1 Thinking about war in international politics

When thinking about war, we usually conjure up the image of two countries arraying their military forces against each other, followed by combat between distinctively designated, organized, and marked armed forces. The purpose of fighting is to destroy the adversary's capacity to resist and then to impose both military and political terms on the defeated party. This was the pattern in the 1991 Gulf War, World War II, and World War I, to mention several of the most famous wars of this century. Diplomatic practitioners, military leaders, and academic experts on international politics typically regard war as a contest between states. This characterization of war is also found in the Charter of the United Nations, in hundreds of bilateral and multilateral treaties between states, in government defense ministries, and in standard textbooks on international politics and security studies.

War defined as a contest of arms between sovereign states derives from the post-1648 European experience, as well as from the Cold War. It is historically and culturally based. In other historical and geographical contexts, wars have been better characterized as contests of honor (duels), marauding, piracy, searches for glory, and pillaging forays. Armies, navies, gangs, and hordes battled, sometimes in quick but massive battles, at other times in decades-long campaigns. They represented clans, tribes, feudal barons, city states, empires, and religious orders such as the Templars and Hospitallers. For many, such as Genghis Khan's hordes, war was at once a style of life, an economic system, and an instrument of the Khan's temper to punish those who offended him. It was largely devoid of political purpose because it did not result in the rearrangement of political units, the creation of empires, or the alteration of a state's territories. Wars in Europe until the seventeenth century reflected medieval, not modern, objectives.

The numerous wars of the first half of the fifteenth century, for example, were fought to assert or defend personal rights of property or succession, to enforce obedience among vassals, to defend or extend Christendom against the Muslims, or to protect Church interests against heresy. The first category predominated. Most wars consisted of personal quarrels between kings, queens, and princes over rights of inheritance; they were not "in any sense conflicts between states, let alone nations, over what they perceived to be their interests" (Howard 1976: 20). As late as 1536 Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, challenged his rival, Francis I of France, to a duel to resolve their quarrels.

War as an instrument of state policy is a relatively new form of organized violence.[1] While predation, plunder, and glory might rank among its by-products, the main purpose of the use of force in Europe for the past 350 years has been primarily to advance and/or to protect the interests of the state. War has been political. This is the Clausewitzian conception of war, summarized in his famous definition "war is a continuation of politics by other means." While the dynamics of armed combat may cause a decline into uncontrolled total violence ("war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds"), the purpose of armed forces is to sustain and advance the diplomatic interests of the state. Those purposes might range from territorial defense, through claims for a crown or gaining control of colonies, to constructing an expanding empire. Military force has purposes which the governments of states in a system of states define, defend, and promote.

If the purposes of two or more states are incompatible, then war is also an instrument of conflict resolution. It is undertaken when diplomats are unable to negotiate conflicting claims and objectives. The contest of arms produces an outcome, which is then set down in a peace treaty that defines a new set of rights, obligations, and resource allocations between the combatants. Territories may be annexed or exchanged, states may be created, partitioned, or extinguished, navigation rights may be denied or established, or the claim to a throne may

[1] Wars in other civilizations have taken numerous forms, in some cases in the service of state-like entities. In many respects, however, the European territorial state is historically unique. Features such as fixed and formal lineal frontiers, the interests of the "state" (as opposed to the personal interests of the ruler(s)), the concepts of sovereignty and legal equality, and the longevity of the state format are seldom to be found elsewhere. For a discussion of forms of warfare in Europe that are not distinctly related to the modern territorial state, see Howard (1976: chs. 2–3).

be honored or rejected. War is thus a rational if not always desirable activity, a means to a known end defined in terms of state or national interests.

Following the mayhem and slaughters of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) that depopulated a large part of central Europe, the Clausewitzian view of war reflected dynastic and Enlightenment politics and etiquette. Centralizing monarchies by the eighteenth century had slowly gained a monopoly of force within their own territories and could get on with the task of state-making with less concern from military challenges within their realms. Their problem now was to define the state more precisely in its external dimensions and how to finance the wars that were necessary to strengthen the state. To do this, they laid claims to old titles and crowns, sought lineal and defensible borders against external threats – which often meant dispossessing others of their own territories – and competed for colonies and their resources. The result was that as states became more established in their sovereignty, they became greater threats to their neighbors. Their rulers demanded that others recognize their status as sovereigns, but they did not always reciprocate the favor, for some aspired to reorganize the states system under principles different than that of sovereign equality of independent states. They thought in terms of hierarchies and domination. Dreams of empire and hegemony did not die out with Charles V and the Treaties of Westphalia. Louis XIV, Napoleon, the Germans in 1914 and again in the 1930s sought to establish clear paramountcy on the continent, a condition that posed mortal threats to the other states.

Until the wars of the French Revolution, professional and mercenary armies led by noble officers, and not infrequently by kings and princes themselves, pursued a variety of dynastic and state objectives. Charles XII of Sweden, Peter the Great, and Frederick the Great were battlefield warriors as well as monarchs. War in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflected the dynastic (and later, Enlightenment) ethos of reason, moderation, and calculation. It was highly regulated and institutionalized in the form of strict etiquette, standardized tactics, uniforms, and informal "rules of the game." War was also a *legitimate* instrument of dynastic diplomacy. The concept of sovereignty, buttressed by the doctrine of the divine origins of dynastic rule, allowed a sovereign to advance or protect his or her interests (dynastic and state interests were often the same) through the use of armed force against other states. While wars of these centuries cost the taxpayers dearly

(leading Immanuel Kant to formulate his famous proposition that if the "people" ruled, there would be no wars), they were not commonly seen as a great problem that required regulation. The unlimited right to wage war was reflected in international law until the twentieth century. As late as 1880, the eminent international lawyer W. E. Hall could write that "both parties to every war are regarded as being in an identical legal position, and consequently as possessed of equal rights" (quoted in Keegan 1993: 383).

Napoleon's assaults on Europe changed public views of war, although not the central concept of war as basically a political contest between two or more states. While Napoleon did not introduce fundamentally new technologies to war, his political purposes went far beyond those of the preceding century's dynasts. His military tactics changed war from a limited exercise into great campaigns of annihilation against enemies. The Napoleonic wars were the most costly in lives and resources since the Thirty Years War. But more important, their purpose was to destroy the European states system and to replace it with a Paris-centered, hierarchical empire. Born of the French Revolution, these wars also had the purpose of changing the domestic orders of the defeated: these were the first wars of "national liberation." The goal was to bring ideological and political orthodoxy to the continent (under French tutelage), a gross deviation from the principles of the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), whose purpose was to sanctify political and religious heterogeneity rather than conformity in Europe.

By 1815, then, war had become a problem of public policy. Something had to be done to prevent a replay of the two decades of revolutionary–Napoleonic war. The Treaty of Paris and declarations of the Congress of Vienna were the first modern attempts to control the use of armed force between states. Sovereigns were henceforth – in theory at least – to use force only with the consent of the great powers (the Concert). This limitation applied to the great powers themselves (Holsti 1992b). If war was to become increasingly unlimited, as it had in the 1791–1815 period, then the society of states had the right and obligation to impose restrictions on its use.

World War I (the "Great War") shattered a century of relative peace in Europe. The war was unprecedented in the scale of destruction and lives lost, if not in its futility. By the late nineteenth century, public peace movements had become increasingly vocal as transnational interest groups. The Great War helped to create a massive groundswell of opinion to impose even greater constraints on the use of force. The

Covenant of the League of Nations restricted the legitimate use of force to only three possibilities: (1) for self-defense; (2) to enforce League-sponsored sanctions; and (3) to resolve a conflict – after a ninety-day waiting period – when the League could not fashion a solution. Once the unlimited right of sovereigns, armed force was now viewed as an *ultimate* instrument of policy, to be used only in circumstances generally approved by the international community.

Not content with the remaining loopholes in the League Covenant, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg–Briand Pact) formally outlawed war as an instrument of policy and compelled signatories to resolve their conflicts by peaceful means. States that violated the new universal norm were to be guilty of "crimes against humanity."

The Tokyo and Nuremberg war trials after World War II established individual responsibility for both waging aggressive war and violations of the laws of war, including "crimes against humanity." These trials further eroded the Clausewitzian conception of war as simply a continuation of politics by violent means. Once the unlimited right of a sovereign, the new doctrine characterized aggressive war as a criminal activity. Thus, today, under the Charter of the United Nations, states can use armed force only in two circumstances: (1) individual or collective self-defense, and (2) enforcement of collective sanctions. The Korean, Suez, and Gulf Wars were significant test cases: in each, aggressors were condemned, and in Korea and the Gulf the Security Council sanctioned the collective use of armed force to repel invaders and to liberate conquered territories. There were, of course, other wars. Most of them were "wars of national liberation" justified on the basis of the anti-colonial sentiments of a majority of United Nations members. As argued during the 1950s and 1960s, these were to be regarded not as wars between states – the combats which the United Nations was designed to prevent – but as uprisings of populations exercising their right to self-determination.

The United Nations was created to provide "international peace and security," which in 1945 meant the prevention of war *between* states. It had many other purposes as well, but the prominence devoted to the problem of international peace and security emphasized that in government and public circles, war remains *the* problem of international politics. Virtually all members of the United Nations nevertheless continue to maintain military forces and to develop strategies and deployments to deal with potential or actual military threats from

external sources. No member has been willing to rely exclusively upon the organization for its own security. Hence, although the use of force has been highly circumscribed in terms of norms, it remains a constant possibility in the relations between states. Defense policies are designed to cope with external threats, and "national security" is a condition in which those threats are successfully deterred or contained, or vulnerabilities reduced. In brief, the Clausewitzian concept of war as a means of serving state interests continues to form the intellectual and conceptual foundation for international organizations, national military institutions, the practices of diplomacy, and the academy. The ultimate problem for all of them remains war between states.

The end of the Cold War has not fundamentally changed either practitioners' or academics' views about war. After 1991, a blizzard of proposals suggested a new "security architecture" for Europe, meaning the creation of new institutional capacities for the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO to deal with the age-old problem of war between states. Despite a few novel ideas, such as Samuel Huntington's concept (1993) of a "clash of civilizations," diplomats and strategists continue to concentrate on Clausewitzian-type wars and the problems that nuclear proliferation would create for regional and universal security. The academic study of international politics similarly continues to be motivated by and concerned with the two faces of Janus: war and peace between states.

The theoretical analysis of war

Since the eighteenth century, philosophers, historians, and experts on international affairs have sought to locate the "causes of war" – meaning organized and politically directed violence between the armed forces of two or more states. They have indulged in a variety of diagnostic exercises from which prescriptions and solutions have flowed. Leading politicians have frequently been influenced by these analyses. This is not the place to develop a full historical survey of systematic thinking on the causes of war and the conditions of peace, order, and stability. A few intellectual highlights are appropriate, however, for they demonstrate the continuing significance of Clausewitzian conceptions of war in the analysis of the problem, and the ways that statesmen and strategists base their policies on academic diagnoses and prescriptions.

At the time that Jean-Jacques Rousseau was developing his thoughts

about the causes of war and the conditions of peace in the middle of the eighteenth century, war was a regular feature of the European diplomatic landscape. Between the Treaties of Westphalia and the French Revolution, Europe's dynasts fought forty-eight bilateral and multilateral wars. Some monarchs earned temporary glory for their victories (primarily Louis XIV, Charles XII, Peter the Great, and his fellow great, Frederick), but most drained treasuries, bankrupted the state, and motivated peasants to organize tax rebellions. If not commonly perceived as a social problem requiring remedies, at least there were many who opposed these many wars because of their economic costs. For Rousseau and Kant, however, war was more than a cost-ineffective pastime of princes. Their critiques of war were founded primarily on their republicanism. For Kant, at least, republican virtue could replace the prevailing dynastic warrior culture.

I concentrate on Rousseau because he was the first to propose a fundamental explanation for the persistence of Clausewitz-style war between states, an explanation that continues to inform theoretical scholarship in international politics. He developed, though not in a systematic or consistent manner, a generic theory of war. It does not explain the origins of any particular armed combat, but demonstrates why war is a necessary feature or outcome in a system of independent states. Such a system is called an *anarchy*. Anarchy does not mean chaos. It is, rather, the literal Greek meaning of the *lack of governance*. States are sovereign and, by definition, no authority resides above them. Only states make laws for their citizens and subjects, and ultimately states must rely only on themselves for their defense. States are legally equal, and thus there are no hierarchies of formal command and obedience, as one would find in a feudal system.

Rousseau used a parable to illustrate why war is inevitable in anarchic state systems. I will embellish his simple story to amplify main points and to underline the systemic or structural character of the explanation.

Five primitive hunters meet by accident. They do not know each other, nor can they communicate for lack of a common language. They have a common purpose, however. It is to kill a stag seen in the neighborhood. Each hunter is armed with only a spear. Each makes the calculation that if he cooperates with the others to encircle the stag, he will increase the probability of making the kill. Put in quantitative terms, a hunter by himself has only a 10 percent chance of killing the stag; but if he succeeds, he gets 100 percent of the kill. If the hunters

collaborate to encircle the game, the chances of a kill increase to, say, 80 percent. However, in the event of success and assuming an equality of effort, each hunter will receive only 20 percent of the kill. By a simple calculation each hunter sees the greater payoff in collaboration: 100 percent of 10 is only 10, whereas 20 percent of 80 is 16. Assuming hunters to be value maximizers, Rousseau shows why cooperation brings greater gains to all. Even for egotists – those motivated solely by self-interest – it is rational to cooperate.

And so it should be in international relations. Everyone gains through peaceful contacts, including trade. If there were less threat of war between states, a great deal of money could be saved for more constructive purposes. The argument has a very modern ring: how much more could the developing and industrialized countries gain by investing in health, education, and the arts, for example, rather than in weapons and preparations for war?

Why, then, don't governments make these rational choices? Why do they consistently forgo important gains available through cooperation and trade for the destructive activities of preparation for war and fighting? To Rousseau, the explanation lies in the situation rather than in the caprices of human sentiment or the attributes of the states themselves.

One hunter finds a hare close by. It is a certain kill for him. He must then make a new calculation. "Should I kill the hare? It is much smaller than the stag, but my 100 percent certainty of food tonight is better than the 80 percent probability attached to the stag." In killing the hare, however, the hunter makes noise that scares the stag, which then flees. Our rational hunter has gone for the short-term and certain gain that ruins the prospects of his fellows.

This would not necessarily preclude future cooperation, but in international politics, *every* hunter (state) knows that the other hunters may have a hare nearby. In other words, mistrust pervades the relations between hunters (states). In this environment, each hunter is compelled to go for the short-term gain because if he does not, another one might and then the rest go home hungry.

This is the predicament of states. It is a necessary feature of all anarchical systems and is based on the fundamental situation, not on the predispositions of individual rulers or states. This is a powerful structural explanation of war, one that remains the centerpiece of neo-realist theories of international politics.

Rousseau went beyond this analysis to show also why the defensive

policies of any state necessarily cause distrust among neighbors. The stag hunt parable explains defection, or war. The concept of the *security dilemma* explains the mistrust that lies behind it. States create armaments and deploy them for a variety of reasons. Since they cannot rely on others for their own security, they must have the insurance of arms for self-defense. But when the defensive-minded state arms, its buildup creates suspicion among its neighbors. They cannot always accept the peaceful pretensions of the first state, and thus must obtain insurance for themselves. Competitive arming is the result. As Rousseau and others put it, the means that states develop for their survival constitute a threat to their neighbors. The price of domestic sovereignty (a monopoly over the use of force within a defined territory and the status of supreme lawmaker over a community) is external insecurity and war. If you want a system of sovereign states, the price is permanent insecurity and occasional war.

It is not necessary to question some of the assumptions of the stag parable (for example, the assumption of the non-sociability of the hunters: how many states today are completely isolated and unable to communicate with others?) to see that it is a powerful theoretical explanation for the persistence of war between states. Such wars remain a central concern of statesmen and scholars of international politics despite numerous charters, covenants, treaties, balances of power, arms control measures, and nuclear deterrents. The logic of anarchy overrides all efforts to control the use of armed force.

Rousseau's analysis did not sweep the academic and diplomatic communities, however. Both have continued trying to find paths to lasting peace in the anarchical system of states. The discipline called international relations developed in the United States and the United Kingdom shortly before and immediately after World War I. Its purpose was both diagnostic and prescriptive. Few academics in this era adopted Rousseau's pessimistic perspective on war. Their diagnoses presented an array of non-systemic causes of interstate war, including the human psyche, imperialism, militarism, nationalism, and racism (cf. Sharp and Kirk 1941).

Yet other observers, including leaders such as Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin, focused their diagnoses of the war problem at the level of states. It is not so much the system of states that is the fountain of conflict and war, but the nature of the individual states. To Lenin, it was capitalist states that became imperialist and thus drove war. For Wilson, militarism and autocracy were the culprits. Democracies, in his

view, are fundamentally pacific. In his early version of the League of Nations, Wilson wanted the organization to restrict membership to democracies; only a covenant between peace-loving democracies could guarantee peace.

Theoretical solutions to war

Under the influence of Rousseauian realism, Wilsonian liberalism, and Marxist revolutionism, government leaders and academics developed a full roster of prescriptions and solutions to the problem of interstate war: disarmament, judicial settlement of disputes, democratization of states, peace education, international organizations and institutions, world federalism, and world revolution – all ideas that remain current in one form or another. But none helped to prevent the serial aggressions of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and the Japanese in Asia during the 1930s.

World War II resulted in a resurgence of realist thought, personified best in the work of Hans J. Morgenthau (1948). Unlike Rousseau, who saw the source of war in the nature of the states system, Morgenthau explained the perennial struggle for power among states by reference to an immutable human personality. Man (generically speaking) always seeks power. There can be a "struggle for peace," based on skillful diplomacy and balances of power, but at best these offer only temporary respites from the perennial problem of war driven by the human being's search for power. Solutions in the sense of a permanent end to war are therefore utopian. There can only be eras of more or less peace generated by skillful and prudent statesmen and diplomats with a design to create and sustain a global balance of power.

Rousseau's analysis remains currently in the guise of "neo-realism," the idea that the basic structural properties of the international system cause conflicts. The solution to the problem, as in Morgenthau – but for entirely different reasons – is a bipolar balance of power (Waltz 1979). Wilson's ideas, whose genealogy go back to early nineteenth-century British liberals, live on in the OSCE Charter of Paris (1990), which emphasizes the connection between democracy within states to peace between them, while Lenin's vision, if not its substance, finds heirs among those who would destroy states and replace them with localisms of various kinds.

Whether emphasizing human nature, the characteristics of states, or the structure of the states system, all these theoretical diagnoses of war

as well as their derivative prescriptions use the same conception of the state. It is the sovereign territorial state of seventeenth-century European origins. The premier problem of international relations is interstate war as it had been experienced since the Treaties of Westphalia. Whether caused by the personal lust for power, imperialism, aggressive militarism, or international anarchy the problem that must be dealt with is essentially a problem of the relations between states. It follows that if war is seen in the Clausewitzian sense as an instrument to support state interests, then solutions to the problem have to be fashioned in the relations between states.

Rousseau could not develop a solution to the problem. If you want states, he argued, then the price is insecurity and war. Other realists emphasized balances of power. It does not solve the problem of war, for war may be used to sustain or create a balance. But at least it helps provide security for the individual states. Those of the Wilsonian persuasion argued for the progressive democratization of individual states, or for democratization of their mutual relations through devices such as open diplomacy, arbitration of disputes, and publicizing treaties and other understandings. Whatever the solution, it depends upon improving the patterns of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and international institutions. Only Lenin prescribed a solution that was not state-centered: world revolution in which individual states would be cast away and new forms of governance would emerge under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Classes, not states, were to be the actors of the future. And since working classes cannot have any contradictions between them, the problem of war would be solved.

The Cold War changed few of these proposed – and often popular – solutions to the problem of war. There was one major exception, however. For the majority of both civilian and military strategists, the ultimate solution to the problem of war is nuclear deterrence. This idea represented a revolution in thinking. The atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 ushered in a new military age, according to most observers. Henceforth, the purpose of armed force is not to fight wars for offensive or defensive reasons, but to prevent them. The traditional cost-benefit analysis underlying any decision to use force is obsolete in the nuclear age. The costs of nuclear war are so horrendous that the old Clausewitzian conception of war as a means of supporting state claims no longer makes sense. What country could conceivably use nuclear weapons to advance its interests if in so doing

it would bring massive retaliation resulting in its obliteration as a recognizable state? Or worse, the end of mankind?

The fundamental dilemma of nuclear deterrence, of course, is that it has to be based on a credible threat of retaliation. But if nuclear retaliation guarantees nuclear war, how can any threat to retaliate be credible? And how can governments extend deterrence to allies and friends? Would the United States destroy itself to save France? Or more pertinent to the pattern of war since 1945, can you threaten to use nuclear weapons to prevent or terminate a guerrilla war in a distant Third World country? Nuclear deterrence as a solution to the problem of war is inherently non-credible when any rational calculation of costs and benefits is made. Even the attempt to impose a Clausewitzian rationality onto nuclear war by proposing it be confined to the exchange of tactical weapons lacks credibility. A "limited nuclear war" is one of the great oxymorons of modern strategic studies. It is also non-credible when wars of a non-Clausewitzian type are at issue. Of what relevance are nuclear weapons in Bosnia or Somalia? Despite these unsolvable intellectual and practical contradictions, strategic studies as an academic subfield of international relations focused for forty years on the problem of creating effective deterrents.

Cold War era peace movements were also consumed with the problem of nuclear war. Their leaders could not abide the deterrence theorists because they saw the problem of nuclear weapons in fundamentally different ways. For the strategic community, nuclear doctrine and deployment were the avenues to peace; for the peace groups, they are guaranteed paths to Armageddon. The two communities were united, however, in their adherence to the old idea that the problem of war is essentially a problem of the relations between states. The context of war and peace is the competition and general incompatibility of purpose between the two superpowers and their respective alliance systems. The two communities also shared the realization that nuclear war could result from human error, fanaticism, or technical malfunction. Deterrence may be a rational means of preventing war but, going beyond Clausewitz, it could also lead to colossal mistakes. The solution to this problem is negotiated, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements between the nuclear powers.

Analysts of the problem of war, from Rousseau to deterrence theorists, have examined primarily the behavior of the great powers. This was natural because between the Thirty Years War and World War II, most wars were precipitated by or eventually involved the

great powers (Levy 1983). Diagnosticians of international relations and war therefore insisted that the field of study should also focus on great-power activity. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979: 72), a premier theorist of international politics during the second half of the twentieth century, "the story of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of our era." Statesmen have concurred and insisted that the major powers hold special responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security. This idea was enshrined in the Concert of Europe, in the League of Nations Covenant, and continues in the Charter of the United Nations.

What recent analysts and practitioners have largely overlooked is that most of the war and killing since 1945 has occurred far away from the central battlefields of the Cold War in Europe and Pacific Asia. The initiators of the many post-1945 wars have not been the traditional great powers, but relatively new and weak states. Most of these wars have been noted, but to the extent that they were analyzed seriously, it was usually from a Cold War perspective (Korany 1986). The developing countries – the Vietnams, Afghanistans, Ethiopias and Somalias – were simply the arenas in which great-power competition was taking place. Their security problems were a reflection of Cold War politics. Academics and professional strategic thinkers characterized many wars of "national liberation" as combats between "freedom" and "communism." The history of these areas was essentially the events and personalities that eased or thwarted the aspirations of the United States, the Soviet Union, or communist China. In Washington, "states" like South Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Burma, Angola, and Somalia were threatened by Soviet and/or Chinese "subversion." In Moscow, "states" like North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea were threatened by "imperialism." Naives like Ronald Reagan or the leaders of many communist parties in Europe thought that once the problems of communist subversion or imperialism had been resolved, perpetual peace would reign between states. Simple diagnoses paved the way for simple solutions.

The relevance of old concepts to new environments

Our ideas about war – its sources, nature, and solutions – come from the European and Cold War experiences. When we think of it either as

a practice or as the object of study, Clausewitzian conceptions of armed combat to support or extend state interests remain in our minds. Our explanations of the phenomenon derive largely from Rousseau's compelling analysis, from human-nature-based theories (including biological theories), or from theories about the attributes of states.

Largely hidden in all this thinking about the causes of and solutions to interstate war is the experience of Europeans in their numerous imperial wars and campaigns, to say nothing of the theory and practice of war in non-European societies (cf. Keegan 1993). Yet it is these types of war that are the precursors to many of the post-1945 and contemporary wars. The Clausewitzian conception of war as organized combat between the military forces of two or more states fits our mental maps naturally because it reflects the predominant forms of great-power warfare within modern (post-1648) European civilization at least until World War II. This is the model of war enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in collective defense organizations like NATO, and in definitions of war and aggression in international law.

Key analytical concepts such as balances of power, hegemony, alliances, deterrence, power projection, and a whole range of geopolitical ideas also derive from the European and Cold War experiences. Their relevance to most post-1945 wars is highly problematic.

The problem is that the Clausewitzian image of war, as well as its theoretical accoutrements, has become increasingly divorced from the characteristics and sources of most armed conflicts since 1945. The key question is: given that most wars since 1945 have been *within* states, of what intellectual and policy relevance are concepts and practices derived from the European and Cold War experiences that diagnosed or prescribed solutions for the problem of war *between* states? Are we to understand the Somalias, Rwandas, Myanmars, and Azerbaijans of the world in classical European terms? Do we find balances of power, alliances, and wars to promote state interests in Africa, South America, South Asia and other regions of the world, as we saw them in eighteenth-century Europe? Are we to assume that the ideas and practices that drove interstate wars between Prussian, Saxon, Austrian, and French dynasts in the eighteenth century must repeat themselves in twenty-first-century Africa? Are the rationalist calculations of balance of power or deterrence theory applicable to ethnic, religious, and/or language communities bent upon destroying each other? Should we continue to regard the security problems of post-1945 states

as merely the reflections of great-power interests? Do not various regions of the world have their own unique set of security problems and dynamics? Is the United Nations, an organization created by the victors of World War II to resolve conflicts between European-type states and European-style wars, and to sustain the Westphalian principles of sovereign independence, particularly well suited to handle the types of conflicts that comprise the current diplomatic landscape? Should the academic study of international relations continue to employ concepts and organizing devices derived from the European and Cold War milieux?

Many have argued that the concept of national security should be broadened to include threats such as environmental pollution, depletion of the ozone layer, earth warming, and massive migrations of unwanted refugees (cf. Waever *et al.* 1993). Pleas by strategists for conceptual innovation are understandable since the prospects of conventional war between industrial countries have declined precipitously. If new threats are not identified, strategic planners may become redundant. To remain relevant, some have begun to focus on "low intensity conflict" but this is done from the perspectives of American foreign policy interests rather than as a serious exercise to understand the etiology of such conflicts. The assumption is that Americans should better understand such forms of warfare if they wish to intervene effectively to protect their interests, however those might be defined. Overall, however, strategic studies continue to be seriously divorced from the practices of war as we have seen them in the West Bank, Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, and elsewhere (Cf., Rice 1994). Most fundamentally, the assumption that the problem of war is primarily a problem of the relations *between* states has to be seriously questioned. The argument of this chapter is that security *between* states in the Third World, among some of the former republics of the Soviet Union, and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent upon security *within* those states. The classical formula was: international peace and security provide an environment in which domestic politics can unfold untroubled by external disturbances. The equation is now becoming reversed. The problem of contemporary and future international politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of domestic politics. The source of the problem is found in the nature of the new states.

On what foundations can we make this claim? The next chapter provides the evidence. Although there has not been a clear break between the era of wars between states and the era of wars within

states, 1945 serves as a convenient breakpoint. The trend is clear: the threat of war between countries is receding, while the incidence of violence within states is on an upward curve. Saddam Hussein's short-lived conquest of Kuwait in 1990 may prove to be among the last classical-style military aggressions.

John Mueller's (1989) argument that man will learn to avoid "major" war (war between the major powers) just as he learned to eliminate other social institutions such as slavery and dueling may be correct. The reasons for such a dramatic breakthrough lie in part in the massive change in cost-benefit calculations arising from the possession of nuclear weapons. I will argue, however, that they have more to do with the nature of the state in industrial societies: these states, after more than 500 years of development, have become "strong" in the sense that for the first time in history, they enjoy popular legitimacy. There has been no war in Western Europe or North America for more than a half-century, in part because of nuclear balances and ideological compatibilities, but more importantly because there has been peace *within* the states of these regions.

Does the end of major war also reflect the "end of history," the universal victory of liberalism (Fukuyama 1989)? This interesting argument has received notoriety for its optimism. Many would like to agree with Fukuyama, but unfortunately his concept of ideology is limited. Fascism and communism have indeed been discredited, but there are other forms of "ideology" than those Fukuyama acknowledges. Some forms of religious fundamentalism are not very compatible with liberal democracy, for example. But, more important, Fukuyama fails to consider that an issue more important than ideology is the nature of *community*. That issue was more or less settled in many industrial societies before 1945, although it is still expressed in the separatist impulses in Scotland, Wales, Quebec, and elsewhere. It has not been settled in most new states.

The processes of state formation in Europe during the last half-millennium were attended by wars, revolutions, rebellions, and massacres. The process is not yet universally complete. Five centuries ago, the world's population was organized in an amazingly heterogeneous array of political units: empires (of which there were many varieties), city-states, independent religious communities, kingdoms, dukedoms, republics, nomadic and sedentary tribes, gangs, and others. That heterogeneity reflected not only different forms of military power, religion, and culture, but also different concepts of community. Some,

like the Knights of Malta or the Templars, defined themselves as religious communities and they took on the attributes of a state in order to promote religious preoccupations. Others reflected the dynastic principle, with the king or emperor as the "father" of a community of loyal subjects. Communities, such as the Hansa cities, were defined primarily in terms of economic interests and practices. And reflecting the oldest basis of community, the clans, lineages, and tribes were based on blood relations.

This heterogeneity of political forms remains with us, but the range of possibilities is dwindling. The Soviet Union and Ethiopia were perhaps the last empires (some would say that China is). Monaco and Liechtenstein represent the leftovers of feudal princedoms. Andorra and San Marino are the only remaining free cities. The Catholic Church remains an important diplomatic agent with most of the attributes of statehood except territory and armed forces. All survive with the tolerance of the world's states. A few communities, such as the transnational drug cartels, pose the same kind of challenges to states that pirates did for many centuries.

Despite these remaining anomalies, the state format has become nearly universal. Heterogeneity of political forms has been replaced by homogeneity. Only states can make treaties under international law; only states can join the United Nations; only states can have (legitimate) armies; and unless one wants to be shunted around from refugee camp to refugee camp, all individuals must have an identity defined in terms of statehood. A woman, child, or man without a passport is trapped within his or her country. The state, then, has become universalized.

The problem is that, in many areas of the world, the state is not the same as the community. In so far as many communities have adopted the mystique of statehood as the ultimate and final political format, then states based on other principles will lack legitimacy. This whole problem has not yet been sorted out. More fundamental than the future hypothesized "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993) is the clash over different conceptions of community and how those conceptions should be reflected in political arrangements and organizations. Regrettably, those clashes are not likely to be resolved by debates, votes, plebiscites, or other peaceful means. They will be settled – if settlement is even an appropriate term – by the force of arms, by terrorism, and by ethnic cleansing and massacres. The problem of the early years of the next millennium, then, will not be war between

states, but wars about and within states. Internal wars may escalate or invite external intervention, but their primary if not exclusive etiology resides in the fundamental quarrels about the nature of communities and the processes and problems of state-building. Most fundamentally, the question is whether the European concept of the state can be transported to non-European environments. Is the state infinitely reproducible, no matter what the context? Recent wars certainly raise questions about an appropriate answer.

Wars within and between communities are not the same as wars between states. The latter throughout modern European history were highly institutionalized and formalized. That is why, when we think of war, we also think of uniforms, chains of command, sophisticated weapons systems, campaigns, honors and decorations, regimental regalia, the laws of war, and peace treaties. Few of these are relevant to wars about communities and states. These wars are not institutionalized. And there seems to be little one can do about them. The French, British, Americans, Russians, Portuguese, and others found out that conventional means of waging war against non-state-sponsored adversaries just don't work. "The cold, brutal fact," writes Martin Van Creveld (1991: 27), "is that much present-day military power is simply irrelevant as an instrument for extending or defending political interests over most of the globe; by this criterion, indeed, it scarcely amounts to 'military power' at all." And if major military powers cannot prevail or help settle quarrels about community and statehood, can the United Nations? Perhaps it can succeed where others have failed, but a fundamental flaw in the organization has to be corrected. An organization designed to prevent or help settle wars between states faces fundamentally different types of problems in wars about and within states. The difficulties faced in Somalia and most poignantly in the former Yugoslavia reflect the conceptual flaws of the organization. But this is anticipating the analysis. First, we must supply the evidence to support the assertion that wars of the recent past and the future have been and will continue to be fundamentally different from those of the European and Cold War experiences. We are concerned with wars of a "third kind."