page1
briefing paper
How to Finish a Revolution:
Civil Society and Democracy in
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Orysia Lutsevych
Russia and Eurasia | January 2013 | REP BP 2013/01
Summary points
zz Civil society in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine remains weak as citizens have
little capacity to influence political developments owing to lack of engagement,
clientelist networks and corruption.
zz Western-funded NGOs form an ‘NGO-cracy’, where professional leaders use
access to domestic policy-makers and Western donors to influence public
policies, yet they are disconnected from the public at large.
zz New civil voices use more mass mobilization strategies and social media, and
are visible in public spaces. They are more effective in influencing the state and
political society than Western-funded NGOs.
zz Many large Western donors, who invest substantial resources in strengthening
civil society, often support NGOs patronage networks and sustain a gap between
a few well-established groups and active citizens.
zz Wider civic engagement would help build the power of the middle class to work
together for enabling citizens to influence policy and further advance democracy
in these countries.
www.chathamhouse.org
www.chathamhouse.org
page2
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Introduction
In the last decade, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have
undergone dramatic changes, often described as ‘colour’
or ‘electoral’ revolutions: the Rose Revolution in Georgia
in 2003; the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and
the so-called Twitter Revolution in Moldova in 2009.
These large-scale mobilization events demonstrated citizens’
demand for change and the inability of the political
systems to meet their aspirations. More recently the
events of the Arab Spring, the global ‘Occupy’ movements
and the anti-austerity protests throughout Europe
manifested the determination of citizens around the
world to become drivers of social change. The growth
of the knowledge economy, the empowerment of people
through social media and the emergence of transnational
citizens’ networks have made non-state actors increasingly
powerful voices in domestic and foreign affairs.
Citizens are increasingly demanding an expansion of the
public space and for their voices to be taken into account
by decision-makers. It is one function of civil society to
bridge the gap between the formal political process and
citizens, but this is hard to accomplish even in Western
democracies.
For states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union,
the legacy of a shared totalitarian past continues to influence
the path of their transition to democracy. For those
with aspirations to closer European integration, this is
manifested in similar trends, especially with regard to the
role and development of civil society. Twenty years of
Western democracy assistance aimed at supporting civil
society in the post-Soviet states have achieved few tangible
results. This paper examines the quality of civil society in
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and suggests how donors’
approaches to strengthening it can be re-targeted to
encourage democratization more effectively.
The development of civil society rests on several key
pillars, including the rule of law, a clear separation of
powers within the state, an active political society, and
free and independent media. This paper focuses mostly
on internal factors that define the quality of public space
such as NGO culture, citizens’ perceptions of democracy
and activism, emerging civil movements and their
interaction with the state, and finally the role of Western
donors. It asks why Western-funded NGOs have not
been able to build on the citizens’ self-empowerment in
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine after the electoral revolutions
in order to hold new governments accountable to
their citizens.
The ‘colour’ revolutions were perceived by the West
as a triumph of civil society, a victory for freedom and
democracy and the grand finale of the ‘third wave’ of
democratization. They brought new leaders to power and
changed political elites. President Mikheil Saakashvili in
Georgia, President Viktor Yushchenko and the Orange
coalition in Ukraine, and Prime Minister Vlad Filat in
Moldova were entrusted by their respective societies
with completing the work of democratic consolidation
and building states based on the rule of law. All three
countries declared Euro-Atlantic integration a priority,
and committed themselves to reinforcing democracy and
introducing European standards of governance. In the
eyes of the West, they were all relative democratic success
stories, backed by the substantial external political support
and financial assistance that followed each revolution.
Only a few years later these countries are progressing
unevenly on the path to consolidating democracy. The
October 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia proved
that peaceful transfer of power is possible, despite numerous
obstacles to democratic competition before the elections. In
March 2012 Moldova managed to overcome an almost
three-year constitutional crisis and elected a new president.
‘The October 2012
parliamentary elections in
Georgia proved that peaceful
transfer of power is possible,
despite numerous obstacles
to democratic competition
before the elections
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page3
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Nevertheless, negative dynamics, especially in Ukraine,
raise the question of how to prevent further democratic
backsliding and ensure that all three countries remain on
a steady path to democracy. There are two factors involved
here. The first is related to the inability of the collective
power of citizens expressed during the electoral revolutions
to manifest itself later in day-to-day political life. The
second is that despite millions of dollars of Western assistance
spent on strengthening civil society, democracy can
retreat unless there is substantial counter-pressure from
civil society. Understanding these factors can lead to new
ways for consolidating democracy in the post-Soviet space.
Civil society as public space
A healthy civil society is considered an integral part of any
democratic system of governance. Along with free and fair
elections, and accountable institutions, it ensures that the
voices of citizens are included in policy-making. Different
democratic traditions can lead to different pathways for
ensuring this inclusion, but a democratic system must
enable expression by those affected by policy decisions.
Civil society is defined here as a public space for citizens
to engage in collective debate and self-expression, and
where public opinions that influence public policy are
formed. This space lies between the family and the state,
is independent from the state and is legally protected.
Fundamentally, civil society is a medium in which the social
contracts between citizens and political and economic
centres of power are negotiated and reproduced.1
Civil
society implies the existence of independent organizations,
with active communication between organizations, citizens
and the state, leading ultimately to a certain degree of
influence on policy-making. These citizens’ groups, which
consolidate various interests, can take numerous forms
such as membership organizations, charities, think-tanks,
neighbourhood associations, informal movements and
faith-basedgroups.Theirkeycharacteristicisindependence
from the government. All these types are equally important
for a vibrant civil society as they provide more avenues
for citizen engagement, which can be expressed in formal
membership, signing of petitions, participation in demonstrations,
volunteering and donations.
With regard to the post-Soviet states, the West perceived
the task of supporting civil society development as one
of providing financial and technical support to locally
registered non-governmental organizations in order to
make them active in influencing the state. These local
NGOs became synonymous with civil society and de facto
monopolized the civil society discourse, leaving wider
society and other non-institutional forms of citizens’
engagement behind.
After the three electoral revolutions, some experts
argued that these NGOs had played a crucial role in youth
and voter mobilization that led, eventually, to regime
change.2
Others countered that the role of Westernfunded
NGOs was marginal and that civil protests had
been successful largely because of their backing by the
local political opposition.3
However, after the electoral revolutions, when civil
society leaders tried to build on this new wave of participatory
spirit, Ukraine’s Pora, Georgia’s Khmara and
Moldova’s ‘Think Moldova!’ and Hyde Park movements
failed to transform the collective energy of the revolutions
into organized, moderate, citizen power. Some of
the movements involved, such as ‘yellow Pora’, tried
to build new political parties, but failed to win seats in
parliamentary elections, while ‘black Pora’ turned into a
typical Western-funded NGO, relying on donors’ funding
and aiming to perform a watchdog function. Khmara
was dissolved and most active NGO leaders took highlevel
jobs in the new Georgian government, while the
rest of the NGO sector was alienated and excluded from
serious public discourse. In Moldova, no new major
civic initiatives emerged from the 2009 protests. Some
	 1	 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003).
	 2	 Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes, Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Eastern Europe (German Marshall Fund of the United
States, 2007).
	 3	 Serhiy Kudelia, ‘Betting on Society: Power Perceptions and Elite Games in Ukraine’, in Paul J. D’Anieri (ed.), Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization,
Apathy and the State in Ukraine (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010).
www.chathamhouse.org
page4
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
activists joined the government; others became television
presenters or active guests of political talk shows. Groups
such as Hyde Park Chisinau transformed themselves into
more informal networks. In Ukraine and Moldova, part of
the sector was tamed by joining public advisory councils
and going into ‘business as usual’ to implement Westernfinanced
projects with marginal outreach to citizens.
Meanwhile, relative media freedom and the mushrooming
of the new television political talk shows slightly expanded
the public space for ordinary citizens to participate in
national debates.
Civil society or NGO-cracy?
In all three countries, citizens are largely isolated from
public deliberations about important issues because local
NGOs have little ability to help them formulate opinions
and influence state policies that affect them. Westernfunded
organizations are not anchored in society and
constitute a form of ‘NGO-cracy’: a system where professional
NGO leaders use access to domestic policy-makers
and Western donors to influence public policies without
having a constituency in society.
NGO-cracy means that many Western-funded organizations
are disconnected from wider society. Despite the
growing numbers of registered NGOs, very few citizens
participate, volunteer their time or make donations to
NGOs. The low figures for citizen engagement ­– 5 per cent
of the population in Ukraine, 4 per cent in Moldova and
4.8 per cent in Georgia – have remained unchanged for
the last twenty years.4
This has been attributed to a lack
of trust in voluntary organizations, stemming from the
communist period, which also prevented citizens from
organizing in associations during the transition period in
post-Soviet countries.5
It is because citizens do not know their local NGOs
that they are reluctant to contribute their time or financial
resources. Instead they mostly donate money to
fellow citizens in need, supporting churches, monasteries,
beggars and victims of natural disasters. Donations to
NGOs in Moldova are ten times lower than to churches.6
In Georgia, 83 per cent of NGOs report that they have
never received an individual donation.7
The low levels
of NGO membership are reflected in the volunteering
numbers: only a third of NGOs in Georgia report having
even one or two volunteers.8
Much evidence today suggests that in the
course of the post-Soviet transitions, a rather elitist
non-profit-organization sector emerged, which focused
on professional consulting and service provision. These
features are present in all three countries, where many NGOs
sprang up in response to the supply of Western funding, or
as spin-offs of various technical assistance programmes.
Avant-garde NGO elite
To gain a better understanding of the perceptions of NGO
leaders in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, a short online
survey was conducted, asking organizations to identify
their sources of strength and their role in democracy.9
The
findings reveal that NGOs believe they play an avant-garde
role in transition, where they know better than the average
citizen, and discount the importance of mass movements as
a driver of social change. The NGO survey confirms a very
strong emphasis on expertise, with 73 per cent of respondents
saying that the strength of their organizations stems
mostly from the expertise of their employees. One Georgian
sociologist describes them as intellectuals and experts who
have learned to interact with embassies and Western foundations
and acquired the know-how to report on projects.10
	 4	 For Ukraine: Democratic Initiatives Foundation, survey, ‘Can civil society influence Ukrainian politics?’, October 2011. For Moldova: behaviour in the Republic of Moldova’,
December 2010, http://www.everychild.md/en/node/267. For Georgia: ‘Citizens’ Attitudes towards Civil Society Organizations and Civic Activism: 2011 Public Opinion
Survey Results’, East-West Management Institute, 2011. http://www.ewmi-gpac.org/failebi/citizens_attitudes_toward_csos_and_civic_activism_report_eng_55445.pdf.
	 5	 Marc Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
	 6	 Every Child Moldova, December 2010.
	 7	 CIVICUS, ‘2011 State of Civil Society Report, Georgia Country Profile’, http://socs.civicus.org/.
	 8	Ibid.
	 9	 Author’s survey, ‘Civil Society and Democratization’, based on 77 responses from leaders of NGOs financed by Western donors (45 from Ukraine, 16 from
Georgia and 6 from Moldova).
	 10	 Interview with Emzar Jgerenia. Georgian weekly Tabula, 19 March 2012, http://en.tabula.ge/print-6531.html.
www.chathamhouse.org
page5
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
In the best-case scenario, NGO leaders approach citizens
as either their ‘target audience’ or as beneficiaries
of their services. Only 27 per cent of those surveyed
described their organization as an association of citizens.
Generating a social foundation for democracy and
supporting citizens’ rights ranked third and fourth among
NGOs’ goals. Building trust and networks was the least
undertaken function. Membership development was not
perceived as a priority, and only 20 per cent considered
that the strength of their organizations came from a
membership base. In one survey in Moldova, when asked
why people do not join NGOs, 49 per cent responded that
nobody asked them to.11
When citizens are not at the heart
of these organizations, they become passive consumers of
democracy development aid instead of the driving force
behind democratic change.
More than 66 per cent of the NGO leaders surveyed said
that the most important function of civil society in a democratic
system was to influence public policy; 50 per cent
said they aimed to promote accountability in politics;
and 52 per cent said that the strength of their NGO was
driven by access to decision-makers in government and
various administrative agencies. The impact of this effort
is weak, however, especially in policy areas that challenge
the state’s political and economic power. Over 70 per cent
of Georgian NGO leaders said that their policy impact was
minimal.12
They invest their time and resources on issues
where they have little capacity to deliver tangible results.
This failure is explained by their weak societal basis,
closed government structures, and the irrelevance of their
analysis to policy-makers.
The elitist nature of NGOs is largely attributable to
the fact that their main sources of funding are foreign.
Western money allows NGOs to attract talent, but their
full-time employees are more comfortable networking
with Western embassies and various state agencies than
holding town hall consultations and engaging with citizens.
For example, following the 2009 electoral revolution
in Moldova, NGO leaders met with foreign embassies
and donors to consult over priorities but no major public
forum or debate was launched to discuss a national reform
agenda.13
Reliance on foreign financing has not decreased
over the years: 95 per cent of Georgian NGOs have never
received support from local businesses and the situation
is similar in Moldova. In Ukraine, however, about
50 per cent of financing now comes from membership
fees, government, citizens and business contributions.14
The connection between NGOs and the private sector
is nevertheless still weak in Ukraine. The growth of a
corporate social responsibility agenda – mainly driven
by international companies operating there – offers the
possibility of partnership and is viewed by NGOs as a
source of sponsorship. Social welfare, education and
healthcare are three major areas of corporate support for
NGOs, but most companies also view NGOs as inefficient
and tend to provide assistance directly to beneficiaries or
establish their own corporate foundations.15
NGO leaders
in Ukraine say that the low level of cooperation with business
is due to the latter’s reluctance to engage and low level
of awareness about NGOs. Thus the reliance on Western
sources of funding endures.
	 11	 Every Child Moldova, December 2010.
	 12	 CIVICUS, 2011.
	 13	 Author’s interview: European diplomat in Chisinau.
	 14	 Lyubov Palyvoda and Sophia Golota, Civil Society Organisations in Ukraine: State and Dynamics 2002–2010 (Kyiv: Kupol Publishing, 2010).
	 15	 Ukrainian Grantmakers Forum, ‘Charity Practices of Ukrainian Businesses’, 2010.
‘Western money allows NGOs
to attract talent, but their
full-time employees are more
comfortable networking with
Western embassies and various
state agencies than holding
town hall consultations and
engaging with citizens
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page6
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Both large private foundations and local businesses find
it too risky to expose themselves as supporters of civic
initiatives that may alienate the state. They steer clear of
fighting such issues as corruption, human rights violations
or media censorship. Two of the largest private foundations
in Ukraine, Development of Ukraine and the Victor
Pinchuk Foundation, prefer to focus on softer issues such
as healthcare, education and culture, providing direct
financial assistance to state institutions or individuals.
They do not operate as grant-making foundations and
often implement programmes themselves.
Reliance on foreign funding drives local NGOs to work
towards donor-driven agendas. Many NGO leaders have
acknowledged this problem. According to one, ‘NGOs
work around grants and experts and not around the
interest of the citizens’.16
This leads to a mismatch, where
citizens think that issues such as elections and human
rights already receive adequate attention from NGOs,
and would like to see more initiatives related to economic
development.
Increasingly, NGOs are functioning as private
consulting companies and not as open, inclusive democratic
institutions. Few organizations have operational
independent boards, publish annual reports, convene
general assemblies of members or have elected executive
directors. They provide services to foreign donors who
fund their projects and, when possible, to governments.
They develop recommendations, write reports, organize
training and study trips for government officials, and hold
conferences.
These professionals form a prestigious ‘NGO bureaucracy’
and participate in national and international events.
This could be considered evidence of a civil voice, but it
is hardly the case. The National Participation Council
of Moldova includes 30 NGOs based in the capital, of
which only six list membership on their website. This can
scarcely be considered representative of civil society. As
one observer in Moldova pointed out: ‘Quite often NGOs
are centred on one leader or a group of leaders who are
trying to promote certain ideas and actions, and over time
this leads to a certain detachment from the real voice and
needs of the society’.17
Mute voices of NGOs
NGOs have a poor media profile in all of the three countries.
Although local and regional newspapers report
their activities, television is the main source of information.
NGO experts, especially from foreign policy and
economic think-tanks, participate in national political
talk shows but they are perceived as individual experts
rather than as representatives of certain groups in society.
NGOs therefore have a weak status as shapers of public
opinion. The editor-in-chief of a leading Ukrainian weekly
magazine could name only five local organizations and
two civic movements out of more than 71,000 registered
NGOs in his country.18
In addition, only 9.5 per cent of
Ukrainians say that NGOs inform them about important
issues.19
Most NGO activities pass unnoticed by the wider
public. In one recent example, an appeal to the president
of Ukraine, signed by 47 NGOs and 13 independent
experts, to implement the Open Government Partnership
initiative was not reported in the national media.20
This is
partly due to poor NGO communication skills and partly
because few donors require media outreach or advocacy
efforts from the NGOs they support.
With rare exceptions, leading think tanks and NGOs,
which have been financed for over a decade by Western
donors, failed to tap into recent innovation offered by social
media and networks as a source of outreach – even though
increasing media censorship and state-controlled content,
particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, make the spread of
independent information through social media particularly
	 16	 Author’s interview: Svitlana Zalishchuk, New Citizen Initiative founder in Kyiv.
	 17	 Author’s interview: Igor Meriacre, Director of NGO Motivacija in Chisinau.
	 18	 National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv, ‘State of Civil Society Development in Ukraine’, 2012.
	 19	 Svitlana Kuts and Lyuba Palyvoda, ‘Civil Society in Ukraine: Driving Engine or Spare Wheel for Change?’, CIVICUS, 2006, p. 74, https://www.civicus.org/
media/CSI_Ukraine_Country_Report.pdf.
	 20	 The Open Government Partnership is a global initiative launched on 20 September 2011 and has commitments from 55 governments to become more
transparent, effective and accountable to their citizens, http://www.opengovpartnership.org/.
www.chathamhouse.org
page7
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
important. For example, the Razumkov Center, a leading
Ukrainian think-tank, has 748 followers on Facebook,
whereas the Moldovan Foreign Policy Association and the
Institute of Public Policy in Chisinau have no Facebook
presence at all.21
Even for the most successful groups, the
social media dynamic is weak. Between January and June
2012, Facebook membership of the New Citizen Initiative
grew by only around 8 per cent compared with general
Facebook growth in Ukraine of 30 per cent.22
Poor media outreach weakens NGOs. Local NGOs like
to cultivate a mystique about their activities, which are
only open to scrutiny by donors or public authorities, but
this creates a negative image and tends to make the wider
public suspicious. More than half of Ukrainians who are
familiar with NGOs do not know what function they
perform.23
In Georgia, NGOs are the least understood of
all public institutions,24
while in Moldova 80 per cent of
the population do not even know what an NGO is.25
Paradoxically, NGO leaders surveyed for this research
say they have support of society for their work. They rank
citizen support third as a source of strength after expertise
and access to decision-makers. Yet citizen support is more
likely wishful thinking. Only 22 per cent of Ukrainians,
21 per cent of Moldovans and 18 per cent of Georgians
say they trust local NGOs.26
These are very low percentages
compared with trust in other institutions, such as the
army, police or local government, especially in Georgia.
The feeble fabric of civil society
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine share the legacy of a
totalitarian regime. The Soviet system aimed to suppress
public debate, eliminate critical thinking and bring collective
endeavours under state control. It also left behind
flourishing corruption, informal networks, and disengaged
citizens who were reluctant to participate in public
initiatives. It has given way to a never-ending transition to
democracy. The very fact that democracy has been only
partially achieved is further damaging public trust and
confidence in the system.
The NGO-cracy in these three countries undermines
democracy promotion initiatives. Because NGOs have
failed to overcome the Soviet legacy and occupy the
narrow public space between the private sphere and the
state, governments have carte blanche.
Uncivil societies
In contrast to the Western notion of civility in society,
where citizens have broad respect for one another based
on trust and security, societies in Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine have ‘uncivil’ traits with instances of the repression
of the will of citizens. Among ‘uncivil’ traits is the
weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, apart from
in Georgia.27
Citizens do not form organized groups to
drive collective action, rendering them powerless to influence
political developments. Private connections and links
to kinship and clientelist networks are more instrumental
in achieving success in public life and influencing the state.
	 21	 As at the time of writing.
	 22	 Social Bakers, ‘Ukraine Facebook Statistics’, http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/ukraine.
	 23	 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, ‘Key Findings: Public Opinion in Ukraine, 2011’, http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/
Survey/2011/Public_Opinion_in_Ukraine_2011_Report.pdf.
	 24	 ‘Citizens’ Attitudes toward Civil Society Organizations and Civic Activism, Georgia’, East-West Management Institute, 2011.
	 25	 Every Child Moldova, December 2010.
	 26	 For Ukraine: Razumkov Center, public opinion poll, ‘Do You Trust NGOs?’, 2011, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=81. For Moldova: Institute
of Public Policy, ‘Barometer of Public Opinion – November 2011’. For Georgia: ‘Citizens’ Attitudes toward Civil Society Organizations and Civic Activism,
Georgia’, East-West Management Institute, 2011.
	 27	 Transparency International rates Georgia 64th in the Corruption Perception Index, while Moldova ranks 112th and Ukraine 152nd out of the183 countries on
the index. Transparency International UK, Corruption Perception Index, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/.
‘The very fact that democracy
has been only partially achieved
is further damaging public trust
and confidence in the system
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page8
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Citizens are slow and reluctant to take public initiatives
and engage in collective action. Not only well-established
NGOs but new types of public associations also face
difficulties in engaging citizens. Neighbourhood associations
have started to develop in Ukraine, but they remain
marginal in Georgia and Moldova. They are set up by
citizens to improve the management of apartment blocks
and their leaders often view them as grassroots schools
of democracy, where citizens learn to cooperate for the
public good. According to the Ukrainian government
there are around 14,000 registered associations, though
this covers only about 10 per cent of all apartment blocks.
Despite low satisfaction levels with state-run utilities, citizens
are reluctant to form such associations. Legislative
deficiencies also limit their further development and the
government is reluctant to create a more enabling envi-
ronment.
With very little formal associative life, citizens rely on
informal and kinship networks. The connection between
these and often invisible and corrupt networks breeds
a culture of closed values and dependency. In Georgia,
47 per cent of citizens say that connections are the most
important factor in getting a job. This contrasts with
22 per cent who see education as the main factor.28
In
Ukraine 43 per cent of students declared that they needed
connections for any kind of success.29
In political life there are also links within interest
groups built around integrating people into vertical
clientelist networks, which mostly centre around the
redistribution of public resources, state jobs or economic
benefits. These networks are often built on the economic
dependence of interest groups on certain political or
financial leaders. They are stronger in a more centralized,
resource-rich and corrupt system such as Ukraine,
but are also present in Georgia and Moldova. Recent
attempts by President Yanukovych to limit Ukraine’s
democratic space and create a system dominated by
one party have been successful partly because they
were based on the distribution of financial resources
to interest groups in exchange for political loyalty. It is
frequently reported that voters are ‘bought’ before elec-
tions.30
State funding for sport associations, youth NGOs
and art groups is also said to be granted in exchange for
electoral support or direct membership of the ruling
Party of Regions.31
Another ‘uncivil’ characteristic of these societies is
corruption. Citizens rely mainly on informal networks
to deal with the state and protect their rights. This is
more visible in countries with higher levels of corruption,
notably Ukraine and Moldova, where around
30 per cent of citizens said they offered bribes in 2010.32
The casual corruption and individual approaches to
getting services from the state deprives these societies
of the participatory spirit needed to propose systemic
solutions to reform sectors such as healthcare, education
and law enforcement. Citizens acquiesce in corruption
in order to receive services from the state and accept
these practices because they feel powerless to change
the system.
	 28	 Caucasus Research and Resource Centers, ‘An Assessment of Social Capital in Georgia’, 2011, p. 18.
	 29	 Gorshenin Institute, ‘Students: An Image of the Future’, 2011, Ukraine http://gorshenin.eu/annuals/5_students-an_image_of_the_future.html.
	 30	 ‘Buying in Votes: Who Will Start sooner?’, Radio Svoboda, 21 May 2012, http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/24502988.html.
	31	 Victor Bobyrenko, ‘Civil Society. Thimble Game’, Ukrainska Pravda, 8 December 2011, http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/12/8/6819061/.
	 32	 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer, 2010/2011, http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/.
‘Citizens rely mainly on
informal networks to deal with
the state and protect their rights.
This is more visible in countries
with higher levels of corruption,
notably Ukraine and Moldova,
where around 30 per cent of
citizens said they offered bribes
in 2010
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page9
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
The role of the church
The Orthodox Church enjoys a high level of public trust
and has a strong mobilization capacity in the region. It has
a self-proclaimed moral authority over many aspects of
social life and governance. In all three countries, it is the
most trusted institution and a powerful opinion-maker.
The level of trust in religious institutions is 68 per cent
in Ukraine, 79 per cent in Moldova and 88 per cent in
Georgia.33
This trust and a strong social outreach allow religious
institutions to play a role in the development of civil
society. Local parishes have started promoting voluntary
action on secular issues related to social inequality, public
health and youth engagement. Faith-based charitable
foundations, such as Caritas in Ukraine and International
Orthodox Christian Charities in Georgia, as well as local
religious associations, play an active role in addressing
issues such as foster care, and alcohol dependency, and
provide assistance to vulnerable individuals. However,
the role of the church is more visible where it is involved
in politics in a narrow sense, advocating certain political
issues and supporting political parties.
The limited space for public discourse in all three
countries is often dominated by political and religious
actors. The power of the Orthodox Church on nonreligious
matter is most evident in Georgia and Moldova.
Religious leaders dominate the public discourse on
various issues in ways that are deemed unacceptable
in Western secular societies but considered normal in
Georgia and Moldova. While in Western societies a
variety of viewpoints is expressed and debated in the
public space, in Georgia and Moldova deliberations are
between the party of power, the opposition and religious
establishment.
The religious discourse often pushes citizens towards
intolerant rhetoric and promotes closed societies.
Statements by the Georgian Patriarch Ilia II range from
the ‘harm’ caused by Western education34
to the ‘danger’
of religious minorities and carry considerable weight in
society. One of the largest demonstrations in recent years
in Georgia was a protest march in Tbilisi by thousands of
people, led by the priesthood, against the law on religious
minorities.35
In Moldova, recent attempts to pass an antidiscrimination
law provoked public protests backed by the
Orthodox Church. The law is aimed at removing discrimination
against sexual minorities, which is perceived in
Moldova as a rather controversial decision. Leaflets vilifying
homosexuals and Muslims were circulated in the
capital during the protests and were publicly supported by
local priests.36
Ukraine’s religious leaders are less assertive on public
issues. Despite maintaining a close relationship with the
state, they refrain from outright public mobilization of
their supporters. They generally express their views on
public matters in the media or by appealing to the senior
state leadership. For example, Ukrainian churches appealed
to President Yanukovych to prevent gay parades that ‘lead
to the moral and physical degradation of the nation’.37
Such statements resonate with the wider public, particularly
in Georgia and Moldova. These societies, which are
not exposed to diversity and are mostly homogeneous,
have negative and often intolerant attitudes towards
people of different race, religion or sexual orientation.
Homosexuality, in particular, is widely condemned: in
recent surveys, 93 per cent of respondents in Georgia,
71 per cent in Moldova and 59 per cent in Ukraine said
they would not like to have homosexuals as neighbours.38
	 33	 For Ukraine: Razumkov Center, public opinion poll, ‘Do You Trust the Church?’, April 2011, Ukraine, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=83.
For Moldova: Institute of Public Policy, November 2011. For Georgia: Caucasus Research and Resource Center, ‘Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in
Georgia’, December 2011.
	 34	 ‘Patriarch: “Refrain from Sending Kids Abroad for Education”’, Civil.ge, 3 October 2010, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22722.
	 35	 The Georgian parliament amended the civil code to allow religious minorities to be registered as legal entities, following a suggestion by the Council of Europe
that legal protection of religious denominations other than the Orthodox Church should be enhanced.
	 36	 ‘Battle over Moldovan Anti-discrimination Bill Reaches Fevered Pitch’, Radio Free Europe, 18 May 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova_gay_antidis-
crimination_law_opposition/24541486.html.
	 37	 ‘Appeal to the President of Ukraine by the Religious Leaders’, Bohoslov Forum, 4 April 2012, http://www.bohoslov.org.ua/distribution/post3505.html.
	 38	 World Value Survey 2005–2008, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeStudy.jsp.
www.chathamhouse.org
page10
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
A 2011 joint statement by three church leaders on
the twentieth anniversary of the Ukrainian referendum
for independence attracted public attention by calling
on society to recognize that the reason for the failures
of contemporary Ukraine lay with its citizens, pointing
to a crisis in values.39
The statement was endorsed by
eleven civic leaders, all highly respected intellectuals,
former dissidents and writers. In 2011 they launched the
December 1 Initiative, a national debate to re-energize
the discussion about how to improve political culture and
the state of democracy in Ukraine. The statement points
to the need to unite the efforts of citizens who oppose the
policies that are damaging the country: ‘Their weakness
is in their civic atomization and because they do not join
forces.’40
Unrestrained states
The weakness of civil society not only renders citizens
helpless to prevent backsliding by ruling elites, it also
allows those holding power to commit abuses. This
is particularly vividly illustrated in Ukraine. Selective
justice in imprisoning opposition leaders, media censorship,
corruption, raids on businesses and the use of force
against non-violent protests are just some examples of the
country’s degradation.41
In Georgia, despite competitive
parliamentary elections in October 2012, the reduction
of petty corruption and economic liberalization, the
political system still lacks openness and public oversight.
State control over the media, abuse of administrative
resources by the ruling party during the elections and
frequent attempts to tilt the playing field against the opposition
Georgian Dream party, established by billionaire
businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, raise serious doubts
about the presence of checks and balances in the previous
political system. Moldova’s democratic consolidation is
still in question as the country recovers from years of
communist rule and moves towards improving freedom
of expression and combating corruption.42
In all three states democratic reforms are either at a
standstill or uncertain, and a significant majority of citizens
in Ukraine and Moldova say that their countries
are moving in the wrong direction.43
At the same time,
they believe they are powerless to influence the state:
only around 18 per cent of Moldovans44
and Ukrainians45
say that they have any impact on policy-making at the
national level. NGO leaders also express concern about
their marginal impact, with 70 per cent of them in Georgia
saying that their policy impact is minimal and that they
can only achieve success in areas that do not challenge the
political or economic power of the state.46
Post-Soviet governments often fake dialogue with their
societies or limit their role. Ruling elites, especially in
Ukraine, manoeuvre around public pressure and became
skilled in the rhetoric of civil society while paying only
lip-service to it. They adopt civil society development strategies,
invite independent experts for consultations, hold
public councils and respond to public inquiries. Then they
do what they always intended to do. In April 2012 Andrii
Kliuev, the head of Ukraine’s National Security Council,
declared that greater citizen access to governmental operations
was needed to ensure public control of the authorities
and reduce corruption.47
Yet the reality on the ground is far
from a situation of openness and the Ukrainian government
takes most of its decisions without serious public debate.
	 39	 Statement of leaders of Ukrainian Churches, Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 1 December 2011, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/church_doc/
ecumen_doc/45747/.
	 40	 Declaration of Initiative Group ‘December 1st’, Sivershchyna, 1 December 2011, http://siver.com.ua/news/iniciativa_pershogo_grudnja/2011-12-14-9199.
	 41	 Freedom House, in its Freedom in the World 2012 edition, downgraded Ukraine from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’.
	 42	 See Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012, http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/pse/mda/.
	 43	 67 per cent in Ukraine (Razumkov Center, public opinion poll, December 2011) and 83 per cent in Moldova (Institute for Public Policy, Barometer of Public
Opinion, November 2011).
	 44	 Institute of Public Policy, November 2011.
	 45	 Democratic Initiatives Foundation, ‘Can Civil Society Influence Policymaking in Ukraine?’, 12 October 2011, http://dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2011-year/chi-zmozhe-
gromadjanske-suspilstvo-vplinuti-na-ukrainsku-politiku_.htm.
	 46	 CIVICUS 2011.
	 47	 Andrii Kliuiev, ‘Ukraine cannot develop efficiently without people’s active participation’, Day, 29 April 2012, http://www.day.kiev.ua/226046/.
www.chathamhouse.org
page11
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
What is striking is how governments in all three countries
adopted major policy decisions without real public
debate. Controversial education reforms in Moldova, a
new tax code in Ukraine, the extension of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet facilities in the Crimea and the Saakashvili
government’s plan to build the new port-city of Lazi in
Georgia are just a few examples of crucial decisions taken
without wider consultations. Citizens are not satisfied
with this approach: for instance, 68 per cent of Georgians
say they regret that the decision on Lazi was taken without
any public discussion.48
Part of the problem is that governments do not see
NGOs as credible counterparts, nor do they consider wider
consultations beneficial. Most high-level government officials
have a demeaning attitude towards NGOs. Knowing
their weak societal basis, government officials believe
they are elitist, non-representative and do not understand
the complexities of political life. In the Moldovan and
Georgian governments, the state–NGO relationship is
more intertwined because several top government officials
have come from civil society. As a result, their organizations,
think-tanks in most cases, became reluctant to take
an objective, independent stance on government policies.
The migration of these NGO leaders to government
revealed the lack of any independent support base for their
organizations.
Public councils
Organized civil society in all three countries is trying
to establish dialogue with the state. Public councils
that have advisory status to national and local government
agencies are often viewed as a way for citizens to
provide input to policy-making. Ukraine has a longer
tradition of public councils, which since 2004 have
existed alongside central and local governmental agencies.
They received a new boost in 2011 through a law
on civil participation in state policy formulation and
implementation, which required government agencies
at both national and regional level to establish public
councils. Today 93 per cent of these councils are operational.
Analysis shows, however, that they are inefficient
as a tool for public consultations. Public hearings and
councils are used simply to legitimize decisions already
adopted.49
The state bureaucracy is not ready for transparent
cooperation where less than half of central
government agencies present their draft decisions for
public discussions. Some segments of governance are
closed to public scrutiny: municipal construction, land
and communal property management, consumer tariff
prices and local budgeting.50
But it is not all the fault
of the state; their work is also hampered by deficiencies
in civil society itself. Civic leaders are unprepared for
effective cooperation, council members have no skills in
policy analysis or budgeting, and many violations have
occurred as a result of activists dishonestly withholding
information.51
There has been less analysis of the track record
of public councils in Georgia and Moldova, but in
the latter there is a more cooperative spirit between
the government and local NGOs than in Georgia or
Ukraine. The Moldovan authorities are more open to
dialogue through the National Participatory Council.
Created in 2010, it is well organized, meets regularly
and has advisory status to the cabinet. Its head
claims that it performs its main function of keeping
independent experts informed about key government
policies.52
Where human resources are scarce, there
is governmental interest in tapping into the expertise
of NGOs. An additional aim is to demonstrate to the
European Union the government’s active cooperation
with civil society.
The 2009 amendments to the law on self-governance
in Georgia required local authorities to engage citizens in
policy formulation. Public councils and citizens’ advisory
	 48	 National Democratic Institute, ‘Public Attitudes in Georgia’, February 2012.
	 49	 National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2012.
	 50	 Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Studies, National Report on the Monitoring of Public Councils at the Local and National Governmental Agencies in
Ukraine, 2011, http://gromrady.org.ua/?p=7503.
	 51	 Victor Bobyrenko, ‘Civil society. Thimble game’, Ukrainska Pravda, 8 December 2011, http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/12/8/6819061/.
	 52	 Author’s interview: Sorin Meriacre, Head of the National Participation Council, Moldova.
www.chathamhouse.org
page12
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
committees, composed of public figures and NGO representatives,
operate in Tbilisi city hall and in some national
ministries, but most exist only on paper. At this stage of
the country’s democratic transformation these are a useful
way to open up national and local government to public
scrutiny. Their power is limited, however, often owing to
the formal approach by the bureaucracy and weak NGO
expertise.
Taming with money
Funding is another dimension of state­–civil society
relations. In resource-rich Ukraine, state funding is a way
of co-opting civil groups. This is used to create a loyal
civil society, especially if money is disbursed on a nontransparent
and clientelist basis, which is often the case.
In Ukraine, compared with Georgia and Moldova, the
level of such financing is high: in 2011 the national budget
included almost $31 million for various associations –
four times more than the Soros Foundation’s budget for
Ukraine.53
Most of this funding is allocated without any
competitive process to sports, arts and youth groups and
organizations serving people with various disabilities and
veteran associations. Only two out of 78 central executive
agencies have a competitive procedure for these funds.
The rest are used arbitrarily to support various interest
groups. Many regional party leaders ‘own’ sports associations,
which allow both clients and patrons to gain
advantage from each other. For example, the state uses
financing for sports federations in exchange for membership
of or loyalty to the ruling Party of Regions.54
No state
funding is available for human rights, environmental or
advocacy NGOs.
The picture is similar in Moldova, where most social
benefit associations receive annual state funding. Minor
support goes on a competitive basis to projects and
cultural programmes organized by public associations.
The funding is decentralized and ministries have special
funds for promoting certain activities, e.g. the environment
ministry’s Ecological Fund.
In Georgia, the Saakashvili government chose a different
approach. A Civil Institutional Development Fund was
established in 2009 with an annual budget of just over
$360,000. It runs open competitions for NGOs and
finances around 100 projects annually. This is a marginal
amount compared with Western grants to Georgian
NGOs, which in 2011 amounted to about $15 million.55
But the model of an independent institution managing
state financing of NGOs is worth replicating in other
countries as it is more in line with the standards of open
and accountable governance.
There is a fragile balance between the state and society
in all three countries. Improvement will come from
building a model where civil society will either counterbalance
or complement the state. In all three countries,
where democratic gains are unconsolidated, the role of
civil society will also shift between counterbalance and
cooperation, with more democratic and open systems
producing more collaborative civil societies. In Georgia
and Ukraine, civil society leans more towards the counterbalancing
function, while in Moldova it is inclined to play
a more complementary role.
New civil voices
New forms of civil associations offer insight into what real
citizen engagement would look like and what impact it
could have on the state. The protests following fraudulent
elections in Russia in 2012 showed that, even in a more
repressive political system, citizens with a more acute
awareness of their political rights can emerge. Post-Soviet
transitions created societies divided between cynicism
and empowered optimism. Whether joining specific
campaigns, protesting against the destruction of heritage
sites, volunteering for environmental causes or demanding
justice for human rights abuses, the empowered part of
society will give a new boost to democratization. Citizens
capable of critical thinking about state affairs who are
willing to express their views publicly and even challenge
the state will be the main agents of change.
	 53	 National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2012.
	 54	 Bobyrenko, ‘Civil society. Thimble game.’
	 55	 East-West Management G-PAC project website, ‘2011 Schedule of Donors’ Grants’, http://www.ewmi-gpac.org/index.php.
www.chathamhouse.org
page13
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Citizens challenging the state
In recent years, citizens of all three countries have demonstrated
a growing willingness to challenge the state and
hold their governments to account. More people are
willing to participate in political demonstrations and
boycotts; more have signed petitions or appealed to
the authorities. Around 20 per cent of Moldovans and
Georgians appealed to the authorities in regard to public
services, political rights and environmental protection.56
Around 30 per cent of Ukrainians say they would protest
in the event of price rises, unemployment or job cuts.57
These non-violent actions are important expressions of
civil energy. Research shows stronger linkages between the
quality of governance and the level of such self-expression
in society compared with membership of citizens in
NGOs.58
In 2010 and 2011 Ukraine witnessed an awakening
of civil movements that had seemed dormant since the
Orange Revolution. Two major national movements
related to tax and educational reforms gained prominence.
The most vivid example was the 2010 Tax Maidan-II,59
when about 90,000 representatives from small and
medium-sized businesses protested against the new tax
and labour codes, with partial success. In 2011 representatives
of various organizations, including those supporting
miners and Chernobyl and Afghan war victims, blocked
the adoption of cuts in benefits for these groups. Later
that same year, students and academics protested against
reforms in higher education and influenced the legislative
process by developing an alternative law with the
help of an independent public committee. Smaller but
equally successful were regional demonstrations to stop
the destruction of the historic centre and green public
spaces in Kyiv.
In October 2011 a new citizens’ initiative that unites
about 50 NGOs from the regions and Kyiv launched a
public information campaign called Chesno (Fair), to
monitor the quality of party candidates for the October
2012 parliamentary elections. Chesno conducted a poll
to ask the public what qualities it wanted from members
of parliament, and published the results on its website.
These qualities include a good parliamentary attendance
record, respect for human rights, declaration of income
and no record of corruption. Activists monitor party lists
for ‘compliance’ and regularly communicate their findings
on websites and in press conferences.60
As a result of an
extensive PR campaign, all major political parties agreed to
cooperate with the movement during the October elections
– with the exception of the ruling Party of Regions. Chesno
successfully used social media to build the collective power
of the movement. Its Facebook page unites over 6,000
followers. All of these movements were non-political,
non-violent and organized by grassroots associations and
activists, aiming to protect citizens’ rights.
The scale of state-challenging movements in Georgia
and Moldova is smaller. Attempts to mobilize publics
around common issues include protests to save historic
places such as Gudiashvili Square in Tbilisi or the post
office building in the centre of Chisinau. In Georgia,
where the public space has been highly politicized, most
mobilization was happening around political movements
and not around issues of concern to individual citizens.
Post-Rose Revolution public movements include
	 56	 East-West Management Institute, 2011.
	 57	 Razumkov Center, ‘Public Opinion Summary of 2011’, http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=386.
	 58	 Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart and Franziska Deutsch, ‘Social Capital, Voluntary Associations and Collective Action’, paper presented at the 2005 ASPA
Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.
	 59	 Maidan-I referred to the Orange Revolution Protests in October 2004.
	 60	 Chesno web site, http://www.chesno.org/.
‘Citizens of all three countries
have demonstrated a growing
willingness to challenge
the state and hold their
governments to account
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page14
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Defend Georgia!, the 7 November Movement and, of
course, the winner of the October 2012 parliamentary
elections, Georgian Dream. All these movements have
political goals. A rare exception is a new public initiative,
‘This affects you too!’, designed to amend the law
on political unions to preclude possible intimidation of
a wider range of civic organizations. This first major
non-partisan public advocacy campaign since the Rose
Revolution united over 80 advocacy groups and media
outlets, and mobilized around 3,000 supporters on
Facebook.
On the eve of the October 2012 parliamentary elections
in Georgia, ‘This affects you too!’ demanded that the
authorities ensure that all television channels with a valid
licence broadcast with no restrictions during and after
polling day.61
The National Communications Commission
failed to deliver on this demand in time for the elections,
but the pressure from local and international actors
to make the so-called ‘Must Carry’ law permanent has
continued since, albeit with less vigour.62
These peaceful protests and expressions of civil engagement
are becoming a part of everyday public life and,
especially in the case of Ukraine, are expected to grow. At
present these protests are the only way to counterbalance
the state and defend the rights of citizens. This growing
drive for self-expression provides a window of opportunity
for civil society activists, encouraging them to talk to
citizens and act as platforms for their opinions. Already,
some leaders are trying to organize citizens and build
up moderate segments of society around specific issues.
Current civil society movements try to defend the rights
of interest groups and professions: journalists, small and
medium-sized businesses, students or urban communities.
They often focus on a single-issue agenda such as
media freedom, economic liberalization or the preservation
of the country’s heritage.
Social media
Social networks allow the creation of more informal, wider
groups that unite citizens in efforts to protect their rights.
Despite lower internet penetration than in the West, individual
usage in all three countries is growing at a much
higher rate than business or government usage.63
On
average, about 30 per cent of the population use the internet
daily in Ukraine and Moldova, and 26 per cent in Georgia.
These numbers are much higher (around 80 per cent daily)
among young people.64
Most young people interact in
social networks. Between January and May 2012, Facebook
usage expanded by 38 per cent in Ukraine, and 22 and
23 per cent in Moldova and Georgia respectively.65
Recently, particularly in Ukraine, new movements
have successfully used social media to build informal
groups, mostly among students, local activists and NGO
leaders. ‘We are Europeans’, the movement for Ukraine’s
European integration, the public network for the preservation
of the historic street Andriyivskyy Descent
from commercial development, and Hospitable Republic
(against the privatization of Hostynny Dvir – a historical
landmark in Kyiv) are just a few recent examples. ‘Stop
Destroying Gudiashvili Square’ in Georgia and ‘Postman
of Chisinau’ or Curaj TV and Hyde Park, all in Moldova,
are also networks uniting activists online. The nature of
	 61	 ‘This Affects You Too!’ Appeal, 9 September 2012, Democracy and Freedom Watch, http://dfwatch.net/campaigners-ask-for-extension-of-must-carry-61838.
	 62	 ‘Georgia Communication Watchdog Sabotaging Must Carry’, Democracy and Freedom Watch, 19 September 2012, http://dfwatch.net/georgian-communications-watchdog-sabotaging-must-carry-30797.
See also ‘Must Carry and Must Offer May Stay’, Georgia Online, 16 October 2012, http://georgiaonline.ge/
news/a1/society/1350412855.php.
	 63	 World Economic Forum, ‘Global Information Technology Report 2012’, http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-information-technology.
	 64	 Gorshenin Institute, 2011.
	 65	 Social Breakers, ‘Facebook Statistics by Country, May 2012’, http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/?interval=last-6-months#chart-intervals.
‘The role of social media is
important for spreading ideas
and motivating citizens to take
action where financial and
personal risks are low
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page15
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
these networks is democratic and they have horizontal
structures. For example, ‘We are Europeans’ functions
as a network of coordinators and members. Membership
is open to anyone and activities are organized around
thematic working groups chaired by coordinators. The
movement is divided into sub-groups that are responsible
for media, public events, EU expertise, legal and
information technology support, administration and new
members. Another important feature is that these movements
are not just virtual but also exist in the physical
public space. They hold street performances to draw attention
to issues. Some, like Hostynny Dvir, occupy public
spaces and run independent cultural festivals at the venue.
The role of social media is important for spreading ideas
and motivating citizens to take action where financial and
personal risks are low. A limitation of online activism,
however, is that it cannot confront socially entrenched
norms and practices – something that is needed to develop
a stronger civil society – as this requires thorough planning
and a hierarchy.66
Many groups spread political commentary
or start virtual initiatives without any follow-up to
develop ties between members. As a result, many online
movements so far have failed to deliver. A Ukrainian
Facebook group supporting the civil society candidate for
the position of ombudsman on human rights managed to
bring only a handful of supporters to Parliament Square on
polling day. Its candidate lost to the government-backed one
and the initiative collapsed. Offline activities are needed for
effective collaboration between core members. Otherwise,
social media will be a substitute for ‘real’ activism and divert
public attention from crucial social issues.
Western donors: time for a new paradigm
Western donors have invested substantial resources in
strengthening civil society in Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine for almost 20 years. Most try to promote
equality and diversity, to strengthen good governance
at national and local levels by empowering citizens to
participate in decision-making, and to develop NGO
capacity. Through the NGO projects they fund, US and
European public and private donors contribute to the
dynamic in the public space around training, conferences
and study trips.
The US Agency for International Development
(USAID) in the largest international donor to civil society
in all three countries. In 2010 it spent $31 million in
Ukraine, $19 million in Georgia and almost $12 million
in Moldova under the heading ‘Governing Justly and
Democratically’.67
Although funding to NGOs was cut back
for while, especially in Georgia after the Rose Revolution,
it bounced back in 2008 when USAID launched new
programmes targeting local NGOs. Today Ukrainian civil
society receives almost the same level of financial support
from USAID as in 2003–04. Moldova and Georgia receive
almost twice as much as they did in 2003.
The European Union is the second largest donor to
civil society, though it gives substantially smaller sums
than USAID. Its programmes include the European
Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR).68
The EU has a thematic programme
targeting ‘non-state actors and local authorities in
development’.69
These programmes add up to approximately
€3 million annually for civil society in each of the
three countries. The EU Civil Society Capacity Facility
was launched in 2011 with €26 million for all EU neighbouring
countries, with about half to be spent in the EU
eastern neighbourhood.70
Thanks to this facility the EU
support for civil society under the ENP programme will
almost double. Individual EU members, such as Sweden,
Poland and Germany, are also active in supporting civil
society.
	 66	 Malcolm Gladwell, ‘Small change. Why the revolution will not be tweeted’, The New Yorker, 4 October 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell.
	 67	 Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, 2012, http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158268.pdf.
	 68	 European Commission, EIDHR 2011–2013 Multiannual Indicative Planning, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/20110321_mip_
eidhr_2011-2013_for_publication3_en.pdf.
	 69	 European Commission, ‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci/non_state_actors_en.htm.
	 70	 European Commission, Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=393&id_type=10.
www.chathamhouse.org
page16
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
The Open Society Foundation (OSF), funded by George
Soros, is also a major funder, with the budget of its local
offices varying from $7.5 million in Ukraine to $10.7
million in Moldova and $4 million in Georgia in recent
years.71
However, there are questions about the effectiveness
of Western aid. Does it help to improve the quality of
civil society or does it in fact preserve the existing state of
affairs – supporting the patronage networks of NGOs and
maintaining the gap between a few well-connected groups
and the wider public?
It has been argued that Western democracy promotion
has contributed to a distortion of civil society. Some
research has pointed out that the West approaches civil
society with a narrow model of liberal democracy that
focuses mainly on individual rights, resulting in the
emergence of organizations that are elitist and disconnected
from the expectations and interests of society at
large.72
NGO-cracy flourishes when donors are reluctant
to support deliberations around ‘real’ issues and focus
instead on building the internal capacity of NGOs.73
The fundamental problem with Western assistance to
civil society in the post-Soviet space is that it leaves much
of society untouched. Viewing civil society through the
narrow lens of NGOs excludes informal youth groups,
intellectuals, faith-based associations, local citizens’ initiative
groups and business associations. Despite efforts
to improve NGO capacity, create a more enabling legal
environment and increase policy impact, local NGOs
are not getting stronger. USAID’s NGO Sustainability
Index shows a weak dynamic, in which Georgian and
Moldovan NGOs have scarcely improved their capacity
over the last ten years, while Ukrainian NGOs have done
slightly better but have still shown almost no improvement
since 2006.74
Donors are reluctant to work with new and informal
groups, and tend to support the ‘usual suspects’, thus
building a network of patronage. For example, in 2010
the OSF-Ukraine awarded 35 per cent of its civil society
funding to 22 Ukrainian NGOs, which received grants
two or three times during the financial year.75
Most of
these organizations are also recipients of USAID grants
from Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms
(UNITER), a civil society capacity-building programme
implemented by PACT International.
Major donors treat citizens as mere recipients of aid
and NGO expertise, while their participation in policymaking
and NGO development is viewed separately.
In Moldova, for example, USAID financed two separate
programmes, implemented by the US organizations
IREX and FHI 360, focusing on citizen participation and
civil society capacity-building respectively. In Georgia,
this is done by another two US organizations, the EastWest
Management Institute and Management Systems
International. The distinction of donors between citizen
participation and civil society development is detrimental
to building up genuine participation and higher levels of
self-expression for citizens.
As for civil society as a public space for citizens’ debate
and expression, the track record of donors is also dubious.
As noted above, public space in all three countries is characterized
by powerless citizens, a dominating state and a
lack of issue-driven debate on public policy. The West has
underestimated challenges of the post-Soviet transformation
such as suppression of private initiative, the symbiosis
between political elites and an oligarchic economy, aversion
to political pluralism, the fragility of national unity and the
scope of state-building tasks. Donors took the traditions of
a free society for granted and assumed that the methods
of Western civil society could be transferred. They have
	 71	 For Ukraine: International Renaissance Foundation, 2011 Annual Report, http://www.irf.ua/files/ukr/programs/irf/annual_report_2011_ukr_final.pdf. For
Georgia: Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2008 Annual Report, http://www.osgf.ge/files/wliuri_angarishi/Annual_Eng_2008.pdf. For Moldova: Soros
Foundation – Moldova, 2011 Annual Report, http://www.soros.md/files/reports/2010%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20EN.pdf.
	 72	 Maria Muskhelishvili and Gia Jorjoliani, ‘Georgia’s On-going Struggle for a Better Future Continued: Democracy Promotion through Civil Society Development’,
Democratization, Vol. 17, No. 4, August 2009.
	 73	 Anna Matveeva, ‘Exporting Civil Society: The Post-Communist Experience’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 55, No. 2, March/April 2008.
	 74	 USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2010, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/.
	 75	 Renaissance awarded a total number of 139 grants to strengthen civil society in 2010. International Renaissance Foundation, Annual Report 2010,
http://www.irf.ua/files/ukr/programs/irf/zvit_2010.pdf.
www.chathamhouse.org
page17
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
continued to award grants to NGOs focused on institutionbuilding,
advocacy and increasing dialogue with the state,
even though it was becoming obvious that this approach
was ineffective ten years ago. In 2002 Thomas Carothers
questioned the assumption that post-Soviet countries were
simply transitioning from totalitarianism to liberal democracy
and pointed out that donors had not adjusted to the
unsteady path of transition or taken account of the role of
underlying historical and social conditions within these
countries.76
Today there are hardly any new approaches to
strengthening civil society in the region.
There is little innovation in the ways in which additional
funds for civil society are invested. The EU’s Civil
Society Facility also follows the old approach to civil
society support where well-established groups will receive
funding to monitor state policies for their compliance with
commitments to the EU. Preliminary analysis indicates
that about 30 per cent of its budget will be allocated to the
EU-based consultancies to map civil society in the region
and provide training and networking for NGOs. Within
each country, priorities may differ. In Moldova, additional
funds will go to existing programmes. In Georgia, it will
probably be used to involve NGOs in policy dialogue
with the state, duplicating a much better-funded USAID
programme.
Most experts today agree that funding for civil society is
substantial and that there is even a problem with the local
capacity to absorb it. The difficulty is not how much but
how to nurture civil society.
Aiding civil society
In order to ‘finish’ the colour revolutions, democracy
promoters and local activists need to focus on society
itself. Active and empowered citizens, not the expertise
and capacity of a few NGOs, are the indicator of civil society’s
strength. Despite all the shortcomings of NGO-cracy,
citizens believe that these bodies are still important.77
In
order to capitalize on and enhance citizens’ trust, NGOs
leaders must design a strategy for engaging them more.
Good NGO work is crucial for the quality of public
space. It defines the culture of public debate and holds
governments accountable. The defining principle of their
work should be to ensure a two-way relationship with
society. Whatever choice civil society leaders make, it
is crucial that they remain independent. In practice,
governments are unwilling to give more space to citizens
in decision-making. It is up to citizens to demand and
occupy this space. They should expand it little by little, by
becoming better organized and more active, educated and
demanding.
NGOs need to become more transparent, increase
their media outreach and build more domestic and
international networks. They should create independent
boards, involving private-sector representatives, and
expand their membership. They also need to catch up
with the growing use of social networks, and to take
greater advantage of the organizational opportunities
offered by the internet.
NGOs would benefit from shifting their outlook from
one limited to the issues of the Helsinki Declaration and
human rights to one that encompasses economic justice,
access to services and consumer protection. Most wellestablished
groups direct their advocacy towards human
rights and monitoring state policies, paying no attention
to inequality, education, access to public utilities and
the poor delivery of public services. Some NGOs do try
to fill the role of the state, especially in providing social
services. In Ukraine, the wider public familiar with NGOs
says that they address areas that the government is unable
	 76	 Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002.
	 77	 In Ukraine support for NGOs almost doubled since the Orange Revolution and is now about 76 per cent. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2011.
‘The fundamental problem
with Western assistance to civil
society in the post-Soviet space
is that it leaves much of society
untouched
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page18
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
or unwilling to address.78
But they mostly redistribute
material help rather than alternatively create new products
and innovative practices in the public space, which
could then be transferred to state practices or the political
space. Experimenting with local participatory budgeting,
education reform, social enterprise, economic justice,
neighbourhood associations and citizen control over the
electoral process could lead to more sustainable social
change.
Civil society in all three countries would benefit from
Western support that focuses on building up moderate
forces. Prioritizing greater citizen participation in organizations,
as well as social trust, tolerance, openness and
self-expression can do this. The domination of public
space by the state and political life is suffocating liberal
democratic developments in these countries. In order
to expand the public space, donors can facilitate debate
among citizens, helping to strengthen public opinion that
could influence the state.
This requires long-term donor commitment as it
takes time for new behaviour to take root. Donors often
switch focus between priorities and instruments aimed at
enabling active citizenship, such as access to information,
participatory councils, rural community centres, neighbourhood
associations and public spending monitoring.
They would do better to invest more long-term resources
into just one or two priorities that could produce a tipping
point in empowering civil society.
Instead of attempting to replicate the better-funded
programmes that the US government has been implementing
for decades, the EU could try different
approaches to revitalize civil society. These could include
switching from a top-down approach, whereby local
NGOs are forced to work with the government, to a
bottom-up one that would include West European
grassroots organizations in programme design and deci-
sion-making. 
In order to strengthen the role of civil society in policymaking
and promote a more favourable attitude among the
Georgian, Moldovan and Georgian governments and local
authorities towards their citizens, donors need to improve
awareness of European practices in citizen engagement
and community organization. Western financing could
also support training for local leaders in community
organization and mobilization.
Donors could also consider supporting nonconventional
actors beyond existing NGOs, such as
youth groups, students’ associations and universities,
grassroots citizens’ initiative groups, intellectual circles,
schools and religious organizations that pursue charitable
and community goals.  They could link teams
of activists, creating more national and international
networks, and create projects to stimulate new patterns
of social behaviour and provide a clear vision of an
alternative future. The belief that few NGO leaders alone
can prevent democratic backsliding is a fallacy. Donors
should enlarge support to new groups in addition to
funding well-established NGOs.
Donors also need to consider incorporating conditionality
in their support for NGOs, based on criteria
including connections with citizens. This could mean
requiring co-funding for projects from membership fees,
a certain number of open community meetings in public
places, media outreach in the community, and a share of
volunteer work as a community contribution.
To reinvent democracy support there is a need to
return to the fundamental principle of a participatory
democratic society where people have more say and more
power. As Karl Popper pointed out, ‘Democracy may help
	78	 Key Findings: Public opinion in Ukraine, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, July 2011, http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Survey/
2011/Public_Opinion_in_Ukraine_2011_Report.pdf.
‘Helping citizens in the
post-Soviet space to cherish
freedom and embrace their
responsibilities in a democratic
system of governance is crucial
’
www.chathamhouse.org
page19
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
to preserve freedom but it can never create it if the individual
citizen does not care for it.’79
Helping citizens in the
post-Soviet space to cherish freedom and embrace their
responsibilities in a democratic system of governance is
crucial. For it will be these citizens, despite the weaknesses
of civil society today, who will decide the future path of
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, just as they did in 2003,
2004 and 2009.
Although voting in elections is an essential element
of the process, if the citizens of Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine want true democracy, transparency and personal
freedom, they also need to engage in public debate and
build social trust. What was started on the central squares
of capitals during the colour revolutions must continue in
self-expression and participation in public and political
life.
	 79	 Cited in Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong (eds), Popper’s Open Society after 50 Years: The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper (London; New York: Routledge,
1999), p. 44.
www.chathamhouse.org
page20
How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Orysia Lutsevych was 2012 Robert Bosch Fellow at
Chatham House. She is currently a consultant for the
EU-Russia Centre to develop the EU-Russia Civil Society
Forum and advises the Westminster Foundation for
Democracy on citizen engagement in Ukraine. She also
serves on the Board of the Black Sea Trust for Regional
Cooperation of the German Marshall Fund. From 2009
to 2011, she led the start-up and regional development
of Europe House–Georgia, a non-profit organization to
promote exchanges between Europe and Georgia. In
2007, she was the Executive Director of Open Ukraine
Foundation. In 2005, she designed and implemented
the strategy for the creation of the Polish-Ukraine
Cooperation Foundation PAUCI, a spin-off of a USAIDfunded
programme, and became its Ukraine Country
Director. Prior to that, she worked in the United States
for Freedom House and Project Harmony International.
Mrs Lutsevych holds Master’s degrees in International
Relations from Lviv State University and in Public
Administration from the University of Missouri-Columbia.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to express special thanks to the
following organizations for assisting in the research
that led to this paper: PACT (Ukraine), FHI 360
(Moldova), Eurasia Partnership Foundation (Tbilisi) and
the Delegation of the European Union to Georgia.
The Robert Bosch Fellowship
The Robert Bosch Fellowship was launched in January
2012 and is open to citizens of the Eastern Partnership
countries and Russia. It is intended for future policymakers,
researchers and opinion-formers from these
countries at an early stage of their careers. It aims
to provide them with an opportunity to advance their
knowledge of post-Soviet politics, develop research
skills, contribute to Chatham House research and
policy recommendations, and build links with policy and
academic communities in the United Kingdom, Germany
and the EU more broadly.
Chatham House has been the home of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs for ninety years. Our
mission is to be a world-leading source of independent
analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how
to build a prosperous and secure world for all.
Chatham House
10 St James’s Square
London SW1Y 4LE
www.chathamhouse.org
Registered charity no: 208223
Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) is an
independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international
questions and does not express opinions of its own. The opinions
expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.
© The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013
This material is offered free of charge for personal and
non-commercial use, provided the source is acknowledged.
For commercial or any other use, prior written permission must
be obtained from the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
In no case may this material be altered, sold or rented.
Cover image © istockphoto.com
Designed and typeset by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk