76
DYNASTIC EMPIRK, c. 17G5 1867
gradually outstripped by events, was already an irritant to his colleagues. Count Franz Anton Kolowrat. complained of him as a pompous j: pedant who was constantly telling everyone that two and two made four, not five, and that all actions had consequences. The claim on his behalf that his criticisms ol'Josephinian centralism in Austria put him on the same wave-length as the early ethnic nationalists6 seems to misunderstand both Metternich's quite impractical bid to substitute regional for national loyalties (as in Galicia) and the necessarily cawl tious tactics of the nationalists concerned.
Mctternich falls short of greatness in another sense. He was aili weaker man than he imagined, who allowed Emperor Francis, one of the most influential mediocrities of modern times, to frustrate! even his modest reform proposals, Francis, the prosaic son of a#| enlightened father, humanised by a somewhat sardonic humour and;;} the old tradition he clung to of receiving petitioning subjects person-;;; ally in Viennese dialect, was unswayed by the exasperation his peB|r antic administrative methods aroused in his abler brothers, :tlfef Archdukes Karl and Johann. The problem was that the Emperor could get his way. He had something of the suspiciousness and amMm propre of the mediocre, which made him prefer disjointed government to a coherent system under a leading minister less easy to control;! Hence the Archduke Charles was driven into political retirement: after 1809; Metternich's reform plan of 1817 was put away- inifcj drawer; a Kingdom of IUyria was set up briefly (1816-23) but hi§f| a shadow existence before abolition; Galicia gained a Diet (-18|||| and a Ministry of the Interior lasted Tor some years, but only for the non-Hungarian lands. The failure to use the favourable outcome;;^} the war to shape strategic decisions for an empire which was still hl»i| able and loyal must be accounted a major factor in its ultimate falillal An unreformed Austria failed to fund the army needed to lend;} weight to Metternich's diplomatic goals. Whereas military expenfti lure took half the state's income in 1817, this had fallen to 23%;;$fj} 1830 and 20% by 1848. Between the last two dates the troops ih|||i important Italian sector fell by half, to less than 50,000 men. Indeed; army strength was always well below its nominal romplement of 400,000, and it was regular practice to furlough soldiers at harvesi time. Mctternich had only his own persuasiveness to rely on infcjfe eign affairs. Increasingly, it was not enough. ll||§r The Eastern crisis of 1821-29 provided the first major eyidene^fP this. The Greek revolt against their Turkish overlords put the principle of Great Power hostility to rebels under strain for the Tsar, vvha
METTERNICH'S AUSTRIA 77
1: could not take kindly to the Turkish response of hanging the titular ffilbader of Orthodox Christians, the Ecumenical Patriarch, on his Ilicathedral door in full regalia on Easter Sunday. When Castlereagh i! Was succeeded by the more liberal Canning as British foreign secre-llfary the next year il822), Mctternich lost a possibly sympathetic liially. Alexander's successor, Tsar Nicholas 1, distrusted him. Russia began to look to Britain as a partner in imposing a settlement on the lliljurks. Together with Britain and France she destroyed the Turkish llBfeet-at Navarino in autumn 1827 before launching a ground war on Turkey the next year. Austria played no part in the Treaty of Adria-nople (1829), which paved the way for the creation of an indepen-[ dent Greek kingdom three years later.
[lilThe 1830 July revolution in France, putting the 'bourgeois mon-|:|fch' Louis Philippe on the. throne, produced wide-ranging echoes, ipjftbratevolts in Belgium, Russian Poland and the Papal States to pres-IliSesifor further constitutionalism in the German Bund. Keeping the lip-on liberal and nationalist tendencies in Germany and Italy remained Metternich's special concern. In the former country his llpttgi^yas that this goal could only be achieved by Austria not appear-lipgfopusb her special interests while at the same time frustrating any llShibinations by others. Though most German rulers shared his anti-lifeolu'tionary fears, so negative an approach cut against the grain of iiiBiiHociefy experiencing economic growing pains and slow rise of a Ipblic 'Opinion. Besides, Austria's defensive posture appeared to Itljahy,; particularly south Germans, to risk drawing Germany into l)|p:in;defencc of over-exposed positions, notably an Austro-French Ppr:.overJtaly •• a scenario that came about in 1859. New ideas were lliiiiddiri.tr, like the Prussian hegemonist ambitions of the first architect IliiilGerman customs union, Prussian finance minister Motz, or the lllllia^schcmes of middle-ranking south German states like Bavaria and \VurUemberg for an independent role alongside Austria and lillls^ia/Hindsight suggests Austria might have sided with the south |j§||jhM over the Prussian scheme. In fact, Mctternich dismissed sitelh,-preferring an Austro-Prussian dualism but under Austrian isiSd^There are parallels with British illusions towards Europe after l||j|i!lh&rtPyrrhic victory, in the Second World War. Following the i'aiiiutis Hartburg festival of German liberal-cum-national sentiment rin 1832. the Austrian Chancellor was able to get six Articles through ig|!|Jr(ankfurt Diet, further establishing the monarchical (i.e. anti-i!||Bii|uuonal) principle in German government and, in 1834, a ,!JpBffi6f arbitration to which rulers could appeal against importunate