

The Ghosts of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement

R. Gerald Hughes

Aberystwyth University, UK

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Abstract

This article is concerned with British foreign policy and the legacy of the Munich Agreement during and after the Second World War. It argues that contemporary policy requirements necessitated an unapologetic attitude to the past that often entailed the adoption of evasive legal formulae. Thus, while West Germany and Czechoslovakia achieved a *modus vivendi* in 1973, the British refused to repudiate Munich *ab initio* and applauded the West German decision to do likewise. London steadfastly maintained this position until 1992, three years after the end of the Cold War. This article explores the reasoning in British policy formulation and demonstrates that while historians discussed the ‘shame’ of Munich, policymakers rarely experienced feelings of guilt – seeking instead to derive the maximum possible benefit from the continuing significance of Munich. Furthermore, many of the actions of the British government during the Second World War, not least with regard to the Katyń massacres and the Yalta Conference, reinforced the idea that Munich had been a creature of its time and a ‘necessary evil’. Drawing extensively on primary sources, this article will make a contribution to the historiography of British foreign relations and that of collective institutional memory and appeasement.

Keywords

appeasement, British foreign policy, Cold War Europe, Katyń, Munich, Yalta

‘The day may come when my much cursed visit to Munich will be understood.’ Neville Chamberlain to Margot Asquith, 11 May 1940.¹

1 R. Self, *Neville Chamberlain: A Biography* (London 2006), 435.

Corresponding author:

R. Gerald Hughes, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales SY23 3FE, UK.

Email: rbh@aber.ac.uk

When did the Munich Agreement die? When Hitler occupied Prague? When the Third Reich collapsed? When the Potsdam Agreement was signed? While all of these events have a claim on being the event that *should* have heralded the death knell of the infamous accord, Munich had an afterlife far beyond 1945. It is that afterlife which is examined here. Only in 1990 did a British leader apologize for Britain's role at Munich when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly that 'We failed you in 1938 when a disastrous policy of appeasement allowed Hitler to extinguish your independence. Churchill was quick to repudiate the Munich Agreement, but we still remember it with shame'.² Six months earlier Thatcher had stated that 'I think each of us still feels some sense of shame over [the Munich] Agreement and we still feel unease that the Western World watched as the Prague spring of 1968 was crushed by Soviet tanks'.³ To the British public such statements were indicative of what was assumed to have been a long-standing repudiation of Munich. This was an erroneous assumption based, in no small part, on the exhortation of Chamberlainite appeasement after 1939.

That the 'appeasers' of the 1930s had been placed, and remained in 1990, so clearly on the wrong side of history was due, in no small part, to the war memoirs of Churchill.⁴ These had effectively institutionalized the so-called 'Guilty Men' thesis, which charged 15 key policymakers with responsibility for having promoted the policies of appeasement in the 1930s.⁵ Although this intellectual hegemony was later challenged,⁶ this occurred largely in academic circles. In 1988 W.F. Deedes observed that, amongst those who had been alive in 1938, the recollection that they had believed Chamberlain to have been wrong *at the time* was 'quite false'.⁷ This contributed to the fact that British public opinion nurtured a longstanding, if vague, sympathy for Czechoslovakia because of Munich.⁸ David Chuter goes so far as to observe that, in terms of international politics, the 'myth' of Munich was

2 Speech to Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, Prague, 18 September 1990. Margaret Thatcher Foundation, available at <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/> (accessed 3 February 2013). Thatcher recalled that 'I felt that [Czechoslovak President Václav Havel] would be an ally in the course on which I had embarked in Europe'. M. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London 1993), 809.

3 Thatcher speech at dinner for Havel, 10 Downing Street, London, 21 March 1990. Margaret Thatcher Foundation, available at: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/> (accessed 3 February 2013).

4 D. Reynolds, 'Churchill's Writing of History: Appeasement, Autobiography and *The Gathering Storm*', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, volume XI (2001), 221–48; D. Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill fighting and writing the Second World War* (London 2004).

5 D.C. Watt, 'The Historiography of Appeasement', in A. Sked and C. Cook (eds), *Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor* (London 1976), 101. The thesis was named for the bestselling polemic. Cato [Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen], *Guilty Men* (London 1940).

6 On the beginnings of this process, see D.C. Watt, 'Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School?', *The Political Quarterly* 36, 2 (1965), 191–213.

7 W.F. Deedes, 'A sentimental look at Munich', in *Words and Deeds: Selected Journalism 1931–2006* (London 2007), 47.

8 L. Ratti, *Britain, Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik, and the CSCE (1955–1975)* (Bern 2008), 190. For attempts to promote this view, see R.W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (London 1943) and J.V. Polišínský, *Britain and Czechoslovakia: A Study in Contacts* (2nd edn Prague 1968).

the most enduring and potent of the second half of the twentieth century.⁹ Part of the reason why the myths associated with Munich endured for so long lay in the fact that appeasement was very much within a British foreign policy 'tradition'.¹⁰ And these myths, in turn, distorted memories of the agreement and made its legacy all the more difficult to negotiate. The sensitivity of British governments on the subject of Munich was, naturally, exploited by their opponents. In this vein, the Soviet Union constantly raised the subject of Munich in order to remind the international community of the perfidy of Western diplomacy. In 1988 a Soviet historian wrote that

The Munich Agreement was perhaps the most shameful diplomatic deal ever known to the civilized world. That agreement of the four leading powers of the capitalist Europe became a symbol of "appeasement" of the aggressor, of virtually unlimited cynicism and base treachery. The agreement on the partition and eventual annexation of sovereign Czechoslovakia constituted a prologue to World War II that cost 50 million human lives.¹¹

The prevalence and longevity of the myths surrounding Munich meant that senior political figures in Britain had little choice but to subscribe to the view that Munich was a disastrous betrayal. That this was often at variance with their own opinions rarely presented an insurmountable obstacle because, as Maurice Cowling famously observed, 'high politics [is] primarily a matter of rhetoric and manoeuvre'.¹² In any case, the confidential nature of the conduct of foreign policy and the complexity of the issues at stake, especially in legal terms, meant that there was nearly always a substantial gap between the public statements and private discussions of policy makers with regard to Munich.

After 1949 attitudes towards the status of Munich were complicated by virtue of the fact that the new West German state was a British ally. The realities of the Cold War meant that the British government's policy on (and attitude towards) Munich was most often antagonistic to Communist Czechoslovakia and, by extension, its masters in Moscow. The rhetoric of the British government was, in any case, primarily designed to demonstrate its commitment to avoiding a repetition of the errors that led to Munich, rather than actually trying to undo the agreement. Ironically, this involved an unwillingness to 'appease' communist Czechoslovakia over the latter's demands vis-a-vis the agreement of 1938. The 'shame' of Munich was used in the public British foreign policy discourse (and in domestic political arguments about British foreign policy) to justify or criticize various courses of action, but was never actually used internally as a basis for policy making.

9 D. Chuter, 'Munich, or the Blood of Others', in C. Buffet and B. Heuser (eds), *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations* (Oxford 1998), 65.

10 P.M. Kennedy, 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865–1939', *British Journal of International Studies*, 2, 3 (1976), 195–215; P.W. Schroeder, 'Munich and the British Tradition', *Historical Journal*, 19, 1 (1976), 223–43.

11 A. Mertsalov, *Munich: Mistake or Cynical Calculation? Contemporary Non-Marxist Historians on the Munich Agreement of 1938* (Moscow 1988), 19.

12 M. Cowling, *The Impact of Labour 1920–1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics* (Cambridge 1971), 4.

When Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by Nazi Germany on 15 March 1939, the Chamberlain government gave no indication that it believed Munich had been abrogated.¹³ The Bank of England acquiesced in the transfer of substantial amounts of gold from the former Czechoslovak state to the *Reich* and, it was recently revealed, continued to do so despite the reservations of the British government.¹⁴ That the British government refrained from repudiating Munich was, John Wheeler-Bennett believed, rooted in appeasement's deeply ingrained nature, the belief that Czechoslovakia was untenable within its 1937 borders and the acceptance that Austria and the Sudetenland should be part of Germany.¹⁵ Thus, contrary to Thatcher's assertion, Churchill was by no means resolute or speedy in his repudiation of Munich although, on 30 September 1940, he *did* state that Germany had 'destroyed the agreement'.¹⁶ That, however, was as far as he went. Churchill was wholly aware there was sufficient continuity between his government and that of Chamberlain to necessitate keeping the follies of appeasement at bay. In the spring of 1941 the publication of a volume of official documents on events leading to up the outbreak of war was mooted. The Foreign Office's Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, demurred as publication would 'merely produce recrimination on the sense of the stupidity of the Government in their being 'taken in' by Hitler'. In December 1941, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's indecision, allied to Churchill's lack of enthusiasm, caused publication to be deferred.¹⁷ This portended future policy. For the British government Munich was both an embarrassment and an irritant and, in the conduct of foreign affairs, was now side-lined whenever possible.

As the war continued it became clear that British official policy on the status of Munich would have to change, especially after the savage retribution that followed the assassination of *SS-Obergruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich, Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia, in 1942.¹⁸ On 5 August 1942 Eden informed the Commons that:

13 The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), Kew: CAB 23/98, Cabinet 11 (39), 15 March 1939.

14 E. Kubu, 'Czech Republic: Czechoslovak gold reserves and their surrender to Nazi Germany', in FCO (ed.), *Nazi Gold: the London Conference, 2–4 December 1997* (London 1997), 245–8; Claire Jones, 'BoE helped sell looted Nazi gold', *The Financial Times* (30 July 2013). The Bank of England's (unpublished) official history, which was opened to scholars in 2013, observed that 'At the outbreak of war and for some time afterwards the Czech gold incident still rankled. Outside the Bank and the Government the Bank's position has probably never been thoroughly appreciated and their action at the time was widely misunderstood. Hence the abnormal amount of attention given to it by the Press, Parliament and public.' J.A.C. Osborne and R.E.H. Allport, 'War History of the Bank of England: 1939/45 – Part III' (draft), 1950, Bank of England Archive (M5/537), 1292.

15 J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (London 1948), 429.

16 J.W. Brügel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich: the German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy* (Cambridge 1973), 303.

17 U. Bialer, 'Telling the Truth to the People: Britain's Decision to Publish the Diplomatic Papers of the Inter-War Period', *Historical Journal*, 26, 2 (1983), esp. 353–9. Quotation 354.

18 Vít Smetana recently argued convincingly that the German reprisals for Heydrich's assassination was not the deciding factor in British policy here. V. Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich: British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938–1942)* (Prague 2008), 305–6.

the Munich Agreement has been destroyed by the Germans . . . [and] as Germany had deliberately destroyed the arrangements concerning Czechoslovakia reached in 1938 [HMG] regard themselves as free from any engagements in this respect, and that at the final settlement of the Czechoslovak frontiers to be reached at the end of the war [HMG] would not be influenced by any changes effected in and since 1938.¹⁹

Eduard Beneš, the exiled Czechoslovak president, was overjoyed and informed Churchill that he was pleased to note the agreements that had 'liquidated between our two countries the period of 1938 and 1939 policy and its consequences and remnants'.²⁰ The idea that matters were so straightforward was, however, wishful thinking on the part of Beneš. This was clear from Churchill's reply to Beneš (which consisted largely of platitudes).²¹ Nevertheless, it now seemed likely that the 'Grand Alliance' would crush Nazi Germany and a postwar settlement, a 'Super Versailles', would then address the 'German Problem' for good.

In April 1943, a fearful discovery called into question the moral superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition whilst threatening to tear it asunder. That discovery, at Katyń, was the mass graves of some 22,000 Poles, murdered by the Soviet NKVD in 1940.²² The Germans revealed Katyń to the world in the hope of sowing disharmony within the 'United Nations', an alliance that Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels termed a 'grave historical crime'.²³ Goebbels gleefully recorded the manner in which, 'We are now using the discovery of 12,000 [sic] Polish officers, murdered by the G.P.U. [sic], for anti-Bolshevik propaganda in the grand manner'.²⁴ Predictably, the Soviets immediately denied the killings and blamed them on the Germans²⁵ before *Pravda* accused the unconvinced Poles of working with the Nazis. Stalin, despite Churchill's efforts, then broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London.²⁶ Goebbels was now understandably ecstatic at the 'sudden fissures . . . appearing in the Allied camp'.²⁷ Acutely aware of such divisions, the historian E.H. Carr, a onetime enthusiast for Munich and an ardent admirer of the Soviet Union, hectored the Polish Government-in-Exile for calling on the Red Cross to investigate the killings. Carr opined that 'Any Polish

19 Cmnd. 6379, *Policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Regard to Czechoslovakia* (London 1942).

20 Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Churchill College Cambridge: CHAR 20/55/138, Beneš to Churchill, 26 August 1942.

21 CAC: CHAR 20/55/147-8, Churchill to Beneš, 2 September 1942.

22 On this, see B.B. Fischer, 'The Katyn Controversy: Stalin's Killing Field', *Studies in Intelligence*, 43, 3 (1999/ 2000), 61–70; G. Sanford, *Katyń and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory* (London 2005); and A.M. Cienciala, N.S. Lebedeva and W. Materski (eds), *Katyń: A Crime Without Punishment* (New Haven, CT 2007).

23 J. Goebbels, 'Das politische Bürgertum vor der Entscheidung', *Das Reich* (4 February 1945).

24 Diary entry for 14 April 1943, in L.P. Lochner (trans. and ed.), *The Goebbels Diaries* (London 1948), 253.

25 J.K. Zawodny, *Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre* (Notre Dame, IN 1962), 15.

26 Churchill warned Sikorski against protesting directly to Stalin about Katyń. Sikorski ignored him. M. Gilbert, *Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill 1941–1945* (London 1986), 385.

27 Diary entry for 28 April 1943, *The Goebbels Diaries*, 270.

quarrel with Russia, whatever its origin, necessarily injures the cause of both Poland and of the United Nations'.²⁸ The Foreign Office and the British government adopted a similar, if less enthusiastic, stance with alacrity. Privately, the British were more candid. Sir Owen O'Malley, ambassador to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, asserted of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland that:

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, even if the Soviet Government did not humiliate the Poles by treating them as an inferior race, as the Germans undoubtedly have done, the amount of human suffering inflicted by them on the Polish race was not less than that inflicted by Nazi Germany during the same period.²⁹

German efforts to sow disharmony between the Allies had no prospect of success (regardless of the accuracy of the charges against Moscow).³⁰ Churchill informed General Władysław Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister-in-exile, that while this had been 'an obvious German move to sow discord between [the] Allies' it was clear that 'the facts are pretty grim'.³¹ And, although the official British record makes no mention of it, Churchill also confessed to Sikorski that 'the German revelations are probably true [as the] Bolsheviks can be very cruel'.³² After an international commission seemed to have confirmed Soviet guilt, O'Malley reflected on the stance of the British government.

If, then, morals have become involved with international politics, if it be the case that a monstrous crime has been committed by a foreign Government – albeit a friendly one – and that we, for however valid reasons, have been obliged to behave as if the

28 E.H. Carr, 'Russia and Poland', *The Times* (28 April 1943).

29 TNA: PRO: FO 371/34571 (C 4850/258/55), O'Malley to FO, 29 April 1943. 'Britain and the Katyn Massacre: An Introduction', Foreign and Commonwealth Office, History Notes no. 16, *Katyn: British Reactions to the Katyn Massacre, 1943–2003* (London 2003), iii. For O'Malley's memoirs, see O. O'Malley, *The Phantom Caravan* (London 1954).

30 In 2012 it was reported that declassified files from the US National Archives appeared to show that President Roosevelt had covered up Katyn so as to maintain relations with Stalin. In 1950 Captain Donald Stewart, an American who was taken to the site by the Germans as part of a delegation of Allied POWs, confirmed that, in 1943, he had sent a secret message to Washington which ran along the lines of 'German claims regarding Katyn substantially correct'. M. Day, US 'hushed up Katyn massacre', *The Daily Telegraph* (11 September 2012). Shortly before Stewart testified to the Congressional Madden Committee in 1951, he had been ordered not to discuss his secret messages wartime regarding Katyn. In 1992, in response to an enquiry from a relative of victims of the massacre, Thomas Gerth, then deputy director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, stated that 'The U.S. government never accepted the Soviet Government's claim that it was not responsible for the massacre. However, at the time of the Congressional hearings in 1951–1952, the U.S. did not possess the facts that could clearly refute the Soviets' allegations that these crimes were committed by the Third Reich. These facts, as you know, were not revealed until 1990, when the Russians officially apologized to Poland.' V. Gera and R. Herrschaft, 'German claims regarding Katyn substantially correct', *Huffington Post* (10 September 2012), available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/10/katyn-massacre-memos-us-soviet-crime_n_1870498.html (accessed 3 February 2013).

31 TNA: PRO: NA: FO 371/ 34568 [C 4230/258/G55] memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister and General Sikorski, 15 April 1943.

32 E. Raczyński, *In Allied London: The Wartime Diaries of the Polish Ambassador* (London 1962), 140.

deed was not theirs, may it not be that we now stand in danger of bemusing not only others but ourselves ... If so, and since no remedy can be found in an early alteration of our public attitude towards the Katyn affair, we ought, maybe, to ask ourselves how, consistently with the necessities of our relations with the Soviet Government, the voice of our political conscience is to be kept up to concert pitch.³³

In subsequent months others questioned the manner in which Poland was being sacrificed in order to appease Moscow. Sir Duncan McCallum, a Scottish Conservative MP, wrote to Eden stating that 'There is ... considerable feeling in the county that H.M. Government ... is acting on the lines of "peace at any price" with Russia.' In order to back a firmer Western policy towards the USSR McCallum advocated using the lever of the 'Lend Lease' programme. If the Soviets concluded a separate peace then, McCallum asserted, the rest of the United Nations had the strength to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. McCallum asserted that, given that Stalin was a 'realist', 'a strong attitude on the part of ourselves and the United States [would] result in a satisfactory settlement of the Polish question'. Alas, McCallum's arguments rested on a false premise, namely that the unpopularity of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in the 1930s precluded the same being done to Poland in the 1940s:

In view of the outcry in 1938/1939 about appeasement, of letting down small nations ... I cannot believe this country would stand by tamely while we sacrifice the Poles, after the way they helped us in our most perilous hour.³⁴

What McCallum failed to note was that the real 'outcry' in Britain over Czechoslovakia came only *after* Hitler had marched into Prague on 15 March 1939. British outrage, magnified as it now was by guilt, had come too late to save Czechoslovakia. And the same inexorable logic of appeasing a Great Power now went for Poland. In both cases, appeasement would have to run its course before it was rejected as an option by British policymakers. And the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe would pay the price.

In May 1944 the British inter-departmental Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-committee had recommended that the British government should not 'oppose any reasonable demands of the USSR where they do not conflict with our vital strategic interests'.³⁵ On 9 October Churchill met Stalin in Moscow in order to seek an arrangement for the organization of postwar Europe. The British Prime Minister shamelessly indulged in anti-Polish rhetoric in order to please his hosts and, emulating his earlier stance over Katyń, even accepted in full the explanation for the recalcitrant behaviour of the Soviet Union during the (recently crushed) Warsaw

33 TNA: PRO: PREM 3/ 353 [C6160/258/55] and TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 34577 [C1660/258/5] O'Malley to Eden, Tel. No. 51, 24 May 1943.

34 TNA: PRO: FO 954/ 20A, Sir Duncan McCallum MP to Sir Anthony Eden MP, 31 January 1944.

35 H. Thomas, *Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-6* (London 1987), 209.

Rising.³⁶ Acting rather less overtly than Chamberlain had done at Munich, Churchill proposed to divide up the states of Eastern Europe with Stalin by means of employing crude percentages to denote the proportions of Soviet and British influence over them.³⁷ Churchill later recounted that he had suggested that the USSR should have 90 per cent influence in Romania and 75 per cent in Bulgaria, while Britain should have 90 per cent in Greece. In Hungary and Yugoslavia, Churchill suggested a share of 50 per cent each. Having written this simple formula on a piece of paper, he gave it to Stalin, who ticked and returned it.³⁸ In the course of the next two days, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov amended the original figures with the result that Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more significantly, also in Hungary, was amended upwards to 80 per cent.³⁹ In diplomatic terms this agreement was extraordinary and, as Henry Kissinger later noted, ‘Never before had spheres of influence been defined by percentages’.⁴⁰

By the time of the Yalta Conference in early 1945, the ‘percentages agreement’ had been overtaken by events. That this was the case was due to the physical control of much of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe by the Red Army. At this juncture, untroubled by the trusting and naïve US President Roosevelt,⁴¹ the military power of the Red Army had little need for diplomacy. After the Warsaw Rising had been crushed in the autumn of 1944, a German propaganda leaflet once again highlighted Soviet misdeeds.

Moscow desired the destruction of the Polish nationalists, desired the destruction of the British policy in Poland... The resistance of the Warsaw rebels has been broken. Their struggle was the overture to World War... Three... [and] Stalin would rather allow the annihilation of a city and an army that was fighting for the Allied cause than budge one inch from his well-laid plans... [which are] the domination of Europe, without regard for the Allies or for any small nation.⁴²

36 F.J. Harbutt, *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads* (New York 2010), 174–5.

37 On this, see A. Resis, ‘The Churchill–Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944’, *American Historical Review*, 83, 2 (1978), 368–87; P. Tsakaloyannis, ‘The Moscow Puzzle’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 21, 1 (1986), 37–55; P.G.H. Holdich, ‘A Policy of Percentages? British Policy in the Balkans After the Moscow Conference of October 1944’, *International History Review*, 9, 1 (1987), 28–47; K.G.M. Ross, ‘The Moscow Conference of October 1944 (Tolstoy)’ in W. Deakin, E. Barker and J. Chadwick (eds) *British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944* (London 1988), 67–77.

38 For Churchill’s copy of this agreement with Stalin, see NA: PRO: PREM 3/66/7.

39 W.S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, volume VI, *Triumph and Tragedy* (London 1954), 198.

40 H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York 1994), 414.

41 Roosevelt had written to Churchill in 1942 stating: ‘I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so’. Against this, Churchill was of the opinion that ‘If only I could dine with Stalin once a week, there would be no problem’. D. Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century* (New York 2007), 110, 111.

42 *The Other Side*, German propaganda leaflet dropped by a V-1 on Sussex, 5 November 1944. ‘German leaflet dropped by Flying Bomb’, TNA: PRO: CAB/66/57/42, W.P. (44) 642. Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to War Cabinet, 11 November 1944.

By early 1945, Germany's imminent defeat prompted the Czechoslovak government to propose that they should resume control 'over all the areas taken from Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich by Germany, Hungary and Poland'.⁴³ Eden composed a formula, communicated to Beneš, which held that the British government 'consider . . . that the question of sovereignty, as opposed to that of administrative control, must remain in abeyance until the international frontiers in Central Europe are definitely laid down in the peace settlement'.⁴⁴ The timing of this proposal coincided with the concessions made to Stalin with regard to the plans for postwar Europe at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Lord Dunglass (Alec Douglas-Home), undaunted by his past as an enthusiastic supporter of Munich, gave voice to 'certain misgivings about certain sections of this Yalta Agreement' in the Commons.⁴⁵ This led the Conservative MP Harold Nicolson to observe wryly that 'Winston is as amused as I am that the warmongers of the Munich period have now become appeasers, while the appeasers have become the warmongers'.⁴⁶ But Dunglass had a point. Churchill, meanwhile, deluded himself stating, without apparent irony, that 'Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin'.⁴⁷ Churchill had been uncannily accurate about Hitler in print as early as 1935⁴⁸ but in his estimation of Stalin a decade later he was totally mistaken.

In March 1945 the Cabinet resolved that 'the Czechoslovak government should exercise full political authority . . . throughout the areas bounded by the frontiers of Czechoslovakia as these existed before the 31st December 1937'.⁴⁹ Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Potsdam Agreement (2 August 1945) permitted the transfer to Germany of the Sudeten German population from Czechoslovakia, albeit in 'an orderly and humane manner'.⁵⁰ This was a triumphant moment for Beneš, who seemed successfully to have promoted the equation of the

43 TNA: PRO: CAB 66/ 60/ 33, WP (45) 16, 'Czechoslovak Frontiers', Eden memorandum, 8 January 1945; reiterated in TNA: PRO: CAB 65/ 49/ 7, WM (45) 7th meeting, 22 January 1945.

44 TNA: PRO: CAB 66/ 60/ 33, WP (45) 16, 'Czechoslovak Frontiers', Eden memorandum (annex), 8 January 1945.

45 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 408, c. 1303, 1304–5, 1307, 27 February 1945. Dunglass (Alec Douglas-Home) had been Chamberlain's Parliamentary Private Secretary at the time of Munich. A biographer of Douglas-Home later observed that this past was 'never forgotten, either by friends or opponents.' D.R. Thorpe, *Alec Douglas-Home* (London 1996), 106.

46 Diary entry for 27 February 1945. H. Nicolson, N. Nicolson (ed.) *Dairies and Letters*, volume 2, *The War Years, 1939–1945* (New York 1968), 437.

47 Reynolds, *Summits*, 145.

48 W.S. Churchill, 'The Truth about Hitler', *The Strand Magazine* (November 1935). This was reprinted in 1936 as a pamphlet published by the Trustees for Freedom (and stamped 'Banned in Germany'), CAC: CHAR 8/518A/33. It then appeared in abridged form as 'Hitler and his choice' in W.S. Churchill, *Great Contemporaries* (Revised edn, London 1938 [1937]), 261–9.

49 TNA: PRO: CAB 66/ 63, WP (45) 180, Eden memorandum, 20 March 1945.

50 I. von Munch (ed.), *Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland: Quellentexte zur Rechtslage des Deutschen Reiches, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Stuttgart 1968), 42. Despite this, Churchill had agreed when the prime minister of New Zealand warned him that the planned large-scale transfers of population and territory would only perpetuate a number of international grievances. CAC: CHAR 20/ 212/ 3-6. Peter Fraser to Churchill, 20 February 1945.

abrogation of the Munich Agreement and the removal of the Sudeten German population as *the* twin answers to Czechoslovakia's 'national question'.⁵¹ Vengeful Czech nationalists quipped cruelly that the *Sudetendeutsche* had simply got what they had asked for. Throughout the 1930s they had articulated their demand of 'Heim ins Reich!',⁵² and *odsun* gave them exactly that – when they were removed 'home' to Germany.

The Allied consensus that had allowed Beneš to realize his aims vis-à-vis the Sudeten Germans did not persist. Despite their acquiescence at Potsdam, the British government now expressed increasing concern at the situation in the Sudetenland as it became clear that the Czechoslovak government was determined to be rid of all of the Germans,⁵³ by means of the so-called *odsun*.⁵⁴ A British parliamentary deputation demanded that Prime Minister Clement Attlee make every effort to stop the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.⁵⁵ This protest was partly motivated by the desire to prevent the collapse of the British occupation zone in Germany, although the treatment of the expellees was, increasingly, the main bone of contention.⁵⁶ Signally, while the British authorities had initially been quite intolerant of attempts by German expellees to organize in their occupation zone, this position was effectively reversed in 1946.⁵⁷ The Americans matched the British *volte face* and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made a famous speech in September 1946 that questioned the permanence of the Oder-Neiße

51 M.D. Brown 'Forcible population transfers: A flawed legacy or an unavoidable necessity in protracted ethnic conflicts? The case of the Sudeten Germans', in J. Black (ed.) *The Second World War*, volume 2, *The German War, 1943–1945* (Aldershot 2007), 377–83; J. Kučera, 'Der Hai wird nie wieder so stark sein': *Tschechoslowakische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945–1948* (Dresden 2001), 112.

52 On this, see R. Gebel, 'Heim ins Reich!' *Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland 1938–1945* (Munich 1999).

53 Note for Attlee, 13 September 1945 [C 5805/ 95/ 18]. *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (DBPO), series I, volume V, *Germany and Western Europe, 11 August–31 December 1945* (London 1990), 122, 123.

54 Even the meaning of the word *odsun* is disputed. For those sympathetic to the Czechoslovak government, the word is rendered as meaning that the Germans had been subject to a 'transferral'. For those favouring the *sudetendeutsch* case, the word is understood as a reference to 'expulsion' (although the Czech word for that is *vyhnání*, crucial to the latter interpretation is the fact that force was used against the Germans by, initially, Czechoslovak mobs and then, later, by governmental bodies). Literally translated, *odsun* actually means 'removal'. It is notable that *odsun* is something that happens to something (or someone) irrespective of its (or their) will. I am grateful to Jan Ruzicka for his advice here. For a useful analysis of the legacy of the tension between the concepts of transfer and expulsion, see J. Kučera, *Odsun nebo vyhnání? Sudetští Němci v Československu, v letech 1945–1946* (Prague 1992).

55 Beveridge–Attlee meeting, 25 October 1945 [UR 4484/ 1617/ 851]. DBPO, I/ V, 273–9.

56 M. Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford 2008), 106. On the expulsions, see R. Luža, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933–1962* (New York 1964); A.M. de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of the Germans from the East* (Lincoln, NE 1977); A.M. de Zayas, *A Terrible Revenge: The ethnic cleansing of the East European Germans, 1944–1950* (New York 1994); R.M. Douglas, *Ordnungsgemäße Überführung: Die Vertreibung der Deutschen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich 2012).

57 P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990* (Oxford 2003), 25–6.

line.⁵⁸ By 1947, links between the governing British Labour party and the German Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD)⁵⁹ had led to tentative contacts with the Sudeten German Social Democrats, now exiled in Germany proper.⁶⁰ The relationship between the SPD and the Labour Party developed to the point where the fact that the SPD advocated the revision of the *status quo post bellum* was accepted with equanimity by the leadership of the Labour Party.⁶¹ In July 1948 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin assured the SPD that he would never abandon efforts to secure German reunification.⁶² Such policies led the historian Elizabeth Wiskemann to observe that 'The fatal tendency of the British to forgive and forget German trespasses seemed to be operative once again'.⁶³

Western support for the national solution promoted by Beneš, already dissipating as soon as Hitler was dead, was ended by the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948.⁶⁴ After 1945 the sympathy that the British public, and their government, had nurtured for Czechoslovakia waned for four main reasons. First, the German people were seen in a very different light after the savagery of their treatment during the so-called 'wild expulsions' (*divoký odsun*).⁶⁵ As the influential publisher Victor Gollancz wrote in 1946: 'The Germans were expelled, not just with an absence of over-nice consideration, but with the very maximum of brutality'.⁶⁶ Second, after 1949 the British government was aligned with the newly

58 J. McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca, NY 2002), 76. The Oder-Neiße line was the border between Germany and Poland that had 'provisionally' been created at Potsdam. On Britain and the Oder-Neiße line, see R.G. Hughes, 'Unfinished Business from Potsdam: Britain, West Germany, and the Oder-Neiße line, 1945–1962', *International History Review*, 27, 2 (2005), 259–94.

59 Denis Healey MP (Secretary of the Labour Party International Division, (LPID)) to John Hynd MP (Control Office for Germany and Austria), 2 August 1946. Labour Party Archive, Manchester (LPA): LPID, Box 2.

60 See, for example, the letters to Secretary Healey from the *Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik* (DSAP) and their leader Wenzel Jaksch, 13 December 1947. LPA: LPID, Box 7.

61 The 1952 'Action Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany' stated that 'The Social Democratic Party will promote the possibility of peaceful return for all displaced people whether they once lived inside or outside of the prewar German borders'. Gaitskell Papers, University College London (UCL): Box G153.

62 DBPO, III/ VI, *Berlin in the Cold War 1948–1990* (London 2009), Ernest Bevin to Christopher Steel, 6 July 1948, Despt 239 to Berlin [C 5439/3/18], document 55 (CD-ROM).

63 E. Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbours: Problems Relating to the Oder-Neisse Line and the Czech Frontier Regions* (Oxford 1956), 134.

64 For a discussion of those positing a relationship between the expulsions and the Communist takeover, see B. Abrams, 'Morality, Wisdom and Revision: The Czech Opposition of the 1970s and the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans', *East European Politics and Societies*, 9, 2 (1995), 234–55.

65 On these, see T. Staněk, *Verfolgung 1945: Die Stellung der Deutschen in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien* (Vienna 2002); G. MacDonogh, *After the Reich: From the Liberation of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift* (London 2008), 125–61, 103–6, 235–7; F. Dostál Raška, *The Czechoslovak Exile Government in London and the Sudeten German Issue* (Prague 2002), 69; B. Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (New York 2005), 35, 64.

66 V. Gollancz, *Our Threatened Values* (London 1946), 96. In September 1945, Gollancz established Save Europe Now (SEN) to campaign on behalf of destitute and dispossessed Germans. R. Dudley Edwards, *Victor Gollancz: A Biography* (London 1987), 410.

created Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).⁶⁷ Third, Czechoslovakia had continued to move towards Moscow after VE Day, culminating in the Communist coup of February 1948.⁶⁸ And, fourth, the unresolved financial disputes over the return of Czechoslovakia's gold, and British claims with regard to a loan made in 1938 to compensate for losses at Munich,⁶⁹ provided both London and Prague with a powerful sense of grievance.

In 1960 an official West German publication noted with satisfaction that 'The expulsion of the Germans ... did not prove the blessing [the Czechoslovaks] expected. The departure of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia was the beginning of Czechoslovakia's departure from the community of the Western World'.⁷⁰ The Cold War had meant that such assertions gained widespread currency within the Western alliance. German nationalist goals – such as the enunciation of the German expellees' 'right of return' (*Recht auf Heimat*)⁷¹ or territorial revision – could thus be advanced with relative impunity so long as they were cloaked in anti-Communism. In his partisan study of relations between the exiled Czechoslovak government and the British, Martin Brown is highly critical of postwar British policy, and of those who purportedly accept 'the Sudeten German expellees' 'expulsion' thesis [that] has come to dominate western historiography'.⁷² Vít Smetana rejects Brown's dismissal of Western historiography, contrasting his ultra-critical attitude towards British policymakers with his unyielding enthusiasm for their Czechoslovak counterparts.⁷³ This is absolutely correct and, even if Brown's case against Western accounts of the policy of Beneš was merited, the blossoming relationship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was bound to have a significant effect on British policy. Increasing British distrust of Stalin was accompanied by a growing belief in the naïveté of Beneš. Munich and appeasement had taught that foreign policy must be founded on what Kenneth Dyson later termed 'concrete interest and power'.⁷⁴ After the distrust sowed by Munich it was this, above all, that drove a wedge between Beneš and the British.

Rising concerns about Soviet power inevitably meant that the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 had a dramatic effect on British policy towards that

67 R.G. Hughes, *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949–1967* (London 2007), 6–31.

68 M. Hauner, "'We Must Push Eastwards!'" The Challenges and Dilemmas of President Beneš after Munich', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44, 4 (2009), 619–56.

69 M.D. Brown, 'Historical amnesia and post-Cold War attitudes in the Czech Republic: A reappraisal in the light of new archival research', *Masaryk Journal*, 3, 1 (2000), 141–55.

70 T. Schieder (ed.), *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern & Central Europe*, volume IV: *The Expulsion of the German Population from Czechoslovakia* (Bonn 1960), 128. For similar, see N. Perzi, *Die Beneš-Dekrete: Eine europäische Tragödie* (St. Pölten 2003), 330.

71 U. Merten, *Forgotten Voices: The Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II* (Brunswick, NJ 2012), 292.

72 M. Brown, *Dealing with Democrats: The British Foreign Office and the Czechoslovak Émigrés in Great Britain, 1939 to 1945* (Bern 2006), 253–4, 254 (n).

73 Smetana, *In the Shadow of Munich*, 18–19.

74 K. Dyson, 'European détente in historical perspective: ambiguities and paradoxes', in K. Dyson (ed.), *European Détente: Case Studies of the Politics of East-West Relations* (London 1986), 19.

country.⁷⁵ Christopher Mayhew, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, recalled that the Prague coup had a 'salutary' effect in removing the 'Stalinist illusions' of the Parliamentary Labour Party.⁷⁶ Czechoslovakia was now targeted as an enemy.⁷⁷ This was especially true of Bevin⁷⁸ and the Foreign Secretary advised the Cabinet that unless the West took 'positive and vigorous steps', the USSR would 'establish a world dictatorship' or initiate 'the collapse of organised society over immense stretches of the globe'.⁷⁹ British officials fretted whether any perceived weakness in the face of the Soviet threat would have a negative effect on international opinion. Memories of Munich were now seen as something that would alarm the German, rather than the Czechoslovak, people. The British Military Governor in Berlin warned that the Communist seizure of power in Prague had led the civilian population of Berlin to draw parallels with 1938.⁸⁰ Thus, despite a certain amount of private sympathy for Prague's position,⁸¹ Czechoslovak hopes that London would declare the Munich Pact null and void *ab initio* had no prospect of success. Indeed, the British government even refused to declare Czechoslovakia's frontiers inviolable. While this was in line with the West's insistence that all frontiers in Europe were provisional pending a final peace treaty, the Soviet bloc interpreted this British position as extremely hostile. And it was. The British ambassador in Prague was brutally frank on this point.

It is usually considered to be one of the principles of British foreign policy that we do not make any statement about what we should do in a hypothetical situation unless it is absolutely obvious in advance where our interest would lie if such a situation arose. A situation which called in question the future of the Sudetenland is a hypothetical one in which the proper course of action for us to take would depend very much on the circumstances which gave rise to the situation. If it came about as the result of war with Russia ... it might be necessary for us in self defence to pay a price for the support of Germany, and it might in such a case not suit us at all to have been committed to the present frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia.⁸²

75 M.J. Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945–1950* (Cambridge, MA and London 2009), 87–8, 92–4. For a contemporary exposition on the Soviet threat, see Frank Pakenham (Minister for British zone in Germany) to Bevin, 24 November 1948. UCL: Gaitskell Papers: Box C21.

76 C. Mayhew, *A War of Words: A Cold War Witness* (London 1998), 25.

77 A. Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945–53: The Information Research Department* (Abingdon 2004), 5, 70–1, 89, 93, 247–8.

78 TNA: PRO: CAB 129/ 25, CP (48) 69, 'Czechoslovakia', Bevin memorandum, 27 February 1948.

79 TNA: PRO: CAB 129/ 25, CP (48) 47, 'The Threat to Western Civilisation' Bevin memorandum, 3 March 1948 (drafted by Gladwyn Jebb).

80 DBPO, III/ VI, Sir Brian Robertson to FO, 3 March 1948, Berlin tel 336 [C 1727/3/18], document 3 (CD-ROM).

81 See, for instance, TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 70682 [c 7533/3701/18] R.M.A. Hankey, Northern Department, FO to Pierson Dixon, Prague, 14 September 1948.

82 TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 70682 [C 8168] Pierson Dixon, Prague Embassy to R.M.A. Hankey, Northern Department, FO, 30 September 1948.

In the years following the war the official British line on Katyń was similarly self-serving, despite various attempts to challenge it.⁸³ In 1950, the British government informed the Scottish Polish Society that ‘the evidence is inconclusive’ regarding Katyń and that Her Majesty’s Government would therefore refrain from re-opening the question.⁸⁴ This was based on advice from the Foreign Office stating that, without Soviet cooperation, there could be no adjustment in London’s position.⁸⁵ This position was maintained despite the deepening Cold War. It was sustained by virtue of the fact that to do otherwise risked revealing the British government’s wartime collusion with the Soviet denial of the facts. In September 1951, the US House of Representatives appointed a select committee to investigate Katyń, chaired by Rep. Ray J. Madden (D-IN). The Madden Committee established Soviet guilt,⁸⁶ but the thaw in relations with the USSR that followed Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War in 1953 saw the matter quietly dropped in the wider interest.⁸⁷ Throughout the Cold War Katyń, like Munich, remained a diplomatic trouble-spot, flaring up on certain anniversaries, in times of international tension, or whenever new evidence came to light.

The baleful effect of Munich on international politics was magnified by virtue of the fact that the FRG managed to construct a foreign policy edifice characterized by intransigence toward the east.⁸⁸ This *Ostpolitik* ensured that Munich remained the main point of contention between West Germany and Czechoslovakia.⁸⁹ This was an essential policy position for the West German government given the numerous, and politically powerful, expellee constituency in that country.⁹⁰ The *Sudetendeutsche* represented a highly coherent and homogenous entity in the FRG.⁹¹ Its lobbying prowess was sufficient to ensure that powerful friends inserted a sympathetic motion onto the agenda of the US Congress.⁹² Alas, the political clout enjoyed by the expellees only encouraged Soviet bloc charges of *revanchism*

83 CAC: CHAR 2/99/A, John J. Campbell, President of the Scottish Polish Society (Glasgow branch) to Clement Attlee and Winston S. Churchill, 4 May 1950.

84 CAC: CHAR 2/99/A, D.H.F. Rickett, 10 Downing Street to Miss E.A. Gilliatt, Churchill’s private secretary, 23 May 1950.

85 CAC: CHAR 2/99/A, Michael Wilford, FO to S.P. Osmond, 10 Downing Street, 22 May 1950.

86 US Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, *The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings before the Select Committee on Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre*, 82nd Congress, 1st and 2nd Session, 1951–1952, 7 parts (Washington, DC 1952).

87 Fischer, ‘The Katyn Controversy’, 63.

88 C.G. Anthon, ‘Adenauer’s *Ostpolitik*, 1955–1963’, *World Affairs*, 139, 2 (1976), 112–29.

89 Hughes, *Britain, Germany and the Cold War*, 18–21, 42–5, 46–54, 66, 80.

90 M. Stickler, ‘*Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch*’: *Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1972* (Düsseldorf 2004); P. Ahonen, ‘Domestic Constraints on West German *Ostpolitik*: the role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era’, *Central European History*, 98, 1 (1998), 31–63; P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion*, esp. 24–53.

91 On *sudetendeutsch* ‘collective memory’ and the expulsions, see E. Hahn and H.H. Hahn, ‘Flucht und Vertreibung’ in E. Françoise and H. Schulze (eds), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I* (Munich 2001), 335–51.

92 T.H. Tetens, *The New Germany and the Old Nazis* (London 1961), 137–8; Wiskemann, *Germany’s Eastern Neighbours*, 207; Ahonen, *After the Expulsion*, 50–1.

against the FRG and, indeed, the West in general.⁹³ The West's toleration of West German indulgence of the expellee programme only stoked Czechoslovak discontent. Rudolf Barák, deputy prime minister of Czechoslovakia, decried Macmillan's 'lamentable role' in helping to 'whitewash the West German militarists', and pointedly asked whether Britain held Munich to be valid.⁹⁴ This response resonated with many in Britain. The left-wing Labour MP Konnii Zilliacus denounced the British government for repeating the sins of the 1930s and for 'The sheer criminal folly of ... relying on German nationalism, militarism and even fascism as a "bulwark against communism"'.⁹⁵ Such views were encouraged by tactless actions in the FRG. In May 1964, FRG Transport Minister and expellee leader Hans Seebohm caused an international storm when he asserted the continued validity of Munich.⁹⁶ In the House of Commons, Labour MP Stephen Swingle stated that, since Seebohm was a government minister who claimed 'that the Sudetenland is a part of Germany and ... that the Munich Agreement was still valid', would it not be prudent for 'the Western Powers ... [to] repudiate this kind of statement and make quite clear that they are not considering territorial claims?'⁹⁷ In the face of such enquiries, where definitive answers would *always* offend someone, the British government preferred to resort to evasive legalisms.

93 From Czechoslovakia: Ústav pro Mezinárodní Politiku a Ekonomii (UMPE), *ČSR a Německo: výbor dokumentů o československé politice v německé otázce* (Prague 1959); UMPE, *Německý revanšismus – hrozba míru* [Beware! German revenge-seekers threaten peace] (Prague 1959); Institute for International Politics and Economics (ed.), *The incorrigibles* (Prague 1960); UMPE, *European security and the menace of West German militarism: Proceedings of the international conference held in Prague from May 23 to 27, 1961* (Prague 1962); A. Šnejdárk, *Revansisté proti Československu* (Prague 1963). From the GDR: Institut für Zeitgeschichte (ed.), *Materialien zur revanchistischen Politik des Bonner Staates und der Landsmannschaften* (East Berlin 1964); Nationale Front des Demokratischen Deutschland (NFDD), *Expansionist policy and Neo-Nazism in West Germany: Background, Aims, Methods: A Documentation* (Dresden 1967); H. Barth, *Bonner Ostpolitik gegen Frieden und Sicherheit: Zur Ostpolitik des westdeutschen Imperialismus von Adenauer und Erhard bis zu Strauß/Kiesinger* (East Berlin 1969). For an East German critique of expellee leader and SPD deputy Wenzel Jaksch, see E. Jauernig, *Sozialdemokratie und Revanchismus: Zur Geschichte und Politik Wenzel Jakschs und der Seliger-Gemeinde* (East Berlin 1968).

94 TNA: PRO: FO 371/154091 [WG 1075/13] Sir Cecil Parrott, British ambassador to Prague to FO, 8 October 1960.

95 K. Zilliacus MP, 'The British Labour Party Today', *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, 3, 10 (October 1960), 48. UCL: Gaitskell Papers: Box C280.2.

96 *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD)*, 1964, volume I (Munich 1995), 579(n). On 11 June 1964 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard declared that Bonn had 'no territorial claims whatsoever with regard to Czechoslovakia and separates itself expressly from any declarations which have given rise to a different interpretation'. 'Zum Muenchener Abkommen von 1938', *Auswärtiges Amt* (ed.), *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vom Kalten Krieg zum Frieden in Europa: Dokumente von 1949–1989* (Munich 1990), 268. Erhard was much chastened by the 'somewhat unpleasant episode'. Erhard meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Washington DC, 12 June 1964, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1964–1968, volume XV, *Germany and Berlin* (Washington, DC 1996), 110.

97 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 696, c. 913, 15 June 1964. East German propaganda seized upon Seebohm's rhetoric, e.g. 'We demand the return of the stolen Sudeten German homeland to the Sudeten German population.' NFDD, *Expansionist policy and Neo-Nazism in West Germany*, 28.

In Britain, Harold Wilson's Labour government came to power in October 1964 declaring a desire to improve East–West relations.⁹⁸ Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited Czechoslovakia stressing that, with regard to the latter's frontiers, 'no consideration should be given to any changes effected in 1938 or subsequently'.⁹⁹ Impressed by President (and First Secretary) Antonín Novotný's articulation of the 'very real threat' posed by the FRG,¹⁰⁰ Stewart acknowledged concerns that Munich might be used to revive German claims and agreed that the agreement was 'detestable, unjust and dangerous ... completely dead and has been dead for many years ... the mere historical fact that it was once made cannot justify any future claims against Czechoslovakia'.¹⁰¹ Even so, it was impossible 'to regard a treaty which had been signed as never having entered into effect'.¹⁰² The Czechoslovak government insisted that the fact that successive British governments refused to declare Munich invalid from its inception effectively endorsed *all* of West Germany's policy positions. This was not the case. British policymakers saw the Adenauer government's insistence on the right of return for expelled Germans would 'deny a fact of history'.¹⁰³ But to declare the agreement null and void *ab initio* would set a dangerous precedent in international treaty negotiations.¹⁰⁴ British resolve was strengthened by US support for the position that the FRG could not declare the Munich Agreement null and void *ab initio* for very sound 'legal reasons'.¹⁰⁵

On 25 March 1966 West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard sent a 'Note on Disarmament and Maintaining the Peace' to 115 states, including those of Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. This so-called 'Peace Note' proposed a reduction in nuclear weapons, a non-proliferation agreement, and a declaration on the renunciation of the use of force between the states of Eastern and Western Europe.¹⁰⁶ Alas, Erhard continued to insist that the borders of 1937 remained valid

98 See, for instance, Michael Stewart, *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 722, c. 28, 6 December 1965; TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 182498 [N 1051/ 25] FO Minute, P.A. Rhodes, Western Department, to Stewart, 12 April 1965. See also T. Macintyre, *Anglo–German Relations during the Labour Governments 1964–1970: NATO Strategy, Détente and European Integration* (Manchester 2007), 182–4.

99 TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 182498 [N 1051/ 25] FO brief, 'Status of the Munich Agreement', 9 April 1965 (for Michael Stewart visit to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, 18–25 April 1965).

100 TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 182500 [N 1053/ 1] Stewart–Novotný meeting, 20 April 1965.

101 Cited in TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2218, D. Tonkin, East European & Soviet department (EESD), FCO to J.A.S. Grenville, School of History, University of Birmingham, 1 August 1973.

102 xTNA: PRO: CAB 128/ 39, CC (65) 26th Cabinet Conclusions, 27 April 1965. M. Stewart, *Life and Labour: An Autobiography* (London 1980), 160. Stewart's colleague, James Callaghan, had come to the very same opinion himself during a visit to Czechoslovakia in 1960. LPA: Int/1960-61/3, notes on a visit to Czechoslovakia, 12–19 October 1960, James Callaghan MP.

103 TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 182498 [N 1051/ 25] FO brief for Stewart, 9 April 1965.

104 TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 182499 [N 1051/ 30] Michael Stewart, Guidance Telegram no. 181, 28 April 1965.

105 United States National Archives, College Park, MD (USNA): RG 59 Central Files, AIRGRAM A-1691, 'Munich Agreement – German Legal Position', George C. McGhee, US ambassador in Bonn to State Department, 14 May 1966.

106 For the full text of the 'Peace Note' see, 'Note der Bundesregierung (Entwurf)', 7 March 1966, *AAPD*, 1966, I, pp. 262–70. See also NA: PRO: FO 371/ 189172, Tel. No. 349, Sir Frank Roberts to FO, 18 March 1966.

in international law and the Soviets thus dismissed the note as symptomatic of nothing so much as heightened revanchist tendencies in West German policy.¹⁰⁷

The familiar pattern of proposal and counter-proposal in East-West relations continued when, in July 1966, the Warsaw Pact demanded that West Germany renounce nuclear weapons; recognize all *existing* frontiers in Europe; and recognize the Communist German Democratic Republic (GDR).¹⁰⁸ Novotný had already made the establishment of relations with the FRG conditional on the renunciation of Munich,¹⁰⁹ but Bonn retorted that Munich remained a valid agreement in international law (invalidated only *after* Hitler broke it).¹¹⁰ Erhard's successor, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, told the West German *Bundestag* that Munich was 'no longer valid' on 13 December 1966,¹¹¹ although he subsequently refused to be drawn into saying exactly *when* Munich had been invalidated.¹¹² When British Foreign Secretary George Brown – who had succeeded Stewart in August 1966 – was asked if Munich was null and void (which would mean that Sudeten German claims could be discounted) he simply replied that Kiesinger had already said that the frontiers are stable and that Munich came about under duress and must be discounted.¹¹³ But only two months later Brown demonstrated the intractable nature of the dispute when he asserted that 'The final determination of the Czechoslovak frontiers with Germany and Poland cannot be formalised until there is a Peace Treaty'.¹¹⁴ This position remained anathema to the Soviet bloc, which continued to complain that the 'Peace Note' had not declared the Munich Agreement invalid from its inception (and that the FRG still maintained 'certain claims' against Czechoslovakia).¹¹⁵ In February 1967 Novotný gave a qualified welcome to Kiesinger's statement but demanded that the Munich Agreement must be declared null and void *ab*

107 A. Pittman, *From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations since 1974* (New York 1992), 8.

108 R.K. Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1949–1991* (London 1993), 41.

109 See, for example, *Rudé Právo*, (11 November 1963) and Radio Prague, 28 October 1965. See: Open Society Archives, Budapest: Radio Free Europe, Research Paper: 99-3-50, 'Signing of FRG-Czechoslovak Treaty: The Thorny Road to Normalization', 7 December 1973 (authors: Hájek and Nižňanský (Czechoslovak Unit)), 1–2.

110 TNA: PRO: PREM 13/ 928, J. Oliver Wright, Private Secretary to Harold Wilson to Bonn, 28 March 1966; *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, 21 October 1966. See also, TNA: PRO: FO 371/ 188477 [N 103118/ 7] J.L. Taylor, Bonn, report of his meeting with Dr. Naupert, head of East European section of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, 19 December 1966.

111 K.G. Kiesinger, 'Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers am 13. Dezember 1966 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Bonn', 13 December 1966, *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages: Plenarprotokolle, Stenographische Berichte*, 1966/67, vol. 63, 3656–65. The Chancellor reiterated his position to US President Lyndon Johnson in Washington DC on 15 August 1967, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, XV, 572.

112 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/ 102 [RG 2/3, tel. no. 114] Sir Frank Roberts, Bonn to FCO, 17 January 1967.

113 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 742, c. 74, 27 February 1967.

114 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 745, c. 207-8, 24 April 1967.

115 Barth, *Bonner Ostpolitik gegen Frieden und Sicherheit*, 115.

initio.¹¹⁶ This demand was reiterated by Czechoslovakia's Warsaw Pact allies at Karlovy Vary in April.¹¹⁷

In early 1968, Novotný's replacement as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by Alexander Dubček instilled hopes in the West that a period of détente was at hand. Such hopes were crushed by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.¹¹⁸ Soviet statements made it clear that the threat of rapprochement between Dubček and the West Germans had been a major factor in the decision to intervene: 'We shall leave [Czechoslovakia only when] assured that the reactionaries will never again dare menace the gains of the Czechoslovak people and the successes of world socialism'.¹¹⁹ The invasion of Czechoslovakia did little to diminish British official sensitivity over Munich. When one Labour back-bench MP asserted

that there is as much admiration amongst British people as there is amongst Czechs for the noble motives which led Jan Palach to take his life a few weeks ago, and that the guilt of the Munich Agreement is one reason why we have a special regard for the Czech people now under Russian occupation

an FCO minister retorted: 'I must warn ... [that for] specific treaties, there are a number of international questions as to legality which need to be considered very carefully.'¹²⁰ Once again, the wrongs of history were discounted in favour of contemporary British interests.

Although, in 1969, a British government minister insisted that 'Her Majesty's Government repudiated the Munich Agreement more than a quarter of a century ago',¹²¹ London continued to resist declaring Munich null and void *ab initio*.¹²² This stance evidenced a determination to refute the Communist charge that the

116 Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1949–1991*, 41.

117 *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, European Navigator* (ENA), 'Declaration issued at the close of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, Bucharest (5 July 1966)', available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration_of_the_political_consultative_committee_of_the_warsaw_pact_on_the_strengthening_of_peace_and_security_in_europe_bucharest_5_july_1966-en-c48a3aab-0873-43f1-a928-981e23063f23.html (accessed 3 February 2013) and 'Statement by the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, Karlovy Vary (26 April 1967)', available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/statement_by_the_european_communist_and_workers_parties_on_security_in_europe_karlovy_vary_26_april_1967-en-e8fe5ae4-27cc-4e0f-a48a-c8c82cb548e6.html (accessed 3 February 2013).

118 G. Hughes, 'British policy towards Eastern Europe and the impact of the 'Prague Spring'', 1964–68', *Cold War History*, 4, 2 (2004), 115–39.

119 Press Group of Soviet Journalists, *On Events in Czechoslovakia (Moscow 1968)*, 9 (commonly referred to as *The White Book*). USNA: CIA Office of National Estimates, memo: 'Near Term Prospects for Czechoslovakia', 31 January 1969.

120 Exchange between David Winnick MP and Goronwy Roberts MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 778, c. 12–13, 17 February 1969.

121 George Thomson MP, Minister without Portfolio, *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 791, c. 191, 17 November 1969.

122 The French and the Italians had done so as long ago as 22 August 1942 and 28 September 1944 respectively. TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 121, memorandum, 'The Munich Agreement', T.C. Barker, 24 May 1968; TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 961, H.F.T. Smith, ambassador to Prague to Thomas Brimelow, Deputy Under-Secretary FCO, 19 November 1970 (2/15). Goronwy Roberts, FCO Minister of State statement,

British government had sacrificed Czechoslovakia in the full knowledge that it would not satisfy Nazi Germany.¹²³ To declare Munich invalid from the outset would have endorsed the charge that Chamberlain had been involved in a ‘criminal conspiracy’ with Hitler.¹²⁴ British sensitivity to such charges was heightened by constant Soviet bloc references to the ‘Munich *diktát*’, which equated the British role at Munich with that of Nazi Germany.¹²⁵ It was even suggested that the question of the validity of the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939 be raised in order to counter Soviet attacks.¹²⁶ Ever mindful of precedent, the British rejected as nonsense the Czechoslovak claim, made well before the Cold War, that Munich was null and void from the outset because it had been concluded under duress.¹²⁷ Furthermore, if the FRG were to concede that Hitler’s Germany ‘by force or threat or any other illegal act, procured the Agreement or Czechoslovak acceptance of it, then such admission would be the key factor in any objective approach to the Munich Agreement.’ The danger was that, in the event of Bonn being prepared to declare Munich invalid *ab initio*, the British government would have to follow suit,¹²⁸ as Britain could not possibly remain the *only* signatory of Munich to deny its invalidity from the outset.¹²⁹ This prompted a hardening of British policy. In November 1969 Michael Stewart, restored to the post of Foreign Secretary, informed West German Chancellor Willy Brandt that to declare Munich invalid *ab initio* was akin to stating that ‘a divorced couple had never been married’.¹³⁰

In Whitehall, a number of departments were invited to give their opinions on the implications of any British acceptance of Munich as being invalid *ab initio*. The debates that ensued involved one Rohan D’Olier Butler, editor of the *Documents in British Foreign Policy* series (1955–65), and the Foreign Secretary’s historical advisor (1963–82).¹³¹ Butler had been a staunch opponent

Hansard, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 768, c. 98, 10 July 1968; L.W. Holborn, *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, volume I (Boston, MA 1943), 574.

123 On 20 March 1939, Litvinov informed Stalin that Germany’s occupation of Prague was consistent ‘with the presumed implications of Hitler’s eastward expansion, on which the Munich agreement was based’. S. Pons, *Stalin and the Inevitable War: 1936–1941* (London 2002), 151.

124 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 961, John R. Rich, Prague Embassy ‘Czech press marks 32nd anniversary of Munich by attacking its illegal nature’, to P.J. Weston, EESD, FCO, 2 October 1970; TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2230. EESD, FCO, brief for the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Bonn, 15–19 May 1973, 10 May 1973.

125 This term was used throughout the postwar period. See, for instance, interview with Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister Jiří Goetz, 31 May 1973; TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2230. Some historians also charged that the British seized upon the Sudeten Germans as presenting an excellent prize with which to buy off Hitler. See, for instance, Brügel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich*, esp. 175–290.

126 For instance: TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1772, K.B.A. Scott, Moscow to P.W. Unwin, Western Department, 31 August 1972.

127 See, for example, the statements made by Goronwy Roberts MP. *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th Series, v. 765, c. 2356-7, 2357-8, 31 May 1968.

128 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 961, Jackling to Brimelow, 22 December 1970.

129 On British fears of West German flexibility on this issue, see TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 121 [NC4/ 1] FCO telegram to Bonn, 11 July 1968; TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 121, memorandum ‘The Munich Agreement’, T.C. Barker, 24 May 1968.

130 Ratti, *Britain, Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik, and the CSCE (1955–1975)*, 194; Stewart, *Life and Labour*, 226. Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969 (having been Foreign Minister, 1966–9).

131 R.T. Stearn, ‘Butler, Rohan D’Olier (1917–1996)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford 2004), available at: <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/63970> (accessed 3 February 2013).

of appeasement,¹³² who had felt that, as a historian, he had a moral obligation to speak out against it.¹³³ Yet, in 1971, he placed his expertise at Whitehall's service in order to justify the Foreign Office's line on Munich. Butler's background and experience meant that he represented an invaluable element in the institutional memory of the Foreign Office with regards to Munich. This greatly assisted the British government in the early 1970s.

British officialdom achieved a consensus against accepting the invalidity of Munich *ab initio* based on four points. First, the legal adviser drew attention to the British interest in the continued validity of the German-Czechoslovak 'Treaty of Nationality and Options' of 20 November 1938, since some of the people affected by this had subsequently settled in the UK (and had been supported financially by the UK). Second, it was also necessary for Britain to reserve its legal position on the question of the German-Czechoslovak frontier given the 'provisional' status of the boundaries of postwar Europe. Third, to declare Munich null and void *ab initio* would 'prejudice British interests in the historical and, more broadly, the moral fields'.¹³⁴ It was absolutely necessary to 'avoid subscribing to a historical interpretation of Munich which might imply a degree of British moral guilt by reason of our having been party to an (ex hypothesi) illegal Diktat'. Furthermore, if it were to be inferred that Munich had never been a 'legally valid instrument', this 'would provide useful fodder for communist propaganda, directed toward blaming us for the outbreak of war'. Fourth, the Bank of England warned that if any agreement between Bonn and Prague declared Munich to be invalid from the start this would weaken Britain's negotiating position with regard to the £5 million claimed against Czechoslovakia (under article one of the Intergovernmental Debt Agreement of 1949).¹³⁵ In conclusion, since it seemed likely that the FRG would refuse to accept that Munich was null and void *ab initio*, the Czechoslovaks would probably have to settle for rather less than their longstanding demand.¹³⁶ For his part, Butler was optimistic that, if the UK could prevail upon the FRG to stand firm on the question of nullifying Munich *ab initio*, then Prague would be forced to give way.¹³⁷ In April 1973, an FCO brief asserted that Munich's validity:

at the time of its conclusion must be looked at in the light of the legal position at that time, which did not invalidate treaties concluded under a threat of force.

132 On this, see R.D'O. Butler, *The Roots of National Socialism, 1783-1933* (London 1941).

133 R. Oresko, 'Obituary: Rohan Butler', *The Independent* (5 November 1996).

134 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1288, P.J. Weston, EESD, FCO circular, 22 March 1971.

135 The UK Treasury had more or less written this £5 million off anyway.

136 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1288, Weston, EESD, FCO circular, 22 March 1971. The British had already (correctly) predicted that rival financial and property claims of the Sudeten Germans against Czechoslovakia would cancel each other out. TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1288, J.W. Maslen, East European Research Department, FCO, 8 February 1971. In the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation Sudeten German property had been 'given' to the Czechoslovak state as compensation. *Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation (with annex)* (Paris 21st December 1945) (London 1946).

137 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1288, Butler to Weston, 23 March 1971.

To admit the contrary might [set] a very unfortunate precedent for other pre-charter treaties.¹³⁸

Given their fear that Bonn might accept the *ab initio* formula, the British were relieved to know that the treaty negotiations between Bonn and Prague were deadlocked¹³⁹ over what Brandt called the ‘emotionally-charged problem’ of whether or not the Munich Agreement was to be declared null and void *ab initio*.¹⁴⁰ Although Brandt had stated in 1969 that while the Munich Agreement ‘was unjust from the outset and not in accordance with international law’ he had added the proviso that there were certain legal consequences that flowed from it.¹⁴¹

The potential for a new flexibility on the part of the Czechoslovak government was now clear as Moscow signalled a desire for more progress in East-West relations.¹⁴² This was derived of the fact that the USSR now viewed Munich as an anachronistic irritant, especially given the progress made in East-West relations as a result of Brandt’s *Neue Ostpolitik*.¹⁴³ Significantly, the Soviet bloc had already achieved West German accession to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the recognition of both the Oder-Neiße line and the GDR.¹⁴⁴ The British, however, remained suspicious. The ambassador in Bonn sought to shore up West German resolve, making it clear that the idea of declaring Munich null and void *ab initio* was unacceptable to London. Indeed, if any such formula were to be adopted, it would be a ‘distortion of history’.¹⁴⁵ The exhortation was unnecessary given that, in May 1973, Brezhnev assured Brandt that a favourable atmosphere ‘for getting rid of the damned Munich Agreement’ now

138 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2223, brief for the visit of Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister Miloslav Růžek, 9–12 April 1973. The ‘charter’ referred to here is the UN charter. Taking its lead from this, Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (initialled on 23 May 1969) states that ‘The expression by a State of consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of the representative of that State through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect’. In addition, Article 52 states that ‘A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (accessed 3 February 2013).

139 Reuters, ‘Munich pact still casts its shadow’, *The Times* (24 February 1973).

140 W. Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960–1975* (London 1978), 415.

141 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 961, Brandt statement, 12 December 1969. John R. Rich, ‘Status of Munich Agreement’, Prague Embassy, to Weston, EESD, FCO, 2 October 1970.

142 TNA: PRO: FCO: 28/ 1772, J.E. Killick, ambassador in Moscow to FCO, 4 December 1972. For early speculation about this development, see TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1288 [ENC 4/ 1] H. Broomfield, Bonn to D.A.S. Gladstone, Western Department FCO, 23 February 1971.

143 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1772, K.B.A. Scott, Moscow to P.W. Unwin, Western Department, 31 August 1972. On the manner in which the *Neue Ostpolitik* addressed the unfinished business of the Second World War, see O. Bange and G. Niedhart, ‘Die “Relikte der Nachkriegszeit” beseitigen: *Ostpolitik* in der zweiten außenpolitischen Formationsphase der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und ihre internationalen Rahmenbedingungen 1969–1971’, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 44 (2004), 415–48.

144 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 1772 [ENC 4/ 3] J.E. Killick, ambassador in Moscow to FCO, 4 December 1972.

145 Nicholas Henderson to FRG State Secretary Paul Frank, Bonn, 9 April 1973, *AAPD*, I (Munich 2004), 475–6. Quotation at 476. In the event, the ambassador was satisfied by Frank’s assurances.

existed.¹⁴⁶ By this Brezhnev did not mean getting rid of Munich by declaring it null *ab initio*. Rather he aimed to kill the question off altogether. Brezhnev, keen to promote good relations with the FRG,¹⁴⁷ was convinced that it was impossible for Brandt to accept the nullification of Munich *ab initio* for domestic political reasons.¹⁴⁸ Brandt was, however, amenable to compromise. The *Bundeskanzler* told the *Bundestag* on 15 February that:

We have attentively followed statements from Prague concerning the relationship between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is now well-known that we distance ourselves politically and morally from the policy – from Hitler’s policy of aggression – that led to the Munich Agreement. We are also willing to declare the Munich Agreement invalid. We hope that – and I think this should be possible given goodwill on both sides – that a common formula for this statement may be found.¹⁴⁹

Encouraged by such moderation, Brezhnev’s May 1973 assurance to Brandt indicated nothing less than a willingness on the part of the Soviet leader to prevail upon Prague to desist in its demand for the *ab initio* formula.¹⁵⁰ Brandt advised Prime Minister Edward Heath that, with the barrier of Munich removed, an agreement between the FRG and Czechoslovakia would soon follow and allow the cause of détente to move forward.¹⁵¹ Brandt’s assurances confirmed the advice that had been given to the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home (Chamberlain’s PPS at Munich): namely that the FRG was holding to the view that the Munich Agreement had, initially, been valid.¹⁵²

146 Brezhnev–Brandt meeting, Bonn, 20 May 1973, *AAPD*, II (Munich 2004), 748–58 (esp. 752–3). Quotation: W. Brandt, *My Life in Politics* (London 1992), 209.

147 M.E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill, NC 2001), 31.

148 The opposition CDU/CSU were very hostile to Brandt and his *Neue Ostpolitik*. Fears of what Brandt might do after he became Chancellor in 1969 (he had been Foreign Minister in a CDU/CSU–SPD ‘Grand Coalition’ between 1966 and 1969) caused senior figures in the CDU/CSU to set up a clandestine political intelligence network. On this, see W. Winkler, ‘Agenten, Verräter und andere Berufene: Konservative Verschwörung gegen Brandt’, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (29 November 2012). As it was there were a number of fierce debates on, and legal challenges to, the *Neue Ostpolitik*. In 1970, there was a political storm in the FRG when a leak to the newspaper *Bild* of the so-called ‘Bahr-Papier’ revealed that Brandt’s chief adviser, Egon Bahr, and already settled certain outstanding questions in consultation with the Soviet diplomat Valentin Falin. H. Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945–2000* (Stuttgart and Munich 2001), 183–4. Falin became ambassador to the FRG in 1971. For his perspectives on the FRG, Brandt and the *Neue Ostpolitik*, see V. Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich 1993).

149 ‘Rede von Bundeskanzler Brandt am 15. Februar 1973 (Auszüge)’, Auswärtiges Amt (ed.), *40 Jahre Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Dokumentation* (Bonn 1989), 272.

150 This represented an effective reversal of the Warsaw Pact demand agreed at Karlovy Vary in April 1967.

151 TNA: PRO: PREM 15/ 1569, Brandt to Heath, 21 May 1973. See also the record of the two meetings between Brandt and Heath in Bonn on 29 May 1973: *AAPD*, 1973, II, 854–8 and 858–64.

152 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2230, EESD (FCO) brief for the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Bonn, 15–19 May 1973, 10 May 1973.

When news of the impending FRG–Czechoslovak treaty reached London, the Foreign Secretary noted that Bonn and Prague were to recognize the legal rights, claims and status of individuals derived from the events in the years 1938–45 in both the FRG and Czechoslovakia.¹⁵³ Douglas-Home remarked with satisfaction that:

the clear implication is that the Munich Agreement, although being recognised as being “nichtig”, may nonetheless be accepted as having had and continuing to have certain legal effects. This is a very far cry from the concept of nullity *ab initio*, which is not acceptable to us.¹⁵⁴

The British government had other concerns, however. After the agreement between Bonn and Prague was announced,¹⁵⁵ Douglas-Home speculated as to whether or not the forthcoming treaty would make reference to Munich as having been imposed by force. The Foreign Secretary vented his frustration at the failure of Brandt’s government to reveal exactly how far it would meet Prague’s demands.¹⁵⁶ The FCO fretted over the FRG–Czechoslovakia treaty’s assertion that ‘the Munich Agreement . . . was imposed upon the Republic of Czechoslovakia by the National Socialist regime under the threat of force.’ This, it was feared:

suggests that Hitler made all [of] the running while Mr. Chamberlain played an insignificant role. It may be no bad thing that the odium for the Agreement should be placed elsewhere than on Mr. Chamberlain; but the preamble suggests that Mr. Chamberlain simply acquiesced in the Nazi threat of force. This has never been the view of any British Government.¹⁵⁷

The Times opined that the agreement between the FRG and Czechoslovakia meant that ‘The [Munich] agreement’s immorality is now obvious to all, even granting that Neville Chamberlain thought he was saving Europe from war by granting Hitler a piece of land . . . in which the majority of the inhabitants spoke German.’¹⁵⁸ In official circles the assertion of Chamberlain’s benign intent was deemed more important than any consideration of morality. The FCO observed

153 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2230, EESD (FCO) brief for the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Bonn, 15–19 May 1973, 10 May 1973. The West German position was that the treaty of December 1973 was valid *only* in the context of contemporary relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia. The treaty therefore allowed acts that had occurred under German law (marriages, wills etc.) between October 1938 and May 1945 to retain their validity. D. Bark and D. Gress, *A History of West Germany*, volume II: *Democracy and Discontents, 1963–1991* (London 1993), 222–3.

154 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/ 2230, Alec Douglas-Home to Bonn embassy, 7 May 1973.

155 D. van der Vat, ‘Bonn settles Munich issue in Czechoslovak treaty’, *The Times* (31 May 1973). For the FRG–CSSR meetings finalizing agreement, see the talks in Bonn between FRG State Secretary Paul Frank and CSSR Deputy Foreign Minister Jiri Goetz on 29 and the 30 May 1973: *AAPD*, 1973, II, 864–85 and 886–90.

156 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/ 2165, Douglas-Home to Bonn embassy, 4 June 1973.

157 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/ 2165, C.M. James, Western Department memorandum, 11 June 1973.

158 Editorial: ‘Null And Void, Thirty-Five Years Later’, *The Times* (1 June 1973).

that, although Britain welcomed the rapprochement between Bonn and Prague, it 'reserve[d] the right to say that responsibility for the terms of the Munich Agreement is shared by all four signatories. *Mr. Chamberlain, for his part, believed at the time that he secured an honourable settlement*'.¹⁵⁹ Further, the avoidance of the *null ab initio* formula had been important to remove the stigma of Munich that had been attached to Chamberlain, and which had represented 'a good stick for the Soviet Union to beat' the British. The advantage thus gained by Britain from the FRG-Czechoslovakia treaty should be maximized by not 'offer[ing] comment which may ... embarrass the Germans'. Caution needed to be exercised as 'the Czechs will seize [any chance] to show that the British are the least interested in promoting détente in Europe and the least sensitive to Czechoslovakia's position [as] signatories of the 1938 Agreement' as well as the power that had gone the smallest distance towards declaring Munich's 'nullity' or invalidity'.¹⁶⁰ Butler argued that it would be wise diplomatically to avoid criticizing any minimizing of Chamberlain's role 'even at the price of the loss of strict historical proportion'. Quoting Chamberlain's speech to the Commons of 3 October 1938 ('War, in a form more stark and terrible than ever before, seemed to be staring us in the face'), Butler concluded that 'It was surely in Chamberlain's mind ... that this threat of force was liable at least to involve German military action against not only Czechoslovakia but also against the United Kingdom'.¹⁶¹ Chamberlain's old Parliamentary Private Secretary remained loyal to the end,¹⁶² reaffirming his belief in the absolute necessity of the Munich Agreement in his memoirs.¹⁶³

On 11 December 1973, the Prague Treaty was signed by West Germany and Czechoslovakia. Article one proclaimed Munich 'void with regard to their mutual relations'.¹⁶⁴ Signally, article two stipulated that that 'The present Treaty shall not affect the legal effects on natural or legal persons of the law as applied in the period

159 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/ 2165, Western Department brief for Douglas-Home to use at NATO Council, 11 June 1973. The emphasis is mine.

160 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/ 2165, D. Tonkin to K.G. McInnes, Western Department FCO, 12 June 1973.

161 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/ 2165, Butler to McInnes, 13 June 1973. For Chamberlain's two statements in the post-Munich debates in the House of Commons (3 and 6 October 1938), see N. Chamberlain, *The Struggle for Peace* (London 1939), 305–27.

162 After Lord Home's death Prime Minister John Major paid tribute in the Commons: 'Suddenly, with Neville Chamberlain's elevation to Prime Minister, Alec Home found himself at the very centre of government ... [and] he was with [Chamberlain] at that crucial meeting in Munich with Hitler. Alec Home was not, of course, personally responsible for the agreements reached, but, with a loyalty that was characteristic of the man, he would never subsequently criticise Chamberlain's actions'. *Hansard*, HC Deb, 6th Series, v. 264, c. 19, 16 October 1995.

163 Lord Home, *The Way the Wind Blows* (London 1976), 67–8.

164 'Treaty of Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic', signed by FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt, FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, CSSR Prime Minister Lubomir Štrougal and CSSR Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chňoupek, 11 December 1973. *Documentation Relating to the Federal Government's Policy of Détente* (Bonn 1978), 67. For an account of the meeting between Chancellor Brandt and President Svoboda that followed the signing the agreement on 11 December 1973, see *AAPD*, 1973, III, 2015–17. Brandt observed that this was his first visit to Prague since 1936 – when he had arrived under a false passport! (*AAPD*, 1973, III, 2017).

between 30 September 1938 and 9 May 1945'.¹⁶⁵ In such a fashion both parties, the FRG and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), were satisfied. The demise of the Munich Agreement as a factor in the international situation was achieved only when *all* sides could point to concrete gains.¹⁶⁶ From Bonn, Henderson reported on the 'muted tones' in which the 'final clearing away of the last major historical obstacle left from the Second World War to the normalisation of [FRG] relations with Eastern Europe ... [had] made a somewhat undignified impression'.¹⁶⁷ For its part, Prague was dissatisfied with the failure of the treaty to declare the Munich Agreement null and void *ab initio*.¹⁶⁸ Czechoslovakia had achieved acceptance of the Yalta frontiers, although it had craved a reversion to the pre-Munich Czechoslovak–German frontiers.¹⁶⁹ To outsiders, however, this was an academic distinction since the pre-Munich and the post-Yalta Czechoslovak–German frontiers were identical.

In many respects Brandt's *Neue Ostpolitik* had been the overture to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Brandt himself had predicted that, once an agreement had been concluded with Czechoslovakia, 'the bilateral aspects of our relations with the East will to a certain extent be replaced by multilateral aspects'.¹⁷⁰ After the breakthrough between the FRG and Czechoslovakia, the British thus hoped that the finalizing of the CSCE would represent the culmination of détente in Europe.¹⁷¹ Brandt later recalled that British attitudes to his eastern policy had demonstrated that 'the administrators of the diplomatic inheritors in London were moved partly by guilty conscience and partly by ... hope. They had been unable to help the Poles in 1939 [or] the Czechs in [1938]'.¹⁷² In this assessment, alas, Brandt was wrong. As with Munich, the question of Yalta necessitated an aggressively defensive stance on the part of the

165 S.S. Malawer, *Imposed Treaties and International Law* (Buffalo, NY 1977), 101.

166 On the significance of the treaty, see R. Břach, 'Die Bedeutung des Prager Vertrages von 1973 für die deutsche Ostpolitik', in J.K. Hoensch and H. Lemberg (eds), *Begegnung und Konflikt: Schlaglichter auf das Verhältnis von Tschechen, Slowaken und Deutschen, 1815–1989* (Essen 2001), 285–304. For an appraisal of the treaty from a Czechoslovak perspective, see R. Břach, *Smlouva o vzájemných vztazích mezi ČSSR a SRN z roku 1973: Od prvních rozhovorů po ratifikaci smlouvy* (Prague 1994).

167 TNA: PRO: FCO 33/2165 [WRG 3/332/1] Sir Nicholas Henderson, Bonn to FCO, 13 December 1973.

168 This ensured that alarmist texts about West German intentions continued to be published: V. Novák, *V pozadí je fašismus: Neonacismus a revanšismus v NSR* (Prague 1980); F. Vobecký, *Whom Does Revanchism Serve?* (Prague 1985); Z. Snítel et al., *Against militarism and revanchism: speeches presented at the international symposium on "the danger of tendencies of militarism and revanchism within the political circles of a number of western countries", held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on September 18–20, 1984*, trans. K. Strádal (Prague 1986).

169 T. Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London 1994), 222–3. To the consternation of the British the Soviets had promised to restore Czechoslovakia to its pre-Munich border with Germany as long ago as June 1942. Hauner, "'We Must Push Eastwards!'", 645.

170 'West Germany: More Power to Brandt', *Time* (4 December 1972).

171 Minute from Mr. Brown (FCO) on CSCE principles – specifically discussing the Soviet desire to list 'inviolability of frontiers' as an independent principle, 20 March 1973. DBPO, III/ II, *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1972–75* (London 1997), 106–8.

172 Brandt, *My Life in Politics*, 454.

officialdom responsible. In 1981 the former British diplomat Lord Gladwyn defended Yalta thus:

In February 1945, the Nazis were still vigorously resisting and the Russian Army was advancing into Poland. Short of declaring war on our ally there was no conceivable way of contesting the (ethnically justified) Soviet claim to the Curzon Line as Russia's Western frontier ... What we could have done – and did not do – was to use Soviet repudiation of their engagements to denounce the previously signed agreement on the German “Zones” by simply staying where we were when hostilities ended ... Churchill, who wanted to stay where we were, was overruled by Roosevelt and Eisenhower. But the idea that we simply handed over half Europe on a plate to Russia at Yalta is a myth.¹⁷³

As Munich had poisoned relations between Czechoslovakia and the West, so Yalta became a byword for betrayal in Poland.¹⁷⁴ The ‘myths’ engendered by Munich and Yalta survived the Cold War and they remain a factor in contemporary politics in Czechoslovakia and Poland to this day.¹⁷⁵ Katyń undoubtedly poisoned relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, but its effect on the relationship between Poland and the West was more complex. After all, the initial Anglo–American desire to retain good relations with the USSR could not simply be jettisoned in the pursuit of Cold War political ends without exposing an unacceptable level of political cynicism. In 1973 Butler concluded that ‘We see no advantage in breaking the silence that we have preserved for nearly 30 years on the Katyn massacre’.¹⁷⁶ Once again the international situation, not least the burgeoning East–West détente,¹⁷⁷ dictated that Katyń would not be revisited.

The Final Act of the CSCE at Helsinki in August 1975, which was signed by 35 states, effectively institutionalized the decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam declaring, as it did, the European frontiers established after the Second World War as ‘inviolable’.¹⁷⁸ For those who sought to defend Britain’s actions at Yalta and

173 Lord Gladwyn, letter: ‘Diplomatic Betrayal’, *Encounter*, November 1981, 95–6. Gladwyn Jebb (1900–96) was the first Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, and ambassador to the UN (1950–4) and to Paris (1954–60).

174 T. Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (3rd edn, New Haven, CT 2002), 3; S.M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York 2010), 394–5.

175 M. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ 1999), 8(n). In November 2012 Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s Foreign Minister, attacked British calls to cut the EU budget (and the ‘cohesion fund’ in particular), stating that ‘This is our very own late “Marshall plan”, thanks to which we may at last catch up and right the wrong that we suffered at the 1945 Yalta conference’. R. Sikorski, ‘For Britain, the EU is good value for money’, *The Observer* (18 November 2012).

176 ‘The Katyn Massacre and reactions in the Foreign Office: Memorandum by the Historical Adviser [Rohan Butler]’, internally circulated to EESD, FCO as DS 2/73, 10 April 1973. Document facsimile reproduced in *Katyn: British Reactions to the Katyn Massacre, 1943–2003*, xxxii.

177 On this, see R.G. Hughes, ‘Britain, East-West Détente and the CSCE’, in V. Bilandžić, D. Dahlmann and M. Kosanović (eds), *From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente* (Göttingen 2012), 124–9.

178 C.E. Timberlake, *Détente: A Documentary Record* (New York 1978), 155–6.

Potsdam, the Final Act provided a welcome boon. In 1984 the then Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe rebuffed one critic of wartime British policy toward Poland thus:

The Yalta protocols are part of history; they produced their successes – and one should remember the very wide range of subjects which they covered – and their disappointments. But however much one may wish that some things had turned out differently, history cannot be rewritten.¹⁷⁹

Such robust positions, framed in the fatalistic language of *Realpolitik*, turned out to be harder to sustain once the Cold War ended.

On 30 October 1989 Gorbachev allowed a delegation of several hundred, under the auspices of the Polish group *Families of Katyń Victims*, to visit Katyń. This group included former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who commented that ‘The fact that the Soviet government has enabled me to be here ... is symbolic of the breach with Stalinism’.¹⁸⁰ On 13 April 1990 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev gave Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski three NKVD dossiers dating from 1940. Gorbachev asserted that these dossiers contained ‘indirect but convincing’ proof of Soviet guilt while an official TASS statement spoke of ‘profound regret’ over ‘one of the gravest crimes of Stalinism’.¹⁸¹ In 1994 a Soviet historian published a book which termed Katyń ‘a crime against humanity’.¹⁸² Such an act had been unthinkable only a few years previously and, in the light of such developments, the official British narrative had little option but to re-position itself.

In the post-Cold War era prominent critics of the wartime betrayal of Poland were now lauded publicly. After the death of Lord Home, Prime Minister John Major told the Commons that ‘Time and time again during his ... political career he demonstrated ... backbone ... [and] dared to criticise Churchill for the Yalta agreement and the way in which it treated Poland’.¹⁸³ Pressure for an official reappraisal of Katyń mounted and, in 1996, the British government published *The Katyn Massacre: An SOE Perspective*.¹⁸⁴ As an attempt to reconcile the official record of the past with something approximating to the truth this was an unsatisfactory document that hinted at the inevitable hegemony of *Realpolitik* in the conduct of international affairs. In the words of one historian: ‘The 1996 FCO paper can, at best, be regarded as a piece of delaying bluster and a smokescreen’ by

179 Sir Geoffrey Howe MP to Sir Bernard Braine MP, 14 June 1984. Z.C. Szkopiak (ed.), *The Yalta Agreements: the White Book: Documents prior to, during and after the Crimea Conference 1945* (London 1986), 167.

180 Deborah G. Seward, ‘Brzezinski: Soviets Should Take Responsibility for Katyn Massacre’, *Associated Press* (30 October 1989).

181 A. Paul, *Katyń: Stalin’s Massacre and the Triumph of Truth* (DeKalb, IL 2010), 348.

182 N.S. Lebedeva, *Katyn: prestuplenie protiv chelovechestva* (Moscow 1994). This was subsequently published in Poland as *Katyn: Zbrodnia przeciwko ludzkosci* (Warsaw 1997).

183 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 6th Series, v. 264, c. 20, 16 October 1995.

184 FCO Library and Records Department, *The Katyn Massacre: An SOE Perspective*, History Notes No. 10 (London 1996).

British officialdom.¹⁸⁵ In 2000, nine years after the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, conceded that ‘previous [British] administrations could have been more candid about Soviet guilt’.¹⁸⁶ This, of course, ignored the reasons for the British policy of ‘seeing no evil’ in the first place and the question of British complicity subsequently. Douglas Hurd (Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 1989–95) simply observed that ‘we have learned that we should be braver about separating our need to deal with tyrannies from our need to avoid offence to them’.¹⁸⁷ These were, of course, laudable sentiments but the fact was that, by the time Hurd was writing, there was no longer a Stalin or Hitler to fear or to appease.

The 1973 Treaty of Prague had been a creature of its time, intimately bound up with the politics and the environs of the Cold War. As such, it was logical that the end of the Cold War would require a reappraisal of matters. After 1989, Munich and the *sudetendeutsch* question crept back onto the agenda in disputes over the questions of the *odsum*, property rights and restitution.¹⁸⁸ These questions rarely involved Britain directly. Britain concentrated instead on seeking to improve relations with former Soviet bloc states and, in 1992, Prime Minister John Major visited Czechoslovakia. During that visit, Major, along with President Václav Havel, initialled an Anglo–Czechoslovak declaration that finally nullified the Munich Agreement *ab initio*.¹⁸⁹ Ironically, this was done on 27 May 1992 – the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination attempt on Heydrich. Havel had wanted to conclude a treaty, but he had acquiesced in the face of a British insistence upon a declaration, despite its inferior legal status.¹⁹⁰ Acknowledging Thatcher’s 1990 Prague speech, Major said of the declaration that ‘This is the first legal repudiation rather than an oral repudiation’. Although the fact that Munich had been nullified by means of a declaration rather than a treaty meant that this was not strictly true, Major was right to assert that ‘We are now formally nullifying the agreement. That was done at the suggestion of the Czech[oslovak] government and it is something the UK wholeheartedly agrees with’.¹⁹¹ In August 1942, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk had declared that ‘Between our two countries the Munich Agreement can now be considered as dead’.¹⁹² Only in 1992 was this actually to become true.

185 G. Sanford, *Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory* (Abingdon 2005).

186 Robin Cook MP to Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Katyń Association, 19 June 2000. ‘Britain and the Katyn Massacre: An Introduction’, xxxii.

187 D. MacShane MP, ‘Foreword’, *Katyn: British Reactions to the Katyn Massacre, 1943–2003*, n.p.

188 T. Burcher, *The Sudeten German Question and Czechoslovak–German Relations Since 1989* (London 1996); ‘The Beneš decrees: A spectre over Central Europe’, *Economist* (17 August 2002).

189 P. Webster, ‘Major and Havel bury Munich pact’, *The Times* (28 May 1992); ‘Munich Agreement torn up by Major’, *The Independent* (28 May 1992). See also N.J. Crowson, ‘Conservative parliamentary dissent over foreign policy during the premiership of Neville Chamberlain: myth or reality?’, *Parliamentary History*, 14, 3 (1995), 315.

190 M. Jones, ‘Enter Mr Europe-in-waiting’, *The Sunday Times* (31 May 1992).

191 J. Williams, ‘Munich’s piece of paper is torn up’, *Evening Standard* (27 May 1992).

192 *British and Foreign State Papers* [BFSP] volume 144, 1940–1942 (London 1952), 988.

The British decision to accept the nullification of Munich was symptomatic of the vogue for apology and atonement which one historian has recently referred to as the 'consciousness of progressive temporality'.¹⁹³ The 1992 declaration had signalled recognition of Thatcher's assertion that 'British foreign policy is at its worst when it is engaged in giving away other people's territory'.¹⁹⁴ Yet a belief in the essential rectitude of British motives at Munich has persisted. Such a fixation with intent has the great advantage of allowing one to reduce moral failings to mere matters of historical detail. In his memoirs Tony Blair, John Major's successor, reflected that:

A comparison to Chamberlain is one of the worst British political insults. Yet what did he do? In a world still suffering from the trauma of the Great War, a war in which millions died, including many of his close family and friends, he had grieved; and in his grief pledged to prevent another such war. Not a bad ambition; in fact, a noble one.¹⁹⁵

The 'much cursed visit to Munich' had, indeed, come to be 'understood'.

Biographical Note

R. Gerald Hughes (FRHistS) is a lecturer at Aberystwyth University, UK. He specializes in diplomatic history, the history of British foreign policy, military history and intelligence history. He is the author of *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: the search for a European Détente, 1949–1967* (2007), *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* (forthcoming) and, with Thomas Robb, of 'Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in the "Special Relationship" between the United States and Great Britain, 1969–1977', *Diplomatic History* (2013). He is the co-editor of three books: *Intelligence, Crises and Security: Prospects and Retrospects* (2008); *Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State* (2008); and *Intelligence and International Security: New Perspectives and Agendas* (2011).

193 J.K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (New York 2007), 122.

194 M. Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (London 1995), 27.

195 T. Blair, *A Journey* (London 2010), 207.