonged until May 19, three days
beyond the time which had been allocated originally, it failed
to solve the problem of Russia,128
which was relegated to a
new Conference at the Hague 1211
on June 26. This fresh
attempt failed again because of a lack of agreement between
the Powers and Russia, which was expected to make all the
concessions.
n1 For the Treaty of Rapallo and the subsequent exchange of notes
between Russia and Poland (April25-May 3, 1922), cf. L'Europe oouvelle,
May 13, 1922. C/. also, D'Abernon. op. cit., vol. i, pp. 309-319 and 333-
335·
·ua For the details of the Genoa Conference, cf. Giannini, A., Les
Documents de Ia COfl.ference de Gines (Rome, 1922); Mills, J. S., The
Genoa COfl./erence (New York, 1922); Memorandum of the Russian
Delegatio,. to the Genoa Conference (Genoa, 192.2); Reply of the Russian
Delegatitm to the Memorandum of Afay 2, 1922 (Genoa, 1922); Les
Reclamations de Ia Russie aus £tats responsables de finteroentio,. et du
blocus (Genoa, 1922) ; Coinfirence lconomique internationale de Gbtu
9 avril-19 moi, 1922 (Paris, 1922).
"1:19 C/. Papers Relating to the Hague Conference, June-lul;v, I9U
(London, 1922).
!44 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1955
Even though the problem of Russia continued unsolved,
the Genoa Conference remained a source of gratification to
the Little Entente because of the strengthening of its ties
with France and because of the recognition it had obtained
from the Powers. Together with Poland, it had been invited
to send to the Supreme Council one delegate to represent
the bloc, which was included in this manner in all the
Commissions ·and which was considered by Great Britain,
France and Italy, for all practical purposes, as a fourth Great
Power.130
Benes had been particularly gratified by the activity of the
Little Entente at Genoa, and regarded the recognition that
had been attained as the reward of solidarity among the three
little Powers and Poland. This solidarity had been enhanced
by a well-prepared program, which had been aided by daily
meetings of the representatives. of the four states at Benes'
headquarters at the Hotel Bristol, where the topics for discussion
had been elaborated in advance of each meeting of
the Conference.131
The Rapprochement with Russia
After the Genoa Conference, Czechoslovakia would have
been ·little nearer a solution of her Russian problem than
before had it not been for her own efforts. In view of the
differences of opinion concerning Russia that existed among
the Great Powers and even among the members of the Little
Entente, Benes turned to the alternative of a separate commercial
treaty between Czechoslovakia and Russia: he would
not have been· himself had he let slip such an opportunity.
18°Cosma, op. cit., pp. 95-98; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 253-200;
Mousset, op. cit., pp. 92-95; Dvoracek, J., "Janovsk3. Konference ",
Zahranicn1 Politika, vol. i, pp. 165-170.
u1 For Bend' speech of May 23, 1922, before the Czechoslovak parliament,
summarizing his actions at Genoa, cf. Benes, Problemy nove Evropy,
pp. 175-<192; L'Europe nouvelle, June 3, 1922; or Zpravy (Poslanecki
Snemovna), 130 meeting, May ZJ, 1922, pp. 423 el seq., 5 session; 142
meeting, May 30, 1922, pp. 591 et seq., 5 session.
THE GREAT POWERS, 1918-1923 145
During the course of the Conference, he sounded Chicherin
upon the subject. The approach was difficult, for the latter
was suspicious of a Little Entente that was dominated by
France. Chicherin, in the belief that Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia owed racial allegiance to Slavic Russia rather
than to Latin France, regarded Ben~s as a Slav renegade.182
At Genoa, Bend had advocated merely de facto recognition
of Russia, and had vigorously opposed de jure recognition,
on the ground that the time for such a move was not ripe;
lest it be followed by evil consequences in Europe in general
and among the labor parties in particular, which in tum
might result in even greater reaction from the Right. In
spite of these sources of friction, BeneS' approach was welcomed
by Chicherin, who agreed readily to a treaty, which
was concluded at Genoa, but signed later.188
The provisional treaty, which was signed at Praha on
June 5, 1922, was a compromise in which both countries
abandoned their extreme demands in order to effect a
rapprochement, Russia in particular giving up de jure recognition
and credits, demands which she had regarded hitherto
as vital portions of any treaty that she would negotiate.
The text indicated that Russia desired to retain a monopoly
of foreign trade, since it condemned in advance any business
arrangements that might be drawn up with private individuals
or groups in Russia that did not either represent the
Bolshevik government directly or have special permission
from it to engage in foreign trade. Czechoslovakia was
unable to obtain any better terms on the problem of the
restoration of the property of her own citizens in Russia than
the mere statement that the question would be reserved for
future discussion. Russia agreed similarly to reserve for
ua C/. D'Abernon, op. cit., vot ii, p. 88. Cf. also, ibid., vol. i, p. 316,
for the report that, on April 26, 1922, Russia bad proposed that Czechoslovakia
prohibit the export of arms to the Russian borderlands.
ua Benes, Problemy nO'VI EwoJry, p. 293; Five Years of Csechoslovale
Foreign Policy, pp. 23-24-
146 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
future discussion the problem of de jure recognition, and,
for the time being, to remain satisfied with the de facto recognition
that the mere negotiation of a· commercial treaty
would entail. Other agreements that were generally the
more favorable to Czechoslovakia were: the guarantee of
security of the property and of unrestricted travel to the
citizens of the other country, a cessation of propaganda
against one another, a diplomatic and consular agreement,
and a pledge of neutrality in the event of an attack on either
by some third Power.134
On the whole, the tone of the
treaty was cordial. In view of the intimate relations that
had been established between Russia and the Ukraine/35
Czechoslovakia negotiated also, on the same day, a similar
treaty with the latter.136
In this manner, Czechoslovakia solved temporarily her
Russian problem and placed relations between the two countries
upon a workable basis. After the conclusion of the
commercial treaty, communist agitation, although still
present, declined even more noticeably than during 1921. As
the sequel was to show, in the opinion of Benes, the five years
of tortuous negotiations with the Great Powers had not been
in vain. The result was a happy compromise between his
eastern and western policies which had helped Czecho- .
slovakia, and Central Europe as well, to work out its own
particular problems of reconstruction with a minimum of
interference from the Great POwers. The latter had been
permitted to assist in the process of reconstruction, but had
not been allowed to attract within their individual orbits the
small states of this region.137
1.u For the text, cf. Obchodnf smlouvy meziswtni, vol. i, pp. 386-391.
u:; For the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty of Alliance of December 28, 1!)20,
cf. Prager Presse, July 16, 1922 (German text).
ne For the text, cf. Obchodn4 smlowvy meziswtni, vol. i, pp. 392-397.
n1 Cf. Benes, Five Years of CzechoslO'lJO.k Foreign Policy (Speech of
February 6, 1924, before the Foreign Committee of the Senate), pp.
:zo-2g.
CHAPTER IV
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE, 1918-1923
BENES' CENTRAL EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES
DuRING 1918-1923 Bend considered the reconstruction of
Central Europe the most important of his many problems.
Within this region the World War had brought about
changes that would require the best efforts of all concerned,
if stability was to be restored. Central Europe had its own
peculiar problems and viewpoints; it could not follow blindly
the policies of any of the Great Powers or rely upon either
East or West alone. With Russia beset by her own internal
troubles and with Germany relegated temporarily to a position
of relative impotence, the Central European stage
appeared set as the scene for French and Italian rivalry.
The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia envisaged the diplomatic
independence of Central Europe, certainly that of its
small victor states at least. Bend sought to create in this
area a political and economic structure that would be both
constructive and permanent.1
Bend, a thorough realist, appreciated the difficulties that
would have to be surmounted if his objective was not to
remain a theoretical ideal. He feared the inevitable interference
of interested Great· Powers. Then, too, he was by
no means certain of the cooperation of even the victorious
small states of Central Europe, to say nothing of the vanquished.
Besides Czechoslovakia, victorious Rumania,
Yugoslavia and Poland, and vanquished Austria and Hun-
1 C/. Bene$, E., •• Probleme des petites nations apres Ia guerre
mondiale ", u .AIonde slav, December, 1925, pp. 4IJ-4JS.
147
148 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
gary formed integral parts of the new Central Europe.
Would it be possible to arrive at any COJ:Il!IlOn understanding
that would be mutually satisfactory to all six states, or even
to the four victorious ones, who might then impose it upon
the defeated two?
Czechoslovakia regarded her small neighbors with varying
degrees of friendship or antipathy. She felt most hostile
towards Hungary, the only one of the defeated states that
failed to resign itself, even temporarily, to the results of the
World War. Towards Austria, the feeling of antipathy
was relatively mild, partly because of Austria's conciliatory
policy, partly because of Czechoslovakia's desire to prevent
Anschluss, and partly because Austria was expected to
become, after Germany, her best customer. On the other
hand, the highest degree of friendship was felt towards
Yugoslavia, partly because of the close Slavic kinship and
partly because the two countries were almost entirely free
from clashing interests. Similarly, relations with Rumania
were cordial, since no major interests came into conflict.
Only with Poland, Czechoslovakia's nearest Slav neighbor,
were relations uncertain immediately after the attainment of
independence.2
Boundary Disputes with Poland
The analogies between Poland and Czechoslovakia were
marked. Both were new Slavic states; in both some leaders
had looked to Russia and some to Germany or Austria-Hungary
for salvation, but, in the end, both had won independence
with the aid of the West, especially of France; both
were exposed to Russian Bolshevism and a resurrection of
German militarism; and both had obtained such large minorities
that they needed assistance in maintaining the status
quo established by the Peace Treaties. Consequently, coa
Cf. Masaryk, T. G., Les Slaves apres Ia guerre (Prague, 1923).
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 149
operation against the former enemy states might almost have
been taken for granted as a necessity for their continued
independent existence. However, since the oppression that
Poland had been forced to endure at the hands of Russia
caused her to have little faith in the ideals of intra-Slav cooperation,
racial appeals from Praha evoked little response
in Warsaw~ Moreover, Bene5, while adyocating warm
friendship for Poland, advised against any hasty relationship
which might lead to an entangling alliance, particularly since
Poland, apparently secure because of the backing of France,
was pursuing an aggressive territorial policy, an attitude well
calculated to develop antagonisms with all her neighbors. In
the estimation of BeneS, Poland apparently failed to appreciate
the dangers involved in her exposed geographical position
and forward policy. Therefore, he considered it wise
for Czechoslovakia to avoid a course that might com.mit
her to some cause foreign to her own interests.•
The land hunger of both countries, moreover, dissipated
any hopes of immediate friendship between them. In· their
desire for more territory, the two states engaged in a series
of boundary disputes which, for approximately five years,
overshadowed all other contacts and threatened both their
mutual friendship and Poland's cooperation in Czechosl~
vakia's plans for the reconstruction of Central Europe. The
frontier areas in question were Tesin, Orava and SpiS, of
which the first was the most important.
The Duchy of Tesin, which contained an area of 877
square miles and, according to the census of 1910, 426,370
inhabitants, of whom fifty-five per cent were Polish, twentyseven
per cent Czech and eighteen per cent German, lies between
Bohemia and Upper Silesia. Before the Peace Conference
met, and even before either Czechoslovakia or Poland
had established permanent governments, the respective
a Bend, Problem:v nove Evro/>3', p. 29.
ISO FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
National Councils, as early as November 5, I918, had divided
the Duchy, and had granted to Poland Tesin, Bilsko
(Bielitz) and the Polish-speaking portions of Frystat. For
the time being, the Duchy was to be governed by a central
committee of seven Czechs, seven Poles and five Germans.4
', ·,Jp. spite of this amicable settlement, which was understood
by both patties to be merely temporary until such a time
as the Peace Conference would apportion the territory in
question, Poland, on December IO, 19I8, attempted to draft
men from the Duchy into her army and announced that, in
January, I9I9, the Duchy would hold elections for deputies
to be sent to the Diet at Warsaw. After a Czech representative
had been arrested for protesting against such procedure,
Czechoslovakia, on January 22, I919, demanded
Polish evacuation of the Duchy.5
A week later, in defense
of this move, Benes stressed the danger of basing hasty conclusions
upon Austrian statistics which were notoriously inaccurate.6
Meanwhile, after the demand for evacuation had
been rejected by Poland, frontier skirmishing ensued for a
few days.
Tesin was claimed at the Peace Conference by both
Czechoslovakia and Poland. Since the Duchy was an economic
unit and had not been divided in the past, Czechoslovakia
claimed it in its entirety for the following reasons:
{I) Tesin had formed part of the Kingdom of Bohemia;
(2) most of the Poles were either Silesians or other immigrants;
(3) the coal fields should not be separated from the
industries outside the Duchy that were dependent upon them ;
(4) the railway from Oderburg to Jablunka was indispensable
both economically and strategically because, on the main
line from Berlin to Budapest, it connected Slovakia with
. 4 Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 356.
5 Prager Presse, January 23, 1919.
e Miller, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 68-70.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 151
Bohemia and Moravia; (5) since a portion of the undeveloped
Karvin basin lay within Poland, the latter would not
be deprived entirely of the coal of the region; and (6)
Czechoslovakia had to obtain complete possession of the railways
and mines in order to maintain the economic unity
of the Duchy, which she felt could not be guaranteed adequately
otherwise, not even by subsequent special treaties.7
Poland, on the other hand, though she conceded to Czechoslovakia
the one district to Frydek, which contained the best
coal deposits, continued to insist upon retaining the other
three--Tesin, Frystat and Bilsko--for linguistic reasons.
She demanded, further, the Oderburg-Jablunka railway.
Poland contended that the econpmic considerations advanced
by Czechoslovakia did not justify the latter's demands for
ownership. In the estimation of Poland, Czechoslovakia's
major difficulty-a shortage of coal--could be easily surmounted
by special conventions permitting coal imports from
the Karvin mines.8
On January 27, the Peace Conference opened its deliber;ttions
upon the question of Tesin, and, on February 3, reached
a decision whereby both disputants were warned against attempting
to create any fait accompli within a territory that
was to be assigned by the Conference. It then relegated the
dispute to an Inter-Allied Commission which recommended
that Czechoslovakia hold provisionally the northern, and
Poland the southern part of the Duchy. In the interim, the
local administration which had been created during the
preceding November was to remain in control."
r Peace Conference Delegation, 1919, Menwirs, no. 4. "Le probleme de
Ia Silesie de Teschen "; cf. also, Kellor, of'. cit., vol. i, pp. 343-346;
Temperley, of'. cit., vol. iv, pp. 349, 3'53-354•
Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 354-355.
• Ibid., p. 357; :Miller, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 423-424; vol. xiv, pp. IS5·ts7.
152 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Bend accepted this temporary arrangement on the same
day, but wrote also to Clemenceau, invoking anew the doctrine
of historical boundaries, a plea that received no
response. Bene$ was aware that France remained in doubt
as to which of her two friends she should favor, and
that Poland, because of her greater population might easily
carry more weight. Paris felt that Poland must not be
weakened in any way, not only in view of a possible conflict
with Germany, but because, with Rumania,. she formed a
bulwark against Russia.10
At this stage of the controversy, Bend' hand seemed to
be forced by the. clamor of Czechoslovak public opinion,
which demanded action.11
The Czechoslovaks apparently
failed to appreciate that the friendship of Poland was more
valuable than the small area in dispute, and, elated by the
relatively easy territorial victories that were being won on
the other frontiers at the Peace Conference, could not understand
the delay over Tesin. They did not realize that the
good impression which Czechoslovakia had created with her
reserve and moderation might be jeopardized if too forward
a policy regarding Tesin should be adopted. In this dispute,
however, neither country had the unreserved support of
France, which deemed the friendship of both essential to
her. France toyed temporarily with the idea of replacing
Austria-Hungary by Poland and Czechoslovakia. She
sought to evade the necessity of'1Ilaking a choice by suggesting
either arbitration or a plebiscite.12
To prevent another outbreak of hostilities and avert the
possibility that the Peace Conference might award the entire
~o Benes, op. cit., pp. 62-64; Vochoc, loc. cit., pp. 1o8-rog.
u Benes and Kramar made a private agreement that the latter would
defend the demand for Tesin obstinately, while Benes would remain
amenable to compromise. Cf. Benes, op. cit., p. 66. However, this move,
which was originally considered good tactics, became a boomerang.
1 2 Benes, op. cit., pp. 64-65; House and Seymour, op. cit., p. 70.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 153
Duchy to Poland, Benes felt it necessary to end the dispute,
even at the cost of concessions. Consequently, he suggested
that Bilsko be awarded to Poland, and the remainder of the
Duchy to Czechoslovakia, a proposal which was accepted by
the territorial commission on April 14, 1919, but which was
rejected by Poland. At the request of the United States,
Benes opened direct negotiations with Paderewski, the Polish
Foreign Minister, but could reach no agreement except to
continue negotiations.18
On April 20, the Tesin Commission
presented a new plan whereby Poland would receive
Bohumin, Karvin and Tesin, and Czechoslovakia the remaining
regions in which she might construct new connections
from Frydek to Jablunka, but this project was ruined also
by delays in agreement between the two states.14
Three days
later Czechoslovakia refused to yield Orava for strategic
reasons, lest Poland obtain a footing in the upper valleys on
the Czechoslovak side of the Carpath:ians.111
As a sign of
moderation, Benes offered to cede Tesin up to the Vistula,
but refused to yield further. The deadlock was apparently
broken by a Czechoslovak-Polish Conference at Cracow
at the end of July, but, after an auspicious opening, differences
once more arose when Czechoslovakia again offered the
area up to the Vi~tula, whereas Poland insisted upon a
plebiscite which she hoped would be more favorable to her.18
When no decision had been reached by August 5, 1919,
the last day which had been set by the Powers, the whole
dispute was referred to the Supreme Council. On August
22 Czechoslovakia rejected the territorial commission's proposal
to divide the Karvin coal fields. Early in the following
month, Bend and Dmowski presented their final argu-
18 C/. Miller, op. cit., vol. xvii, pp. 35-39, for the telegraphic correspondence
among Benes, Svehla and Paderewski concerning Tesin.
,.. Benes, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
u Miller, op. cit., vol. xvi, pp. 107-115.
u Vochoc, loc cit., p. I'IO.
I 54 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
ments to the Supreme Council, which, from all indications,
was moved primarily by the plea that the coal of Tesin was
vital to Czechoslovakia. At the same time the representatives
from Tesin agreed with Benes and Kramar that the
Olsa River represented the limit of Czechoslovakia's vital
needs. France attempted to save Karvin and the railroad
from Kosice to Bohumin for Czechoslovakia, but, when the
Powers failed to agree, accepted the plebiscite on September
27, 1919.17
All men and women over the age of twenty and
residents since August I, 1914, might vote. The Plebiscite
Commission finally arrived on January 30, 1920, to encounter
propaganda and racial friction which culminated in riots in
May when II,6oo Tesin miners struck in the Karvin area.
Consequently, a fair plebiscite was deemed hopeless by the
Commission itsel£.18
By the summer of 1920, it seemed as if Poland would be
ruined by the Bolshevik invasion. Her war with Russia
had been the direct result of her policy of expansion. In
spite of the advice of the Allies and of offers of peace from
Chicherin, Poland had sought to revive her frontiers of I 772.
For a time she was successful, even to the capture of Kiev,
but her ambition proved superior to her resources. A
Russian counter-offensive reached the gates of Warsaw by
July, 1920. Poland was saved only after desperate efforts
on her part, and because of the help of France, which sent
munitions and a staff of officers, led by General Weygand,
who assumed supreme command.19
Subsequently, the Russians
were driven to the east. The Treaty of Riga,20
11 Ibid., p. III.
18 Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 358-36o.
111 Cf. D'Abernon, op cit., vol. i, p. 75.
oo Treaty Series, vol. iv, p. 32; for full details of Poland's boundary
struggles, 1918-2o, cf. Przybylski, A., La Pologne ~ lutte pour ses
/rontieres (Paris, 1929).
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 1 55
of October 12, 1920r which terminated the war, resulted in
ethnographically unwarrantable Polish gains.
In the hour of Poland's greatest distress, BeneS had to
make one of the major decisions of his diplomatic career.
Public opinion in Czechoslovakia demanded a .strong stand
against Poland, or even military cooperation with Russia
against her. Benes, with the support ·of President Masaryk,
determined to be strictly neutral: he wisely refused to
heed either the domestic clamor or the rumor of a French
request to help Poland. Allegedly, French pressure was
exerted upon Czechoslovakia by the Allied military mission,
which visited Praha on July 22, 1920, on its way from Paris
to Warsaw.'~1
According to another rumor emanating from
Warsaw,22
even the State Department of the United States
was reported to have informed Czechoslovakia that the route
must be kept open for ammunition and supplies to Poland!
Without exception, the Praha newspapers of July 28 discussed
at length what the action of the government should be
if the Allies should actually make such a demand. Czechoslovak
labor organizations were particularly active in. demanding
a prohibition of arms shipments to Poland across
Czechoslovak territories. There can be no doubt that the
action of Germany, which, on July 25, proclaimed neutrality
and forbade transportation of all war materials to either
belligerent,28
had great influence upon the actions of Czechoslovakia,
which on August 7, issued a similar declaration
of neutrality.2
' Apart from the dislike of becoming involved
in a foreign quarrel, Benes' policy was dictated by his desire
to promote intra-Slavic solidarity, an ideal which had already
M Cas, Narodn4 Listy, Narodn£ Politika, July 23. 1920.
32 Gazeta Warsaawska, July 24. ·1920; SwNUJst, July 26, 1920.
38 Deutscher Reichsa.nzeiger uttd PreussiscMr Staatsanzeiger, July 28,
1920.
u Prcivo Lidu, August 8, 1920; SvoNUJst, August 9. 1920.
156 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1996
been dealt a cruel blow by the Russo-Polish war and which
he felt would be further injured by Czechoslovakia's participation
on either side. He hoped that Russia would recover
her former position as a Great Power, whereas Poland feared
that such an event might subvert the new status quo which
had been established by the Treaty of Riga.25
Benes' moderation became more praiseworthy in view of
the fact that Czechoslovakia and Poland had other sources
of friction besides boundary disputes. They differed also
in their policies concerning their Ukrainian minorities.
Poland ruled sternly in Galicia which she had seized by
force in 1919, and which, except for a temporary Russian
occupation during the summer of 1920, remained hers de
facto until March 15, 1923, when the.Allies awarded it to
her de jure. In contrast, Czechoslovakia had promised
Ruthenia concessions almost tantamount to national autonomy.
Then, too, Poland flirted with Hungary, with which
she had no quarrel, and which, according to generally prevalent
rumors, offered during July, 1920, her aid against
Russia, in return for Polish support in recovering territory
from Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. In any
event, such rumors retarded the rapprochement between
Czechoslovakia and Poland.26
Czechoslovak-Polish relations became still further complicated
by an apparent attempt on the part of Germany to fish
in troubled waters. Poland resented bitterly German sympathy
with Czechoslovakia during the Tesin dispute. Benes
was far from having, as rumors intimated, any understanding
with Germany at Poland's expense. On the contrary,
he believed that Germany desired Poland to obtain both
a& Benes, op. cit., pp. 92-94-
26 Jeden Svooek, "Benes a Mala Dohoda ", Dr. Edvard Benes, pp. 234-
235; Mousset, op. cit., p. r8; Toynbee, A. J., Survey of Intern<Jtional
Affairs, I92o-:13, p. 282; Bend, op. cit., pp. 12o-122.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 157
Galicia and a large portion of Russia, but not Posen and
Silesia, not, as Germany maintained, in order to strengthen
Poland, but in order to antagonize her and Russia, and force
Czechoslovakia to become unfriendly to one of them. Benes
deemed Germany's action a further justification for his policy
of intra-Slav cooperation, and felt that her future course
could be checked only by the united action pf the three SlaV'
states. In the Upper Silesian dispute, he supported Poland,
rather than Germany, in spite of the existing friction, and
gave the lie to the then current rumor that the Allies would
compensate Poland with Te?iin for the expense of her recent
war with Russia.2
'~'
In the meantime, the T esin dispute continued to drag
along. The Czechoslovak Committee on Foreign Affairs
still preferred a plebiscite to arbitration, despite the failure
of one attempt to hold an impartial vote. This fact was
distorted by the press until the Czechoslovak public came to
delude itself with the belief that a majority vote in a plebiscite
would award Czechoslovakia the whole Duchy. It was
considered good tactics to claim all and bargain later. Benes
realized that, even if Czechoslovakia did obtain most of the
coal-producing areas, it would still be an economic disaster,
whereas Poland had other valuable mines in Upper Silesia.
In a conference with Millerand at Spa, he was informed that
Poland would be granted every area in which she would
poll a majority, a decision which he felt would involve the
loss of Karvin. Not wishing to bear the sole responsibility
for accepting or refusing the Allied offer, and preferring an
agreement dividing the Duchy to a plebiscite, he sought to
ascertain the attitude of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs, but could get no response in time. Compelled to act
independently, Benes signed with Paderewski the agreement
of July 28, 1920, whereby Czechoslovakia obtained the whole
u Benes, op. cit., I>P· 69-7I, IS~-I 53; HrusovskY, loc. cit., pp. IJG-IJI.
158 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Karvin area, the entire strategic railway, and the suburbs
of Tesin on the western bank of the Olsa River, whereas
Poland received the eastern part of the Duchy together with
most of the city of Tesin except for the railway line and
station.28
In seeking parliamentary approval for his agreement with
Paderewski, Benes encountered the most intense opposition
that he had met thus far in his career. Both the National
Democrats and Bohemian Germans denounced a decision
which neither they nor the Poles would consider final.29
The Prager Tagblatt in particular" protested against so,ooo
Germans being given to ' insatiable Poland ' " 80
• • • The
N arodn£ Listy stated that " Czechoslovakia will never desert
the minority lost in the decision"}1
The Cesk~ Slovo was
almost alone " in being happy that a decision had been
reached ".82
A crisis developed on August 4 when Benes
addressed to the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Senate
and the Chamber of Deputies an expose in which he explained
the necessity for dividing Tesin after the Conference
of Ambassadors 88
had ignored Czechoslovakia's historic
as For full details, cf. Benes, op. cit., pp. 7'1~81 ; Temperley, op. cit.,
vol. iv, pp. 361-363. On November 29, Ig20, at Brno, the two countries
signed a treaty which provided for a " Mixed Commission" to protect
the respective minorities, but the treaty was never ratified. Cf. FouquesDuparc,
op. cit., pp. 318-319. Cf. also, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, I920 (Washington, 1935), vol. i, pp. 36-7'3,
for the correspondence of the Americari Government regarding Tesin.
Apparently, President Wilson desired to have a voice in the final settlement,
but had no intention of signing the agreement of July 28, 1920.
as Pravo Li&u, July 3,1, 1920.
30 Prager Tagblatt, July 31, 1920.
31 Narocm£ List;y, July 31, 1920.
32 Ceske Slovo, July 31, 1920.
33 After the Supreme Council ceased to exist (January 21, 1920), a
new agency, the •Conference of Ambassadors, composed of the Ambassadors
of the United States, Great Britailll, Italy and Japan to Paris,
and of a representative of France, assumed responsibility for the execution
of the Peace Treaties.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 159
rights to the Duchy..Although his report was approved by
the narrowest margin--eleven votes (Social Democrats,
National Socialistsand Agrarians) to ten (Germans, National
Democrats and Clericals)-the Committees as a whole commended
his conduct of the negotiations. It appears that a
favorable reception had been assured by Benes' driving home
the points that he had considered a plebiscite cowardly because
it evaded direct negotiations with Poland, and that, by
the division of the Duchy, Czechoslovakia's gains had exceeded
her losses. According to Bend' figures, Czechoslovakia
had obtained 292,000 inhabitants, including 37,000
Poles, whereas Poland had received 143,000 inhabitants,
only 2,000 of whom were Czechs.84
The approval of the
Committees having been won, ratification followed almost as
a matter of course on January 28, 1921.36
Oosely connected with the Tesin question were similar
disputes in Orava and Spis, particularly over Javorina.
Javorina, a small region on the northern slope of the Tatra
Mountains in the district of Spis, contained a pass of great
strategic value that was coveted by both countries. Czechoslovakia
claimed Orava and Spis on economic and strategic
grounds, whereas Poland's claims were historic and ethnic.
On July 28, 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors defined
the boundaries of Tesin, Orava and Spis and appointed a
Delimitation Commission, composed of one representative of
each of ·the Principal Allied Powers and of Poland and
Czechoslovakia, to draw the actual frontiers on the ground.88
Although both BeneS and Paderewski signed the agreement,
the latter, two days later, raised an objection because the
principle of nationality had not been heeded in accordance
B4Narodnl Politika, Augusts, 1920; Svornost, August u, 25-26, I92Q.
aa zp,.avy (Poslanecki Snemovna), 49 meeting, January 28, 1921, PP.
1988 et seq., 2 session.
ae Benes, 0 p. cit., pp. n7-119; Treaty Series, vol. ii, pp. 49-58.
160 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
with Point 13 of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, inasmuch
as 25,000 Poles in Spis and Orava had been awarded
to Poland and 45,000 to Czechoslovakia.81
Nevertheless, on August 10, Poland and Czechoslovakia
concluded the Frontiers Treaty of Sevres 88
which confirmed
the boundaries that had been established on July 28 except
for some frontier modifications in Spis. · In general, the
old frontier line between Galicia and Hungary was retained,
but the treaty never became effective because it was not ratified.
Meanwhile, the Delimitation Commission began its
labors, and on April 23, 1921, adopted certain modifications
of the line in Tesin and Orava which were approved by the
Conference on May 25. On that occasion, the representative
of Poland voted, as a conciliatory gesture, in favor of these
changes in the hope that, in return, Poland might obtain
Javorina.89
When the two disputants still failed to reach
any agreement, the Commission, on July 5, was forced to
report to the Conference that it was unable to make any
satisfactory recommendation.40
It explained its failure to
act by the fact that the modifications that had been proposed
were beyond the scope- of its discretionary powers.41
The
Conference temporized by referring the matter to the contestants,
who on November 6, 1921, signed an agreement
whereby, in mutual good will, they undertook to reach an
agreement in six months. On December 22 the Conference
suspended the execution of the aecision of July 28, 1920, to
August 16, 1922. When no agreement was reached by that
time, the Allied members of the Commission, on September
12, proposed, and on September 25 accepted, by a vote of
·a'l' Permanent Court of Internatioml Justice, series C, no. 4, PI>· IaS-140.
88 Treaty Series, vol. viii, ·I>· 39.89
Permanent Court of International Justice, series B, no. 8, p. 52.
4o Ibid., series B, no. 8, p. 44·
4'1 Ibid.; series B, no. 8, p. 45·
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 161
five out of six, a new line somewhat more favorable to
Poland, but which still retained for Czechoslovakia the crests
of the Tatras."2
In spite of the fact that the repeated delays
were increasing the unrest in Javorina, where the inhabitants
appeared generally indifferent as to whether. they should
become Poles or Czechoslovaks as long as thdr villages and
grazing lands were not separated, the Conference of Ambassadors,
on November 13, 1922, refused to approve the
new solution without further investigation.'"
At last, after four years of bickering, the Conference of
Ambassadors, on July 27, 1923, confessed its own inability
to agree and referred the dispute to the League Council, a
move that was opposed by Poland as involving further
delay."4
Such, however, was not the case. The Council
referred the dispute to Senor Quinones de Leon, of Spain,
and requested also an advisory opinion from the Permanent
Court of International Justice regarding the delimitation of
the frontier between Poland and Czechoslovakia."6
The
Court met, on November 13, 1923, in extraordinary session,48
and held that the decision of July 28, 1920, was final,47
but
withheld an opinion on the question whether the Delimitation
Commission had exceeded its authority in its recommendau
Ibid., series C, no. 4. pp. 245-247 ; Z pr6vy ( Poslanecka Snemovna),
161 meeting, October 26, 1922, pp. 194 et seq., 6 session.
48 Perm4ru?nt Court of International Justice, series C., no. 4. pp. t8J,
26o-263.
H Cf. VochoC, V., "Javorina ", Zahranibl4 Polit-ika, vol. ii, pp. 793-
8o8; Krcmar, J., "Ceskoslovenskopolski hranice v llzemi s:pi5skem pfed
Stalym Dvorem v Haagu a pfed Radou Spolecnosti Narodu ", Zahranicnl
Politika, vol. iii, pp. 7-20, 102-'118, t86-Ig6, 6oo-6oJ.
u Offidal Journal, November, 1923, pp. IJI6-IJI7, 1332-IJJJ.
<18 Cf. Permaru?nt Court of International Justice, Fourth Session (Extraordinary,
November 13-December 6, 1923), Documents relating to
Advisory Opinion no. 8 (Jaworzina), series C. no. 4. p. 438.
n IbiJ., series B, no. 8, p. JO.
162 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
tion of September 25, 1922.48
The Council, after accepting
Czechoslovakia's contention that the Commission had exceeded
its powers, requested this last to 'obtain fresh proposals
in agreement with more recent deliberations.49
In
conformity with these instructions, the Commission proposed
a new frontier line on March 12, 1924. Two weeks later,
the Conference approved the proposal, which was embodied
in the protocols drawn up at Warsaw in May by a mixed
Czechoslovak-Polish Commission.50
The signing of these
protocols on May 6, 1924, terminated the dispute.51
In
itself, the Javorina dispute had been a minor matter, but it
had become extremely important in exacerbating the relations
between the two countries.52
With its solution,
Czechoslovakia not only completed the delimitation of her
frontiers, but removed the main obstacle to a rapprochement
with Poland that was to result in a relatively high degree
of cooperation in the reconstruction of Central Europe.
The Formation of the Little Entente
Benes had not allowed the Czechoslovak-Polish quarrel to
distract his attention from his main objective, the reconstruction
of Central Europe. He believed that, in this area, his
country would derive the greatest advantages from a continuation
of the embryonic Little Entente policy that he had
inaugurated even before Czechoslovakia had attained independence.53
As early as October and November, 1918, he
had entered into tentative negotiations with Jonescu of
48 Ibid., series B, no. 8, pp. 39-40.
49 Official Journal, February, 1924. pp. 34S-J48, 357-364.
5 0 Monthly Summary, June, 1924. p. 828.
&n Permanent Court of Internalional Justice, series E, no. I, p. 220.
5 2 Cf. Keller, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 346-347, for the details of several
characteristic frontier "incidents".
53 Cj. Codresco, F., La Petite Entente (Paris, 1931), vol. ~ pp. 133l'SS,
for a discussion of precedents for the Little Entente.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 163
Rumania, and with Pasic and Trumbic of Yugoslavia, with
regard to cooperation among their respective countries.114
These attempts proved to be premature. Amid their mutual
worries in obtaining satisfactory peace settlements, the three
small Powers dropped the project temporarily.· Bend, who
had welcomed the departure of the Emperor-King Charles
into exile in Switzerland after the termination of the World
War 55
and the separation of Austria and Hungary, began
to be worried anew during 1919 by the symptoms of reactionary
tendencies, particularly in Hungary. After the termination
of the war over Slovakia and the resulting overthrow
of the Soviet government of Bela Kun,116
Archduke Joseph
came into power at Budapest. In the estimation of Benes,
this move might foreshadow an attempted Habsburg restoration
which would threaten anew the peace of Central Europe.
He protested to the Supreme Council, which, by a note of
August 21, 1919, made clear to Budapest that no Habsburg
could have a place in any Hungarian government.'" ·As a
result, Joseph's tenure was extremely brief,118
but the menace
that he typified rendered almost inevitable the formation of
some opposing combination of the small victor states.
1• Cf. Jonescu, T., "The Future of the Little Entente", The Litling
Age, vol. cccxi, p. 699; Toynbee, op. cit., p. 287; Cosma, of/. cit., p. 17.
aa Cf. Arbeiter Zeitung, November <12 and 14. 1918, for Emperor
Charles' .proclamations of withdrawal from the affairs of Austria and
Hungary respectively. Cf. also, ibid., November 17, 1918, for article
"The Dynasty Must Go".
56 Cf. supra, p. 39·
liT Documents diplomatiques c011ee~ les tentatives de restauratiors
des Hapsbourg au trone de Hongrie (henceforth referred to as Documents,
Hapsbourg), no. I.
&8 Bela Kun was overthrown on August 1, 1919. and was succeeded by
Peidl. Cf. The Times, August 9 or Le Temps, August 10, for Joseph's
proclamation on assuming power. He resigned in less than three weeks
(cf. The Times, August 26 for his proclamation on leaving power).
164 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Czechoslovakia reopened negotiations with her two prospective
partners when Benes offered alliances to Trumbic in
Paris on December 30, 1919,59
and to ·vaida-Voevod at
Bucharest on January 5, 1920.60
Since Yugoslavia welcomed
the advance the more enthusiastically, direct negotiations
between the two countries were inaugurated during
February. The Kapp Putsch in March and the flirtation of
France and Hungary during July made the need for haste
apparent.61
The latter of these two threats aroused particular fear.
After Czechoslovakia had refused to assist Poland against
Russia during the summer of 1920, France considered the
offer of Hungary to send four divisions to aid Poland, but
refused primarily because Hungarian intervention would
have taken place only at the cost of territorial compensations
that would have necessitated a revision of the Peace Treaties
to the detriment of Czechoslovakia, Rumania andYugoslavia.
Realizing that Hungarian friendship at such a price would
have been too costly, France herself helped Poland. However,
before France made her choice, Paris and Budapest had
exchanged many .communications, more or less secret in
nature, that had been alarming to Hungary's neighbors.
Benes was aware that such negotiations were taking place,
$Documents diplomatiques relatives aur conventions d'alliance conclus
par la Republique Tchkoslovaque awe le Royawme des Serbes, Croates
et Slovenes et le Royaume de Roumanie (henceforth ;referred to as. Documents,
alliance), no. I.
so Documents, alliance, no. 2.
61 Ibid., nos. 6 and 19. On January 22, 1920, Jan Slavicek, a member
of the Czechoslovak parliament, threatened Hungary with an alliance
between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (cf. HrusovskY, loc. cit., p. x8o).
During the course of the negotiations for the Treaty of Trianon, there
was cooperation between Osusky of Czechoslovakia, Zolger of Yugoslavia,
and Ghika of Rumania against Count Apponyi of Hungary, cf.
Z/>ravy (Senat), 27 meeting, Decembe;r 21, I!)20, pp. 643 et seq., 2 session;
28 meeting, December 22, ·1920, pi). 678 et seq., z session.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE , 165
but was almost alone in trying to dispell alarm, for he felt
that France could be trusted to do nothing inimical to Czechoslovakia.u
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia continued to fear
particularly that, should Hungarian troops cross Slovakia on
their way to the east, they would do their be.st to increase
irredentism. About 2,500,000 Magyars resided in the
four neighboring states. These mirioritie~ were responsive
to nationalist appeals from Budapest." During September,
further alarms were spread by the Vienna Arbeiter Zeitung
and the Praha Pravo Lidu, both of which published repeated
" revelations " of Magyar machinations, allegedly directed
from bases at Vienna and Szombathely against Austria;
from Vienna, Miskolcz and Gyor against Czechoslovakia;
and from Kaposvar, Pees and Szeged against Yugoslavia."
Although such " revelations " were perhaps inspired as much
by anti-Hungarian sentiment as by Magyar provocation, they
were effective in hastening the cooperation of Hungary's
neighbors.
Bend appreciated the difficulties that confronted him: in
view of the divergent interests of his prospective partners,
he believed that it would be necessary to negotiate step by
step, by a series of bilateral treaties. On August 14, 1920,
at Belgrade, Benes. and Nincic signed a defensive treaty of
alliance. Article I specified that each state was to aid the
other against an unprovoked attack by Hungary. According
to Article 2, the method of assistance would be determined
by a later agreement between the competent technical
authorities, i. e. by a military convention. Article 3 stated
that neither country might conclude an alliance with a third
Power without informing the partner in advance. Article 4
provided that the treaty was to endure for two years, and
112 Documents, allimtce, nos. 19, 28-30.
111 Cf. Crane, J. 0., The Little Effdente (New York, 1931), p. 176.
11' C/. Mousset, op. cit., pp. 13-14-
166 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
would be renewable. If denounced upon expiration, it was
to remain effective for another six months. Article 5 required
registration of the treaty with the League of Nations,
and Article 6 arranged for an exchange of ratifications at
Belgrade as soon as possible.65
Benes, always an opponent of secret diplomacy, desired
publicity for the alliance, lest its objectives be misunderstood.
At Belgrade, on August 15, he granted a lengthy interview
to a correspondent of the Journal des debats, and, on September
1, presented a lengthy expose to the Czechoslovak
parliament. Bend' first reason for the formation of what
he himself styled " the so-called Little Entente " 66
was the
unrest prevalent throughout Europe, as a result of which the
small states in particular felt insecure as to their future as
long as each remained isolated. His second reason was economic
: he believed that political contacts would lead ultimately
to economic cooperation. His third motive was the
domestic stabilization of the states concerned so that each
might work out without interference its own political and
social reforms. He felt that the realization of these first
three objectives would remove from the minds of some of
his people any lingering regrets over the destruction of
Austria-Hungary, whose main justification for existence, in
recent times, had been the law and order which she had
provided for the diverse peoples of Central Europe, a service
which, in his estimation, could'be rendered equally well by
the new organization. Fourthly, the concrete and immediate
reason for the formation of the Little Entente was the attitude
of Hungary, which sought to contest the verdict of
the World War, retain her former aristocratic social order,
and regain her lost territories. Benes' fifth and final reason
. 65 Documents, alliance, no. 25; Treaty Series, vol. vi, pp. 2Q9-2IJ.
66 Cf. Machray, R., The Little Entente (London, 1929), pp. IOS-Io6,
on how the Little Entente was named.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE I67
was to be found in the general European situation : although
continuing to profess faith in both the League and the Great
Entente of Great Britain and France, he felt that the policies
of both should be reinforced and rendered more effective by
special " regional understandings .,.87
The second link in Benes' chain, an alliance with Rumania,
required more careful preparation. · Except for Masaryk's
visit late in I9I7 and for cooperation at Paris in Benes' embryonic
Little Entente policy,68
the two peoples had had practically
no contacts with one another. Predominantly Latin,
Rumania had little sympathy with the Slavophil tendencies
of her two prospective partners. Take Jonescu, who deserves
to rank with Bend as a co-founder of the Little
Entente, had, since I 9I 9, advocated closer ties among the
late Allies. After becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in
June, I920, he had secured in the Rumanian parliament a.
majority which favored his policies. When Benes, en route
from Belgrade, reached Bucharest on August I7, Jonescu
had already drafted a treaty analogous to that between
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.69
The inclusion of Rumania would give territorial contiguity
to the Little Entente, but would also present many new problems.
On October 30, at Praha, Czechoslovakia and
Rumania appointed two mixed commissions : one to delimit
their frontier in Ruthenia, and the other to make recommendations
upon economic questions.vo Italian objections to
&T Benes, Problemy nove Ewopy, pp. 284-285; Five Years of Czechoslovak
Foreigt1 Policy, pp. 12•14; The Foreigtt Policy of CzechoslOflakitJ,
pp. 32-33; Prdvo Lidu, August 16, September I, 1920; cf. also, Machray,
o/1. cit., pp. 126-134; Mousset, op. cit., pp. 2'3-26; Cosma. of'. cit., pp. 20-
22; Codresco, op. cit., vot. i, pp. 157•165, 183-186.
8& Cf. Roucek, ]. S., Ctmtemporar;v Rumania and Her Problems (Palo
Alto, 1932), pp. 136-140.
611 Documetlts, alliance, nos. 26-27.
To Ibid., no. 32.
168 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
the new alignment were removed by the defensive agree.'
·ment 71
of November 12, 1920, between Italy and Yugosla~1a,
·anq by an exchange of notes, of February 8, 1921,
between Benes and Sforza regarding their common interests.72
Bend and Jonescu had different conceptions of the
scope of the Little Entente. Jonescu feared not only Hungary,
but Bulgaria and Russia, whereas ·Benes desired a
treaty that would apply merely to the first. This essential
weakness in the Little Entente-the divergent policies concerning
Russia between Rumania on the one hand and
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the other-was appreciated
by each state, and hence was kept carefully in the background.
Jonescu desired particularly a guarantee of retaining
Bessarabia, to which Benes would not agree. Jonescu
envisaged a belt of small states from the Aegean to the
Baltic, on the order of France's contemplated "cordon sanitaire
", which would cooperate on all international questions
and have the force of a Great Power.. To this end, he
desired to include Greece, and, particularly, Poland.18
On
the other hand, Benes believed that Poland's geographic
position and peculiar problems, particularly her hostility to
Russia, which was shared by the other Baltic states, should
exclude this whole group from anything more than cooperation
with the Little Entente. Similarly, he was not concerned
with Rumania's and Yugoslavia's relations with Bulgaria
and Greece, whose inclusion he believed would give too
Balkan a character to the organization. He maintained that
an attempt to include too many questions would weaken any
'll]biJ., no. 34 (The Treaty of Rapatlo).
u Ibid., nos. 39-40· In the negotiations of Italy, both with Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia, the first agreed to insist upon the enforcement
of the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, and upon the exclusion
of the Habsburgs.
Ta Jonescu, loc. cit., vol. cccxi, pp. 699-703; cf. also, Mousset, op. cit.,
pp. 26-zg.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE l~
bloc that might be created, and won his point. As a result,
the Little Entente became more limited in scope, but decidedly
more effective.a
Before the Czechoslovak-Rumanian negotiations had been
embodied in a treaty, the exiled ex-Emperor-King Charles of
Austria-Hungary made his first attempt to regain the Hungarian
throne. Perhaps in the erroneous- belief that the
Great Powers would not interfere 15
and that Austria and
Hungary might welcome some form of union under his rule,
Charles attempted his first coup d'etat on March 27, 1921.
After the withdrawal of the Rumanian army of occupation
from Budapest on November 14, 1919, there had come into
power the " White " government of Admiral Horthy, from
whom Charles expected every assistance; however, in the
hour of need, Horthy gave Charles no aid. The representatives
of Great Britain, France, Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia at once protested against the presence of
Charles in Hungary.78
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in
particular considered it a casus belli and proceeded to invoke
the clauses of their treaty that provided for such an emergency.71
The Hungarian National Assembly met in special
session and approved Horthy's attitude and remonstrances to
Charles as strictly constitutionaL On March 3I it answered
"Le Temps, August 26, 1920; Benes, Problemy tw'Vi Evropy, pp. 83-
87; Jonescu, T., " How the Little Entente Began "• .The Living Age,
vol. cccxi, pp. 627-632; Cosma. op. cit., pp. 25-29.
n For full details concerning Charles' first attempt cf. Werkmann.
Baron K. von (Private Secretary to the Emperor), The Tragedy of
Charles of Habsburg (London, 1924), pp. 127-144; or Ashmead-Bartlett.
E., The Tragedy of Cemrol Europe (London, 1923), pp. 252-Z57 (account
of A. Boroviczeny, Charles' aide-de-camp). Ashmead-BarUett maintains
that Charles had absolute guarantees from Briand that France would not
interfere. Cf. also, Cosma, op. cit., pp. 40-49; Mousset. op. cit., pp. 29-34.
78 Documents, Hapsbourg, nos. 8-12.
"Zpr6v:; (Poslanecki Snemovna), 66 meeting, March 31, 1921, pp.
30 et seq., 3 session.
170 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
the Allied protests by promising to enforce the departure of
the ex-King.78
Benes, who had deemed the Hungarian government
suspiciously passive in the crisis,' still remained unconvinced
of its good faith, and, on April 3, sent to Budapest
an ultimatum in which he threatened to take immediate
measures if Charles were still on Hungarian soil by six
P. M. of April 7·79
The measures contemplated a declaration
of blockade, which was to be followed, if necessary, by
a military demonstration. Benes had planned to have
friendly Powers cooperate, but believed that the need for
haste justified his independent action. On April 4 the joint
ultimatum that had apparently been planned became a fact
when Yugoslavia suggested that Charles be granted three
days of grace, a suggestion that both Czechoslovakia and
Rumania accepted.110
On the same day, the Conference of
Ambassadors presented its note to Hungary.81
In spite of
the fact that Charles was already preparing his departure,
Bend instructed the Czechoslovak Minister at Budapest to
present the text of the ultimatum to the Hungarian government,82
an act which, technically, was independent, since the
Ministers of Rumania and Yugoslavia, in the absence of
instructions, failed to protest jointly.88
Charles' first attempt hastened the negotiations necessary
to complete the Little Entente. On April23, 1921, Czechoslovakia
and Rumania concluded their alliance on essentially
the same terms as the Czechos1ovak-Yugoslav treaty, except
for an additional Article (4) whereby the two states agreed
that, " in order to coordinate their· efforts on behalf of
peace, they would consult with one another upon all ques-rs
DO'cuments, Hapsbourg, no. 13.
'111 Ibid., nos. 16-18.
8o Ibid., nos. 19-21.
81. Ibid., no. 12.
82 lbid., no. 24.
ss Ibid., no. 25.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 171
tions of foreign policy that concerned their relations with
Hungary ".84
Side by side with her political negotiations, Czechoslovakia
inaugurated with her prospective partners economic discussions
which made relatively equal progress. After extensive
preliminary negotiations, a commercial treaty was signed
with Yugoslavia on October 18, 1920; whereby fixed amounts
of goods were to be exchanged. This agreement was to
endure until June 30, 1921, at which time new clauses
might become effective or the old agreement might be renewed.
The original agreement drew a distinction between
annual contingents and special ·permits. It allowed free
mutual exports of agricultural and industrial products only
to the extent of the domestic requirements of both states.
Yugoslavia guaranteed to deliver 100 truckloads of preserved
meat, 300 of lard, 1,000 of bacon, 6,000 of wheat, 10,000
of iron ore, 100 of manganese ore, and lesser amounts of
hoop-iron, lead, hemp, soda, pyrites, etc., whereas Czechoslovakia
promised to furnish 300 truckloads of coal for river
navigation, 1,200 of pit coal, 1,500 of railway coal, J,OOO
of coke, 2,500 each of sugar, tin plate, crude iron, machine
parts, and farm machinery, 500 of plate glass, 220 of paper,
and 400 of other industrial products. In addition, trade
was to be facilitated by the mutual granting of most-favorednation
advantages, a reduction of customs formalities, freedom
of transit, rapid transportation facilities, fixed import
duties, and the permission for the nationals of each to establish
branches of industrial concerns in the territories of the
other.811
Nevertheless, in 1920, transportation difficulties
s• Zprdvy (Poslanecka. Snemovna), 86 meeting, October 18, 192'1,
pp. 25 et seq., 4 session (announcement of the governmental ~ogram
by Benes, then Prime Minister also); Treaty Series, vol. vi, pp. 215-219;
Documents, alliance, no. 65.
8a Treaty Series, vol. xvii, pp. 9-29; ZPrdV1 (Senat), 65 meeting,
August 5, 1921, pp. 319 et seq., 3 session.
172 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
and currency fluctuations were so great that it was cheaper
for Czechoslovakia to import flour and grain from the United
States.
In like vein, Czechoslovakia and Rumania signed, at Bucharest,
on April 23, 1921, the day of their political treaty, a
commercial agreement embodying reciprocity and mostfavored-nation
treatment. Special clauses concerned postage,
telephones, telegraphs, and other methods of communication
and transportation both by railroad and via the
Danube. In general, Czechoslovakia exchanged industrial
products, particularly machinery and other metallic goods,
for raw materials, especially for cereals, naphtha, and crude
and refined oils.86
Both countries derived considerable economic
advantages from this treaty.
There still remained to be concluded the third connecting
link, the treaty between Rumania and Yugoslavia. Direct
negotiations were begun on June 7, 1921, and concluded ten
days later. At the time of the negotiations, both states were
harassed by bands of Macedonian comitadjis, whose raids
Bulgaria was unable to prevent. Both were dissatisfied
over the reluctance with which Sofia was carrying out the
disarmament and reparations clauses of the Treaty of
Neuilly. Consequently, the new treaty, which in other respects
was a counterpart of its two predecessors, included
clauses against Bulgaria as well as against Hungary.87
The three links in the Little'" Entente chain were supplemented
by military conventions: Czechoslovakia-Rumania,
July 2, 1921; Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia, August I, 1921;
and Rumania-Yugoslavia, January 23, 1922. These treaties
defined the signatories' mutual obligations against unprovoked
attacks from Hungary or Bulgaria, the military preparations
that would be made in defense of their territorial in-
86 Treaty Series, vol. xv, pp. 235-257.
S'l' Documents, alliance, no. 72.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE '173
tegrity, and the mutual guarantee of the Treaties of Trianon
and of Neuilly.88
The Problem of Austria
Bend felt that, with the formation of the Little Entente,
his work was merely begun. If the construCtive value of
the new organization was to be enhanced, it would be necessary
to attract within its orbit such other small states of
Central Europe as would be willing to cooperate with its
policies. Austria was the most promising of such prospective
additions. In fact, if any of the new states needed
assistance, it was Austria, whose survival as an independent
-entity hung in the balance.89
In despair, the Austrians looked upon Anschluss as their
sole hope of salvation,90
but it was not to be.91
. Austria was
compelled to embark upon a desperate struggle for an independent
existence. . Attempts either to unite with Germany
or to recover her German minorities failed, and the new gov-ernment
suppressed energetically incipient Bolshevik tend-encies.
Impotent militarily and almost surrounded by
hostile neighbors, Austria accepted her fate. The Peace
Conference, aware of her desperate plight, sought to aid by
allowing wide discretionary powers to the Reparations
Commission, which was entrusted with supervising the
-enforcement of the economic and financial clauses of the
Treaty of St. Germain. On March I, 1919, Great Britain,
France and Italy took equal shares in a loan to Austria of
$3o,ooo,ooo, which was increased eventually to $48,ooo,ooo,
in order that she might purchase foodstuffs for her starvsa
Mousset, op. cit., pp. 22-23; Cosma, op. cit., 'PI>· 30-34; Codresco.
~JI. cit., vol. i, pp. 176-182; Machray, oJ!. cit., pp. 153-156.
1141 Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 314-316.
90 Cf. Graham, op. cit., pp. 154-156.
111 For full details as to how France and Czechoslovakia prevented
Anschluss, cf. supra, pp. 47-49.
174 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
ing population.u This measure proved to be a mere
palliative. In April, 1920, the Reparations Commission was
aided by the newly created Internatiomi.l Relief Credits
Committee, which, from Paris, attempted to take charge of
Austrian relief. One of its first acts was to authorize
Austria to issue bonds which were secured by specific national
assets and monopolies and which became a sort of first mortgage
upon all Austrian revenues.98
The Little Entente saw in the Austrian situation not only
an opportunity for service, but a grave political and economic
menace to its own security. In Czechoslovakia, which was
the most concerned, public opinion still remained hostile to
Austria because of the friction that had been engendered
during the process of separation. Most Czechoslovaks failed
to appreciate that assistance to Austria would be the best
method of averting Anschluss and might also enable her
to become their best customer among the small states of
Central Europe. BeneS received considerable domestic criticism
for expressing the opinion that Czechoslovakia, because
of her peculiar position, was best able and should be most
eager to extend economic, financial, and perhaps even political
aid to Austria. Benes' further opinion that Austria would
be enabled to stand on her own feet if immediate assistance
were forthcoming caused much speculation as to what he
might have promised her.94
Direct negotiations between Austria and Czechoslovakia
were inaugurated during January, 1920, when the Austrian
Chancellor, Dr. Renner, accompanied by several technical
experts, visited Benes in Praha. The pourparlers concerned
92 Rapport sur les travaux de Ia commission des reparations, vol. i
(I92Q-I922), p. 2:81~
sa Ibid., vol. i, p. 287.
9 4 Cf. HrusovskY, loc. cit., pp. 134-135· Bend adopted practically the
same viewpoint in his speech of January 27, 1921, in the Chamber of
Deputies, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslowkia, ·PP· 8-r6.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 175
two major questions:. economic relations and problems arising
from the enforcement of the Peace Treaties. Benes'
domestic opponents took advantage of the unfavorable condition
of public opinion to stress the needs of Czechoslovakia
herself, then in the midst of the process of domestic stabilization,
and to point out what they considered ·the folly of
attempting .to aid a rival when in so great need hersel£.115
On the other hand, the Great Entente, as well as Czechoslovakia's
prospective partners in the as-yet-unformed
Little Entente, favored Bend' policy out of fear lest
Austria's desperate plight drive her into a union with Germany.118
Yet even Benes apparently lost patience when he
stated, on February 13, that "Austria must help herself if
she does not desire to prolong her own agony ".117
On June 17, 1920, the Treaty of Brno 118
provided for
mutual protection for the respective minorities and for the
clarification of the respective definitions of citizenship.
Since several minor points still remained in doubt, the Treaty
was amplified by a supplementary protocol 89
of August 3·
The chief constructive virtue of these two treaties was perhaps
the provision for a special Court of Arbitration which
was to try all disputes that might arise either from the rights
of citizenship or from questions concerning the educational
facilities that were provided for minorities.
Between November, 1920, and June, 1921, Great Britain,
France and Italy toyed with several sporadic suggestions for
aiding Austria,100
but few of them produced any results.
Czechoslovakia preferred to do her own negotiating with
85 Prdtvo Litlu, January 22 and 24. 1920.
8& The Times, January 22, 1920.
er Svo!"'Ost, February 14. 1920.
es Zprtivy (Senat), n meeting, July IJ, 1920, pp. 497 el seq., 1 session;
Treaty Series, vol. iii, pp. 183-229·
eo Treaty Series, vol. iii, pp. 2JG-2J2.
100 Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 44-45, 320.
176 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Austria.1
il
1
A new commercial treaty was signed at Praha
on May 4, 1921. The first of the two major divisions contained
general provisions based upon most-favored-nation
clauses. It included also the additional items of facilitation
of frontier traffic and cooperation in levying customs,
in preventing infringement of customs regula~ions, in prosecuting
violators, in inspecting cattle suspected of disease,
and in the honoring of goods which had been tested properly
prior to shipment. The second part of the treaty, which
was to become effective on June I, 1921, involved modifications
of the existing system of import and export licenses.
Finally, both countries granted concessions upon many individual
items.102
This treaty became the entering wedge
for the mutual reduction of control over foreign trade.
This new commercial treaty had been consummated largely
as the result of a distinct change in Czechoslovak public
opinion regarding Austria. Whereas in 1919 Benes had
been subjected to severe criticism for pleading for the adoption
of a generous Austrian policy, less than two years later
his people had accepted his viewpoint. On May 25, 1921,
in answer to an interpellation of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the National Assembly, Benes announced that he
had really intervened in order to preserve the Peace Treaties
and to prevent a plebiscite whereby Austria might unite with
Germany. He stated that he had made his views clear to
both the Austrian minister at Praha and to the Czechoslovak
representative at Vienna.103
The chariged sentiment had
been a direct outgrowth of Czechoslovakia's industrial situation.
As soon as it was realized that Austria could no
1.il1 Cf. Prager Tagblatt, March 18, April 5, June 4-5, 1921, for Czechoslovak
sentiments concerning the various aborti~ Allied projects for the
aid of Austria.
· 1.oa Treaty Series, vol. xv, pp. 13-157.
1.03 N arodn£ Politika, May 26, 1921; Swrnost, June I, 1921.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 177
longer afford to purchase Czechoslovakia's coal or industrial
products, aid became imperative if the two alternatives of
Anschluss or anarchy were to be avoided. It was regrettable
that Czechoslovakia as a whole had failed to appreciate
the true condition of affairs before 1921, for many unpleasant
incidents might have been avoided, but even that
date was not too late for the adoption of a new policy.10
•
Czechoslovakia's desire to aid Austria was shared by her
two Little Entente partners. Before the War, about seventy
per cent of Serbia's exports had been absorbed by Austria.
The trend of this trade had been changed by the War. In
consequence, on June 27, 1920, Austria and Yugoslavia concluded
a provisional treaty of commerce which, after four
different renewals, became a definitive treaty. By its terms,
Austria agreed to purchase most of Yugoslavia's exports of
wheat, meat, prunes, live-stock, etc. Rumania was also well
disposed towards Austria, for, although economic contacts
were on a lesser scale, the two countries had few interests
that clashed.1011
In view of such generally amicable sentiments, it beeame
relatively easy for Czechoslovakia partially to associate
Austria with the policy of the Little Entente. President
Masaryk, whose views on Austria coincided with those of
Bend, negotiated with President Hainisch of Austria, at
Hallstatt on August 10, 1921, a loan of soo,ooo,ooo Czechoslovak
· crowns.106
The rapprochement was cemented at
Praha on December 16, 1921, when the Presidents and Prime
Ministers of the two states-Masaryk, Hainisch, Bend and
106 Cf. Hejn, E. T., "The Czechoslovak Viewpoint", TAt Amcrictm
Review of Reviews, vol. lxv, pp. 490-491.
t{)rs Cf. Mousset, op. cit., pp. 117-125: Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 183-
203.
101 Cf. Papousek, J., "Zaklady Masar)•kovt koncepce r:abranicni
politiky ", Zahramlni Politika, vol. i, pp. 349-350.
178 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Schober-signed the treaty of Lany which provided for
general cooperation and for the arbitration of any disputes.101
The Attempted Rapprochement with Poland
Just as Benes had hoped to attract Austria within the
orbit of the Little Entente, so had he hoped similarly to associate
Poland with its policies. To this end, he had inaugurated
with the latter a series of negotiations entirely separate
from those relating to boundary disputes. The
approach was economic. The first agreement of August 21~
1919/
08
sought to regulate temporarily the exchange of
Czechoslovak coal and Polish naphtha, but was denounced
by Poland, which deemed it disadvantageous. Similarly,
the second agreement of March 12, 1920,109
was also of a.
temporary character, but remained in force. Both treaties
were inadequate in that they concerned merely limited
aspects of mutual commercial questions. A new and mor~
general treaty was signed at Praha on September 24, 1920,
in regard to problems of transportation and customs and
passport procedure.110
Three days later another agreement
specified that Czechoslovakia should export to Poland 37,000
tons of coal and. 15,000 tons of coke every month. In addition,
provided that Poland made the necessary application,
a further 10,000 tons of coal and a proportional tonnage
of coke might be added to the monthly quotas. In return,
Czechoslovakia was to receiv~ 7,o83 tons of raw naphtha
and 1,250 tons of naphtha derivatives per month. Payments
would have to be made in advance at the prices then current
in the exporting states. This agreement did not change
earlier agreements and was to be of temporary duration, until
1o1 Treaty Series, vol. ix, pp. 247-251; Documents, alliance, annex 2.
1os Narodni Listy, August 21, 1919.
1oo Prager Presse, March 12, 1920.
no Ceske Slovo, September 24-25, 1920.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 179
the German-Polish dispute over Upper Silesia should be
terminated.111
On October 20, 1921, the two states signed
their first general commercial treaty.112
In the meantime, France, realizing that both Czechoslovakia
and Poland were essential to her for possible future
aid against Germany, bent her bes~ efforts to effect a
rapprochement between them. The first step was the FrancoPolish
political agreement, which was signed at Paris on
February 19, 1921.ua It was followed rapidly by a similar
agreement between Poland and Rumania which was signed
at Bucharest on March 4, 1921,114
by Sapieha and Take
Jonescu. The core of this latter agreement, which had been
negotiated with the approval of the military leaders of both
countries, provided for mutual assistance against an unprovoked
attack from the East and for consultation prior to
the drafting of any new alliances.
After these preliminaries, the next step, a CzechoslovakPolish
treaty, proved much more difficult. There was little
diminution of friction until after Poland had accepted the
decision of the Supreme Council in regard to Tesin. Poland
was not especially interested in the primary objectives of the
Little Entente ; to her the Russian and Baltic problems
seemed much more important.m Only gradually was the
mutual antipathy overcome.118
A change for the better
took place during the summer of 1921 when Prince Sapieha
was succeeded as Foreign Minister of Poland by Skirmunt.
The new Foreign Minister desired to renew, with both Take
111 Ibid., September 27-:28, 1920.
na Obchodm smlowvy mesi.rtatm, vol. i, pp. 264-294; Zfwt}vy (Senat),
123 meeting, June 30, 1922, pp. 441 el seq., 5 session.
na Treaty Series, vol. xviii, pp. 12-13.
1u Ibid., vol. vii, pp. 77·'19·
tu Mousset, op. cit., p. 39·
ue Cf. Narodni Politika, Narodnf List;y and Cas, July 24. 1921; Gazeta
fVars.sawska, August 23-24. 1921.
-18o . FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Jonescu and Benes, the policy of collaboration that had
been inaugurated during the 1918 Congress of Oppressed
Nationalities at Rome.117
As a result of Skirmunt's visit
to Praha, he and Bend, on November 6, 1921, signed a
defensive treaty which was intended to· seal the rapprochement
between the two states and the collaboration of Poland
with the Little Entente. The new agreement provided that
the two Slav states respect one another's territorial integrity,
maintain a benevolent neutrality in the event of an attack
on either by a third state, permit the free passage of war
materials, proclaim disinterestedness in Slovakia (Poland)
and Galicia (Czechoslovakia), respectively, conclude a new
commercial treaty, arbitrate points in dispute, communicate
to one another treaties negotiated with a third state, recognize
mutually treaties already concluded, suppress propaganda
directed against one another, and conclude the present
treaty for five years.118
However, Poland never ratified this
treaty, much to the regret of Benes.119
Poland cooperated
with the Little Entente to some extent, but her rapprochement
with Czechoslovakia remained to be consummated at a
later date.120
The objective of Benes' various Central European manoeuvres
was not to recreate Austria-Hungary in any form:
at this time he and his Little Entente partners were opposed
to the formation of any Danubian Confederation, which
they feared might be dominated by Vienna and Budapest.121
11'1 Cf. Benes, My War Memoirs, 316-318.
11.8 Ducuments, alliance, annex t.
110 Benes, Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, pp. 18-19
(speech of February 6, 1924).
12o For full details, cf. infra, pp. 242 et seq.
n1 Benes, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, p. 17; cf. also,
Hodza, M., "Mala Dohoda, jej tradicie a jej dnesny ukol ", Zahraniln£
Politika, vol. i;pp. 610; Seton-Watson, R. W., "The Psychology of the
Succession States", New Europe, vol. xvii, pp. 62-64-
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 181
His policy of intra-Slav cooperation was intended to enable
the Slavs to occupy in European affairs the place of influence
to which he believed them entitled and which they had not
hitherto enjoyed. This objective had been clearly brought
out on January 24, 1921, in Bend' inaugural lecture as Professor
of Sociology at Charles University in Praha.122
He
hoped that his new policy would result in Praha, and Warsaw
also, taking its " true " position in Central Europe, at the
expense, perhaps, of Vienna and Budapest.
Bend desired also to impress upon the minds of Allied
statesmen the fact that his policy of intra-Slav cooperation
was not militaristic. He replied cordially to a letter of the
League Council of March 8, 1921, which requested his viewpoints
regarding disarmament. By a note of August 28,
1921, Bend welcomed a limitation of military, naval and air
expenditures during the two fiscal years following the next
year, and stated that his government was" prepared to participate
in negotiations regarding concrete proposals for limitation."
1211
When other states refused to cooperate in the
project, the matter was dropped.
Friction with Hungary
In spite of the apparent hopelessness of any reconciliation
with Hungary, Benes resolved to make the attempt, which
he hoped might avert any attempted coup on the part of exKing
Charles. After serving notice on his own people of
his project,12
• Benes met Teleki, the Hungarian Premier, and
Gratz, the Foreign Minister, on March 14, 1921, at Most nad
Litava (Briick) where it was decided to appoint four commissions
that were to apply gradually, to economic matters
'l:ll C/. Bene$, Problemy KOTJI EvrofJy, pp. 233, 24o-246 for his lecture,
" The Idea of a Czechoslovak State".
ua Official Jour-nal, November, 1921, p. ¢o.
'lN Bene$, The Foreig11 Policy of Csecltoslovakia (January 27, 1921),
pp. 17-22.
a82 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
common to both countries, the principles of the Treaty of
Trianon.125
Nothing .could be accomplished until after the
situation had quieted down as a result c>f the first attempted
coup of Charles. In this crisis, Benes' vigorous action had
been motivated in large measure by the suspicion that the
Hungarian ejection of Charles had not been sincere. After
Charles' first failure, Teleki was succeeded by Bethlen, and
Gratz by Banffy. Benes, still optimistic, resumed negotiations
with Hungary at Marianske Lazne (Marienbad) late
in June, 126
but again nothing resulted beyond a· joint antiHabsburg
agreement, because further negotiations were once
more postponed by the Burgenland crisis.
By the Peace Treaties, Burgenland had been transferred
from Hungary to Austria without a plebiscite, a procedure
which had been resented by the Hungarians, especially those
in Odenburg ( Sopron) .. When the time for the cession
arrived, August 29, 1921, the Hungarians, instead of evacuating
the area, drove out the Austrians who had come to
take possession. To Allied remonstrances, Hungary replied
by requesting direct negotiations between Vienna and Budapest,
but was informed by the Conference of Ambassadors
that an immediate evacuation of the region would be a
necessary prerequisite to any agreement with Austria.127
Benes, in response to a Hungarian request for mediation,
asked the Conference of Ambassadors, on September 10, for
a speedy solution of the cm{troversy,128
and, in interviews
with Banffy and Schober, attempted to arrange a compromise
whereby Austria would yield a portion of the disputed
Ul> Cf. Machray, op. cit., p. I57·
126 Cf. The New York Times, June 26, 1921, or Machray, op. cit., pp.
157-158 for the elaborate agenda that had been planned for this conference.
1M Madhray, 0'/J. cit., p. I6o; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 5o-55; Codresco,
op. cit., vol. i, pp. 201-2o8; Mousset, op. cit., pp. 50-53.
us Mousset, op. cit., p. 53·
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE .183
area. . On September 26, at the Conference of Brno, he
reopened negotiations with Hungary for the third tim~.
129
Although Czechoslovak mediation was welcome to Rumania,
it was not to Yugoslavia, which feared lest Bene5' suggestion
regarding Austria's cession of Odenburg lead to further
attempts to modify the Treaty of Trianon.130
Similarly,
Czechoslovakia's action aroused the jealousy of Italy, which
arranged that Hungary should ask for her mediation in preference
to that of Czechoslovakia. Italy's initiative produced
results, for the Conference of Ambassadors, which followed
its usual questionable policy of considering the small states
as Powers with merely limited interests, and of yielding to
her as to a Great Power, ratified the Protocol of Venice of
October 13 which ordered a plebiscite for Odenburg.m The
plebiscite of December 14-15 resulted in 15,334 votes for
Hungary, and 8,227 for Austria, whereupon the latter yielded
Odenburg.182
Bene5' objections to undue interference in Central Europe
on the part of the Great Powers acquired still more force
as the consequence of the manner in which the latter handled
a similar dispute over Baranya, a region at the confluence
of the Danube and Drave Rivers. When Serbia occupied
it in 1918, she did.not proceed as in other areas of whose
possession she was certain, but appointed merely the chief
officials and left the details of local government to the natives.
The Treaty of Trianon awarded her merely the southern
part, two communes in the region of Darda. At the suggestion
of Hungary, the Conference of Ambassadors linked
together the two disputes and demanded that Yugoslavia
evacuate Baranya before Hungary evacuate Burgenland.
ne Cf. Machray, ofJ. cit., p. IS~t
uo Mousset, ofJ. cit., pp. 53-SS; Von Werkmann, op. cit., pp. JOO-J06.
111 Official Jownal, August, 1922, annex 377, pp. 907-913.
ua Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 304-307·
184 ~OREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Since the note to this effect was addressed to Belgrade, the
uproar over the apparent favoring of Hungary was not
surprising. Despite public opinion, Yugoslavia obeyed the
order.ua
Any lack of harmony that might have existed within the
Little Entente over the Burgenland and Baranya questions
was instantly hushed as a result of the second attempted coup
of Charles, who had spent the time since his first venture in
Switzerland.134
On October 20, 1921, Charles arrived via
aeroplane near Sopron. He attempted to justify his breach
of faith to Switzerland, whose neutrality he had violated in
spite of specific promises to the contrary, by maintaining that
the obligations placed upon him by foreigners were inferior
to those of his own country, which, .in its troubled condition,
needed his guidance.135
This time the Little Entente was
fully prepared for the emergency. On October 22, both
Ententes, through their representatives at Budapest, demanded
the departure of the ex-King.188
The course of events within Hungary had been too much
for Bend, who stated that the return of Charles was a
casus belli.187
Bend presented to Hungary five specific demands:
(I) strict execution of the territorial and military
clauses of the Treaty of Trianon, (2) disarmament, (3)
definitive solution of the Habsburg question, (4) indemnity
for the costs of Czechoslovak mobilization, and (S) annulment
of the Austro-Hungarial'f agreement of Venice regarding
Burgenland.ns On October 23 he warned the Great
188 Cf. Mousset, op. cit., pp. 56-.58; Machray, Qp. cit., pp. 159-161;
Official Journal, August, 1922, annex 378, pp. 91'5-917.
184 Werkmann, op. cit., pp. 157-184.
us Documents, Hapsbourg, no. 35.
136 Ibid., DOS. 3G-J2.
131 Zpr6vy (Poslanecki Snemovna), go meeting, October z6, 1921, pp.
217 et seq., 4 session; Documents, Hapsbourg, no. JZ.
us Toynbee, op. cit., p. 293·
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE ,185
Powers that the Little Entente would intervene militarily,
and alone if necessary.1811
Immediately both Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia issued orders for mobilization, which
was begun by the former four days later. It proceeded
smoothly, thus demonstrating that the defects in the Czechoslovak
military system which had come to light two years
earlier during the war with Hungary·over Slovakia had been
corrected.uo Compelled to acquiesce in the situation, the
Hungarian government captured Charles on the same day,u1
and, on October 26, opened with him negotiations for his
renunciation of the throne, a step which he refused to take.uz
The Little Entente appealed to the Conference of Ambassadors/"
which responded with an ultimatum warning Hungary
that she alone would have to bear the full responsibility
for the results of any rejection of the demands of the Little
Entente.u• This warning was reiterated to Count Banffy
on October 26 by Bend, who pointed out that military intervention
could be avoided only if Hungary agreed in writing
to execute the Treaty of Trianon and deprive the Habsburgs
of their rights to her throne.m At the same time Benes
requested that the Powers grant the Little Entente representation
on the special sub-committee of the Disarmament
Commission for H;ungary and that the latter pay at least·a
nominal indemnity to cover the costs of mobilization.u6
On
'lat Documents, Ho.psbourg, no. 31·
'1.0 Benes, Problem;, nove Evropy, p. 144; The Net~~ York Times,
October 29, 1921. Cf. also, The New York Times, November 9, 1921, or
Lo. Gasette de Prague, November 12, 1921, for Ma5aryk's order for
demobilization, to be completed by the end of the month.
1u Documents, Hapsbourg, nos. 33-34'l<lt
Cf. Ashmead-Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 261-285.
·ua Documents, Hapsbourg, no. 42.
H6Jbid., no. 43.
H 6 Jbid., no. 48.
'14&[bid., no. 49· The mobilization had cost Czechoslovakia 450,867,935
crowns, or almost $Io,ooo,ooo; cf. Machray, op. cit., p. 179.
186 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1985
the next day the Conference of Ambassadors demanded that
Hungary proclaim the deposition of Charles and surrender
him to the commander of the British Danubian fleet for
removal to some other place of residence which was to be
determined by the Powers.u7
When Hungary agreed to
these terms, the Glowworm took Charles to his new place
of exile, Madeira, where he died on April i:, 1922.148
BeneS remained dissatisfied after Charles had been removed
from the scene, because the questions of the dynasty
and of the indemnity still awaited solution. He continued
to demand the immediate compliance of Hungary upon these
points, if military intervention was to be avoided,149
but he
denied having addressed an ultimatum to Hungary directly.150
Hungary decided to risk the clemency of the Great Powers
rather than that of the Little Entente. On October 30, the
Conference of Ambassadors, by note, warned BeneS against
any hasty action without consulting in advance the Great
Powers, denied his claim for an indemnity on the ground
that the Hungarian government had overthrown Charles by
its own unaided efforts, but agreed to insist upon the deposition
of the Habsburgs.n1
With no recourse left, Hungary
agreed to pass the required deposition law within eight
days,152
but BeneS continued to doubt her good faith.ua
The projected act of deposition, which contained all Bend'
points except the indemnity, was presented to the Hungarian
14T Documents, Hapsbourg, no. so.
148 Toynbee, dP. cit., p. 294.
149 Documents, Hapsbourg, nos. SI and 54
150 Cf. ibid., no. 63 for Benes' statement that rumors of an ultimatum
(such as reported, for instance, in Toynbee, op. cit., p. 295) were of
Hungarian origin. BeneS points out that the Hungarian Minister at
Praha, Tahy, admitted having misinformed his own government.
151 Ibid., no. ss.
152 Ibid., no. 59.
153 Ibid., no. 58.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 187
parliament on November 3.1
" Benes raised a still further
objection, namely, that the document merely mentioned
Charles specifically, but permitted the possibility that some
other Habsburg might regain the throne by means of a subsequent
free election.155
At his insistence, the Conference
of Ambassadors took the same viewpoint,156
and, on November
10, exacted from Hungary a subseque~t declaration that
no Habsburg could ever become a candidate for the Hungarian
throne, and that no candidate could be selected without
a prior agreement with the Great Powers.151
In this manner
was the Conference of Ambassadors at last satisfied.us To
clinch the matter and to satisfy Benes, it proclaimed the
law an "International Act ",158
thereby, in its estimation,
providing a guarantee superior to that of an act which might
be revised at some subsequent date.180
In addition to the previously announced objectives of the ·
Little Entente, Benes' unbending insistence upon guaranteeing
the deposition of the Habsburgs with every conceivable
legal safeguard had been motivated by his desire to prevent
Hungary from falling back upon the so-called juridical argument
in order to annoy her neighbors. \-Vhen Charles had
gone into exile late in 1918, he had not abdicated,161
but had
merely suspended his royal power and had left Hungary the
right to act as her interests might dictate. Since he had not
signed the Peace Treaties, his own rights and those of his
15• Ibid., no. 64.
no Ibid., nos. 65-66.
ue Ibid., no. 67.
ur Ibid., no. '/I.
ua Ibid., no. ';Z.
1118 Ibid., no. 73.
uo Cf. Machray, o/1. cit., p. 179.
1111 His abdication was of questionable legality because it had not been
counter-signed by a parliamentary minister.
188 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
heirs as well, by the juridical argument, still extended over
the territories that had belonged to Hungary in 1914, even
though large portions of this area had been " occupied ••
later by members of the Little Entente. Benes feared lest,
in the eyes of the Hungarian Legitimists, a Habsburg restoration
would automatically abrogate the Treaties of St.
Germain and Trianon and legally justify Hungary's claims
to the areas that had been torn away as a result of the World
War. In the light of this argument, the members of the
Little Entente felt that their existence as independent entities
would be menaced by a Habsburg restoration.162
Charles' second attempt had been the first severe test of
the Little Entente's efficiency and of the progress that had
been made by Benes' system of collaboration. Hungary had
yielded apparently to the Great Powers, yet, in the last analysis,
her compliance had been forced by the pressure of the
Little Entente. · Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had adopted
identical policies, whereas that of Rumania had been unique.
Rumania's sincerity had been above question, for, not only
had she proclaimed her solidarity with her two partners by
a note of October 26,163
but had proceeded to mobilize six
divisions of infantry and two of cavalry. After the inter•
vention of the Great Entente, she had agreed to demobilize
before the termination of the crisis. Although she had supported
the demands of her two partners for compensation
for the costs of mobilization, s'he had made no similar demand
of her own. Italy, on October 24, had also promised
to support the Little Entente in a vigorous policy against
162 Cf. Temperley, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. u8~II9; Mousset, op. cit., pp.
14-15; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 209-231; Benes, Problemy nove
Evrop;y, pp. 141-148. For Benes' explanations to parliament, cf. Zprdvy
(Poslanecka Snemovna), go meeting, October 26, 1921, pp. 217 et seq.,
4 session; ibid., 91 meeting, November 16, 1921, pp. 265 et seq., 4 session.
'lea Documents, Hapsbourg, no. 46.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 189
Hungary/M yet advised a resort to diplomatic methods of
terminating the dispute.165
Even Poland had cooperated
with the Little Entente and had, in substance, warned Hungary
not to depend upon former friendship.168
Central European Economic Cooperation
The crises to which the Little Entente had been subjected
had demonstrated both its vitality and its necessity, and had
resulted in a consolidation of the viewpoints of the three
allies. The new alignment was not imperialistic; on the
contrary, it was satiated and had nothing further to conquer.
Above all, it sought to preserve the new political status quo
which had been established by the Peace Treaties. Regardless
of the alleged political necessity for retaining the discrimination
between victors and vanquished, there existed
no economic basis for the continuation of such a policy..
Even the vanquished states welcomed to some degree the
economic aspects of Benes' plans for the reconstruction of
Central Europe, whereas the victors realized equally that
Central Europe could not be reconstructed economically
without the assistance of their former enemies. All the Succession
States would have to cooperate if there was to be
restored, in the existing six fragments, the economic wellbeing
of the former Empire-Kingdom.161
Bend hoped also
that economic cooperation would further his policy of reconstruction
by drawing both Austria and Hungary from
their political isolation.168
166 lbid., no. J8.
16Dlbid., no. 44.
188 Cf. Mousset, op. cit., p. 4J. For the attitudes of the various countries
during this crisis, cf. also, Benes, E., "The Little Entente", For-eig•
Affairs, vol. i, pp. 66-72; ]eden Svedek, "Bend a Mala Dohoda ", lA
Revue de Fr-ance, annee :z, tome v, pp. 595-623; L'Euro/'6 Muvelle,
November 5, 1921.
ur Cf. Cosma, op. cit., pp. 73-76; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 235-237.
l&& zprtlvy ( Poslanecka Snemovna), 91 meeting, November 16, 1921,
pp. 265 ef seq., 4 session.
I90 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Early in December, I920/69
Benes had invited the other
.five Succession States to an economic conference at Bratislava,
but the project failed because of a general lack of interest.
Nevertheless, Benes refused to lose hope that a
future " Bratislava Conference ", as he termed it, regardless
of the time or place of meeting, would " lead to some
positive result". In his speech, The Foreign Policy of
Czechoslovakia, delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on
January 27, I92I, he pointed out that, at such a conference,
Czechoslovakia would strive to solve the problems of transit,
communication, navigation, apportionment of rolling stock
and of shipping, and of obstacles in the way of transport
and exchange of goods. B.enes termed these problems
European in scope, and, despite his optimism, warned his
listeners that any effective solution would have to go to the
root of the evils and would require international cooperation,
patience and a long period of time.170
In the interval between the two attempts of Charles, the
Succession States had called, for economic purposes, the Conference
of Rome, from Apri16 to June IS, I92I, but nothing
of general constructive value could be accomplished, for
neither Austria nor Hungary attended.171
Another Conference
at Portorose from October IS to November 2S, 1921,
was attended by all six states. Hitherto, the trade of all
had been hampered by the inability of any state to regain
possession of freight cars when they had once passed its
frontiers. To remedy this situation, the various delegates,
upon their own responsibility, agreed that, after January I,
1922, each state should mark its own rolling-stock, which
should then be allowed to circulate freely within all the other
states, but without prejudicing the right of ownership of
the original owner until a .final distribution should be made
'16'9 Ibid., 30 meeting, December 3, 1920, pp. 1049 et seq., 3 session.
uo Benes, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, p. 14.
'111 Cf. Mousset, op. cit., pp. 98-99; Machray, op. cit., ·PP· I56-IS7·
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 191
by the Reparations Commission: Austria alone was authorized·
to retain all the rolling-stock within her territories.
In addition, the delegates sought to prepare a series of com-.
mercial treaties and a general tariff agreement, to facilitate
foreign trade within each state by lessening Qr abolishing
import and export prohibitions, to reduce postal tariffs from
twenty to twenty-five per cent and to pla)J new telegraph
and telephone lines, particularly between the various capitals.112
It became difficult to enforce these recommendations.
except for the one concerning Austria's rolling-stock. The
several states put into effect voluntarily much of this ambitious
program, enough to save the Conference from total
failure and to restore in some measure the economic cooperation
that had been destroyed by the World War.173
According
to Bend, of the twenty protocols approved at Portorose,m.
eleven went into partial effect very shortly, eight
others were put in partial effect within a year, and only one,
referring to a general tariff union of all the Succession
States, was dropped.116
By subsequent individual negotiations,
the members of the Little Entente in particular
proceeded to strengthen the economic ties with one another.ms
n:a Cf. OmluvtJ o J>ostotmich .stycich me3i Rakou.skem, Madarskem,
!tali£, Rumunskem, Kralovstvfm Srbu, CharvatU'll 11 Slovincu 11 Ce.skosloveMkem,
.sjednan<J f.l Portorose 23 Listopadu, I92.l; cf. also, International
Conciliation, July, 1922, pp. S-9, for Shotwell, J. T., "The
Portorose Conference"; and pp. 10-23, for Smith, C..B., "An Account
of the Portorose Conference". Colonel Smith, the American representative
on the Reparations Commission in Vienna, and subsequently
observer for the American Government at Portorose, did more than
perhaps any other individual to bring about the Portorose Conference.
He has also an interesting editorial in The Independent, December 3,
1921, pp. 226-2Z'].
na Cf. Machray, op. cit., pp. 187-189.
1u Cf. International Conciliation, July, 1922, pp. 24-84.
115 Cf. Bend, Problen1;y "~ve Evrop:y, p. 210, regarding the progress
that had been made.
176 Cf. Mousset, op. cit., pp. 99-n6; Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 243-251.
192 F_OREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
The partial success of the Conference of Portorose caused
Benes to state that the desperate domestic situations within
both Austria and Hungary represented the greatest retarding
influences for his plans in Central Europe and that both
of these former enemy states would have to be thoroughly
reconstructed before normal conditions could be restored.171
In this manner he sought to conceal his discomfiture over the
fact that Czechoslovakia had refused to ratify the Portorose
protocols;178
although Hungary had signed and was willing
to ratify them if the other states did likewise.1
'~'9
One
obstacle to Czechoslovakia's ratification was Yugoslavia's
refusal to ratify.180
But of even greater influence perhaps,
was the fact that Czechoslovak public opinion had not been
completely converted, as yet, to a policy of economic cooperation
with the former enemy states?81
The Reconstruction of Austria
Although having little faith in the palliative measures that
the Powers were proposing for Austria, Benes united with
them in the Austrian loan of February, 1922, whereby Great
Britain agreed to loan Austria 2,250,000 pounds sterling,
France, ss,ooo,ooo francs, Italy 7o,ooo,ooo lire, and Czechoslovakia
soo,ooo,ooo crowns, a measure that relieved only
.temporarily the needs of Austria. Most of the Czech loan
was used to pay earlier debts for coal.182
Conditions within Austria 'became more desperate during
the summer of 1922. In May, Schober resigned as Chancellor
and was succeeded by a Jesuit, Ignaz Seipel, who
1 7f C/. Benes, Problemy nrrve Ewopy, pp. 108-1>12 and 205-215.
'1TS Pasvolsky, o'fJ. cit., p. 276.
179 Ibid., p. 369.
:tso Ibid., p. 533.
181 Cf. supra, pp. 79 et seq.
1s11 Toynbee, op. cit., p. 3211; Pasvolsky, op. cit., p. II4.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE .193
adopted a double pQlicy--curtailment of expenditures and
attainment of foreign aid. To this latter end, Seipel undertook,
late in August, a pilgrimage to Praha. He asked the
opinion of Bend upon three points: should Austria appeal to
the League, would such an appeal produce results, and, if
such an appeal should fail, what would be the attitude of
Czechoslovakia regarding an Austrian appeal for the assistance
of her immediate neighbors? Bend. replied that he
would regard any regional grouping of states to aid Austria
as dangerous to the peace of Europe, but that he believed that
the League would help Austria effectively, and that, in any
event, Czechoslovakia would use all her influence to help
bring about such a possibility. Thereupon, Benes informed
the other victorious Powers .of his pourparlers with Seipel
and requested their aid to help avert an Austrian crisis.188
Benes' cautious reply to Seipel had been motivated in part
by a fear of the reaction of Italy. As he had anticipated,
Italy became threatening and, while Seipel was conferring in
Praha and Berlin, sent a circular warning Germany, Austria
and all three members of the Little Entente that a union
between Austria and any neighbor would be regarded as a
casus belli.1
u At once, Seipel hastened to meet Schanzer, the
Italian Foreign Minister, at Verona, in order to disclaim any
intention of uniting either with Germany or with the Little
Entente, and, at the same time, to deny current rumors that
Italy had desired, by means of an economic union, to rule
Austria with the Duke of Aosta as viceroy.181
Austria appealed once more to the Powers during the
London Conference, August 7-14, 1922, and, on the 15, was
1sa Benes, Problemy Mv~ Evropy, pp. 205-206; c/. also, pp. 205-215 for
his expos~ of October 24, 1922, on the Austrian question. For further
details c/. Bauer, op. cu., pp. 262-264.
1a. Ntirodm Politika, August 24, 1922.
n11 Neue Freie Presse, August 25, 1922; Prager Presse, August 26, 1922.
194 ' FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
referred by the Supreme Council to the Financial Committee
of the League. After an investigation, the latter reported
that economic reconstruction, as well as financial reform~
would be necessary for a permanent solution of the Austrian
problem.186
This report confirmed the contentions of Benes,
who, speaking for the Little Entente and Poland, stressed
the belief that the political aspects of the question were the
most important factors in the reestablishment of general
confidence in the future of an independent Austria. To that
end, he advocated the formation of a special group of guarantors
for Austria, but, to meet the objections of Italy, this
group of interested states should operate under the auspices
of the League. Benes believed also that such procedure
would lessen the rivalry of Italy and the Little Entente in the
affairs of Central Europe, and might prevent the recurrence
of unfounded rumors on the order of .one then prevalent,
namely, that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were on the
verge of attacking Austria.18
'l" In all these manoeuvres,
Benes sought to abate international friction and further international
cooperation, for he was aware that his opponents,
particularly the Magyars, were seeking to fix the responsibility
for a large measure of the distress of Central Europe
upon Czechoslovakia's series of international agreements;
whereas the contrary was perhaps true: to cite just one instance,
the commercial treaty that Czechoslovakia had granted
to Austria on May 4, 1921,188
according to Bene8,189
had been
far more liberal than the Conference of Portorose had demanded.
All Czechoslovakia's economic agreements had
been dictated by immediate necessity, but were only tern-
186 0/ficiallourna.l, November, 1922, pp. 1464-1479.
18'1 Bene_s, op. cit., pp. 207-209.
1ss Cf. S'ltpra, p. 176.
189 Benes, op. cit., p. 210.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 195
porary, and hence were open to revision whenever conditions
should become stabilized.190
Benes pleaded that Austria should not be compelled to
undertake any reforms that might be impracticable because
of her internal situation.191
On October 4, 1922, there were
signed at Geneva three protocols for the reconstruction of
Austria. ·The first stated that the five signatories-Great
Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Austriawould
respect the political independence and territorial
integrity of Austria, would not compromise her sovereignty
by requesting any unusual economic or financial privileges,
and would submit all disputes to the Council and abide by
its decisions; the second stipulated the terms of the loan, the
securities that guaranteed it, the powers of the Committee
of Control, and the obligations of the creditors; the third
specified the obligations of Austria and the powers of the
Commissioner-General. The sums that Czechoslovakia had
advanced previously were deducted from her share.192
Bend seized the opportunity that presented itself during
the joint negotiations over the Austrian protocols to try to
clarify relations with Italy. In this connection he made a
trip to Venice, where, on October 9, he held with Schanzer
a conference at which the effects of the Austrian crisis upon
the two countries were discussed. The two statesmen realized
the necessity of ending rumors of their political rivalry
with one another and with other Allied states, and both
desired to maintain the status quo regarding Austria. The
conference ended with ari understanding that the reconstrucne
Ibid., pp. 209-ZII; Zprbvy (Senat), 120 meeting, June 27, I92Z.
pp. 38o et seq., 5 session.
1n Benes, op. cit., pp. 211-212; Toynbee, op. cit., p. 323·
n2 Treaty Seriu, vol. xii, pp. 385-411; Monthly Sumnzary, vol. ii,
pp. 1-33, supplement, October, 1922; Agreemettt for Guaranteein-g tJ Locm
to Austria.
196 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
tion of Austria would be hastened by a rapprochement be-'
tween Italy and the Little Entente.n3
In the meantime, the League plans for. the reconstruction
of Austria were progressing favorably. On November 14,
1922, the Austrian parliament established a new bank of
issue, and, four days later put an end to inflation. On December
12, Dr. Zimmerman, the Burgomaster of Rotterdam,
became Commissioner-General, a post he assumed on the 16.
By January 23, 1923, Austria had floated successfully in
Amsterdam, Brussels, London, Paris, Stockholm and in
Switzerland a short-term loan of so,ooo,ooo gold crowns,
which was secured by Austrian customs and a tobacco monopoly,
and which was expected to cover merely the interim
until a long-term loan could be floated. A new twenty-year
loan of 65o,ooo,ooo gold crowns was authorized on April
16, 1923, was guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Italy,
Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Czechoslovakia/94
and was oversubscribed several fold, a financial triumph that
indicated widespread faith in the measures that were being
taken for the reconstruction of Austria.195
The three protocols ended Austria's four years of currency
depreciation and improved her economic position.196
Czecho-
193 Zpravy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 159 meeting, October 24, 1922,
pp. 14 et seq., 6 session.
194Great Britain,France and Czechoelovakia each guaranteed twenty-four
and a half percent of the loan; Italy, twenty and a half .percent; Belgium
and Sweden, two ·percent each; and Denmark and Holland, one percent
each. Cf. Winkler, M., "The Investor and League Loans", Foreign
Policy Association, vol. iv, supplement 2, p. 116. The writer prefers the
figure of 65o,ooo,ooo gold Austrian crowns given in Treat:v Series, vol.
xii, Protocol no. 2, rather than the figure of 630,000,000 gold crowns
given by Winkler.
'ls5.Monthly Summary, vol. iii, pp. 1-35, supplement, March, 1923;
Official Journol, March, 1923, pp. 307-343; April, 1923, pp. 435-466·
1116 Cf. Basch, A. and Dvoracek, J., Austria and Its Economic Eristence
(Prague, 1925), pp. 39-40.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 197
slovakia ratified the loan guarantee on December 21, 1922.197
In his desire to appear entirely impartial, Benes deprecated
the infusion of national antipathies into the question. He
was particularly insistent that selfish national interests be
eliminated. He denied vehemently that he had ever desired
to dictate the sending of a comptroller to Vienna or any other
interference with Austrian sovereignty, bu~ maintained that
the League should have exclusive control over operations and
should receive full credit for their success.198
Benes had a
well-defined motive behind his apparent· impartiality. The
best interests of Czechoslovakia demanded an independent
Austria, a state sufficiently strong to maintain its identity
apart from the orbit of any Great Power. When foreign
assistance for Austria became imperative, the League represented,
to Benes, the ideal agency by means of which Austrian
reconstruction would be effected, and the fact that the protocol
took the form that it did {i. e. an ironclad pledge of
Austria's independence) was largely owing to Bene5' own
efforts.19
"
Early Little Entente Conferences
The members of the Little Entente realized that the success
enjoyed in 1921 had been the result of cooperation. -Therefore,
for 1922, they resolved to make their constructive policy
felt even beyond Central Europe; if possible, they hoped to
create something more than a mere defensive organization.
Not only Central Europe, but the whole Continent was then
in the process of reconstruction. The main issues involved
-the recognition of Russia, the economic reconstruction of
Europe, and the relations between Great Britain and France
191 Monthly Summary, SUJ>plement, March, 1923, p. 36.
'1118 BeneS, op. cit., p. 213: cf. also, The Fi~tancial Rec011Structiofl of
Austria, Agreement approved by the League of Nations on September
J6, 1924'1911
Cf. Kremar, loc. cit., p. 171.
198 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
-were vital to the Little Entente, whose members resolved to
hold a series of preliminary conferences in order to arrive
at a general understanding and present a united front at the
Genoa Conference. Each of the three states viewed the
Russian problem in a different light: Rumania, and. Poland
as well, had serious disputes with her; whereas both Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia had the Slavophil idea of friendship,
although the former would have preferred a Russian
republic, and the latter a monarchy.2110
Then, too, the Little
Entente hoped to avoid being faced with a choice between
Great Britain and France, who showed a wide divergence of
views regarding both Russia and Germany.201
The first of the preliminary conferences was held at Bucharest,
February 2o-24, 1922, when Pa.Sic and Nincic,
Bratiano and Duca, the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of
Yugoslavia and Rumania, respectively, took advantage of the
betrothal of King Alexander and Princess Marie of Rumania
to bind the two states still more closely together. BeneS,
who at the time was on a trip to Paris and London to ascertain
the viewpoints of these Powers towards the Little
Entente/112
was represented by Veverka, the Czechoslovak
Minister to Rumania. The chief results of the conference
were the solution of the dispute between Rumania and Yugo-.
slavia over the boundary in the Banat of Temesvar and an
agreement upon a common line of action for Genoa.208
Upon Benes' return from the West, he conferred, at Bratislava
on March 2, with Nincic, and approved the results of
the Conference of Bucharest. The two partners decided to
amplify the program of the Little Entente for the coming
20<1 Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. I6I-I72.
201 Mousset, op. cit., pp. 76-78; Machray, op. cit., pp. I8g-Igo.
2oz Cf. supra, p. 141.
208 Le Temps, February 28, 1922; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 88-89; Mousset,
op. cit., pp. 8o-8z; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 239-244-
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE ;I99
Genoa Conference. - They were particularly interested in
recommending the participation of the League of Nations in
the ensuing deliberations, in opposing any discussion regarding
the revision of the Peace Treaties, and in reopening commercial
and economic relations with Russia, regardless of the
question of Russian recognition.204
The final preliminary conference of experts was held at
Belgrade, March 9-12. Yugoslavia submitted a memoir that
was adopted as the basis for the work of the various Commissions,
which, at Genoa, would seek to improve economic
conditions by a general reestablishment of international communications
and transportation, by financial stabilization and
by balancing budgets. Another important point was the
decision of the three partners to hold, in the future, regular
periodic conferences at which to discuss such new problems
as might arise.206
The Conference of Belgrade was of interest also because
Poland, who had sent merely an observer to the Conference
of Bucharest in February,208
now participated in the deliberations,
despite the fact that her representative was stilt,
technically, an observer. To avoid isolation, Poland· appeared
willing to collaborate with the Little Entente upon
questions of common interest, yet seemed to fear too intimate
a connection. Poland had many interests foreign to
those of the Little Entente. She had no fear of Hungary,
but was afraid that both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
might welcome a Russian hegemony in Central Europe.
She was convinced that no solution of the Russian problem
would be possible unless her own territory was used as a
li04 Codresco, o-p. cit., vol. i, pp. 245-246; Machray, op. cit., pp. 1!)2-
193; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 90-91 ; Mousset. op. cit., pp. 82-83.
zoa Mousset, op. cit., pp. 83-85; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 91-93; Machray,
op. cit., p. 193; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 247-251.
zoe C/. Cosma, op. cit_, p. 88.
200 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
means of transit whereby Russian isolation would be terminated.
In this connection, Poland dreaded lest Germany
decide to help Russia as the result of a new " Drang nach
Osten" of which she herself might be the first victim. In
order to draw to her side the Baltic states, Poland, on March
17, 1922, called the Conference of Warsaw. Finland,
Estonia and Latvia sent delegates. The Conference agreed
to aid mutual commerce, and to recognize the peace treaties
that ended the war with Russia, but all these resolutions
proved futile when Poland disavowed her plenipotentiaries.
Thereupon, the Baltic states held another Conference at
Riga, where, on March 30, they agreed on a common line
of action for Genoa.207
At the Genoa Conference, the recognition that the bloc
of the Little Entente and Poland received 208
was owing again
to their solidarity upon that occasion, a result which blinded
many observers to the fact that such close collaboration was
temporary. Benes was disappointed because Poland had
sent merely an observer to the Conference of Belgrade which
she refused to consider as a quadruple affair, for he deemed
her relations with the Little Entente sufficiently intimate for
a closer connection,:w9
whereas Nincic even spoke of a
"Quadruple Entente ".210
However, Poland remained consistent
in her attitude, and, from time to time, continued to
send observers to some of the Little Entente Conferences,
but remained aloof from any closer contacts. For Central
Europe, the primary significance of both the Genoa Conference
and of the series of preliminary conferences that had
207' Mousset, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
2os Cf. supra, p. 144.
209 Benes, op. cit., p. 290; Five Years of CzechoslO'Uak Foreign PolicJI,
pp. 18-19.
210 Mousset, op. cit., pp. 132-133, 'I47-I49; Cosma, op. cit., pp. IS6-I8I
(passim) ; The Times, August 23, 1923.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 201
preceded it was perhaps the fact that the little Powers admitted
the possibility of renewing relations with Russia while
still adheririg to the French thesis of the inviolability of
treaties.211
Since Bucharest and Belgrade had been the sites of the
preliminary conferences, it was logical that the first of the
regular periodic meetings of the Little Entente be held at
Praha. At this Conference, which met on August 25, 1922,
there were present Benes, Duca, Pasic and Piltz, the Polish
Minister to Praha. The negotiations centered on two topics:
the attitude the four states should adopt at the Third League
Assembly which was to open on September 4 and the renewal
of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. In the
discussions of the 27 and 28, there were introduced also the
questions of the reconstruction of Austria, the admission of
Hungary to the League, the treatment of minorities, the
delimitation of the Austro-Hungarian and Austro-Yugoslav
frontiers, the danger of having to make a choice between
Great Britain and France, and the rumors of a Bavarian
Wittelsbach restoration in Germany. After due deliberation,
the Conference agreed to endorse Benes' policies regarding
Austria and the Western Powers, to proclaim against the
Wittelsbach possibility as less favorable than the status quo,
and to permit Hungary to enter the League provided that
she accept definitely the situation that had been created by
the Treaty of Trianon.11112
·
On August 3 I, at Marianske Lizne to whose waters Pasic
had again resorted for his annual cure, the CzechoslovakYugoslav
treaty of alliance was renewed and amplified by a
more exact definition of their respective obligations. The
mt Mousset, op. cit., p. 88.
ltlll Mousset, op. cit., pp. 149-156; Cosma, of>. cit., pp. 101-1o8; Codreseo.
op. cit., vol. i, pp. 273-278; Machray, op. cit., pp• .:aoo-201. No published
minutes of Little Entente conferences exist.
202 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
original treaty of August 14, 1920, was extended again, not
for two, but for five years; all the other treaties that each
state had negotiated (Czechoslovakia with Rumania, Austria
and Poland; Yugoslavia with Rumania and Italy) were
approved; a mutual basis was to be found for economic,
financial and transportational ~ollaboration; mutual political
and diplomatic assistance was to be given in international
relations; and consultation was to take place upon all questions
that might affect common interests.218
The Praha-Marianske Lazne Conference marked an important
phase in the evolution of the Little Entente. It
changed the new bloc into a Power that had to be considered
in all European questions. Nevertheless, the Little
Entente had marked defects : on only limited questions would
its action become automatic, and the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav
link was far stronger than the other portions of the chain.
To Benes, the latter defect appeared less important than
the fact that the interests of the three partners coincided; yet,
even though he stressed the point that the manner of union
was of secondary importance, he did admit that the existing
system of fragmentary bilateral treaties could be improved,
for instance, by further treaties upon the model of
that of Marianske Uzne.214
At the Lausanne Conference, which opened on November
20, 1922, to attempt to settle the affairs of Southeastern
Europe, the Little Entente was found in the background.
Benes, who did not arrive to confer with his partners until
the 28 because of the exigencies of domestic politics,211
ms Documents, alliance, annex 5; Treaty Series, vol. xiii, pp. 231-235.
2u Zpravy (Senat), 195 meeting, March 18, 1924. pp. 58 et seq., 9
sess-ion; 1!}6 meeting, March 19. 1924. pp. 65 et seq., 9 session.
215 On October 7, •1922, Benes resigned the Premiership which he had
assumed on September 26, 1921, but retained his portfolio as Minister of
Foreign Affairs. His decision was made, not because of any ministerial
crisis, but because he could not do justice to both positions.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 203
was not interested in theGreco-Turk question, with regard to
which he left his two colleagues a free hand; his sole interest
lay in a rapprochement of Bulgaria and Greece with the
Little Entente, perhaps on the order of the Balkan League
of 1912. Nevertheless, BeneS remained true to his earlier
policy. Out of deference to his colleagues he was willing to
consider the inclusion of Greece and Bulgaria within the
Little Entente even though he would have preferred merely
collaboration with them. The inclusion of Greece within
the Little Entente had been the dream of Take Jonescu to
the day of his death, June 21, 1922, but could not be consummated
in spite of the various dynastic ties among Greece,
Rumania and Yugoslavia.218
The treaty of May 19, 1913,
which was to last ten years, still bound Greece and Yugoslavia
by a military and political alliance, a treaty which
Greece desired to renew. Yugoslavia could not forget
Greece's interpretation of the document during October,
1915, in Serbia's hour of greatest need. When General
Dousmanis arrived in Belgrade in early February, 1922, to
negotiate a renewal, he encountered a reserved reception, for,
although a signer of the treaty, he had opposed aid to Serbia
against the Central Powers. As a result, in spite of Greece's
offer of special commercial rights to Yugoslavia via Salonika,
the treaty of alliance failed of renewal. Rumania's request
for reciprocal economic advantages from Greece, the granting
of which might nullify the special advantages of trade
via Salonika, was perhaps another factor that led Yugoslavia
to reject the advances of Greece.2
n Similarly, a
rapprochement with Bulgaria failed to materialize beyond an
D18 Elizabeth of Rumania married King George of Greece; Marie of
Rumania, King Alexander of Yugoslavia; and Helen of Greece, Carol of
Rumania.
211 Yugoslavia denounced the old treaty definitively on November 15,
1924. Cf. The Times, November 20, 1924; Codresco, ofJ. cit., vol. ii,
pp. 229-240.
204 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
amicable exchange of views, largely because bands of Macedonian
comitadjis still continued their raids across both the
Greek and Yugoslav frontiers.218
Thus; although the year
1922 had resulted in a strengthening of the Little Entente,
the closing months left much uncertainty as to the future :
for .even the treaties of October 23, 1922/'119
whereby Yugoslavia
and Italy agreed to execute certain disputed details
of the earlier Treaty of Rapallo, represented a rapprochement
of questionable duration, inasmuch as a few days after their
signature a new regime, in the person of Mussolini, seized
power in Italy.
The Czechoslovak-Rumanian treaty was renewed on May
7, 1923.220
Although this new treaty was to last three years,
it had not been strengthened as had been the one between
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The second regular annual
Conference took place on July 26 at Sinaia, the Rumanian
royal summer palace. After an exchange of views, it was
decided to do nothing about Russia for the time being, and
to exclude both Greece and Bulgaria from active membership.
The Conference agreed with Bend that Hungary remained
the chief problem of Central Europe and, despite her intransigeance,
should be reconstructed after the fashion of Austria.
The greatest permanent result of Sinaia was perhaps the
strengthening of the bilateral system of treaties on September
14, 1923, by a tripartite military convention which
provided for mutual cooperatiOn in the event of a casus foederis,
for which the three military staffs were to begin to
work out solutions immediately.221
a1s Bulgaria was refused a port on the Aegean Sea, which she requested
in accord with Article 48 of the TreatY' of Neuilly. Cf. Mousset, op. cit.,
.pp. 133-141, 159-162; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 1o8-no; Machray, op. cit., pp.
207-209; Codresco, qp. cit., vol. i, pp. 279-2&2; vol. ii, pp. 151-159·
me Treaty Series, vol. xviii, pp. 387-5:23.
220 Ibid., vol xviii, pp. 81-83.
221. Benes, Problemy nove Evrofry, p. :263; Cosma, op. cit., pp. I,Io-ns;
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE
The Reconstruction of Hungary
Bend felt that assistance to Hungary would be the last
step that would be required for the reconstruction of the
small states of Central Europe. Although willing to rehabilitate
Hungary after the fashion of Austria, he believed that
additional safeguards would be required. While willing that
Hungary's national revenues should be released from the
terms of the Treaty of Trianon as collateral for a new loan,
Bend desired to assure himself that the new funds would
not be devoted to either military or propaganda purposes: to
that end, he suggested that the Little Entente safeguard itself
through a commission of control. · Since his own direct
negotiations with Hungary during 1922 had produced only
a commercial treaty of November 22,222
which neither country
had ratified, he believed that the problem of Hungary should
be submitted to the League which had functioned so well in
the case of Austria.228
·
Even though the condition of Hungary was by no means
as desperate as that of Austria had been, her rapidly depreciating
currency, unbalanced budgets, unemployment and general
economic distress were sufficiently marked to render improbable
any great improvement solely through her own unaided
efforts. In fact, Himgary confessed her inability to save
herself on April 22, 1923, on which date she requested that
the Reparations Commission release, as security for a new
loan, the national resources that had been impounded by
Machray, op. cit., pp. 220-2211; Toynbee, op. cit., p. 302; Codresco, 0/1. crt.,
vol. i, pp. 291-294; Le Temps, July 27, 30, 31, August 2 and 12, 1923;
The Cenlral European Obsen:er, July 28 and August 4. I!)ZJ. The treaty
of May 7 renewed for three years both the Czechoslovak-Rumanian defensive
alliance of April 3, 1921, and the military accord of July 2, 1921.
Similarly, on July 7, 1923, the Rumanian-Yugoslav military convention of
June 7, I!)ZI, was renewed fOI" three years.
Ha Prager Presse, November 23, 1922.
22a Benes, Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, pp. 16-17.
200 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1!!35
Article 180 of the Treaty of Trianon. The Little Entente,
which held considerable Reparations Claims against Hungary,
agreed not to oppose this measure, 'provided that none
of the new fund was" misapplied", that it be granted" mostfavored-nation
treatment " by Hungary in Reparations, that
Hungary give guarantees of her good faith, that she disarm
definitely and agree to a protocol on the Austrian model224
Before the question of Hungarian reconstruction had made
much progress, Hungary and Czechoslovakia became involved
in a boundary dispute over Salgo-Tarjan, a region valuable
for its coal deposits and stone quarries. The two communes
involved, Samosko and Samosujfalu, which contained 20.5
square miles and a predominantly Magyar population of
about I ,900, were claimed by both states : by Hungary, for
economic and ethnic reasons, and by Czechoslovakia upon a
legal technicality, namely, because the Treaty of Trianon had
authorized frontier rectifications only by unanimous consent
of the members of the Delimitation Commission, which, in
the instance of Salgo-Tarjan, had been deadlocked three 'to
three until the chairman had voted in favor of Hungary.
After both states had agreed to accept arbitration, the dispute
was submitted to the League Council, which, on February
15, 1923, drew a new frontier. Hungary was awarded both
communes proper, whereas Czechoslovakia received the coal
mines, most of the stone quarries, and an unasked-for slice
of northern Hungary. The compromise was regarded with
mixed feelings by Hungary, which had gained a part of the
disputed area only at the cost of other territory which had
been hers indisputably.226
224 Offici'al Journal, February, 1924, pp. 413-414; J.fonthl:y Summary,
May, 1923, suJ>plement, pp. 1-59.
2as Mont>hly Summary, January, 1923, p. 14; February, 1923, pp. 2'!-22;
March, 1923, p. 6o; April, 1923, p. 88; Official Journ<d, March, 1923.
pp. 282-293; June, 1923, pp. ss6-ss8, 559, 6ox-602, 632-634; Treaty Series,
vol. lvii, pp. 87-u3.
RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 207
At the Fourth Session of the Assembly of the League,
on September 29, 1923, the Little Entente, with the understanding
that it should be represented on the Council during
the deliberations concerning Hungary, proposed that that
body authorize the Financial Committee and the Secretariat
to inaugurate the procedure necessary to begin the reconstruction
of Hungary, a proposal that ·the Council approved
immediately. The Reparations Commission acquiesced on
October 17, but only upon condition that the states with
individual claims against Hungary be associated with the
League in the process of reconstruction. After several
further investigations and conferences, the plans for the
reconstruction of Hungary were embodied in two protocols
of March 14, 1924/~26
The first, signed by both Ententes
(Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Rumania) and Hungary, obligated Hungary to fulfill voluntarily
the clauses of the Treaty of Trianon.22
' Benes had
worked hard to obtain such a pledge from Hungary, particularly
regarding the military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon.
In fact, despite Italian displeasure, he had insisted, throughout
these negotiations, upon a favorable treatment of Czechoslovakia's
financial obligations before he would consent to
the scheme for Hungary.228
He won his point. The second
protocol, which was signed solely by Hungary, listed her
financial obligations as a good neighbor.2211
On May I,
Jeremiah Smith, Jr., a prominent Boston financier, became
the Commissioner-General. During June, a loan of II,ooo,ooo
pounds sterling was floated successfully in the same
manner, and under the same auspices as that of Austria, with
2218 Monthly SumHWry, May, 1924, supplement, documents 2-8; 0 fficic.l
lourmJ!, February, 1924, pp. 414-4:29.
a:!T Treaty Series, vol. xxv, pp. 423-425.
2218
Cf. Toynbee, o/1. cit., 1924. p. 453.
229
Treaty Series, vol. xxv, pp. 427-440.
2o8 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
the marked difference that Hungary's own national resources
were deemed sufficient security, and, hence, no foreign guarantee
was necessary.280
Czechoslovakia took advantage of the general improvement
of relations with Hungary to settle certain other issues.
On February 9, 1924, the two states signed the two protocols
concerning Salgo-Tarjan,l!S1
and on March 8 agreed upon the
question of mortgages.282
Finally, on May 1, 1924, Czechoslovakia
ratified a convention regarding archives, which had
been signed on April 6, 1922.283
In spite of these amicable
gestures, no real friendship resulted, as the sequal was to
show.284
None the less, Benes' more than five years of
efforts for the reconstruction of Central Europe had been
partially successful: his masterpiece, the Little Entente,
was a vital force, both politically and economically. It had
managed to exert considerable influence upon the decisions
of even the Great Powers regarding Central Europe, and
had had some influence upon other affairs beyond that
region.'2ss
2soMomhly Summary, April, 1925, p. II2; Official Journal, June, 1924,
pp. 872-&77.
2s1 Treaty Series, vol. xxx, pp. 325-345·
2ss Ibid., vol. xxxvi, pp. 6I-73· Mortgages and capital invested in
financial establishments (deposit books and current account claims) were
assigned to the state in which the establishments were situated.
:l!llls Ibid., vol. xx, pp. u-a7. ,
2s4 For the renewal of Czechoslovak-Hungarian friction, c/. infra,
pp. 27I et seq.
:1!1115 Cf. Benes' own summary of his work. Five Years of Czechosl(}t1{Jk
ForeigN Policy (speech of February 6, 1924. before the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Senate); Problemy nove EvrofrY, .pp. 279-3o6; or
Boj o mir a bespelnost statv (Praha, 1934. hem:eforth referred to as
Boj o mfr), pp. 233-267.
CHAPTER V
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926
",-HE TREATY OF :MUTUAL ASSISTANCE"
JusT as Benes had deemed the reconstruction of Central
Europe 1
the major problem of his first five years as Foreign
Minister, so did he envisage security as the major problem
during the next phase of the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia.=
By the latter part of 1923, the problem of security,
with which there had become inextricably linked the
question of disarmament, had become one of the chief concerns
of the Great Powers. France, which had strongly
advocated the inclusion of Article 8 in the League Covenant,
now submitted it for solution. Meanwhile, the series of unsuccessful
negotiations with Great Britain, whereby li'rance
had hoped to achieve security,• had produced a "Treaty of
Mutual Assistance", technically under League auspices,
which represented the joint projects of Lord Robert Cecil
and Colonel Requin. It provided for restriction and permanent
control of armaments, assistance by the signatories
for any state attacked, recognition of regional treaties as the
1 Benes, E., Boj o mir, pp. 233-267; Five Years of CzechoslOflak Foreign
Policy, pp. 12-19.
ll Bend, Five Years of CsechoslOflak Foreign Policy, p. S; •• The Foreign
Policy of Czechoslovakia", Nineteen.th Cen.tury, vol. xcv, pp. 483-
490; " European Security ", I ntenwlional Conciliation, no. 212.
a Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact; Doct~ments
diplomatiques relatives aux negociations concernant les garanties de securite
contre une aggressiott de fAllemagne; Bend, Boj o mlr, pp. 301-324;
The Diplomatic Struggle for Europeatt Security and the Stabili.11atioK of
Peace (speech of April 1, 1925. before the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the Senate), pp. 7-9; Selsam, op. cit.. pp. 1-58; cf. also, .rupra, p. 105.
209
210 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
best means of rendering such assistance, differentiation
between various parts of the world in order to permit greater '
freedom in enforcing the treaty, and control over its functioning
to be vested in the League.
The "Treaty of Mutual Assistance" aroused the interest
of Bend, not only because he was the representative for the
Little Entente, but because of his official capacity as
rapporteur for the Third Committee of the General Assembly,
the Committee which had. been entrusted with the
problems of security and the ·reduction of armaments. To
Bend this treaty appeared as an almost ideal supplement to
the League Covenant, as thus far the best suggestion that
had been made for furthering security and general disarmament.
Until a better solution should be proposed, he believed
it his duty to support and attempt to improve this project.
Nevertheless, Benes supported the treaty with many reservations.
He preferred a majority, rather than a unanimous,
vote of the Council to determine which state should be regarded
as the aggressor in any dispute. Czechoslovakia, a
small country which might easily be ruined by a single military
thrust, objected to having her limited defensive areas
reduced further by demilitarized zones. She desired to revise
Articles 13 and 18 of the projected treaty so as to
permit individual states to revise their scale of armaments
whenever the factors involved in their security should change.
Benes believed that armaments'could be reduced only in proportion
to the security attained, but objected to the mutual
interdependence of the problems of security and of progressive
reduction of armaments. He felt convinced that better
results could be obtained by a separation of these two questions.
Hence, he demanded a corresponding supplement for
Article 8 of the League Covenant. In voicing this demand~
Benes stated his belief that the proposed treaty was an extension
of the Covenant, particularly a restatement in concrete
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1921,-1926 211
form, of Articles 10 ·and 16. As a final plea, he pointed out
that Czechoslovakia, as well as other small states, regarded
the treaty as one which could be rejected only at the risk
of arousing a conviction that even comparative security could
be attained only through the patronage of some Great Power.
Therefore, he suggested that two procedures should be
followed simultaneously-negotiations regarding both the
" Treaty of Mutual Assistance " and special treaties referring
to demilitarized zones.•
The French Alliance
Benes was too astute a diplomat not to have prepared the
way for the alternative policy he here foreshadowed-an
alliance with France. During the latter half of 1923 he
made several visits to the western capitals. Between July 6
and 20, he visited Paris, London and Brussels, to get their
viewpoints upon the question of the reconstruction of Hungary
and to take soundings regarding his coming alliance
with France. After attending the Little Entente Conference
of Sinaia from July 26 to August 1,
5
where it seems
safe to infer he took further soundings, he wished to clarify
the attitude of Italy towards the Little Entente. On August
26, Benes visited Rome to ascertain Mussolini's attitude regarding
Hungarian reconstruction and other special ItaloCzechoslovak
questions. He found II Duce cordial. Pla.11s
• Benes; E., "0 sniieni zbrojeni" (speech of September 29, 1923, the
day of Czechoslovakia's election to the League Council, during the plenary
session as rapporteur for the Third Commission of the Fourth Assembly),
reprinted in Zahranibtf Politika, vol. ii, pp. 1257-1264; c/. Official JounuJI,
special supplement, 1922-1923, annex 34. pt. :2, pp. :2-100 (record of
seventeen Council meetings during September, 1923); ibid., September,
1924. pp. II72-II76 (Benes' reply of August '17, 1924. to League Secretariat);
ibid., special supplement no. 23, 1924, pp. 61-65 (Benes' defense
of "Treaty of Mutual Assistance" before Fifth Assembly, Septrmber
5. 1924).
a For details, cf. supra, p. 204.
212 . FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
were made speedily for a tariff agreement and for a debt
settlement which was to become a part of the general interAllied
debt question. Italy agreed to treat Czechoslovak
war debts in the same· manner as her own debts would be
treated by Great Britain. These pourparlers,- -Czechoslovakia's
first official contact with Mussolini, defined their relations
more clearly than had ever been the case before and
convinced Benes that Mussolini intended to continue the
policy regarding the Little Entente that he had proclaimed in
his first speech regarding foreign affairs, on November 16,
1922, when he stated that Italy's attitude towards the Little
Entente would remain " correct , .6
Benes failed to indicate v
whether he had discussed with Mussolini his projected alliance
with France, and perhaps he did not. Benes'
advances were more than welcome to France, which
hoped, through Czechoslovakia, to attract the Little Entente
within its sphere of influence. After prolonged wrangling,8
the French Senate, on December 17, 1923, approved loans
of 400,000,000 francs to Poland, 300,000,000 to Yugoslavia,
and 1oo,ooo,ooo to Rumania,11
loans which Rumania alone
refused.10
Czechoslovakia inaugurated direct negotiations
for an alliance with France on October 16, 1923, as the
result of a visit which Masaryk and Benes made to Paris,
whither they had been invited by the French President,
Millerand. After an enthusiastic reception/1
they went on
to Brussels and London. In response to questions as to the
a Cj. Currey, M., Italian Foreign Policy, 1918-1932 (London, 1932),
pp. 78-8o.
v C/. Benes, Problemy nove Evropy, pp. 261-265, for this series of visits
which prepared the way for the French alliance. .
a Cf. The Times, November 20, I!)ZJ.
11 Le Temps, December 18, I!)ZJ.
'lo Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 440-444; Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. I19-IJ2.
'11 Le Temps, October 17-18, 1923.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1921,-1926 213
reasons for the trip, Masaryk, on October 23, replied that
he desired to reduce the tension between Great Britain and
France, whose continued Entente he deemed vital. Czechoslovakia
would not negotiate any treaty hostile to either.12
Bend was anxious lest a French alliance give umbrage to
Great Britain/8
and, in order to avert so unfortunate a possibility,
returned again to London on January i3, 1924. At
this time he sought to prove that the projected alliance was
not militaristic in nature and contained no·military convention,
although he did confess that the French General Staff
had desired such an agreement. Above all, he denied that
his country would become a vassal of France. In conclusion,
Bend stated that he would have preferred a joint AngloFrench
guarantee, but when this became impossible, he had
no alternative, for Czechoslovakia's insecurity necessitated a
military guarantee by some Great Power, a commitment
which France alone was willing to assume.14
Thereupon,
Bend returned to Paris. Here the treaty of alliance, whose
exact terms were drafted early in January/5
was signed on
January 25.18
It was ratified by Czechoslovakia on February
14 17
and by France on February 29.18
Ratifications
were exchanged in Paris on March 4.111
'12/bid., The Times, October 24, 1923; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp.
295-298; Machray, op.. cit., pp. 228-229; cf. also, Anon., President
Masar:yk in Paris, Brussels and London in October, I923.
1a Zpr6v3• (Poslanecka Snemovna), 219 meeting, October 30, 1923, pp.
24 et seq., 8 session; ibid. (Senat), 173, 174 and Ii'S meetings, October
30, November 8 and 9. 1923, pp. n et seq., 24 et seq. and 92 et seq.,
respectively, 8 session:.
,. Cf. D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 34-
111 Le Temps, January 8, 1924u
Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 444·
1'1' The Central EuropeaPJ Obseroer, February 15, 1924·
18 Le Temps, March I, 1924-
111 Ibid., March s, 1924-
2I4 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
By Article. 'I the two countries agreed to cooperate on all
foreign questions that might threaten their security or the
status quo that had been established by the Peace Treaties
of which they were signatories. By Article 2 $ey promised
to agree in whatever specific measures they might deem
necessary to protect themselves whenever their common interests
might be menaced, a promise that went beyond the
purely diplomatic support that had been envisaged in Article
1. Article 3 contained a declaration against Anschluss and
in favor of maintaining the Geneva Protocols of October
4, I922, as the basic solution for the problem of the reconstruction
of Austria. Article· 4 vetoed the restoration of
the Habsburgs in Hungary, and Article 5 the Hohenzollerns
in Germany. The method of enforcing Articles 3, 4 and 5
would be determined by consultation between the two allies.
Article 6 specified that all disputes, not otherwise decided,
be arbitrated either by the Permanent Court of International
Justice or by other arbiters selected by the two states. By
Article 7 both promised to inform each other of the treaties
that they had already negotiated and to consult one another
before concluding any new ones: moreover, the present treaty
contained nothing contrary to the spirit of the French alliance
with Poland or with Czechoslovakia's treaties with
Austria, Italy, or her Little Entente partners. Finally,
Article 8 required the registration of the treaty with the
League of Nations according to Article IS of the Covenant.20
Although this treaty of alliance, y.'hich henceforth might
be regarded as next in importance only to the Little Entente
treaties, represented in one sense merely the culmination of a
long friendship between the two states, in another sense it
represented a radical departure in Czechoslovak foreign
policy. Heretofore, Czechoslovakia had concentrated her
attention upon obtaining immediate security against Hun-
00 Treaty Series, vol. xxiii, pp. 163-169.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURIT¥,1924-1928 215
gary, and had shunned too intimate contacts with any of the
Great Powers. By midsummer, 1923, Bend' plans for the
reconstruction of Central Europe were practically consummated
and a wider horizon !:3.me into view. He began to
scan the distant future and to seek more adequate protection
against Germany than was offered by the League. The
danger of losing a measure of diplomatic independence by
appearing as the satellite of aGreat Power seemed less acute
.than that of insecurity. In fact, in. a later expose, Bend
confessed that "from the very beginning of our policy it
had always been our intention to arrive at a treaty of this
kind ".21
Thus, although Benes took care lest he voice any
criticism of the League of Nations, in which he proclaimed
publicly, upon every possible occasion, the utmost faith, his
actions indicated much less faith in that organization than
did his words: perhaps, his alliance with France was intended
merely as a supplementary guarantee, hut it did represent a
return to a system of alliances.22
The Czechoslovak alliance with France was negotiated
essentially to defend the status quo (Articles I, 3, 4, 5), hut
also included safeguarding " common interests " (Article
2), an elastic term. Although the treaty provided patently
for diplomatic consultation, some of its phrases (i. e. " agree
. . • as to the measures ", " measures to be taken ", " common
action ") might mean consultation regarding military
action. In the absence of any specific mention of a plan for
concerted military action or any outline of military cooperation,
it appeared that the two governments took the view that
the agreement imposed no military obligations beyond mere
"understandings between the General Staffs of the two
n Benes, Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreig• Policy, p. 25.
n Cf. Vochoe, V., •• Nas spolek s Francii ", Zahranilnl Politik11,
vol. iii, pp. 1-6; Aubert. L., "Security: Key to French Policy", Foreig,.
Affairs, vol. ii, pp. 1.22-'IJ().
216 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
nations ".28
It seemed that even this interpretation had been
agreed upon only after considerable pressure from France,
which regarded Poland as militarily unreliable. Foch himself
conceded that Benes was correct in rejecting,any military
convention which would provoke almost inevitably a similar
opposing combination in reply.2
~ Benes stated that
The only purpose of this treaty is the pacification of Central
Europe and the rapprochement of all European States. European
States must a!H realize that they must cooperate and cannot
exist :to themselves within! their own frontiers. Ou.r treaty with
France is a continuation of the policy begun by our treaties with
Poland and Austria.25
In eulogy of the solidarity between Czechoslovakia and
France, he declared in parliament, "Never has France's
friendship and aid failed us during the four years' strife
or since the Armistice. None of the Allies has done more
politically for the independence of Czechoslovakia than
France ".26
As might have been expected, the treaty encountered much
criticism in foreign countries. The chorus of disapproval
seemed so widespread that as early as January I, 1924, Mr.
Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister to Great Britain, was
impelled to deny categorically that any military alliance was
contemplated.27
In view of the tension between Great Britain
and France over the Ruhr question and over the Separatist
Movement within Germany, a section of British public
opinion resented the alliance as expressing a definite preference
of Czechoslovakia for France and as the latest French
28 The New York Times; March 5, 1924-
24 Cf. D'Abemon, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 35·
25 The New York Times, January 27, 1929.
asNarodnJ PolitikaJ February 6, 1924; L'Europe twuvelle, February ::Z.
1924:!1
The Times, January 2, 1924.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURIT¥,1921,-1926 217
attempt to encircle and crush Germany.28
To Italy it signified
impending French domination of Central Europe,28
an
opinion which drew from the N arodni Listy the retort that
Italian ill-feeling was inspired by inability to rival France
successfully in Central Europe.80
Austrian and German
public opinion agreed that the treaty represented fresh evidence
of French oppression and encirclement.81
. Poland felt
slighted because the agreement referred only to the treaties
that had been signed by both France and Czechoslovakia, and
failed to call attention to France's other allies.82
Among all the foreign comments upon the alliance of
France and Czechoslovakia, one German attack stood out as
the most vicious. The Berliner Tageblatt published several
documents which it asserted to be the texts of secret military
appendices to the treaty. These documents represented an
alleged attempt to revive a policy of German "encirclement
" similar to that of Edward VII in forming the Triple
Entente. It was also "revealed" that Benes had been
rebuffed by Yugoslavia when he had sought to have her join
the French alliance; that, instead, she had seized the initiative
among the Little Entente states and inaugurated a rival
policy of rapprochement with Italy, as had been evinced by
the" Pact of Rome". Thus, allegedly, Benes had not been
able to force the hands of his Little Entente partners so as
to compel them to accept the hegemony of France, and, as a
result of the action of Yugoslavia, France came to fear
possible. Italian domination of the Mediterranean. Of the
~Ibid., December 28-29, 1923; The Manchester Guardian, January I,
3, sand 6, 1924ze
Corriere della Sera, January I, 4. 6, 'I and 8, 1924·
8o Narodn£ Lirty, January g-xo, 1!)24-
81 Neue Freie Presse, January 2, 1924; Berliner Tageblatt, March 4
and I I, I924aa
Le Temps, January 5, 1924; Gaseta Warssawska, January 6 and
8, 1!)24-
218 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
ten clauses of' the alleged "secret" treaty, three were substantially
the same as in the true party: prohibitions of
Anschluss, and of the restoration of the Habsburgs and the
Hohenzollerns. Four other clauses were per4aps inferred
from Article I of the true treaty as possible violations of
the status quo: war by Germany against either France or
Czechoslovakia or against both; war between Germany and
Poland; between Czechoslovakia and Hungary;.and German
aid to the Soviet Union in any future war. The three final
clauses represented contingencies not contemplated in the
authentic treaty: neutrality in the event of a war between
the U. S. S. R. and Poland, aid to Rumania against the
Soviet Union, and opposition to Italian domination of the
Mediterranean.88
This attack on the treaty of alliance was reinforced by
the Vienna Neue Freie PresseJ which commented upon the
fact that, in view of the Geneva Protocols and the disarmed
condition of both Austria and Germany an alliance between
France and Czechoslovakia could hardly be considered either
" heroic " or " contributory to general European peace ",
and that, if authentic, these revelations demonstrated that
secret diplomacy was still very active.84
Both the French and Czechoslovak legations in Vienna
repudiated all knowledge of the secret treaty.85
Benes pronounced
the documents " foolish and false " and " without
foundation ".88
Nevertheless, he was requested to make an
explanation to the Parliamentary ~ommittee on Foreign
Affairs, which, after a heated session, kept its proceedings
secret.81
s3 Berliner Tageblatt, March r8, 1924; cf. also, Toynbee, op. cit.,
p. 445·
a. Neue Freie Pr-esse, March 19, 1924.
3 5 Ibid., March 20, 1924; cf. also, Le Temps, March 23, 1924.
ssNarodm Listy, The Times and The New York Times, March 20,
1924·
u Narodm Politika, March 21, 1924.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 .219
Disbelief in the authenticity of the secret clauses was soon
justified. The Czechoslovak government ascertained that,
except. for the nameS and dates, many clauses were exact
duplicates of earlier authentic treaties which had been published
in Professor Pribram's The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary,
and that the alleged French treaty with Yugoslavia,
supposedly negotiated after the initial rebuff to BeneS,
reproduced the Austra-German Protocol of September 24,
1879•. Bismarck's treaty with Andrassy.88
·
Despite this expose, the Berliner Tageblatt still continued
to defend the authenticity of its documents,311
even against
other members of the German press which generally conceded
their falsity. The Frankfurter Zeitung pronounced
them " apochryphal ".40
The Socialist V orwaerts, which,
generously, expressed an opinion that the publishers acted
in good faith, nevertheless proclaimed the secret treaty a
4
' forgery ".41
The Vossische Zeitung took pains to cite
certain textual peculiarities as the basis for its doubts.42
The general consensus of German public opinion was that
the " revelations " constituted an international hoax which
had been inspired by forgers.48
As a matter of fact, military consultations between
Czechoslovakia and France had ensued prior to the drafting
of the treaty of alliance. On May 14, 1923, Foch was feted
in Praha on his homeward trip from Warsaw. An inspection
of the Czechoslovak army was followed by military conas
Pinon, R., "The Franco-Slovakian Treaty of Alliance", Currenl
History, vol. xx, pp. 748-753; cf. also, Pi'ibram, A. F., The Secret Treaties
of Austria-Hungary (Cambridge, 1920), vol. i, pp. 18-3I, for the Austro<ierman
alliance of 1879.
ae Berliner Tageblatt, March 25, 1924·1&0
Frankfurter Zeitung, March 21, 1924•1
Vorwaerts, March 23, 1924-
42 Vossische Zeitung, March 23, 1924.a
The New York Times, March 25, 1924-
220 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
versations similar to those that had taken place between Foch
and Polish military authorities. Although the Marshal
praised the armies of both allies of France, he marveled particularly
at the military achievements of Czechoslovakia during
the first five years of independence!• Thus, even if
the specific implications of Foch's visit did remain a mystery,.
German suspicions were not unfounded.
France, Italy and the Little Entente
Benes' initiative was apparently welcome to his Little
Entente partners, which, during 1924. also sought to enhance·
their security by creating closer ties with the Great Powers of
the west. Yugoslavia and Rumania were negotiating French
loans, and hence were already somewhat in the French orbit.
The three small states felt that they could establish such relationships
without becoming mere tools. The prestige that
they had attained through their mutual cooperation and because
of the moderating influence that they had exerted upon
the various Central European crises had given them hopes.
of attaining one of.their fondest dreams-of becoming one·
of the four major European blocs, along with the U.S.S.R.,
Germany and the Western Powers. New issues were needed,.
particularly to combat current rumors that the Little Entente
was on the verge of dissolution because the reconstruction of
Hungary had removed the menace that had been its chief
raison d'etre. Hence, Czechoslovakia's alliance with France,
which had always supported the Little Entente, met with the
approval of both Yugoslavia and Rumania!5
.
In order again to discuss the various aspects of their
respective problems regarding security, the members of the
"Svornost, April 25, May 23 and 30, 1923; Pravo Lidu, Prager
Tagblatt, May 15, 1923; Le Temps, May 23, 1923.
•s Cf. Chmelar, J., "Ceskoslovenska zahranicni politika v roce 1924 "..
Za.hroniCn4 Politika, vol. iv, pp. r-6; Rankovitch, J., "France and the
Little Entent~ ", The Living Age, vol. cccxvii, pp. 7-13.I,,
,I
\
I
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 19elr1926 221
Little Entente held the Conference of Belgrade, January Io-
12, 1924. Even before the delegates met, rumor exaggerated
the extent of the-rapprochement with France. Although
Bene§ was alleged to have prepared Franco-Yugoslav and
Franco-Rumanian treaties analogous to the Franco-Czechoslovak
alliance,46
he failed to present such projects, regardless
how desirable he may have deemed them!' When the
Conference actually opened, it approved the action that had
been taken regarding reconstruction of Hungary, from
which satisfactory guarantees were exacted,48
and then
turned to the problem of relations with the Great Powers.
In view of the impending recognition of the Soviet Union
de jure by the Western .Powers:9
Benes felt it necessary to
clarify the attitude. of the Little Entente regarding the
U.S.S.R., a question which he believed could no longer be
kept in the background lest it disrupt the unity of the three
partners. Although opposed personally to the immediate
recognition of the U. S. S. R. de jure, not because of principle,
but because of a belief that such a step would be premature,
Bend was prepared to do so if Moscow ·would
renounce foreign propaganda,. whereas Yugoslavia considered
Soviet conditions a purely internal affair, and Rumimia
demanded Bolshevik recognition of her title to Bessarabia.110
When Rumania remained firm in her opposition to Soviet
recognition, Benes refused to press the matter further, even
after Nincic stressed the joint Czechoslovak and Yugoslav
•e The Times, January 7, 1924u
Ibid., January 12, 1924•s
C/. supra, p. 2o6.
•• This step was actually initiated by Great Britain on February I, 1924.
and imitated by France, Italy and many other Powers. Cf. Toynbee,
op. cit., pp. 228-.262.
50 BeneS, Five Years of Czechoslowk Foreign Policy, p. 36; Problemy
nove Ewopy, p. 304; D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 275·
222 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
interests in a strong Soviet Union: 61
to have done so might
have alienated Rumania, which was resentful of the fact
that, in the event of a war with the Soviets, the support of
her partners would be problematic. In such. a conflict,
Rumania's only ally would be Poland. However, Poland,
in fear of being asked to commit herself still further,
refused to attend the Conference of Belgrade. As a result,
the decision of the Conference that each member of the Little
Entente should retain freedom of action regarding a Soviet
policy was the only basis upon which continued cooperation
could be guaranteed.52
Mussolini's apprehensions regarding the activities of
France in Central Europe were evident.58
In order to counteract
the threat of French preponderance, through control of
the Little Entente, he had recourse to the same methods.
As a result, there developed, between France and Italy, keen
competition for the favor of the members of the Little
Entente and of Poland. Through negotiations begun at the
time of the Conference of Belgrade, Mussolini also drew
closer to the Little Entente when he signed with Yugoslavia,
on January 27, 1924, the" Pact of Rome" which minimized
friction between the two countries. This treaty included:
first a "Pact of Friendship and Cordial Cooperation";
secondly, a protocol which stated that the new agreement
contained nothing that did not agree with Yugoslavia's earlier
treaties with her Little Entente partners, that it was nonaggressive
in that it guaranteed th~ Peace Treaties and
promised mutual neutrality in the event of an unprovoked
51 The New York Times, July 16, 1924·
52 Ibid., January 10, 12, 13 and 14, 1924; The Times, January 14 and
February 8, 1924; Le Temps, January 16, 1924; cf, also, Codresco,
op. cit., vol. i, pp. 299-304; Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 449-450; Cosma, op. cit.,
pp. ns-n8; Machray, op. cit., pp, 23o-233; L'Europe nouvelle, January
19, 1924·
53 Cf. Corriere della Sera, January 3-4. 1924.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 223
attack by a Third Power, that it promised mutual cooperation
and diplomatic support against external threats of violence,
and that it would last for five years; and, thirdly, a supplement
which recognized the annexation of Fiume by Italy
and ceded to Yugoslavia Port Baros and the delta immediately
adjacent.54
In the words of Benes, this treaty was
... joyfully welcomed " by the Little Entente: he and Nincic
had kept one another informed of their respective negotiations
with France and Italy,65
and both took pains to explain
that they had not intended to commit the Little Entente to
friendship to France alone.5
6
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia's alliance
with Italy was both fragile and unnatural; 57
in any
great emergency she would have preferred one with either
Paris or Moscow, whose military strength was greater and
whose friendship she considered more sincere.58
Rumania appeared dissatisfied over her relative insecurity,
and, although she did rebuff France by rejecting, on January
22, 1924, the proffered loan of 100,000,000 francs,59
she
reopened negotiations with her the following April.
Rumania desired particularly a French guarantee of Bessarabia,
a commitment that France was apparently willing to
assume, provided that Yugoslavia would undertake a similar
responsibility. However, Yugoslavia, on April 23, refused
to assume such a guarantee.60
Similarly, Bend declared
54 Treal31 Series, vol. xxiv, pp. 31-89.
u Machray, op. cit., pp. 233-235.
58 Cf. Currey, op. cit., pp. 123-125; The Times, January 18, 1924-
5'1 Friction still existed regarding land-owning quarrels and minority
rights.
58 Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 448-449; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 305-
3o8; vol. ii, pp. 133-149.
511 Toynbee, op. cit., p. 444- Apparently, Rumania resented the fact
that France had been more willing to grant loans to Poland and
Yugoslavia.
&o The Times, April 26 and May 10, 1924-
224 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
that, in the event of a war over Bessarabia between the
U. S. _S. R. and Rumania, he would assist the latter only in
the event that Hungary should aid the former.61
BeneS and Nincic met at Bled from May I3 to IS, I924,
to discuss the project of a four-Power treaty, whereby Yugoslavia
was to adhere to the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance and
Czechoslovakia to that between Italy and Yugoslavia.
Although such a treaty would have rendered more secure
the position of each Power concerned, it failed to be consummated
because Benes, true to his principle of avoiding
strictly Balkan commitments, refused to guarantee the Treaty
of Neuilly in addition to those of St. Germain and Trianon.62
The Italo-Czechoslovak Treaty
The failure of the pourparlers at Bled did not deter Benes
from continuing his search for Czechoslovak security, for
there remained one other alternative-independent negotiations
with Italy. An alliance with Italy would confirm
Benes' contentions that he wished to remain equally friendly
with Great Britain, France and Italy, and that no Great
Power would be permitted to exercise domination over the
Little Entente.68
While Masaryk went to Taormina, Sicily,
for his vacation, Benes went to Rome, where, on May IS,
he stated publicly that his objective was to negotiate with
Mussolini an agreement that would guarantee the preservation
of the status quo, promote the maintenance of order in
Central Europe, assure Italo-Czec4oslovak cooperation in
time of war and enable both states to use the port of Fiume
to their mutual economic advantage.64
The text of the new
61 Ibid., May 19, 1924; Narodn£ Listy, May 18, 1924; Machray, op. cit••
p. 241.
62 The Times, May 10, IS. and 17, 1!)24.
68 Carriere della Sera, May x8, 1924-
64oibid., May 16, I924i cf. also, Currey, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 225
treaty was drafted 65
on May 18 and approved by Masaryk
two days later.66
It was signed on July 5,61
ratified by Italy
on July IO
68
and by Czechoslovakia on July 17.69
Ratifications
were exchanged in Rome on August 2 I.'lil
The treaty was brief : in Article 1 the signatories promised
to cooperate in safeguarding their common interests; in
Article 2, to maintain the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon,
and Neuilly; in Article 3, to limit the treaty to five years,
with the mutual right of either denunciation or renewal one
year prior to expiration; and, in Article 4, to register the
document with the League of Nations.71
Of these terms,
Article 2 is of particular interest in that Bene5 conceded
Mussolini a guarantee of the Treaty of Neuilly, a commitment
which he had refused Yugoslavia. Although Benes
has not expressed himself publicly upon this point, he may
have felt that the friendship of Yugoslavia was assured
sufficiently without any such guarantee, whereas. that of
Italy, which, with that of France, he regarded as the absolute
minimum requirement for the adequate security of Czechoslovakia,
would not be assured without such a commitment.
Moreover, the Treaty of Neuilly was only of secondary importance
to Italy, whereas an Italian guarantee of the three
Peace Treaties, particularly those of St. Germain and
Trianon, was most important to Czechoslovakia. Benes'
own comments were as follows:
Our country is rich and prosperous and we therefore have
everything to lose and nothing to gain by any change. The
65 The New York Times, May 18, 1924-
611 Ibid., May 20, 21, 1924&'1'
Prager Presse, July 6, 1924es
Corriere della Sera, July II, 1924"Prager
Presse, July 18, 1924'0
Corriere della Sera, August :22, 1924n
Treaty Series, vol. xxvi, pp. 21-:25.
226 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
obje<;t of my. policy, therefore, has been to consolidate our
present poo!Sition by working hard to create a network of treaties
around Czechoslovakia to guarnntee her agaillJSt any osetting aJSide
of the existing Peace Treaties which lay down her,independence
and status.
With our membel"ship in the Little Entente on the one hand
and our treaJties with France and Italy we now feel safe, as
we consider that peace in Central Europe is assured.'2
In view of the rivalry between Italy and_ France, the
Halo-Czechoslovak treaty was perhaps even more welcome
to Mussolini than to Benes, for it reestablished within Central
Europe a sort of equilibrium between the two rival Great
Powers. When Mussolini had come to power, the Little
Entente had been friendly to France and distinctly hostile to
Italy. Italian distrust of its ultimate objectives had been
aggravated by the conclusion of the Franco-Czechoslovak
alliance. In response, Mussolini had concluded with Yugoslavia
the " Pact of Rome " which had eased the main sources
of friction between the two states, and had followed this
initial diplomatic triumph with a loan to Poland and the
Italo-Czechoslovak alliance. Italian influence in Central
Europe had been strengthened to an extent where it almost
counter-balanced that of France, and, not yet content, Mussolini
proceeded to sound out Rumania also.78
Nevertheless,
Czechoslovakia's alliance with Italy was not as close as that
with France.
The Praha and Ljubljant:t Conferences
Bene8 continued to welcome suggestions that might provide
additional safeguards for the preservation of the status
quo. At the Little Entente Conference of Praha, July II-
72 The New York Times, May 18, 1924; cf. also, Prager Presse, June
23, 1925, for Benes' general statement on foreign policy concerning the
French and Italian alliances.
'1& The New York Times, May 18, 1924.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1911r19£6 227
12, 1924, he not only discussed with his colleagues, Nincic
and Duca, current problems, such as a unified attitude regarding
debts, reparations and cooperation with the League of
Nations, but advocated the eventual admission to the League
of Germany, whose absence, together with that of the Soviet
Union, he believed a menace to general security and disarmament.
At the same time he deplored the ignorance or
ill-will of those who were engaged in disseminating rumors
that predicted an impending dissolution of the Little
Entente.'•
As the result of a political upheaval in Yugoslavia, Pasic
was succeeded as Prime Minister by Davidovic, and Nincic
as Foreign Minister by MarinkoviC. Benes took advantage
of his journey to Geneva to attend the meeting of the League
Council on August 27, 1924, to tarry for a few hours at
Ljubljana to confer with Marinkovic. On the next day,
Duca also arrived at Ljubljana. The two sets of conver- .
sations concerned primarily the U.S.S.R., with regard to
which the three partners again agreed to disagree: Rumania
opposed Soviet recognition de jure until the question of Bessarabia
should be solved; Yugoslavia failed to express any
decided opinion; and Bend alone was willing to grant recognition,
which even he conceded to be premature in view of
the existing state of public opinion within the three
countries.76
·
The Geneva Protocol
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance failed of adoption, primarily
because of the opposition of Great Britain to a universal
agreement. Bend was entrusted by the Third Com"~•
The Times, July 4. II and 14. 1924; Le Temps, July 13-14. 1924;
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July IS, 1924; Cosma, op. cit., pp. n8-123;
Machray, op. cit., pp. 242-247; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 309-313.
n Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 452-453; Machray, op. cit., pp. 248-250;
Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. JIS-3t8; cf. also, Miller, D. H., The Geneva
Protocol (New York, 1925).
228 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
mittee of the. League Assembly with the formulation of a
project which would meet the objections of London. The
result of the labors of many statesmen, particularly of Bend,
Politis (Greece), Herriot and MacDonald, was .a resolution
of September 6, 1924, which developed into the Geneva
Protocol that sought to facilitate both the limitation and the
reduction of armaii1ents as provided by Article 8 of the
League Covenant by ensuring the security of each state
through a peaceful solution of every international dispute.
By means of compulsory arbitration, clear definition of an
aggressor in future conflicts, and of provisions for sanctions
and alliances, all aggressive wars were to be prevented.76
On October 28, 1924, Czechoslovakia became the first
state to ratify the Geneva Protoco1."7
This procedure was
in conformity with two principles of foreign policy which
Benes had steadfastly pursued: to ensure the security of the
state by Czechoslovakia's power and by meansof defensive
treaties which had been negotiated under the auspices of the
League, and to seize every possible opportunity to further
universal guarantees of peace, also preferably under the
same auspices. He regarded the new negotiations as a confirmation
of the correctness of the general trend of his own
foreign policy, for now even the policy of regional agreements,
which had been the object of marked criticism, met
with approval. Benes promised that his foreign policy
would continue to follow these principles not only because
they were ethically just and expressive of mankind's highest
moral ideals, but because, from the viewpoint of practical
politics, they had been, and would always continue to be, the
best source of security for a state like Czechoslovakia.78
76 Monthly Summary, October, 1924, supplement, pp. t-35·
n Official Jounwl, November, 1924. pp. 1662-1663.
79 ZPravy (Poslanecki Snemovna), 294 meeting, October JO, 1924,
pp. 16 i!t seq., to session; ibid., Sen{d, 231 meeting, November 4. 1924.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 229
Nevertheless, the Geneva Protocol was also doomed by
the action of Great Britain, which, both at the meetings of the
League Council at Rome in December, 1924, and at Geneva
in March, 1925, was the first in rejecting its principles.n
Without the adherence of Great Britain, no general protocol
would be worth while, hence her rejection was fatal.
Locarno
Although Bend was profoundly .disappointed because of
the failure of the Geneva Protocol,80
in the framing of which
he had played an important part, he did not indulge in any
vain regrets; rather, he sought to utilize the regular Conference
of the Little Entente during 1925 for the purpose
of sounding his partners regarding their attitudes towards
the security negotiations then taking place between the Western
Powers and Germany.81
The regular annual meeting o.f
the Little Entente had been planned at Bucharest originally
for March 15-20, 1925,Sll but was postponed at the request·
pp. 26 et seq., 10 session; 2,32 meeting, November 5, 1924, pp. 95 et seq.,
10 session; Benes, The Diploma4ic Struggle for European Security and.
the Stabilisation of Peace, pp. 24-27; Five Years of CsechoslO'llak Foreign
Policy, pp. 3o-34; Problemy neve Ewopy, pp. 299-303; Boj o mir (speech
of October 30, 1924)~ pp. 268-300; cf. also, International Conciliation,·
September, 1925, pp. 19-2r; Arbitration, Security and Reduction of
Armaments (extracts from the debates of the Fifth Assembly, reports
and resolutions of the Assembly and Council), pp. Zio-216 for Benes'
report and the ensuing discussion; Arbitration at!d Security.
111 Cf. The Times, March 13, 1925, for the speech of Sir Austen
Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, against the Protocol. This
speech is reprinted also in Intenmtional Conciliation, September, 1925,
pp. 25-35· Cf. also, ibid., pp. 36-43, for the reply of MacDonald, the
former British Prime Minister, April IO, 1925. For further details, cf.
also, Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 36-64-
80 Official Journal, April, 1925, p. 454·
81 Cf. Chmelar, ]., '' Ceskoslovenska zahranicni politika v race 1925 ",
Zahraniln' Politika, vol. v, pp. 1-7.
82 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, February 22, 1925·
230 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
'
of Yugoslavia,83
and did not actually meet until May 9-II.
At that time, the three Foreign Ministers discussed the
problems of the day. By mutual agreement, the Russian
question was omitted. Czechoslovakia did no.t share the
interest of her partners in Bulgarian outrages. All three
states favored a continuation of the existing method of
Austrian reconstruction, and, as a result of a statement of
Premier Bethlen of Hungary regarding the injustice of the
Treaty of Trianon, a statement which the Little Entente
considered deliberately provocative, united in a protest
against any change in the status quo.84
Benes was particularly
pleased that his colleagues regretted the failure of the
Geneva Protocol and approved his various security negotiations;
85
confident of their support, he could deal with the
Great Powers with much more assurance.
Germany's Foreign Minister, Stresemanti, wished to collaborate
in the negotiations, for the problem of security concerned
his country as much as it did the victor states.88
This opinion was embodied in the German memoire of February
9, 1925, which suggested a special guaranty pact for
the West, that was to be coupled, simultaneously, with a
series of arbitration treaties with Germany's neighbors to
the East.87
88 Corriere della Sera, March 19, 1925.
S4 The Central European Observer, May 15, 1925.
85 Cf. Machray, op. cit., pp. 259-265; Codresco, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 319.331;
Cosma, op. cit., pp. 123-142; Toynbee, dp. cit., ,1925, pp. 25o-255;
L'EurdPe nouvelle, May 23,' 1925. ,.
88 Cf. Benes, The Diplomatic Struggle for Europeom ·Security and the
Stabilization of Peace, pp. 14-19, for a summary of earlier German
proposals.
8'1' Papers respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security made by the
German Government on February 9, I925, Miscellaneous no. 7 (His
Majesty's Stationery Office); Neuf pieces relatives d Ia proposition faite
le .9 fewier, I925, Par le GoU'Uernement allemand et Ia reponse &u
Gowuernement franfaise (Republique Franc;aise, Ministere des Affaires
t:trangeres).
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 231
Few diplomatic secrets were ever preserved more faithfully
than were these German proposals, which became eventually
the Locarno agreements. Had they been disclosed prematurely,
the general reaction might have been so violent within
every state concerned that the chances for ultimate success
might have been severely jeopardized. The six weeks of
uncertainty to which the press was subjected produced many
false rumors that were of service in warning the public that
general security negotiations were wider way, so that, when
the facts were published, the ground had been prepared for
their favorable reception.88
France and Great. Britain, followed by Belgium, Italy,
Poland and Czechoslovakia, announced their adherence to the
general principles of the German proposals. On April I,
1925, BeneS informed Chamberlain,the British Foreign Secretary,
of the viewpoint of Czechoslovakia, which still continued
to regard the Geneva Protocol as the best solution of
the problem of security. However, Czechoslovakia agreed
" to examine the German proposals and arbitration treaties as
a certain advance in the universal work of peace ". Before
assuming any definite stand, she wished to satisfy herself as
to the exact meaning of the memoire and its attendant arbitration
treaties. She considered it essential that the proposed
guaranty pact must not encroach upon the Peace Treaties in
any way, that it should inaugurate a new period of peace
which was to be supplemented by the admission of Germany
into the League, and that it must lead eventually " to a guaranty
pact which would be universal, or at least European, in
scope ". Except for such reservations, Czechoslovakia accepted
the German offer, particularly since she could lose
nothing by such action. According to Benes, Herriot, the
French Prime Minister, approved these reservations in toto.
This reserved attitude on the part of Czechoslovakia was
saC/. D'Abernon, op. cit., vot. i, pp. s-6.
232 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
motivated in 'part by the election of Von Hindenburg as
President of the German Reich on April 26, 1925, an event
which was interpreted by many Czechoslovaks as a part of a
general undercurrent of reaction against the status quo
within the vanquished states.89
Thereupon; · at Geneva,
Benes, Briand, Hymans of Belgium and Skrzynski of Poland
agreed to examine the German proposals.90
As soon as Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Poland
and Czechoslovakia had agreed upon a common policy, they
sent Germany two notes of June 16 and August 24 which laid
down as essential to any agreement the following principles :
{I) Germany and France agreed to respect the territorial
status quo and the Treaty of Versailles, and also the agreements
made to secure its application, as well as to repudiate
all recourse to force or to war against one another.
{2) Both parties recognize the demilitarization and inviolability
of the Rhine frontier. Exceptional cases whereby it
would be possible for military forces to violate this frontier
will be determined in a definite manner.
(3) Great Britain, and eventually Italy, will guarantee the
arrangements made.
(4) Germany will enter the League of Nations and assume
the rights and obligations of a Member.
{5) Germany will draw up arbitration treaties with her
neighbors; France will guarantee those with Poland and
Czechoslovakia.91
89 Ibid., vol. iii, pp. x6o-I6I.
9o Benes, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
Dl Reply of the German Government to the note handed to Herf'
Stresemann by the French Ambassador at ·Berlin on June 16, 1925,
respecting the ProPosals for a Pact of Security, Miscellaneous, no. 9
(His Majesty's Stationery Office).
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1928 233
The negotiations lasted eight months.92
Czechoslovakia
and Poland objected to Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant,
which left tliem with inadequate security whenever·
the League Council failed to reach a unanimous verdict in
any dispute. The Conference of Locarno, held October S-
16, 1925, attempted to meet these objections by separate
treaties between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia,
whereby mutual aid was tq be given immediately
in all cases of unprovoked attack. Although Poland regarded
this arrangement still inadequate, Czechoslovakia
approved it as the best compromise that could be obtained.
On the other hand, Germany abandoned her initial opposition
to a French guarantee of her arbitration treaties with
Poland and Czechoslovakia, and consented that they be identical
with those with France and Belgium. Germany's
views, together with her entry into the League and a com-
92 The following newspaper references cover the most important of the
negotiations prior to LOcarno: French note of June 16 replying to the
German note of February 9, Le Temps, June 18, The New York Times,
June 19; Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons, The Titmes,
The New York Times, June 25; German acceptance of the note as a basis
for negotiations, Vossische Zeitung, Le Temps, June 28; House of Lords'
debate, The Times, The New York Times, July 7; the German reply to
the French note of June x6, The New York Times, July 20 and 22;
Stresemann's speech to the Reichstag, Vorwaerts, Vossische Zeitung,
Deutsche Allgemeirnle Zeitung, The Times, The New York Times, July
23; the German note of July 20, The Times, July 22, Le Temps, July z3,
L'Europe nouvelle, SeJ>tember 12; the French reply of August 24. The
Times, T.he New York Times, August 27, Le Temps, August 28, L'Europe
nouvelle, Sel)tember 12; the German reply of August 27, The Times, The
New York Times, August 29, Le Temps, August 30, L'Europe nouvelle,
September u; Briand-Chamberlain pourparlers, The New York Times,
August 13; London meeting of experts, The Times, September I, 2, S
and 7; French invitation to a conference, Le Temps, September 18;
German acceptance, The Times, September 25; German note of September
26, Le Temps, September 30; British note of September 29, The Times,
The New York Times, September 30, Le Temps, October x; the French
note of September 29, Le Temps, October 1.
234 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
promise on Article 16 of the Covenant, were to be stipulated
in the Rhine pact in a manner more agreeable to Germany.98
On October 16, 1925, the Locarno Protocolwas initialed: 114
(I) The Rhine Guaranty Pact, among Germany, France,
Great Britain, Italy and Belgium; 96
(2) Four Arbitration Treaties between Germany and
Belgium,96
France,97
Poland,98
and Czechoslovakia; 99
and
(3) French treaties of guaranty with Poland 100
and
Czechoslovakia.101
By the terms of the Germane-Czechoslovak Arbitration
Treaty, for which negotiations had begun as early as Sep-
93 Disarmed Germany sought to safeguard herself from becoming a
battle-field in the event of the League taking action against some other
state. Similarly, she tried to avert the possibility of French troops using
her territory as a means of transit to aid Poland in case of a war with
the U.S.S.R. Cf. Langsam, W. C., The World since I9I4 (3 ed., New
York, 1936), p. 482, note.
M Documents signls ou pa.raphes a Locarno le I6 octobre, I925,
prece&es de si~ pieces relatives au~ nigociations preliminaires (Republique
Franc;aise, Minisb~re des Affaires 1i:trangeres) ; Monthly Sumtnar'Y, vol.
v, ·pp. I-24. supplement, December, 1925; Final Protocol of the Locarna
Conference (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925); Final
Protocol of the Locarno Canference, I9Z5, and treaties between France
and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia (New York, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace).
95 The signatories "collectively and severally " guaranteed the territorial
and military status qzro in the Rhineland as determined by the Treaty of
Versailles. They also agreed to settle all questions peaceably and not to
resort to war against each other except in a few clearly-defined possibilities
where such action would meet with th~ approval of the League of
Nations. Cf. Trea.t',9 Series, vol. liv, pp. 289-301.
96 Ibid., vol. liv, pp. 303-313.
97 Ibid., vol. liv, pp. 315-325.
9B Ibid., vol. liv, pp. 327-339-
99 Ibid., vol. liv, pp. 341-351.
1.00 Ibid., vol. liv, pp. 353-357.
1.01 Ibid., vol. liv, pp. 359-363.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 235
tember 2I, I925/02
the way was prepared for a policy of
conciliation before recourse was to be had to judiciary procedure,
should the two states so desire. Questions of the
first category (juridical) were obliged to be submitted to an
especially created Permanent Conciliation Commission of
five members, of which each state would appoint one and
consult regarding the other three, who were to be from three
different states. If the two parties .could not agree upon
this agency~ the question might be submitted to the Permanent
Court of International Justice or to a special arbitral
tribunal, under the Hague Convention.
For questions of the second category (political), negotiations
of conciliation were also obligatory. By Article I7,
such questions devolved upon the Permanent Conciliation
Commission. If not settled within one month after the completion
of the work of this Commission, they would be
presented for solution to the League Council according to
Article IS of the Covenant. However, these two methods
of conciliation and judgment were not applicable:
(I) To questions provided for by other Agreements (i.e.
minorities, etc., which were already provided for by ·the
League).
(2) To questions which originated from events which
antedated the present Treaty and which were covered by the
Covenant ( i. e. old disputes could not be revived).
(3) To questions in which the subject of dispute, after
internal ·legislation in one country, was released from the
jurisdiction of its national tribunals, so that the competent
juridical authority had not rendered a decision upon it.
Article I9 of the Arbitration Treaties conferred upon the .
agencies mentioned (Arbitral Tribunal, League Council and
Commission of Conciliation) the right to take provisional
1oa The Times, September 22, 1925.
236 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
measures to. hinder any modification of the status quo.
Much importance was attached to this point. Parties in a
dispute were offered substitutes for hasty procedure which
ordinarily made matters worse. The fact that old disputes
alone were excluded from peaceful settlement gave some
assurance that the disputants would not resort to. war.
Nevertheless, as Benes has pointed out, it should be noted
~t, for one frontier, Germany had concluded a guaranty
pact, and, for the others, merely arbitration treaties. This
action .was due to the fact that, except for France, no Great
Power was willing to assume the guarantee of any except
the western frontier.103
Also, according to Benes' interpretation,
by Article 21 of the Germano-Czechoslovak Arbitration
Treaty, each state retained the rights and privileges
of a Member of the League, a provision which supplemented
Article 10 of the Covenant, whereby each had agreed to
respect the political independence and territorial integrity of
the other. In the event of war, Czechoslovakia would invoke
against Germany Articles 15 (paragraph 7) and 16 of the
Covenant.104
France's reciprocal guarantees with Poland and Czechoslovakia
were motivated also by the desire to approach as
closely as possible the Rhine Guaranty Pact in the matter
of the German frontiers to the East. In the case of Czechoslovakia,
the new treaty was designed to revise and supplement
the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance and the
new Arbitration Treaties. Benes ~sumed that if a dispute
would come up between Czechoslovakia and Germany, in
which Czechoslovakia accepted the arbitral decision but
Germany did not and began hostilities, or if the League
1os BeneS, Les Accords de Locart110 (expose of October 30, 1925), pp.
xs-x6.
104 Ibid., p. x6. These parts of the Covenant specified the sanctions that
League members were to apply against any aggressor.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1921,-1928 237
Council could not decide unanimously a question submitted
to it for settlement, war would be permissible. Bend felt
that both possibilities were met by Article I of the Czechoslovak
Guaranty Treaty with France, wherein each party
became the sole judge of whether a casus foederis had arisen.
Since by Article 2 of the Rhine Guaranty Pact, the passage
of the Rhine was permitted in certain specially cited cases
only (thereby rendering more difficult the extension of
French aid-to Poland and Czechoslovakia) -and since those
cases were the only ones, after the signing of the Treaty of
Locarno, in which Czechoslovakia would be in any danger
of war, his inference was that the Guaranty Treaty with
France was intended only for such special cases.105
In the estimation of Benes, the acts of Locamo constituted
an indivisible whole, materially as well as juridically; they
were based on the same ideas and pursued the same ends.
All entered into effect at the same time, and were to end
simultaneously under the same conditions (Articles 8 and
10 of the Rhine Guaranty Pact, Article 22 of the GermanoCzechoslovak
Arbitration Treaty and Article 4 of the
Czechoslovak Guaranty Treaty with France). Becoming
valid when Germany entered the League, they were not limited
as to duration, but might be abrogated one year after
the League Council, by a two-thirds vote, would decide that
the League assured -the contracting parties sufficient guarantees.
They could not be denounced by any one of the
contracting parties.108
Of greater significance than the mere terms of the pact
was the spirit evinced at Locarno--a cooperative feeling that
all must unite to safeguard the peace of Western Europe.
Its importance lay in the fact that the basic principles of the
Geneva Protocol were applied successfully in the Rhineland
lOS Ibid., pp. tS-20.
1oa Ibid., pp. zt-22.
238 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
area to allay .whatever future danger might develop from
resentment in Germany over the Treaty of Versailles, which
had deprived her of approximately twelve per cent of her
European territory and which had left her with unsatisfactory
frontiers. The victor states realized that German military
impotence was temporary, and sought to ensure themselves
against a renewal of German strength. To this end, Locarno
seemed a favorable adjustment. To Germany it signified
that, rather than continue to consider her a permanent outcast,
tile Allies welcomed her again within the Concert of
Europe; she would enter the League, and, as a token of
recognition as a Great Power, would receive a permanent seat
on the Council. France would attain her long-sought-for
security, but in a manner which promised to promote a
rapprochement with Germany rather than perpetuate a coalit
tion against her. Locarno embodied the British principltof
seeking to ensure Franco-German peace without assum..:
ing dangerous commitments, such as an anti-German alliance
or a guarantee of the frontiers of the small Allied states of
Central and Eastern Europe, whereas it still afforded ade_:
quate security for Poland and Czechoslovakia. Despite the
obvious fact that such an agreement did not mean necessarily
the end of war, it was indubitably a step of great moral
significance. As such, it was one happy result of the long
search for security, in that it greatly enhanced both the
prestige and the power of the League by arranging for the
future admission of Germany, and by providing for the
extension of some of the League's major principles to one
of the most dangerous threats to the peace and security of
the whole Continent.101
lOT Cf. ibid., pp. 22-28; also, Fenwick, C. G., "The Legal Significance
of the Locarno Agreements", The American Journal of International Law,
vol. xx, pp. Io8-III, 1926; Krcmar, J., "Pfispevky k vjkladu o oceneni
locarnskjch smluv ", Zahraniln£ Politika, vol. iv, pp. 1334-1355·
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1f}g(J 241
Security to the East
Although the Locarno agreements and membership in the
Little Entente provided apparently an adequate guarantee for
the immediate safety of Czechoslovakia, Benes did not remain
content, but attempted to maintain a parallel line of
negotiations regarding security to the East. Ever an optimist
with regard to the future of relations with Moscow, Bend
welcomed the suggestion of the Soviet representative at
Praha, in October, 1924, for a newer and more satisfactory
Soviet-Czechoslovak commercial treaty. This initial sounding
produced no immediate results, for the question of commercial
relations between the two countries soon became subordinated
to that of de jure recognition.116
Approximately
two months later Benes, in the Congress of the Czechoslovak
Social Democratic Party, stated his belief that the time had
arrived for according the U.S.S.R. de jure recognition.m
This announcement aroused immediate protests from army
circles, from the Agrarian Party, and from Kramar, who
staged with Benes a heated debate before the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Benes attempted to ·
defend his stand by stating his belief that the Soviet government
was not supporting the propaganda of the Third International.
He pointed out that the establishment of diplomatic
" normalcy " would not only be opportune, but would
prove to be no hindrance .in counteracting domestic co'mmunist
propaganda.118
In spite of this plea, a majority still
continued to oppose immediate recognition, a fact which
went far in explaining Benes' later cautious Soviet policy.118
us Toynhee, op. cit., 1924. p. 259.
1.11 Prager Presse, December 16, 1924n&[bw.,
N arodm Listy and Narotln£ Politika, December 15-21, 1924'119
For full details of the political situation within Czechoslovakia and
its influence upon foreign policy, cf. Chmelar, J., Political Parties in
Csechoslovakia (Prague, 1926). For Kramar vs. communism, cf. Zpravy
242 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Undeterred by his failure to arrive at a better understanding
with the Soviet Union, Bend continued his search for
security to the East by persevering in his hitherto unsuccessful
attempts to effect a rapprochement with PoJand. As has
already been narrated,120
the numerous interests that Czechoslovakia
and Poland had in common had been overshadowed
· by their disputes over boundaries and their divergent policies
regarding the Soviet Union. As a result, in spite of the
common tie of mutual treaties with France, the cooperation
between Poland on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia and the
Little Entente as a whole on the other, had been spasmodic
and uncertain. It remained for the year 1924 to furnish
renewed indications' of a bettering of relations.121
The last
boundary dispute, that of Javorina, was finally decided on
May 6 by a conference at Cracow, which also drew up a
protocol permitting freedom of movement for the local population,
for tourists and for foodstuffs.122
In October, at
Geneva, the two Foreign Ministers, Benes and Skrzynski,
prepared a comprehensive program for a general understanding
upon all questions in dispute,123
as a result of which direct
negotiations for a new commercial treaty were inaugurated
in Warsaw during November.124
Prior to the German proposals of February 9, 1925, which
resulted ultimately in the Locarno agreements, Poland had
apparently underestimated the dangers to which she might
be exposed at the hands of a revived Germany, which would,
,
(Poslanecka Snemovna), 5 meeting, December 19,. 1925, pp. t36-I42.
I session..
120 C/. supra, pp. 148 et seq.
121 C/. Gazeta W arszawska article o£ March 17, 1924, denouncing
"those who desired to continue Czechoslovak-Polish friction".
1 32 Treaty Series, vol. xlviii, pp. 397-423.
us Le Temps, October 17, 1924.
1JM Ibid., November 27, 1924·
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 243
in all probability, seek to abolish the Corridor and regain
her lost areas in Upper Silesia and in Posen. Poland's unfortunate
position between the two millstones, Germany and
the Soviet Union, combined with her own land-hunger which
had antagonized both, had placed her in a quandary. In view
of her relatively greater feeling of hostility towards the
U.S.S.R., she had hitherto stressed the differences rather than
the similarities between her own foreign poljcy and that of
Czechoslovakia. To Poland, both Moscow and Berlin represented
menaces of the first magnitude, wh~reas to Czechoslovakia,
Germany alone was a threat, but one which represented
a danger that was much less imminent. On the
other hand, Czechoslovakia's fears regarding Hungary were
of no concern to Poland, which had been traditionally on
good terms with the Magyars. Before 1925, Poland had felt
secure in her French and Rumanian alliances, and had even
attempted to play the Soviets and Germany against one
another to her own advantage. However, the Locarno negotiations
opened the eyes of Poland to a new possibility: what
if the Soviets offered France an alliance? Might not France
prefer the stronger ally and leave Poland isolated? Would
not ordinary prudence dictate closer ties with both France
and Czechoslovakia, and indicate an inclusion in the Locarno
agreements of some further guarantee of Germany's eastern
frontiers in order to counteract any changes in France's
eastern treaty obligations which might develop from a \Vestern
European Security Pact? 126
As a result, the Polish
negotiations for a rapprochement with Czechoslovakia received
a fresh impetus, and a special conference for railway
problems was arranged.126
The satisfactory progress that was being made in the negotiations
with Poland was announced to the Senate Foreign
ns Cf. D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 45.
U6 Le Temps, March 2, 1925·
244 FOREI<?N POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Affairs Committee on April 1, 1925, by Benes who considered
the imminent rapprochement most important " in view
of the fact that it means the definite liquidation of all the
disputes which have existed between the two· countries and
the opening of a new period of friendly relations between
the two states ".121
Six days later a provisional commercial
and tariff agreement became effective.128
To conclude the
negotiations, Benes undertook a journey to Warsaw, where
he arrived on April 20, and where, three days later, he
signed three treaties that confirmed the rapprochement.129
The first. treaty, which was termed a " liquidation convention
", specified detailed regulations regarding the financial,
juridical and minority questions that were still outstanding
as a result of the partitions of Tesin, Spis and
Orava,130
and was relatively easy to negotiate.
Similarly, the third treaty, a lengthy commercial agreement,
was easily consummated. It conceded a reciprocal
most-favored-nation status, comprehensive reciprocal tariff
reductions, and mutually favorable railroad rates. Poland
could export freely, across Czechoslovakia, coal to the rest
of Central Europe, a region wherein lay several of her best
customers, and Czechoslovakia could export her manufactured
goods across Poland to the U.S.S.R. There· was
appended, as an annex, a veterinary convention which was
intended to protect Czechoslovakia from the importation of
diseased cattle.181
It proved more difficult to reacn an agreement upon the
second and most important treaty, that of·conciliation and
121 Prager Tagbla.tt, April 2, I!)25; The Central European Observer,
Svornost, April 3, I925·
138 Treaty Series, val. lvi, pp. 285-zSg.
1.oo Cf. Taynbee, op. cit., 1925, val. ii, pp. 247-250; L'Europe nouvelle,
May 2, 1925.
180 Treaty Series, vol. xlviii, pp. 2&7-381.
ts1Jbid., val. lviii, pp. 9-95·
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1924-1926 245
arbitration. Except for problems arising from territorial
disputes or for those for which another procedure had already
been prescribed, all other questions which could not be settled
by the ordinary diplomatic methods within a reasonable time
were to be submitted to conciliation first and then to arbitration,
unless, according to Article I, the latter method was
preferred initially. Article 3 specified that, within six
months after ratification, the two states agreed to create a
permanent Conciliation Commission of five members, one
from each state, one selected by each state from a third state,
and the president being a neutral nominated by mutual consent.
If no agreement could be reached, the President of
the Swiss Federal Council was to name the president.
Articles I2 and 13 laid down respectively six and three
months as the periods within which the Commission was to
report its findings and the disputants were to indicate whether
they accepted its decision. If conciliation failed, Article I 5
provided for a special arbitral tribunal As an alternative,
Article 17 permitted a resort to the Permanent Court of
International Justice. In either event, Article 2 I specified
that the decision would be binding for both disputants. Of
interest also was Article 23 which stated specifically that the
treaty did not modify in any respect the Geneva Protocol,
assuming that the latter would ever become effective.
Article 25 fixed the duration of the treaty at five years,
beginning thirty days after the eichange of ratifications.
A supplementary protocol stated that it was not necessary
to create any body competent to cope with territorial differences,
since such differences could be terminated only by
mutual agreement.182
1u Zpravy (Semit), 282 meeting, October I, 1925, pp. 522-528, II
session; ibid. (Poslanecka Snemovna), 365 meeting, September 29. 1925,
pp. 712-717, II session; Treaty Series, vol. xlviii, pp. 383-395.
246 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Before the treaty of conciliation and arbitration was ratified,
Czechoslovakia and Poland signed two additional
treaties to cement further their rapprochement. The treaty
of May 30, 1925, eliminated many obstacles that had heretofore
retarded tourist traffic/53
and, similarly, the sanitary
convention of September 5, 1925, terminated much of the
frontier friction between the respective medical authorities.13
•
The treaty of conciliation and arbitration was finally
ratified on April 14, 1926, when Skrzynski visited Praha to
return the visit that Benes had paid Warsaw the year before.
The former took pains to be unusually cordial and stated
publicly their " absolute agreement " upon all political problems.135
Apparently, the substitution of friendship for
friction was welcome to both Slav states.136
Nevertheless,
Polish foreign policy remained unchanged in other respects.
Poland still held aloof from too intimate contacts with the
Little Entente by preserving neutrality regarding Hungary
in response to a " correct" Little Entente attitude towards
the Soviet Union.137
Upon the vital questions of security
and a common policy regarding the eastern frontiers of Germany-Poland
and Czechoslovakia cooperated to the fullest
extent. Benes was particularly happy over the rapprochement,
which in his estimation gave the finishing touch to his
search for security by extending after a fashion the spirit of
Locarno to the East and ensuring for Czechoslovakia a
more secure all-around defense in any future emergency.138
ua Treaty Series, vol. 1, pp. 243-251. ,
'184 Ibid., vol. lviii, pp. 143-177.
'135 Cf. Prager Presse and The Times, April 15, 1!)26.
ue Cf. Le Temps, February IS, April 7 and May 16, I92S; Gazeta
Warszawska, February IS and May 16, I92S; The New York Times,
April 24. 192s; Prow Lidu, April 24. I92S. April IS and 16, 192().
1BT Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., 1926, p. 153; Machray, op. cit., pp. 2S7-2S9;
Codresco, o'fl. cit., vol. ii, pp. 21S-228.
'138 BeneS, The Diplomatic Struggle for European Security and the
Stabilization of Peace, pp. 28-29-
CHAPTER VI
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE NEw STATUS Quo
COMMERCIAL TREATIES
THE optimism generally prevalent as a result of the successful
culmination of the Locarno Iiegot~tions found its
reflection also within Czechoslovakia. With the apparent
solution of the major problems of reconstruction and security,
Bene5 turned to the next phase of his foreign policythe
safeguarding of the new status quo. In the process of
readjustment, there yet remained to be made many adaptations
to the new environment. Benes, always an ardent advocate
of peace, was eager to do his part.
As soon as a fair degree of domestic stability had been
attained, Czechoslovakia inaugurated a drive to obtain favorable
commercial treaties from all her neighbors/ a policy
that was ultimately successful, despite many obstacles. By
the end of I925, about forty commercial treaties had been
negotiated. Attempts were made also to stimulate overseas
trade. For a long time no treaties could be made with
Latin American states because of mutual distrust, poor contacts,
and tariff policies, hence the process of regaining the
important pre-war traffic as middleman for coffee and colonial
products was retarded. Nevertheless, during the
middle i920's Czechoslovakia's foreign trade continued to
show marked gains.8
Except for the commercial treaties
1 Cf. supra, pp. 87-89.
• For the years 1923, 1925 and 1927, respectively, Czechos~ovakia's imports
amounted to 10,222,000, 17,6I8,ooo and 17,¢2,000 crowns, respectively; her
exports, 12,573,000, 18,821,000 and 20,135,000 crowns, respectively. Cf.
Publications of the League of NatiOM (henceforth referred to as Publications),
Economic and Financial, 1930, ii, x, p. 142.
248 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
considered_ in detail elsewhere, the following are the most
important negotiated by Czechoslovakia: with Latvia,
October 7, 1922; 8
Greece, December 28, 1922,4
and April
8, 1925; 5
the Netherlands, January 30, 1923; 6
Great
Britain, July 14, 1923; '~ Norway, October 2, 1923; 8
the
United States, October 29, 1923; 9
Denmark, January 31,
1924; 10
the Irish Free State, May 8, 1924; u Sweden, April
18, I925; 12
Spain, July 29, I925,U and December I3,
1928; 14
Bulgaria, October I6, I925; 115
Japan, October 30,
1925; 18
Albania, January 19, 1926; u Switzerland, February
I6, 1927; 18
Finland, March 2, 1927; 19
T~rkey, May
3I, I927; 110
Estonia, June 20, I 927; 21
and Canada, March
IS, 1928.22
The Debt Settlement with the United States
Another important question was the settlement of Czechoslovakia's
debt to the United States. Because of the economic
dislocation and of a desire to obtain more lenient
terms, Czechoslovakia, in common with other debtors of the
United States, was in no great haste to come to a definite
understanding immediately after the termination of the War.
No agreement was reached until October I3, 1925. Upon
that date, Czechoslovakia agreed to pay $1 15,000,000 in
s Treaty Series, vol. xx, pp. 379-393. ,. -
4 Ibid., vol. xxi, pp. 217-219.
5 Ibid., vol. xxxviii, pp. 291-299.
'I Ibid., vol. xxix, pp. 377-387.
e Ibid., vol. lvi, pp. 271-278.
:u Ibid., vol. xlvi, pp. 419-425.
1a Ibid., vol. lx, pp. 329-351.
n Ibid., vol. lvi, pp. 200-269.
17 Ibid., vol. lxiv, pp. 349-353.
111/bid., vol. lxvi, pp. 385-401.
21 Ibid., vol. lxxvii, pp. 341-357.
6 Ibid., vol. xxxi, pp, 85-91.
8 Ibid., vol. xx, pp. 355-361.
10 Ibid., vol. xxiii, pp. 139-147.
12 Ibid., vol. xxxvi, pp. 289-297.
14 Ibid., vol. xcviii, pp, 65-79u
Ibid., vol. lviii, pp. 263-277.
18 Ibid., vol. lxiv, pp, 7-75·
20 Ibid., vol. lxxi, pp. 335-359.
22Ibid., vol. lxxxii, pp. I47-I5I.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 249
principal {amount actually borrowed $g1,8oo,ooo, the rest
unpaid interest) and $197,81 1,433·88 in interest. Interest
was fixed at three per cent for the first ten years and at
three and one-half per cent for the next fifty-two years.
For the first eighteen years the annual payments would range
from $4,022,700 to $4,565,425. It was ;,~.greed also that,
during this period, Czechoslovakia would pay annually only
$J,OOO,ooo and defer the rest to the nineteenth year and later.
On the deferred amount, interest payments would be the
same as upon the principal, three per cent for the first ten
years, and three and one-half per cent thereafter. On June
15, 1943, the deferred amount was to be added to the principal
and paid off in forty-four annual payments ranging
from $5,879,225 to $5,884,725. This settlement, as of June
15, 1925, which spread payments over a sixty-two year
period, which reduced interest payments from an original
rate of five per cent, and which represented a considerable
cancellation, was apparently satisfactory to both countries.211
The Catholic Question
If Czechoslovakia was to attain stability, it was also vitally
important that she. solve in some satisfactory manner the
Catholic question that had vexed her since the attainment of
independence. Of all the major aspects of the comprehensive
policy of domestic stabilization,:~• the question of relations
with the Catholic Church had made the least progress.
The passage of time had increased the feeling of hostility
between the Catholics and the religious radicals. The Slovak
bishops went so far as to issue, on Christmas Day, 1924, a
211 Moulton, H. G. and Pasvolsky, L., W a,. Debts and W o,.ld p,.osperity
(Washington, 1932), pp. 86-95 (cf. pp. 434-435 for detailed schedule of
payments); World War Debt SettleHU!Hfs (New York, 1926), pp. 82-95;
The New York TiHU!s, October 13, 1925; Prager Presse, Narodm Politika,
N6rod11l Listy, October 14. 1925·
M Cf. su.f>ra, pp. 91 et st'q.
250 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
pastoral letter which banned membership in anti-church
organizations, a decree which was interprett;d to .include even
the quintumvirate 25
which then maintained in power the
Svehla government.26
Masaryk delivered on New Year's
Day, 1925, an address in which he stated his belief that the
proposed separation of Church and State was not an indication
of anti-clerical tendencies, but would result in an intensified
spiritual life.21
However, ardent Catholics remained
unconvinced of the advisability of a separation.
The actual severance of diplomatic relations between
Czechoslovakia and the Vatican resulted from the events of
July 6, 1925. July 6, the anniversary of Hus' martyrdom
at Constance, had recently been selected by the Czechoslovak
parliament, without any marked political opposition, as one
of the new national holidays that were to replace several old
religious ones. This particular date had long been popular,
for most of the Czechoslovaks, regardless of religious denomination,
revered the memory of John Hus as an early
anti-German patriot, and as one of the creators of the
national language. Benes was greatly surprised when the
Papal Nuncio to Praha, Monsignor Marmaggi, informed him
that the presence of the high officials of the Czechoslovak
government at the festivities of July 6 would be interpreted
as an intentional offense to the Holy See.28
In spite of this protest, July 6; 1925, was observed
throughout the Republic with great enthusiasm. In Praha,
where the Hussite flag was flown over the presidential palace,
the government was represented officially by the President,
the Prime Minister and other cabinet members. To Catholic
protests, the government answered in a conciliatory
35 Cf. supra, p. 74·
liS Narodn£ Politika, December 26, I924
27 Ibid., January 2, I925·
118 Ibid., Narodni Listy, July 3, 1925.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 251
manner that no offense had been intended, but that the whole
affair had been a purely national demonstration. It was also
pointed out that its intention to participate in 1928 in the
celebration of the millennia! anniversary of St. Vaclav
(Wenceslaus), the Catholic patron saint of Bohemia, should
prove a sufficient indication of impartiality and of an absence
Qf anti-Catholic tendencies.29
·
Regardless of all explanations, Marmaggi informed BeneS
.on July 6 that he was leaving Praha the next day in response
to an order to that effect. Czechoslovakia felt compelled to
recall its representative at the Vatican.S0
The break with Rome profoundly affected the political
situation within Czechoslovakia. The religious radicals,
with the Socialists in the van, held several meetings whose
Qbject was to demand the abolition of the Legation at the
Vatican and the immediate separation of Church and State.
After the National Socialists staged a violent interpellation
in parliament,81
even the quintumvirate, hitherto almost allpowerful
politically, became concerned whether it could maintain
its bloc. The government, on July 19, published an
-official communique, which, while attempting to remain conciliatory,
pointed out that any interference on the part of
the Vatican with ·the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia
would be inadmissible. The government denied all responsibility
for the recent rupture of relations and announced that
its future policy would be the maintenance of a " correct"
attitude religiously. The differences between the Vatican
and Czechoslovakia centered in five grievances: (I) Negotiations
for a Concordat made no progress; (2) the new ad4
ministrative methods sought to destroy lo~l autonomy; (3)
the policy of agrarian reform was breaking up Church proplli
Narodnl Listy, July 6, 1925.
ao Ibid., July 6, 1925; Prager Presse, July 6, 7 and 9, 1925.
a1 Tisky (Senat), no. 22II, July 8, 1925, II session.
252 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
erties; (4) the law for national holidays disregarded wellestablished
Catholic anniversaries; and ( 5) the, Nationalists
and Socialists sought to control education.82
Even the Clerical cabinet ministers, who were personally
opposed to the religious policy of the government, acquiesced,
lest their withdrawal enable the radical Liberal, Soc-:
ialist and Agrarian parties to enact their anti-Clerical
program.33
To avert an immediate crisis, parliament adjourned
until September. Fresh fuel was added to the
flames when the government, on August 12, proclaimed
formally that Marianske Lazne, famous as a spa, would
henceforth be state property. The land in question had been
owned by the Tepl Abbey, whose abbot, Dr. Helmer, was a
prominent German nationalist; hence the action was conceived
as a joint attack upon both German nationalists and
supporters of the Papacy.34
Despite the contention of the
Czechoslovak government that the whole religious controversy
was strictly an internal affair of the Republic, the pope,
on September 23, 1925, issued a communique stating that he
could not concede to the government of a state whose population
was two-thirds Catholic a reservation of the right to
bffend the Holy See indefinitely.35
The dispute led to the
calling of new elections, although, normally, the Chamber of
Deputies would have continued into 1926, and the Senate for
another two years and a hal£.88
Tile ensuing elections of
November 15 and 22 were generally favorable to the quin-
32 Ibid., no. 2212, September 14, 1925, II session, points out that the
text of the communique was issued to all Praha newspapers on July 19
and that these are to be regarded as official sources. The communique
is also reprinted in Bernus, P., "Le Gouvernement tcheque et le Vatican",
Le Journal des &ebats, vol. xxxii, pt. 2, pp. I3o-I3I.
88 Narodn£ Listy, July I9, I925·
34 Prager Presse, August I2, 1925.
35 Narodm Politika, September 24. 1925.
B8 Cf. The New York Times, October IS, 1925.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 253
tumvirate, even though the latter's majority in the Chamber
was decreased. The coalition included Agrarians, Social
Democrats, National Socialists, National Democrats and
Clericals. Before the elections, this bloc had mustered I 73
votes against 121 in the opposition; after the election, the
totals were 159 and 141. Because of the scanty majority,
Premier Svehla offered his resignation, which President
Masaryk refused to accept.81
For a period of over two years after the rupture of relations,
no rapprochement was reached despite gestures of
friendship from both sides. In 1927, the government
showed its goodwill by abstaining from any official participation
in the festivities of July 6, an attitude greatly appreciated
by the Church, which, in turn, returned the compliment
by recognizing the celebration of Hus' anniversary as
a national holiday, non-provocative in itself, and as an event
at which the attendance of the ministry was understood.S8
The Clericals, particularly the followers of Father Hlinka,
refused to believe that Benes, a religious liberal, really desired
to reestablish friendly relations, and sought to place upon
him the responsibility for the failure to reach any under-
standing.811
In attempting to discredit such allegations,
Bend informed the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign
Affairs that
the Czechoslovak Government iJS anxioU'.S to avoid useless social
conflicts and desires a solution of the problem of relations with
the Vatican that will be acceptable to all parties. There can be
no complete separation of Church and State in Czechoslovakia,
but neither can there be a permanent, indisputable Concordat.
af N6.rodnt Politika, November 16 and 23, 1925·
88 Svomost, September 10, 1927.
811 For interpellation, c/. Tisky (Poslaneclai Snemovna), no. 776, v,
December IS, 1926, 4 session.
254 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
A ·satisfactory outcome of the present negotiations is expected
shortly.40
On December 20, 1927, Pope Pius met Dr. Krofta, the
Czechoslovak plenipotentiary sent specially to the Vatican, in
a private audience, and, later in the day, Dr. Krofta and
Cardinal Gasparri, the Papal Secretary of State, agreed upon
the exact terms of a compromise. While Dr. Krofta was
on his return to Praha to present the new agreement for
ratification, Monsignor Marmaggi began his preparations to
resume his duties as Nuncio at Praha in January, 1928.41
in order to come to an agreement, the Vatican had decided
to change its existing policy regarding Czechoslovakia-to
abandon attempts for a Concordat and to establish instead a
modus vivendi. The text, which was not made public unti]
after an exchange of notes, was ratified by Czechoslovakia on
January 20, 1928,42
and by the Pope on February 2, 1928.n
A day earlier, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Senate, Benes made clear the seven points that formed the
basis of the agreement:
(I) No Czechoslovak diocese had any authority beyond
its boundaries, and no foreign diocese was to have any influence
in Czechoslovakia_ A mixed committee would draw
anew the boundaries of each diocese.
(2) State control of Church lands, inaugurated during the
land reforms, was to end, and the Church authorities were
to resume control over unexpropriated Church holdings.
(3) Monasteries and orders having cloisters in Czechoslovakia
could have no seats outside of Czechoslovakia.
4& Zpro:uy (Poslaneck:i. Snemovna), 102 meeting, October 25, 1927,
p. 14. 5 session.
41 Prager Presse, Svonwst, December 21, 1927.
o Prdvo Lidu, January 21, 1928; Svonwst, January 25, 1928.
43 Svonwst, February 3, 1928.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 255
(4) :Bishops had to be citizens of Czechoslovakia and
could be installed only with the consent of the Czechoslovak
government. The government could refuse to endorse any
high Church official connected with irredentist or separatist
movements against Czechoslovakia.
(5) Church officials must take an.oath of allegiance to
Czechoslovakia.
(6) The Czechoslovak government guaranteed freedom of
public worship to all religious creeds.
(7) The Czechoslovak government would pay the salaries
of the Catholic Clergy, just as it was paying the ministers of
other religious denominations recognized by the state.44
Delicate indeed had been the problem of the appointment
of bishops. Czechoslovakia had acquired large areas, formerly
Hungarian, which were still under the religious control
of bishops residing in Hungary. The government desired
that the religious and political boundaries coincide, particularly
since the major portions of several Hungarian dioceses
were now within the boundaries of Slovakia. The strength
of Magyar influence in Slovakia explained also Czechoslovakia's
insistence on the fourth point in the modus vivendi.411
On the other hand, the Church desired primarily to regain
control of the holdings lost by Czechoslovakia's policy of
44 Narodnt List:v, Prager Presse, February I, 1928; Svomost, February
2 and I7, 1928; L'Europe nouvelle, February 18, 1928; Anon., "Modus
vivendi mezi Ceskoslovenskem a Vatikanem ", Zahranicm Politika, vol.
vii, pp. 97-98 (Beneii to Gasparri, text of Czechoslovak note of January
29, I928); Benes, E., "Expose Ministra Dra. Edvarda Benese o modu
vivendi mezi Ceskoslovenskem a Vatikanem ", Za.hraniCm Politika, vol.
vii, pp. 2oo-203 (text of Benes' speech of February I, 1928). Tisky
(Postanecka Snemovna), nos. 1465 and 1467, February 6, 1928, S session,
point out that the text of the modus vivendi was given by the government
on January JI, 1928, to all Praha newspapers, which are to be regarded
as official sources.
u Svornost, April 23, 1928; Narodni Listy, April 4, 1928.
256 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1995
land reform. Here was a substantial grievance, whereas the
concessions granted to Czechoslovakia were all theoretical,
involving prerogatives that had already been lost. This fact
was seized upon by the religious radicals, who accused the
Church of materialistic and mercenary motives, of having
given up all the principles for which it had long stood in
order to regain its lands. In spite of the cordiality with
which the modus vivendi was received by the Czechoslovaks,
the radical minority still persisted in its agitation against the
Church."'6
The modus vivendi had been made possible only by the
moderation and conciliatory attitude displayed by both
parties. Czechoslovakia, although firmly determined to
retain July 6 as a national holiday, still tried to eliminate
such aspects of the ceremony as might be considered deliberately
provocative by the Catholic Church. With such
friendship evinced by both sides, there was no need for a
definite stipulation in the modus vivendi on the question of
national holidays.
As another gesture of friendship towards Czechoslovakia,
Monsignor Marmaggi was succeeded as Nuncio to Praha by
Monsignor Ciriaci, who was persona gratissima to the Republic
because of his long negotiations, from September to
December, 1927, with Dr. Krofta."'1
The rapprochement
between the Vatican and Czechoslqyakia was confirmed by
the decoration of President Masaryk, on September 28, 1929,
with the grand cross of the Papal order of the Holy
Sepulcher, a distinction granted hitherto only to a few reignu
As typical samples, c/. Pr{wo Lidu, January 9, 1929. and Svornost,
January 26, 1929, for articles purporting to show the great disappointment
of the Vatican at the fact that Czechoslovakia had attained independen<:e;
or Prager Presse, January 26, 1930. and Svornost, March 13,
1929, and February 15, 1930, for charges of unwarrantable dabbling of
the Church in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.
47 Svornost, February 20, 1928.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 257.
ing sovereigns." It appeared as if Bend' explanation of the
modus vivendi, as a victory for neither side but as a
thoroughly satisfactory agreement which promised a permanent
religious settlement, would be justified.49
Fascism
As the middle 192o's wore on, Bolshevis~ became less of
a menace, because of better relations with the U.S.S.R. and
because of reviving domestic prosperity. By 1926, Fascism
also raised its head. The leader of the Czechoslovak Fascisti
was Radula Gajda, the hero of the Siberian campaign 110
and now Chief-of-Staff of the Czechoslovak army. Immediately
before the opening of the great Sokol Congress at
Praha, he received a compulsory leave of absence {September
I, 1926)u owing to rumors that he was contemplating
an imitation of Mussolini's "march on Rome" with the aid
of the Sokol athletes:52
Well-informed men pointed out that
the Sokols were a unit for the Republic and that Gajda could
have no reasonable hope of success, but the government refused
to assume any unnecessary risk. Gajda was punished
••Ibid., October 12 and 24, 1929; Berliner Tageblatt, Ndrodn£ Lirty,
September 28, 1929; cf. also, Narodni Listy, May 18, 1929, or Swrnost,
June 4. 1929, for President Masaryk's viewpoint on the celebration of
the anniversary of St. Vaclav and on Catholicism in general.
441 Benes, Boj o m£r (speech of February 2, 1gz8), pp. 388-396.
50 Cf. supra, pi). I 18 et seq.
111 Republika Ceskoslovensk3., Ministerstvo Narodnl Obrany, Osobnl
Vestnik, vol. ix, p. :233.
n The famous Sokol (falcon) Gymnastic society, founded in 1862,
had cleverly utilized the externals of physical drill as a cloak to cover a
well-planned democratic and nationalistic program. Austria was slow to
realize its menace, not trying to suppress it until during the winter of 1915,
at which time the Sokols had 953 branches and I 10,000 members in
Austria alone, as well as other units in all parts of the world where there
existed large Czech settlements. Cf. Fisher, L. K.. "What the Sokols
Stand for", The Bohemian Rrview, vol. i, pp. 1-4; Temperley, op. cit.,
vot. iii, p. 251; Mercier, op. cit., p. s8.
258; FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
by degradation in rank to that of a private in the reserves.
He was allowed three-fourths of his pension because of
physical disability and because the government' did not wish
to make him a martyr. This sentence, passed by the
Supreme Disciplinary Commission of the Ministry of
National Defense, was approved by the Senate on October
26, 1926, after a spirited interpellation.53
Gajda's drastic
punishment seemed to deprive the Fascisti of any strength
they might have possessed. In general, Czechoslovak public
opinion welcomed the verdict, which made the cause of the
Fascists appear ridiculous. Both Masaryk and Benes considered
the movement within Czechoslovakia a comic opera
gesture}14
Minority Reconciliations
The German minority within the Republic, which had hitherto
refused to cooperate politically with the Czechoslovaks,
became reconciled and apparently surrendered any immediate
hopes for a union with Germany. On October 12, 1926, the
two most prominent German parties, the German Agrarian
and the Christian Social, entered the Svehla Cabinet. Their
leaders, Spina and Mayr:-Harting, received, respectively, the
portfolios of Public Works and of Justice.56
This event
markedthe acceptance of the post-Locarno status quo by the
German minority.68
Similarly, the consolidation of the state
was again furthered on January 15;- 1927, when the Slovak
Popular (Catholic) party, led by Father Hlinka, also joined
the Svehla coalition by accepting two posts in the Cabinet :
Tiso, the portfolio of Public Health; and Gazik, that of the
r.szprtw:v (Senat), 46 meeting, October 26, 1!)26, pp. 252-262, 3 session.
H The New York Times, February 12, 1928. It might be noted also
that the two chief Fascist demands were an anti-Jewish governmental
policy and a new constitution with a stronger executive.
55 Prager Presse, October 12, 1926.
lie cj. Borovicka, op. cit., p. 123.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 259
Unification of Laws:,.., By this move, the Magyar irredentists
were dealt a severe blow. These successive reconciliations
of the Germans and discontented Slovaks with the
Czechs presented one of the best guarantees for the permanence
of the state.58
Better Relations with the Soviet .Union
One of the chief disappointments that Benes was destined
to encounter in his desire to safeguard the new status quo
was the lack of fulfillment of his optimistic prediction 69
that
an Eastern Locamo with the Soviet Union would follow the
conclusion of the agreement with the Western Powers. In
fact, Locarno and its sequel, the rapprochement between
Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R's enemy, Poland, rendered
more remote the possibility of a Czechoslovak-Soviet
rapprochement. Regardless of the reaction of Moscow to
such actions on the part of Czechoslovakia, Benes had never
intended them as evidences of hostility to her, but merely as
necessary moves in the solution of the problem of security.
He went so far as to admit that his hands were tied, that his
delay in recognizing the Soviets had been forced by repeated
protests from high Czechoslovak military authorities."
Despite such pressure, Bend again advocated publicly the
recognition of the U.S.S.R. on May I, 1926.81
At Little
liT lbitl;, pp. 124-125; Prager Presse, January IS, I!)27.
M Cf. Mirkine-Guetzevich, B., and Tibal. A., La Tchecoslovaquie
(Paris, 1929), pp. 49-50. One of the best pleas for a greater degree of
cooperation between the Czechoslovaks and the German minority is contained
in the book by E. Radl, Der Kampf zwischen, Tschechen tmd
De.mchen (Reichenberg, 11)28). For Czech and Slovak reconciliation,
c}. Seton-Watson, R. W., Slovakia, TheK an& Now (London, 1931).
~>9 Cf. supra, p. 239.
"Cf. ZPr{wy (Senat), 8 meeting, February 23, 1926, pp. 155-156.
1 session, for the Senate's statement of political reasons for its refusal
to recognize the U. S. S. R. de jure.
&1 The NeuJ York Times, May I, 192().
260 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Entente Conferences, particularly at Jachymov (Joachimsthal),
he risked antagonizing Rumania by his insistence
that each member retain freedom of action concerning the
Soviet Union, and by his repeated refusals to participate in
any hostile gesture against her, a policy that was supported
generally by Yugoslavia also.82
Yet, it is doubtful if even
diplomatic consideration for the feelings of Rumania would
have been sufficiently influential to have restrained Bend.
Czechoslovakia, a Slav state with professed Slavophil sentiments,
could have been expected normally to have lost no
time in recognizing Russia after Great Britain and France
had done so. Benes had sfated (March II, 1920)63
that
Czechoslovakia would neither anticipate nor lag behind the
Western Powers in the matter of Russian recognition. The
fact that he did lag behind against his own volition was owing
primarily to the composition of the Czechoslovak governmental
coalition, which, because of its political antipathy to
Communism, prevented de jure recognition of the Russian
Soviet.8
•
The provisional commercial treaty, signed by Russia and
Czechoslovakia on June 5, 1922,85
had resulted in an improvement
of business relations, yet had not been entirely
satisfactory to either. From 1922 to 1925, the amount of
intercourse continued to increase annually, but, after that
date, there ensued a period of decline, caused perhaps by the
fact that both countries, through' numerous commercial
treaties, had found better markets elsewhere. By 1928, the
decline of Soviet-Czechoslovak trade had become so marked
as to attract the attention of statesmen in both countries.
Soviet imports from Czechoslovakia fell from over 100,-
82 Ibid., May 14. 1927.
83 Cf. suPra, pp. IJ6-IJ7.
&4 Cf. Narodni Politika, February 27, 1927; Svornost, March 17, 1927.
8 5 Cf. supra, pp. I45-I46. ·
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 261
000,000 crowns in 1925 to JI,ooo,ooo crowns in 1928, and
Czechoslovak exporters began to complain that their products
were being overlooked by the Bolsheviks.68
In order to restore lost contacts, Moscow took the initiative
in the negotiations for a new Soviet-Czechoslovak commercial
treaty. Early in 1928, Stein, the secretary of the
Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference at Geneva,
held preliminary discussions with Veverka, the Czechoslovak
representative. On March 9, 1928, Stein and Dr. Niederle,
councillor at the legation and acting commissioner for Litvinov,
the leader of the Soviet delegation at Geneva, conferred
with Bend. No great disagreement existed between
the viewpoints of the two countries.67
The Soviet Union
agreed to withdraw the demand formerly considered indispensable--de
jure recognition, but sought to do so, if possible,
without giving the matter any domestic publicity.68
Every assistance in loading goods, in consolidating rates, and
in granting notable reductions for products in which both
countries had a particular interest, was offered by the Soviet
Union. The time and place of the final negotiations were
to be settled by mutual agreement. Official Czechoslovak
circles considered the chances for a successful conclusion of
the negotiations favorable.611
Czechoslovakia requested the inclusion in any new treaty
of the. following points: (I) a most-favored-nation clause
for herself; (2) reciprocal facilitation of traffic; (3) a tariff
agreement with mutually autonomous rates; (4) strict import
and export quotas; ( 5) a consular convention; and (6)
indefinite postponement of the question of de jure recognie8
Ceske Slovo, Arbeiter Zeitung, May 15, 1928; Svornost, May 16, 1928.
8'1 Svomost, March 24-25, 1928.
ee The New York Times, April 2, 1928.
eo Prager Presse, March 22, 1928.
262 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
tion of the U.S.S.R., which question was not to he raised
during the negotiations.70
These proposals were submitted by BeneS to Litvinov, who
forwarded them to Moscow. The first three points were
conceded immediately, but the fourth encountered violent
objections because the Soviet government hesitated to commit
itself to the purchase of as large a quantity of Czechoslovak
goods as Czechoslovakia did of Soviet products. On
the other hand, Czechoslovakia objected to certain Soviet
tariff regulations. Then, too, mutual difficulties were raised
with regard to the details of powers of the consuls in residence
and of a satisfactory visa arrangement.11
Although the negotiations were spun out for weeks, no
definite agreement on the various points in dispute could he
reached. However, the economic contacts between the two
countries became more intimate. than ever before. Before
the negotiations came to an end, nearly two hundred of the
leading manufacturing and exporting concerns of Czechoslovakia
had entered into business relations with the Soviet
U nion.72
Great impetus had been given this trade by the
establishment in Praha, late in 1927, of a foundation whose
object was the creation of economic ties between the two
countries, and under whose auspices there was opened on
September 26, 1928, an exposition of Soviet goods.73
Statistics issued by Basil Sacharov, the Commissar of Foreign
Trade, showed that Soviet importS from Czechoslovakia
rose from 31,000,000 crowns for 1928 to 298,000,000
crowns for 1929.74
It was also hoped that, in the future,
10 Ibid., March 20, 1928.
n Svornost, April 4, 1928.
v:t Ceske Slovo, June 2, 1928; The New York Times, June 24, 1928.
vs S'VOrnost, October 14, 1928.
u Ibid., December 29, 1929. For further details, cf. ibid., November
3, 1928, and June 6, 1929.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 263
still better use would be made of the Danube River as the
main artery of trade between the U.S.S.R. and Central
Europe.75
Friendship with Poland
Similarly, Czechoslovakia and Poland, states which had
their " frontiers hardly solidified " 76
· and which had almost
as much to gain from Locarno as had France and Germany,
drew even closer together. The two Slavic friends sought
to strengthen the new status quo by concluding a series of
additional treaties which attempted to regulate ordinary international
activities.
Much was expected from the treaty of aerial navigation,
which had been signed at Praha on April 15, 1926, in the
midst of the enthusiasm engendered by the visit of
Skrzynski.n Regular air mail service was to be provided
between Brno and Lwow, where customs airdomes were to be
erected. There was to be no duty on parts or tools needed
for aircraft. Czechoslovakia agreed to grant to one Polish
air navigation company, to be designated specifically by
Poland, the right to fly Polish aircraft over Czechoslovakia
at regular intervals from Cracow or Katowice to Vienna, but
such aircraft must ·land en route at the customs airdome at
Brno. Poland agreed to grant similarly to one Czechoslovak
company the right to fly over Poland to Uzhorod, Moravska
Ostrava, or Podwoloczyska. However, each country reserved
the right to revoke without advance notice the special
privileges given to the favored company and to grant them
to others.vs
n[bid., July 29. 1928, and April 10, I929f6
Cf. D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. I83-I4
n C/. su.pra, p. 246.
"Treaty Series, vol. lxvii, pp. 305-331.
264 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
The high expectations raised by the treaty of aerial navi.o
gation were never realized. The volume of business was
much less than .had been anticipated, and there were many
objections to the monopoly and customs features of the
agreement. Many wild and unfavorable, even if false,
rumors circulated regarding the menace to neighboring states
that might be embodied in allegedly secret military clauses of
the treaty. In view of the fact that objections to the treaty
seemed to outweigh any possible advantages that might be
derived from its continuation, it was denounced by mutual
consent as of December 31, 1930.711
Four treaties of February 8, 1927, granted access to the
authorities of each country to certain archives of the other
and provided for the free exchange of documentary information.
The first treaty dealt with the exchange of documents
of the former Austrian, Hungarian, and Austro-Hungarian
military authorities; 80
the second treaty regulated the
disposal of documents still remaining with the Austrian military
authorities and provided for independent requests on
the part of both Poland and Czechoslovakia to Austria for
records still in Austrian hands ; 81
the third treaty concerned
the disposal of railway records and archives; 82
and the
fourth treaty arranged for the mutual loan of documents,
prior to those mentioned in Article 23 of the "liquidation
. convention" of April 23, 1925.83
~milar in scope was the
· treaty of April 14, 1927, which provided for the exchange of
judicial archives.84
A treaty of May 30, 1927, facilitated
railway traffic across the frontiers,85
and one of February
79 Prager Presse, January I, 1931.
80 Treaty Series, vol. lxx, pp. ~61-273.
81 Ibid., vol. lxx, pp. ~75-287. 82 Ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 28g-297.
8S Ibid., vol. lxx, pp. 299-303.
85 Ibid., vol. xcviii, pp. 233-295.
st Ibid., vol. lxxxii, pp. 157-169.
E,FFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 265
18, 1928, regulated fishing and the preservation of fish in
frontier waters.86
The denunciation of the treaty of aerial navigation and
protests in certain Polish circles about the alleged favors
granted by Czechoslovakia to Ukrainian radicals hostile to
Poland,87
were minor exceptions to the generally cordial
tenor of relations between Poland and· Czechoslovakia. For
the time being, their rapprochement appeared to guarantee
friendship by the adoption of tolerant and far-sighted foreign
policies whereby they gave one another consistent support in
all negotiations concerning security, disarmament and world
peace. They agreed to keep in the background the point of
their greatest divergence--their respective policies regarding
the Soviet Union.
Franco-Italian Rivalry
In the West, the spirit of Locarno had failed to mitigate
the rivalry that existed between France and Italy. By 1926
this conflict of interests had become so obvious, particularly
in Central Europe, that the small states of that area faced
the possibility of having to forget their post-war division into
victors and vanquished in favor of a new alignment under one
or the other of the Latin rivals. Such an eventuality would
threaten both Benes' hope for the maintenance of the new
status quo and one main objective of the Little Entente, that
of seeking to preserve its diplomatic independence from any
one of the Great Powers. While contracting friendly ties
with both France and Italy, the members of the Little
Entente were determined not to become satellites of either.88
France's relatively greater measure of success in concluding
treaties with the victor states was again clearly marked.
ss Ibid., vol. cxix, pp. 385-401.
Bf Gazeta Warszawska, May 22, 1929; Svonwst, May 23, 1929.
sa Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., 1926, pp. 146-147.
266 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
On June 10, 1926, she signed two treaties with Rumania: a
treaty of friendship 89
and a convention for the pacific settle~ent
of disputes.90
On November II, 1927; France and
Yugoslavia signed two similar treaties of friendship 91
and
arbitration.92
Both treaties of friendship were to last five
years. In each case the contracting parties agreed to examine
jointly all questions that might endanger the status
quo which had been established by the Peace Treaties. If
either were attacked without provocation, both governments
would agree without delay upon the action each should take
within the terms of the League Covenant. However, the
treaties were discreetly vague upon the subject of furnishing
military aid in an emergency, and were drawn with care in
order to contain no definite obligations with regard to such
a possibility.
The most that Italy could obtain from the Little Entente
was a treaty of friendship with Rumania on September 16,
1926,98
a treaty which was unpopular within the latter.u
A renewal of friction between Yugoslavia and Italy over
Balkan and Adriatic questions caused Mussolini to seek
support elsewhere. By 1927, Italy had established friendly
contacts with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland
and Turkey.95
Mussolini could feel that he had made some
progress in his efforts to counteract French preponderance
s9 Treaty Series, vol. lviii, pp. 225-231. "
90 Ibid., vol. lviii, pp. 233-243. 91 Ibid., vol. lxviii, pp. 373-379.
92 Ibid., vol. lxviii, pp. 381-39I. 98 Ibid., vol. lxvii, pp. 393-397·
"The New York Times, September 16, 21 and 26, 1!)26.
95 It is beyond the scope of this work to attempt to present in detail
French or Italian foreign policy. For further information, cf. Toynbee,
op. cit., ·rg28, pp. '14V-.I6I ; Machray, op. cit., pp. 303-3o8, 32'8--330, 332-
334, 34o-342; Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. U9-149; Currey, op. cit., pp.
211-233; Schuman, F. L., War oml Diplcmoc:y mthe French Republic
(New York, 193'1), pp. 253-301 and 401-409; Cippico, Count A., Italy
the Central Problem of the Mediterranean (New Haven, 1!)26), pp. 85-IOI.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 26']
in Central Europe. .However, these new friendships were
destined to cause him gradually to emerge as the leader of
the revisionist bloc. The uneasiness within the Little
Entente was not dispelled by Mussolini's denial that this
response to France was" cause and effect ".98
During the quest for foreign support, Franco-Italian relations
remained tense; Early in 1928~ the arrival of a new
French Ambassador to Italy, Count Maurice de Beaumarchais,
was welcomed as the beginning of a rapprochement.
The wild rumors then current of an Italian demand
for the cession of Corsica and Tunis did not materialize, but
there did result an abatement of friction and a restoration
of better conditions when France agreed to Italian requests
for a share in the international regime at Tangier, for a
recognition of her dominant interests in the Adriatic, and
for measures against anti-Fascist plotters within France.117
The situation was further clarified on June 5, 1928, when
Mussolini broke a silence of nearly two years on general
foreign affairs to deliver a lengthy restnne of his policy,
" from China to Peru ".98
Despite Benes' statement that there existed no differences
between Czechoslovakia and Italy and that both states desired
friendly relations,99
·public opinion within the former continued
to view with alarm the tendency of the latter to draw
closer to the vanquished states. Was this the beginning of
an attempted revision of the Peace Treaties? A large number
of irritating" incidents" served to arouse more strongly
the latent hostility. The so-called " Rothermere affair " was
the first to reawaken the antagonism to Italy that had been
98 Currey, op. cit., pp. 205-206.
9'1' The New York Tlmes, January 22, 1!)28.
98 Cf. Currey, op. cit., pp. 234-255; Corriere della Sera, June 5, 1!)28.
99 Corriere della Sera, June 20, 1926.
2 68 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
dormant for several years.100
Lord Rothermere, an influential
British newspaper owner, expressed, on June 20, 1927,
in his newspaper, the London Daily Mail, great concern for
the minorities within the states of the Little Entente and
pointed out the unfairness to Hungary of the Treaty of
Trianon. Benes retorted that Rothermere was very poorly
informed on Central European affairs.101
All the Czechoslovak
newspapers, and even the German· Prager Tagblatt,
supported Benes' stand. After an exchange of letters had
failed to elicit any retraction from Rothermere, Benes felt
it necessary to ask the British government to disclaim
Rothermere.102
Premier Baldwin's statement of October 6,
challenging Rothermere to prove his allegiance to the Con-
servatives,103
was apparently accepted as. a disclaimer by
Czechoslovak public opinion.104
The incident was explained
at length to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak
National Assembly by Benes on October 25, 1927.106
Benes pointed out that the British government had nothing
to do with the Rothermere campaign which was directly
contrary to British foreign policy, that Sir Austen Chamberlain,
the British Foreign Secretary, had specifically disclaimed
Rothermere in a personal conference with Benes at
Geneva, and that Rothermere's articles represented Hungarian
revisionist propaganda masked as agrarian reform for
Central Europe.
The affair might have ended here, had not Rothermere been
received with great eclat by Mussolini in March, 1928. At
once public opinion in Czechoslovakia was again aflame.
'100 Cf. Machray, op. cit., pp. 322-326.
:101 The New York Times, August 7, 1927.
'1°2 Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., 1927, p. 2o6.
1os The Times, October 6, 1927; The New York Times, October 7, 1927.
104 Cas, Narodni Listy, Narodni Politika, October 7-8, 1927.
105 Cf. BeneS, Boj o mir, pp. 374-377.
EFFORTS TO MAlNTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 26g
The Lidove N oviny -pointed out Mussolini's sympathy for
Hungary, and stated that fairer boundaries than the present
ones could not be drawn.108
The Prager Tagblatt claimed
that all except Rothermere must realize the bad feeling that
would exist when Mussolini asked strategic boundaries for
Italy and ethnographic ones for Hungary.107
The Pravo
Lidu accused Mussolini of preferring war i~ Central Europe
to an agreement}08
The Narodni. Politika claimed that
Hungary had refused a frontier rectification, but wanted her
former boundaries intact.1011
All newspapers united in emphasizing
the inviolability of the Treaty of Trianon. If
possible, Czechoslovak feeling at the time was more bitter
.against Italy than against Hungary, for such hostile expressions
were taken for granted from the latter but were unexpected
from the former.110
Bene5 had perhaps the last
word regarding the incident in an expose of June 6, 1928,
before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly.
Once again he pointed out that, on May 23,
Chamberlain had stressed the fact that the British government
"did not identify itself with the press campaign for
the revision of the Treaty of Trianon." 111
Benes concluded
with the observation that the new status quo would be maintained
because the constructive forces of Europe were greater
than the destructive ones.112
1os Lidqve NO'IJiny, March 29, 1928.
101 Praget' Tagblatt, March 29. 1928.
101 Pravo Lidu, March 29, 1928.
1011 Narodm Politika, March 29. 1!)28.
no C/. Svornost, April I, 1!)28.
'111 The Times, May 23, 1!)28.
112 Bend, E., La Sit'Uation inlernatio-.le et la politique elrtJngere
rchecoslovaque. Cf. also, Tlsky (Poslaneck:i. Snimovna), no. 1587, xii,
June 6, 1928, 6 session, Benes' answer to Chamber of Deputies' interpellation
regarding Rothermere, for which cf. Tisky (Poslanecka
Snemovna), no. 1337, xii, November 16, 1927, S session.
270 "-F.(J_RE1GN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
In contrast with Italy, France remained on excellent terms
with Czechoslovakia. Economically, the ties between France
and Czechoslovakia were drawn closer by the conclusion, on
July 2, 1928, of a new commercial treaty providing for mostfavored-nation
treatment and for reciprocal freedom of
commerce and navigation.118
Similarly, the military ties
linking Paris and Praha were strengthened by discussions
between the respective military authorities at periodic conferences
which had followed the visit of Marshal Foch to
Czechoslovakia in 1923.114
Flattering to the military prestige
of Czechoslovakia was the visit in 1929 of Marshal
Petain, who promised, in the presence of delegates from the
two other states of the Little Entente, that France would
always be on the side of Czechoslovakia whenever the need
should arise.111
; After witnessing the manoeuvres in Moravia,
Petain complimented the Czechoslovaks upon the efficiency
of their army.118
After Locarno, the cooperation of Czechoslovakia and
France became particularly intimate, and, despite a prediction
that the former would revert to the Soviet orbit whenever
Europe would become normal,117
continued to give every
indication of permanence as long as the post-war status quo
should endure.us In answer to wide-spread criticism that
the Little Entente as a whole, and particularly Czechoslovakia,
under the guidance of Benes, had become a tool in
the hands of France, might not th~ reverse be maintained
with equal justification? In view of the mutual interdeus
Treaty Series, vol. xcix, pp. IOS-257·
114 Cf. supra, pp. 219-220.
115 The New York Times, August 27, 1929; Svornost, August 28 and
September 3, 1929'116
Narodm Listy, September 4, 1929; Svornost, September 18, 1929.
1.11 Cf. D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. i, p. 237.
'118 For Franco-Czechoslovak relations during the depression, cf. infra,
pp. 312 et seq.
EFFORTS TO MAlNTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 27i
pendence, could it not. be said that" French policy was more
the captive than the master of the Little Entente " 1111
and that
France had no alternative for her precarious system of alliances?
In the estimation of the writer, the tru$1ies somewhere
between these two extreme statements, in a tolerant
appreciation of the similarity in t}le major interests of both,
particularly. as long as they remain guardians of the new
status quo. ·
u Irreconcilable Hungary"
Within Central Europe, apparently irreconcilable Hungary
remained the chief obstacle to any post-Locarno adjustment
just as she had been formerly to reconstruction.120
The
successful reconstruction of Hungary, which had been completed
by the end of June, 1926, when Mr. Jeremiah Smith,
the Commissioner-General, left Budapest,121
contributed less
to the stability of Central Europe than had been anticipated.
As early as 1922 or 1923, certain Hungarians, out of "patriotic
" motives, had begun to forge French bank notes. By
1925 the spurious bills had appeared in large quantities in
various parts of Europe. As the result of information that
had been obtained at the time of the arrest, in Amsterdam,
of three Hungarians.who had attempted to pass forged 1,000
franc notes, the counterfeiters, led by Prince Ludwig Windischgratz,
were arrested on January 4, 1926.122
ue Cf. Simonds, F. H., Can Europe Keep the Peace! (New York,
1931), p. 198.
uo Cf. supra, pp. 205 et seq. ·
n1 For further details regarding the reconstruction of Hungary, ef.
Officiallournal, February, 1926, p. 131; July, 1926, pp. 876-876; September,
1926, pp. 1176-n88; The Financial Reconstruction of Hungary, General
survey and principle documents, Geneva, 1!)26; Termination of the
Functions of the Commissioner-General, resolution of the Council of the
League of Nations of June 10, 1926.
122 The Times, January 4-II, 1926.
FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
, In view of the financial interests involved, French apathy
in not following the matter energetically was surprising.
The Bank of France did make "due investigations ",128
but,
thereafter, France failed to make the anticipated protest to
the Hungarian government.124
Briand stated merely that,
at the proper time, in cooperation with Czechoslovakia, his
government would "draw the necessary conclusions from
this affair of incredible brigandage ".125
Briand never explained his apparent inertia. Was his
obvious reluctance motivated by· fear that he could not prove
the responsibility of the government of Bethlen? Or did
he dread lest he throw Hungary automatically into the arms
of Mussolini? Czechoslovak public opinion failed to relish
the hesitation of France. The incident revived memories of
Hungarian forgeries of Czechoslovak bank-notes to the
amount of over JO,ooo,ooo crowns between 1919 and 1921,128
and was taken as fresh evidence of the impossibility of reconciliation
between the two states.121
While extremists demanded
joint action with the two Little Entente partners,
which had also suffered in the past from Hungarian forgeries
of their currencies, the Czechoslovak government adhered
to the view of the moderates, who desired a judicial
inquiry.128
On May 26, 1926, Prince Windischgratz and his accomplice,
Nadosy, formerly Chief of Police of Hungary, were
,-
1U Ibid., January 27-28, xg26. 124 Ibid., February 2, 1926.
n5 Ibid., March 4. xg26. 128 Macbray, op. cit., p. 273·
1ll'l CeskC SIO'VO, Prager Presse, Narodm Listy, Narodnl Politika, January
S-7, Ig.26.
· 128 For Benes' answers to violent interpel1ations in parliament on the
question of the Hungarian forgeries and for debates on his speech, cf.
Zprav:y (Poslaneck& Snemovna), 7 meeting, February 16, xg26, pp. 279-
290, I. session; 9 meeting, February IS, I926, pp. 304-341, I session;
IO meeting, February 19, 1926, pp. 410-446, I session. Cf. also, Le Temps,
March I, xg26, for the reply of Count Bethlen to Czechoslovak
accusations.
.EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 273
sentenced to four years' imprisonment and fines of 10,ooo,ooo
crowns, whereas lesser sentences were meted out to
the minor conspirators. The Bank of France received damages
of one franc as a vindication of its right to financial
compensation, and the government of Hungary was absolved
from all connection with the plot.129
When two appeals in August and· October, carried ultimately
to the Royal Curia (the highest court in Hungary),
failed to change materially the original judgment, public
opinion in both France 1110
and Czechoslovakia 131
felt outraged
over what it considered the inadequacy of the punishments.
BeneS remained unconvinced of the innocence of
the Hungarian government.1112
France, with the approval
of Czechoslovakia, on June 5, 1926, presented officially the
general question of international forgeries to the League
of Nations.183
The matter was referred to the Mixed
Committee of the Council, which, on October IJ, 1926,
presented a report requesting closer cooperation among the
authorities of all states. In order to prevent a repetition
of the incident, it advised the establishment of a central
international committee.18
~ After due time had been
allowed for a summary of the viewpoints of the various
governments concerned (until December6, 1928), there was
prepared a draft convention for the suppression of counterfeiting
currency.135
In announcing her ratification, Czecho-
1211 The Times, May 27, 1926; for full details cf. also, Toynbee,
op. cit., 1926, pp. Ii'&-190; Machray, ofJ. cit., pp. 272-274. 294-296; Gedye,
G. E. R., Heirs to the Hapsburgs (Bristol, 1932), pp. 148-153.
1so Le Temps, August 18-21, October 15, 1!)26.
n1 Prager Presse, May 27, August 18-20, October IS. 1926.
us Cf. Official Jounwl, July, 1926, pp. 871-873, for BeneS' discussion.
na Ibid., July, 1926, p. 950·
18~ !lJid., February, 1928, pp. 197-203.
186/bid., February, 1929, pp. 275-304; June, 1929. pp. 886-912; April,
1930, pp. 308-317.
274 FOREl.GN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918;1935
.slovakia stated that " the competent organs of the Republic
have declared themselves to be in favor of the draft convention,
which forms a first step towards the' effective prevention
and the international suppression of counterfeiting
currency ".136
Thus innocuously terminated the efforts of
France and Czechoslovakia to hold Hungary responsible for
the forgeries committed by some of her prominent citizens.
Nevertheless, the incident was neither forgotten nor forgiven
in either Czechoslovakia or Hungary, in both of which
countries public opinion continued to attribute the most sinister
motives to the actions of the other.
Before the matter of the Hungarian forgeries was ended,
another incident, perhaps even more serious, again strained
the relations of Hungary and Czechoslovakia almost to the
breaking point, and brought about a general international
tangle of no mean proportions. On January 2, 1928, at the
Austrian frontier railway station of St. Gotthard, Austrian
railroad officials discovered five freight cars loaded with
machine gun parts enough for five hundred guns which were
being shipped from Italy across Austrian territory. The
cars, shipped from Verona and declared to contain machinery,
were consigned ostensibly to Czechoslovakia, but were
believed, in reality, to have been intended for Hungary 137
contrary to Article 18o of the Treaty of Trianon, which had
specified that " the importation of arms, munitions and war
material of all kinds is strictly forbrdden ". This allegation,
if true, would constitute a violation of the treaty by both
Italy and Hungary. Austria was interested merely in the
1se Ibid., February, 1929, p. :276.
1s1 To Berkovics Brothers, at Slovensko-Nove-Mesto (Satoralja-Ujhely
or Satorlajaygtely). It was shown subsequently that this firm, which
denied all knowledge of the shipment, was actually located across the
border in Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon had awarded the railway
station to Czechoslovakia, but most of the town to Hungary. Cf. Official
Journal, July, 1928, pp. 907, 910, 9II and 915.
E.FFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 275
violation of her regulations regarding arms and in the loss
of revenue, since arms were charged higher rates than machinery.
The discovery was an accident, the result of suspicions
that had been aroused by the haste with which the
cars were being connected to Hungarian engines. Since the
cars were already in Hungarian hands, the Austrian officials
did not attempt to stop them. The Austrian government was
informed promptly of the incident, but it made no official
protest, for it regarded the whole affair merely as a minor
frontier question entirely within the competence of its Ministry
of Railroads.138
The Little Entente was not willing to consider the St.
Gotthard incident so lightly. Yugoslavia had been uneasy
since April 5, 1927, the date of the signature of the HaloHungarian
Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration,189
a treaty which had almost surrounded her with states
within the orbit of Italian influence. To Yugoslavia, and
to Czechoslovakia as well, Italian and Hungarian efforts to
minimize the importance of the affair at St. Gotthard seemed
clear indications of guilt. Benes announced that Czechoslovakia
did not desire to make a great international issue
of the affair, but that such an attempt must not be repeated~
He warned Hungary that, in such an event, the Little Entente
could not remain inactive.140
On February I, 1928, all three
members of the Little Entente brought the matter up before
the League Council in order to fix the responsibility for the
188 The Times and The New Yo,.k Times, January 3, 1!)28; Toynbee,
op. cit., 1928, pp. 161-162; Machray, op. cit., pp. 33o-331.
189 Treaty Series, vol. lxvii, pp. 399-409·
'140 The Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies, by a vote of 165 to 44,
passed a proclamation considering the St. Gotthard incident as an attempt
to detach Slovakia and to destroy the integrity of the Republic. Zprovy
(Poslanecka Snemovna), 123 meeting, January 24. 1!)28, pp. 29-39. 5
session; 124 meeting, January 25, 1!)28, pp. 3 ef seq., S session.
276 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
incident,141
but Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were apparently
distressed by the disinterestedness of Rumania.u2
Before the League Council met, new developments took
place. When no consignor appeared to claim the guns .by
the middle of February, Hungary announced that they would
be sold at auction, after having been rendered useless for
military purposes. In spite of the request of the League
Council that Hungary delay the sale until due investigations
could be made, the auction was held, according to Hungarian
reports, on February 24, but the parts continued to remain
in the hands of Hungarian officials. The truth soon came
to light, that, on February 20, Htuigary had destroyed the
five carloads of arms that were to have been investigated.
The Little Entente determined to probe the matter to the
bottom. Italy's claim that the guns had been manufactured
by a private firm which was also in charge of shipping them
was shown to be false. A minute investigation proved that
they were arms that Italy had captured during the War, and
that, beyond all doubt, she still owned them. The Little
Entente believed that, when Rome discovered that evasions
were of no avail, she applied pressure upon Budapest to
destroy the arms in defiance of the League, and the chief
culprit, Italy, thus avoided responsibility and tried to make
the League helpless by destroying the evidence.14
~
On March 5, 1928, began the forty-ninth session of the
League of Nations. The Council decided to send to investigate
the incident a group of neutral experts, a Committee
of Three, representing the Netherlands, Finland and Chile,
141 Cf. Official /ournol, April, 1928, pp. 387-397, for texts of notes of
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and pp. 545-549 for official communiques
on the incident from Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia.
H 3 The New York Times, January 27-28, 1928.
us Official Journal, July, tg28, pp. 906-9<>7.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 277
who were to make -a study of the pertinent documents.
Their report, originally due March 10, was not presented,
because all the documents were not yet available. After
further delays, it was decided to send investigators to Basel
to examine the original way-bills (April 15-19), but even
they could not discover what Czechoslovakia regarded the
most important point, the ultimate destination of the
machine-gun parts.1
u
The investigators finally made two reports on June 7,
1928. No satisfactory evidence had been unearthed. The
ultimate destination of the weapons had not been ascertained,
and consequently, Hungary, while censured severely for the
illegal possession of war material and for its unduly precipitate
destruction, was not held responsible for any intent to
violate the Treaty of Trianon. Thus, the final judgment
was inconclusive in that it neither acquitted nor convicted
Hungary. The chief significance of the incident lay in the
arousing of the suspicions of the Little Entente as to the
motives of Italy and Hungary, and in the demonstration that
the three partners gave of their relative solidarity.u5
In view of the bitterness that characterized the relations
of Hungary and Czethoslovakia, especially during this period
of "incidents", it might well be wondered whether any
attempts to safeguard the new status quo would not be undertaken
in vain and whether anything constructive could be
accomplished. The commercial relations between the two
countries, which through seven years of intermittent and
apparently fruitless negotiations had been carried on practically
without any treaty basis, were regulated by a treaty
of May 31, 1927. For a long time both states had felt the
need of a definitive commercial treaty, but the final impetus
to the renewal of negotiations had been provided by the in-
1Hfbid., April, 1928, pp. 387-397.
1u Ibid., July, 1!)28, pp. 905-910.
278 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
creased duties that Czechoslovakia levied on agricultural
products. According to the new treaty, Hungary was
granted concessions on foodstuffs in return for similar concessions
on Czechoslovak manufactured goods. Additional
clauses clarified many other points ordinarily provocative of
friction, such as the legal treatment of production and transportation
quotas, railway traffic, mutual assistance in customs
clearance, the prevention, prosecution and punishment of
infringements of customs regulations, mutual legal assistance
in criminal customs cases, and a veterinary convention
toncerning traffic in animals and animal products. The
treaty was to be of indefinite duration, but could be denounced
on six months' notice.146
The treaty failed to produce
all the beneficient results that had. been anticipated
because the bitterness between the two states was too deepseated
to be abated except in a limited degree even by the
best of treaties.
The Austrian Problem Again
The other half of the former Dual Monarchy, Austria,
felt less bitter towards the victor states, and, in the hope of
assuring her own salvation, had even shown, periodically, a
relatively high degree of cooperation with them. Her financial
reconstruction was terminated successfully on June JO,
1926, at which time the Commissioner-General's office was
abolished.u 7
,.
Reconstructed Austria was no longer self-sufficient economically.
Her extensive internal pre-war trade had become
u11 Treaty Series, vol.lxv, pp. 61-299; Zprav;; (Poslanecka Snemovna),
95 meeting, July 7, 1927, pp. 237o-2405, 4 session; 114 meeting, December
6, 1927, pp. 7-Ig, 5 session.
1 4'1' Cf. Monthly Summary, August, 1925, p. 189; Official Journal, March,
1926, pp. 447-450; July, 1926, p. 916; special supplement, October, 1926,
pP. 393-396; The Financial Reconstruction of Austria, Termination of the
Functions of the Commissioner-General; The Financial Reconstruction
of Austria, General Survey and principal documents; supra, pp. 192 et req.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 279
international trade. lf she were to survive, she would have
to increase the efficiency of her production and obtain favorable
tariff rates from her neighbors. Henceforth, as in the
cases of Belgium and Switzerland, foreign trade would be
her life blood. In appreciation of this fact, Article 222 of
the Treaty of St. Germain had granted Austri3. permission
to conclude, for a five-year period, special accords with Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, but, because of mutual hostility,
no advantage had been taken of this concession. After the
initial bitterness of the post-war period had somewhat subsided,
Austria did follow the recommendation of the League
Council that she conclude commercial treaties with her
neighbors,148
and, during 1923-1925 concluded such treaties
with Italy, April28, 1923; France, June 22, 1923; Germany,
July 12, 1924; Czechoslovakia, November 27, 1924; and
Spain, February 3, 1925. Treaties with almost all the other
states of_ Europe followed.1411
The new tariff agreement with Czechoslovakia, signed at
Vienna on November 27, 1924, supplemented the commercial
treaty of May 4, 1921. Except for some minor exceptions
for which special licenses were still required, Austrian exports
to Czechoslovakia were no longer subject to governmental
control. About one-third of the items mentioned in
the Czechoslovak tariff--dothing, rubber, leather, paper,
textiles, wooden goods, tools, hardware, iron, machinery,
metal ware, electrical appliances, musical instruments, automobiles,
and various chemicals-were conceded lower rates;
in most instances, the reductions amounted to fifty per cent
or more.160
us Official Jounw.l, March, 1923, pp. 215-216•
. HB Ibid., March, 1923, pp. 211-221; Basch and Dvoracek, op. cit.. pp.
88-Sg. Cf. also, p. 89 for chart of Austria's exports, 1923-1924-
150 Treaty Series, vol. xlii, pp. 201-443.
280 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
The stimulation of Austrian exports to Czechoslovakia
enabled Austria to remain also the latter's best customer
among the small states of Central Europe.nt On the whole,
Czechoslovakia: held a favorable balance of trade against
,Austria, but still had to make payments because of other
items, such as interest on investments, transit trade, banking,
insurance, profit on sales made on commission, tourist traffic
and the export of articles of quality in the personal baggage
of tourists.162
As both countries sought to eliminate the more obvious
of the many unnecessary disadvantages that had resulted
from their separation, there ensued a rapprochement which
was confirmed by the treaty of arbitration and· conciliation,
which was signed on March 5, 1926, at Vienna amid profuse
expressions of mutual friendship.158
Arbitration was made
practically obligatory in every instance. There was created
a permanent board of arbitration, from which appeal might
be made to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the
Hague. Similarly, disputes of a political nature which were
not settled by regular diplomatic methods had to be submitted
to this same Court, from which, however, a joint
appeal might be made to the Permanent Court of International
Justice. The treaty was to be effective for ten
years, and might be renewed for another ten years.15
"
This rapprochement was hardly consummated before it
·was ruptured temporarily by a tariff war, which was caused
by Austria's denunciation, in November, 1926, of the political
agreement of December 16, 1921, and the commercial
161 Cf. Publications, Economic and Financial, 1927 ii 68 ii, pp. 238-239,
for statistics to 1927. .·~,,.,.._ ·
ua Basch and Dvoracek, op;··cit., pp. 90-91 (charts).
'163 Cf. Arbeiter Zeitung, Nette Freie Presse and The New York Times.
March 4-6, 1926.
u.r. Treaty Series, vol. li, pp. 349-359.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 281
treaty of May 4, 1-921, together with its supplement.155
The tariff war would begin with the expiration of the treaty
on April 15, 1927. Because of the long years of unfavorable
trade balances, Austria regarded it necessary to increase
her duties on certain Czechoslovak goods. Czechoslov~ia
maintained that the Austrian adverse balance was superficial,
not real, because Austria reexported many of the goods
she obtained from Czechoslovakia. The tariff war caused
severe losses to both states. In Austria, the worst sufferers
were the manufacturers of machine tools, women's dresses,
millinery and lingerie, whereas in Czechoslovakia, distress
was most prevalent among the producers of cotton and linen
goods, glassware and machinery.158
On July 21, 1927, there
was signed a new treaty, favorable to the manufacturers of
both states, in the form of a supplementary agreement to the
treaty of May 4, 1921.u'f
The superficial nature of Austro-Czechoslovak hostility
was revealed by the negotiations that were taking place during
this period of friction. At the time when the respective
manufacturers were at daggers drawn, the statesmen were
negotiating for the improvement of means of communication
between the two capitals. Two treaties of February 15,
1927, provided for air navigation and for the establishment
of regular air-ways.158
About a year later, as a part of
her campaign against the visa nuisance, Czechoslovakia completed
the negotiations for the mutual abolition of compulsory
passport visas with both Austria and Germany.169
In spite of the efforts of Czechoslovakia to aid Austria
economically, the position of the latter remained desperate.
1.1111 Ibid., vol. lxxviii, p. 437·
168 The New York Times, April 9, .29, 1927.
ur Treaty Series, vol. hood, pp. 7-275.
n•IbUl., vol. lxxiii, pp. 349-385.
1511 Ibid., vol. lxxiii, pp. 87-93.
282 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
The process of reconstruction under League auspices had
been successful financially, but had failed to solve the major
economic difficulties of Austria. Various interested neighboring
states sought to advance solutions for the Austrian
problem, such as the so-called -i'I:absburg solution which
might involve a reunion with Hungary, a so-called Italian
solution, a German solution or Anschluss, a Danubian Confederation
and continued independence. Of these alternatives,
Czechoslovakia preferred the last, which in spite of its
obvious difficulties, she thought practicable with a fair degree
of cooperation from neighboring states, and which involved
the least danger to herself. One of the chief objectives of
Benes' foreign policy was to prevent the consummation of
one of the alternatives less favorable to his country, for,
until some permanent solution was attained, stability could
not be expected within Austria.
As has already been narrated, Benes, with the aid of the
Big and Little Ententes, had averted, for the time being at
least, the Habsburg solution to the problem.160
Similarly,
any so-called Italian solution had been prevented when the
Little Entente had opposed successfully an undue extension
of Italian influence over Austria.161
Of the proposed solutions,
Anschluss was regarded as the most menacing by
Czechoslovakia, as involving the greatest threat to her own
existence. It was to be regretted that, at the time when
Austro-Czechoslovak relations were 'becoming more friendly
because of Czechoslovakia's active participation in the reconstruction
of Austria, Germano-Czechoslovak relations were
becoming more tense. Since 1924, there had been developing
friction over the possibilities of an Austro-German union
'160 Cf. Bend, E., The Problem of Central EuroPe and the Austrian
Question (speech of March 211, 1934, before the Foreign Affairs Committees
of parliament), pp. 49-54; supra, pp. 186-188.
1 61 Benes, op. cir., pp. 40-46; cf. also, supra, pp. 193 et seq.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 283
and over Germany's policy of economic penetration.182
Since the middle years of the decade of the 192o's, Czechoslovakia
had considered Anschluss as her chief single
problem, in perhaps greater need of immediate solution than
any other, an opinion particularly prevalent since 1927.163
To quote J. 0. Crane, "The two main causes of the recent
revival of Anschluss agitation in Austria were economic maladjustment
and the lack of a will to survive ".164
Within
Austria, there appeared to exist little national patriotism;
some Clericals opposed the union and the Socialists advocated
it, but both viewpoints might undergo rapid changes as
the result of any one of several influences.185
Another alternative contemplated the possibility of replacing
the Little Entente with a Danubian Confederation which
would include also Austria and Hungary, and perhaps Poland
as well. Such a grouping would subvert one of the .basic
ideas of the Little Entente, namely, that it was impossible to
include friends and enemies within the same organization.
The political fears of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia
had been greater than their desires for any increased
economic advantages that might have resulted from a larger
bloc. In this respect the interests of Czechoslovakia and
Austria clashed. The former sought to preserve equally
both her political and economic independence, whereas the
1s2 Cf. Hudec, K., "Ceskoslovenslci. repuhlika a Nemecko ",
Zahranitnt Polilika, vol. viii, pp. 425-433, 546-55'5, 68r-6g6, 8o3-813.
188 Benes, op. cit., pp. 27-40; Ounelar, J., "Ceskoslovenslci. zabraniCni
politika v roce 1927 ", Zahranilm Politika, vol. vii, pp. 1-6; c/. also,
Prager Presse, October 28, 1927 for speech of Masaryk.
186 Crane, op. cit., p. 133.
1u Ibid., pp. 134-135; Kteinwaechter, op. cit., pp. 34-35; Slosso~ P. W.,
'!'The Problem of Austro-German Union," International Conciliation, no.
250, pp. 221-254; Chmelaf, J., "RakouskY problem a stfedni Evropa ",
Zahranicm Politika, vol. vii, pp, 11'47-II59; Bemus, P., "L'Autrkhe et
I'Anschluss", Le Journal des dCbats, vol. xxxv, pt. ii, pp. 312-314; c/.
also, The Times, February I and 28, 1927.
284 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
latter sought the advantages of a larger organization, regardless
of the loss of independence that might be involved.
Czechoslovakia desired an extension of the existing commercial
treaties into a system of preferential tariffs for the
entire Danubian area, as the most desirable solution that
was possible of attainment. Her experiences at Portorose 166
and subsequently had convinced her that an economically
unified Danubian Confederation was an impossibility, that,
if nothing else, the post-war development of industrial activity
within the hitherto purely agricultural states of this
area alone would have precluded such a solution.167
Czechoslovakia's
desire to draw Austria into the orbit of the Little
Entente was consistent with her unwillingness to accept
Austria as a member of the Entente or of any Danubian
Union. To all appearances, Benes drew a delicate distinction
: he desired amity and economic preferences with both
Austria and Hungary, but not their inclusion in the Entente.
The Little Entente was to remain an exclusive group of victors,
·with dominating power.
During the autumn of 1924 there had been many rumors
of the imminence of the formation of a Danubian Confederation.168
Benes, who had been the alleged author of the
project, declared that it could never be realized because none
of the Little Entente states desired it.169
France and Great
Britain apparently favored such a combination.170
There
began, during 1925, among the vafious Danubian states, a
series of negotiations that envisaged the establishment of a
system of preferential tariffs. Benes, who welcomed such
166 Cf. suPra, pp. 190 et seq.
181 Cf. Pasvolsky, Economic Natiooolism of the Donubian States, p. 282.
us Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, September 28 and October 2, 1924;
Le Temps, September 30, 1924; Carriere della Sera, October 1, 1924.
'160 The Times, May 13, 1925·
uo Ibid., June 8, 1925; cf. also, Bend, op. cit., pp. 47-49.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 285
soundings initially, withdrew his approval when Italy insisted
upon being included in the bloc/71
and Austria, France and
Great Britain experienced the same reaction.n2
, Austria, which still retained hopes of arriving at some
satisfactory solution of her problem, called a Central European
Economic Conference to meet at Vienna September
8-9, 1925. · However, such differences of.opinion resulted
that little of a constructive nature could be accomplished
After recommending the formation of a permanent commission
to examine the possibilities of a Central European
Economic Union, the Conference adjourned with the platitude
that " The Central European Economic Conference
considers as one of the principal evils of the Central European
economic situation the continuing isolation of the economic
systems of the small States ".118
After this failure, the project of a Danubian Confederation
lagged for a period of over two years and appeared
to be overshadowed by the more imminent Anschluss. Since
Czechoslovakia dreaded both alternatives, the visit of Chancellor
Seipel of Austria to Praha on February 13, 1928,
aroused speculation as to his real objectives. Talk of both
Anschluss and the Danubian Confederation was revived.
Seipel appeared to be concerned primarily over the continued
independence of Austria, to which end he sought Czechoslovak
support for his own project to have the League's
place of meeting transferred from Geneva to Vienna. He
stated that he already had the support of many Balkan and
n1 Prager Presse, The Times, July 27, 1!)25.
Ull The Times, August JI, 1925, and February 9, 1926; Arbeiter
Zeitung, August 31, 1!)26; Le Temps, February 9-10, 192(). The Great
Powers' disapproval was motivated largely by a realization that their
own foreign trade might suffer if an economically efficient Danubian
Confederation were created.
ua Pasvolsky, op. cit., pp. 90-91 ; cf. also, Arbeiter Zeitung, September
8-g, 1925·
286 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
East-European states, but that he was opposed by the
Viennese Pan-Germans, who feared that such a transfer
would prevent any future Anschluss. Czechoslovakia did
not support his scheme. In Praha Seipel sounded the possibility
of a Central European Locarno, of an alternative
regional agreement among Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
under the leadership of Czechoslovakia.174
Benes, who had undergone, meanwhile, a change of
opiniort, was favorable to this last proposal, but apparently
believed that a. still larger unit would be even more advantageous.
Benes allegedly envisaged a Central European
Locarno whereby the Little Entente was to be transformed
into a Five- or Six-Power Entente by the addition of
Austria and Hungary, and perhaps Poland as well. It
appeared that he no longer feared the addition of Vienna and
Budapest to the Little Entente, for he realized that the
difference in strength between the vanquished and victor
states was so great that the former could not hope to regain
their pre-war hegemony over the latter. Purely economic
considerations were becoming increasingly important. The
fact that others were still unconverted to the new idea became
evident from the hostile reception accorded to it.171
' Rumors
arose that the Little Entente was doomed. Much was made
of the fact that the Jachymov Conference of 1927 had
adjourned dismally after failing 1;D reach any economic
agreement. Similar reports were aired when the Little
Entente failed to call in 1928 the customary spring and fall
conferences. Benes was alleged to have suggested the return
to Hungary of two small frontier areas overwhelmingly
114 The New York Times, February 16, 1928; Narodnf List;v, Ceske
Slovo, February 15, 1928; Svornost, February 16, 20, 25, 1928.
115 Narodm List:y, The New' York Times, February 23, 1928; Swrnost,
February 23, March 9, 1928.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO .287
Hungarian in order_ to induce Hungary to participate.176
Hungary reacted unfavorably to the projected Federation,
for she did not want to commit herself to any permanent
recognition of her existing boundaries. Similarly, both
Rumania and Yugoslavia felt no enthusiasm for the project,
whereas public opinion within Czechoslovakia was also
generally hostile. Italy would be certain to make secret, if
not open, opposition because of her fears of a revival of a
Great Power in Central Europe, and Germany would regard
it as the deathknell of Anschluss. Under the circumstances,
many feared that the project would be more apt to cause
friction rather than prevent it, hence nothing was done at
this time.m·
To Czechoslovakia, the inclusion of Germany, or any
other Great Power, in any Central European Federation
would be unthinkable: an Austro-German union alone
might threaten her both politically and economically. An
economic approach to the problem did not blind Czechoslovakia
to the fact that a political union might result. Such
a union would render still more precarious Czechoslovakia's
competitive position for the trade of the Danubian region.
Czechoslovakia realized also that, despite her efforts, she was
still compelled to seek the assistance of Austro-German
foreign financial contracts, a dependence which would become
enhanced by a unification of Austria and Germany.
Finally, her chief fear was political-that an Austro-German
economic union would develop inevitably into an Anschluss
that might threaten her existence.178
Therefore, out of the
11s The New York Times, March 8, 1928. Four days later the Czechoslovak
Consul-General in New York City, Novak, denied categorically
any suggestion by Benes to cede territory to Hungary. The New York
Times, March 12, 1g:z8.
111 Ceske Slovo, March Io-n, 1928.
111 Cf. Pasvolsky, op. cit., pp. 284-286; Slosson, P., "Problem of
Austro-German Union", ln.tenwtional C011Ciliation., no. 250, pp. 221-254;
288 FOREiGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
instinct for sheer self-preservation, Czechoslovakia felt
compelled to insist upon the independence and territorial
integrity of Austria.179
Little Entente ConferencesJ I925-I929
The three Little Entente partners agreed to hold at Sinaia,
August 15-18, 1925, a Little Entente of the press for the
purpose of coordinating the respective public opinions of
their peoples. At this Conference, the official press bureaus
of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia created a central
bureau, in which each country was represented by a committee
and which was expected to meet regularly.180
Despite this new agency, the ties among the members of
the Little Entente tended to become weaker rather than
stronger. An indication of this new trend was furnished
during February, 1926, at the Conference of Temesvar, a
special meeting which had been called, ostensibly, for the
purpose of arriving at a unified policy with regard to the
Hungarian forgeries. During the discussion of February
10, the fact developed that Czechoslovakia alone was interested.
Her two partners, apparently satisfied with the
degree of security that had already been attained, determined
to await the results of the regular judicial inquiry.181
As a
result, in the attempt to bring the forgery scandal home to
the Hungarian government, Czechoslovakia had to proceed
without the support of her Little En;ente partners.182
Benes
Friedman, J., "Soueasna obchodne-politicka situace ceskoslovenske
republiky ", Zahranicm Politika, vol. viii, pp. 7-17.
u11 Benes, op. cit., pp. ss-62. For the later renewal of Anschluss
agitation, cf. infra, pp. 312 et seq.
180 Ceske Shrvo, August 17-18, 1925; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,
August 25, 1925; L'Europe nouvelle, October 24. 1925; cf. also, Cosma,
op. cit., pp. 1,50-152; Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 269-272.
181 Prager Presse, February u, 1926; The New York Times, February
12, x!)26.
1Bll The New York Times, October 12, 1926; Le Temps, October 14.
xg26.
E.FFORTS TO MAlNTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 289
indulged in no useless ·recriminations. He merely stated his
belief that, ultimately, Hungary would have to be added to
the Little Entente, but only after the former had explored
first every other possibility.183
There were also current
rumors that, at Temesvar, a Balkan pact to include Greece
was also discussed, but, in any event, nothing came of it.18
~
Regardless of the lack of cooperation in the affair of th~
Hungarian forgeries, the states of the Little Entente were
willing to renew their treaties of alliance. On June 13,
1926, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, at Bucharest, agreed to
another extensiol\ of the alliance of April 23, 1921, which
had already been prolonged for three years on May 7,
1923.185
In a like manner, in a protocol of the same date,
Rumania and Yugoslavia renewed again their alliance of
June 7, 1921, which had already been renewed on July 7,
1923.188
The third link, the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty,
did not require prolongation at this time.18''
The regular Little Entente Conference for 1926 was held
at Bled during June. Once more there became apparent the
tendency for the three states to drift further apart when
the discussions were terminated rather abruptly as the result
of Rumania's announcement that she had concluded with·
Poland, on March 26, 1926, a defensive treaty against
th U.S.S.R.u8
Benes and Nincic, who desired Soviet
friendship and complete freedom of action regarding the
188 The New York Times, February 13, 1926.
18• Toynbee, op. dt., 1926, pp. I46--I49; Cosma, op. cit., pp. 142-149;
Machray, op. cit., pp. 274-277; Codresco, o'fJ. cit., vol. ii, pp. 7-u.
181 Treaty Series, vol. liv, pp. 253-255.
188/bid., vol. Iiv, pp. 257-265.
181 Le Temps, June 15, 1926; c/. also, Chmelar, J., "Ceskoslovenski
zahranicni politika v roce 1926 ", Zahramcnl Politikt~o vol. vi, pp. 4-10,
188 Treaty Series, vol. he, pp. I6I-167.
290 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Soviet Union, disapproved of this treaty, not as anti-Bolshevik,
but as anti-Russian.189
·During the following year, 1927, the divergence among
the three partners became even more apparent. The three
Foreign Ministers, Benes, Mitilineu and Marinkovic, held
their regular Conference at Jachymov on May 13-14, 1927,
to decide their future policies. After a discussion of five
hours on the first day and another of three hours on the
following day had demonstrated that solidarity still existed
on few political issues, the three ministers decided to abandon,
for the time being, all attempts to strengthen their alliance
politically, and, instead, to turn their efforts towards a cultural,
economic and commercial union. Some such conclusion
was inevitable if the Little Entente was to be preserved
as an efficient organization. Yugoslavia had failed to interest
her partners, especially Rumania, in the dangers attending
the Halo-Hungarian rapprochement. On the other
hand, Rumania feared the Soviet Union. The interests and
political alliances of Yugoslavia and Rumania clashed; it
seemed as if the former would gravitate towards France and
the latter towards Great Britain. Confronted with the conflicting
objectives of her two partners, Czechoslovakia apparently
preferred to evade the issue until the position of Germany
should become clarified; what she considered at the
time her chief problem, an Austro-German union, was of no
particular concern to either Rumania or Yugoslavia.190
In this manner, the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente
determined to retain their union and to avoid any definite
statements as to their respective foreign policies; but, by such
189 The Times, June 18-19. 1926; Machray, op. cit., pp. 286-291;
Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 19-23; cf. also, Macllray, R, " The Little
Entente and its Policies", Fortn.ightl::v Review, vol. cxxv, pp. 764-77+
too The New York Times, May 14-15, 1927; Machray, The Little
En.ten.te, pp. 3o8-313. Cf. also, Prager Ta.gbla.tt, May 18, 1927, for
Bend' views on the future of the Little Entente.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 291
tactics, they let slip an opportunity to adopt a constructive
policy that might have been followed by other Powers. All
three Ministers sought to reduce friction with Hungary.
Calling attention to the increased economic vitality of
Austria, they agreed to unite with France in objecting to an
Austro-German union. However, they refused to commit
themselves on Poland's question whether German economic
pressure upon Poland would not be a danger to all Europe,
on the ground that this question was beyond their scope
and a matter rather for the League. In concluding the
Conference, the three members stated that the Little Entente
was stronger than ever and necessary for the preservation of
European peace.1111
Benes deplored current rumors regarding the imminent
dissolution ·of the Little Entente and exerted himself to
counteract them. To this end, on January 5, 1928, he
granted a special interview to representatives of the Chicago
Daily News, wherein he expressed his belief that it would be
impossible for any great war to break out for the next ten
years, by which time the older generation would have disappeared
and the horror of war lessened. Benes considered
that any union of the defeated states would make for war,.
whereas a union of states led by France would tend to make
for peace. The Little Entente was to be a vital part of
any such union. In Benes' opinion, the recent Franco-Yugoslav
alliance was a great deterrent to Italian militarists and
the expansion of such treaties might lead to total disarmament.
Individual treaties might solve also the Russian question,
a process in which the Little Entente might become the
connecting link between the U.S.S.R. and the Western
Powers. Benes looked forward to a treaty uniting the
1111. The New York Times, May 16, 1927; cf. also, Codresco, op. cit.•
vo!. ii, pp. 33-37; Seton-Watson, R. W., "The Little Entente", Co,._
temporary Review, vol. cxxxii, pp. 694-707.
292 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Soviet Uniqn, Poland, and the Little Entente, a treaty heretofore
impossible because of the bitterness between Warsaw
and Moscow, and between Rumania and the 'U.S.S.R. over
Bessarabia. The main point to be noted was that the Little
Entente was not on the verge of dissolution and that it had
not already fulfilled its mission, but that it still had an important
role to play in the affairs of Europe.193
The activities of the Little Entente during 1928 were
prima facie evidence of the continued vitality of the organization.
The St. Gotthard incident 1981
did much to consolidate
the bloc. In the spring the three states organized an
air service to operate between their leading cities.194
Early
in April, Duca, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
invited Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to a conference at
Bucharest to consider the hostile attitude of Mussolini to the
Little Entente, but the respective Foreign Ministers found it
impossible to accept the invitation before June. The Conference
of Bucharest, June 2o-21, 1928, greatly strengthened
the loosening ties of the Little Entente. As usual, Poland,
without being formally a member, was also present, being
represented by an observer. BeneS proposed the holding of
a Central European Economic Locarno, without any attempts
being made to convert it into a Danubian Confederation and
suggested Austria as the first accession. His proposal was
received favorably, but no active steps were taken at the
time to make it effective. It w;s decided also that each
state should remain free to adopt an independent policy concerning
Italy and· Italian anti-Slav agitation, a decision that
did nothing to strengthen the bonds between Yugoslavia and
191 Benes, La Situation intenzationale et Ia politique etrangere tchlcoslovaque
(expose aux Commission des affaires etrangeres du Senat et
Chambre, le 6 juin, 1!)28).
198 Cj. supra, pp. 274 et seq.
194 Cf. Svornost, December 27, 1927, for plan.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 293
her two partners. The main pronouncement of the Conference.
was to the effect that the Little Entente, although
desirous of friendly relations with Hungary, had not changed
its earlier attitude, and still stood as a unit in opposing any
attempts to revise the Peace Treaties and thereby to threaten
anew the peace of Europe.11111
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, during the autumn of
1928, negotiated a series of treaties that cemented even more
firmly their long-standing friendship. Still unsettled was the
question of mutual claims and debts contracted before and
during the World War. A treaty of September 29, 1928,
prohibited legal procedure for all claims and debts in former
Austro-Hungarian crowns contracted before February 26,
1919, in which the currency was contestable,196
and relegated
such questions to a later treaty, which was signed at Praha
on November 7, 1928.197
On the same date, the two states
also signed a consular convention.198
In the meantime, the
negotiations for a new commercial treaty were threatened by
a" pig war" between the two countries.199
The new treaty
of commerce and navigation was signed at Praha on November
14, 1928. Yugoslavia won her point for reciprocal
most-favored-nation treatment, but prohibitions might be imposed
on trade for purposes of public health, safety, morality
or finance. It was agreed that any restrictions on state
195 Prager Tagblatt, Prager Presse, June 20, 1928; Swrnost, June zr-
23, and Juiy 8, 1928; Machray, (}p. cit., pp. 342-346; Codresco, op. cit••
vol. ii, pp. 59-64.
196 Treaty Series, vol. xcvi, pp. 421-425.
111'1' Ibid., vol. XCV, pp. IOI-II'I.
198 Ibid., vol. xcviii, pp. 297-317.
199 The New York Times, December 2, 1928. Yugoslavia produced
more hogs than all the other Balkan countries combined, and had been
able to undersell all European competitors. The farmers of Czechoslovakia
demanded protection against Serbian pigs, but Yugoslavia insisted
upon most-favored-nation treatment in return for similar privileges
that had been granted to Czechoslovak industrial products.
294 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
monopolies would be mutual. Citizens of either state would
be exempt from military service in the other or from contributions
in lieu thereof. Other clauses prov'ided for numerous
exemptions from duties, for freedom of transit by
rail, for equal railway rates, for seagoing vessels to have
equal rights in both countries and for postal communications
to be as speedy as possible.200
The acts that specifically strengthened the Little Entente
were the renewals of the treaties of alliance and of the
defensive .military conventions that supplemented them.
The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty of alliance was prolonged
in September, 1928,
201
as a part of the series of treaties
between the two states, and was ratified by Czechoslovakia
on February 12, 1929.
202
The alliance was to remain effective
until a year after notice of termination had been given.
The regular Little Entente Conference for 1929 was held at
Belgrade, May 20-21, at which time the prolongations of all
the treaties of alliance were consummated. On May 21,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia changed the terms 203
of their
recently prolonged alliance in order to make it the same as
the similar treaties of the same date between Czechoslovakia
and Rumania/04
and between Rumania and Yugoslavia.205
Each of the three treaties was prolonged for five years, with
renewal automatic at the end of each such period unless the
treaty should be denounced six m<;_nths earlier.
During the course of the Conference of Belgrade there
arose the conviction that the system of bilateral agreements,
which had hitherto been employed and which Benes, perhaps
ooo Treaty Series, vol. xcvii, pp. 9-59·
oo1 Ibid., vol. lxxxvii, pp. 309-3II.
2oa Geske Slovo, February 12, 1929; Svornost, March s, 1929.
2os Treaty Series, vol. xciv, pp. 53-55.
004 Ibid., vot. xcvi, pp. 307-309.
2011 Ibid., vol. xcviii, pp. 221-223.
EFFORTS TO MAlNTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 295
from a sense of making the best of a semi-favorable necessity,
had always defended as an element of strength rather
than of weakness, should be replaced by a tripartite alliance.
From the viewpoint of Czechoslovakia, the obvious increase
in the defensive strength and cohesion of the Little Entente
might be to a large degree offset by an increase of obligations
and by a decrease of freedom in the con,duct of foreign
policy, particularly in questions that might concern the
Balkans.208
She obtained a compromise on May 21, 1929,
in the general treaty of conciliation, arbitration, and judicial
settlement, an act which reflected the basic principles of both
Locarno and of the Kellogg Peace Pact which the League
was then sponsoring. By this new treaty, the three partners
agreed that all disputes, of whatever nature, were to be
either conciliated, arbitrated, or subjected to judicial dectston.
There was to be no interference with already established
judicial procedure. All disputes as to the respective
rights of the three states were to be submitted to an arbitral
tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
It was decided that all disputes might be submitted to conciliation
before resorting to arbitration. After three
months' notice, direct application by any party could be made
to the Permanent Court of International Justice to settle
any dispute. At the request of one state, a Permanent
Conciliation Commission would be constituted within six
months; This Commission was to be composed of five members,
one from each disputant and the other three from three
different countries. In conciliation procedure, the parties
might agree to invite a third Power to intervene, if the third
Power had an interest in the dispute.207
This general treaty
had the advantage that it strengthened the ties of the Little
Entente by providing for the peaceful solution of any dispute
206 Cf. Crane, op. cit., pp. 185-186.
2or Treaty Series, vol xcvi, pp. JII-JJI.
296 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
without increasing the obligations of its members. The
Conference of Belgrade closed with a resolution for a closer
economic alliance among the three states. It had been one
of the most constructive of the Conferences of the Little
Entente, one which was expected to become significant in
the.safeguarding of the new status quo.208
On August 20, 1929, Czechoslovakia ratified the treaties
which had been signed at the Conference of Belgrade.2011
On the same day, the Geske Slovo created a sensation with
the statement that the treaties were supplemented by a secret
military treaty among the three countries of the Little
Entente,210
a statement that lost little force by spirited
denials and by the retraction of such an assertion in the
following issue.211
Since the Geske Slovo had always been
considered Benes' mouthpiece, and since the editor of its
foreign news columns, Dr. Jaroslav Kopecky, had accompanied
Benes to the Conference of Belgrade, Czechoslovak
public opinion refused to credit any denials of the existence
of a secret military convention.212
Added point was given
to this opinion by the fact that no German member of the
Czechoslovak cabinet had been present at the meeting that
had ratified the treaties. If any additional confirmation was
necessary, Czechoslovak public opinion considered it offered
by the manoeuvres in Moravia, late in August, 1929, when
there were present as observers Marshal Petain of France,
and the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of Rumania and Yugoslavia,
with their assistants.215
zos The New York Times, May 21-23, 2-5, 1929; Svornosl, May 10, 22,
25, 26, 1929; Le Temps, May 24, 1929; Machray, op. cit., pp. 35~362;
Codresco, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 77-94
2011 Ceske Slovo, August 20, 1929; Svornost, August 26, 1929.
21 0 Ceske Slow, August 20, 1929. an.Jbid., August 21, 1929.
21 2 For the dose cooperation of the Little Entente during 1929, cf. also,
Chmelar, J., " Ceskoslovenska zahranicni politika v roce 1929 ", ZahraniCns
Politika, vol. ix, pp. x-8.
:11s Narodnt Listy, September 4, 1929; Svornost, September 18, 1929·
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 297
Germany and the League of Nations
CzeChoslovakia held the highest hopes that the Locarno
agreements would be followec:l by a period in which Europe
as a whole, under the auspices of the League, would seek to
establish upon a firm basis the new post-war status quo.
To this end, one of the most important steps was to have
been the entry of Germany into the League. However, this
step, instead of promoting harmony, became rather the
occasion for a fresh display of international rivalry. An
extraordinary session of the League was called for March,
1926, to arrange for the admission of Germany, a matter
that should have been relatively simple had it not been for
other Powers. Spain, Brazil, Poland, China, Czechoslovakia
and Persia requested permanent Council seats also,
but all except the first two soon abandoned their demands.
In order to save the situation by a compromise, Czechoslovakia
offered to resign her non-permanent seat to Poland,
and Sweden made a similar offer. After considerable international
intrigue, marked particularly by foreign pressure
upon Sweden, both states resigned, to be succeeded by Poland
and Holland, but Germany's admission was still blocked by
Brazil, which resisted all pressure.216
The March session
proved to be entirely barren of results. When, largely
because of German objections, Brazil and Spain were denied
permanent seats, they submitted resignations from the
League~ The way was thus cleared for the admission of
Germany by a unanimous vote at the meeting of September
8, 1926. The number of permanent seats was increased
from four to five, and, at the same time, the number of nonpermanent
seats was increased from six to nine.2111
214. Toynbee, op. cit., 1926, pp. 1-g8; Cosma, ofJ. cit., pp. 248-251; Buell,
op. cit., pp. III-uS; Bassett,]. S., The League of Nations (New York,
Ig28), pp. JQ0-325·
2n Official Journal, October, 1926, p. 1241.
298 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
While the prolonged struggle for seats was an undignified
exhibition of national selfishness, the transaction as a whole
strengthened the League by the substitution of one Great
Power for two lesser ones and also accentuated the influence
of Europe within that body. Czechoslovakia felt that her
sacrifice of a seat on the Council was worth while in order
to ensure a satisfactory solution of the German problem;
the fact that her friend and ally, Poland, had succeeded her
on the Council augured well for the adequate.representation
of her own interests within the League.216
Even this sacrifice
proved needless, for the elections of 1926 for the
Council resulted in Poland, Rumania and Chile being designated
to sit for three years; China, the Netherlands and
Colombia for two years; and Belgium, Czechoslovakia and
San Salvador for one year.21'r
Benes stated,
I did not sl:l.are the optimism of those who believed that the
entry of Gennany would solve everything, and I do not share
the pessimism of those who think it wm be di<Sa.5trous. What
we must face is the fact that, with Gernnany's inevita!hle inolusion,
the League enteris upon a new pha:se, also inevitable.
The heroic period is over. We have .to find the routine working
level .on which all human business mmt be conducted. Germany's
presence will !llaturally add complicationiS, though I am
convinced the German delegation win move very slowly. They
will watch and wait; they will make no attempt to change the ·
Treaty~which without textual change, you know, is already a
good deal. modified!
.A!side from Germany, it is going to be harder to work with a
Council of fourteen tl:l.an with a Council of ten. The more
au Chmelat, J., "Otazka rekonstrukce Rady Spoleenosti Narodu ",
Zahranicni Politika, vol. v, pp. 777-783; Hobza, A., "Reorganisace
Spoleenosti Narodu ", Zahranicm Politika, vol. v, pp. 863-867.
21'1 Monthly Summary, vol. xi, p. 192.
EFFORTS TO MAlNTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 299
sea:t:s, the less respo111Sibility for each, and the more nations represented,
the less international representation. . . . We who are
making a new order must learn to adjust oul'Selves to it.218
Peace, Security and Disarmament
Bend desired to ensure still further the new status quo
by embodying, in some general agreement, his efforts of
almost a decade on behalf of peace, security and disarmament.:m
This ideal appeared to be on the eve of realization,
when, on September 17, 1927, the League adopted two
Czechoslovak proposals : (I) to render it obligatory for
League members to facilitate the meetings of the Council in
case of a crisis and the functioning of the organs of the
League in times of emergency, and (2) to specify the
methods of regulation which would enable the Council to
make such decisions as might be necessary to enforce the.
obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.220
To give force to the above resolutions, the League formed
a new committee on Arbitration and Security, headed by
Benes.221
Bend urged all League members to negotiate
regional security compacts on the Locarno model as the best
practical means of obtaining security. He desired that each
state be asked to halt existing rearmament programs.222
As chairman of the Committee on Arbitration and Security,
Benes had sent to all members of the League a questionnaire
regarding their views. Norway, Sweden, Great
Britain and Germany sent replies. The two Scandinavian
states preferred a general treaty upon the Locarno model.
:na Benes, Boj o mir (speech of December 9, 192()), pp. 362-373.
lllG Cf. Kaeer, K., "Deset let prace pro ideu odzbrojeni ", Zahramlni
Politika. vol. vii, pp. I()48-Io64, II59--II7o; vol. viii, pp. 629-647, 776-790,
901-912, n8J-H97, I455-I478i L'Europe nouvelle, January 15, 1927.
22o 0 fficial Journal, special supplement, no. 57, pp. 42-43.
2:n Ibid., May, 1928, pp. 6ro-6u.
1122 Benes, Boj o ml,. (speech of October 25, 1927), pp. 374-377.
300 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1995
Great Britain opposed the enforcement of the Peace Treaties
by any system of guarantees based solely upon public opinion,
and suggested instead a series of regional treaties. Germany
advocated the removal of the causes for war by the
adoption of conciliation procedure for non-justiciable disputes,
and considered guarantees for the enforcement of
treaties of arbitration unnecessary. With these views before
them, Benes and the three rapporteurs 223
who assisted him
prepared a series of model treaties 224
at a conference at
Praha beginning January 26, 1928. When these treaties
were presented to the second session of the Committee (February
2o-March 7, 1928) at Geneva, spirited discussions
followed.225
France wished each state to guarantee every
boundary in Europe, a move that would spell the union of
all against any aggressor, whereas Great Britain presented a
plan of regional understandings. Both plans contemplated
the aid of the United States in maintaining peace. In
the dispute wherein Great Britain maintained that a " progressive
reduction of armed forces could be the only true
safeguard for world peace" and France that "military
security would have to precede disarmament on land or sea",
the three states of the Little Entente shared the views of
France.226
Again Benes wished to avoid a definite choice
between Great Britain and France; his policy embraced elements
of both plans, yet Czechoslovakia was bound so closely
to her two Little Entente partners anc1 to France that, had it
come to a crisis, he would have had to follow the lead of
France.227
On September 26, 1928, the League Assembly
223 Holsti of Finland, Politis of Greece, and Rutgers of the Netherlands.
324 Cf. Official Journal, May, 1928 pp. 6121-650.
325 Cf. ibid., pp. 651-706, for discussions and other proposals.
326 Cf. Crane, op. cit., p. 149.
:121 Ceske Slovo, June 7, 1928; Svornost, June zo, 1928; Benes, E.,
" Expose Dra. Benese, pfednesene 4 rijna 1928 v zahranicnim vjboru
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 301
approved both a general act and the negotiation of special
bilateral treaties of arbitration and conciliation.228
In the struggle for the attainment of pacific means for
the settlement of international disputes, a prominent part was
played by the Kellogg or Paris Peace Pact. After a year
of international negotiations,:m the Secretary of State of t.lte
United States, F. B. Kellogg, was succes~ful in obtaining,
on August 27, 1928, the signatures of fifteen of the leading
countries of the world to the treaty. The contracting parties
condemned recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national
policy. They agreed that the solution of all disputes or conflicts
of whatever nature or origin would be sought only by
pacific means. The treaty would be open for the adherence
of every Power of the world and would become effective
among the fifteen original signatories when ratifications by ·
all fifteen were deposited at Washington, D. C.280
Benes took the lead in his country in advocating the
Kellogg Peace Pact/81
a sentiment that was almost unanimous
throughout Czechoslovakia,2311
which signed the treaty
on August 27, 1928,ll88
ratified it on January 23, 1929~ and
deposited the ratification with the League on March .2,
1929.28
.. The Czechoslovak government interpreted the
poslanecke snernovny", Zahranicnl Politika, vol. vii, pP. Ioo6-IOI2; cf.
also, Chmelar, J., "Ceskoslovenska zahranicni politika v race 1928 ",
Zohranien4 Politika, vot. vm, pp. I-6.
S2B Official Joun~al, special supplement, no. 67, pp. 34 et seq.
229 Cf. Shotwell, J. T., War as a" Instru.men.t of Naticmal Policy (New
York, 1929); Zimmerman, M.A., "Americkj projekt paktu proti vilce ",
Zahranilnl Politika, vol. vii, pP. 427-432·
380 Treaty Series. vol. xciv, pp. 57~4za1
ci. Bene5, Boj o mir (speech of June 6, 1928), pp. 397-413.
:as:a Prlwo Lidu, PYager Presse, Ceske SlOfJO, June 9 and 18, July I, 1!)28.
1sa Ceske SlOfJO, August 27, 1928.
'"Ibid., March 2, I!)29.
302 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Kellogg Peace Pact in a note of July 20, 1928, sent to Lewis
Einstein, United States' Minister at Praha. Benes thanked
the United States for the invitation to participate in the
general negotiations and pointed out that for many months
he had been stressing the importance of the Pact and the
political necessity of associating other Powers in it. His
representations to the Locarno Powers had been particularly
urgent. He believed that any violation of a multilateral
treaty by one contracting party would liberate the
other signatories from obligations to that Power, and that
the right of self-defense would be in no way restricted by
the new Pact. Thus defined, the Pact, in the eyes of Czechoslovakia,
had as its objective the maintenance of peaceful
relations among the signatory Powers. . Czechoslovakia
gladly made renunciation of war an instrument of her
national policy. Hence she accepted the explanations contained
in the United States' note of June 23, 1928 (nothing
in the Pact was incompatible with either the League Covenant,
with the Locarno agreements or with other treaties
that had been negotiated), and approved the Pact.235
By March 8, 1929, fifty-eight states had ratified.288
'
Thereupon, the League Council at its session of January,
1930, appointed a committee which, meeting from February
25 to March 5, worked out an amendment to the Covenant
in order to bring it into harmony with the Pact of Paris.23
r
Since the texts ofArticles 12 to 18 w€re not revised, Czechoslovakia
was satisfied and made no comments.288
However,
the amendment was not adopted.
During the early years of the existence of the League,
there had been established the Permanent Court of Inter-
235 C/. Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., In/ornwtion on the Ren.unciation of
War, I921-I928 (London, 1928), pp. 166-168.
2sa 0 fficial Journal, May, 1930, p. 383.
:m1 Ibid., May, 1930, pp. 353-383. 288 Ibid., May, 1930, p. 381.
EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEW STATUS QUO 303
national Justice, the- Protocol of which had been prepared,
as early as December 16, 1920, for the signatures of adherence
of the members of the League and of the other states
mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant. Czechoslovakia
had acceded on September 2, 1921.2311
The Protocol had
also a so-called " optional clause " by the signature of which
a state rertdered the jurisdiction of- the Court compulsory
for the pacific settlement of certain international disputes.
Adherence to the " optional clause " might be made unconditionally,
or for a limited time, or through reciprocal agreements
with other states. The core of the whole matter was
stated in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the statute, which specified
that, by its declaration, a state accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court in (I) the interpretation of any
treaty, (2) any question of international law, (3) the existence
of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
violation of an international obligation, and (4) the nature
and extent of the reparation that was to be exacted for the
aforementioned violation.
On September 19, 1929, Czechoslovakia accepted the
optional clause. Benes declared that, without any special
agreement regarding any other state, Czechoslovakia accepted
the jurisdiction of -the Court under the optional clause for
ten years from the date of the depasit of ratification in any
future _dispute except in cases where another method of
pacific settlement had already been provided.:uo The fact
remained that the ratification of Czechoslovakia had followed
that of other Powers. In the 1929 Assembly of the League
of Nations, Great Britain, France and Italy had continued
8811Jbid., November, 1927, p. I533·
240 C/. Pernument Court of Internationol Justice, series E. no. 6, pp.
481-482, for text of Benes' note.
304 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
the drive for the acceptance of the optional clause, and
Czechoslovakia had followed their example.241
Attention should also be called to the fact that Czechoslovakia
has not ratified the general act,242
even though it was
virtually the child of Benes' own Committee on Arbitration
and Security. This apparent inconsistency was owing to
adverse public opinion which balked at entrusting to any
foreign agency questions vital to the existence of the Re-
public.248
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia continued to be one
of the most ardent advocates of the basic principles of the
League. Through Benes, she had been extremely fruitful
in constructive suggestions for the improvement of the organization,
i. e. amendments expediting the procedure of the
Council and Assembly, reinforcing the Covenant by a general
non-aggression agreement (the Geneva Protocol), by
special regional agreements like the Little Entente treaties,
and by urging the League to exert effective jurisdiction over
any question that might threaten general peace. Although
Czechoslovakia has never regarded the League as a cure-all
for her international troubles, for she has solved her most
vital ones outside its scope, she has shown, on the whole,
willingness to submit to that body such questions as fell
within its proper jurisdiction, particularly minorities, the
reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, security, disarmament,
and the preservation of the new status quo upon the
""basis established by the Locarno agreements..
241 C/. Official Journal., special supplement, no. 75, pp. 74-76. Twentyfour
states had accepted it before 1929.
u2 Cf. supra, pp. 299 et seq.
MS Cf. Ceske Slovo, Narodni Politika, September 19, 1!)28.
CHAPTER VII
THE DEPRESSION
ECONOMIC CONFERENCES
THE high hopes that had been preyalent throughout
Europe as a result of the progress made in the various negotiations
regarding the establishment of security failed to
materialize. The feeling of optimism that had produced
Locamo and the Pact of Paris was followed by a reaction
that produced a feeling of pessimism as to the future and a
general disinclination to follow the precedents of interna~
tional cooperation. There resulted a marked revival of
selfish nationalism that augured ill for the future success of
such projects for international harmony as still felt the
impetus of the preceding period of optimism. This new
trend of events was an outgrowth of the world-wide economic
depression which began in the autumn of 1929, and
which soon attained such proportions that the major activity
of almost every state was directed towards its mitigation.
Instead of a unified international struggle against the
common menace, there developed a tendency for each individual"
state to go it~ own way, to seek its own salvation
regardless of the consequences to the others. This revival
of national selfishness tended to aggravate still further the
trend towards international chaos, and produced a depression
that existed not only in the sphere of economics, but in
almost every other human activity. Amid the general distress,
most of the nations of the world sought to alter those
portions of the status quo that appeared detrimental to their
own interests.
305
300 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
The transition from optimism to pessimism was fairly
rapid. While the various Powers were still desirous of
attaining a greater degree of international cooperation and
stability, they called at Geneva, under the auspices of the
League of Nations, a World Economic Conference, which
met on May 4, 1927, with fifty states being represented by
194 delegates. After a debate of four days, the Conference
was divided into three Commissions : ort commerce, industry
and agriculture. The first Committee (commerce) advocated
an immediate general tariff reduction; the second
(industry), of which the chairman was Dr. Hodac of
Czechoslovakia, specified the circumstances in which international
industrial combinations would be considered beneficial
or harmful; and the third (agriculture) sought to
adjust the prices of agricultural and industrial products, to
form cooperative societies and to develop agricultural credit.
After heated debates, it was decided to abandon all attempts
to create an international agricultural credit bureau. The
Conference terminated with the plenary session of May 21,
at which time the reports of the three Committees were
approved, the U.S.S.R.1
alone dissenting.
The Czechoslovak delegates to the World Economic Conference
issued an official statement to explain their views:
( 1) Czechoslovakia has not yet overcome the economic
results of the World War ; ( 2) Czechoslovakia has devoted
all her energies to coordinate a mftional economic system ;
(3) Czechoslovakia has always tried to avoid inflation and
to balance her budget; (4) Czechoslovak agricultural and industrial
production has been handicapped by the results of
the War; ( 5) Czechoslovak industry was in a difficult position
owing to a complete change in the fundamental conditions
ruling output and markets ; (6) the above factors had
determined the trend of Czechoslovakia's trade policy after
1 Publications, Economic and Financial, 1927, ii, 13, 33 p.
THE DEPRESSION
the War; and therefore (7) Czechoslovakia was pursuing a
nationai economic policy which was still in a condition of
transition.2
Czechoslovakia's viewpoint was further clarified
by one of her delegates, Dr. Stodola, who, on May 7•
stated that his country had made untiring efforts to better
her own economic situation without relying to any great
extent upon foreign assistance. Czechoslovakia was willing
to cooperate loyally with other countries to revive international
trade. For several years it had been her policy to
reduce customs duties. As evidence of this fact Stodola
pointed out that Czechoslovak duties in 1927 were only five
per cent higher than the Austrian duties of 1913. He
promised that Czechoslovakia would try to decrease still more
internal obstacles to the maintenance of a large agricultural
and industrial output, and would press for the ·adoption of
the same policy upon an international scale.8
On June 16, 1927, Bend stated in a meeting of the
League Council that the great merit of the Conference had
been to throw impartial light upon the origins, causes and
nature of present economic problems. He believed that
many confused and mistaken ideas had been set right. He
issued also a warning that the cure that had been prescribed
(i. e. international cooperation) would be slow and would
require much patience, but would be sure. He pledged the
full adherence of Czechoslovakia in principle to the work
of the Conference, but again pointed out the need for
patience. Certain ideas and principles that had been formulated,
particularly in regard to commercial policy, would
require more thorough examination in order that their consequences
might be fully appreciated. On behalf of his
country, Benes announced his intention of adopting immedill
Ibid., 1927 ii 31, PP. 4-9.
a Ibid., 1927 ii 52, vol. i, pp. 124-125.
3o8 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1985
ately a policy conforming with the principles approved by
the Conference."'
A special Conference was called to meet at Geneva on
October 17, 1927, to deal with the abolition of import and
export prohibitions and restrictions, thirty-five states being
represented. Dr. Ibl, speaking for Czechoslovakia on October
18, 1927, referred to Bend' speech of June 16, and
pointed out that no change had taken place in the views of his
country.5
After three weeks of debate, this second Conference
approved a convention of eighteen articles which was
based upon the recommendations of the Economic Committee
of the League. The treaty specified that, except for restrictions
imposed for the sake of public safety, public health,
the protection of national currencies, or for curtailing the
traffic in arms, all export and import prohibitions or restrictions
would be abolished within six months of the coming
into effect of the treaty, but that, under abnormal circumstances,
each signatory might adopt temporarily whatever
measures might be deemed necessary to protect its vital
interests.6
At once fifteen states submitted extensive exceptions which
were intended to safeguard interests that they considered
vital. Only eight states agreed to sign immediately, among
them Czechoslovakia,1
but eighteen ratifications were necessary
to render the treaty effective. Since the required ratifications
were slow in coming, a Protocol was prepared in
Paris on December 20, 1929, whereby Pohind and Czechoslovakia
were allowed until May 31, 1930, to submit their
"'ibid., 1927 ii so, pp. &-9. Cf. Zpravy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 128
meeting, February 7, 1928, pp. 19-22, 5 session, for Deputy Horpynka's
explanation of how Czechos~ovakia's activities at the World Economic
Conference differed with the economic ideas of parliament.
II Publications, Economic and Financial, 1928 ii 7, pp. 64-65.
6 Treaty Series, vol. xcvii, pp. 391-462.
't Narodni Listy, November 8, 1927.
THE DEPRESSION
ratifications, whereupon the treaty would go into effect.8
Subsequently, in the hope that other ratifications might be
forthcoming, Poland was granted an extension of time to
June 20, 1930, and Czechoslovakia to June 26, 1930.
Czechoslovakia ratified the treaty the day before her time
limit expired,9
but Poland still postponed ratifications until
all artificial import barriers would be lifted from what she
considered her natural markets.10
Thereupon, on June 25,
Czechoslovakia announced that she would wait for other
ratifications, particularly Poland's, before she would consider
the treaty effective.11
Czechoslovakia's attitude in waiting
for Poland before ratifying the treaty for the abolition of
import and expOrt prohibitions, and. thereby inaugurating a
widespread repudiation of the agreement, appeared reactionary
and contrary to her general policy.12
The explanation
would be found in the fact that Czechoslovakia, in spite of
her readiness to sigr1 the treaty at once, had been but lukewarm
to the agreement because of her internal political situation;
the Agrarian Party, although not in a majority,
still retained a considerable influence which, for economic
reasons, had been wielded relentlessly against the treaty, and
the indecision of the other states had furnished the Agrarians
with the necessary weapons to make their policy prevail.18
Czechoslovakia's action induced eight other states to proclaim
in disgust that, after July I, 1930, they would also
cease to regard the treaty as binding upon themselves.u
•Le Temps, The New Yo,.k Times, December 20, 1929fl
The New Yo,.k Times, June 25, 1930.
10 Gazeta Wa,.szawska, June 27, 1930.
n. Ceske SlO'Uo, June 28, 1930.
12 Cf. McOure, W., Wo,.ld p,.osperity (New York, 1933), p. 368.
1a Cf. Publications, Economic and Financial, 1930 ii 13, p. 23, for
Czechoslovak explanation (Ibl) of December 6, 1929u
The New Yo,.k Times, June 30, 1930.
310 FOREIGN Pr:JLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Only Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Portugal, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Norway continued to adhere to
the treaty.15
Another effort to promote international cooperation was
inaugurated by Aristide Briand, who, on April 17, 1930,
sent to twenty-six nations memoranda regarding a vast new
project.16
His draft plan, completed on May II, 1930,
envisaged a United States of Europe upon an economic
basis.17
To support his project, Briand cited the League's
approval of regional understandings.18
The general response
was favorable.19
Czechoslovakia's reply was handed to the
French Minister in Praha on July 14. The Czechoslovak
government pointed out that its foreign policy, as evinced
by membership and work in the Little Entente, by Locarno,
and by efforts generally on behalf of European peace, had
always been favorable to any plan that would tend to promote
a greater degree of cooperation among the nations of Europe.
Briand's plan was of the type of regional agreement which
had been approved by Article 2 I of the League Covenant
and which Czechoslovakia had been sponsoring. Czechoslovakia
was willing to enter into any federation provided
that the national sovereignty of the states participating remain
unimpaired, that European states with overseas interests
be included, that the organization be not aimed against
any overseas state, and that the principles of the League prevail.
Czechoslovakia considered 'it expedient that the
eleventh League Assembly institute a Committee of Research
which would assemble the replies of the various states, and
u Toynbee, o/1. cit., 1929, p. I'll.
16 The New York Times, April 17, 1930.
11 Ibid., May II, 1930.
18Jbid., May 18, 1930 (text of -plan).
1 9 Cf. Publicatiom, Political, ·1930 vii 4. pp. 17-65, for the texts of the
various replies.
THE DEPRESSION 3II
prepare for next year~s meeting a draft statute of organization.
The Czechoslovak note suggested also that this statute
include only fundamental rules in order to ensure harmony
between political and economic factors.20
Lengthy debates took place between Briand and Henderson
over the respective French and British viewpoints over
the details of the plan: France desired first a federation,
which was to bring about disarmament,· whereas Great
Britain wished disarmament first, and believed that a federation
would follow. On September 16, 1930, the French delegates
proposed the creation of a Commission of Inquiry on
European Union.21
The suggestion was adopted on the
following day by the forty-five delegates of the various states,
the response of the Czechoslovaks being favorable.22
The
general approval induced Schober, the Austrian delegate, to
point out that a United States of Europe should be preceeded
by regional understandings and, that in view of this fact,
Austria and Germany were projecting a Customs Union,
which other states might join.23
As a result of this new
development, which raised the question of the revision of
the Peace Treaties, Briand gave up his plan for a United
States of Europe and sought merely " a decent orthodox
Geneva burial for his idea ".26
Benes still persevered. At the third session of the Commission
of Inquiry on May 19, 1931, he proposed three economic
remedies : ( I) a system of customs unions; (2)
systems of agrarian preferences and industrial understandings
coupled with customs truces; and (3) a system of
• Cj. ibid., Political, 1930 vii 4. pp. 4S-46; cf. also, Benes, E., LA Situotion
de l'Europe, la Societe des Nati(}ff.S, et lo Tchlcoslovaquie, speech
of October IS, 1930, Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, no. xs.
n Official Journal, special supplement, no. 84. pp. II7-II8.
22/bid., p. 126.
ll8 Cf. Monthly Summary, vol. xi, pp. II7-II8.
24> The New Yo,.k Times, September 6, 1931.
312 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
special bilateral treaties. Benes issued a warning that the
question was primarily political, regardless of the intention
of the delegates to regard it as essentially economic. The
formation of one European group would consolidate a rival
group and produce economic war. In his estimation, the
present exaggerated protectionism would have to be replaced
gradually. The first step might well be tariff stabilization,
followed by reductions later. Haste might ruin the entire
program. He suggested a system o{ bilateral treaties which
would preserve intact most-favored-nation clauses and which
would restrict preferences to agricultural products. Czechoslovakia
was willing to study all phases of the problem and
would do her share to bring about a general improvement.25
On September 12, 1931, Bend praised the Commission of
Inquiry as practical, justifiable and necessary. He emphasized
the fact that Czechoslovakia had placed high hopes in
it. The League Assembly, largely as the result of this plea,
prolonged indefinitely the life of the Commission of Inquiry,26
and on September 26, at the fifth session of the Commission
of Inquiry, Czechoslovakia was given a place on a
special committee to examine a draft pact of economic nonaggression.27
It was not to be. Briand died on March 7,
1932/8
and the Commission, at its next meeting (September
30-0ctober I}, accomplished nothing.29
Thereupon the idea
was abandoned.
,.
The Proposed Austro-German Customs Union
The long proposed Anschluss assumed a concrete form
in the spring of 1931 in the project for an Austro-German
3 5 Publications, ~olitical, 1931 vii 7, pp. 46-50.
26 Official Journal, special supplement, no. 99, pp. II-12.
l¥1 Publications, Political, 1932 vii 8, p. I.
2s The New York Times, March 8, 1932.
M Publications, Political, 1932 vii 13, pp. 7-n.
THE DEPRESSION
Customs Union. The question was broached by Curtius, the
Germa.Il Foreign Minister, early in March, 1931, during a
visit to Vienna.80
A communique of March 22, 1931, announced
officially that the economic unity of the two countries
was contemplated by a Protocol on March 19.81
This
announcement proved to be a test of the sincerity of France,
Czechoslovakia, etc., in a United States of Europe. Although
the Customs Union might be joined by others, it was construed
by some of the victor states as an evasion of the Peace
Treaties and as the first step towards a political union. On
the following day the representatives of France, Italy and
Czechoslovakia lodged at Vienna a protest that the proposed
union constituted a breach of the Geneva Protocols of. October
4, 1922 82
(the reconstruction of Austria). The protest
was unheeded by Austria; rather, she appeared to be
furthering the project by announcing on March 25 that she
would consider as denounced from July 1, 1931, her existing
commercial treaties with Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.••
Her dissatisfaction with the treaty of July 21,
1927, with Czechoslovakia, had been caused by what she
had considered its excessive rates. Despite her impending
Customs Union with Germany, Austria, on July 22, 1931,
signed at Vienna a new commercial treaty with Czechoslovakia,
whereby tariff rates were readjusted, generally at
lower figures, mutual most-favored-nation clauses of earlier
treaties were retained, and neither country, except with the
consent of the other, was to levy export duties under whatever
name.••
so Arbeitef' Zeitun.g, The New York Times, March 4. 1931.
111 The New York Times, March 22, 1931; text, March 24, 1931.
811 Ibid., Arbeitet' Zeitung, March 23, 1931.
as The New York Times, Svorn.ost, March 25, 1931.
86 Treaty Series, vol. cxxviii, pp. 59-305.
314 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
The projected union met with diverse responses. Great
Britain decided not to oppose the move.8
~> Italy studied the
project with a view to acceding.36
The U.S.S.R. was sympathetic.87
France objected to the union, which was expected
to kill prospects of a long-term loan by her to Germany.88
Curtius explained the whole matter to the Ambassadors
of France, Great Britain and Italy,39
and requested
that the still broader question of a European customs union
be placed upon the League agenda.40
The tension was
relieved somewhat when Briand obtained from Austria a
promise not to resume negotiations until after the May meeting
of the League.41
The Little Entente, after the most
serious internal crisis in its history, also pronounced itself
definitely opposed to the project.42
From the outset, Czechoslovakia was bitterly opposed to
the union, and affected to disbelieve Austro-German denials
of any political aspects of the proposal. Benes voiced repeatedly
the viewpoint of his country,43
and called upon the
German minority to prove itself loyal to Czechoslovakia in
the crisis.44
To avert the union, Benes, on April 23, 1931,
ss The New York Times, March 25, 193·1.
ss Ibid., March 26, 1931. 3T Ibid., March 28, 1931.
as Ibid., March 26 and 28, 1931. 811 Ibid., March 24,· 1931.
4 0 Ibid., April 16, 1931. u Ibid., April 18, 1931.
42 Ibid., May 6, 1931; for full details, cf. infra, pp. 323 et seq.
48 Bend, Boj o mif', pp. 551-553 (speech 10f March 26, 1931); pp. SS4-
6oo (speech of Apri123, 1931, summarizing the whole situation before the
Foreign Affairs Committees of both houses of parliament); Official
Journal, vol. xii, pp. 107'5-'1077· Through March, April and May, 1931,
practically every issue of every Czechoslovak newspaper printed columns
on the union, only with the coming of summer was there any marked
decrease in public interest. C/. Benes, E. (Argus), The Economic Aspect
of the Austro-German Customs Union (Prague, 1930), for a semi-official
summary of Czechoslovakia's economic reasons for opposing the project;
also, Bitterman, M., Austria and the Customs Union (Prague, 1931).
« The New York Times, May 8, 1931 ; Ceske Sl01Jo, May 10, 1931 ;
Svornost, May n, I9JI.
THE DEPRESSION
proposed a counterplan embracing all Europe, a customs
union based upon most-favored-nation principles with agrarian
preferences.45
Benes had had this plan in mind for some
time, but had not announced it earlier out of deference to
Briand'~ projected United States of Europe.46
If successful,
Bene5' scheme would have been a practical compromise between
the exigencies of the European economic situation and
the demands of the Czechoslovak Agrarians, but, failing to
attract sufficient support, it became but one of many suggestions
that led to no practical results.
The campaign against the Austro-German Customs Union
acquired added momentum as the result of the denunciation
of the project by France in a memorandum of May 18,
1931,47
which was reinforced by a report that the French
bankers would be willing to aid Austria if the projected union
was dropped.48
On September 3, 1931, in order to. save
face by anticipating an adverse opinion of the World Court,
the agency to which the project had been referred for an
advisory opinion, both Austria and Germany stated that they
had renounced it voluntarily.49
Many within Austria deemed
this renunciation merely temporary, to be revoked at some
more favorable occasion in the future.50
The only permanent
factor in the situation was that the future relations of Austria
and Czechoslovakia would depend largely upon the sincerity
of the renunciation. The official death-knell of the AustroGerman
Customs Union was sounded, apparently, on Sep-
45 The New York Times, April 24, 1931; Ceske Slwo, April 23, 1931;
Svornost, April 24. 1931.
u Cf. Benes, Boj o tnir, pp. 529-550 (speech of October 15, 1930).
47 Official Journal, vot. xii, pp. II68-t·I6g.
48 The New York Times, May t8, 1931•
.e Arbeiter Zeitung, September 3, 1931.
50 Ibid., Neue Freie Presse, September 3, 1931; Swmost, September
4, 19JI.
316 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
tember 5, 1931, when the World Court by a vote of eight
to seven pronounced it contrary to the international agreements
already entered into by Austria.n
Czechoslovakia's contacts with Germany, potentially her
most dangerous enemy, remained " correct ", indeed almost
cordial for many years, a condition of affairs that reflected
creditably upon the statesmen of both countries~ The mutual
cooperation between the two states, which had been engendered
by close economic ties, reached perhaps a climax in
two treaties which were signed at Praha on April29, 1931,6
:r
regarding the establishment and operation of regular airways,
both with and without landings in the territories of
both countries.
Despite these two treaties, relations between Czechoslovakia
and Germany became strained as the result of the
active part which had been taken by the former in aiding the
frustration of the Austro-German Customs Union. Benes,
in his desire to maintain relations with both Austria and
Germany upon the former cordial plane,. stressed the point
that Anschluss was not merely a problem for Czechoslovakia,
but was continental in scope. He sought to substitute
for the defunct Customs-Union a new project. On
October 20, 1931, he proposed, specifically, a tentative customs
union of Austria and Hungary with Czechoslovakia.
To this bloc would be added eventually Yugoslavia, and
perhaps Rumania also. In his esthnation, nothing of permanent
value could be accomplished without the approval of
France, Italy and Germany, but, on the other hand, no plan
could be imposed successfully by the Great Powers upon the
51 Permanent Court of Internotional Justice, series A/B, no. 41;
The World Court's Advisory OpinioPJ on the Austro-German Customs
Union, the American Foundation, Foreign Relations Bulletin no. 9,
September 5, 1931; Official Journal, vol. xii, pp. 2o6!}-207o; Monthly
Summary, vol. xi, pp. II7-II8, 167-168, 190, 213 and 226.
lUI Treaty Series, vol. cxxxiii, pp. 347-367.
THE DEPRESSION
small states of Central Europe without the consent of the
latter. ·Above all, there must be no secret negotiations.68
Through a leakage which developed from Benes' informal
conversations with the Austrian Minister at Praha, to whom
he had outlined his project, Czechoslovak public opinion became
aware of the plan before Benes delivered his expose.
Much agitation resulted when the Czechosloyak government
saw fit to censor the October 7 edition of the Prager Tagblatt
because of an article wherein a Dr. B. Jelinek, in approving
Benes' plan too forcibly, stated that, if the proposed Danubian
Union was not consummated, Czechoslovakia would
revert to the condition of Bohemia after the Thirty Years'
War." In spite of a generally favorable reaction within
Czechoslovakia, Bend' plan drew little support elsewhere:
the other Little Entente states were cool, Germany, Austria,
Hungary and Italy were hostile,55
and France alone approved
58
-in fact, disapproval was so general that BeneS felt
it advisable to deny rumors that his project had been inspired
by France}17
The lack of support encountered by Bend' plan could be
accounted for in part by a German counter-project for relieving
to some degree the economic distress of Central Europe.
Germany sought to aid the agricultural states of Southeastern
Europe by granting special preferential tariffs to their wheat.
To this end, treaties were drawn up between Germany and
Hungary, and between Germany and Rumania, despite the
fact that such special privileges violated the most-favored-
113 Narodm Lirty, The New York Times, October 21, 1931; Swmost,
October 14 and 23, 1931.
u. Cf. The Central European Observer, October 9, 1931.
&5 Berliner Tageblatt, Arbeiter Zeitung, Corriere della Sera, October 21,
1931 ; Swrnost, March 17 and April S. 1932; The Times, April 8, 1932.
•e Le Temps, October 21-22, 1931.
111 The New York Times, December n, 1931; Svomost, December IS.
1931.
318 FOREiGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
nation clauses of treaties with many other countries. These
two treaties, to become effective, required the approval of all
the states with which Germany had negotiated commercial
treaties that contained most-favored-nation clauses. Twenty
countries, including the United States,58
failed to protest
because of the diminution of their treaty rights, but three
others, namely, Czechoslovakia, Argentina and Turkey, sent
Germany vigorous protests immediately, and demanded privileges
similar to those which Germany was offering to Hungary
and Rumania. These protests caused the German
project to be dropped, and strained also future relations
between Germany and Czechoslovakia.59
Austria, disappointed in being excluded from some larger
customs organization and apparently despairing of her future
as an independent entity, seethed with rumors regarding
the imminence of desperate action. Dr. F. Soukup, President
of the Czechoslovak Senate and one of the leaders of
the Social Democratic Party, returned to Praha from Austria,
where he had attended a convention of Austrian Social
Democrats, and brought with him an alarming report of the
activities of the Austrian Fascists, who were charged with
desiring the destruction of the Austrian Republic and the
restoration of a monarchy. In Soukup's opinion, Czechoslovakia.
could never tolerate such a change within Austria.60
Politics vs. Economics within,.the Little Entente
One of the best examples of the interplay·of politics and
economics was offered by the negotiations that Czechoslo-
58 The United States, the Soviet Union and Denmark reserved the right
to suspend judgment until a later time.
511 Berliner Ta.geblatt, Narodnf Listy, November 17, 1931; Neue Freie
Presse, Prager Presse, November 20, 1931; Svornost, November 18 and
2I, 1931.
oo The New York Times, November 19, 1931; Svornost, November 21,
1931.
THE DEPRESSION
vakia conducted with her two Little Entente partners during
1930 arid 1931. The 1930 conference of the Little Entente
was held on the plateau of Strba (Strbske Pleso), in the
Tatra Mountains of Slovakia, June 25-28, 1930. There
were present the three Foreign Ministers: Benes,. Marinkovic
and Mironescu. The Conference centered its attention upon
Hungary, where rumors were rife of a coup d'etat on the
part of Otto on the model of Carol Il's in Rumania. Again
the Little Entente deemed it necessary to warn Hungary
against attempting the restoration of the Habsburgs and
against attempting any revision of the Treaty of Trianon.
Other questions concerned the application of the Pact of
Paris and the decision of the recent Hague Conferences.
Concern was felt that Poland sent no observer to the Conference,
and the menace of Franco-Italian rivalry was also
felt keenly. BeneS stated that he desired a renewal of
Franco-German friendship. The high degree of economic
nationalism still extant caused him to be sceptical of the
success of an economic Little Entente.61
The Praha Veler
of June 26, 1930, created a sensation at the Conference by
publishing a statement of Dr. Viskovsky, the Czechoslovak
Minister of National Defense, to the effect that Central
Europe was in more·danger of war than it had been at any
time in the past ten years because of Italian and Hungarian
intrigues and because of the increase in armaments in Europe
as a result of such threats. Nevertheless, the Conference
closed on an optimistic note,62
caused primarily by the signing
of a new Czechoslovak-Rumanian commercial treaty 68
in spite of domestic objections in both states/14. and by the
1n Ceski Slovo, June 29, 1930; Svornost, June 30, 1930.
63 Svornost, July 2, 1930; Prager Presse, July I, 1930.
11a Treaty Series, vol. cxix, pp. 73-159.
6• Cf. The New York Times, June 28, 1930.
320 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
evidences of solidarity of the major interests of the three
members.65
On July 21, 1930, there opened at Bucharest a conference
between Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary for the purpose
of creating an agricultural bloc in Central Europe. Very
early a limited degree of cooperation was attained on the
questions of erecting grain elevators and of· financing harvests.
For a time the Praha newspapers displayed a measure
of resentment over the exclusion of Czechoslovakia.68
Nothing
of note was accomplished, because no agreement could
be reached upon the question of a unified monopoly of
exports, to which neither Rumania nor Yugoslavia would
assent, owing to fears that the agency might be controlled
by Hungary.87
Of relatively greater importance were the Conferences of
Sinaia and Warsaw. On July 22, 1930, representatives of
Rumania and Yugoslavia met at Sinaia in order to attempt
to render the Little Entente as efficient economically as it
was politically. It was hoped also that Rumania and Yugoslavia
could establish economic contacts with the U.S.S.R.
on the order of those of Czechoslovakia. On August 1 the
Conference recommended a more complete agreement between
their agriculturalists and the Czechoslovak manufac-
turers,68
but any such attempt would be certain to encounter
the hostility of the powerful Agrarian Party within Czecho-
slovakia.69
Although much could -be accomplished by longtermed
bilateral commercial treaties, the .states concerned
doubted whether the concessions that would be required
65 Narodnf Listy, Lidovi Noviny, June 26, 1930; Svornost, June 25July
2, 1930.
ss Cf. Ceski SlO'UO, Narodni Politika, Narodnf Listy, July 21-22, 1930.
6T Cf. Crane, ~p. cit., p. 158.
68 Cj. ibid., p. ISS.
69 Cf. Svornost, August 2, 1930.
THE DEPRESSION 321
might not be greater than the benefits that would be
received.To
The Conference of Warsaw, which met on August 28,
1930, was attended by representatives from Poland, Estonia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,
and by observers from Finland and from the League.
There were signed a whole series of inte~ational agreements
between the agricultural and industrial states, as well
as agreements based upon ·collaboration between states economically
similar.u The Conference decided to advocate
the formation of an economic United States of Europe based
upon mutual preferential tariffs on agricultural products.
It recommended an immediate abolition of export bounties
and of discriminations that tended towards indirect protection.
However, the objections of overseas states, coupled
with the unwillingness of the industrial states to grant concessions
to the agricultural states, precluded the possibility
of creating a successful economic combine that might have
any pretensions of being continental in scope.72
Perhaps the chief problem of the Little Entente in 1930
was the fact that its members were at odds economically,
although in accord politically. The conflict of economic interests
had been demonstrated by the fact that, before 1930~
Czechoslovakia had had no tariff treaties with either of her
diplomatic partners. To the inherent difficulty of creating
an economic unit of industrial yet semi-agricultural Czechoslovakia
and of predominantly agricultural yet industrially
ambitious Rumania and Yugoslavia, must be added the fact
that the exigencies of the geographical position of the states
of the Little Entente would demand the inclusion of Austria
and Hungary as well in any really efficient economic blocTO
Crane, op. cit., p. 162; cf. also, Prager Presse, August 13, 1930.
n For text, cf. L'Europe nouvelle, September 13, 1930.
u Cf. Crane, op. cit., pp. 159-16o.
322 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
a combination apparently impossible for nationalistic and
political reasons.73
The spring of 1931 witnessed fresh rumors of the imminent
dissolution of the Little Entente. The visit of Prince
Nicholas of Rumania to Budapest early in April gave rise
to reports that he had been sent there by his brother, King
Carol II, for the purpose of sounding Hungary on the possibility
of a union of the crowns of Hungary and Rumania
under Carol, in which event Nicholas would become Governor
of Transylvania.74
The visit of Nicholas was merely
the occasion for one of many rumors that Carol was considering
the withdrawal of Rumania from the Little Entente
and that he would carry his country from the French to the
Italian camp.711
On the other hand, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
cemented still more firmly their existing friendship
by a new commercial treaty signed on March 30, 1931.76
Benes won his point to have the regular 1931 conference
of the Little Entente held at Bucharest early in May, before
the May meeting of the League Council, in order to ascertain
the views of the three states regarding the proposed AustroGerman
Customs Union.77
He was surprised to receive
from Rumania an evasive answer as to her viewpoint on the
question, for fear lest the discussions might give rise to
economic questions delicate to the susceptibilities of the members
of the Little Entente! The new Rumanian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ghika, went on to state that, in view of the
recent cabinet crisis, Rumania had not been able to come to
a definite viewpoint on the question.78
u Cf. Hanc, ]., "0 Stredoevropsk~ hospodarske dorozumeru ", ZahraniCn'
Politika, 1932, pt. i, pp. Io8-n8.
74 Svornost, April 10, 1931. 75 Cf. ibid., June 9, 1930.
76 Trealy Series, vol. cxxv, pp. 273-335·
77 Cf. Svornost, May I, 1931.
-ra Ceske Slovo, April 30, 1931.
THE DEPRESSION 323
The Conference of Bucharest, which was held in the
utmost ·secrecy behind closed doors, confronted the Little
Entente with the greatest internal crisis it had ever faced.
At the end of the first day's proceedings, May 3, 1931, it
was announced that the object of the Conference was the
winning over of Hungary to the Little Entente in an effort
to prevent the accession of Hungary to the Austro-German
Customs Union, an event which it was feared would have
spelled complete German hegemony over Central Europe.
To avert such a calamity, the Little Entente proposed to
Hungary considerable reductions in tariff rates to permit the
importation of Hungarian wheat into the states of the Little
Entente, a cooperative pooling of Hungarian, Rumanian and
Yugoslav wheat, and a uniform system of credits for farmers.
Desperate as was deemed the situation of the Little
Entente, further reports of the offering of full membership
in the organization to Hungary were discredited-the Little
Entente was fundamentally a defensive alliance against Hungary
and would lose its raison d'etre by such a step. Baffiing
indeed was the secrecy of the Conference and the refusai of
admission to reporters.'le
After the final session of May 6, 1931, definite statements
were issued: there had been passed resolutions of hostility
to the Austro-German Customs Union and others urging
Czechoslovakia to forego the collection of duties on
Rumanian and Yugoslav agricultural products in return for
preferential duties on Czechoslovak manufactures.80
In
spite of the secrecy surrounding the Conference, it may be
assumed that a great clash of interests took place between
Czechoslovakia on the one hand and her two partners on the
other, a conflict from which the former emerged victorious,
'18 Ceske Slovo, The New York Times, May 4. 1931; Svornost, May
5, I9JI.
se The New York Times, May 6, 1931.
324 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1985
and in which political considerations triumphed over economic
ones. The alignment of Yugoslavia and Rumania
against Czechoslovakia was revealed by the meeting at
Temesvar, of Kings Alexander and Carol, during the crisis
of the Conference, a meeting which caused anxiety in both
Czechoslovakia and France, which was supporting her
against her two partners.81
·
Czechoslovakia, predominantly industrial, had interests
diametrically opposed to those of Rumania and Yugoslavia;
for instance, she had a well-developed agricultural system as
a result of which she could not consume more than a small
part of the agricultural exports of her two partners.82
In
the search of the latter for other markets, the large and
hungry population of Germany appeared the most promising.
The two agricultural members of the Little Entente felt the
need of protecting themselves against becoming the dumping
ground for Czechoslovak manufactured goods. The projected
Austro-German Customs Union, the bugbear of
Czechoslovakia and France, was no menace to Rumania and
Yugoslavia; if anything, they welcomed it as a step in the
abolition of tariff barriers against their agricultural products
-with such a Union, trade would flow both ways and under
conditions more advantageous to them than would trade with
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, both of which had a
relatively lesser need for agricultural products. Rumania
and Yugoslavia had little fear of the results, even if the
Austro-German Customs Union were the first step to Anschluss.
Their strength and geographical position were such
that they deemed that the economic advantages far outweighed
any remote political dangers that might result.
n Ceski Slovo, Le Temps, May 4, 1931; Svornost, May 5, 1931.
82 Cf. Svornost, January 24. 1932, for the influence of the Czechoslovak
Agrarian Party upon Benes' negotiations.
THE DEPRESSION
It was a great tribute to the influence of Czechoslovakia
and of Benes personally that Rumania and Yugoslavia were
induced to continue the policy of preserving the status quo
economically as well as politically. The important part
played in Czechoslovakia's diplomatic triumph by unstinted
French support could hardly be overestimated, and was
appreciated accordingly by the recipient, in spite of the realization
that France had an equally vital interest in the preservation
of the Little Entente. The crisis served to show the
interdependence of international politics and economics.
Rumania and Yugoslavia were subjected to a cruel choice--
in the crisis they preferred to preserve the friendships and
policies of the War, which were of unquestioned value even
if they were not entirely an unmixed blessing, rather than
adopt the untried road which might lead to possibly greater
economic advantages with perhaps attending perils.8
~
Czechoslovakia did her utmost to minimize the points of
divergence with her partners, hence the policy of secrecy.
At the close of the Conference of Bucharest, Ghika asserted
anew the absolute solidarity of the Little Entente.84
It had
weathered successfully the most severe crisis in its history;
as long as the same enlightened policy of mutual tolerance
and understanding would guide its statesmen, it promised to
continue " sitting on the lid " and preventing any alteration
of the status quo. However, nothing could last forever an~
amid the increasingly insistent attempts of discontented states
to revise the Peace Treaties, it became more and more open
to question how long such a p<)licy could be maintained.
sa For a comprehensive account of both the domestic and the foreign
problems of the Little Entente, cf. Malynski, E., Les Probtemes de fesf
et la Petite Entetllte (Paris, 1931).
s• Ceskl Slovo, May 5, 1931; Svornost, May 6, 1931.
326 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Hunga:rian Revisionism
Hungary continued to make renewed atte~pts to alter the
status quo. Since Hungarian resentment might be considered
practically permanent, there remained the question of
the tactics that Czechoslovakia should use to counteract Hungarian
agitation. For many years it had been rumored that
Masaryk and Benes had held widely divergent viewpoints
regarding the attitude Czechoslovakia should adopt towards
attempts to revise the Treaty of Trianon. In the belief that
Czechoslovakia could not continue to resist indefinitely hostile
pressure from both Germany and Hungary, Masaryk allegedly
had, in recent years, asserted repeatedly in public his
willingness to negotiate with Hungary the question of a
boundary revision, whereas Benes did not believe in yielding
a square inch of soil to Hungary. The Czechoslovak
Chamber of Deputies went on record as opposed to any
revision.85
On October 8, 1929, it was rumored that President
Masaryk was willing to negotiate with Hungary for all territory
granted to Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Trianon,
and, except for Bratislava, to return all regions in which the
Hungarian population totalled fifty per cent or more.86
Benes officially denied the authenticity of Masaryk's offer,
but political opponents remained sceptical.87
For about a
year nothing more was heard of th~ matter, but in the fall of
1930 the question was revived. The Vienna Neue Freie
Presse stated that one of its reporters had been granted an
interview by Masaryk wherein the President had stated his
sG Zprlwy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 1g8 meeting, May 23, 1929, pp.
31-33, 8 session.
sa The New York Times, Ceske Slovo, Prager Presse, October 8, 1929;
Svornost, October 9. 1929.
sr The New York Times, Ceske Slovo, November 17, 1929; Svornost,
November 18, 1929.
THE DEPRESSION
willingness to negotiate modifications of the existing frontier
with Hungary if the latter would abandon its traditionally
hostile attitude towards Czechoslovakia.88
Again there
came official denials to the effect that the President had
not granted any such interview, that he realized that a
problem of such magnitude could not be decided by Czechoslovakia
alone without consulting both the_ Big and Little
Ententes, and that he had no intention of arousing the
question of an entire revision of the Peace Treaties.811
Great
indeed was the agitation within Czechoslovakia and widespread
the protest against any concession to the traditional
foe. Pronouncements of Hungarian revisionists to the
effect that a plebiscite in Slovakia would result in union with
Hungary were given the lie by Father Andrew Hlinka, the
political leader of the Slovaks and their spokesman in the
Chamber of Deputies, when he stated that the Slovaks would
never consent to any voluntary revision of the boundary, but
would rise to the defense of their existing frontiers whenever
the need might arise.110
Thus ended, for the time being at
least, any talk of revising the frontiers of Slovakia.
On September 28, 1930, the Czechoslovak government
proclaimed its intention to begin the construction of a navy.111
The keel of the first patrol boat, the " Masaryk ", was laid at
Komamo on October 15, 1930.82
Another question that disturbed the quiet of Czechoslovakia,
as well as that of the other members of the Little
Entente, was the constantly haunting menace of the restoration
of a Habsburg to the throne of Hungary. After the
exile and death of Emperor Charles in 1922, his eldest son,
ss Neue Freie Presse, September 28, 1930.
811 Narodm Listy, October 1-2, 1930; Svornost, October 3 and 16, 1930.
110 Prager Presse, December 8, 1930; Svornost, December g, 1930.
111 Ceskl Slovo, September 28, 1930.
es Ibid., October IS, 1930.
328 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Otto, had been recognized as " King " by the Hungarian
legitimists. Otto, a boy of ten: at the time, was brought up
in exile by his mother, Zita, to regard himself as the true
ruler of Hungary. Although forced by poverty to accept the
hospitality of King Alfonso and of various noblemen in
Spain and later in Belgium, he nevertheless continued to
greet regularly delegations of Magyars and to indicate in
every possible way his dissatisfaction with the existing condition
of affairs. Since I922, ex-Empress Zita had left little
undone that might hasten a Habsburg restoration, and had
increased her activities as Otto grew older, to the increasing
uneasiness of the states of the Little Entente. A sigh of
relief went up in Czechoslovakia when November 20, I930,
the date of Otto's eighteenth birthday and of his majority,
passed without action.93
Nevertheless, the so-called "King
Question " still remained unsolved and continued to be regarded
by Hungary as an open wound. Zita and Otto continued
their quest for foreign support. Benes stated that the
position of Czechoslovakia remained unaltered, and that a
restoration of the Habsburgs would mean war.94
The Czechoslovak-Hungarian commercial treaty of I927,
which expired on December IS, I930, again had the effect
of leaving the commercial relations between the two states
without any treaty basis. The cause of the difficulty had
been Czechoslovakia's dissatisfaction with certain of the
tariff provisions of the treaty. As,.early as April 30, I9JO,
she had requested Hungary to revise these·certain items 95
·
and, when no satisfaction was forthcoming, on June IS,
I930, she denounced the treaty,96
which was to expire six
98 Ibid., Narodn£ List;v, Prager Presse, Svornost, November 20, 1930.
94 Ceske Slovo, July 3, 1930; Svornost, July 4. 1930.
95 Narodni List;v, April 30, 1930.
oa Sbirka zakonu a na.N.sem statu ceskoslovenskiho, roenik 1930, castka
83 ze dne 13 prosince, Cis. 177.
THE DEPRESSION
months later. At once a tariff war broke out; from the
date of the expiration of the treaty, both countries proceeded
to levy on the goods of the other duties far higher than those
in effect during the validity of the recent treaty. Hungary
suffered particularly from the Czechoslovak .boycott on
wheat. Late in December, 1930, a delegation of Hungarian
business men visited Praha in the hope of ~ving the situation
by some compromise,97
but, owing primarily to the opposition
of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, no agreement
could be reached.118
Hungary replied to Czechoslovak restrictions
on agricultural products by decreeing that henceforth,
except by special permission, certain manufactured
goods, including shoes, textiles and woolens, could not be
imported from countries with which Hungary had no. trade
agreements.99
Thus the tariff war raged on. Its immediate
result was closer economic ties between Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia, whereas Hungary turned to Germany,
Austria and Italy.1
G
0
Another evidence of the depth of hostility between Czechoslovakia
and Hungary was the verbal clash between Benes
and Premier Bethlen of Hungary. BeneS had granted ·an
interview to a reporter of the Paris Midi in which he had
made statements which Bethlen had deemed unwarranted
interference in the internal affairs of Hungary.1
G
1
In selfdefense
Bend replied that he asked nothing better than ecollf
Prager Presse, December 17, 1930.
eszprrwy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 96 meeting, December 16, 1930,
p. 42, 3 session.
119 Narodni Listy, December 26, 1930.
100 C/. Svornost, January 31, 1931. Commercial relations between
Czechoslovakia and Hungary had no treaty basis until June 4, 1934. but
the agreement of that date was changed several times during 1934 and
1935. For full details, cf. Chmelar, J., "Ceskoslovenska zahranicni
politika v roce 1935 ", Zahranilni Politika, vol. xv, p. 679.
101 Cf. The New York Times, February 15, 1931.
330 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
nomic and political cooperation with Hungary. He considered
Bethlen's violent attack nothing more than propaganda
against his, Benes', comparison of the treatinent of the respective
minorities by Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a
comparison unfavorable to the former.102
He ignored
completely Bethlen's personal remarks. As usual, the
Czechoslovak press took up the issue. From the protest of
February 21, 1931, of Ghiczy, the Hungarian Minister to
Praha,103
it appeared that the comments of the Pravo Lidu
were the most irritating, but again, as in the case of earlier
protests of Italy which will be considered shortly, Czechoslovakia
refused to place any restrictions upon the freedom of
the press.104
Czechoslovakia's relations with Hungary remained
far more embittered than those with any other
country.
Italo-Czechoslovak Friction
Since the so-called "Rothermere incident" of 1927-28,105
Czechoslovak public opinion continued to associate Italy with
Hungarian attempts to revise the Peace Treaties. After
this outburst, there ensued a period of two years of silent
resentment of Italian foreign policy on the part of Czechoslovakia,
until the year 1930 witnessed a series of new crises.
Italian foreign policy appeared tortuous, opportunistic and
hard to understand. Its apparent contradictions might be
best explained perhaps by the fact,.that Italy desired to preserve
the status quo in regard to her gains during the War,
and yet sought to revise those portions of the post-war
settlement which had failed to bring her the rewards to which
she felt herself entitled. Unsatisfied colonially, and playing
l.oa Ceske SlOflO, February 15, 1931 ; Svornost, March I, 1931.
1os Ceskl SlOflO, February 21, 1931.
'104 Ibid., February 23, 1931; Svornost, February 24, 1931.
105 Cf. Le Temps, March 30, 1928, for Mussolini's speech on the necessity
for a revision of the Peace Treaties; also supra, pp. 267-269.
THE DEPRESSION 331
a losing game against-France and the Little Entente for preponderance
in Central Europe, Italy, to avoid isolation, felt
that any future improvement in her international status
might well depend upon the success with which she could
hold the balance of power between the victor and the vanquished
states -of the World War. Thus, Italy sought tc
revive the game that she had played so successfully before the
War--of having one foot in each camp.108
The April visit of Premier Bethlen of Hungary to Rome
aroused the apprehensions of all the members of the Little
Entente, particularly when it was reported that Mussolini
had promised to second Hungarian attempts to revise the
Treaty of Trianon.107
In June it was rumored in Praha
that Otto would ascend the Hungarian throne in the fall,
primarily through the assistance of Italy, which would confront
France and the Little Entente with the fait accompli.1118
September, 1930, witnessed a severe Italo-Czechoslovak
cns1s. On June 6, 1930, there circulated throughout Yugoslavia
reports of the summary execution of several Yugoslavs,
charged with high treason, by a Fascist tribunal at
Trieste. The report filtered through in spite of strict censorship.1011
Without exception, Czechoslovak newspapers
condemned the bloody deed, calling attention to the possibility
of a world-wide conflagration as the result. Czechoslovak
public opinion was incited still further by Italian concern
for defenseless Hungary, whose capital, Budapest, lay
within range of Czechoslovak guns from across the
frontier.110
100 Cf. Simonds, op. cil., pp. 212-213.
"lOT Swmost, April 20-21, 1930; Narodnl Lisry, April 20, 1930.
lOll Provo Lidu, June 22, 1930; Swmost, June 23, 1930.
"lOG Svomost, June 8, 1930.
uo Ibid., September 10, 1930; Narodn£ Listy, August 21, 1930.
332 FOREiGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
On September 10, 1930, Kramar, the leader of the
National Democrats, openly called the executions at Trieste
barbarous,111
a statement echoed throughotit the Czechoslovak
press. The next day, Signor Pedrazzi, Italian Minister
to Praha, protested to Dr. Krofta, acting for Benes
while the latter was at Geneva, against the hostile tone of
the Czechoslovak press, but received the ariswer that the
Czechoslovak press was independent and enjoyed freedom
of expression, hence the government regretted that it could
do nothing about the matter.1121
Czechoslovak anger grew
apace at the outrage to a Slav minority.118
The Pravo Lidu,
as usual the most radical, led the way, followed by the Geske
Slovo, in demanding in the name of Slavdom a cessation of
Mussolini's interference in the internal affairs of other states
-that it was high time he understood that his sovereignty
did not extend to Czechoslovakia.114
On the same day a
mass meeting at Praha ended in a march to the Italian Legation,
the windows of which were broken by stones.1111
A
committee was organized to boycott Italy and Italian goods
as a further protest.116
Dr. K. Viskovsky, Czechoslovak
Minister of National Defense, pledged Yugoslavia military
assistance in the event of an emergency.117
The Czechoslovak
Legion, composed of war veterans, pledged similarly
their loyalty to Yugoslavia.118
Czechoslovak and Yugoslav
Sokols, protesting in union against the Trieste executions,
,.
111 Narodni Listy, September IO, 1930; Svornost, September II, 1930.
ua The New York Times, Narodnt Listy, September II, 1930; Svornost.
September 12, I930.
na Cf. The New York Times, September 12, 1930.
1u Pravo Lidu, Ceski Slovo, September 13, 1930; Swrnost, September
14, 1930.
1111 The New York Times, September 13, 1930.
ns Ibid., September 17, 1930; Swrnost, September :zo, 1930.
11'1 Svornost, September 20, 1930; Ceski Slovo, September 19, 1930·
118 Ceskl Slovo, September 23, 1930; Svornost, September 24. 1930·
THE DEPRESSION 333
drew in response heated Italian criticism of their interference.1111
Another Italian protest against the sentiments of
the Czechoslovak press, this time by Signor Francesco Palmieri,
Italian Consul at Bratislava, had an effect entirely
opposite to what had been intended.120
.
Mussolini aroused apprehensions throughout Europe by a
provocative· speech of October 27, 1930, wherein he called
attention to the future of Italy and of Fascism.121
Abroad,
his utterances were considered more cynically brutal than any
of Bismarck's; the chorus of disapproval resounded from
London, Paris, Berlin and Praha.122
The statement that a
general revision of the Peace Treaties would be to the interest
of all Europe and would tend to prevent war was subjected to
particular criticism.128
Early in 193I there took place the celebrated flight of the
Italian air squadron to Brazil. After the official report of
the flight had been published, it was discovered that, among
the casualties, were some Hungarians, who had come to
Italy to be trained in aviation. At once the Pravo Lidu
called attention to the fact that Italy was conniving in Hungarian
evasion of the Peace Treaties by training Hungarian
officers in Italy.124
Signor Pedrazzi again protested to
Bene5, who expressed his regret about the article in the
Pravo Lidu, but no steps were taken to prevent the paper
from publishing further anti-Italian articles.U11
:uo Corriere della Sera, September 24, 1930; Svornost, September 25,
1930.
120 Pravo Lidu, Lidove Noviny, Narodnl Listy, Ceske Slovo, September
10, 1930; Svornost, September 28, 1930.
121 Corriere della se,.a, October 27. I9JO.
1n The Times, Le Tem;s, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Narodn£ Listy,
October 28, 1930; Svornost, October 29, 1930.
u.a Cf. The New York Times, November 2, 1930.
124 Pr6vo Lidu, February 18, 1931.
1211 The New York Times, February 19. 1931; Svornost, February 20.
19Jl.
334 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
The U.S.S.R. and Poland
Czechoslovakia's neighbors to the East sought to allay
rather than to enhance the friction that existed within Central
Europe. Hand in hand with closer economic contacts,
there became marked also between the U.S.S.R. and
Czechoslovakia a steady diminution of political friction.
The former had long abandoned any hopes. of successful
interference in the internal affairs of the latter. The once
formidable Communist Party within Czechoslovakia, which
had been founded in 1921 by Czechoslovak radicals, dwindled
and was tom by internal dissensions,126
until on August 14,
1930, its members agreed to merge by September 1, 1930,
with the Social Democratic Party.1
n Although revived
later, it no longer represented a threat to the stability of the
Republic.
The question of de jure recognition of the Soviet Union
received renewed impetus during the summer of 1931 through
the active efforts of Czechoslovak manufacturers, who insisted
that such recognition of Russia was a vital necessity
to the recently improved business relations between the two
states and more important to the welfare of the Republic
than any purely political considerations. Within Czechoslovakia,
the Socialists were favorably inclined, but the
National Democrats, led by Kramcii·, were as always bitterly
opposed to the move. On September 3, 1931, Jan Seba,
former Czechoslovak Minister to Belgrade. and at the time
a member of the Czechoslovak parliament and an intimate
friend of Benes, admitted that he was conducting, at Moscow,
negotiations for de jure recognition.128
Despite the infer-
126 Svornost, April 13, 19, 1929.
1a1 Ibid., August 15, 1930. Cf. also, Reimann, P., Dejiny komunistickl
strany leskoslovenske (Praha, 193<1), for a detailed account of the history
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
12a Narodnt Listy, Ceske Slovo, Svornost, September 3, 1931.
THE DEPRESSION 335
ence of Fischer that_ Benes, since 1929, might be using
Kramar's opposition as a mere excuse for withholding de
jure recognition,129
no evidence had been produced that
Bene5 had not been sincere on every occasion that he
had advocated Soviet recognition. In 1931, the opposition
within Czechoslovakia was still so strong that there existed
little chance for a successful outcome of any Soviet negotiations
that were not strictly economic in nature.1119
Nevertheless,
the initialing of the treaty of friendship and nonaggression
between France and the U.S.S.R.181
had a marked
effect upon Czechoslovak public opinion, which hoped for
similar agreements between the Soviet Union and Poland
and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. It created within
the Republic a sentiment more favorable to recognition than
ever before, a steadily growing conviction that de jure
recognition of the Soviet government on the part of Czechoslovakia
was merely a question of time and circumstances.1
u
The outlook on Czechoslovakia's eastern horizon appeared
still more favorable as a result of Poland's conciliatory attitude.
Poland, which had already, on January 15, 1931,
concluded with Rumania a five-year treaty of mutual guarantee,138
renewed again, for three more years, the secret treaty
of military alliance with France which had been drawn up
during June, 1922, for ten years.184
Still feeling insecure,
1219 C/. Fischer, o~. cit., vol. ii, p. 507.
uo Cf. Chmelai', ]., "Ceskoslovenski zahranicni politika v roce 1931 ",
Zah,.anilnl Politika, voL x~ pt. i, pp. 101-107.
181. The Times, The New Yo,.k Times, August 20, 1931. The treaty
was signed November 29. 1932. Cf. Nouveau ,.ecueil, iii serie, vol. xxix,
pp. 28 ef seq.
1a2 Narodm Politika, Ceske Slovo, August 20, 1931; Svornost, August
21, 1931; cf. also, Fierlinger, Z., Sovietske Rusko fiG nove d,.d:Je (Praha,
1932).
1aa T,.eat:p Series, vol. cxv, pp. 171-175.
1a•Le Tem~s, May 19, 1932; Svomost, May 20, 1932.
336 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Poland, despite the almost frantic objections of Rumania,
signed, on July 25, 1932, in Moscow, with the Soviet Union,
a non-aggression pact with regard to which the two countries
had been negotiating since January.185
The only satisfaction
that Rumania could secure was a promise that Poland would
withhold ratification of the treaty until Rumania would bring
to a satisfactory termination her own dispute with Moscow
over Bessarabia.136
During the summer and early fall of
1932 Poland sought to cultivate also warmer friendship
with Czechoslovakia, a campaign which perhaps reached its
climax early in October when Czechoslovak public opinion
reacted favorably to a much publicized statement attributed
to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zaleski, that the
preservation of peace and the maintenance of a balance of
power in Central Europe were dependent upon the cooperation
of Poland and Czechoslovakia.1M
Revisionism vs. the Status Quo
It appeared that Europe was again threatened with a division
into two armed camps over the question of the Peace
Treaties: into a revisionist bloc which included Germany,
Italy, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, and into an antirevisionist
bloc composed of France, Belgium, the Little
Entente, Poland, and possibly Great Britain/88
an alignment
which had been predicted several years in advance by Viscount
D'Abernon, the British Ambassador to Germany.1311
France, which continued to uphold the principle of the inviolability
of the Peace Treaties, met the challenge subtly
185 C/. Izvestia, Gazeta Warszowska, January 30, 1932; Svorno.st,
January 31, 1932.
nssvorno.st, July 25-26, 1932; Gazeta Warszawska, July 24-25, 1932.
nT Narodnl Listy, October 1, 6, 1932; Svornost, October 13, 28, 1932·
1ss C/. De Balla, V., The New Balance of Power in EuroPe (Baltimore,
I9J2).
n11 D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. ii, p. to8.
THE DEPRESSION 337
in 1931; by means of granting foreign loans judiciously
and by exerting thereby political pressure upon the recipients
of her favors, she not only strengthened greatly her own
bloc, but hoped to disrupt, eventually, the opposing alignment.
The first of these so-called political loans was made
on March 10, 1931, $42,000,000 to Rumania. By means
of two agreements of March 30 ~nd April 17, France
loaned Poland $4o,ooo,ooo,_most of which was to be spent
for the construction, by French engineers, of a railroad connecting
the coal fields of Upper Silesia with Gdynia, Poland's
only seaport. On April 23, the day of Bene5' denunciation
of the Austro-German Customs Union, Czechoslovakia was
granted a loan of $so,ooo,ooo to help liquidate frozen
assets. On May 8, Yugoslavia was loaned $42,000,000 for
public works and for the stabilization of her finances. After
protracted negotiations, the last of this particular series of
loans was made in August, $25,000,000 to Hungary,140
in
return for control of Hungarian finances, a lease on Hungarian
railroads, and a Hungarian promise to renounce revisionism,
an act which may have had some influence in
inducing the latter to adopt a reserved attitude towards the
proposed Austro-German Customs Union.141
In spite of the loan from France, Czechoslovakia's finances
remained in a strained situation. Her foreign trade greatly
declined between 1930 and 1932.142
The depression was
caused by several factors. The civil war in China and the
uo Cf. The New York Times, September 13, 1931, for article by R. L.
Buell, " The Weight of France's Gold on the Scales of Diplomacy";
Toynbee, op. cit., 1932, p. 36; Roueek, op. cit., p. 146; Langsam, op. cit..
p. 2o8.
1n Cf. The New York Times, April 17, I9JI.
'lU For the years 'I9JO, I9JII and 1932, respectively, Czechoslovakia's
imports amounted to I5,7IS,OOO, u,Sox,ooo and 8.tss,ooo crowns, respectively;
her exports, 17,474.000, 13,149.000 and 7,399.000 crowns, respectively.
Cf. Publications, Economic and Financial, 1933. ii A 7, p. 165.
338 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1985
series of bankruptcies in various South American states had
crippled Czechoslovakia's textile exports, the decline of the
pound sterling had affected adversely the eiport of glassware,
porcelain, gloves, and other small manufactured articles
and, worst of all, about twenty-five per cent of Czechoslovakia's
foreign trade had been conducted with her immediate
neighbors, Germany, Austria, Poland and Hungary, states
which were on the verge of bankruptcy. In these states,
Czechoslovak merchants had granted extensive credits which
had become frozen assets, owing to moratoria and other
factors. During the several years in question, the Republic
had also made considerable payments on its foreign debts.ua
Hence, negotiations were opened for a second loan. When
Dr. V. PospiSil, Governor of the Czechoslovak National
Bank, sounded France in December, 1931, the terms were so
severe that he declined even to consider them. They were
not made puJ?lic, but were resented by Czechoslovakia, whose
financial distress was but temporary and owing to a lack of
liquidity rather than to excessive deficits.144
However, the
negotiations were continued. On January 22, 1932, an
agreement for a new French loan of one billion Czechoslovak
crowns (about $3o,ooo,ooo) was approved by the Czechoslovak
government,145
and signed by Osusky, the Czechoslovak
Minister to Paris, and by Flandin, at the time the
French Minister of Finance, but, again the specific terms
were not made public.146
It might be safely inferred that
the new loan, which was considered the culmination of the
148 Cf. Stdtni zaverelnj sUet republiky leskoslovenske za rok 1930,
pp. 286-289; 1931, pp. 312-3•13; 1932, pp. 330-331; 1933, pp. 332-333·
UA Svornost, January 22, 1932.
u5 Zpravy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 165 meeting, January 22, 1932,
pp. 3-6, 5 session.
ue Narodni Listy, January 21, 25, 1932.
THE DEPRESSION 339
French system of political loans, bound Czechoslovakia more
closely to France than before.147
Another of these so-called political loans was granted by
France to Austria, $14,000,000 on December 29, 1932.
Voted in the French Chamber of Deputies 325. to 188, and
in the French Senate 144 to 68, this loan to an enemy state
two weeks after France defaulted ori $19,000,000 of war
debts due to the United States was an act which even Flandin
characterized as " monstrous , •148
Benes' project for an economic Danubian Confederation
comprising, as a nucleus, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary,
a project which as late as January 6, 1932, was reported
abandoned by France because of the opposition of Germany
and Italy/411
was revived during March, and embodied in the
so-called Tardieu plan for a Danubian Confederation of
Austria, Hungary and the Little Entente. In general,
Czechoslovak public opinion was favorable. The N arodnz
Listy desired that the bloc be truly a new Confederation and
not merely a resurrection of the Dual Monarchy/50
whereas
the Ceske Slovo recommended that the plan be studied first
by economic experts, then by the various Czechoslovak political
parties, and finally by the May conference of the Little
Entente.151
In an expose of March 25, 1932, Benes approved
the project in the hope of improving Central Europe's economic
status, but felt that the united support of the Great
Powers would be essential for its success.152
On the same
day France secured the approval of Great Britain for the
147 Cf. SvontJOst, January 26, 1932.
148 Le Temps, December 29, 1932.
1.ae The New York Times, January 6, 1932.
1~ Narodnf Listy, March I'I, 1932.
151 Ceske Slovo, March u, 1932.
152 Ibid., Narodnl Listy, March 25, 1932; Svornost, March 26, 1932.
340 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-19!15
plan.1118
On April 6 a four-Power conference of France,
Great Britain, Germany and Italy met at London in an attempt
to prevent the economic collapse of Central Europe.
Britain and France recommended that the five states in the
projected Confederation lower their tariffs against one
another by ten per cent, that they abolish all other agencies
that hindered trade, that other states renounce most-favorednation
clauses in treaties with the states of the bloc, that
$4o,ooo,ooo be loaned to the states in the bloc, and that the
agricultural produce of these five states be given a unilateral
preference by all other countries. Germany and Italy remained
unalterably opposed to the plan, on the ground that
their own exclusion would complicate unnecessarily their
existing economic difficulties without affording sufficient
relief to the five small beneficiaries.1
" As a result, the
London Conference collapsed within two days, and with it
went all hopes for the success of the Tardieu plan.1115
In
vain did Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia accept the
Tardieu plan in principle/58
and in vain did Hungary support
the Little Entente against Germany, Italy and Austria.m
The regular Conference of the Little Entente was held at
Belgrade, May 13-15, 1932, with the Foreign Ministers of
Poland (Zaleski) and of Greece (Michalakopoulos) present
as observers. The chief significance of the meeting was a
pronouncement against supernationalism as expressed in the
tendency for each state to adopt' its own selfish economic
policy: as the best antidote, the five-Power Danubian Confederation
was again recommended temporarily, until a more
t53 Le Temps, March 25, 1932; cf. also, Chmelar, J., "Tardieuuv plan
stfedoevropske spoluprace ", Zahranicni Politika, vol. xi, pt. i, pp. t85-191.
tM The Times, The New York Times, April 6-9. 1932.
ns Narodnt List~. April t•t, I9J2.
ue The New York Times, April 20, 1932.
15T Ibid., April :u, 1932·
THE DEPRESSION 341
extensive agreement could be reached1118
This recommendation
was denounced by Premier Bethlen of Hungary, who
had apparently been converted to a viewpoint that the best
interests of his country lay in the continuation of a policy
of revisionism/59
and by both Italy and Germany.180
Reparations and Debts
The problem of Central European reparations, which had
been for a decade one of the bitterest of controversies, had
arisen again in 1929. The Succession States had been complaining
that the League had been so interested in the problem
of German reparations that it had neglected to pay adequate
attention to problems of a similar nature in Central
Europe. The supposedly final settlement 181
of the question
of German reparations renewed the desire of the Succession
States for an equally definite solution of their corresponding
problems, hence Bene5' activity in the interim. Benes became
the spokesman for all the Succession States when he urged
the Little Entente to adopt a unified attitude regarding the
question. He went on to state his opinion that all the states
of Central Europe would be wise if they associated their
respective financial and political problems with the issue of
German reparations and with the Young Plan.182
At the
Little Entente Conference of Belgrade of May 20-21,
1929,168
the three partners came to an agreement, in which
158 Ibid., May 15-16, 1932.
1511 Ibid., May 23, 1932. 180 Ibid., June 12, 1932.
1111 The Young Plan for German reparations, after being threshed over
by a committee of experts at Paris from February, 1929, to June 7,
1929. stated the definite amount that Germany would be compelled to pay.
The plan was also referred, for final approval, to a conference of governments,
to meet at the Hague on August 6. Cf. Til# Times, Le TemPs,
June 6, 1929.
1ell Ceske Slow, May 15, 1929; Svomost, May 16, 1929.
188 Cf. supra, pp. 294-2¢.
342 FOREJGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
they were joined later by Poland and Greece, that they would
withhold their approval of the Young Plan and of the reduction
of German reparations until after their own reparations
problems with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria had also been
solved. The five states formed a bloc that acted as a unit
at the Hague Conference in August, 1929, and at the second
session in January, 1930, until its essential demands had been
conceded. The same stand was taken at the Paris Conference
on non-German reparations during September-November,
1929.164
The agreements signed at the Hague Conference on January
20, 1930, represented one of the most important events
in post-war Europe since the Peace Treaties. Austrian reparations
to Poland and Czechoslovakia (Article 177 of the
Treaty of .St. Germain) were abrogated. Czechoslovakia
objected to being burdened by the Powers with a debt of
approximately $15o,ooo,ooo for" Costs of Liberation" until
Hungarian reparations were fixed at a figure which she
approved. All in all, the " Costs of Liberation " for the
Succession States totalled approximately $2,ooo,ooo,ooo.
The thorny problem was not direct reparations, but the claims
which arose for former crown properties of Austria-Hungary
and for the estates which were being broken up as the
result of the new policies of agrarian reform which the states
of the Little Entente were enforcing. Italy cooperated with
the Little Entente in the adoption of a compromise, the
"Brocchi Plan", for Hungary, whereby there were created
two separate funds: fund A, about $4s,ooo,ooo, for land
claims, and fund B, about $2o,ooo,ooo, for the claims of the
Habsburgs, of churches, of railroads, and of industrialists.
The operating capital for these funds was to be raised, until
1943, partially through deposits from Hungarian payments
'16t Cf. Le Temps, January 24, 1930. for the declaration of Mironescu
regarding the intimate collaboration of the states of the Little Entente.
THE DEPRESSION 343
made by Great Britain, France and Italy, but, from 1943 to
19<}6, entirely by deposits of the states of the Little Entente
from Hungarian payments which :would accrue to their benefit.
The Mixed Tribunals (Hungarian-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Rumanian
and Hungarian-Yugoslav) might exercise
merely juridical functions, but could no longer be the vehicles
for financial claims directed against these three states.165
The reparations that Czechoslovakia had been expected to
contribute to the Allied fund for crown property, about
25,ooo,ooo,ooo Czechoslovak crowns, were cancelled. The
"Costs of Liberation" were cut to about one-fourth and
were to be represented by thirty-seven annual payments of
Io,ooo,ooo Reichsmarks each (a little over 8o,ooo,ooo
Czechoslovak crowns). Czechoslovakia was granted also a
share of Bulgarian and Hungarian reparations, about 25,ooo,ooo
Czechoslovak crowns.166
In addition to the sacrifices
that Czechoslovakia had made for independence, she
could point to the fact that her national pride could not permit
others to bear the entire cost of the war that had freed
her.167
The agreements reached at the second Conference
were signed at Paris by the Commission for Eastern Reparations,
composed of Bethlen, Benes, Marinkovic and Titulescu,
on March 31,.1930, and by the representatives of the
Great Powers on April 28, 1930.. They took the form of
four conventions concerning (I) the reparations agreements
between Hungary and the Creditor Powers, (2) the settlement
of land reform, (3) the settlement of Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal questions, and (4) the Powers of the Special
Funds.168
·
185 C/. Crane, op. cit., pp. 163-169.
us Cf. Agreements Concltufed al the Hague Conference, January, I9JO
(London, 1930).
tsr Cf. Krofta, K., "Haag a Pafiz ", Zahranicni Politika, vol. ix. pp.
497-soo; Chmelar, J., .. Ceskoslovenska zahranicni politika v roce 1930",
ZahraniCnf Politika, 1931, pt. i, pp. 12-19-
168 Treaty Series. vol. c:xxvii, pp. 95-101.
344 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
The settlement represented for Czechoslovakia a total liquidation
of the reparations question. She also took advantage
of her cooperation with France and Italy during the
reparations negotiations to settle her debts with them. For
the equipment and maintenance of the Czechoslovak Legions
during the war, France was to receive for fifty years an
annual payment of 1o,ooo,ooo paper francs, and Italy, for a
like period of time, an annuity of 2o,ooo,ooo Czechoslovak
crowns.189
It remained for the sequel to demonstrate how illusory
had been any hopes for a final settlement of the general question
of reparations. The post-war loans, primarily of the
United States and of Great Britain to Germany, added to the
already immense burden of reparations,· created for· Germany
in the summer of 1931 a very precarious financial situation.
In the emergency came the proposal of President
Hoover of July I, 1931, of a moratorium of one year in the
payment of reparations and all inter-governmental loans.170
It was well received in most countries with the exception of
France, which objected lest it be especially favorable to Germany,
and lest it militate against the inviolability of the
Peace Treaties and of the subsequent reparations settlement.
Nevertheless, after a struggle, France fell in line with the
other Powers to avoid isolation.171
Hoover's plan was welcomed
by the Little Entente and espl!cially by Czechoslovakia,
to which it would mean relief from the annual payment of
1 89 For Bend' two exposes of January 30 and May 20, 1930, cf. Benes,
Boj o mir, ·pp. 438-490 and 491-528; also Benes, E., Les Probtemes des
reparations et Ia liquidation de Ia guerre mondiale d Ia Haye and Vers
Ia liquidation de Ia guerre: traites de Ia Haye et de Paris, Sources et
documents tchecoslovaques, nos. 12 and 13.
no The New York Times, June 19-30, 1931.
1 71 Ibid., Le Temps, June 19-30, 1931; cf. also, Armstrong, H. F.,
"France and the Hoover Plan", Foreign Affairs, vol. x, pp. 23-33.
THE DEPRESSION 345
$3,000,000 in interest due on her debt to the United States/72
but the political situation, especially the fear of offending
France, dictated a reserved acceptance of the proposal until
France had accepted as wen.ua However, the moratorium
failed to improve the situation. .
The three states of the Little Entente desired to have
discussed further before the League the que~tions of disarmament,
war debts and German reparations.u• In this attempt,
they seconded_ the initiative of Great Britain, which
had attempted to call an economic conference at Lausanne,
Switzerland, on January 18, 1932.u5
Throughout the year,
BeneS worked on the question of world disarmament,178
but,
without much success.. The negotiations on disarmament
took him far afield in their almost labyrinthine details, not
only into every European political conflict of importance,
but even to a declaration against the activities of Japan in
China. Benes was not concerned in the intricacies of the
Manchurian situation on its own merits, but solely because
Japan's headlong course in defying the opinion of the rest
of the world had, in his estimation, contributed greatly
towards reducing the prestige and influence of the League.17
'
By the middle of the summer of 1932, France had apparently
begun to lose hope of obtaining extensive German repua
Regard-ing Czechoslovakia's debt settlement of October 13, 1925,
with the United States, cf. supra, pp. 248-249.
'1'1'8 Ceskl Slow, June 2S, July 2, IS, 1931; Ndrodnl Listy, July IS,
1931; Benes, Boj o mif', pp. 6o1-619 (speech of October 20, 1931, before
Foreign Affairs Committees of Senate and Chamber of Deputies).
l'l'ft Swrnost, February 4. 1932.
1111 The Times, December 30. 1931.
ne Cf. The New Yof'k Times, February 13, 28, March 2, July 19. 1932i
Svornost, January I, 4. February 4. 13, 14. 26, 29. March 3, 5, 16, 19.
April 24, June 15, 24. July 14. 20, 29, August '], I932· For full details,
cf. Kraus, J., Svitove od:.b,.ojini (Praha, 1'933). Cf. also, inf,.a, pp.
3.52-354·
nr Benes, Boi o mir, pp. 62o-652 (speech of March 22, 1932).
346 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
arations. At the Lausanne Conference, on July 9, 1932,
there was signed an agreement whereby the Young Plan for
German reparations, which had envisaged <1n amount of
34,000,000,000 gold marks, payable in annuities until 1988,
was scrapped and replaced by a new obligation of merely
3,ooo,ooo,ooo gold marks (about $714,6oo,ooo). Other
parts of the agreement concerned the extension of the moratorium
on inter-Allied debts, financial assistance to the distressed
states of the Danubian area, the appointment of a
commission to examine the agricultural problems of the
Danubian area, and the calling of a world economic conference
under the auspices of the League of Nations.178
Clear-cut indeed was the inference that the United States
was expected to reduce its debt claims against the former
Allies in proportion to the reductions that they had accorded
Germany.1
"
\Vhen the regular war debt payments to the United States
again became due on December IS, 1932, after the one year
interval of the Hoover moratorium, the resumption of payments
was irksome to the nations of Europe. As has already
been mentioned, France took the lead in defaulting.
Czechoslovakia, which with Poland asked the United States
on November 22, 1932/80
for a revision of her debt agreement
and for a suspension of the payment due on December
IS, 1932, paid her instalment of $I,500,000 under protest,
after the United States had decfmed her request. This
action was explained by Dr. Kamil Krofta, Under-Secretary
1T8 Anon., The Lausanne Agreement, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, no. 282; Final Act of the Lausanne Conference; cf. also,
Lippmann, W. and Scroggs, W. 0., The United States i11 World Affairs
(New York, 1933), pp. 132-153; Moulton and Pasvolsky, JVar Debts
and World Prosperity, pp. 344-366.
"l'l9 C/. Langsam, op. cit., p. 193. regarding the "gentlemen's agree~
ment •• of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium.
1so N aroam Listy, November 22, 1932.
THE DEPRESSION 347
of Foreign Affairs, as an evidence of Czechoslovakia's sincere
desire to honor all her international obligations, regardless
of the actions of other states.181
The Czechoslovak
Minister to the United States, Dr. Ferdinand Veverka, while
presenting the payment expressed the hope that the United
States would participate in an international conference for
the solution of the problem of war debtsr2
_and, on January
21, 1933, asked for a reconsideration of Czechoslovakia's
war debt by the United States}88
Another part of the Lausanne agreement, the promise to
convene a general economic conference, was fulfilled by the
Conference of Stresa, which was attended by eighty delegates
representing fifteen states. During the Conference,
which met from September 5-21, 1932, a united front was
presented by delegates from the Little Entente, supported
by Austria, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. France proposed
a plan to grant the five states of the rejected Danubian
Confederation preferential tariffs on their agricultural
exports for at least three years. This scheme was to be
financed by a sum of 75,ooo,ooo Swiss francs which was to
be raised by contributions from each state participating, in
the proportion to which each adherent failed to grant preferences
by a system of bilateral commercial treaties. The
Conference struck a snag when Great Britain refused to
contribute to the fund as an alternative to the granting of
tariff preferences. In the last analysis, only Germany,
Austria, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland were willing to
grant preferences; Italy preferred to contribute to the fund;
whereas France was amenable to both alternatives. The
181/bid., Prager Presse, December IS, 193'2·
us Swrnost, December 16, 1932. For details of the debt correspondence
between Czechoslovakia and the United States, cf. Chmelar J., "Zahranieni
politika v roce 1932 a Ceskoslovensko ", Zahranilm PolitiktJ, vol.
xii, pp. 1-10.
1sa The New York Times, January 22, 1933.
348 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
final report of September 20 represented a compromise of
the views of France, Italy, Germany and the bloc of small
states, since Great Britain still continued to hold aloof. Embodied
in nine general resolutions, the final agreement established
an administrative committee of the adhering states,
with headquarters at Basel and with supervisory powers over
such matters as grain preferences, bilateral treaties and the
special fund. The actual value of the new set-up was open
to question. Considerable disappointment was expressed
over the lack of agreement upon a second fund for the stabilization
of currencies.184
In this manner were dashed the
ambitious plans of the Lausanne Conference.
Throughout 1932, the states of the Little Entente had been
watching with concern the growth of revisionist sentiment,
both among their own discontented minorities and in the
members of the revisionist bloc. The success of the hastily
called special Little Entente Conference of January 22-23,
at Montreux, Switzerland/85
for the purpose of evolving a
unified policy with regard to the questions of disarmament,
reparations and reyisionism, convinced the three Foreign
Ministers of the advisability of a second special Conference
late in the year. Bend, Titulescu andYeftic met at Belgrade
on December 18-20, 1932, to discuss primarily a common
line of action regarding the threats of revisionists. Other
questions concerned disarmament, reparation payments of
Germany's former Allies, and an ec'Ori.omic reorganization of
the Little Entente. The fact that the Lausanne agreement
had altered the financial clauses of a Peace Treaty, that military
clauses of all the Peace Treaties were being subjected
to threats of revision, and that the territorial clauses alone
seemed to retain any indications of permanence, caused alarm
which was not allayed by the fact that the disarmament con-
184 C/. Publications, Political, 1932, vii ii.
185 The New York Times, February 2, 1932.
THE DEPRESSION 349
ference of the Powers had been a failure thus far and had
been adjourned until January 19, 1933. The Conference
of Belgrade closed with an official communique that again
revealed the solidarity of the Little Entente. It proclaimed
the creation at Geneva of a permanent committee of the three
Foreign Ministers and of a permanent secretariat, but no
declaration· was issued against the propaga:nda of revisionist~,
much to the disappointment of Yugoslavia, which desired
some such declaration against Italy. On the othet"
hand, the solidarity of ·Rumania was welcome to her two
partners, who had feared that Italian influence might have
had a weakening effect upon the organization.186
Shortly
after the close of the Conference, BeneS summarized both
the .future hopes and fears of his country when he warned
the Great Powers that the Little Entente would continue to
advocate disarmament and to oppose any revision of the
Peace Treaties.187
The tendency to default the debts due to the United States
found its echo also in the question of the so-called" Eastern
reparations". Before the special Conference of the Little
Entente met at Belgrade,· the three partners were informed
by the Great Powers that the latter would no longer continue
to advance the deposits that would be necessary to administer
the special funds that had been created by the agreements of
the Hague and Paris. By this decision, Hungary and Bulgaria,
on the one hand, would receive no longer any money
payments in compensation for the territories that they had
lost by the Peace Treaties, but, on the other hand, would
deem themselves absolved also from further reparation payments.
Thereupon, the three states of the Little Entente,
in paying their January instalments of $10,000 each, agreed
1&8Jbid., December 18-20, 1932; Swrnost, December 17, 1932.
18'1' Ceske Slwo, December 24. 1932; The Nefl! York Times, December
25, 1932.
350 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
that this payment would be their last, and that they also
would consider themselves released from any further reparations
obligations.188
In this manner was the general disrespect
for treaty obligations enhanced and the chaotic condition
of Europe aggravated, until, by the winter of 1932-
1933, the disintegration of any " Concert of Europe" appeared
complete and pessimism seemed to be ·the order of
the day.189
:1ss C/. Prager Tagblatt, January 6, 1933; also, Svornost, January 7,
1933·
1811 For a detailed discussion of the desperate financial plight of Central
Europe, cf. Chappey, J., La Crise de la monnaie et Ia restauration des
Pays Danubiens (Paris, 1933).
CHAPTER VIII
THE NAZI CRISIS
THE -CAUSES AND IMPORTANCE OF HITLERISM
DuRING the winter of 1932-1933 the world-wide depression
still endured: although there was improvement in some
respects, in others lower depths were reached. The ensuing
pessimism, coupled with a high degree of nationalism,
created for the whole world problems which represented a
composite picture of almost every aspect of human activity.
Of such problems Central Europe had perhaps more than its
share: certainly among the states of the revisionist bloc at
least there grew stronger the tendency to blame the Peace
Treaties for the major portion of the evils that they had to
endure. These states came to advocate, more and- more
forcibly, revisions of the Peace Treaties that were considered
too drastic by the states of the status-quo bloc. The dangers
of the situation were appreciated by Benes, who, on November
7, I932, before_the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, delivered an address
entitled " Will Europe decide for Peace or War? " In this
expose, after a thorough review of the situation, he pointed
out how recent events had created, particularly in Germany,
a condition of affairs ominous to the future peace of Europe.1
The Reich was seething with discontent because of numerous
frustrations of the national will Too weak to rebel
directly against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles during
the years immediately after the termination of the War, Germany
had already tried twice in vain to evade indirectly
1 Bend, Boj o m!,., pp. 653-681.
35I
352 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
certain of its provisions.2
Many Germans had accepted the
Locarno agreements reluctantly, and with misgivings.3
The
final blow to the status quo was dealt by the' failure of the
disarmament conference of I932. From February 3 to December
I I the delegates from the German Republic pleaded
almost frantically that, in order to avert a domestic upheaval,
Germany be allowed to arm to a degree consistent
with her own security, if the other Powers could not agree
to disarm to the German level.4
The only concession that
Germany could obtain was the agreement of December I I,
I932, whereby, in principle, she was granted equality of
rights in arms matters to prevent her from leaving the conference
which adjourned on December I4, I932, to meet
again on January I9, I933·11
Benes worked hard to try to save the 1932 disarmament
conference. The viewpoint of Czechoslovakia was stated
officially on February I2: the Czechoslovak government (I)
ll For seeking a complete moratorium, the Cuno government had been
punished by the French occupation of the Ruhr, which had lasted from
January, 1923, to August, 1925, and which, by ruining the German middle
classes, had paved the way for the later Nazi movement; whereas the second
attempt, the proposed Austro-German Customs Union, had been frustrated
through the use of the financial power of France, which, in 1931, had
hastened financial crashes in both Austria and Germany, results that, in
the eyes. of patriotic Teutons, justified fully the most drastic countermeasures.
Cf. Simonds, F. H. and Emeny, B., The Great Powers ita
World Politics (New York, 1935), pp.,. 1g6-197; Einzig, P., WorlcJ
Finance, I9I4-I935 (New York, 1935), pp. 217-223.
a Cf. Simonds and Emeny, op. cit., p. 197.
• France and Germany blamed one another for the failure to reach an
agreement : France accused Germany of " calculated encroachments " on
the Treaty of Versailles, and Germany blamed France for the "calculated
withholding" of rights that she, Germany, believed her just due morally
according to the same Treaty. Cf. The Times, The New York Times,
February 3, December n and 12, 1933; cf. also, Prochazka, R., " Nova
tva.F problemu bezpecnosti ", Zahranicm Politika, vol. xiv, pp. &2-83;
Toynbee, op. cit., 1933, p. 13().
5 Publications, Disarmament, 1933, ix 10, p. 2o8.
THE NAZI CRISIS 353
accepted the guiding -principles of the conference as a basis
for: discussion; (2) expressed the opinion that the final convention
should establish the principle of a definite and explicit
limitation of armaments; (3) was prepared to adopt supervision
of effectives, of armaments, and of arms.manufacture
and trade in a more complete and effective manner than that
in present operation or that proposed thus .far in the conference;
(4) favored the establishment of a more complete
system for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological
warfare, and was prepared to extend this prohibition to other
means of offensive warfare, particularly to aerial bombardments
of the civil population, of cities, and especially of the
capitals of the belligerents; (5) was convinced that the above
suggestion should be supplemented by a system of penalties;
(6) intended to support the view of France; and (7) believed
that the final convention should bring about genuine disarmament
by a series of graduated stages. At the same time the
Czechoslovak government reasserted its belief in the necessity
of a progressive and scientifically organized policy of peace
with a view to strengthening the authority and augmenting
the powers of the League Council.8
Bend became rapporteur of the General Commission of
the conference on February 24. In this capacity, on April
20 he explained the organization of the national civilian
forces of his country. He pointed out particularly that civil
aviation was controlled by the Ministry of Public Works and
had received a subsidy of 38,6oo,ooo crowns in the budget
of 1932.' The preliminary phase of the conference terminated
in the meetings of July 20-22,8
whereupon the Technical
• Ibid., 1932, ix zs, p. 52.
'Ibid., 1932, ix 31, pp. 66, IOJ-104a
Cf. ibid., Records of the Conference for the Reduction and LimitatiorJ
of Armoments, Series B, Minutes of the General Commission, vot i
(February 9-]uly 23, 1932), pp. IS3-I8S, for details of Benes' work as
rapporteur.
354 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Committee of the National Defense Expenditure Commission
of the conference sought to obtain from each member
of the League all facts and figures pertinent to its national
defense expenditures.9
After this information had been
assembled, no agreement could be reached. In vain did
Benes seek to set an example by pledging Czechoslovakia's
continued adherence to a disarmament truce.10
Amid the
conflicting opinions regarding security and disarmament, one
fact stood out prominently, namely, that in refusing the
demands of Germany, the other Powers became in a large
measure responsible for the fall of Chancellor Briining and
for the rise of Hitlerism.11
Germany's third revolt against the terms of the Treaty of
Versailles was direct. The Austrian-hom Adolf Hitler,
who had long been considered harmless and later merely a
threat to the internal tranquillity of Germany, became Chancellor
of the Reich on January 30, 1933.12
Taking his stand
upon an unqualified condemnation of the Peace Settlement,
Hitler arrogated to himself more and more power. The
aging President of the Republic, Von Hindenburg, could not
stem the tide, with the result that long before his death at
the age of eighty-six years on August 2, 1934,18
he had
II Cf. ibid., ·1933, ix 3, vol. ii, pp. I3I-I37, for facts and figures regarding
Czechoslovakia.
10 A disarmament truce, i. e. a pledge not to increase armaments, which
had been proposed by Italy and advocated by Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, had been accepted by Czechoslovakia
for one year as from November I, 1931. Upon its expiration,
Benes renewed his country's pledge for another four months. Cf.
Official lmtrnol, special supplement, no. g6, p. 46 (Bene5' statement
of September 24, 1931); January, 1932, p. 148 (Benes' statement of
October 27, 1931); Januacy, 1933, p. 128 (Benes' statement of September
14. 1932).
11 Cf. Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., The Pipe Dream of Peace (New York,
1935), pp. xiii-xv.
13 The New York Times, January 30-31, 1933.
n Ibid., August 2, 1934-
THE NAZI CRISIS 355'
become a mere figur-e-head and Germany had been transformed
from a republic to a dictatorship with Hitler in full
control. Many of the German people, with whom any
leader who would dare to condemn openly the Treaty
of Versailles would become popular, acquiesced willingly in
the change in government. In this manner there came to
pass the reaction that Dr. Vlastimil Tusar, as Czechoslovak
Minister to Germany, had predicted as early as March 21,
1922.
16
The ultimate result of the Nazi revolution can not be
foreseen at this writing. It was unquestionably the most important
single event of the year 1933, and certainly one of
the most important events of the whole post-war era. It
might be considered even as marking the end of the immediate
post-war period 15
and as inaugurating an entirely new
period, one in which Germany no longer accepted more or less
supinely the dictates of the victor states of the World War,
but began to reassert herself actively. Conscious of her own
reviving strength, she sought to abolish all the existing distinctions
between victor and vanquished states, and to regain
a position of equality with the other Great Powers. Of the
small states of Central Europe, Czechoslovakia was perhaps
the most endangered by the rise of Hitlerism. She was
aware of her peril, but, in the early days of the movement
at least, regarded it as a menace that would necessitate vigilance
on her part, but one that she need not necessarily fear.111
u Cj. D'Abernon, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 296-297. Tusar, whom Benes
allegedly thought unduly pro-German (cf. ibid., vol. ii, p. 58), considered
" insane " the French policy of pressing Germany too hard, and predicted
that the ultimate result would be a revolution which would cause
a general collapse and the rise of a labor party which would pay no
reparations.
n Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., 1933, p. III.
1e For this attitude of Czechoslovakia, cf. Bauer, F., Hitle,.ova treti
iiSe a na1 stat (Praha, 1933).
356 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Strengthening the Little Entente
There arose again the question of the illegal shipment of
arms to Hungary. On January 9, 1933, forty carloads of
arms (40,000 to so,ooo rifles and 200 machine guns) were
shipped from Italy to Hirtenberg in Austria, allegedly to be
repaired there in order to furnish labor for unemployed
machinists, since the weapons represented pre-war Austrian
equipment. If the charges of the Arbeiter Zeitung were
true, the weapons were not repaired at Hirtenberg, but, with
the connivance of the Austrian government, were merely
loaded into trucks and transshipped into Hungary.17
At once
the Little Entente was aroused. Czechoslovak public opinion
questioned whether this move did not represent a verification
of rumors of a secret alliance between· Italy, Austria and
Hungary.18
Benes seized the occasion to issue again a warning
against any propaganda aimed at revising the Peace
Treaties.19
On January 20, France decided to support the
protest of the Little Entente against the shipment of arms
from Italy to Hungary.20
Benes, as spokesman for the Little
Entente, demanded action, either by the League of Nations
or by a cooperative effort of Great Britain and France.21
He
pointed out that the Hirtenberg affair was not an isolated
incident, but that, in all, Italy had shipped to Hungary
18o,roo rifles, 200 machine guns, and unknown numbers of
aeroplanes and trucks, the latter .of which could be transformed
into tanks. He pleaded for a cessation of HaloMagyar
intrigues,22
but again, as in the case of earlier incilT
Arbeiter Zeitung, January 9, 1933; Svornost, January 10, 1933-
18 Narodnt List;v, January IS, I933·
to The New York Times, January IS, 1933.
2o Ibid., ]anuary 20, 1933.
211 Ibid., January 27 and February 9, 1933.
22 Svornost, February 12 and March s. 1933.
THE NAZI CRISIS 357
dents,28
in vain. Nothing effective was accomplished to
check such activities, probably because Italy, a Great Power,
was involved.
Germany's new challenge to the status quo was answered
promptly by the Little Entente. On February ;r6, 1933, the
three Foreign Ministers-Bene§, Titulescu and Yefticsigned,
at Geneva, a new treaty whereby their mutual ties
were again strengthened. In order to ensure unity in the
prosecution of a common foreign policy, there was created
a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers, which, by unanimous
vote, would have to approve the negotiations of any
new treaty or the adoption of any new unilateral policy of
international significance on the part of any member. The
Permanent Council would meet obligatorily three times a
year. One of these meetings would rotate among the three
states, another would be held at Geneva at the time of the
meeting of the League Assembly, and the place of the third
was not specified. The presiding officer would be the foreign
minister of the state wherein the first obligatory conference
was held. He would select the date, place and agenda, and
would continue to preside until the first obligatory conference
of the following year. All three states would enjoy
equality upon all questions. The Permanent Council could
decide whether any question should be entrusted to one
delegate or to the delegation of one country. It would also
have the right to establish other commissions on special
questions. An economic council would be created. The
Permanent Council would be aided by a secretariat, one
section of which would work permanently at Geneva. The
policy of the Permanent Council would be guided by the
League Covenant and by the important post-war treaties.
Treaties already negotiated with other states would be coordinated
to the greatest degree possible. Eventually, full
:zs Cf. supra, pp. 267-269, 274-277.
358 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
membership might be extended to other states "on conditions
to be decided in each specific case ". The three existing
bilateral treaties of alliance and the tripartite treaty of conciliation,
arbitration and judicial settlement were renewed in
perpetuity, an action which was intended to give the Little
Entente the force and cohesion of a Great Power.24
In a lengthy expose of March I, 1933, before the Foreign
Affairs Committees of the Czechoslovak Senate and of the
Chamber of D~puties, Bend stated the reasons why the new
pact had been negotiated. In his estimation, some stronger
union had become inevitable for two reasons: because of the
chaotic condition of Central Europe, particularly since each
of the three Great Powers that were immediate neighbors of
the states of the Little Entente were undergoing internal
political revolutions, and because the Little Entente dreaded
the outcome of the 1933 disarmament conference. He
stressed particularly the fact that the reorganized Little
Entente was not directed against Italy.25
The reorganized Little Entente was indeed a powerful
entity, but not without weaknesses. Although the military
provisions of the new agreement remained unpublished and
unknown, the Little Entente was known to have, at the time,
the third largest military establishment in Europe (after
the U.S.S.R. and France). Its area, among Continental
Powers, was second only to the U.S.S.R., ~hereas its population,
approximately 48,soo,()()(( exceeded that of either
France or Italy. On the other hand, there might be pointed
out, as weaknesses, the following facts; approximately onefourth
of the population consisted of minorities ; Czechoslovakia
was the only industrial member; her Skoda works, the
u Treaty Series, vol. cxxxix, pp. 233-239.
25 BeneS. E., Le Pacte cforganisation de la Petite Entente et Utat
actuel de la politique internationale, Sources et documents tchecoslovaques,
no. 20; Boj o mir, pp. 688-691; for the whole expose, cf. pp. 682-713.
THE NAZI CRISIS 359
only arms manufacturing establishment, lay, in time of war,
in an extremely exposed position; and finally, the armaments
of the three partners, particularly those of Rumania, were
fast becoming obsolete. In view of these facts, the actual
efficiency of the Little Entente, in the event of a major war,
remained problematic.28
·
. The closer union of the Little Entente states met with
diverse responses in the foreign press. It was approved most
heartily by France,27
and also, but with less cordiality, by
Great Britain.'18
Both Moscow 29
and. Warsaw 80
considered
it a constructive step, one that would increase materially the
prospectof preservingthe peace of Central Europe. Austria 81
and Germany 112
disapproved, whereas Italy and Hungary
were violent in their objections. The Italian press denounced
certain alleged secret clauses in the Little Entente treaty.11
Perhaps the most bitter denunciation of all was the Berlin
speech of March 8 of ex-Premier Bethlen of Hungary, who,
in the course of calling attention to the common interest of
Germany, Italy and Hungary in trying to prevent too intimate
a union between Northern and Southern Slavs, stigmatized
the Peace Treaties as a " rotting status quo which
could not be maintained"." The chorus of disapproval and
of false allegations .mounted so high that it provoked, within
Czechoslovakia, parliamentary interpellations and heated reHCf..The
New York Times, March 5, 1933·
:21 Le Temps, February 17, 1933.
DS The Times, February 17-18, 1933·
"Izvestia, February 18, 19J3.
so Gazeta Warszawska, February 17, 1933·
a1. Neue Freie Presse, February 17-20, 1933.
a:~ Vossische Zeihmg, February 17-1!), 1933·
aa C/. Corriere della Sera and The New York Times, February 26, 1933,
for reprints of a series of earlier allegations by Giornale d'Ita.lia.
u Vossische Zeitung, March 9, 1933.
36o FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
torts from high officials of the government. Benes denied
the authenticity of a French allegation that, on August 7,
1932, Germany, Italy and Hungary had drawn up a secret
military alliance, and branded as " idiotic ., current Hungarian-sponsored
rumors that the new Little Entente treaty had
called for a joint Czechoslovak-Yugoslav occupation of Hungary
in the event of a Soviet-Rumanian war; 85
whereas Dr.
Bradac, the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense,
responded to a parliamentary inquiry by stating that he had
"full confidence in the army's power of resistance ".86
Italy and Poland
By March, 1933, among the more interesting aspects of
the Nazi crisis were the reorientations of foreign policy on
the parts of Italy and Poland. In order to enhance the
prestige of Italy, Mussolini sought to play the part of an
arbiter, to hold the balance of power between the status quo
and revisionist blocs, between France and Germany, whereas
Poland determined to continue her support of the status quo
bloc only in return for specific new advantages.87
Czechoslovakia
believed that, in order to attain his objective, Mussolini
desired to dominate Central Europe, and that, to this end,
in the eyes of Italy, a strong Little Entente or an extension
of either French or German influence into this area were
equally undesirable.88
On March 22, Mussolini had made public the details of a
Four Power Pact, whereby, through an agreement among
Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, necessary revisions
would be made and the peace of Europe safeguarded for
s5 Svornost, February n, 1933; The New York Times, March 4. 1933.
se Narodnt Listy, March IS, 1933.
87 Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., 1933, pp. 184-186, 206-2o8; also, Krofta, K.,
Ceskoslovemko v mesinarodn' politice (Praha, 1934), p. IS.
ss Cf. Krofta, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
THE NAZI CRISIS
the next decade.39
Great indeed was the indignation of the
small victor states at being excluded from consultations so
momentous to their future. Poland was particularly angry
that her pretensions were ignored, and considered for a time
the acceptance of full membership in the Little Entente/0
a
sentiment that was echoed within that organization.41
However,
time brought reflection, and Poland turned again to her
policy of prestige which would be shattered by such a move.
The Polish Dictator, Pilsudski, who had long opposed such
a step as an abandonment of Polish pretensions to the status
of a Great Power, came to the conclusion that intimate cooperation
with the Little Entente would insure adequate security
against the German menace.42
During April, 1933,
the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, made a series of visits to
the capitals of the Little Entente states in order to sound
their policies. As a result of this trip, there arose a rumor
that France, Poland and the Little Entente had signed an
agreement against Mussolini's Four Power Pact,48
a rumor
that the Polish Foreign Office denied." Nevertheless,
Mussolini's threat of reviving the Triple Alliance,411
intended
to hasten French acceptance of his plan, had, perhaps, some
influence in crystallizing public opinion in the status quo bloc.
On March 25, 1933, after a lengthy discussion in its Permanent
Council at Geneva, the Little Entente lost no time in
taking a firm stand in denouncing Mussolini's plan and in
warning against any attempted revision of the Peace
a9 The New York Times, March 22, 1933.
~Ibid., March 24. 1933.
41. Ibid., March 26, 1933; Narodm List::v, March 28, 1933; Svornosl,
March 30, 1933.
u Gaseta Warssawska, April 25, 1933·
•s The New York Times, April 25, 1933.
"Gaseta Warssawska, April 25, 1933·
45 The New York Times, April 12, 1933.
362 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Treaties.46
Confident that France would fully protect its
interests during the four Power conferences, the Little
Entente sent Titulescu as its representative to Paris, where he
received assurance that France would continue to oppose
unreservedly all revisions, particularly those territorial in
nature.47
Czechoslovakia's attitude regarding the Four Power Pact
was presented to a plenary session of parliament by Benes
in another lengthy expose of April25, 1933. After a summary
of the evolution of revisionism, Benes pointed out how
Mussolini's project represented the culmination of a decade
of efforts to dominate Central Europe and to reduce the small
states of that region to the status of pawns of the Great
Powers. · Should such a condition come to pass, it would be
a backward step, a major tragedy for Europe as a whole.
In his estimation, a strong Little Entente functioned as a
balance-wheel that helped stabilize Europe : it was neither a
purely anti-Hungarian concept, nor was it a mere satellite
of France. Any territorial alterations at Czechoslovakia's
expense would mean war. Revisions of the Peace Treaties
were possible only under the terms of Article 19· of the
League Covenant. Czechoslovakia might accept certain
minor frontier rectifications, provided that there would be no
threat .of foreign pressure, no reign of terror, but a mutual
agreement arrived at peaceably after due negotiations, and
that adequate compensation be given her in return. Otherwise,
in sheer desperation, she might feel compelled to leave
the League of Nations! Finally, Benes advocated the doctrine
of the equality of states-the abolition of all distinctions
between the Great Powers and other states, and between
the victors and vanquished of the World '\Var; for, as long
as these distinctions remained, no reconciliation was possible,
48 /bid., March 27, 1933.
u Ibid., March 3G-JI, 1933.
THE NAZI CRISIS
nor could any European Directorate function satisfactorily
without the consent or the participation of the small states.48
As the negotiations regarding the Four Power Pact continued,
it came to be realized generally that the result would
be a synthesis of the views of the Great Powers.49
On May
18, Hitler pledged his support to Mussolini's ptan to preserve
peace and stated his belief that no war would improve existing
conditions.50
Four days later, the four Powers agreed
to the plan in principle,51
news that was received calmly by
the Little Entente,52
which also gave its approval on May 30.
The Little Entente communique accepted the Four Power
Pact on the strength of French assurances that the original
proposal had undergone drastic revision, particularly that
unanimous consent by the League Council would continue to
be required for any treaty revision. It stated further that
the Little Entente could not tolerate any organization that
would entitle any Great Power to make any decisions regarding
the interests of other states. In reply to these objections,
France promised that the Four Power Pact would concern
only the signatory Powers, and that it would exert no
pressure for frontier revisions upon the Little Entente.68
The final draft, a compromise of the views of France and
Italy, was initialed .on June 7, and signed on July 15. Italy
and Germany were denied colonial compensation by Great
Britain and France. France insisted on several points: that
the four Powers deal only with their own interests and aban<~B
Benes, E., La Question du directoire euro;len et la revision des
frontieres, Sources et documents tchc!coslovaques, no. 21; Boj o m!r, pp.
114-769·
<~9 Cf. The New York Times, May 22, 1933; Fi8a, P., "Pakt ctyf
velmoci ", Zalwanilm Politika, voL xii, pp. 305-312.
110 Volkischer Beobachter, May 18, 1933.
n. The New York Times, May 22, 1933.
111 Ibid., :May 24, 1933.
68 Ibid., May JI, 1933.
364 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
don all pretensions to determine any territorial revisions, and
that the prestige and authority of the League be permitted to
remain intact. As a result, the final draft of the Pact retained
vague provisions for revision of the Peace Treaties,
and, in the event of the failure of the Disarmament Conference,
for a gradual attainment of armament equality by
Germany.54
On June 7, France sent almost identical notes
to the Little Entente and to Poland, explaining her attitude
and promising again that nothing in the Pact would affect
their existing treaties with her. The notes called particular
attention to the fact that Article 2 of the new Pact permitted
revisions only under Article 19 of the Covenant.55
Nevertheless,
France had not asked the other three Great Powers
to accept her interpretation of the Pact, and she could not
bind them by her own action.56
In this manner did France
keep her faith with her small Allies. Of all the small victor
states of Europe, Poland alone nursed a grievance--that
France did not support adequately her claims to recognition
as a Great Power.57
I933 Little Entente Conferences
On June 2o-22, 1933, the three Foreign Ministers of the
Little Entente met in London in order to ascertain the British
viewpoint regarding the practicability of a Danubian Confederation
as a means of weaning ·Austria and Hungary
from the influence of Germany.58
,. Despite the support of
Great Britain, France and Italy,59
the plan failed. The
54 Nouveau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxviii, pp. 4 et seq.
55 Le Temps, June 7, 1933.
sa Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 145.
51 Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., 1933, p. 218; Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp.
127-146.
58 The New York Times, June 22, 1933.
59 Ibid., August 26, 1933.
THE NAZI CRISIS
German Vice-Chancellor, Von Papen, and the Reich Minister
without Portfolio, GOring, preferred instead, and in fact had
already predicted,60
a new Central Europe, dominated by a
revisionist bloc under the joint leadership of Germany and
Italy. Premier GombOs of Hungary considered unsatisfactory
the proposed Danubian Confederation,61
or any other
project that would perpetuate the status quo,62
and maintained
that a drastic revision of the Peace Treaties alone
could restore Central Europe to economic health.68
When
Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria visited Mussolini on August
20,64
rumors arose of a plan for a new Danubian Confederation
of only Austria; Hungary and Italy, to the exclusion of
the Little Entente.65
These rumors of the rivalry of Italy
and the Little Entente for predominance in Central Europe
became so persistent that, on October 15, Benes felt compelled
to issue a statement that he would oppose any. Danubian
Confederation that would not include Czechoslovakia."
Mussolini had probably intended to crown his Four Power
Pact with another project, an economic and political union
of the Little Entente, Austria, Hungary and Italy.67
·The
visits of Premier GOmbos of Hungary to Vienna on July g,
and to Rome on July 2 5, were interpreted as steps preliminary
to the formation of the new bloc. The fact that the
states of the Little Entente had shown more interest in, than
opposition to, the new project, seemed to indicate that France,
although excluded from the contemplated new bloc, had given
it her approval. Benes, to whom any territorial strengthen-
60 Ibid., April 14, 1933.
61 Ibid., September 17, 1933.
61 Ibid., July 2, 1933·
AJbid., July 10, 1933.
64 Cf. ibid., August 21, 1933, for the official communique of the visit.
611 Ibid., August 23, 1933; cf. also, Pravo Lidu and Ceskl Slwo, August
22, 1933·
68 The New York Times, October 15, 1933·
61 Cf. Nowveau recueu, iii serie, vot. XXX, pp. 7 et seq., for the Italian
memorandum of September 29, 1933. regarding Danubian affairs.
366 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
ing of Austria and Hungary or any union between them
alone would be as distasteful as Anschluss, favored the
new plan as a practical consummation of the Danubian Confederation
that· he had long been advocating. In order to
safeguard the economic future of Central Europe, he advocated
the restoration of an economic equivalent of the former
Austro-Hungarian Empire.68
The Permanent Council of the Little Entente met in
Praha early in June, 1933· The chief purpose of the Conference
was economic, to create an Economic Council of three
sections, one for each country and each with five members
and technical advisers. Its main duty was to create a preferential
tariff system for the three states and to investigate
how a quota system could be employed to increase the exchange
of goods. The Economic Council would meet four
times annually, alternately in the three capitals, and would
concern itself with such questions as general commercial
policies, agriculture, industry, credits, banking and finance,
and transportation. It would create immediately a special
committee to" normalize" all branches of commerce and of
industrial life. Interesting was the statement that " this
normalization process will naturally extend to all branches
of military equipment ".69
The discussions also waxed political.
. It was agreed that the dangers of revising the frontiers
of Hungary had been overestimated. Many complaints
were made that the official comnrtmique failed to mention
the status of relations with Poland, whose relations with both
France and the Little Entente were cooling as the result of
the Powers having disregarded Poland's wishes regarding
the negotiations of the Four Power Pact_T0
The activities
of the Economic Council made such progress that, on Oc-
6&Prager Ta.gblatt, June 17, 1933; The New York Tinu>s, June t8, 1933-
89 The New York Times, June 2, 1933.
To Narodnt List:~. Narodni Politika, June 4, I933·
THE NAZI CRISIS
tober 31, Benes pre~icted that the next few years would
witness the transformation of the Little Entente into a compact
economic unit. He stated that Czechoslovakia would
have to prepare for new developments by controlling private
capitalism under a nationally planned economy. She would
have to specialize in products her Little Entente partners
could not supply, and would have to make adjustments to
import their cattle and grain. At the same time Benes desired
close relations with both Austria and Hungary, but
admitted that the attainment of any great degree of friendship
with the latter would be difficult, particularly since Hungary's
revisionist campaign was again revived.71
Another Little Entente Conference met at Sinaia for four
days beginning September 24, 1933. All precedents were
shattered by ·the presence not only of the three Foreign Ministers--Bend,
Yeftic and Titulescu-but of Kings Alexander
and Carol, since this was the first Conference ever attended
by the titular heads of more than one state. On the agenda
for discussion were the recent visits of GOmbos and Dollfuss
to Rome, the prospects of a Danubian Confederation~ the
general problem of increasing still further the solidarity of
the Little Entente, and its relations with France and Poland.
The result of the Conference was a declaration against the
inclusion of Austria and Hungary in any bloc with the Little
Entente. Benes was selected to represent the organization
on a diplomatic mission to Rome, where, by means of a conference
with Mussolini, it was hoped that better cooperation
with Italy could be attained.72
No immediate agreement
resulted. On October 19, Bend paid a visit to Vienna,
where he pointed out to Dollfuss his conviction that a system
of bilateral treaties would be Austria's best protection, both
economically and politically, and warned him against adoptn
The New York Times, November I, 1933.
u Ibid., September Z'/, 1933.
368 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
ing any radical policy that might endanger relations with
Czechoslovakia.n
. .
The Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
The potential menace of Hitlerism created a FrancoSoviet
non-aggression pact which was approved by Moscow
on February 17,74
1933, and by the French parliamentary
committee on foreign affairs on March 16; 711
in fact, the
friendship between these two countries became so marked
that, late in the year, Paris was rumored to have offered
Moscow a defensive alliance.76
On July 4, at London, the
U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia
signed a non-aggression pact, which clearly defined
both an act of aggression and an aggressor.77
The Little
Entente considered this pact an " Eastern Locarno "~
78
a
consolidation of Eastern Europe against Gerrilany.79
Czechovakia
was overjoyed that the U.S.S.R. had apparently broken
definitely with Germany and had come over to the status quo
bloc: as for herself, she determined to follow the example
of the United States in recognizing the U.S.S.R. de jure.
The Czechoslovak Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate,
on October 24, 1933, approved a memorandum wherein it
began to prepare the way for recognition by a restoration of
normal relations whenever practicable.80
When the United
n Ibid., Prager Tagblatt, Prager Presse, Svornost, October I!), 1933.
.,.... The New York Times, February 17, [933.
Til Ibid., March 16, 1933.
'1'6 Ibid., December 17, 1933.
'1"1 Treaty Serit:s, vol. cxlviii, pp. 2II-2I9.
78 The New York Times, July 9, 1933.
"Ibid., July 16, 1933. Cf. Padelford, N. J., Peace in the Balkans
(New York, 1935), pp. 96-98 and I07-Io8, for the sequel. The Balkan
Entente (Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) represented an attempt
to extend to the Balkans the philosophy of the Little Entente.
8o TLsky (Senat), no. 1134, October 24. 1933, 9 session.
THE NAZI CRISIS
States recognized the-Soviet Union on November 17, it was
merely a question of time before Czechoslovakia would do
the same.81
The long delay, so strange for a state ostensibly
as Slavophil as Czechoslovakia, had been caused, as related
earlier,82
primarily by political antipathy to the principles of
communism.
Disarmament Negotiations ·
At the disa~mament conference at Geneva, Great Britain
took the lead in vain efforts to reconcile the German demands
for arms equality with the French thesis of security first.88
In this controversy, as might be expected, the sympathies
of Czechoslovakia lay entirely with the latter. The nature
of Hitler's foreign policy was clearly evinced when, following
the example of Japan, Germany defied the public opinion
of the world on October 14, 1933, by withdrawing from
both the disarmament conference and the League of
Nations." Almost as a unit, the Nazi press welcomed the
move as " an escape from the trap which had been set for
Germany at Geneva ".811
Nevertheless, Baron von Neurath,
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, left open the possibility
of further negotiations by stating that, if German demands
for equality were met adequately, Germany might re-·
consider her recent decision.88
.
As a result of Neurath's hint, there ensued secret negotiations
at Berlin between the French Ambassador, Fran~oisn
Chmelar, ]., "Ceskoslovenski zahranieni politika v roce 1933 ",
Zahranilni Politika, vol. xiii, pp. 85-93. For the Czechoslovak de jure
recognition of the U.S. S. R. cf. infra, p. 387.
82 Cf. ,supra, pp. :259 el seq.
88 Publications, Disarmament, 1933, ix 1-2.
a• Ibid., 1933, ix n, p. IS; Official/oumal, January, 1934. p. I6.
u C/. Vossische Zeitung, Frankfurter Zeitung, Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung, October IS, I93J.
88 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitsmg, October IS, 1933.
370 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Poncet, and Hitler. Apparently, the latter desired to negotiate
a series of bilateral agreements with certain individual
states, and was reported to have offered non:.aggression pacts
to both France and Czechoslovakia.87
Hitler insisted that
Germany be permitted 300,000 men, 200 aeroplanes, six-inch
guns and tanks. If this were conceded, Hitler expressed his
willingness to agree to internationalize comrilercial air transportation
whenever all other states would destroy their bombardment
and combat aviation.88
These negotiations were
viewed with distrust by the French, who feared that they had
much to lose and little to gain by a bilateral agreement.
Largely because of this sentiment, the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs announced, on November 28, 1933, that it
would negotiate with Germany no bilateral agreement, but
would insist upon conducting such negotiations either at
Rome or at Geneva. Since France and Germany were but
two of the states that had signed the Versailles Treaty,
France maintained that, to abrogate any of its provisions,
there would be required also the assent of the other signatories,
particularly of Great Britain, Italy, Poland and the
Little Entente.69
As a result of this insistence, little was
accomplished.
Czechoslovakia's official attitude towards the Nazi rearmament
threat was voiced by Benes on October 31, 1933, in a
speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee of both the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. After summarizing
the effect of the Nazi revolution upon the general European
situation, he denied the imminence of any general catastrophe.
He professed to find nothing particularly new in the
Hitler variety of Pan-Germanism. The tenor of Czechoslovakia's
foreign policy would remain unchanged: as for-
8'1 Le Temps, November 26, 1933; Svornost, November 27, 1933·
88 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 28, 1933.
Btl Le Temps, November 28, 1933·
THE NAZI CRISIS 371
merly, it would be guided by a desire to maintain the status
quo that had been established by the Peace Treaties, to
further attempts at general disarmament, to strengthen the
Little Entente, particularly by an economic union, to preserve
"correct" relations with Germany, to remain. on intimate
terms with France, to continue existing friendships with
Poland and· Austria, to seek still closer relations with the
Soviet Union, to attempt to reconcile Hungary, and to oppose
every effort to destroy the principle of the equality of states ·
which the League was striving to uphold.90
Although the
address of Bend met with general domestic approval, he felt
urged to defend himself against sporadic accusations that he
had placed too much faith in the League. On November 8,
he stated, " While treaties are being made, Czechoslovakia
will make treaties. If machines guns are fired, it will be
ready to fire machine guns, and if cannon, it will be ready to
fire cannon also ".91
Among Bend' enemies, much was made
of the alleged chauvinism of this speech, but, as Benes' long
record had indicated, this outburst must have been owing to
extreme provocation, and its belligerent tone should be discounted.
Within Czechoslovakia, the fifteen years of peace
and internal consolidation had produced a general feeling of
faith in the future of the Republic.92
The Economic Council of the Little Entente, under the
presidency of Benes, at Praha on January 9, 1934, sought
to devise ways and means whereby the three partners might
retain at least one-half of their foreign trade among themeo
Benes, E., La Revolutiots allemande et la nouvelle phase de la politique
europeentse, Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, no. 23; Boj o tnlr,
pp. 77o-802.
91 Narodnl Listy, November 8, 1933.
u Ibid., November 20, 1933; Svornost, November 27, 1933, for summary
by President Masaryk; cf. also, Ripka, H., Pat~W&t let leskoslovenskl
demokrac~ (Praha, 1933).
372 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
selves.113
The regular Conference, which had been called
originally for January 8, did not assemble until January 20,
because of the assassination of Duca, the Rumanian Prime
Minister. At Zagreb, January 20-24, the Conference came
to a general agreement with regard to the future. United
opposition was expressed against Mussolini: both as to his
supposed project to replace the League with a "Concert of
Europe ", and as to his suggestion for a Danubian Confederation
based upon an economic alliance of Austria and Hungary.
A firm stand was taken against Hungarian revisionist
propaganda. Despite the wishes of France, the Little
Entente states refused de jure recognition to the Soviet
Union immediately, but insisted first upon further negotiations
as to the terms she would offer in return. The sole
discordant note was the desire of Yugoslavia for a rapprochement
with Hitler. To Yugoslavia, Hitlerism represented no
direct menace, whereas, in an emergency against Italy, the
support of Germany might, conceivably, be of more value
than that of France. There was also suggested a five-year
Balkan non-aggression pact which was to be attempted immediately
after the Conference.114
A Balkan Pact was initialed at Belgrade on February 4
and signed on February 9 by the Foreign Ministers of
Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Rumania. It was but partially
s.uccessful, because Bulgari' refused, quite naturally, to
agree to a perpetuation of her own dismemberment and
Albania, presumably because of Italian pressure, also refused
to join. The new agreement, in Articles 1-3 respectively,
guaranteed the security of existing Balkan frontiers for five
years, provided for mutual consultation of the member states
upon all questions of common interest, and left open future
113 Cf. P..OOo Lidu, January 10, I934at
The New York Times, January 24, 1934.
THE NAZI CRISIS 373
membership to the other Balkan states.115
Czechoslovakia
welcomed the new organization as an additional guarantee
of the stability of th~ Balkans and of Southeastern Europe.'"'
The Germano-Polish Rapprochement
Other aspects of Hitler's policy--opposition· to Catholicism,
Judaism and Communism-troubled still further the
diplomatic waters of Europe. At first, the threat of a resurrection
of German military power had produced in Poland a
feeling of dismay that had caused her to desire closer relations
with the victor states and even with Moscow.'" Rumors
of a secret military alliance between Germany and Lithuania
98
aroused Pilsudski to the point where he opened negotiations
with the U.S.S.R. and Rumania for a united antiGerman
eastern bloc.911
However, he soon realized that
Hitler's opposition to Communism had destroyed Poland's
greatest fear of the past--of a Germane-Soviet combination
against her-and that, correspondingly, she had, for the time
being at least, lesser need of French support.
The long months of tortuous negotiations between Germany
and Poland resulted in the signing, at Berlin, of a
ten year non-aggression pact on January 26, 1934, and in its.
ratification on February 24. This treaty, regarded by
Poland as a diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude for
her Foreign Minister, Beck/90
was modelled on the BriandKellogg
.Peace Pact. By its terms, .both countries agreed
not to resort to war as a means of settling disputes, regardless
of circumstances. Each state promised to prohibit,
IIG Treaty Series, vol. cliii, pp. 1SJ-I5!).
11s Narodnf Listy, February s. I934-
9'1' Gazeta W arszawska, May I I, 1933; Svornost, May 12, 1933.
118 Svornost, May 27, 1933; Gazeta Warszawska, May .26,.1933·
" Gazeta W arszawska, September 7, 1933; Svornost, September 8, I933·
100 Gazeta Warszawska, January .27-28, 1934-
374 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
within its territory, propaganda unfavorable to the other.
The pact was to endure for ten years, and indefinitely thereafter
unless denounced by a notice of six months. Purely
domestic questions and earlier treaties with other Powers
were to remain unaffected by this new agreement.101
Beyond
the mere text of the pact there remained many implications.
The pact represented a private agreement between Hitler and
Pilsudski, some of which was perhaps secret. The fact that
the League had been omitted seemed to indicate the permanence
of Germany's withdrawal from that organization; and
the failure to mention a new frontier, the absence of further
German territorial designs upon Poland for the next decade.
A new protocol of March 7 terminated a tariff war of
eight years' duration. Both states abandoned, against one
another, their maximum tariff rates and adopted fixed quotas
instead. Nevertheless, much still remained to be clarified :
did the new pact have secret military and commercial claus~s;
was not Poland playing too dangerous a game; did the new
agreement represent Poland's adherence to the revisionist
bloc; and, if so, did it not spell a temporary, rather than a
permanent, settlement for the Corridor, Posen and Upper
Silesia? 102
European reactions to the new pact were varied. Great
Britain could see no harm in it.103
The French Foreign
Minister, Paul-Boncour, "rejoiced" over the treaty, at least
for publication.104
Germany aeemed the Allied cordon
around her broken.105
Italy thought it a great blow at the
101 Nouveau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxviii, pp. 643 el seq.
102 Cf. Duranty, W., Europe: War or Peace! (New York, 1935), pp.
27-28.
1oa The Times, January z;, I9J4.
104J Le Temps, January 27, 1934-
1011 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter, Zeitung, January 28,
1934-
THE NAZI CRISIS 375
French system of allia_nces.106
The U.S.S.R. approved it as
a supplement to her own non-aggression pact with Poland/01
which was reported prematurely as extended for another ten
years also.108
Czechoslovakia greeted the new agreement
without cordiality; to her it indicated another Polish desertion
of the principles of intra-Slav cooperation.109
Rumors
that Germany contemplated extending. to her also an amity
pact 110
failed to alter her opinion. During March, 1934,
Czechoslovak-Polish relations became tense as the result of
several irritating frontier incidents, particularly in Tesin.111
With considerable success, France, arid Benes also, exerted
themselves to minimize friction and restore friendly relations
prior to the visits of the new French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Barthou, to Warsaw and Praha.112
The French
government desired particularly to strengthen the loosening
ties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Barthou's trip to the
two Slavic capitals, begun on April 21, was a success. It
confirmed the Franco-Polish alliance and the desire of all
three countries to collaborate loyally in attempting to preserve
the peace of Europe. Poland was flattered because
Barthou promised that France would treat her as an equal
and insist upon her participation in all future conferences
of the Great Powers. Finally, the influence of Barthou
brought to fruition the Soviet-Polish non-aggresion pact and
eased Polish friction with Lithuania.113
10s Corriere della Sera, January 28, I934-
10f lftlestia, January 30, 1934-·
1~ Gazeta Warssawska, February u, 1934-
109 Narodnl Listy, Narodnt Politika, Ceskl Slow, Cas, January 27-30,
1934-
110 The New York Times, February 21, 1934"111
Ibid., Narodnl Listy, Swrnost, March 18, 22, 26 and 27, 1934'lU
Swmost, March 31, 1934'118
Ibid., April 25, 1934; Gazeta W arssawska, April 24, 1934- The
Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact was signed at Moscow on May S and
376 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
On April 26, 1934, Barthou arrived in Praha, where he
was greeted with much· more cordiality than he had been
at Warsaw.114
Negotiations with Benes. began at once.
The two statesmen soon agreed that the maintenance of peace
in .Central Europe depended upon the preservation of the
independence of Austria. They agreed further upon a united
front against Germany's demands at the disarmament conference,
for they felt that they could never approve a policy
which, in the name of arms equality, tended to encourage
general rearmament. In all probability, Barthou might
have pointed out also to Benes the advisability of a speedy
recognition of the Soviet Union.116
Debt Default
Czechoslovakia was compelled to turn her attention also
to the problem of international finance. What should be her
policy regarding her debt to the United States? Should
·she default like France, offer a token payment like Great
Britain, or pay in full like Finland? The depression had
caused serious doubts as to her ability to continue payments,
yet considerations of honor and of gratitude rendered default
distasteful. Ultimately, Czechoslovakia decided to follow the
example of Great Britain: therefore, on June 15, 1933, she
offered also a token payment ($180,000 instead of $r,sooooo),116
and, a half year later, when the United States
ratified at Warsaw on June 15. By thir.agreement the earlier treaty of
July 25, 1932, was extended to January I, 1946, thereupon to be renewed
automatically every two years unless denounced by six months' advance
notice.
'114 Benes met Barthou immediately upon his arrival in Praha, and upon
his departure, escorted him to the frontier. In contrast, when Barthou
had arrived in Warsaw, no representative of the Polish foreign office had
been on hand to greet him.
n5 Cf. Narodm Listy, Narodnt Politika, April 26-30, 1934; The New
York Times, April 30, 1934; Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 224-229.
. ue Publications, Economic and Financial, 1933, ii a 16, p. 261.
THE NAZI CRISIS 377
decided that token payments were defaults, she again
followed the example of England in ceasing payments and in
asking for a new debt arrangement.111
No new agreement
was reached.118
When the devaluation of the dollar threatened
to curtail exports to the United States, Czechoslovakia,
on February IO, 1934, decided to desert the French gold
bloc of which she had been a member and devaluate her
crown also, by 16.6 per cent, or from a· nominal value
of $.0501 (exchange value $.0485), American post-devaluation,
to $.041783 (exchange value $.040449}, post-devaluation,118
yet, even so, her crown remained far above its.
earlier nominal value of $.0296375, American pre-devalu-
ation.120
The Revival of Hungarian Revisionism
Czechoslovakia had to face also a revival of a movement
for the autonomy of Slovakia, to which the Magyars sought
to give the appearance of spontaneity. At the same time,
Hungary continued her outspoken condemnation of the
Treaty of Trianon.121
The direct attacks of the Magyars
'11'1 The New York Times, December 16, l9J3.
us According to the Washington correspondent of Le Temps, Czechoslovakia
sought to pay her debt to the United States with her savings
in cotton. On the average, she purchased annually from the United
States about $18,ooo,ooo worth of cotton, through German middlemen,.
whose annual profits on the transaction averaged about $6oo,ooo. If this
amount could be saved by purchasing directly through its own government
buyers, it, plus manufactured exports, might, with the consent of
the United States, pay Czechoslovakia's debt. However, nothing further
was heard of the project. Cf. Le Temps, Svornost, January s. 1934.
118 Svornost, February 13, 1934; The New York Times, February·
II, 1934.
uo Cf. supra, p. 76.
'121 Cf. NefUI Freie Presse, January 17, '1933, for speech of GOmbi>s.
Revisionist agitation within Hungary was revived largely by Julius
GOmbOs, who became premier on October 1, 1932. Cf. also, Bethlen, 1.,
The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace (New York, 1934), for four
lectures delivered by the author in London during November, 1933.
378 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
were relatively easy to answer, and drew responses in kind.
On April 25, 1933, Benes proclaimed before the Czechoslovak
parliament that whoever might desire to wrest from
Czechoslovakia any of her territory would have to come for
it with an army,123
and, on December 11, 1933, the Rumanian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Titulescu, in a speech at
Kosice while visiting Czechoslovakia, announced that, after
a conference with Benes, both had agreed that any revision
of the Peace Treaties would mean war.128
The reiteration of the Magyar thesis that Slovakia and
Subcarpathian Ruthenia did not desire to be component parts
of the Czechoslovak Republic required refutation. Czechoslovakia
set out to prove that most Slovaks and Ruthenes
were satisfied with union with the Czechs and that the real
dangers to the peace of Europe were neither intra-Slav cooperation
nor the imminence of French hegemony, but rather a
revision of the Peace Treaties and a restoration of pre-war
Hungary.1
u The Ceske Slovo maintained that the renewal
of Hungarian agitation represented a desperate effort to
prevent a domestic revolution by the exaction of some revision
of the Treaty of Trianon.u5
Benes' speech of April
25, 1933, was followed by two days of parliamentary interpellation
in the course of which Senator Vaclav Klofac on
behalf of the Czechs, and Deputy Igor Hrusovsky on behalf
of the Slovaks, enthusiastically approved Benes' viewpoint
against revision.126
,.
121 Zpravy (Poslanecka Snemovna), 263 meeting, April 25, 1933, pp.
3-25, 8 session; ibid. (Senit), 2II meeting, April 25, 1933, pp. 9-34.
8 session.
us SfXW'fWsf, December 12, I93J.
'1st C/. monograph of K. Krofta, The SubslofiCe of Hrmgarior~ RevisiDJ~ism
(Prague. 1934).
us Ceske SIO'UO, October 12-13, 1933tM
ZJ)ravy (Senat), 212-213 meetings, April 26-27, 1933. pp. 2-40 and
J-23 respectively, 8 session; ibid. (Poslaneclci Snemovna), 266 meeting,
April 27, 1933. pp. 77-So. 8 session.
THE NAZI CRISIS 379
Many Ruthenes dreaded a return to the yoke of Hungary.12'T
Bene5 made a trip to Slovakia in December,
1933,128
and to Ruthenia in May, 1934.1211
Upon both
occasions he was greeted with enthusiasm when he summarized
the domestic policy of the Republic as one of
" progress, consolidation and unity ".180
A cruel blow was
dealt to Magyar hopes on April 12, 1934, when Father
Andrew Hlinka, in a letter to the editor of the Ceske Slovo,
pledged unqualifiedly the support of the Slovak Peoples'
Party, of which he was chairman, to the maintenance of the
Czechoslovak Republic.181
In vain did Father JehliCka 132
presume to represent truly the wishes of the Slovaks when
he advocated a return of Slovakia to Hungary.183
Equally
ineffective were the pleas of another Magyarized Slovak,
Unger, to divide Slovakia between Hungary and Poland.184
This particular phase of Magyar revisionism came to an
inglorious end in Slovakia itself during August, 1934,185
but an echo of it persisted among certain dissatisfied individuals
in the United States early in 1935.186
'127 Cf. Svomost, September 14. 1933.
'128 Ibid., December 24. 1933. 129 Ibid., May 17, 1934'180
Ibid., May 20, 1934; cf. also, Benes, E., Rec o trobllmu podka.r~Gtoruskem
(Praha, 1934).
'181 Ceske Slovo, April 14, 1934; reprinted also in Svornost, April 29,
1934:1S2
Cf.. supra, p. 95·
'las Narodnl Listy, August 7, 1934; Svornost, August 22, 1934- Cf.
Sf!Omost, September n, 1933, and May 14, 1934. for refutations of
Jehlicka by Dr. Osuskt. An excellent monograph exposing Hungarian
propaganda is that by R. W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and lhe
Hungarian Frontiers (London, 1934), particularly, pp. 72-74- Cf.
Slovensk' poslonci 11 revisitJ mierO'Vjch smltw for the repudiation of
JehliCka by the various Slovak political parties on December 20, 1933.
:184 Cf. Svornost, July 18, 1934'1811
Cf. ibid., October 2, 1934. for reprint of article found in various
Praha newspapers of August 18, 1934.
1as Cf. "Autonomist", SlowkitJ's PletJ for A"tonomy. This anonymous
38o FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Austria
The situation of Austria again attracted the attention of
the whole world. Several years of interference on the part
of German Nazis had produced a critical situation. The
Fascist government of Chancellor Dollfuss felt compelled to
resist pressure from both Nazis and Socialists. During
February, 1934, in Vienna, there broke out, between the
Fascist authorities and Socialists, an armed conflict in which
several hundred lives were lost.nT Since certain members
of the Czech minority in Vienna had become implicated in
the movement, the Czechoslovak Minister to Austria, Dr.
Zdenek Fierlinger, deemed it necessary to intervene in an
attempt to obtain for them less drastic sentences.138
Bene5 journeyed to Paris to confer with the French
Premier, Doumergue, and the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Barthou, regarding Austria.138
It was decided that,
in all probability, Dollfuss would not need armed support, but
that warning to Germany not to interfere in the internal
affairs of Austria would prove sufficient. On February 17,
1934, Great Britain, France and Italy issued a joint declaration
in favor of the continued independence and integrity of
Austria.14
° France and Italy were wondering whether a
restoration of the Habsburgs might not be an excellent check
monograph attempts to point out how the Czechs have failed to carry out
the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. ,Ostensibly, it is a plea for the
safeguarding of the rights of the Slovaks by a grant of full autonomy,
rather than a plea for separation from the Republic. The existence of
a certain amount of Slovak dissatisfaction with the existing rule cannot
be denied, yet its extent bas often been exaggerated.
U1' Arbeiter Zeittmg, New Freie Presse, The New York Times.
February 12-16, 1934- C/. Langsam, op. cit., pp. 526-535, for a summary
of events in Austria.
'1HNew Freie Presse, February 16, 1934; S1JQmost. February 17, I~
ue The Nett~ York Times. February 16, 1934uo
Nowr:eau recueil, iii serie. vol. XXX. pp. 3 et seq.
THE NAZI CRISIS
against Anschluss, but again BeneS made clear the fact
that such an event would mean war.141
The official attitude
of Czechoslovakia was presented by Benes on March 21,
1934, before the Parliamentary Foreign AffaiJ,"s Committee.
In this expose, after analyzing at length the rival schemes of
interested Powers, BeneS stressed the belief that the only
solution that would guarantee permanent 5a:tisfaction would
be a policy that "Austria must remain Austrian ".142
Nazi activities within Austria caused much concern also
to Mussolini, who sought to revive his earlier project of a
triple pact among Italy, Austria and Hungary. The visits
of Dollfuss (February 7)us and of Fulvia Suvich, Italian
Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs (February 20)/44
to
Budapest to confer with Premier GOmbOs of Hungary were
interpreted as soundings. On March 3, there followed an
official announcement that, on the 14, Dollfuss and GOmbos
would confer with Mussolini in Rome.145
The new bloc was
actually formed on March 17, when the three Premiers
signed three protocols : in the first, they agreed to negotiate,
by May 15, a series of bilateral treaties to aid exports, to
bolster the price of Hungarian wheat, to increase the amount
of commerce passing through the various Adriatic ports, and
to establish, on the model of the Little Entente, a permanent
economic commission of experts; in the second, Italy and
Austria agreed to inaugurate, by April 5, negotiations for a
new commercial treaty; and, in the third, the three states
agreed, in future, to consult mutually upon problems common
to all.148
On May 14, a trade agreement was signed
'141 Svomost, March 10, 1934; Narodnl Listy, March 9. I9J4.
142 Bend, E., The Problem of CenJral Europe and the Austrian
Question, p. ,56.
'1~ Neue Freie Presse, February 8, 1934
'1<14 Ibid., February 21, 1934·
'1411 Carriere dellCJ Sera, March 3, '1934
ue Treaty Series, vol. cliv, pp. 281-303.
382 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
whereby Austria agreed to import 2,200,000 quintals of
Hungarian wheat, and Italy, 2,ooo,ooo quintals-an arrangement
that was intended to preserve the economic status quo.147
On March 23, 1934, in an expose before the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Senate, Benes
pledged his support to Mussolini's plan to stabilize economic
conditions in the Danubian area. He did not wish to render
more difficult any understanding regarding the problems of
Central Europe. Italy, the Dollfuss regime in Austria,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia were, in his estimation, united
in their opposition to any Austro-German union. Benes
admitted the necessity of supplementing a political understanding
with an economic agreement. On the same day,
in another address before the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies, Benes stated that
a solution of the Austrian question would automatically solve
most of the other problems of Central Europe. He was convinced
that the recent resurrection of a feeling of nationalism
within Austria was a positive factor in European politics,
and that Austrian independence would have to be maintained.
Apparently, Benes, in these two addresses, had expressed the
general opposition of Czechoslovakia to revisionism, for, in
the parliamentary discussion that followed, even some German
delegates shared his views.148
The preservation of the status quo became increasingly
difficult after the Nazi revolution, for it soon became evident
that relations with Germany could not be maintained upon
the basis that had prevailed prior to the advent of Hitler to
power. Czechoslovakia was confronted with the self-imposed
problem of saving not only Austria from the clutches
14'1' Nouveau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxx, pp. 10 et seq. A quintal equals
3.67 bushels.
148 Cf. Prager Presse, Ceske Slovo, The New York Times, March 24.
1934·
THE NAZI CRISIS
of Germany, but of _assuring her own preservation as an
independent entity. To the former threat of becoming
almost an enclave whenever Germany might extend their
common frontier by approximately three hundred miles by
the annexation of Austria, was now added the even greater
menace of direct German designs upon the ·integrity of
Czechoslovakia herself, from which Hitler desired to detach
the borderlands inhabited by over three million Germans.
Nor was the Nazi threat merely territorial in nature: the
approach was far more subtle. Since Czechoslovakia remained
almost alone as a democracy in Central Europe and
was virtually surrounded by dictatorships, her leaders faced
·the necessity of combating German-inspired rumors of the
imminent rise of Fascism from within. Masaryk and Benes
discounted the immediate dangers of both foreign war and
Fascism. They regarded such rumors as primarily propaganda
intended for home consumption within the revisionist
states themselves.149
Friction with Germany
Czechoslovak relations with Germany were also becoming
more tense. As early as January 14, 1933, just prior to the
Nazi revolution, Benes warned his people that a war between
Germany and Czechoslovakia over their own differences was
improbable, hut that both states might easily become involved
_in a general conflict.150
When it became evident
that Hitler's tenure of power threatened to become more or
less permanent, the reaction against Nazism became more
pronounced. In the estimation of the Czechoslovaks, Hitler
had done the world a service in tearing the mask from the
face of German militarism, but, in so doing, had nullified in
Htl For Masaryk on war, cf. Svornost, April 13, 1934; on Fascism.
ibid., April I and December II, 1933; for Bene5 on war and democracy,
ibid., February 21-22, 1934; on Fascism, ibid., May 29, 1934uo
Ceske Slovo, January IS, 1933·
384 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
three months fourteen years of patient effort on the part of
German Socialists.151
On May 8, Czechoslovakia listed 334
foreign newspapers, most of them Hitlerite· in nature, whose
circulation was henceforth forbidden within her borders.uz
Czechoslovakia extended assistance to such German exiles
as sought her hospitality.158
Her representative on the
League Council, Osuskj, on May 30, favored speedy League
action on behalf of the Jewish minority in German Upper
Silesia.154
On October 11, the League Assembly provided
an international basis for the care of Jewish refugees.u5
In
the interim, President Masaryk had come to the conclusion
that the situation of the Jews in Germany was an international
problem.158
After he had assured a delegation of
Czechoslovak Jews that anti-Semitism would not be tolerated
by the Republic,u., a \Vorld Congress of Zionists met
in Praha during August. The delegates, 332 in number,
included many of the leaders of the Jewish world. The
Congress planned to aid the emigration of 250,000 Jews
from Germany. Before adjourning, the delegates put themselves
on record as opposing revisionism.158
Czechoslovakia's deep-seated opposition to the Nazi movement
was again revealed on October 4, 1933, when the government
suspended the activity of the German National
151 /bid., May 6, 1933.
UliJQid., May 8, 1933. ,. .
us C/. Svornost, May 23-24. 1933. for estimates that 6,000 members
of the German intelligentsia bad sought refuge in Czechoslovakia from
the persecution of Hitler.
n• O/ficiallD14rnal, July, 1933, pp. 842-843.
1S5Jl;id., December, 1933. pp. 16I6-1618.
15e SvONJOst, August 25. 1933.
151' Ibid., July 20, 1933- Cf. also ibid., October 15, 1933, for Masaryk's
further views.
us Cf. Ceske Slovo, Atlg\lst 21-24. 1933; Svomost, August 22, 23, 28,
1933-
THE NAZI CRISIS
Socialists and the German Nationalists.159
This move was
precautionary and was intended to put an end to Fascism
as an element in internal politics. The order was well timed,
and coincided with a new series of " incidents ". The antiGerman
feeling that had been provided with a fresh impetus
in September by the discovery of a new Pan-German map
which included, among other regions, a third of Czechoslovakia
in the projected new "Third Reich ",160
culminated,
on the last day of the month, in an attack by a Praha
mob on Baron von Bibra, the First Secretary of the German
Legation, who was parading the swastika on the most
crowded streets of the city.161
The German Minister to
Praha could obtain no satisfaction for the incident; 162
rather,
the Czechoslovak police staged raids in order to arrest wellknown
Nazis.168
Czechoslovakia was amazed by Germany's "blood bath"
of June 30, 1934, wherein, according to Nazi reports,
seventy-seven persons lost their lives in a " purge ".164
Hardly had this surprise passed, before there occurred on
July 25, 1934, the assassination of Premier Dollfuss of
Austria by one member of a band of 144 Austrian Nazis.165
1 1111 C/. Ttsk:v (Poslanecki Snemovna), no. 2358, October 19, 1933, 9
session, for law suspending activity of political parties dangerous to the
state. The three largest German parties (Social Democrat, Agrarian and
Christian Socialist) gradually abandoned their hostile attitude towards
the Czechoslovaks. Two smaller parties (National Socialist and Nationalist)
retained Pan-Germanic and anti-Semitic programs. The
former closely imitated Hitlerism, whereas the latter, dating from the
origin of Czechoslovakia, was composed of dissatisfied German radicals.
Cf. Hoch, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
uo Cf. Svomost, September 19, 1933.
181Ibid., The New York Times, October I, 1933.
U'IIThe New York Times, October 4,1933.
168 Svomost, October 9, 1933.
u' Volkischer Beobachter, July 1-3, 1934.
u15 The New York Times, Svomost, July 26, 1934-
386 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVAKJA, 1918-1935
Amid such bloody scenes, Czechoslovakia reaped the reward
for her years of tolerant rule, when even part of her German
minority expressed its gratitude for being·spared participation
in such civil strife.1611
The bloody course of Nazism
was accepted by Czechoslovakia as evidence of the difficulty
of the establishment of cordial relations between Hitler
and herself, another potential victim. In her estimation, the
only recourse was the creation of an overwhelming coalition
that would isolate Germany and impress upon her the utter
hopelessness of any new conflict.187
This viewpoint was
similar to that of France, perhaps an echo of Barthou's statement
that his country would " continue to tighten the screws
of diplomacy until Hitler would be compelled to capi-
tulate.".168
Attempts to Isolate Germany
In Benes' opinion, the situation called for a new orientation
of the Powers. Since the fall of 1931, when the Soviet
Union had come to realize the danger of a war on two fronts
-in Central Europe and the Far East-she had begun to
face about in her foreign policy, from a revisionist to a
status-quo viewpoint. By March of 1934, Moscow had
proceeded so far in the new direction that she began to take
soundings in London and Paris regarding the possibility of
her entry into the League.169
The question was discussed
further at Geneva by Barthou 411d Litvinov on May 18,uo
and, ten days later, the Soviet government announced that it
had been invited to join the League.m To Benes, these
ue Cf. Prager Presse, August 20, 1934UT
Cf. Svonwst, August 17, October 22, 1934ueu
Temps, May 26, 1934; Svomost, May 27, 19J4.
169 Svomost, March 18, 23. 1934uo
Cf. u Temps, May 19, I9J4.
U1fBVestia. May 18, 1934- C/. also, u Temps, May 30. 1934. for
Litvinov's Geneva speech.
THE NAZI CRISIS
motives indicated the advisability of the formation of a new
bloc of France, the U.S.S.R., the Little Entente and the
Balkan Entente, from which Czechoslovakia could not afford
to be excluded.U2
He believed that the time had arrived,
according to the agreement which had been made at the
Little Entente Conference of Zagreb on January 22, 1934.
to recognize the Soviet government.us On June g, Czechoslovakia
and Rumania, apparently with the approval of
Yugoslavia, recognized the Soviet Union: the fact that
Yugoslavia did not act similarly was explained by Benes
as merely an indication that she did not find that particular
time convenient.174
The enthusiasm with which Czechoslovakia
received the announcement indicated what a great
change in sentiment had transpired as a result of the events
of the Nazi crisis.1111
The Little Entente followed the recognition of Moscow
with the Conference of Bucharest, June 13-20, 1934, at which
meeting it was decided to continue mutual cooperation with
a view towards the economic recovery of Central Europe,
and to continue opposition to Hungarian revisionism and to
any restoration of the Habsburgs.176
Hardly had the Conference
terminated, when Barthou arrived from Paris.
That evening, June. 20, he delivered an address in which
he stressed the common interests of France and Rumania
in opposing revisionism.117
After tarrying in Belgrade June
1'12 Bene8, E., Une Nouvelle phase de la lutte pour fequilibre europletS
(speech of July 2, 1934), p. 32.
1u Cf. supra, p. 372.
174 Bend, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
1111 Cf. Narodm Politika, Narodn' Listy, Ceske SlO'VO, July 9-10, 1934;
The Central European Obseroer, July 13, 1934; cf. also, Chmelar, J.,
"Ceskoslovenski zahranicni politika v roce 1934 ", Zahranilm Politika,
vol. xiv, p. 95.
ne The NeUJ York Times, June 20, 1934-
17f Le Temps, June 21, 1934-
388 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
23-26/78
Barthou departed homeward, via Vienna.179
His
trip was highly significant. France was worried over the
future solidarity of the Little Entente, particularly over the
attitude of Yugoslavia. The failure of the Geneva disarmament
conference, and the threatened Italo-German rapprochement,
apparently foreshadowed by Hitler's conference with
Mussolini in Venice on June I4-I5/80
had increased French
uneasiness as to the future.181
Apparently, King Alexander
of Yugoslavia had also decided to fish in troubled waters.
Just as Poland had resented the fact that a · Soviet
rapprochement with France would reduce her own value to
the latter, Alexander, who in view of Nazi interference
within Austria discounted the possibility of a lasting ItaloGerman
rapprochement, felt that an Italo-French rapprochement,
which he believed inevitable if Anschluss was to
be averted, might involve an abandonment of his own country
by France. Yugoslavia had nothing to fear either from
Moscow or from Anschluss, but did fear a Habsburg
restoration and the extension of Italian influence in Central
Europe and the Balkans. Might not a recognition of the
U.S.S.R. antagonize Germany needlessly without any corresponding
gain for herself? · Should not Yugoslavia keep
open, against a possible Habsburg restoration and future
war with Italy, the chance of obtaining German support,
which, conceivably, might be more powerful and more willingly
extended than that of Fram:e? Obviously, Alexander
must have been motivated by some such reflections, when,
according to reports, he declined to take any further action
regarding the Soviet Union and promised merely to pay a
visit to France in autumn.182
'118/bid., June 26, 1934- 1111 Ibid., June 27, 1934-
180 C/. Volkische,. Beobach.te,., June 15-16, 1934.
181 Cf. The Cent,.al European Observe,., July 13, 1934. for Barthou's
own comment on his trip.
usC/. Duranty, op. cit., p. 23; Simonds and Erneny, op. cit., p. 316.
THE NAZI CRISIS
Moscow continued -her peaceful policy by offering to Germany
an amity pact to include also Po14nd and Czechoslovakia,
but her overtures were rejected by Hitler.183
Undeterred
by this rebuff, Litvinov suggested, as an alternative,
an Eastern Locamo Mutual Assistance Pa~t embracing
Germany, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and the
Baltic states.184
His project enlisted the support of Italy
and Great Britain,1811
and, later, of France as welP88
Both
Germany and Poland professed to see no benefits for themselves
in the new agreement.187
The Soviet Union offered a
compromise--she would adhere to the Western Locarno Pact
if Germany would do the same for the East; 188
she demanded
some Eastern agreement prior to her entry into the
League.189
Nevertheless, Poland continued to oppose the
plan as too indefinite,U0
and Germany suggested instead a
series of bilateral treaties.191
At last France lost patience
and demanded from Poland a clear-cut answer as to her
stand, hinting broadly that a negative reply might create a
Franco-Soviet alliance.192
The exact contents of the Polish
reply were not published.1118
On September 18, 1934, the
Soviet Union became a member of the League.194
·
J.8B Volkischer Beobachter, June 18, I9J4.
184The New York Times, June 24. 1934-
1811 Ibid., July 14, 1934-
188 Ibitl, July 16, 1934.
18'1' Ibid., July x6-17, 1934.
us Ibid., July 24, 1934; cf. also, ibid., July 22, 1934, for a summarY of
the negotiations.
1so Ibid., September 2, 1934uo
Ibid., July 29, September 9, 1934.
1111 Ibid., September u, 1934llll!
Ibid., September 2, 1934-
1118 Ibid., September 28, 1934·
111• Official Journal, November, 1934, pp. 1392-IJ¢, and special supplement,
no. 123, p. 18.
390 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Czechoslovakia supported whole-heartedly the entry of the
U.S.S.R. into the League, whose prestige would be enhanced
by such an accession, and her attitude was supported by her
Little Entente partners.195
Even Poland withdrew its opposition
to a permanent Council seat for the Soviet Union.196
On September 13, the Little Entente announced its approval
of the proposed Eastern Locarno Pact.197
On the 26, Litvinov
and Barthou agreed upon a Mutual Assistance Pact
that would include not only their own countries, but the
Little Entente, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Spain.198
So idealistic
a project could not be realized.
The summer of 1934 witnessed further steps in the isolation
of Germany, when both Great Britain and Italy, which
had formerly looked askance at a Franco-Soviet rapprochement,
came to welcome it, and even .considered joining it, in
order to curb the Nazi menace. Within Great Britain there
had been developing, even before the Nazi " blood bath ",
sentiment against repeating the mistake of 1914, when a
clear-cut stand might have averted the World War; and,
after the "purge", the ties with France became closer.199
Similarly, Italy was aroused to action when a year and a half
of Nazi interference within Austria culminated in the assassination
of Dollfuss on July 25, 1934. For Germany, this
event represented a setback in that it alienated the only Great
Power in Europe that might have,.been friendly, Italy, which
was thereby almost compelled to seek the friendship of
France.200
195 The New York Times, September I, 1934-
196 The Times, August 30, 1934-
19'1 Ceske Slovo, September 14, I934us
The New York Times, September 26, 1934.
198 Cf. Duranty, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
2oo Ibid., p. 19; Simonds and Emeny, op. cit., p. 274-
THE NAZI CRISIS 391
At once, Mussolini ordered an army to the Austrian frontier
to prevent Anschluss.201
Italy's speedy action in tum
alarmed Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, both of which
took prompt military measures also, for, to them, the extension
of Italian control over Austria would be intolerable.
The situation became critical and complex. Whereas Yugoslavia
sought particularly to prevent. Austria's falling into
the hands of Italy, Czechoslovakia sought ·to save Austria
from both Italy and Germany.202
Apparently, Prince Starhemberg,
Austria's Acting Chancellor after the murder of
Dollfuss, preferred to cooperate with·the Little Entente and
Italy, rather than join Germany.203
Barthou frankly declared
his opposition to any solution of the Austrian question
which would make Italy preponderant in Central Europe.206
It appeared that Yugoslavia, of the small states, held the
key to the situation. Should she desert France for Germany,
she might be followed by Rumania, and even by Hungary.
Thus, not only would the Little Entente and the French
system of alliances be threatened with disruption, but Italy
would lose her friend, Hungary. Such an eventuality was
not impossible, for neither Yugoslavia, Rumania, nor Hungary
was threatened directly by German ambitions in Central
Europe, but on the contrary, found her a better market for
their agricultural products than either France or Italy. In
this emergency, Barthou sought to clarify the situation by
inviting King Alexander to visit France.205
Instead of clarifying the situation, Alexander's visit to
France made matters worse when, on October 9, 1934, both
Alexander and Barthou were assassinated in Marseilles by
201 Coniere della SerrJ, July 26, I934-
20ll Ceske Slovo, July 3o-August 2, 1934.
zoa The New York Times, September 16, 1934.
206 Ibid., September 26, 1934-
205 Cf. Simonds and Emecy, ol. cit., p. 275.
392 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
a Croatian terrorist. Barthou's death apparently was an
accident, the result of his attempt to protect the King, whom
certain dissatisfied subjects had sought to slay as part of a
plot to disrupt the unity of Yugoslavia.2011
On October 14 the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente
met at Belgrade to confer regarding their stand against
lsC:t.~C;;.;.i· t!"rrorists,207
and, on the 19, united in a protest in
which they accuseri· Hungary of abetting the assassins.20
s
Large detachments of the Yi.tgoslav army were concentrated
on the Hungarian frontier, and it was decided to request the
League to investigate the charges against Hungary. The
general situation was explained to both houses of parliament
by Benes in an expose of November 6, 1934.209
Assured of the support of her Little Entente partners, of
Greece, Turkey and France,210
Yugoslavia threatened to take
matters into her own hands if no satisfaction was forthcoming
from Geneva. Hungary demanded the withdrawal
of Benes as President of the League Council when the case
would be tried.211
Despite French requests for further delay
in order that some agreement might be reached with Italy,
Yugoslavia actually submitted her protest to the League on
November 22.:112
Two days later a fresh crisis was reached
when Hungary demanded immediate action regarding the
charges, which she characterized as a threat to the peace of
Europe.213
Matters were embittered still further when
1':
2oe Cf. Le Temps, The Times, The New York Times, October IO, 1934.
207 The Netu York Times, October 14, 1934
2oSibid., October 19, 1934·
200 Benes, E., Vers un regroupement des forces en Europe!, Sources
et documents tchecoslovaques, no. 26.
2IO Cf. Padelford, op. cit., pp. 114-115 and 124-125.
211 Official Journal, December, 1934, p. 1769.
212Ibld., pp. 1765-1766.
2l8 Ibid., p. I768.
THE NAZI CRISIS 393
Yugoslav troops dro~e across the frontier into Hungary
several thousand Magyars who had resided in Yugoslavia
since the War and who had not been naturalized.2
u.
The League, which considered the dispute December 7-10,
1934, finally evolved a satisfactory compromise. In the
course of the deliberations, the Little Entente again demonstrated
its solidarity. Bene5, speaking for Czechoslovakia,
threatened her resignation from the League· Council unless
that organization demonstrated sufficient courage and efficiency
to prevent an armed conflict between Hungary and
Yugoslavia. However, Benes took care to explain that such
a step would not mean that his country would withdraw
from the League.2111
After denouncing the principles of
revisionism, Titulescu, speaking for the Little Entente,
pointed out that Hungary's national honor was in no way
questioned, whereupon both Hungary and Yugoslavia accepted
the draft treaty sponsored by France, whereby there
was created a permanent international investigating committee
of five members for the suppression of terrorism.218
At the same time all further frontier deportations ceased.
Upon his return to Praha, Benes explained his strong stand
by pointing out that the object of revisionism was to destroy
the status quo in Central Europe, and that revisionism could
never accomplish its ends in a peaceable manner.21
'~
The outcome of the assassination crisis helped further the
isolation of Germany. A sensation was created on Novem- ·
her 23 when Leon Archimbaud, Reporter of the Budget, announced,
in the course of a debate in the French Chamber of
Deputies, that the Soviet Union had offered her army to
216 Ibid., p. 1755·
li'15Ibid., pp. 1723-1728 and 1745-1748; Benes, E., Le Sens politiqw de
Ia tragedie de !.!arseille, Sources et documents tcbecoslovaques, no. 27.
218 Official Journal, December, 1934, p. 176o.
2'17 Ndrodni Politika, December 16, 1934-
394 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
France in the event of a war with Germany.218
This statement
of an alliance was in all appearances premature, yet,
subsequent denials by the Quai D'Orsay failed to remove the
impression that an alliance was imminent.219
The signature,
on December 5, by France and the U.S.S.R. of a protocol
which called for joint negotiations regarding the completion
of an Eastern Locarno agreement seemed to confirm the
new trend of events.22
° Czechoslovakia adhered to this
protocol on December 12.221
France and Italy, after protracted negotiations, also
reached a rapprochement on January 7, 1935. Signed by the
F.rench Foreign Minister who succeeded Barthou, Laval,
and by Mussolini, the new Rome accord specified: ( 1) a pact
of consultation whereby the two countries agreed to consult
with one another upon all European questions, particularly
in the event that Austrian independence should be jeopardized;
(2) a pact of non-intervention, to be signed by the
Little Entente, Austria, Hungary and possibly ~rmany;
(3) other powers might accede to the consultative provisions
of the pact and (4) colonial concessions by France to Italy
in Africa. Although both negotiators disclaimed that the
new accord was aimed at any particular country, the specific
guarantee of Austrian independence left no doubt that it
was intended against Germany.222
In this manner was a new ring of nations created around
Germany. Except for distant Japan, whose willingness and
ability to engage in a war in Central Europe were alike inconceivable,
and for Poland, whose military value and sin-
21s Anmues de Ia Chambre des Deputes, IS legislature, session extraordinaire
de 1934. I partie, I seance le 23 novembre, 1934. p. 2572.
· 219 Le Temps, November 24, I9J4.
220 Nouveau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxx, pp. 643-644.
221 The New York Times, December 12, 1934-
222 N o'U'Veau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxx, pp. 644 ef seq.
THE NAZI CRISIS 395
cerity were alike open to question, Nazified Germany appeared
deserted by all whose weight was of great value.
Nevertheless, Hitler continued to reiterate his demands for
absolute German equality with the other Great Powers, on
land, on sea, in the air, and colonially.
Czechoslovakia welcomed enthusiastically the FrancoSoviet
and the F ranco-ltalian rapprochements as ensuring
the peace of Europe and her own safety.223
Both rapprochements
were viewed with almost equal cordiality by her Little
Entente partners. On January I I, 1935, at Ljubljana, the
three Little Entente Foreign Ministers-Bene5; Yeftic and
Titulescu-met to discuss the new situation that had been
created by the recent Franco-Italian accord and to formulate
a unified policy regarding it.22
" The decision of the
conference was made public by Titulescu, who stated that the
Little Entente would enter negotiations regarding a Danubian
Pact only as a unit.225
He was reported to have demanded
also four specific conditions upon which alone the
Little Entente would consider accession : (I and 2) the
restoration of the Habsburgs and the minorities question,
respectively, would not be considered as solely internal
affairs of any signatory Power; (3) all revisionist propaganda
regarding the territories of signatories would be
dropped and (4) the exceptional privileges enjoyed by some
citizens of certain signatory states within the territories
of another state (i. e. the special economic privileges of
Italians in Dalmatia) would terminate with the signature of
the new pact.220
Although the effect of Titulescu's reported
demands upon France and Italy is not known, the fact re~~~
Cf. Ceske Slovo, Cas, Narodnl Politika, Narodnl Listy, January
8-g, 1935·
112• Svonwst, January 12, 1935·
11211 The New Yol'k Times, January 12, 1935.
220 Ibid., January 29. 1935·
396 FG_REIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
mained that the Little Entente did not accede to the Rome
accord of January 7, 1935.
Nazi success in the Saar plebiscite of January 15, 1935,
increased Czechoslovak apprehensions regarding Hitler's
ultimate objectives. Rumors spread that Hitler might attempt
a series of other plebiscites unauthorized by the Treaty
of Versailles, particularly in Memel, Danzig, the Belgian
communes of Eupen and Malmedy, Austria, and the German
regions of Bohemia.227
Fears of German surprise air
attacks and growing convictions that Anglo-French negotiations
with Germany regarding an air pact of non-aggression
would produce no concrete results induced the Czechoslovak
government in February, 1935, to approve a comprehensive
plan of aerial defense. The new enactment
required the owners of all large domiciles to provide bomb
and gas proof concrete basements for the inmates. Employers
were to provide similar shelters for their employees. All
citizens were required to purchase gas masks. The larger
cities were to provide warning sirens and first-aid stations.
Severe penalties were to be meted out for sabotaging any air
defense equipment. The government could force the sale
of any property needed for defense purposes. Such elaborate
precautions might not be necessary, but, in view of the
fact that the Republic was almost surrounded by more or
less hostile neighbors, it was deemed best to take no
chances.228
'
On March 16, 1935, Hitler proclaimed compulsory military
service throughout Germany. By this decree the standing
army was increased to thirty-six divisions (soo,ooo-
6oo,ooo men). Although Hitler pleaded the necessity for
self defense,229
particularly against the Soviet Union which
2 2'1 Cf. Svornost, January 21, 22, February 16, 1935.
22a Ti.rky (Senat), no. 1436, February 22, 1935, 2 session.
220 Viilkischer Beobachter, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 16, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS 397
maintained a standing army of 940,000 men/30
his move
aroused general apprehensions. On March 18 Great Britain
sent a note of protest against Germany's unilateral abrogation
of the Treaty of Versailles.231
Three days later France
and Italy sent similar protests,232
all of which were unheeded
by Germany. After this repudiation of the Treaty of
Versailles, Czechoslovakia felt compelled to rearm also.233
Within a week she was reported to have begun new fortifications
on the German frontier.234
The Austrian government feared Hitler also.235
Chancellor
Schuschnigg and Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg
visited Paris (February 21-23) and London (February
24-26) in an effort to obtain further assistance against
German threats. They were received politely but without
enthusiasm in both western capitals. The British and
French governments agreed to help maintain Austrian independence,
but refused Austria any further loans and
renewed their bans against a Habsburg restoration.236
The question of Austria's future became also the subject
of discussions between the Little Entente and Italy. On
March 25, Titulescu, who was spokesman for both the
Balkan and the Little Ententes, conferred with Yeftic at
Belgrade in the course of a tour through the states of the
Little Entente. An unofficial report from Belgrade indicated
that a difference of opinion had developed between Italy and
the Little Entente. The former was apparently willing to
approve the reintroduction of compulsory military service
230 PublicatioM, Disarmament, 1935, ix S, p. 839.
:a1 The Times, March 19, 1935.
n1 Le Temps, March 22, 1935.
ua The NeuJ York Times, March 17, 1935.
u• Ibid., March 24. 1935·
2311 Cf. Neue Freie Presse, January 16, 1935.
sse The Times, Le Temps, Svornost, February 22-27, 1935.
398 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
within Austria as essential to prevent ultimate annexation by
Germany, whereas the latter opposed such a move as establishing
a precedent for the rearming of both Hungary and
Bulgaria. The rearming of Austria might not represent a
threat to the Little Entente, but the rearming of either
Hungary or Bulgaria would be met "in the most resolute
manner ,., (i. e. mobilization) by the three partners.2117
Two
days later Titulescu met Benes at Bratislava enroute to
Paris. Apparently, the two statesmen were in complete
accord, for, on departing, Titulescu stated that " no power
could separate Czechoslovakia and Rumania ".238
The Western Powers also decided to hold a Conference
in order to try to agree upon acommon line of action regarding
Germany. To this end, Eden, British Lord Privy
Seal, Laval, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Suvich,
Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, met at Paris on
March 23 and decided to call a three-Power Conference at
Stresa for April 11.289
Thereupon, Eden, together with
Simon, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, departed
for Berlin to hold a series of "exploratory conversations ".
On March 25-26 they conferred with Hitler and the German
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Neurath.240
Upon his
return to London on March 27, Simon gave the press a summary
of the results. According to Simon, Germany refused
to join any "Eastern Locarno ", Pact of Rome, or other
guarantee of existing Danubi:ln boundaries. Allegedly,
Hitler demanded also a navy of 400,000 tons, an air force
equal to that of the Soviet Union, a reopening of the question
of the Austro-German Customs Union together with an
Austrian plebiscite upon the issue and the cession by Czecho-
23T Svornost, March 26, 1935.
238 The New York Times, March 28, 1935.
2S9 Ibid., March 24, 1935.
240 Ibid., March 25-26, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS 399
slovakia of territory said to contain 3,soo,ooo Germans.241
However, it still remained a question whether Hitler had
merely hinted or had expressed openly such views.
While Berlin newspapers printed columns regarding
Hitler's "moderation,. and denied any desire to dominate
Europe or to seize territories beyond Germany's existing
frontiers,242
great indeed was the pessimis~ in London,243
and the anger in Praha."4
At Paris, Titulescu delivered to
Laval what was virtually an ultimatum of the Little Entente.
Unless France would take immediate measures to create an
effective " ring of steel " around Germany, the Little Entente
would be compelled to open negotiations with Germany itself.
As a result of his conversations at Belgrade and Bratislava,
Titulescu pointed out that the Little Entente expected unstinted
French support, failing which it would seek a
rapprochement with Germany. To avert a collapse in the
existing system of alliances, Titulescu suggested that France
attempt to draw Poland again within her orbit and that
France negotiate as soon as possible a military alliance with
the U.S.S.R. By the creation of an overwhelming coalition
alone could Germany, in his estimation, be made to disarm:215
Eden embarked on another series of visits in an effort to
isolate Germany. On March 29 he arrived in Moscow to
confer with Stalin, who promised to do all in his power to
cooperate with the Western Powers in attempting to preserve
the peace of Europe.248
On April 1, Eden came to Warsaw,
u1 The Times, March 27-28, 1935.
us Vorwaerts, Vossische Zeitung, Volkischer Beobachter, March 27-29.
1935·
ua Cf. The Times, March 29-30, 1935.
liH Cas, Nlwodnl Politika, Pravo LUlu, S'l}(Jntost, March 27-30, '19JS.
245 S'l}(Jrnost, Le Temps, March 30, 1935; cf. also, The New York Times,
March 30-31, 1935.
u•Jsrvestia, Svomost, March 30, 1935; cf. The New York Times,
April r, 1935, for joint statement of Eden and Litvinov.
400 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
where he was received coolly by Pilsudski and Beck. Poland
remained firm in objecting to an "Eastern Locarno ", par.
ticularly since such an agreement might make her the battleground
between Germany and the Soviet Union and, under
certain conditions, might even obligate her to defend Soviet
territory.247
At Praha, on Apri14, Eden received the warmest
welcome. The similarity between the foreign policies of
the two countries was brought out forcibly by Bend' state~
ment, "we pursue the same policies and objectives as Great
Britain ", and by Eden's response, " we stand or fall together
".248
Upon returning to London, Eden pointed out
that his tour had convinced him of the impossibility of including
Germany either in an " Eastern Locarno " or in any
pact with Great Britain, France and Italy.249
Mussolini also regarded the situation as being critical.
He warned Great Britain and France that the Stresa Conference
must bring Germany's aggressive policy to a halt.
To that end he made the following suggestions: (I) it is
useless to make peaceful gestures towards Germany, (2) the
three Great Powers-Great Britain, France and Italy-must
clarify the fact that Germany cannot continue to break treaties
without suffering the consequences, (3) Germany must be
punished for violating the Treaty of Versailles, (4) new
steps must be taken to guarantee the integrity of Austria,
and (5) the rearming of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria
must be permitted under some compromise that remained to
be negotiated.250
·
Benes regarded the general situation more optimistically.
In his estimation, the best basis for peace would be unity
247 The New York Times, Svornost, Gazeta Warssawska, April 2-3,
1935·
2u Svornost, The New York Times, April S, 1935.
lid The New York Times, The Times, April6, 1935.
250 The Times, April 4, 1935; Svornost, April 5, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS 401
among the three Great Powers of Western Europe.261
The
encirclement of Germany appeared more imminent when the
Balkan and Little Ententes stated that they not only approved
a Franco-Soviet alliance, but would join it eventually.252
On the other hand, according to a rumor emanating from
Vienna, Austria was on the verge of an alliance with Germany.
It was alleged that Austria would send to Stresa an
envoy who would demand a cancellation of the military
clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain in order that Austria
might have an army of 65,000 men, 30,000 of whom would
be " selected conscripts ".258
The Stresa Conference of April II-14, 1935, established
a united front of Great Britain, France and Italy and represented
a joint effort in defense of peace. Again Great
Britain refused to accept any definite continental commitments
beyond those of Locarno. The Conference decided
that Austrian independence could best be preserved by a
Danubian Pact which would include all the neighbors of
Austria. In order that such a Pact might be consummated,
Mussolini invited all interested Powers to a Conference at
Rome, tentatively for May 20. With regard to an Eastern
Pact, the three Great Powers concluded merely to continue
discussions for "the· consolidation of security in Eastern
Europe". France had already decided to enter into such a
pact with the Soviet Union, and even Germanyhad agreed to
accede to it, at least to some limited degree. With regard to
the question of the rearming of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria,
Italy and France expressed the conflicting views of
the three former enemy states and of the Little Entente
:a51 The New Yo,.k Times, AprilS, 1935.
15•Ibid., April n, I935· Cf. also, Padelford, op. cit., pp. 127-129. for
the cooperation of the Balkan and Little Ententes, both of whom were
represented by Titulescu.
ll5a New Freie Presse, April 4. 1935.
402 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
respectively. Since the Stresa Conference had decided to
bring before the League the question of Germany's violation
of the Treaty of Versailles by rearming, the Little Entente
did not intend to permit the approval of similar violations of
the Peace Treaties by the smaller former enemy states. As
the result of Laval's forceful pleading of the Little Entente's
views, the Stresa Conference decided that any rearming of
the small former enemy states would have to await a truly
effective peace and security agreement negotiated under the
contemplated Danubian Pact.254
The condemnation of Germany
as a violator of the Treaty of Versailles by the League
Council on April 17 inferred that similar condemnation
might follow any further violations of the Peace Treaties
by other states.255
Czechoslovakia received the results of
the Stresa Conference enthusiastically. Her people looked
forward to the approaching Conference of Rome and to the
imminent Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, which
would be followed by a similar pact between the U.S.S.R
and Czechoslovakia.256
On May 2, at Paris, Laval and the Russian Ambassador to
France, Potemkin, signed a Franco-Russian pact of mutual
assistance. Negotiated entirely within the framework of
the League, the new pact contemplated : (I) consultation in .
the event of any danger of aggression, (2) immediate aid
in the event of "unprovoked aggression", (3) "aid and
assistance " in the event of unprovoked aggression by a
nation which violated the League Covenant by such action,
(4) this pact would not be interpreted in a manner which
might restrict the duties or obligations of members of the
League and ( 5) this pact would endure for five years, and
would continue indefinitely unless denounced one year before
254 The Times, The New York Times, April 12-15, 1935.
2511 Official Journal, May, 1935. pp. 556-571.
256 The Central European Observer, April19, May J, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS
the end of the five year period.257
The protocol of signature
which accompanied the pact showed the true significance of
the rapprochement. One clause specified that " undertakings
in this treaty refer only to cases of aggression against either
of the contracting parties' own territory ". Although the
Locarno agreements were not mentioned specifically, they
were amply protected by the statement tha~ the new pact
" shall not be carried out in any way which, being inconsistent
with treaty obligations undertaken by the contracting
parties, might expose the latter to sanctions of an international
character". German accession to the pact might
ensue " although circumstances have not hitherto permitted
the conclusion of these agreements, which the two parties
still look upon as desirable, the fact remains that the understandings
set forth in the Franco-Soviet treaty of assistance
are to be understood to come into play only within the limits
contemplated in the tripartite agreement (i. e. among the
U.S.S.R., France and Germany) previously projected". In
contrast with the pre-war alliance between France .and
Russia, the new agreement was much more limited in scope.
An outgrowth of the desire for an Eastern Locarno, it was
aimed only at Germany (i. e. France would not be required .
to aid the U.S.S.R. against Japan).258
The signature of the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual
assistance was followed by a report that France would help
finance the construction of strategic roads and railroads along
the western frontiers of the Soviet Union.2611
On May 13
Laval visited Moscow.1180
Two days later he and Litvinov
issued a joint invitation that nations which objected to an
l!5T Nouveau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxxi, pp. 645 et seq. Ratifications
were exchanged at Paris, March 27, I936·
258 Cf. The New York Times, February 28, 1936, for article comparing
the two alliances.
2511 Ibid., May 4. 1935.
260 Le Temps, May 14. 1935.
404 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKJA, 1918-1936
" Eastern Locarno " should join a non-aggression pact
which would have no military obligations,261
Czechoslovakia hastened to associate herself with France
and the U.S.S.R. As a matter of fact, her relations with
Moscow had become increasingly cordial since-her recognition
of the Soviet regime, and she had been waiting merely
for France to take the initiative. Ali alliance between
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had been rumored
early in January, 1935, when a delegation of Czechoslovak
journalists was received in Moscow with acclaim so unusually
cordial 262
as to draw the ire of both Germany 268
and Poland.264
A further gesture of friendship was the
signing, on March 25, of two· new Soviet-Czechoslovak
treaties. One was a simple patent agreement, whereas the
other, a trade credit treaty, was of relatively greater importance.
Czechoslovakia had organized recently an Export
Institute to investigate foreign trade and had opened commercial
negotiations with the U.S.S.R., Austria and Hungary.
Upon the recommendation of the Export Institute,
the new commercial treaty with the Soviet Union included
mutual most-favored-nation clauses, equitable import quotas
and foreign exchange regulations, and an extension of the
state guarantee of export credits. When ratified, this treaty
would extend to the U.S.S.R. a credit of 25o,ooo,ooo
Czechoslovak crowns.265
The treaty of mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia
and the Soviet Union, similar to that between France and the
Soviet Union, was actually signed in Praha on May 16 by
Benes and by the Soviet Minister to Czechoslovakia, Alex-
261/bid., May 16, 1935.
26:1 Cf. Svornost, January IS, 21, February 10, I935·
268 Vossische Zeitung, January 8, 1935.
264 Gazeta Warszawska, January 8, 1935.
2611 Prager Presse, Cas, March 26, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS
androvskj. The pact was to become effective whenever one
of the signatories became the object of an unprovoked attack
on the part of a European state, in which case the other
would assist immediately. It was to be noted, however, that,
as in the case of the Franco-Soviet treaty, aid .to Moscow
would not be forthcoming against a .Japanese attack. The
protocol of signature specified also that " both governments
understood that the obligation of mutual assistance becomes
effective only when it shall meet the foreseen conditions of
the pact and when the victim of aggression shall receive also
theafd of France". Czechoslovakia would not be obligated
to assist the U.S.S.R. if France should refuse to do so. Still
another variation from the Franco-Soviet pact was represented
by a so-called " neutrality clause ", whereby, in the
event of an attack upon one of the signatories " by one or
two states, under circumstances that could not be foreseen,
the other signatory must not aid, directly or indirectly, the
aggressor, and both signatories offer one another assurances
that there exists no secret treaty which would invalidate the
fulfillment of these understandings ''.266
At the same time
the two states negotiated an air convention whereby service
between Moscow and Praha was to be begun in August.
The direct route would have been via Warsaw, but when
Poland refused permission to fly across her territory, the
route was projected via Kiev and Uihorod.267
.
The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of mutual assistance,
which was negotiated with the approval of Rumania and
Yugoslavia,268
was followed by a visit of Benes to Moscow,
whither he had received repeated invitations. Enroute, at
260 Nouveau recueil, iii serie, vol. xxxi, pp. 327 ef seq.
267 The Central European Observer, May 31, 1935; cf. also, The Nev~
York Times, April 18, 1935.
268 The New York Times, May 17, 1935.
4o6 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Warsaw, he received a cool reception.269
At Moscow, Benes
and Litvinov exchanged ratifications of the mutual assistance
pact, of the air treaty, of the patent agreement and of the
trade credit treaty. They agreed that the only way to preserve
European peace was by an extension of the mutual
assistance pact to other states. Their three day conference
terminated with a joint communique stating that Czechoslovakia's
geographic position had been a dominant factor in
the rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.270
The communique
was followed almost immediately by a report that the Soviet
Union and Rumania were also negotiating a pact of mutual
assistance.1
!71.
The various states of Central Europe were looking forward
also to the contemplated Danubian Pact. At the Conference
of Venice, which terminated on May 6, Austria,
Hungary and Italy were reported to have reached a tacit
understanding favorable to Hungarian rearming. Italy was
alleged to have promised her moral support to a " rectification"
of Hungarian frontiers in return for a Hungarian
guarantee of Austrian independence.212
An interesting sidelight
to the Conference of Venice was the report that Suvich
had induced Beck, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
who was then visiting Italy, to participate in the Danubian
negotiations and help counterbalance the influence of France
and the Little Entente.278
The Foreign Ministers of tli.e three Little Entente states
and of Greece met at Bucharest May ro-n. They viewed
the situation realistically. Since eventual Hungarian and
Bulgarian rearming was perhaps inevitable, would it not be
269 Ibid., June g, 1935.
210 Ibid., June II, 1935.
211 Ibid., June 14, 1935.
an The Times, Le Temps, May '1, 1935·
ara The Central European Obseroer, May 24, 1935·
THE NAZI CRISIS
4<>7
advisable to please th~ Western Powers by approving the
recommendation of the Conference of Stresa? What price
might be exacted from Hungary and Bulgaria for such consent?
In view of these considerations, the Little Entente
and Greece agreed that these states accede to a six-Power
pact of non-aggression and of mutual assistance.274
The
Little Entente was willing to abandon its long opposition to
the rearming of the former enemy states on· condition that
they guarantee the status quo and agree to terminate revisionist
propaganda.275
Both the Little Entente and the Balkan
Entente were haunted by two fears: (I) Hungary and Bulgaria
would probably refuse to perpetuate their own dismemberment
in return for a right they assumed already theirs
and (2) the whole conception of a Danubian Pact was
jeopardized seriously by Mussolini's African policy.:m
The Henlein Movement
In the midst of the Soviet and Danubian negotiations,
Czechoslovakia held, on May I9, the fourth general elections
to both houses of parliament. The elections were orderly
and resulted in but few changes in the governmental coalition,
in which seven parties divided 166 of the 300 seats in
the Chamber of Deputies, and 82 of the ISO seats in the
Senate. However, most striking was the rise of the Sudetendeutsche
Partei of Konrad Henldn,277
which polled over
a million votes as against four million for the governmental
coalition. Absorbing the German National Socialists and
the German Nationalists, it obtained 67 seats in parliament.
Never before had two-thirds of the German votes been conlilT~
The New York Times, May n-12, 1935.
zn The Central European Observer, May 24. 1935.
liTe The New York Times, May 24. 1935. For the Italo-Ethiopian war,
c/. infra, pp. 420 et seq.
nr Prior to his entry into potltics, Henlein was an obscure gymnastics
instructor.
4o8 FOREIGN POUCY OF CZECHOSLOVA.KIA., 1918-1935
centrated in one party. The fact that the governmental coalition
had been weakened could not be disguised. Significant
also was the fact that the new party was not given representation
in the Malypetr cabinet.218
Despite the pledge of
loyalty Henlein made to Czechoslovakia and to the ideals of
democratic government, he was distrusted by the Czechoslovaks,
particularly after he had objected to the secondary
position to which his party had been relegated politically.218
The Geske Slovo took the lead in denouncing him as
" Czechoslovakia's Hitler •• and in alleging that he represented
Pan-Germanism financed by the Reich. It pointed
out in particular that, in the estimation of Germany, the rise
of the new party justified calling Czechoslovakia "the
appendix whose removal was necessary before Europe could
be restored to political health ".280
Despite the new fears that were aroused as a result of
the consolidation of the Germanic opposition, the fact that a
composite state like Czechoslovakia, with fourteen political
parties, could enjoy five and one-half years of political peace
without the necessity of new elections was definite proof of
her political stability.281
Since 1926, when Czechoslovakia's
German minority had decided to cooperate politically with the
various Czech and Slovak parties,232
its leader, Dr. Spina,
had advocated a cultural union with Germany to which no
278 Cf. The Central EswopeaK Observer, May 24, 31, June 14, 1935.
2111 The New York Times, June 21, '1935.
28o Cf. CeskJ Slovo, May 23-25, 1935·
2s1 Two other minor threats to the Czechoslovak Republic were deemed
to be Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, which won twenty-two seats, and
Gajda's Fascists, who won six seats. The smallest of Czechoslovak
parties, the Fascist National Community was represented in parliament
for the first time after the 1935 election. Cf. Hoch, op. cit., PP. 35-36.
Gajda had resumed political activity after the 1933 amnesty for all
political offenses. For the law, cf. Tisky {Poslanecka Snemovna), no.
2388, October 12, 1933, 9 session.
282 Cj. supra, p. 258.
THE NAZI CRISIS
liberal Czechoslovak had objected. However, Henlein's new
conception," Volksgemeinschaft ",indicated more than mere
cultural affinity, although the exact nature of this " more "
has·not been specified. Coupled with an avowed intention
to influence the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia to the
abandonment of its present world-wide orientation in favor
of a narrow orientation as a satellite of. Germany, it was cal~
culated to arouse grave concern among patriotic Czechs
and Slovaks.288
Czechoslovak mistrust mounted with the discovery that
followers of Henlein were prominent in three different
espionage" affairs" that had come to light during the year.28
~
Benes sought to extend the olive branch to Germany on June
19 when he pointed out, to a delegation of Berlin newspaper
representatives visiting Praha, that the chief goal of his
foreign policy was the attainmentof a friendly understanding
with Germany which would not contravene Czechoslovakia's
existing obligations to France. In his estimation, a
rapprochement with Germany would go far towards solving
the problem of Czechoslovakia's German minority,285
but no
rapprochement with Germany resulted. A new sensation
was created by Henlein on September 2 I when he sued the
Prager Presse for libel for having stated that his movement
had been financed by 50,000 marks from the German Minister
of Propaganda, GObbels.286
The disclosures caused two
2ss Cf. The Central European Observer, December 13, 1935, for article
entitled "Konrad Henlein in a Vicious Circle"; Hoch, op. cit., pp. 41-44For
contrasting accounts of what the Henlein movement means for Germans
and Czechs, respectively, cf. A German Bohemian Deputy, "The
German Minority in Czechoslovakia", The Slavonic Gnd East Europeatt
Review, vol. xiv, pp. 295-300, January, 1936; Sobota, E., "Czechs and
Germans: a Czech view", ibid., pp. 301-320.
286 Cf. Svornost, April 17, August 15, November 4, S, 21, 1935.
2n Ibid., June 19, 1935.
2ss Cf. Prager Presse, September 21-22, 1935·
410 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
of his followers in the Chamber of Deputies, Hans Krebs
and Rudolf Jung, to flee into voluntary exile in Germany, an
act which convinced Czechoslovaks of the their guilt and
led to demands that the Henlein party be disbanded by governmental
decree as a threat against the integrity of the
Republic.287
The Czechoslovak authorities were at a loss
whether to oppose Henlein or to compromise with him,288
for both alternatives were distasteful. Early in December
Czechoslovak public opinion was somewhat mollified when
Dr. Spina, .in a public address in Most (Briix), subjected
Henlein's policies to severe criticism on the grounds that
they aroused needlessly the antipathies and fears of the
Czechs, whereas in reality, according to Spina, there was little
probability that Germany would attempt to annex Czechoslovakia's
Germanic borderlands.2811
The fact that the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia would
remain unchanged after the elections was made clear by
several official pronouncements. In two press interviews,
Benes pointed out his belief that collective security compacts
could best preserve peace, which might become threatened
seriously in the critical years 1936-1937,290
and that the
creation of international friendships would be the chief goal
of his foreign policy.:m On June 18, the first full day's
session of the new National Assembly, the Prime Minister,
Malypetr, explained at length both his domestic and foreign
policies. Domestically, he w,arned recalcitrant Germans,
Slovaks and Fascists against attempting to weaken national
JST Cf. Svomost, Se!)tember 26, 1935.
2sa Cf. Hanighen, F. C., "Troubled Days in Czechoslovakia ••, Current
History, vol. xliii, p. 583.
:~nsvomost, December 8, 1935; The New York Times, December 4.
1935·
uo The New York Times, June 14. 1935.
ll111Jbid., Svornost, June 19, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS 411
unity. In foreign aff~irs, Czechoslovakia would pursue the
ideals of the League, under which, he stated, all her treaties
of alliance had been negotiated. For the immediate future,
Czechoslovakia, together with France, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, Italy and her Little Entente partners, would
strive for the successful conclusion of both Eastern and
Central European Pacts.2112
Goring's Balkan Tour
Hitler decided to take advantage o£ successive postponements
of the Conference of Rome, which had been scheduled
originally for May 20, by sending his lieutenant, General
GOring, on a Balkan tour to restore Germanic influence in
that area. On May 27, Goring was in Sofia to return a
recent visit that a Bulgarian delegation had made secretly
to Berlin. The trip took him also to Rumania, Yugoslavia
and Hungary. He made a particularly strenuous effort to
attract Yugoslavia within the German orbit, and thereby to
create a Germanic 'bloc across Central Europe. Although
GOring's tour was termed in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere
a diplomatic failure,298
its sequel was a political crisis within
Yugoslavia, whereby Yeftic was succeeded as Premier by the
allegedly Germanophil Stoyadinovic.m As a result of the
internal difficulties of Yugoslavia, the Little Entente Conference
of Bled was postponed, and Rumania hastened to
draw closer to both Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.21111
tu Cf. The Central European Observer, June 28, 1935, for detailed
summary of Malypetr's speech.
298 Ibid., June 28, 1935, for full details of GOring's trip; also, The
New York Times, June 2, 8, 12, 1935. Hitler considered the trip a
decided success. Cf. Volkischer Beobachter, May 25-June 8, 1935.
29i The New York Times, Svornost, June 21, 1935·
2011 Svornost, June 26, 1935.
412 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1986
Amplification of the Modus Vivendi
The month of June, 1935, witnessed also an amplification
of the modus vivendi of 1928 298
between·Czechoslovakia and
the Vatican by the definitive settlement of the question of
the boundaries of dioceses. Czechoslovakia had long maintained
that a diocese should lie entirely within one state.
The Austrian Bishop of St. Hypolite held jurisdiction over
the Czechoslovak parishes of .Vitorazko and Valcicko, and
the German Archbishop of Breslau over much of Czechoslovak
Silesia. On the other hand, the Archbishop of Praha
had authority over the Prussian County of Glatz. Of the
six Slovak dioceses, only two (Nitra and Banska Bystrica)
lay wholly within Czechoslovakia. A part of the Bishopric
of Spis was in Poland. The other three (Roinava, Kosice
and Ostrihom) were divided with Hungary. Particularly
acute was the question of OstHhom, whose Archbishop was
Primate of Hungary. By the new agreement, the political
and religious boundaries were made to coincide. The Archbishop
of Praha surrendered Glatz. Similarly, the Archbishop
of Breslau turned over his parishes in Silesia to the
Archbishop of Olomouc. On the Austrian, Hungarian and
Polish frontiers the new dioceses lay entirely within Czechoslovakia.
The loss of territory to Ostrihom was particularly
regretted by the Hungarians who had regarded ecclesiastical
control as a symbol upon which to base hopes of revisionism.
It might also be pointed out that the Holy See, in consenting
to change boundaries which had existed since the Seven
Year's War (1756-63), granted to the new Czechoslovak
Republic a concession which it had refused to permit to the
Austrian Monarchy. The agreement embraced also two
other points : two commissions, a state and an ecclesiastical,
were to determine the property divisions that the revision
of diocesan boundaries would necessitate; and bishops would
298 Cf. supra, pp. 254 el seq.
THE NAZI CRISIS 413
be appointed by the Holy See, but the state could make confidential
objections to any candidature.297
Solidarity of the Status-Quo Bloc
There arose again the question of a Habsburg restoration
in Austria. Within Czechoslovakia, the Prager Presse took
the lead in calling attention to the ~mminence of a restoration.298
Some of its assertions received apparent confirmation
when the Austrian Federal Chamber approved a law
restoring to the Habsburgs their former property within
Austria.299 The Little Entente took immediate action. The
Yugoslav Regent, Prince Paul, hastened to Sinaia to confer
with King Carol II.1100
Their decision was announced by
Titulescu, who stated that, on the day of an Austrian coup
d'etat, the three Little Entente states would recall their dip-:lomatic
representatives, inaugurate an economic blockade,
terminate the transportation of goods and passengers, mobilize
their three armies, and take immediate military
measures. The action of the Little Entente would not be
motivated by mere sentiment, said Titulescu, but by a desire
to avert the confusion that a change in the Austrian status
quo would produce m Central Europe.801
Cooperation
among the three partners was further confirmed when Bend
stated that his oft-repeated earlier views regarding a restoration
remained unchanged.1102
The Prager Presse objected
to the return of Otto or Zita to either Austria or Hungary
even as private citizens.11011
21Jr The Central European Observer, July 12, 1935; Svomost, June 18,
29. 1!)35·
11118 Prager Presse, July 9-10, 1935.
11119 The New York Times, July n, 1935.
800 Ibid., July 12, 1935.
ao1 Ibid., July 14. 1935; The Central Et~ropean Obseroer, July 26, 1935·
eoa The New York Times, July 21, 1935·
1108 Prager Presse, July 16, 1935·
414 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
The relative solidarity of the Little Entente, together with
its close cooperation with the Balkan Entente, was again
evinced at the Little Entente Conferen~e of Bled, August
30-31, which was followed immediately by a Conference of
the Balkan Entente. The Little Entente's fifteenth anniversary
was commemorated by Benes, who characterized the
organization as a " fruitful alliance . . . which had fully
justified its existence ". Benes also raised the question of
the recognition of Moscow by the Little Entente as a unit,
but no action was taken because of the opposition of Yugoslavia.
At the termination of the Confenence, an official
communique expressed solidarity regarding all political questions.
The Little Entente would strive to help preserve general
peace and remain faithful to the League. It remained
unalterably opposed to a Habsburg restoration in either
Austria or Hungary. In its estimation, existing difficulties
would be greatly lessened by the successful conclusion of
Eastern and Danubian Pacts. The latter, negotiated perhaps
under French and Italian auspices, should include a
guarantee of Austrian independence, mutual pledges of nonaggression
and non-intervention, and a general agreement
for consultation rather than mutual assistance in the event
of a threat against either the political or the territorial status
q~o. The communique closed rather pessimistically with the
statement that, since the question of the revision of the Peace
Treaties was not to be raised; Hungary alone would probably
destroy all hopes for a general agreement.804
The successive French, Czechoslovak and Soviet army
manoeuvres during the late summer and early fall of 1935
produced fresh indications of friendship among the three
countries. Significant also was the choice of location for
304 The New York Times, Svornost, August 29-31, 1935; The Central
European Observer, September 6, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS
each: the French in the Champagne in July,1105
the Czechoslovaks
on the German Irontier in August,806
and the Soviets
in the Ukraine in September.307
The three states sent
military missions to one another's manoeuvres. The
Czechoslovak manoeuvres, which were witnessed also by
Rumanian and Yugoslav military missions, developed more
than a tinge of reality when the hosti.le German minority
showed its sentiments by cutting wires and committing other
acts of petty sabotage.1108
The round of military manoeuvres
closed early in October with those of Rumania, to which
observers from her Little Entente partners and from France
were invited.309
Both friends and foes realized that, in the event of war
with Germany, Czechoslovakia's strategic position would be
critical. The value of Soviet military aid might be merely
psychological. Germany might be aided by Austria and
Hungary, and perhaps even by Poland. The corridor
whereby Soviet troops could reach Czechoslovakia (i. e.
· assuming Rumanian consent for Soviet troops to cross her
territory) would be, in all probability, cut off and Czechoslovakia
isolated before any Great Power could render effective
aid.810
Late in Sept~ber, 1935, the Little Entente denied a
report that a Soviet-Rumanian pact permitting passage to
Soviet troops across Rumania to aid Czechoslovakia in the
event of. war had been negotiated.311
Nevertheless, the
ao:; Le Temps, July 20, 1935.
- The New Y oYk Times, August 18, 20, 1935; Svornost, August 22,
1935·
ao'l Na,.odm Listy, September 18, 1935.
aos C/. The New YoYk Times, September 12, 1935, for statement of the
Czechoslovak Minister of War, Machnik.
808 Ibid., October 6, 1935; Svornost, October 7, 1935.
8to Buell, L R., The DangeYoUS YeaY (New York, 1936), P. 14.
811 The New YoYk Times, September 27, 1935· Cf. ibid., July 17, 1936,
416 ·FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1985
report produced, among Germany, Hungary and Poland,
counter-negotiations alarming to Czechoslovakia.812
Soviet
leaders felt convinced that the new bloc .aimed at the isolation
and eventual partition of Czechoslovakia as a prelude to a
war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.818
The Czechoslovak
government planned more elaborate fortifications, particularly
along the German frontier.814
' The general situation
was summarized by Benes in a lengthy expose, which he
delivered on November 5 before the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Benes
again pointed out that Czechoslovakia stood for peace and
international cooperation. She threatened no one and would
never become a party to an aggressive war. In a general
crisis, the League could not refuse its aid. In addition to
this moral support, he stressed the increase in Czechoslovakia's
own strength because of the military progress that
had been made. Czechoslovakia's system of alliances and
friendships promised her the maximum security then attainable.
After admitting that Czechoslovakia's geographical
position was dangerous, he added,
bu.t it is so because that geographical position is so important
and far-reaching for the whole of Europe. It means tha.t our
State is the key to the whole post-War structure of Central
Europe. H it is touched either intermlly or internationally,
the whole fabric of Central Europe is menaced, and the peace
of Europe seriously infringea.· It would not be long ere all
Europe would be grievously conscious of the fact. It ils for that
reason that today and for all future our international position
for the report that Rumania permitted the U. S. S. R. the use of a
strategic railway to be constructed and financed by Czechoslovakia.
Such a railway would materially improve Czechoslovakia's military
prospects and enhance the value of the U. S. S. R. alliance.
813 Swrnost, September 26-27, •I935·
8i8 Cf. The New York Times, October u, November 10, 1935.
tn4ofbid., October 17, 1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS
and our internal stability are a matter of great interest equally to
France and the Soviet Uriion, equally to England and Italy, ·and
to the Little Entente aJS they ought to be to Germany and Poland.
Thus, whenever we 'Should be in danger the vitaL interest of all
the cOll'.Structive forces of Europe would be on the side of our
integrity and our prosperity.8
111
Benes' able .expose, which might be regarded as the keynote
of almost two decades of foreign policy, was approved
enthusiastiCally by both houses of parliament. It attracted
several Opposition groups and drew favorable comment from
almost every shade of political opinion.. The Social Democratic
Pravo Lidu praised his consistent and peaceful policy
as exemplified by adherence to the League.316
The Czech
Socialist Ceske Slovo approved the Anglo-French and
League policies.311
The Independent Lidove Noviny of
Brno lauded Bene§' candor.818
The Independent N arodni
Politika labeled his League policy " a dictate of reason".81
e
The Liberal Opposition Narodni Listy also praised his
League and his Polish policies.820
Even the Independent
German Prager Tagblatt found praise for Bend' collective
security endeavors.821
Abroad, Benes' speech was also received
with general approval. The Neue Freie Presse was
pleased with Benes' cordial words regarding Austria.822
The
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. reproduced Bene§' remarks regarding
Germany in their entirety.823
The Times deemed
8'11 Bend, E., The Struggle for Collective SecuritY in EuroPe and the
ltal()-Ab:yssinian War, Czechoslovak Sources and Documents, no. 8, p. sS.
816 Pr6vo Lidu, November 6, 1935·
au Ceskl SlO'Uo, November 6, 1935·
a11 Lidove NO'Vin:y, November 6, 1935.
819 Narodnt Politika, November 6, 1935.
82o N6rodm Listy, November 6, 1935·
821 Pragef' Tagblatt, November 6, 1935.
8UNeue Freie Presse, November 6, 1935.
821 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 6, 1935.
418 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1936
Benes' words the best foreign tribute that British foreign
policy had received during 1935,82
~ and French 8211
and
Soviet 826
comment was almost equally flattering.
Renewed Friction with Poland
In the speech of November 5, Benes also voiced regret
over his inability to draw Poland into the Soviet-Czechoslovak
rapprochement. Tension between Poland and
Czechoslovakia had been mounting steadily since January,
1934, when the former had adopted the "new policy " of a
rapprochement with Germany.827
The death of the Polish
dictator, Pilsudski, on May 12, 1935, at the age of sixtyseven,
did not change materially the trend of Polish foreign
policy.328
Under the guidance of the Germanophil Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Beck, Poland rejected a Slavophil
policy. Over a period of several months, many sections of
the Polish press waged a violent anti-Czech campaign on
behalf of the Polish minority in Tesin, which, allegedly,
was being mistreated and subjected to a process of denation-
alization.829
These allegations could not be substantiated by
facts. The Polish minority enjoyed all the privileges of
citizenship. It had representation in the Moravian-Silesian
Diet, and sent two representatives to the Chamber of Deputies
at Praha. Most of its children attended schools in
which Polish was the language of instruction. Czechoslovakia
was equally tolerant r$ligiously. Eleven of the twentyeight
Catholic parish priests in Tesin were Polish. During
the depression Czechoslovakia did adopt the policy common
826 The Times, November 6, 1935.
825 Le Temps, November 6, 1935·
828 Izvestia, November 6, 1935.
8 27 Cf. supra, pp. 373 et seq.
828 Gazeta Warszawska, May 13, 1935.
sa Cf. reprints in Svornost, February 4. 23, May 14, August II, 13,
1935.
THE NAZI CRISIS
to all European states--~hat of discharging foreign workmen
-but the Poles affected were citizens of Poland and thus
had rio special cause for complaint.1180
Irredentism among the Poles in Tesin was aroused not
only by irresponsible agitators, but by Polish officials. In
the Polish Sejm itself there was brought out the fact that
Malhome, the Polish consul in Tesin, had openly organized
opposition to Czechoslovakia. After his recalfat the request
of Czechoslovakia, his successor, Klotz, was equally provo-
cative.831
Poland retaliated by asking for the recall of
Meisner and Doleial, the Czechoslovak· consuls at Cracow
and Posen respectively.8112
Within Tesin itself hostility
between Poles and Czechs became so marked that since early
September gendarmes and military detachments guarded the
public schools.338
A large section of Czech public opinion
feared lest Poland attempt to seize Tesin by a coup similar
to that in Vilna in 1920.
88
•
In the speech of November 5, Benes warned Poland that
Czechoslovakia could not permit illegal activities within her
territories. He offered to submit the question to a Czechoslovak-Polish
arbitration commission, to the League, to the
world Court or to the conciliation and arbitration procedure
provided by the still valid Czechoslovak-Polish convention of
1925.385
On the same day, the Czechoslovak government
declared a" state of emergency" in Tesin. Three days later
came the Polish refusal to arbitrate. The official statement
made much of the alleged discrepancy between Benes' words
330 C/. The Central European Observer, October 18, 1935.
3 31 Ibid., October 18, 1935.
saa Svornost, October 211, 1935·
3aa Ibid., September 8, 1935·
sa• The Central European Observer, October 18, 1935.
an Ibid., November 15, 1935; Svomost, November 6, 1935· For the
agreement of 1925, cf. supra, pp. 244-245.
420 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZBCHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
and Czechoslovakia's actions.836
On November 19, when
Beck conferred with Smutny, the Czechoslovak charge
d'affaires at Warsaw, hopes of a settlement of the dispute
were raised temporarily, only to be dashed again when nothing
further resulted.331
The fact that Polish Germanophils
regarded Czechoslovakia as a "seasonal State" that would
be absorbed eventually by her neighbors hindered the realization
of a Slavophil Polish foreign policy.
Italy vs. Ethiopia
Another major question of Czechoslovak foreign policy
concerned the attitude that should be adopted with regard to
Mussolini's African adventure.838
The necessity for a clearcut
attitude on the part of Czechoslovakia became evident
when Benes was elected President of the League Assembly
early in September, at the time when the League was faced
with the Italo-Ethiopian question. In his first speech as
President of the Assembly, Benes urged that the crisis be
considered with the proper reserve.889
The small states of
Central Europe, Austria in particular, were concerned lest
the new crisis preoccupy the Western Powers to the extent
that Germany be left a free hand in Danubian affairs. Amid
the pessimism prevalent generally at Geneva, Benes continued
· to urge patience despite his conviction that Mussolini would
not pause short of a deci~ive military triumph. With the
outbreak of actual hostilities in Africa on October 3, Benes
announced that his government would remain strictly neutral,
but also faithful to the general principles of the League.840
sse Cf. Gaseta Warssawska, November 8, I935·
ssT Cf. Svornost, December 9. 1935.
888 Cf. infra, p. 423·
as9 Official Journal, special supplement, no. 138, pp. 35-36.
8~ Ibid., p. 97·
THE NAZI CRISIS 421
The Ethiopian crisis not only broke the so-called " Stresa
front" of the three "Western Powers" against Germany,
but demonstrated again the inability of the League to halt
the headlong course of a Great Power. Following the example
of Japan in Manchuria, Mussolini planned the conquest
of a part of Ethiopia, another member of the League,
while, throughout the spring and summer of 1935, that
organization had done little to halt such procedure. It· was
only after the termination of the rainy season had permitted
the actual outbreak of hostilities that the League, at the
behest of Great Britain, took up the. question seriously.
Although the reasons for the gradually stiffening attitude of
Great Britain lie outside the scope of this work, the fact
remained that Mussolini had miscalculated when he thought
he would have a free hand in Africa after his agreement
of January 7, 1935, with France. In requesting that the
League declare Italy an aggressor, Great Britain, in the
person of her Foreign Secretary, Hoare, sought to avoid the
implication of acting solely to preserve her own African
interests.an
The League Council on October 7 by a unanimous vote
proclaimed Italy an aggressor for having violated Article
12 of the Covenant.842
Two days later the Assembly took
up the question in plenary session and on October 10 ratified
the action of the Councit.B•a Austria,au Hungary 845
and
Albania 846
alone supported Italy. The Assembly set up
at once a coordinating committee of seventeen (of which
Czechoslovakia was a member) to prepare sanctions against
841 Ibid., pp. 43-46.
an Ibid., November, 1935, pp. 1217-1226.
a•a Ibid., special supplement, no. 138, pp. IIJ-114au
Ibid., p. IOI.
ua Ibid., pp. 101-102.
8 • 6 Ibid., p. 114-
422 FOR!J.IGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
Italy. From the comprehensive list that was submitted,
petroleum, cotton and iron were omitted on the ground that
Italy could obtain these articles in unlimited quantities from
either Germany or the United States. With these exceptions,
sanctions were approved, to go into effect on November
18.341
Upon that date there became effective against Italy an
arms embargo on the part of fifty states, a prohibition of
financial transactions on the part of forty-seven, a refusal
to purchase Italian products on the part of forty-three, and
an embargo on certain raw materials on the part of forty-
five.s4s
The firm stand of the League in declaring for the first
time in its history that one of its members was an aggressor
raised the question what would be the attitude of the
various members if the application of sanctions should impel
Italy to declare war on Great Britain. The small victor
states of Central Europe stood squarely behind Great Britain
and the League. In their estimation, the African crisis was
a mere prelude to a much greater one in the future involving
Germany.8
'4
9
If the League could be strengthened sufficiently
to cope efficiently with an aggressive Great Power, a precedent
might be established whereby the small states might
£nd in the League a safe refuge against future threats to
their own integrity. While France hesitated long before
leaning in the direction of Great Britain, for she needed
both Britain and Italy against Germany in the future, certain
members in •both the Little and die Balkan Ententes (Yugoslavia,
Greece and Turkey) pledged armed support to Great
Britain against Italy should war ensue.850
After the annual
841 Ibid., pp. II3-II4S4-8
Cf. Buell, op. cit.. p. 37.
848 Cf. Stolfer, G., "European Kaleidoscope", Foreign Affairs, vol.
xiv, pp. :n6-226.
sso The Times, December 22, 1935 ; Svornost, December 23, 1935·
THE NAZI CRISIS 423
military conference of the Little Entente at Belgrade,u1
Rumania and Czechoslovakia had agreed tentatively to follow
the lead of their more aggressive partner, Yugoslavia,
although the final decision to approve Yugoslavia's pledge
of armed support to Great Britain was not made until January
22, 1936.853
Czechoslovakia had no direct quarrel with
Italy; in fact, the government permitted the shipment of
coal, shoes and other products to ItaJy until sanctions became
operative.S58
However, the Czechoslovak government did
not falter in its support of League principles, for it regarded
the question as vital to the future of the Republic: if Czechoslovakia
should refuse to support the League against Italy,
what right would she have to invoke League assistance
against German aggression in some future crisis? Thus
motivated, Czechoslovakia informed the League of her willingness
to impose upon Italy an oil, coal and steel embargo,
should the League so decree.85
• Rarely had any policy of
Bend commanded such general support, even from the
Opposition.m
Masaryk's Resignation
President Masaryk attained the age of eighty-fiveon March
7, 1935. An illness during the summer caused him to decide
to yield his office. whenever he felt he would be no longer
able to perform all its duties. Having made no secret of
this decision, Masaryk, early in November, began to make
quiet preparations.858
The actual resignation was postponed
to December 14, until after the termination of the debates
a111 The New York Times, November 25. 1935·
ar>aJbid., January 23, 1936.
aMJbid., November 6, 1935.
8116 Svornost, December :z, 1935.
8511 Cf. The Central Ewo;ea,. Obsen~er, November 2!), 1935.
asefbid., December 27, 1935.
424 FOREIGN POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-1935
regarding the 1936 budget.3117
It had been Masaryk's dearest
wish that his successor would be Benes; in fact, Masaryk
was reported to have stated that he would not yield the office
to any other.3118
In the address of resignation, he stressed
the fact that he had been motivated largely by a desire to
avoid the error of Hindenburg-of remaining in office too
long-and recommended Benes as the successor who would
carry on most ably the policies upon which the future of
the Republic depended.31111
Benes was elected President on
December 18. Of the 442 ballots, he obtained 340; his only
opponent, Dr. Bohumil Nemec, received 24, and the rest were
blank. Nemec, a professor of botany, received the votes of
the parties led by Benes' personal foes, Kramar and Stribrny.
Blank ballots were returned by the followers of Henlein, by
the Fascists and by the feeble National Unity Party. Significant
was the fact that Benes was supported by most of
the large parties, by Right and Left, by Communists, Socialists
and non-Socialists, by Catholics and Protestants, by
Czechs, Slovaks, Magyars and non-Henlein Germans.860
He was the logical successor to Masaryk, and his overwhelming
triumph a guarantee that the foreign policy of the Republic
would remain unchanged. This impression received
fresh confirmation on March I, 1936, when Benes was succeeded
as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Dr. Kamil Krofta,
his assistant since 1927.861
Dr. Milan Hodia, a Slovak and
Minister of Agriculture, who h~d succeeded Malypetr as
asr Svornost, November 30, I9JS.
na The Netu York Times, December 13, 1935.
8511 Cf. ibid., December IS, 1935, for text of address.
8 60 Ibid., Svornost, December 19. 1935; cf. also, The Central EtWopeaH
Observer, December 27, 1935.
861 C/. The Cemral EtWopeaH Observer, March 6, 1936, for short
biography of Krofta; Svornost, March 2, 1936.
THE NAZI CRISIS
Premier on October JO, 1935/'62
retained his Premiership
after the election of BeneS.
Czechoslovakia's tolerant and constructive policies, both
domestic and foreign, have gained for her the respect and
admiration of the rest of the world and have gone far to
reconcile her own minorities: her stability has been demonstrated
beyond any doubt. In the realm of foreign affairs,
she was ·singularly fortunate to have enjoyed the services of
Dr. Edward BeneS. In foresight, patience, energy, integrity
and ability, his foreign policy was outstanding. Athome and
abroad, particularly among the allies and friends of Czechoslovakia,
there existed great pleasure·over the fact that two
of the co-founders of the Republic had succeeded one another
in the Presidency! 68
B62 Svornost, October 31, 1935.
a6a Cf. The Times, Le Temps, Izvestia, December 19-20, 193'5.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DOCUMENTS
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Documents diplomatiques relatives au.r cowventitmS d'allimsce conclsu tar
la Repuhlique Tchlcoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croat~s
et Slovenes ef le Royaume de Roumanie, Prague, Republique Tchecoslovaque,
Minisb~re des Affaires :ti:trangeres, Recueil des Documents
Diplomatiques no. 2, 1923, 198 p.
Documents diplomaliques concenKJtl.t les tentatives de restauration des
Hapsbourg sur le trone de Hongrie, Prague, Republique Tchecoslovaque,
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, 1922, 169 p.
MesieiN piehled aahranicniho obchodu (Monthly survey of foreign trade)
Praha, The Czechoslovak Government Statistical Office, Monthly.
Narodnl Shromtiidinl Ceskoslovenske v Prv~a.im roce Repuhlik;y (The
Czechoslovak National Assembly during the first year of the Republic),
Praha, Pfedsednictvo Narodni Shromazderu, 1919. 377 p.
Obchodn$ smlouvy me.ristatm (International Commercial Treaties), Praha,
Orbis Pub. Co., 1923-1925, 19~ (J. Dvoracek and Z. Konecny, eds.),
3 vols.
Peace Conference Delegation, I9I9, Memoirs (Official claims of the
Czechoslovak Delegation), Paris, 1919.
No. I, Les Tchecoslovaques, leur histoire et civilisation, leur lutte
et leur travail, leur role dans le monde.
No. 2, Les revindications territoriales de la R.epublique Tcheco-
slovaque.
·No. 3, Le probleme des Allemands de Boheme.
No.4. Le probleme de la Silesie de Teschen.
No. 5, La Slovaquie -le territorie- revendique en Slovaquie.
No. 7, Les Serbes de Lusace.
No.9. Le probleme de Ia region de Glatz.
No. III, La R.epublique Tchecoslovaque et son droit ala reparation
des dommages de guerre.
Republika Ceskoslovenski. Narodni Shromazderu, Poslaneck& Snemovna,
Tisnopisecki apravy o schrlsich Poslanecke Snlmovny Narodniho
Shronu1idenl Republiky Ceskoslovenske (Stenographic Reports of the
Meetings of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Assembly of
the Czechoslovak Republic).
426
BIBUOGRAPHY 427
Republika Ceskoslovenski, Narodni ShromaZdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna,
T£sky k tesnopiseck;Vm :zpr6:uam o schu:zkh Poslanecke SnimD'llny
Narodmho Shromazdem Republiky Ceskoslovenske (Documents on
the Stenographic Reports of the Meetings of the Chamber of Deputies
of the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic).
Republika Ceskoslovenski, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecloi Snemovna,
Z6pisy o schu:zich Poslanecke Snimovny Narodniho Shromaidim
Republiky Ceskoslovenskl (Minutes of the Meetings of the Chamber
of Deputies of the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic).
Republika Ceskoslovenska, Narodni Shromaide¢, Sen!t, Tesnopisecke
:zpr4f131 o schusfch Senatu Narodniho Shromaidem Republiky Ceskoslovenski
(Stenographic Reports of the Meetings of the Senate of
the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic).
Republika Ceskoslovenski, Narodni Shromazdeni, Senat, T£sky k tesnopiseck;Vm
sprtklam o schu:zkh Senatu Narodniho Shromaiden$
Republiky Ceskoslovenske (Documents on the Stenographic Reports
of the Meetings of the Senate of the National Assembly of the
Czechoslovak Republic).
Republika Ceskoslovenski, Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany, Osobm 'Distmk
(Personnel Journal), annual.
Resultats preliminaries du recensement de Ia population du ts fhlrier,
I92:t, Prague, L'Office de Statistique, 1921, 63 p.
Rocenka N6rodniho ·Shromliidim Republiky Ceskoslovenske (Yearbook
of the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic), Praha,
"Politika" Pub. Co., annual.
Sbirka :z6konu a nafi:zem statu leskoslovenskeho (Compilation of Laws
and Proclamations of the Czechoslovak State), Praha, Statni
Tiskarna, annual.
Slovenski Poslanci a re'Dizia miero'V;Vch .smlu'D (Slovak Deputies and the
Revision of the Peace Treaties), Slovenska odboCka Ceskoslovenskej
narodnej rady v ·Bratislave, 1934. 8 p. .
St6tni zavereln;V ulet republiky leskoslMJmSke m rok :1924- (The State
Debt Account of the Czechoslovak Republic for the Year 1924-),
Praha, Statni Tiskarna, Nejvyssi ucetni kontrolni urad, 1926-, annual.
Umluva a po:Sto"Dnich stycich tnezi Rakouskem, llfad'arskem, Italii, Rumunskem,
Kralovsh!fm Srbu, Charvatfl'l! tJ Slovincu a Ceskoslovenskem,
sjednan6 v Porlorose 23 Listopadu, I921: (Treaty concerning Postal
Service between Austria, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Czechoslovakia, negotiated at
Portorose on November 23, 1921), Praha, Statni Tiskarna, 1923, 24 p.
Zahranicn4 Politika (Foreign Policy) (Sbornik pro studium mezinarodnich
otazek politickYch, pravnich, hospodarstcych a socialnich),
Ufedni Vestnik Ministerstva Zahranicnich Veci, Praha, Orbis Pub.
Co., monthly.
428 BIBLIOGRAPHY
FRANCE
Annale..r de Ia Chambre des Dejmte..r.
Conference economique internationole de Gines 9 tl'IJ1'il-I9 tfllli, I922, Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale, 1922 (Ministere des Affaires fitrangeres,
Documents diplomatiques), 186 p. ·
Document..r diplomatique..r relatives aux negociation..r concernant les gara,.._
tie..r de securite cantre une aggression de f Allemagne (10 janvier,
1919-7 decembre, 1923), Paris, lmprimerie Nationale, 1924. 271 p.
Document..r signe..r 011 paraphes d Locarno le z6 octobre, _I925, precedes de
sis pieces relatives aus negocWtions preliminaires (20 juillet-16
octobre, 1925), Paris, R.epublique Fran~se, Ministere des Affaires
fitrangeres, Pacte de Securite ii, Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels,
1925. 39 p.
Neuf pieces relatives d Ia proposition faite le 9 fCvrier, I925, par le
Gouvernement Allemand el Ia reponse du Gouvememenl Fran{aise
(g fevrier-16 juin, 1925), Paris, Republique Fran~se, Ministere
des Affaires fitrangeres, Pacte de Securite i, Imprimerie des J ournaux
Officiels, 1925, 31 p.
GREAT BRITAIN
Agreement for Guaranteeing a Loan to Austria, signed by Representatives
of Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Austria, October
4, 1922, London, 1922, His Majesty's Stationery Office (Parl. Rep.,
1922, Cmd. 1765), 29 p.
Agreement..r Concluded at the Hague Conference, /am~ary, I9JO, London,
1930, His Majesty's Stationery Office (Pari. Pap., 1930, Cmd.
3484), 17'2 p.
Convenlian Instihlling the Definitive Statute of the Danube, Signed at
Paris, July 23, 1921, London, 1922, His Majesty's Stationery Office
(Treaty Series no. 16, 1922, Cmd. 1754), 31 p.
Correspondnw:e betwee• His Majesty's Government and the French GOflernmenl
respecting the Genoa Canference, London, 1922, His Majesty's
Stationery Office (Misc. no. 6, 1922, Parl Pap., 1922, Cmd. 1742),
10 p.
,.
Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, july 9, 1932, London, 1932 (Misc.
no. 7, 1932, Cmd. 4126), 16 p.
Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, London, His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1925, 61 p.
Paper..r relating to the Hague Conference, June-July. I922, London, Igzl,
His Majesty's Stationery Office (ParL Pap., 1922, Cmd. 1724), 18 p.
Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact, London, 1924.
His Majesty's Stationery Office (Pari. Pap. France no. I, 1924.
Cmd. 216g), 175 p.
BIBUOGRAPHY
429
Papers respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security made by the
German Go~nt on February 9, I925, London, 1925, His Majesty's
Stationery Office (Misc. no. 7, 1925), 51 p.
Reply of the German Government lo the Note handed fo Herr StresemanPJ
by the French Ambassador at Berlin on June z6, I925, respecting the
Proposals for a Pact of Security, London, His Majesty's Stationery
Office (Misc. no. 9, 1925), 9 p.
Resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January, I922,
fJS the Basis of the Genoa Conference, London, 1922, His Majesty's
Stationery Office (Part. Pap., 1922, Cmd. 16~1), 7 p.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Arbitration, Security and Reduetion of Armaments, Geneva, 1924. League
of Nations, 378 p.
Arbitratitm and Security, Geneva, 1926, League of Nations Secretariat,
200 p.
Rapport sur les tr~ de la commi.fsion de reparations, Paris, Librairie
F. Alcao, 1923. vol. i (192o-1922).
The Financial Reconstruction of Austria, Agreement approved by the
League of Nations on September 16, 1924. Geneva, 1924. 16 p.
The Financial Reconstruction of Austria, General Survey and principal
documents, Geneva, xg26, 312 p.
Financial Reconstruction of Austria, Termination of the Functions of the
Commissioner-General (League of Nations, 1926, ii, 22), 8 p.
The Financial ReconstructioPJ of Hungary, General survey and principal
documents, Geneva, 1!)26, :.a-48 p.
Tenmnahon of the Functions of the Commissioner-General (Hungary),
Resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on June
10, 1926 (League of Nations, 1!)26, ii, 23), 8 p.
League of Nations Official l ournal.
League of Nations Monthly Summary.
League of Nations Treaty Series, supplemented by Nouveau recueil
general de trait:is et autres actes relo.tifs tJIU" rapports de droit international
{continuation du grand recueil de G. F. Martens par H.
Triepel), Leipzig, Librairie H. Buske, iii serie.
Permanent Court of International Justice, series A, B, C and E.
Publications of the League of Nations,
ii, Economic and Financial
vii, Political
ix. Disarmament.
The World Courts Advisory Opiniors oK tlu Austro-Gernwn Customs
Union, The American Foundation, Foreign Relations Bulletin no. 9,
SeptemberS, 1931, 8 p.
430 BIBLIOGRAPHY
THE NETHERLANDS
Conference at the Hague, June 26-July 20, I9ZZ, Minutes and Documents,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Government Printing Office, the
Hague, 1922, 235 p.
THE SOVIET UNION
Memorandum of the Russian Delegation to the Genoa Conference, Genoa,
1922.
Les Reclamations de Ia Russie aus iitats responsable de fintervennon e1
du blocus, Materiaux et documents sur !'intervention, le blocus et les
dommages causes par eWt ala Russie, vol. iv, Edition de Ia Delegation
de Russie aIa Conference economique internationale de Genes, Ig22.
Reply of the Russian Delegation to the Memorandum of May 21 I922,
Genoa, 1922.
Soviet Russia (official organ of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau
in New York).
UNITED STATES
Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, I925, and treaties between
France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia, New York,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse
and Education, 1926, 93 p.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, I9I7-I9I8,
I920, Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office,
I9I7, Supplement 2, 2 vols., 1932;
I9I8, Supplement I, 2 vols., 1933;
I9I8, Supplement 2, 1933;
I9I8 (Russia), 3 vols., 1931-1932;
I920, 3 vols., 1935.
" Reply of President Wilson to a Senate Resolution concerning the
American Troops in Siberia, June 26, 1919 ", State Department,
Russian Series, no. 4. p. 5.
Russian-American Relations, March, I9I7-March, I920, New York,
Harcourt, Brace and Howe (League of Free Nations Association),
1920. 375 p. ~
United States Congress, Senate, 65 Congress, 1919, "Hearings on Bolshevik
Propaganda before a Sub-committee of the Judiciary", p. 24NEWSPAPERS
AND PERIODICALS
Allgemeine Zeitung, weekly, Litomerice.
Arbeiter Zeitung, daily, Vienna.
Berliner TageblaU (Wochenausgabe fiir Ausland und Uebersee), weekly.
The Bohemian RevieUJ (later The Czechoslovak RevieUJ), Official organ
of the Bohemian National Alliance of America, monthly, Chicago.
Cas, twice daily, Praha.
BIBliOGRAPHY
The Central European Observer, fortnightly, Prague.
Ceske SlO'IJO, twice daily, Praha.
431
Ceskoslownski Kores"pondence, Paris, published irregularly during the
Peace Conference.
Ceskoslownsk6 Samoslotnost, Paris, published on behalf of Czechoslovak
independence.
Corriere della Sera, daily, Milan.
Current History, monthly, New York.
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, twice daily, Berlin.
Deutscher Reichsanzeiger und Preussischet Staatsanzeiger, daily, Berlin.
L'EuroPe nouvelle, weekly, Paris. ·
Frankfurter Zeitsmg, daily.
Gazeta Warszawska, daily.
LtJ Gazette de Prague, semi-weekly.
International Conciliation, monthly, except July and August, Worcester.
Massachusetts (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
Isrvestia, daily, Moscow.
Lidovi Noviny, twice daily, Brno.
Manchester Guardian, daily.
Le Matin, daily, Paris.
Le M orule slav, monthly, Paris.
N twodni Li.sty, twice daily, Praha.
Ntwodm Politika, twiCe daily, Praha.
La Nation tcheque, bimonthly, Paris.
Neue Freie Presse, twice daily, Vienna.
The New York Times, daily.
Prager Abendblatt, dai:ly.
Prager Presse, daily.
Prager Tagblatt, twice daily.
Pr6vo Lidu, twice daily, Praha.
RO'lJif()st, daily, Brno;
StsmOstatnost, weekly, Olomouc.
Swrncst, daily, Chicago.
Le Temps, daily, Paris.
The Times, daily, London.
Volkischer Beobachter, daily, Berlin.
Vorwaerts, daily, Berlin.
Vossische Zeitung, daily, Berlin.
BOOKS AND p AVPBLETS
D'Abernon, E. V., The Diary of an Ambassador, New York, Doubleday,
Doran & Co., 3 vols.; Versailles to Rapallo, I920-I922, 1929, 335 p.;
Rapallo to Dawes, I922-I924, 1930, 350 p.; Dawes to Locanw, Z924I926,
1931, 317 p.
432 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anon., Deset let ceskoslovenske zahranilm polinky (Ten Years of
Czechoslovak Foreign Policy), Praha, Ministerstvi ZahraniCnich
Veci, 1!)28, 213 p.
--, Dr. Edvard Benes, sPoluzakladatel nove S'Vobody a tviirce zahranicm
politik:y ceskoslovenske (Dr. Edward Benes, Co-founder of the
New Freedom and Creator of the Czechoslovak Foreign Policy),
Sbornik Stati, Praha, Cin Pub. Co., 1924. 283 p.
--, The Evolution of Socialism in Czechoslovakia, Prague, Executive
Committee of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers Party,
1924,45 p.
--, The Lausanne Agreement, New York, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, no. 282, 1932, 43 p.
--, Prehled linnosti z fJrve pitileti Republiky Ceskqslovenske (Survey
of the Activities of the First Five Years of the Czechoslovak Republic),
Praha, G. Herman, ed., 1923, 141 p.
--,President Masaryk in Paris, Brussels and Landon in October, I92J,
Prague, 1924. 141 p.
Ashmead-Bartlett, E., The Tragedy of Central Euro;e, London, T.
Butterworth, 1923, 320 p.
Ausset, ]., La Quesnon Vaticane, Paris, Sirey, 1928, 175 p.
"Autonomist", Slovakia's Plea for Autonomy, Middletown, Pa., Jednota
PrinterY, 1935, 120 p.
Baerlein, H., The March of the Seventy Thousand, London, L. Parsons,
19z6, 287 p.
Baker, R S., What Wilson Did at Paris, New York, Doubleday, Page
& Co., 1920, 113 p.
--, Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement, New York, Doubleday,
Page & Co., 1922, 3 vols.
De Balla, V., The New Balance of Power in Europe, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1932, 2o8 p.
Basch, A. and Dvoracek, J., Austria and Its Economic Existence~
Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1925, 1o6 p.
Bassett, J. S., The League of Nations, New York, Longmans, Green &
Co., 1!)28, 415 p. ,.
Bauer, F., Hitlerow Tieti Rise a naJ Stat, Praha, Osveta, 1933.
Beaumont, A., Heroic Story of the Csechoslovak Legions, Prague, _The
Czechoslovak Foreigner's Office, reprinted from the Daily Telegram,
1919, 84 p.
Benes, E., The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, speech of Januazy 27.
1921, Prague, edited by the Gll3ette de Prague, 1921, 35 P.
--. Five Years of Csechoslo'Uak Foreign Policy, Prague, Orbis Pub.
Co., 1924, 39 p.
--. Problemy nove Evropy 1J zahraniln£ politika leskoslO't!ensk6, Praha,
Melantrich Pub. Co., 1924, 3o6 p.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
433
--, The Diplomatic Struggle for Erwopea~~ Securi~ and the Stabilisatiota
of Peace, spe«;ch of April I, 1925, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1925,
31 p.
-.-, Les Accords de Locanw, speech of October 30, I925, Prague, Orbis
Pub. Co., 1925, 30 p.
--, M:v War Memoirs, New York, Houghton MifHin Co., 1928, 512 p.
(trans. from Czech by Paul Selver).
--, La Situatiota internationale et Ia Politique etrangJre tchecosl(}'l/(J(/.tu!,
expose du 6 juin. 1928, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1928, 25 p.
--, Les ProbUmes des reParations et Ia liquidation de Ia guerre mcmdialed
Ia Haye, expose du 30 janvier, 1930, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co.,
1930 (Sources et documents tchecoslovaques no. 12), 67 p.
--, Vers Ia liquidation de Ia guerre: traites de la Haye et de Paris,
expose du 20 mai, 1930, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1930 (Sources et
documents tchecoslovaques, no. 13), so p.
--, La Situation de fEurope, Ia Societe des Nations, et Ia Tchecoslo'Vaquie,
expose du IS octobre, 1930, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1930
(Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, no. IS), 32 p.
--, (Argus), The Economic Aspect of the Austro-German Customs
Union, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1931, 85 p.
--, Le Pacte d'organisatio11 de Ia Petite Entente et fetat actuel de Ia
politique internationale, expose du I mars, 1933, Prague, Orbis Pub.
Co., 1933 (SourceS et documents tchecoslovaques, no. 20), 64 p.
--, La Question du directoire europeeta et la revision des /rontieres,
expose du 25 avril, 1933, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1933 (Sources et
documents tcbecoslovaques, no. 21), 93 p. ·
--, La Revolution allemande et Ia nouvelle phase de Ia politique
europeenne, expose du 31 octobre, 1933, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co.,
1933 (Sources et documents tchecoslovaques, no. 23), 62 p.
--, Boj o mira bezpelnost statu (The Struggle for Peace and the
Security of the State) (compilation of Benes' speeches, 1924-1933),
Praha, Orbis Pub. Co., 1934. 833 p.
--, The Problem of Central Europe and the Austrian Question, speech
of March 21, 1934. Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1934. 66 p.
--, Rec o problemu podkarpatoruskem (Speech on the Problem of Subcarpathian
Ruthenia), Praha, Orbis Pub. Co., 1934. 56 p.
--, Une nouvelle phase de Ia lutte pour l'equilibre europeen, expose du
2 juiliet, 1934. Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1934 {Sources et documents
tchecoslovaques, no. 25), 62 p.
--, Vers "" regroupement des forces en Erwope!, expose du 6 novembre,
1934. Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1934 (Sources et documents tchecoslovaques,
no. 26), 33 p.
--, Le Sens politique de Ia tragedie de Marseille, discours du 1 et IO
decembre, 1934. Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1935 (Sources et documents
tchecoslovaques, no. 27), 47 p.
434 BIBliOGRAPHY
--. Tlte Stnggle for Collectic;y Secwrit~ ia EwvjV aJtd tl&e ItGl~r
.Aby.s.rirtiara W or, speech of November S. 1935. Prague, Orbis Puh.
Co.. 1935 (Czechoslovak Sources and Documents. DO. S}, 6o p.
Bethlen. I., Tl&e Treaty of Trimwr& tJ1IId Et~ro;e- Peace, New York.
l.ongmans. Green & ~ I~ 187 p.
Bitterma.IJ. M., .AM.Sfria tl1ld tl&e Castmns t•11io11, Prague, Orbis Pnh. ~
1931. uS p.
Borovieka, J.. Tea Years of CseciUJslq;;u]e Politics, Prague, Orbis Pub..
Co., 1929, IJ1 p.
Brei, A, Tl&e Rise of tl&e Czecltosltn'IJR Rt:f'tlblic, London, Twentieth
Centmy Press. 1919. 3I p.
--, Tl&e First Year of tl&e Czecl&o.skTtult Re/'lfblic, Londoo. Twentieth
Century Press. 1920, 8o p.
--, Three Years of tl&e CzeclwslO"C''ll Re/'lfblic, Prague; Orbis Pub.. Co.,
1921,40 p.
Buell, R. L, E11r0pe: o Hist~ of Tea Years, New York, J.[acmjllan
1929,428 p.
--.The DmtgerOli.S Year, New York, Foreign Policy Ass'n.. 19,16. 8o p.
Butter, 0. and Ruml. B., La Ril'lfbliqw tchicoslfX'Uqlle. Prague, Orbis
Pub. Co.. 1921, 101 p.
Caldwell. R. J.. TM Ecorwmic Sitwati~ ia CsecloslotYJiio ia I92'0.
\Yashington. Go•emment Printing Office. 1921,48 p.
Capek, T., Jr., Origms of the Czeclroslq;;u]e Stak, New York, The Revcll
Press, 192(i. 104 p.
Chalcuped-j, Y., Zatas o Sl(]'['CJISko (The Struggle for Slovakia). Pr..ha,
Cin Pub.~ 1930.251 p.
<llamberlain. J. P., The Da-';e, Wash.in.,vton, Go•enrment Printing
. Office. 1918. 122 p.
--. Tl&e Regilrw of the Ifllen~atioflal Rin!rs: DiJ:JIIJJt: Gad Rlaitv. New
York, Columbia University, 1923. 317 p.
Olamberlin. \Y. H., The Rausimt R£'£Yllutio•. I9IT-I9ZI, Xew York,
Macmillan. 1935. 2 Tols.
Ola.naJ. E., Mu•JIIJie et icUJIOJflie NJtiofla:le ea Tcl&icosl~. I9I8-I!)28,
Paris. M.. Giard. 1929. J22 p.
Oiappey, J.. La Crise de Ia 111u~ d 14 resta~ lks Pays D~.
Paris. M. Giard, 1933. 23-1 p.
Ounelar, J.. Political Partiu V. CzecloslotukiiJ, ~ Orbis Pub. Co..
1926, 102 p.
Ounelir. J.. Klima, S. and NeCas, J., Podkarjotsko R.s (Subcarpathian
Rnthenia). Praha, Orbis Pub. ~ 19ZJ. 206 p.
Gppico. Count A., I tal~. tl&e Ct:11trul Probkw of tl&e Medil~Q11. :Xew
Hnen. Yale Cniversity Press, 19-">6. no p.
Cisar, J. and PokornY F. (comps.). Tile C.uchoslur:ull Rep,JJlic, Lond.:>n.
Adelphia Terrace, 1922. 218 p.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
435
Cizmar, J., Ruske 11 naJe vojsko v revoluce (The Russian Troops and
Ours in the Revolu~on), Brno, Moravske Legionare, 1926, 240 p.
Codresco, F., La Petite Entente, Paris, P. Bossuet, 1931, 2 vols.
Cosma, A., Jr., La Petite Entente, Paris, Jouve et Cie., 1!)26, 295 p.
Crabites, P., Benes: Statesman of Central EuroPe, London, G. Routledge
& Sons, 1935, 293 p.
Crane, J. 0., The Little Entente, New York, Macmillan, 1931, 222 p.
Currey, M.,ltalian Foreign Policy, London, I. Nicholson & Watson, 1932.
330 p.
Danubius, La Petite Entente et fOrient, un cri d'alarme, Paris, 1922.
34 p.
Dedeeek, V., La Tchecos/()'IJ(lquie el les Tchecosl()'IJ(lqUes, Paris, Bossard_
1919, 19() p.
Dennis, A. L. P., The Foreign Policies of Stwiet Russia, New York,.
E. P. Dutton Co., 1924. 499 p.
Dillon, E. ]., The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, New York,
Harper & Brothers, 1920, 513 p.
Dominian, L., The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe.,
New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1917, 375 p.
Drummond, Sir E., Ten Years of World Cooperation, Geneva, Secretariat
of the League of Nations, 1930, 467 p.
Duranty, W., Europe: War w Peacef, New York, Foreign Policy Ass'n.•
1935, 47 p.
Einzig, P., World Finance, I9I4-I93S, New York, Macmillan, 1935, 382 p.
Eisenmann, L., La Tchecoslovaquie, Paris, F. Rieder et Cie., 1921, I~ p.
Fierlinger, Z., Stwietskl Rusko 110 nove draze (Soviet Russia on a New
Road), Praha, Ustfedni Delniclre, 1932, 195 p.
Fischer, L., The Soviets in World Affairs, New York, Cape and Smith,
1930, 2 vols.
Fouques-Duparc, J., La. Protection des minorites de race, de langue, et de
religion, Paris, these, 1922, J69 p.
Gedye, G. E. R, Heirs to the Hapsburgs, Bristol, Arrowsmith, 1932.,
290 p.
Giannini~ A., Les Docume11ts de Ia Conference de Genes, Rome, G. Bardi..
1922,273 p.
Gibbons, H. A., Europe since I9I8, New York, The Century Co., 1923~
62.2 p.
Glaise-Horstenau, E. von, The Collapse of the Austro-Hun.gariaH Empire,
London, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1930, 347 p.
Graham, M. W., New Governments of Central Europe, New York, Henry
Holt & Co., 1924. 683 p.
Graves, W. S., America's Siberian Adventure, New York, Cape and Smith,.
1931, 363 p.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
,<:iruber, J.- (ed.), Czechoslovakia: A Survey of Economic and Social
Conditions, New York, Macmillan, 1924. 256 p.
Hi<skins, C. H. and Lord, R. H., Some Problems of the Peace Conference,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920, 307 p.
Hazen, C. D., Europe since IBIS, New York, Henr}r Holt & Co., 1923,
vol. ii, pp. 8o4-831.
Hlinskj, J., Ruskem a Sibiri (Through Russia and Siberia), Praha, Pam.
Odboje, 1922, 185 p.
Hoch, C., The Political Parties in Czechoslovakia, Prague, Orbis Pub.
Co., 1936 (Czechoslovak Sources and Documents, no. 9), 72 p.
Hoetzl, J. and Joachim, V., The Constitution of the CsechoslO'Uak Republic,
Prague, Edition de la Societe L'Effort de la Tchecoslovaquie,
1920, 54 p.
House, E. and Seymour, C. (eds.), What Really Happened at Paris,
New York, Charles Scribners' Sons. I92I, 528 p.
Huszar, K., Proletarier Diktatur in Ungarn, Regensburg, Kosel & Dustet,
1920, 212 p.
Jaszi, 0., Revolution and Counter-Re'Uolution in Hungary, London, P. S.
King & Son, 1924. 239 p.
Jolly, E., Le Pouvoir legislatif dans la Republique Tchicoslovaque, Paris,
Jouve et Cie, 1924. 143 p.
Kaas, Baron A. and Lazarovics, F. de, Bolshevism in Hungary, London,
Grant Richards. 1931, 411 p.
Kellar, F. A., Security against War, New York, Macmillan, 1924. 2 vols.
Klecanda, J., Operace ceskoslovenskiho vojska na Rusi 'V letech I9I7I920
(The Operations of the Czechoslovak Armies in Russia during
the Years 1917-1920), Praha, Orbis Pub. Co., 1921.
Kleinwaechter, F. F. G., Self-Determination for Austria, London, Allen
& Unwin, 1929, 78 p.
Kolousek, J., RaJinovd reforma mlny (Rasin's Currency Reform),
Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1921.
Koud~lka, J., Zenevsky protokol, idea a organrisace svetoviho miru (The
Geneva Protocol, the Idea and Organization of World Peace), Praha,
Cin Pub. Co., 1!)26, 252 p. ,._
Kramar, K., Die russische Krisis: Geschichte und Kritik des Bolschewismus,
Miinchen und Leipzig, Duncker & Humbolt (autorisierte
"Obertragung aus dem Tschechischen von A. Schebek), 1925, 689 p.
Kratochvil, J., Cesta revoluce (The Road to Revolution), Praha, Cin
Pub. Co., 1922, 674 p.
Kraus, ]., SvetO'Ve odsbrojeni (World Disarmament), Praha, Orbis Pub.
Co., 1933. 316 p.
Krofta, K., Les Nouveaffz etats dans l'Europe centrale, Prague, Orbis
Pub. Co., 1930, 147 p.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 437
--, The Substance of Hungarian Revisionism, Prague, 1934, Orbis Pub.
Co., 31 p.
--, (eskoslovensko vmezmarodnt tolitice (Czechoslovakia in International
Politics), Praha, Orbis Pub. Co., 1934, 28 p.
--,A Short Histof'31 of Csechoslovakia, New York, R. M. McBride,
1!)34, 1!)8 p.
Kiovak, R., vecnj ukasO'IJatel k stikon.u (J norisenim 0 pozemkO'IJe refonne
(Permanent Index to the Law regarding Agrarian.Reform), Praha,
1922, S5 p.
Langsam, W. C., The World Since :19:14. New York, Macmillan, 3 ed..
1936, 888 p.
Lippmann, W. and Scroggs, W. 0., The United States in World Affairs,
New York, Harper & Bros., 1933, 355 p.
Liscovi, Mrs. M., The Religious Situation in Czechoslovakia, Prague,
Orbis Pub. Co., 1925, 6o p.
Lloyd George, D., War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Boston, Little,
Brown & Co., 1934, 4 vols.
Macartney, C. A., National States and National Minorities, London,
Oxford University Press, 1934, 553 p.
Machray, R., The Little Entente, London, Allen & Unwin. 1929, 394 p.
Malynski, E., Les Problemes de I'est et la Petite Entente, Paris, Cervantes,
1!)31, 500 p.
Masarylc, T. G., Sur le ·Bolchevisme, Geneva, Sonor, I!)2I, 38 p.
--, Les Slaves apres Ia gue"e, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1923, 20 p.
--, Svitov6 revoluce sa V<ilky tJ -ue v6lce, I9I4-I9I8 (The World Revolution
during the War, 1914-19I&), Praha, Orbis Pub. Co.,· 1933,
640 p.
--, The Making of a State, New YGrk, A. Stokes Co., 1927, SIB p.
McOure, W., World Prosperity, New York, Macmillan, 1933, 613 p.
Mercier, M., LtJ Formation de fetal tchicoslowque, Chartres, F. Laine,
1!)22, 195 p. .
Miller, D. H., J,fy Diary at the Conference of Paris, IL p., Appeal Printing
Co., 1!)26, 21 vols.
--, The Drafting of the CO'IJenant, New York, G. P. Putnam's Son's,
I !)28, 2 vols.
--,The Geneva Protocol, New York, Macmillan, 1925, 279 p.
--, The Peace Pact of Paris, New York, G. P. Putnam's Son's, 1!)28,
.287 p.
Mills, J. S., The Genoa Conference, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.,
1!)22, 436 p.
Mirkine-Guetzevich, B. and Tibal, A., LtJ TchicoslO'IJalluie, Paris,
Librairie Delagrave, 1929, 1 I!) p.
Molisch, P., Die Sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den lahren I9I8I919,
Vienna, Braumiiller, 1932, 191 p.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Moulton, H. G. and Pasvolsky, L., World War Debt Settlements, New
York, Macmillan, 1926, 448 p.
--, War Debts and World Prosperity, Washington, D. C., The Brookings
Institution, 1932, 498 p. ·
Mousset, A., La Petite EnJente, Paris, Bossard, I92J, 192 p.
Mowrer, P. S., Balkanized Europe, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.,
1921,349 p.
Nicolson, H., Peacemaking, New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933,
378 p.
Nosek, V., Independent Bohemia, London, J. M. Dent.& Sons, 1918, 190 p.
O'Higgins, H.]., March of the Czechoslovaks across Siberia, New York,
The Czechoslovak Arts Qub, 1918, 28 p.
Opoeenskj, J., The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and
the Rise of the Czechoslovak State,. Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., 1928,
216 p.
Padelford, N. ]., Peace in the Balkans, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1935, 209 p.
Pap:inek, J., La Tchecoslovaquie, histoire politique et juridique de sa
creation, Prague, these, 1922, 97 p.
Pasvolsky, L., Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States, New York,
Macmillan, 1928, 6o9 p.
Piot, A., La Couronne tchecoslovaque jusqu'au mort de Ralin, I9I8-I923,
Paris, these, 1923, 26o p.
PHbram, A. F., The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1920, 2 vols.
Przybylski, A., La Pologne en lutte pour ses frontieres (translated from
the Polish), Paris, Gebethner and Wolff, 1929, 172 p.
Radl, E., La Question religieuse en Tchecoslovaquie, Prague, the Gazette
de Prague, 1922, 62 p.
--, Der Kampf zwischen Tchechen und Deutsclzen, Reichenberg, Stiepel,
1928, 2o8 p.
Rasiil, A., The Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year
of its History, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923, 16o p.
--, Muj finanlni plaJJ (My Financial Plan), Praha, Orbis Pub. Co.,
1921.
--, Infiace a Deflace (Inflation and Deflation), Praha, Orbis Pub.
Co., 1922.
Reimann, P., Dejiny komunisticke strany ceskoslovenske (History of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party), Praha, Boreck)', 1931, 28o p.
Ripka, H., Patnact let ceskoslovenske demokracie (Fifteen Years of
·Czechoslovak Democracy), Praha, "Pokrok", 1933, 51 p.
Rist, C., La Deflation en pratique, Paris, Delagrave, 1924Ross,
E. A., The Russian Soviet Republic, New York, The Century Co.,
1923.405 p.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 439
Roucek, J. S., Contemporary Rumania and her Problems, Palo Alto,
Stanford University Press, 1932, 422 p.
Schacht, H., The End-of Reparations, New York, J. Cape and H. Smith,
1931, translated by L. Gannett, 248 J:).
Schmidt-Friedlander, R., Die Wahrungspolitik der Tschechoslowakei,
Reichenberg, Stiepel, 1929, 2II PSchuman,
F. L., War and Diplomacy in the French Republic, New York,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1931, 4S2 p.
Scott, A. P., An Introduction to the Peace Treaties, Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1920, 292 p.
Scott, J. B., Official Statements of War Aims- and Peace Proposals,
December, I9I6 to Nrrvember, I9I8, Washington, D. C., Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1921, SIS p.
Sedivy, K., Sept annies de politique intericure tcMcoslMJaquc, I9r8-25,
Prague, Orbis Pub. Co., I92S, 6g p.
Selsam, J. P., The Attempts to Form an Anglo-French Alliance, I9I9I924,
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, 8S p.
Seton-Watson, R. W., The New Slovakia, Prague, F. Borov.Y, 1924.
130 p.
--, Slavakia, Then and Now, London, Allen & Unwin, 1931, JS6 p.
--, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers, London; Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1934. 76 p.
Seymour, C. (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, New York,
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926, 4 vols.
Shotwell, J. T., War as an Instrument of National Policy, New York,
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929, 310 p. Simonds,
F. H., How Europe Afade Peace U7 ithout America, New
York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927,407 p.
--, Can Europe Keep the Peace?, New York, Harper & Bros., I9JI,
36op.
Simonds, F. H. and Brooks, E., The Great Powers in World Politics,
New York, American Book Co., 1935, 644ll·
Slosson, P. W., Twentieth Century Europe, Cambridge, Houghton,
Mifflin Co., 1927, 747 p.
Stanoyevich, M. S., Slavonic Nations of Yesterday and Today, New
York, H. W. Wilson Co., 1925.
Steidler, F. V., Ceskoslovenske hnuti fkJ Rusi (The Czechoslovak Movement
in Russia), Praha, Pam. Odboje, 1921, 113 p.
Stewart, G., The White Armies of Russia: a Chronicle of CounterRevolution
and Allied Intervention, New York, Macmillan, 1933,
469 p.
Stone, J., International Guarantees of Minority Rights, London, Oxford
University Press, 1932, :288 p.
440 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Strauss, E., .Tschechoslowakische Aussenpolitik, Prague, Orbis Pub. Co.,
1936, 165 p.
Street, C. J. C., Slowkia, Past and Present, London, P. S. King & Son,
1928, 64 p.
Temperley, H. W. V., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris,
London, Froude, 1920, 6 vols.
Thompson, C. T., The Peace Conference Day by Day, New York,
Brentano's, 1920, 423 p.
Toynbee, A. ]., Survey of International Affairs, I920-2J, I924-, London,
Oxford University Press.
Vinacke, H. M., History of the Far East in Modem Times, New York,
F. S. Crofts & Co., 1933, 503 p.
Werkmann, Baron C. von, The Tragedy of Charles of Hapsburg, London,
P. Allan & Co., 1924,297 p.
Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., lnformatio'll o'll the Renunciatio'll of War, I92?I928,
London, Allen & Unwin, 1928, 192 p.
--, Disarmament and Security since Locamo, I925-I93I, London, Allen
& Unwin, 1932, 383 p.
--, The Pipe Dream of Peace, New York, W. Morrow & Co., 1935,
302 p.
Zmrhal, K., Vlada Sovetu a Ceskoslovaci (The Soviet Government and
the Czechoslovaks), Praha, Socialisticke Listy, 1919, 46 p•
.ARTICLES
A German Bohemian Deputy, "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia",
The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. xiv, pp. 295-300, ·
January, 1936.
Anon., "In the matter of cessions by Germany to Czechoslovakia under
Article 339 of the Treaty of Versailles", The American Journal of
International Law, vol. J..-viii, pp. I86-Ig8, January, 1!)24.
--, "Modus vivendi mezi Ceskoslovenskem a Vatikinem ", Zahranicnl
Po#tika, vol. vii, pp. 97-98 (Benes to Gasparri, text of Czechoslovak
note of January 29, 1928), 1928.
Armstrong, H. F., "France and the Jipover Plan", Foreign Affairs,
vol. x, pp. 23-33, October, 1931. · .
Aubert, L.; "Security: Key to French Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol. xi,
pp. 122-136, October, 1932.
Avennier, L., "Mezinarodni pravo ficni a reiim na Dunaji ", Zahranicnl
Politika, vol. i, pp. 106-uo, 189-194. 294-300, 1922.
Benes, E., " Expose Ministra Dra. Bene5e o modu vivendi mezi Ceskoslovenskem
a Vatikanem ", Zahramlnt Politika, vol. vii, pp. 2oo-203
(Text of speech of February I, 1928), 1928.
--, "The Little Entente", Foreign Affairs, vol. i, pp. 66-72, September,
1922.
BIBliOGRAPHY 441
--, "Les Sens de hi. revolution tchecoslovaque", Vie des peuples, voL
X, pp. 293-351, 1!)23.
--, _" 0 sniZeni zbrojeni " (speech of September 29, 1923, during the
plenary session, as rapporteur for the Third Commission at the
Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations), reprinted in Zahranicm
Politika, vol. ii, pp. 1257·1264, 1923.
--, "The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia", Nineteenth Century, voL
xcv, pp. 483-490, April, 1924--,
"European Security", Intenf4tional Conciliation, no. 212, September,
1!)25- ·
--, •• Le Probleme des petites nations apres la ·guerre mondiale ", I.e
Monde slav, December, 1925, pp. 413-435.
--, "Les Slaves et l'idee slave pendant et apres Ia guerre ", Le Montie
slav, March, 1!)26, pp. 321-,381.
--, " Expose Dra. Beneiie, prednesene 4 iijna, 1928, v zahranienim
vjboru poslanecke snemovny ", Zahranilm Politika, vol. vii, pp. 1oo6-
10I2, Igz8.
Bemus, P., "L'Autriche et l'Anschluss", I.e Journal des debats, voL
xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 312-314. August 24. 1928.
--, "Le Gouvernement tcheque et le Vatican", Le Journal des debats,
vol. xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 86-87, IJO-IJ2, July 18-25, 1925.
Binkley, R. C.. "New Light on the Paris Peace Conference", PoliticalScience
Quarterly, vol. xlvi, pp. 335-361, 509-547, 1931.
--, "Ten Years of Peace Conference History"~ Journal of Modem
History, vol. i, pp. 607-629, 1929Brailsford,
H. N., "Prague and Vienna", New Re/11lblic, vol. xxxi, pp.
223-226, August 2, 1922.
Buell, R. L., "The Vatican and the New World", Current Histor,, vol.
xvi, pp. 977-984. September, 1922.
Chmelar, J., "Ceskoslovenska zahranicni politika v roce 1924", Zahranicm
politika, vol. ·iv, pp. 1-6, 1925. Similar annual summaries follow
in the first number of Zahranicni. Politika each year.
---, "Otazka rekonstrukce Rady Spolecnosti Narodu ", Zahranicnt
Politika, vol. v, pp. 777-783, 1!)26.
--, ''RakouslcY problem a stiedni Evropa ", Zahranicni Politika, vol. vii,
pp. II47-IIS9, 19z8.
--, " Tardieuiiv plan stiedoevropske spoluprace ", Zahranilnt Politika,
vol. xi, pt. I, pp. 185-192, 1932.
Chopin. ]., •• Les Tchecoslovaques en Russie ", Revue de Paris, vol. xxv,
pt. 4. pp. 777-796, August IS, 1918.
Dumont-\Vilden, L., "Lei Difficulte!t interieures de Ia Tchecoslovaquie",
Revue politique et litteraire, vol. lix, pp. 156-159, March 5, 1921.
Dvoraeek, ]., "Janovska konference ", Zahronilm Politika, vol. i, pp.
165-170, 1922.
442 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fenwiclc, C.· G., "The Legal Significance of the Locarno Agreements",
The American Journal of Internalional Law, vol. xx, pp. to8-1n, IgOO.
FiSa. P., "Pakt ctyr velmoci "; Zahranicni Politika, .vol. xii, pi}. 305-
312, 1933.
Fisher, L., "What the Sokols Stand for", The Boh'emian Review, vol.
i, pp. I-4. June, 1917.
Friedman, J.. .. Soueasna obchodne-politicka situace ceskoslov~BSke republiky
", Zahranicni Politika, vol. viii, pp. 7-17, 1929.
Hajn, A., " Ochrana narodnostnich men5in-otazkou mezinarodni ",
Zahranicni Politika, vol. i, pp. 88-92, 1922.
Hanc, J., "0 stredoevropske hospodarske dorozumeni ", Zahranicm
Politika, vol. xi, pt. I, pp. 1o8-118, 1932.
Hanighen, F. C., "Troubled Days in Czechoslovakia", Current History,
vol. xliii, pp. 578-583, February, 1935.
Hejn, E. T., "The Czechoslovak Viewpoint", The American Review of
Reviews, vol. lxv, pp. 490-491, May, 1922.
Hobza, A., "Reorganisace Spoleenosti Narodu ", Zahranibd Politika,
vol. v, pp. 863-867, 1!)26.
Hodia, M., "Mala Dohoda, jej tradicie a jej dnesny iikol '', Zahranicni
Politika, vol. i, pp. 6-10, 1922.
Hudec, K., "Ceskoslovenska republika a Nemecko", Zahra11icm Politika,
vol. viii, pp. 425-433, 546-555, 68I-6g6, 8o8-813, 1929.
Janin, General M., "Fragments demon journal siberien ", Le Monde slav,
December, 1924. pp. 221-240; March, 1925, pp. 339-355; April, 1925,
pp. 19-24.
--,"Au G. Q. G. russe ", Le Afonde slav, January, 1926, pp. 1-24; May,
1!)26, pp. I61-1&5.
]eden Svedek, "Benes a Mala Dohoda ", La Rh·ue de Frm1ce, annee ii,
tome v, pp. 595-623, October I, 1922.
Jonescu, T., "The Future of the Little Entente", The Living Age, vol.
cccxi, pp. 699-703, December 17, 1921.
--, "How the Little Entente Began", The Living Age, vol. cccxi, pp.
627-632, December 10, 1921. ,.
Jorga, N., "Les Fondements geographiques et historiques de la Petite
Entente", Le AIonde sltw, March, 1925, pp. 439-461.
Kaeer, K., "Deset let prace pro ideu odzbrojeni" Zahranicni Politika.,
vol. vii, pp. xQ48-Io64. II59-II70, 1928; vol. viii, pp. 629-647, 776-790,
901-912, II83-II97, 1455-1478, 1929·
Kadlec, K., "Magyars and the Czechoslovak Republic", The Csechoslowk
Review, vol. iv, pp. sS-64. 1920.
Kremar, J., "Pfispevky k v,Ykladu o oceneni locarnsk.Ych smluv ",
ZahraniCn' Politika, vol. iv, pp. 1334-1355, 1925.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 443
--, "ceskoslovenskopolska hranice v uzemi spisskem (Javorina) pred
Staljm Dvorem_ v Haagu a pred Radou Spoleenosti Narodu "•
Zahranilm Politika, vol. iii, pp. 7-20, 102-n8, x86-19(), 6oo-6o3, 1924.
Krofta, K.. "Haag a Pafiz ", Zahranilm Politika, vol. ix, pp. 497-500,
1930.
Kueera, B., "Ceskoslovenska. pozemkovi reforma s hlediska mezinirodniho
prava. ", Zahramlm Politika, vot. iii, pp. 444-454. 1924Lockhart,
R. H. B., "Central Europe and Czechoslovakia", Edinburgh
Review, vol. ccxxxviii, pp. 209-229. October, 1923·
Loiseau, C., "The Vatican and the New States o~ Central Europe", New
Europe, September 25, 1919, pp. 241-247.
Loubal, F., " Slovenska. declarace z 30 iijna, 1918, s WediSka mezinirodniho".
Zahramlnl Politika, vol. ii, pp. 1435-1440, 1923.
Machray. R., "The Little Entente and Its Policies", Fortnightly Review,
vol. cxxv, pp. 764-774. June, 1926.
Orbach, C. L, "Czechoslovakia's Place in the Sun", Current History,
vol. xiv, pp. 944-945, September, 1921. ,
Palickir, S. J. and Broi, A., "Czechs and Slovaks at Odds", Current
History, vol. xx:ii, pp. 784-788. August, 1925.
Papousek, J., "Ziklady Masarykovt koncepce zahranieni politiky ",
Zahramlm Politika, vol. i, pp. 349-350, 1922.
Pergler, C., "Minorities in Czechoslovakia", Current History, vol. xvii,
pp. JI0-3II, November, 1922.
Pichon, J. E., "Le9 Frontieres de l'etat tchecoslovaque ", Tr(W(lux du
Comite d'Etudes, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1919, vol. ii,.pp. 1o5-120.
Pinon, R., "La Reconstruction de l'Europe danubienne ", Revue·des deus
mondes, 6 periode, tome li, pp. 557-582, June I, 1919--,
"The Franco-Slovakian Treaty of Alliance", Current History, vol.
xx:, PP· 748-753, August, 1924Prochazka,
R., "Nova tvaf problemu bezpeenosti '', Zahranilni Politika,
vol. xiv, pp. 75-84. 1935.
Rankovitch, J., "France and the Little Entente", The Living Age, vol.
cccxvii, pp. 7-13, Apri,l 7, 1923.
Ryan, J. H., "The Vatican's World Policy", Curre1~t Histors, vol. xvii,
pp. 429-438, December, 1922.
Seton-Watson, R. W., "The Little Entente", Contemporary Review,
vol. cxxxii, pp. 694-707, December, 1927.
--,"The Psychology of the Succession States", New Europe, vol. xvii,
pp. 62--64, October 28, 1920.
--, "The Czechoslovak Republic", Contemporary Review, vol. cxix,
pp. 3IG-32I, March, 1921.
Slosson, P., "Problem of Austro-German Union", InternatiotUll Cortciliation,
no. 250, pp. 2z1-254. May, 1929.
444 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Smith, C. B.,. The Independent, December 3, 1921, pp. 226-227 (editorial
on Portorose Conference).
Sobota, E., "Czechs and Germans: a Czech View", The Slavonic and
East European Review, vol. xiv, pp. 301-320, January, 1936.
Srom, J. E., "Sovetske Rusko a Janov ", Zahraniln£ Politika, vol. i,
pp. 429-434. 1922.
Stolfer, G., "European Kaleidoscope", Foreign Affairs, vol. xiv, pp.
216-226, January, 1936.
Vochoe, V., "Nas spolek s Francii ", Zahranicni Politika, vol. iii, pp.
I-6, 1924WiJliams,
M. 0., "The Fighting Czechoslovaks ", Asia, vol. xviii, pp.
722-728, September, 1918.
Winkler, M., "The Investor and League Loans", Foreign Policy Association,
vol. iv, supplement 2, pp. 15-18, June, 1928.
Young, R. F., "Czechs and Slovaks", New Statesman, vol. xiv, pp.
IS5-IS6, November 8, I9I9Zimmerman,
M. A., "Americkj projekt paktu proti valce ", Zahranicni
Politika, vol. vii, pp. 427-432, 1928.
INDEX
Albania, 25, 248. z66, 372, 421
Alexander I, 198, 324, 367, 388,
391-~
Alexandro:vskY, 404-405
Allied High Command, 33, 35
Anschluss, 47-49, 148, 173. 177,
282-283, 28s-286, 287, 290,
JIZ, 324. 366, 3&1, 388, 391
Apponyi, 164n.
Archangel, IIS, 127, 128, 132
Archimbaud, 393
Austria,
Armistice of November, 1918, 34
Bank of Austria-Hungary, so,
53. 63'-69. 76
and Little Entente, 174. 193, 284-
287, 312-318, JSo-383
Protocol of Venice, 104. 183
reconstruction of, 192-197, 278
Republic recognized, 52
Treaty of St. Germain, 32, 43n.,
sz. s6. s8, 59, 68, 71, 82,
173. 224, 225, 279. 342. 401
war debts, 50-54
war finance, 62-63, 64
and Western Powers, 173-174.
175, 192, 195, lgO, 284-
285, 314. 38o-381, 397
see also, Anschluss, Austr~rman
Customs Union,
Danubian Confederation
Austr~rman Customs Union,
287, 311, 312-318, 322, 323,
324. 337. 398
Baldwin, 268
Balfour, 127
Balkan Entente, ,368n., 372-373, 397,
401, 407. 414. 422
" Balkanization of Europe", 44-
45. 58
Banffy, 182, 185
Baranya, 183-184
Barthou, 375, 376, ·J8o. 386, 387-
388. 390. 391-392, 394
Beaumarchais, de, 267
Beck, 361, 373, 400, 400, 418, 420
Belgium, 2II, 212, 232
Benes,
and Austria, 1'713-178. 1~197,
282:..288
becomes Foreign Minister, 16
and Central European economic
cooperation, 79, 189-192
and disarmament, 44. 181, zto-
2II, 299-394. 345, 352-354.
37o-371, 398
early life of, 14-15n.
elected President, 423-425
and France, 24. 105. 141, 2II, 212zt6,
217, 22o-224. ~ 231,
236-240, 265, 376
and Germany, 298-299. 316-317,
409 .
and Great Britain, 24. 105, 127.;,
128, 141, 211
and Hungary, 163, 164-165, 169-
110, ISI-189, 204, 205, 207-
2o8, 286-28;, 326. 329-330,
356-357, 36o, 392
and Italy, 24, 104, 2II-212, 223,
224-227, 265, 356-357. 362-
363, 367. 42D-423
and League of Nations, 105, 100,
107, III-'II3, 20!)-211, 227.229,
229, 307, 3'H-J.I2, 352-
3'54
and Little Entente, 162-173, 198,
201, 202-203, ZII, 221-222,
224. 226-227, 230, 26o, 28g,
291-292, 296, 319, 322, 325,
339. 341-342. 348-350, 357-
358, 371-372, 395. 414'
and Peace Conference, 26-27,
J7fi., 45.59
and Poland, 134-135, 150, 152-
154. ISS-100, 178, 242-246,
263
and reparations, so, 207, 343, 345,
349-350
and Rothermere, 267-269
and Russia (U. S. S. R.), IIJ-
445
INDEX
II4, ;114-129, 131-135, 136-
138, 145-146, 241, 259-200,
261-262, 386-387, 404-406,
414
speeches:
September 30, 1919, 59. 6o
January 31, 1920, 134
March II, 1920, 136, 26o
April 2, 1920, 137
August 4, 1920, 158-159
September I, 1920, 166-167
January 27, 1921, 190
April I, 1925, 244
October 30, 1925, 239
January 5, 1928, 291-292
April 23, 1931, 314"'"31'5
October 20, 1931, 345n.
March 25, 1932. 339
November 7, 1932, 351
January 14, 1933, 383
March I, 1933, 358
April 25, 1933, 362-363, 378
October 15, 1933, 365
October 31, 1933, 367, 370-37'1
March 21, 1934, 381 ·
March 23, 1934, 382
November 6, 1934, 392
November 5, 1935, 416-417,
418, 419
and war debts, 51
and Wilson, 44
Berger-Waldenegg, 397
Bethlen, 230, 329-330, 331, 341, 343,
359, 377n.
Bibra, von, 385
Bradac,36o
Bratiano, 198
Bratislava, 32, 37, 40-41, 82, 85, 190
Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, II5-n6
Briand, .140, 232, 272, 3IG-3II, 3'15
Bruning, 354
Bulgaria, 172, 203, 230, 248, 266,
321, 336, 347. 349. 4o6-407
Neuilly treaty of, 2Q4U., 224, 225
Burgenland, 182-183, 184
Cannes, 140
Carol II, 319, 322, 324, 367, 413
Catholic Church,
and Benes, 251, 257
Concordat of 1855, 91
Czech national revival, 91
Czechoslovak National Church,
93-94
Free-Thinkers, 95
and Hus, 92, 250, 253
land reform, go-91, 251
and Masary~ 92, 96. 250, 256-257
Modus Vivendi with Czechoslovakia,
254-257, 412-413
Praha riot, 92 ·
separation of Church and State
(Czechoslovakia), g6
and Slovaks, 96-97, 249-250, 255-
256
St. Vaclav, 251
see also, Hlinka
CecH, 127, 209
Celjabinsk, II], II9
Cermak, II7
Chamberlain, 231, 268
Charles, ex-Emperor-King, see
Habsburgs
Chicherin, 121-122, 135-136, 137,
145. 154
China, 107-108, 337, 345
Ciriaci, 256
Clemenceau, I 52
Conference of Ambassadors, xs&t.,
159~161, 182, I8J, 186-I87
Council of Four (Big Four), 30,
3I, .32, 40, 1$3
Curtius, 3I3, 314
Czechoslovakia,
Allied recognition of, IS
area of, 78
army in World War, 22n.
bankruptcies in, 86
commercial treaties of, 87-89. 102,
103, 171-172, 176, 1]8-1]9,
205, 244, 247-248, 26o-263,
263-265, 277-278, 279-28I,
293-294, 319-320, 328-329.
404
conduct of foreign affairs, 21,
22-23
constitution:
'1Jel'lllanent, zo-2In., II2-II.3
provisional, 20
cooperation of Benes and
Masaryk, 21, 326
" costs of liberation", 53. 342-343
customs duties, 8~1, 84-85, 88
Czechoslovak National Council,
14
Declaration of Geneva, 16
disarmament, see Benes, and dis-
armament
and Fasdsm, go, 257-258, 385,
4o8n., see also, Gajda
INDEX
447
Foreign Affairs Committees, 23
Foreign Trade Bureau, 81, 84. 87
Import and Export Commission.
8o, 81
. industrial inheritance of, 77
land reform, 90-91
Liberty Loan, 64
military policy, 19-20, 4I4-4'IS,
416, see also, Little Entente,
military conventions
minorities, 17, 18, 45. 46-47, 61-
62, '/I, 79, Io8-1IJ, 240,
314. 384-385, 407-411
nayy, J27
occupation of Slovakia, 18-19
at Peace Conference:
Anschluss, 47-49
boundaries:
Austrian, 31-32
Bohemian, 24, 28-31
Hungarian, 32-42
Polish, 43, 1:50-154
Ruthenian, 42
corridor, 31-32
Czechoslovak territorial commission,
27
economic outlets, 54-58
Inter-Allied Commission for
Tesin, 27
Lusatian Sorbs, 32
reparations, 49-51
summary of, 58-59
war debts, 51-54
political form of, IS
political parties of:
Agrarian, 69, 137, 241, 252, 253,
309, 320, 329, aSsn.
Christian Social, 258, 385n.
Oerical, 252, 253 ·
Communist, 334. 424'
Fascist, 4o8, 410, 424
German Agrarian, 258
German National Socialist,
384-385, 407
German Nationalist, 385, 407
National Democrat, 253. 332,
334
National Socialist, 251, 253
National Unity, 424'
Petka, 74. 25o, 252-253
Popular (Slovak Catholic),
258, 379, 4o8
Socialist, 70, 251, 252, 424
Sudetendeutsche Partei, 407-
4II
population of {192r), 78
Provisional National Assembly
16 •
religions of, 94n.
return of Legions, 16, 129, 133
social reform, 89-90
stability of, 97, 408
tariff barriers against, 87-!!9
see also, France. Great Britain,
Italy, League of Nations,
Little Entente, Russia,
United States
Danubian Confederation, 58, I8o,
z82, 283-288, 292, 316-317,
339-341, 347. 364-368
DavidoviC, 227 ·
Diderichs, 119
Dmowski, 153
Doleial, 419
Dollfuss, 365, 367, 38o-382, 385,
390. 391
Doumergue, 38o
Dousmanis, 203
Duca, 198, 201, 22'/, 292, 372
Eden. 398, 399-400
Einstein, J02
Englis, 71-73, 74
Estonia, 134. 248
Ethiopia, 407, 42o-423
Fierlinger, 380
Finland, 2.¢8, 321, 376
Flandin, 338, 339
Foch, 38. 130, 216, 219-220, 270
Four Power Pact, 36o-364, 400
France,
and Czechoslovakia, 22, 24, 31,
34. 37, 102, 122, 2n-:220,
231-239. 270, 338-339
debt default, 339, 376-377
at Peace Conference, 24. 25, JO,
41
and Poland, 135. 152, 179. 212,
216, 233. 236-238, 243, 335.
337. 364, 366-367, 389. 399
see also, Italy, Little Entente.
Russia
Fran<,;ois-Poncet, 369-370
Gajda, u8-n9, 123, 125, 129, 257-
258, 4o8n.
Garbai, 35
Gasparri, 254
INDEX
Gazik, 258
Geneva Profocol, 227-229
Genoa Conference, 14o-145, 199,
200-201
Germany,
and Czechoslovakia, 18, 88, 98-
99, 215, 382-383. 397. 407-
4II, 416
reparations, 341-342, 345-346
Saar plebiscite, 396
Versailles, treaty of, 43n., 48-49,
49-50, 56, 57, 59, 79-80, So-
81, 351-352, 355. 396. 397,
400.402
Weimar constitution, 48-49
see also, Anschluss, AustroGerman
Customs Union,
Hitler, Locamo, Poland,
Russia
Ghiczy, 330
Ghika, l<i4!L, 322, 325
GObbets, 409
GOmbOs, 365, 367, 377n., 381
GOring, 365, 411
Gratz, dh-182
Great Britain,
and Czechoslovakia, SS, IOG-101,
122, 248, 422-423
at Peace Conference, 24. 25, 30,
31
see also, League of Nations,
Little Entente, Russia
Greece,
and Italy, II3, 266
and Little Entente, 168, 203, 248,
289. 340, 342. 390. 392. 400
Politis, 228
see also, Balkan Entente
Habsburgs:
Charles, 52, 73, 169-170, '181-182,
184-186, 187•188, 327
Joseph, 163
Otto, 319, 328, 331, 413
Zita, 328, 413
Hainisch, 177
Helmer, 252
Henderson, 3r1
Henlein, 407-411
Herriot, 228, 23"1
Hillerson, 133-134, 139
Hindenburg, von, 232, 354, 424
Hitler, 354-355. 363, 369-370, 372,
373-374. 382-383, 386, 389,
3¢-399, .¢II
Hlinka, 23, 95, 253, 258, 327, 379
Hoare, 421
Hodac, 300
HodZa, 424
Hoover, 44. 344-345, 346
Horthy, 39, 169-170
Hotowetz, 84
House, 120
Hrusovskj, 378
Hungary,
ex-prisoners in Russia, 1'17, 119
forgeries, 271-274
Hirtenberg affair, 356-357
and Italy, 183, 266, 274-278, 290,
319, 331, 333, 356-3'57
reconstruction of, 205-2oS, 271
revisionism, 17, 18, 42, 134. 165,
259. 268-269, 326-330. 336-
341, 372. 377-379. 392. 400,
414
St. Gotthard affair, 274-278
Trianon, treaty of, 43D., s6, 164n.,
173. 182, 183, 201, 205, 2o6,
207, 224, 225, 230, 269. 274.
319, 326. 331, 377-378
see also, Habsburgs, Little
Entente, Slovakia
Hus, see Catholic Church
Hymans, 232
Ibl, 3o8
International rivers:
Danube, 32, 33-35, 40-41, 54. 56sS,
82
Etbe. 29, 54-55. 56, sx, 98
Oder, 30, 54-55, S6
Vistula, 54-55
Irkutsk, II9, 129
Italy,
Corfu incident, I'I3
and Czechoslovakia, 101-102, 103,
104, 1o8-109, 207, 268-269,
33Q-333. 341, 423
,. at Peace Corllference, 24. 3o.
31, 50
rivalry with France, 100, 22o-.224.
226, 265-271, 394-395
see also, Hungary, Little Entente,
M ussolini, Yugoslavia
Janin, 126-127
Japan, I2o-I2I, 122, 126, 248, 345,
369. 394. 403, 405, 421
Jehlicka, 95, 379
Jelinek, 317
Jews, 18, 46-47, 384
INDEX
449
}onescu, 1o8, 162, 16/', 168, 179
Joseph, see Habsburgs
Karolyi, 34. 35
Kellogg Peace Pact, 295, 301-302,
373
Keremky, 121
Klofac, 19. 378
Klotz, 419
Kolchak, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132
KopeckY, 296
Kosice, 37, 42
Kramar, I5D., I6-I7, 19, 23. 45. S4-
5S. 6g, 123, 130, 137, IS2tl.,
154. 241, 332, 334-33S. 424
Krofta, 2S4. 2S6, 332, 346. 424
Kujtun, treaty of, 129
Kun. Bela, 19, 35-39. 163
Laroche, 41
Latvia, 134. 2$
Lausanne Conference, 346-348
Laval, 394. 398, 399, 402, 403
League of Natiom,
Amendments to Covenant of,
1o6-n3
and Austria, 193, I9S-I97
Czechoslovak minorities treaty, 4S
early sessions of, 2S, 46. 107
and Ethiopia, 42o-423
and Germany, 297-299. see also,
Hitler
and Hungary, 2os-2o6, 207, 271-
278
and Russia (U. S. S. R.), 386,
389-390
"Treaty of Mutual Assistance",
20!)-2II, 227 ·
see also, Little Entente
Lithuania, 37S
Little Entente
conferences of, 197-204. 2II, 221.
222, 224, 226-227, 229-230,
26o, 286, 288-29(), JI8-J2S,
339. 340, 341-342. 348-350,
361-362, 364-368. 371-372,
387-388, 39S, 406-407, 41 I,
414. 423
extensiom of, 201-202, 204. 28g,
294-29(), 357-36o
formation of, 162-173
and France, 197-198. 212, 220-
224. 26S-266, 270, 290. 291,
32S, 336-341, 364. 399. 414-
41S
and Great Britain, 197-1g8, 290,
422-423
and Hungary, 164-165, x6Q-17o,
'I84~18g, 199, 221, 243. 246,
272-277. 293. 323. 349-3SO,
3S6
and Italy, 103, 188-18g, 193-194.
195-196, 222-223, 266-267,
274-278, 363. 36S, 397, 422-
423
and League of Nations, 107, 1o8
military conventions of, 172-173,
204.
and Russia (U. S. S. R.), 138,
·Jg8, 199-200, 221-:222, 230,
26o, z89.290, 320, 33S-336,
368-369. 387-390. 4IS
see also, Anschluss, Austria,
Balkan Entente, Bulgaria,
Danubian Confederation,
Greece, Habsburgs, Poland
Litvinov, 261, 386, 389, 390. 403, 4o6
Lloyd George, 128n., 130, 140
Locamo, 229-240, 3S2
MacDonald, 228
Magyars, see Hungary
Malhome, 419
Malypetr, 4o8, 410, 424
Marinkovic, 227, 290, 319. 343
Marmaggi, 250, 2SI, 254. 256, see
also, Catholic Church
Masaryk, I4fl., 16, 18, ·19, 41, no,
II5, u8, 123. 124, 126, I,JIIJ2,
135. ISS, 16/', 177. 212-
213, 224-225, 239. 326-327.
423-425
Mastny, 216
Mayr-Harting, 2.58
Maxa, 117
Meisner, 419
Michatakopoulos, 340
Mi!lerand, 157, 212
Mirbach, n6
Mironescu, 319, 342n.
Mitilineu, 290
Mussolini, 204, 2r1-212, 222-223,
224-22'6, 266-267. 269, 332'-
333, 336-341, 36o-364. 365.
367, 381-J82, J88. 391, 394.
401-402. 40], .po-423
Nadosy, 272
Nationalism, 13 and n.
Nemec, 424
450 INDEX
N ~urath, von, 369, 398
Nicholas, Prince, 322
Nincic, r6s, r98, 200, 221, 223, 224.
227,240,289
Omsk, IIS, II9, 128
Osuskj, 107, 16411., 336, 379n., 384
Otto, see Habsburgs
Paderewski, 157, ISS, 1S9
Palmieri, 333
Papen, von, 36S
Pasic, 163, r98, 201, 227
Paul, Prince, 413
Paul-Boncour, 374
Pedrazzi, 332, 333
Peidl, 39
Petain, 270, 2g6
Pichon, 41
Pilsudski, 361, 373-374. 400, 418
Piltz, 201
Pittsburgh Agreement, 17
Poincare, 140
Poland,
Amendments to League Covenant,
1()9-II3
and Baltk states, 179, 200, 389
boundary disputes : ·
Javorina, IS9-I62, 242
Orava, 43. 1S9-162, 244
SJ.>iS, 43, 1s9-162, 244
Tesin, 43, 149-1S9. 244. 418-42o
and Germany, 1SS-157, 200, 242-
243. 373-376, 394. 395
and League of Nations, 1o6-II3,
309
and Little Entente, '144, 168, 179-
18o, 189, 194. 199-201, 222,
242, 246, zSg, 291, 292, 319,
342. 366-367
and Russia, 130, IJI4, 135, 139,
154-IS6, 222, 243, 336
see also, France
Politis, 228
Portorose Conference, 190-192, 194
Pospisil, 338
Potemkin, 402
Ra8in, so, 63-6g, 70, 71, 74, 7S-
76, 79
Renner, 174
. Requin, 209
Rothermere, 267-269, 330
Rumania,
war against Hungacy, 34. 36-39
see also, Carol II, Little Entente
Russia (U.S.S.R., Soviet Union)
and Czechoslovakia, II4. 133, 138~
139. 1'44-146, z6o..263. 334-
336, 368, 386-387. ~389,
39S. 402, 404-405, 415-4I8
and France, roo, I r8, 125, 136,
139, 22'1D., 243, 335, 368-
36<}, 390. 393-394. 402-404
and Germany, II5-II6, 120, 142-
143, 368. 386
and Great Britain, 100, n8, 125,
140, 221n.
New Economic Policy of, 140
see also, Little Entente, Poland
Ruthenia, 17, IS, 42, 378, 379
Sacharov, 262
Salgo-Tarjan, 36, 41, 206, 2o8
Sapieha, I79
Satoralja-Ujhely, 41, 274n.
Schanzer, 104, 193, I95
Schober, r]8, 182, 192, 3II
Schuschnigg, 397
Seba, 334
Seipel, 192-193, 285-286
Serbian Orthodox Church, 94
Simon, 398
Sirovj, 128
Skirmunt, 179-180
Skoda munition works, 36, 358-359
Skrzynski, 232, 242, 246, 263
Slavicek, 164n.
Slovakia, 16, 17, 61, 95-96, 163, r6s,
2SS. '577-379 .
).>rovincial government inaugurated,
19
war over, 34-42, 77
see also, Hlinka, Hungary, re-
visionism
. Stl'lith, 207, 271
Smutny, 420 .
Smuts, 41
Sokols, 257, 332
Soukup, 318
Soviet Union, see Russia
Spain, 161, 248, 297, 390
Spina, 258, 4o8, 410
Stalin, 399
Starhemberg, 391
Stefanik, ISn., 16, 4Jn., 101, I26-I27
Stodola, 307
Stoyadinovic, 41 r
ll!DEX 451
Stresemann, 230
Stribrny, 424
Succession States,
economic and financial relations
of, 63, 65, 67n., 68-69. 71,
85,8;, I89-IQ2
and the peace settlement, 44-45,
46, so-54
and reparations, 341-350
see also, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania,
Yugoslavia
Supreme Council, .26-27, see also,
Council of Four
Suvich, 381, ,398, 4o6
Svehla, 253, 2,58
Tardieu, 339-340
Teleki, 181-182
The Hague, conferences of, 143
Tiso, 258
Tittoni, 109, IIG-III, II3
Titulescu, 343. 348, 357. 362, 367,
378, 393. 395. 397-398. 399.
413
Tokaj, 33, 41
Trotsky, II7
TrumbiC, 163
Tureanskj- Sv. Martin, 17n.
Turkey, 203, 248, 266, 318, 368, 390,
392, see also, Balkan
Entente
Tusar, 70, 355
Ukraine, 139. 146, 265
Unger, 379
United States,
and Czechoslovakia, 101, 105, 122,
248-249. 344-345. 346-347.
368-369. 376-377. 379
and Germany, 318
at Peace Conference, 24. 3o-
31, 41
and war debts, 248-249, 339, 344-
34'5, 346
U. S. S. R., see Russia
Vaida-Voevod, 164
Veverka, xg8, 261, 347
Vienna, 32, 36, 48n., 6o-6x, 165, 176,
197,27~ 285,286,313, 38o
ViskovskY, 319, 332
Vladivostok, II5, II7, U9, 127,
1z8, 129
" Western orientation ", 82, 85, 86,
g8, 105, 1!3, 129, 137
Weygand, 154
Wilso~ 30, 44, 101, I2o-I2I, 122,
123, 130, 158n., 16o
Windischgrii.tz, 271-273
Wiseman, 121
World Economic Conference, 300-
307
Yeftic, 348, 357. 367, 395, 397, 411
Yugoslavia,
and Austria, 177
friction with Italy, 100, 103, 168,
391
see also, Alexander I~ Little
Entente
Zaleski, 336, 340
Zimmerman, 196
Zita, ex-Empress, see Habsburgs
Zolger, 16411-
48
Scale 1; 3,000.000
En ~!l lh Moltl
:10 30 40
Kilomelltl .
0 10 :10 30 •O $0 60 70 80 90 100
"""''_..,.,...,.*Stateboundary O lnh..,blted by more lholn 100.000
___ Provlncl.:tl bound;,l)l Inhabited from 20 to 100 000
13°
• Inhabited from 10 to 20 000
o Inhabited by less than IO.OOU
14° 15'
AHajdub:s~ormeny
Oebrecene
17' 18' 21°
VITA·
THE writer wa born in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on September
J, 1901. He wa raduated from Washington High School
of that city in ne, 1919, and in September received a
scholarship from e College. At that institution he was
a Reader in Ameri an History for Professor S. G. Pattison.
After two and a ha' f years at Coe College, he transferred in
January, 1922, to the State University of Iowa, where he
obtained his A.B. in 1923 and his A.M. in 1924. At Iowa
he was Undergraduate and, later, Graduate Assistant to
Professor Louis Pelzer in the freshman classes in American
History. In Septembe~, 1924, he went to Columbia University,
New York City, for graduate work and research
for the Ph.D. degree. Here, he had three seminars under
Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes. Since September, 1928,
he has been at the. University of North Dakota as Assistant
and Associate Professor of American History.
453