Post-Communist Democratization
Revisited: An International Relations
Approach
THEODOR TUDOROIU
Research Group in International Security, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
ABSTRACT Using a theoretical approach inspired by Alexander Wendt’s International
Relations constructivism, this article argues that the main engine of post-communist
democratization and democratic consolidation is represented by external factors. A triple
international structure including the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Union’s Europe Agreements, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace
efficiently interacted with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) state–society complexes in a
process of international socialization that used both incentive- and persuasion-based strategies.
This led to the creation of two parallel and sometimes independent processes of socialization
targeting CEE elites and society, respectively. The international socialization of the society was
in fact the main cause of democratization in countries dominated by anti-democratic elites.
Internal factors are not completely ignored. Rather, they are regarded as structural causes that
facilitated, hampered, or blocked the international diffusion of democratic norms and values, thus
dictating differences between CEE, the Western Balkans, and the Commonwealth of Independent
States’ trajectories. The 1990s ‘soft’ authoritarian regimes of Romania and Slovakia are used as
case studies that illuminate the decisive importance of external factors.
KEY WORDS: Post-communism, democratization, democratic consolidation, constructivism,
international socialization, Central and Eastern Europe
1. Introduction
On 1 January 2007 the accession of Bulgaria and Romania completed the
enlargement of the European Union to include ten Central and Eastern European
(CEE) states. The same countries had also become NATO members. This is
generally perceived as a direct consequence of the democratization process initiated
by the fall of communism in the region. Ensuing change made CEE countries fully
compatible with their Atlantic neighbours and allowed accession to the Western
community. This is not the case with other post-communist states. Plagued by ethnic
conflicts and authoritarian regimes, the republics of the Western Balkans and the
Correspondence Address: Theodor Tudoroiu, Associate Researcher, Research Group in International
Security, 3125, boulevard des Trinitaires, app. 307, Montreal, Quebec, H4E2S2, Canada.
Email: tudoroiu@hotmail.com
Perspectives on European Politics and Society
Vol. 11, No. 1, 80–108, April 2010
ISSN 1570-5854 Print/1568-0258 Online Ó 2010 Taylor & Francis
http://www.informaworld.com
DOI: 10.1080/15705850903553661
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) clearly did not follow the same
trajectory. Consequently, it is logical to see democratization as a precondition to EU
and NATO accession. However, the goal of this article is to show that, from its very
beginning, democratization itself was caused by international factors that included
the pre-accession process.
Previous democratization waves were mostly driven by internal factors. The only
major exception is the fall of fascist regimes due to military defeat at the end of
World War II. But more recent South European and Latin American transitions to
democracy had little outside influence. The fall of communism, on the contrary, was
decisively influenced by external elements. Still, as the next section shows, the
importance of external causes has been largely underestimated. The literature on
early post-communist democratization is dominated by the analysis of internal
factors.
This article proposes a different view. An International Relations-based approach
inspired by Alexander Wendt’s constructivism is used to explain the evolution of
post-communist countries. To be more specific, external factors are perceived as the
main engine of democratization. ‘External factors’, in this context, include but are by
no means limited to geopolitical elements. They fully incorporate the process of
international socialization that ensured the diffusion of the Western system of
democratic values and decisively contributed to the identity change of CEE states
and societies. This does not mean that internal factors are completely ignored.
Rather, they are regarded as structural causes that determined the geographic
distribution of the democratization process. Internal factors facilitated, hampered,
or blocked democratization, thus dictating the major differences between CEE, the
Western Balkans, and CIS trajectories. But they are not the main cause of
democratization itself.
Another important aspect concerns the mechanism of diffusion of democratic
values. Most of the literature on post-communist democratization tends to prioritize
the actions of elites. This article claims that the international socialization process
leading to the assimilation of democratic values took place at two levels: elites and
society. The latter was in fact the main engine of the democratization process in
countries dominated by anti-democratic elites.
In order to support this view, two case studies have been chosen at the border
between rapidly democratizing Central Europe and the undemocratic postcommunist
republics. Romania and Slovakia initially gave preference to neocommunist
or ultra-nationalist regimes not unlike those of the Western Balkans/CIS.
However, there was a major difference. The two states were part of international
structures diffusing democratic norms and values: the Conference (later Organization)
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE); the European Union’s
Europe Agreements; and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). Under their
influence, the two states and societies experienced a progressive identity change
that finally led to the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes and allowed Bucharest
and Bratislava to adopt pro-Western, democratic trajectories. It is the complexity
and length of this process that make the two countries perfect examples illustrating
the international origin of post-communist democratization. In Central European
states the speed of change makes a similar analysis difficult. In the Commonwealth of
Independent States the difficulty comes from the modest results of the democratizaPost-Communist
Democratization Revisited 81
tion process. This is why Romania and Slovakia are used to support the theoretical
model proposed by this article.
One more point has to be mentioned. The transitology literature makes a very
clear differentiation between democratization and democratic consolidation (for
discussions of this term see Pridham, 1990, pp. 8–16; Hanson, 2001, pp. 126–151;
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, 30–31). However, this perspective can be highly
misleading. In many post-communist republics, a clear-cut division between the two
categories is problematic due to the existence of hybrid regimes (for a definition of
this term see Levitsky & Way, 2002). In fact, as Henry Hale noticed, in certain cases
it is difficult to speak of ‘a ‘‘trajectory’’ toward or away from ideal-type endpoints
like democracy or autocracy’ (Hale, 2005, p. 134). Therefore, the following analysis
does not make a formal differentiation between democratization and democratic
consolidation. Rather, it treats them as imbricate parts of a unitary, continuous
process.
The article has the following structure: section 2 briefly examines the assessment of
external factors by previous theories of post-communist democratization. Section 3
builds a new, International Relations-based alternative approach. Sections 4 and 5
present the case studies of Romania and Slovakia. Findings are compared in section
6 while section 7 emphasizes the decisive importance of international factors as
causes of democratization. The conclusion summarizes the article’s main findings.
2. Transitology vs. Europeanization
The study of transition to democracy and democratic consolidation led to the
creation of a sub-field of comparative politics known as transitology. Scholars like
Lipset, Almond, Verba, Rustow, O’Donnel, Schmitter, Diamond, and others
contributed to its development. Their case studies were the Southern European and
Latin American transitions of the 1970s and 1980s. Predictably, the resulting theory
was applied with little change to transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Subsequent contestation of this approach led to a ‘vigorous polemic’
(Wiarda, 2006, p. 79; see note 1 at p. 91 for a review of the literature on this subject)
but did not succeed in fundamentally revolutionizing the field. One of the main
consequences is the diminished role generally assigned to international factors:
It seems to us fruitless to search for some international factor or context which
can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization,
much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse. (O’Donnell
et al., 1986, p. 18; see a discussion of this statement in Pridham et al., 1994, p.
13)
However, the fall of communism was so clearly marked by external influences that
most scholars had to take them into consideration. The general opinion in the early
1990s on the importance of the international causes of democratization is well
illustrated by the book edited in 1994 by Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen.
External factors are classified by four main categories: the influence of the Soviet
Union, that of the Western countries, the influence of multilateral organizations, and
the ‘diffusion of ideas’ (Pridham & Vanhanen, 1994, p. 265). There are two separate
82 T. Tudoroiu
chapters on the role of the Soviet Union and on the ‘external dimension.’ But the
overall international influence is seen as belonging to the ‘conjunctural’ set of factors
(Ibid., p. 7). The European Community, CSCE, and the Council of Europe are
international organizations that, in the future, might and should bring important
support to the democratization process. But their contribution prior to 1994 is not
perceived as decisive. The general view is that ‘external agents can only provide a
favourable international environment to democratic reform’ (Ibid., p. 11).
A different approach is suggested by the first paragraph of a book edited also in
1994 by Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford: ‘the international
dimension has been central to democratization in Eastern Europe’ (Pridham et al.,
1994, p. 1). The volume is dedicated entirely to the ‘international dimension of
democratization in Eastern Europe’. Its highly theoretical effort to ‘unscramble the
international context’ of post-communist democratization uses a complex pattern of
background or situational variables, different external actors, and forms of external
influence (Ibid., p. 11). It is clearly stated that ‘any bald relegation of external factors
to a secondary or subordinate category is too simplistic’ (Ibid., p. 9) given the fact
that ‘international factors have had a more persistent and profound effect’ in Eastern
Europe than in the previous South European transitions (Ibid., p. 29). There are
chapters analyzing the role of international security determinants as well as the
contribution of the European Community. Nevertheless, Laurence Whitehead
concludes his contribution stating
the recent democratizations in East-Central Europe have introduced some
important variations on the themes present in earlier transitions in
literature; important variations, but not an entirely new tune. (Whitehead,
1994, p. 54)
In fact, only the geopolitical factors are regarded as decisive and much of the
analysis is focused on the role of the Soviet Union. Besides that, the international
influence is not assessed as fundamental. The internal factors remain the main cause
of post-communist democratization.
By 2001, however, transitology seemed prepared to accept a different point of
view. The second volume of the series edited by Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda makes
a complex and detailed analysis of the influence of Western states, international
organizations and NGOs on the ‘democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe’.
Twenty-one contributors explore the political, economic and security dimensions of
this influence. Regionalization, ethnic strife, international migration, crime and
corruption are also taken into consideration. In the concluding chapter, Jan
Zielonka speaks explicitly about ‘the enormous impact of external factors on
democratic consolidation’, as it ‘appears that democracy in East Europe is to a
significant extent foreign made’ (Zielonka, 2001, p. 511). He believes that
it is no longer possible to claim that internal factors are more important than
external ones . . . If one was asked which factors are truly important, external
or internal, the answer ought to be that both are important, although the very
nature of interplay between these two factors varies at different times and
places. (Ibid., p. 531)
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 83
This view is presented as a conclusion of the entire volume. Still, many of the
contributors think differently. Writing precisely about ‘Western Actors and the
Promotion of Democracy’, Karen Smith states
of course, [democratic consolidation] was not primarily the result of Western
direct influence – domestic conditions favoured democratic consolidation. But
[. . .] the Western model of democracy, pressure for reforms, and aid for
democracy project had a positive, contributing effect. (Smith, 2001, p. 57)
Despite Zielonka’s position, the view of external factors as ‘contributing’ elements
continues to dominate the transitology literature. This made Howard J. Wiarda
write in 2006 a subchapter on the ‘Underestimation of International Influence’
(Wiarda, 2006, p. 87). Noting that recent analysis only partly corrected the ‘woeful’
underestimation of external factors by the early literature, he suggests two
explanations. The first is the lack of knowledge about the policy involvement of
outside actors. The second ‘reflects a preference on nationalistic or political grounds
to give credit for democratization to internal, domestic forces, and to ignore and
downplay the crucial importance of international influences’ (Ibid., p. 88). Of course,
these explanations might not satisfy everyone. In any case, external factors are today
present in post-communist transitology. But their role remains secondary, as internal
causes are considered the main engine of regime change.
The opposing view was adopted by a different approach created in the late 1990s.
Its goal, however, is not the study of post-communist democratization itself. Rather,
it analyses ‘Europeanization’, which
consists of processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways
of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of
domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures
and public policies. (Claudio Radaelli quoted by Grabbe, 2006, p. 46)
There are two different approaches to Europeanization originating from policy
analysis and international relations, respectively (Ibid., p. 45). The latter, inspired by
the ‘sociological turn’ in International Relations, studies the process of international
socialization leading to the accession of CEE states to the European Union (see
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). As this is a subject
of major interest in European politics, it is not surprising that Europeanization
replaced transitology as the dominant theme of post-communist studies outside the
Commonwealth of Independent States (within the CIS, the ‘coloured revolutions’
helped preserve the interest in democratic building and consolidation). It was even
used to explain change in the turbulent area of the Balkans (Demetropoulou, 2002).
It is beyond any doubt that Europeanization brought a major and innovative
contribution to the study of post-communism in Central and Eastern Europe. It
illuminates mechanisms that contributed greatly to the transformation of CEE states
into consolidated (or, at least, consolidating) Western-type democracies able to join
the European Union. Unlike transitology, it also convincingly explains the
84 T. Tudoroiu
importance of external factors. However, this comes at a price: internal factors are
now marginal. A good example is provided by the well-known Europeanization
scholar, Frank Schimmelfennig:
under a policy of reactive reinforcement, the CEE states’ preparedness to adopt
liberal norms varies mainly with their domestic conditions of power
preservation. Where society is strongly oriented toward the West and the
current government has based its claim to power on a liberal ideology, the
domestic incentives for internalization are so strong that Western policy is
almost redundant. Conversely, where Western orientations in society are weak
and governments owe their power to nationalist-authoritarian programmes,
Western reactive reinforcement will not make much of a difference. The effect
of Western socialization policy will be most important if societal and
governmental orientations diverge. (Schimmelfennig, 2000, p. 111)
This is correct, but clearly fails to illuminate the structural causes that made CEE
societies pro- or anti-Western. Those causes can be ignored if the goal of the analysis
is limited to the explanation of EU accession, a process that became credible only in
or after the mid-1990s. On the contrary, this is a major flaw in the study of the
overall democratization of former communist states and especially of its decisive
episode of the early 1990s. It is at that moment that the Western Balkans and CIS
republics missed the opportunity to consolidate their nascent democracies and turn
westward. Unfortunately, Europeanization is not equipped to deal with this process.
Therefore, a different approach has to be built in order to combine Europeanization’s
appropriate assessment of external factors with transitology’s analysis of
structural internal causes of democratic consolidation. This is the goal of the
following section.
3. An International Relations-Based Approach
The sudden fall of communism created an ideological and identity vacuum that
simultaneously affected a large number of states. At the societal level, the
disappearance of communism left no dominant ideology. At the international level,
this was paralleled by an identity vacuum aggravated by the irrelevance of all
previous regional political and security structures. In Yugoslavia and the former
Soviet Union this led to a wave of ethnic wars. Three competing systems of values
immediately tried to impose themselves. The first was the democratic one. As local
pre-communist experience with democracy was scarce or nonexistent, this was
basically a Western-imported ideology formalized by the 1990 Paris Charter of the
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its provisions included respect
for democracy and human rights, development of a market economy, and peaceful
foreign policy. As will be shown later, the diffusion and assimilation of democratic
values and norms were actively supported by Western states and organizations. The
two competing systems had an endogenous genesis, based on local historical
experience. They were the ultra-nationalist system of values, which led to ethnic wars
and the creation of authoritarian regimes in former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and
certain ex-Soviet republics; and the neo-communist system of values, which became
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 85
the dominant ideology of non-democratic regimes in Romania, Bulgaria, and some
CIS republics. In order to define the former, a difference has to be made between
nationalism and ultra-nationalism. While the first might use a civic, Frenchrevolution
approach, the second is always based on ethnic, Herder-type rejection of
the ‘other’. It is also much more radical (one could usefully compare Charles de
Gaulle and Jean-Marie Le Pen as representatives of the two categories). Neocommunism
can be simply described as an effort to mirror totalitarian communism
with more modest, authoritarian means. A working definition might be that
provided by the former Romanian president, Emil Constantinescu, in an article
published by Le Monde on 22 February 22 1997:
We are not talking about classical communism . . . but rather of a form that is
both old . . . and new because of its goal, which is to preserve all that can be
preserved, both in men and structures, of the old regime: as many as possible of
the large enterprises, as many monopolies as possible, especially in the areas of
energy and agriculture, as many of the political and economic leaders as
possible, and as much as possible of an isolationist and anti-Western
mythology, ready to halt all openings towards Europe and the rest of the
world. (quoted by Gallagher 2001, p. 392)
Analyzing the beginning of post-communism in a rationalist perspective, Rose
et al. (1998, pp. 3–24) speak about ‘Competition between Regimes: A Question of
Supply and Demand’. It is perhaps more useful to assess the competition between
rival systems of values. The option for a certain type of regime is the logical
consequence of the prevalence within a given society of the corresponding system of
values. Another important aspect is the dynamic nature of this competition. In the
early 1990s only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary seemed to have
consolidating democracies. Nevertheless, continuing international interaction
allowed further diffusion and assimilation of Western democratic norms and values.
This process was important in all CEE-10 states, whose evolution illustrates the
strong relationship between internal and external change. Western influence
contributed to the assimilation of democratic values. This favoured the democratization
process while, at the international level, natural affinities were created with
Western states sharing the same values. Progressive democratization encouraged
pacific, pro-Western foreign policy, while the latter further contributed to
democratic internal development.
This phenomenon is well captured by Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of
International Politics (1999). In this view, both state and society are relevant in
international interactions; therefore, the actors of international relations are not
states but ‘state–society complexes’. Such complexes are permanently involved in
socialization and learning processes, which modify both their identities and interests.
In turn, the interaction of state–society complexes modifies their international
environment, sometimes changing the very ‘culture’ of international anarchy. The
two key concepts of this interaction are identity and socialization. The analysis of the
former leads Wendt to define international actors as a ‘script or schema, constituted
to varying degrees by cultural forms, about who [they] are and what [they] should do
in a certain context’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 230; for the entire analysis of the concept see
86 T. Tudoroiu
pp. 224–233. A discussion of the ‘identity literature of IR’ can be found in Flockhart,
2006, pp. 94–97). The working definition I will use in this article sees the identity of a
state–society complex as ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations
about self’ representing ‘a property of international actors that generates
motivational and behavioural dispositions’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 224). The other key
concept, international socialization, can be defined as ‘a process in which states
are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community’
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2006, p. 2). Its outcome is
sustained compliance based on the internalization of . . . new norms. In
adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from
following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is
sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of
material incentives or sanctions. (Checkel, 2005, p. 804)
In his introduction to the 2005 special issue of International Organization on
‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe’, Jeffrey Checkel identifies
two types of international socialization. In the framework of Type I internalization
or socialization,
agents may behave appropriately by learning a role – acquiring the knowledge
that enables them to act in accordance with expectations – irrespective of
whether they like the role or agree with it. . . . conscious instrumental
calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing. (Ibid.)
This rather limited type of socialization is generally preferred by rationalist
approaches. Constructivists favour the more advanced Type II internalization/
socialization that goes beyond role playing. It implies that agents accept community
or organizational norms as ‘the right thing to do’. They ‘adopt the interests, or even
possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part. Conscious
instrumental calculation has now been replaced by ‘‘taken-for-grantedness’’’ (Ibid.).
Checkel also outlines three mechanisms involved in the process of socialization:
strategic calculation, role playing and normative suasion. They are associated with
‘three modes of rationality that may contribute to socialization outcomes:
instrumental, bounded, and communicative’ (Ibid., p. 805). Given the rather limited
reach of the first two (incentive-based) mechanisms, normative suasion is normally
needed in order to complete the switch from a logic of consequences to one of
appropriateness and ensure Type II socialization. The mechanisms of international
socialization are analyzed in more detail later in this section. Reviews of the
literature, detailed analyses of the socialization process and its mechanisms as well as
discussion of the role of international organizations can be found in Checkel (2005,
pp. 804–815) and Schimmelfennig et al. (2006, pp. 2–11, 16–56).
Returning to Wendt’s vision of the effect of (successful) international socialization
on the ‘culture’ of international anarchy, the CEE-10 states represent an ideal case
study. They first experienced the absence of any security framework (which could
have transformed ethnic tensions in Slovakia, Romania, Estonia and Latvia in
Yugoslav-type conflicts), then relative stability and, finally, membership of the
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 87
Western security community. Wendt analyses ‘the three cultures of anarchy’,
associated with Hobbes, Locke and Kant. Correspondingly, states are enemies, rivals
and friends. Following this approach, there can be an evolution (not mandatory, but
at least unidirectional, except for an exogenous shock) between the three ‘cultures:’
from Hobbes to Locke and then toward Kant (Wendt, 1999). It is clear that since
1989 CEE-10 states have followed exactly this trajectory. Ultra-nationalist or neocommunist
regimes in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were overthrown. Ethnic
tensions in Estonia and Latvia were reduced to irrelevant levels. Finally, EU and
NATO enlargement confirmed the ten states’ accession to the Kantian Western
community.
This impressive transformation was possible due to the existence of three
international structures linking CEE-10 and Western states. Chronologically, the
first was the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (which became in
1994 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Its 1990 Paris
Charter formalized the democratic system of values. As all post-communist states
were CSCE members and approved the charter, even those resilient to democratization
accepted at least the superficial aspects of electoral democracy (Decaux, 1992;
Heraclidis, 1993). This was the first step of the diffusion of democratic norms and
values that finally imposed themselves in CEE-10. CSCE’s contribution did not stop
there. It developed specialized organs – the Office for Free Elections, later
transformed in the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR);
the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media; the Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration – that effectively and efficiently helped develop democratic political
systems (http://www.osce.org). The so-called ‘seminar diplomacy’, which included
seminars and colloquia as well as different forms of multilateral diplomacy led to the
creation of an epistemic community in the field of European security (Adler, 1998,
pp. 138–139). This was extremely important in a region threatened by military
conflicts. Even more important, CSCE’s preventive diplomacy and especially the
actions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) helped reduce
ethnic tensions, thus preserving regional peace and increasing concerned states’
chances of democratization (Flyn & Farrell, 1999, p. 522; Huber, 1994, p. 25). Of
course, the HCNM could not stop the Yugoslav wars. But he contributed greatly to
the prevention of ethnic conflicts related to Russian and Hungarian minorities in
Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. While less visible, this had an important
effect on both the stability and the democratization of CEE.
The second institutional framework was initiated by the EU’s Europe Agreements.
These were association treaties clearly stating the perspective of accession. Given the
remarkable economic advantages associated with membership, it is not surprising
that impoverished ex-communist states did everything in their power to comply with
accession criteria. Furthermore, the European Union’s Eastern enlargement was
regarded by the huge majority of the CEE population as a natural reunification of the
European family that Soviet military occupation had divided for half a century. Proaccession
efforts were therefore highly legitimated while political forces perceived as
hampering the enlargement rapidly lost public support (a good example is provided
by the end of the Slovak ultra-nationalist regime of Vladimir Meciar in 1998).
Progressively, the European Union added further elements to the initial Europe
Agreements. The Essen pre-accession strategy and the reinforced pre-accession
88 T. Tudoroiu
strategy defined by Agenda 2000 brought significant improvements (see Demetropoulou,
2002). But the decisive step had been the 1993 adoption of the Copenhagen
criteria, as they introduced political – and, more specifically, democratic –
conditionality. This was an extremely effective instrument that forced candidate
members to democratize their political institutions and practices in order to be
accepted as EU members (see Tucny, 2000; Hughes & Sasse, 2003; Vachudova, 2005;
Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Grabbe, 2006). The European Union’s conditionality
had a visible impact on the very identity of concerned state–society complexes, which
progressively evolved toward the model provided by their EU counterparts. This is
why democratization and EU accession of the CEE-10 states were mutually
constitutive. Through conditionality, the enlargement process forced them to fully
democratize. But their inclusion in this process – only ten post-communist states were
granted Europe Agreements – was itself due to the fact that the ten countries had
already begun to democratize. Unfortunately for them, the authoritarian, war-torn
Western Balkans and CIS states remained outside this cercle vertueux.
The third structure belongs to the field of security and is related to NATO. The
Partnership for Peace, created in 1994, did not provide security guarantees for CEE
members. Initially it was even perceived as a modest alternative to NATO
enlargement. Its main mission seemed to be peacekeeping (Drew, 1995, p. 27). Still,
it created cooperation mechanisms and procedures and helped build an epistemic
community reuniting NATO and CEE military. Furthermore, its functioning directly
influenced a specific aspect of democratization. It helped modify post-communist
states’ civilian–military relations, assuring the control of the armed forces by
democratic institutions (Vankovska & Wiberg, 2003, p. 27; Sherr, 2004, p. 65). But
PfP’s major contribution was linked to its perception by CEE societies and political
elites as a first step toward the United States’ involvement in the region. This was a
subjective impression. Nevertheless, the perspective of active American hegemony
significantly encouraged pro-Western political forces. It was widely believed that
Washington’s involvement would put an end to regional conflicts (as it did in Bosnia,
imposing the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement). Through future NATO enlargement –
which effectively took place in 1999 and 2004 – it would protect the region from
possibly hostile external powers. Accession to NATO as well as to the European
Union would bring CEE states fully inside the Western community, thus fulfilling
their population’s desire of ‘returning to Europe’ (for the case of Romania see Gros &
Tismaneanu, 1997, p. 28). Overall, the apparently modest Partnership for Peace was
the final key element needed for a resolutely pro-Western – and implicitly prodemocratic
– orientation of Central and Eastern Europe. CIS members of the PfP, on
the contrary, failed to perceive it as more than an empty framework. Involvement in
the PfP did not prevent them from maintaining an ambiguous or even hostile attitude
toward NATO enlargement that isolated them from the CEE-10 pro-Western
evolution.
This evolution was also facilitated by individual Western states, other specialized
international organizations (such as the Council of Europe and the International
Monetary Fund), and Western NGOs (for a country-by-country detailed description
see Zielonka & Pravda, 2001). While the individual contributions of these entities
cannot be compared with those of the CSCE, EU or NATO, their cumulative effect
was significant.
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 89
As following sections will show, the overall influence of Western structures was
threefold. Pressure was put on CEE decision-makers. There were actions meant to
influence CEE public opinion. And, most importantly, there was the very diffusion
of democratic norms and values throughout CEE societies. This led to the
development of civil society that made impossible the survival of non-democratic
structures and practices. Finally, all CEE-10 states were able to join the EU and
NATO, which confirms their inclusion in the category of genuinely consolidating
democracies.
At this point, more has to be said on the specific mechanisms involved in this
process. In principle, there can be two strategies for socialization. The first is social
influence, which elicits pro-norm behaviour through the distribution of social
rewards and punishments. The second is persuasion, which encourages normconsistent
behaviour through a social process of interaction that involves changing
attitudes without use of either material or mental coercion (Flockhart, 2006, p. 96).
Out of Checkel’s three socialization instruments – strategic calculation, role playing
and normative suasion – the first two are incentive-based mechanisms that fall into
the category of social influence. As such, they are accepted and analyzed by both
Rationalists and Constructivists. EU conditionality, for example, belongs to this
category. Nobody denies that it has been particularly effective ‘when the EU offered
a credible membership incentive and when incumbent governments did not consider
the domestic costs of compliance threatening to their hold on power’ (Epstein &
Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 796). This is not the case for the strategy of persuasion and the
associate mechanism of normative suasion. Rationalist approaches tend to reject or
ignore them. Constructivists, on the other hand, insist on their importance for
achieving Type II socialization. In her study of NATO’s contribution to the
transformation of the Czech Republic and Romania, Alexandra Gheciu (2005,
p. 973) notes that, ‘in teaching new liberal-democratic norms, NATO exercised
significant power: the power to shape its socializees’ interpretations of the world and
ideas about proper ways of acting in that world’. Indeed, NATO conducted a
socialization process affecting ‘not simply the behaviour of CEE socializees, but also
their definitions of national identity and interests’ (Ibid.). Gheciu convincingly
argues that this was mostly the effect of teaching and persuasion. She defines
teaching as ‘an attempt to project into Central and Eastern Europe the common
lifeworld of the Euro-Atlantic community, consisting of shared liberal ideas and
norms’ (Ibid., p. 979). But it was on persuasion that NATO – as well as other
Western actors – relied heavily. Argumentative persuasion is a social process of
interaction in which a communicator attempts to induce a change in the belief,
attitude or behaviour of another person through the transmission of a message in a
context where the persuadee has some degree of free choice (Checkel, 2001, p. 562).
Persuasion suggests that preferences and identities do change in the absence of
material incentives and disincentives. Basically, ‘argument and emotion help explain
changes in actor motivation’ (Johnston, 2005, p. 1030). In Gheciu’s view, the
techniques of persuasion used by NATO (as well as CSCE and EU, I would add) in
Central and Eastern Europe were consistency, authority and social proof:
Consistency involves linking prescribed reforms to norms that are accepted by
socializees as unproblematic. Linked to this, also frequently used were
90 T. Tudoroiu
authority appeals, involving efforts at persuading actors to adopt specific
reforms by pointing to the special expertise of NATO on a given question, or/
and invoking the moral reliability of an institution that embodied the liberaldemocratic
community. Finally, NATO officials sometimes resorted to social
proof, seeking to convince Czechs or Romanians to promote a series of legal
and institutional changes by pointing to examples of established and even
emerging democracies who had set up similar institutions. This argument
posits that if everyone followed a similar course of action, then it must be the
right thing to do, because everyone else could not be wrong. (Gheciu, 2005,
p. 992)
This is, of course, a view rejected openly by Rationalists. But the Slovak and
Romanian case studies (see below) suggest that persuasion was indeed effective in
modifying the convictions of CEE citizens even when the local political elites had
adopted anti-democratic and anti-Western attitudes.
This latter aspect is important because the assessment of the relation between CEE
societies and political elites frequently subordinates the former to the latter in a way
that leaves little place for diverging trajectories. Analyzing the post-communist
socialization from a rationalist perspective based on strategic calculation, Frank
Schimmelfennig examines the international institutions offering incentives to
governments as well as to nongovernmental actors (the latter trying to force their
government to comply with international norms). The two situations are defined as
intergovernmental reinforcement by reward and transnational reinforcement by
reward, respectively. He concludes that ‘the main channel of international
reinforcement in the CEECs is intergovernmental, because societies are too weak
vis-a` -vis the states, and electorates are too volatile, to serve as effective agents of
socialization’ (Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 828).
At first view, this seems a reasonable statement. But it is contradicted by the
Slovak and Romanian examples. In these cases, the transnational reinforcement by
reward worked while the intergovernmental one failed. Furthermore, there is a clear
contradiction between Schimmelfennig’s intergovernmental view and a Wendt-type
approach that sees the state–society complex as the main actor of International
Relations. At this point it is useful to examine Trine Flockhart’s reconceptualization
of the domestic level into a nexus between state/elite and nation/people. In the
framework of a ‘Complex Socialization’ model,
‘state’ and ‘society’ can be conceptualized as two differently constructed social
groups; one located at the state level and consisting of the elite, and one located
at the nation level and consisting of ‘the people’. . .
By dividing the domestic level into these two different ‘we-concepts’ it is
possible to work with a bifurcation of causal dynamics in relation to different
norms, which effectively means that the domestic level operates with two
distinct political cultures; a ‘state culture’ at the elite level and the widely
accepted ‘political culture’ at the mass level. (Flockhart, 2006, pp. 98–99)
In Flockhart’s view, the international socialization represents the interaction of three
different levels: international; domestic, state/elite; and domestic, nation/people (I
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 91
prefer to call these three levels: international; elites; and society). Norms emanate
from a socializing agent located outside the norm-receiving domestic society. They
are directed to a ‘fairly limited number of individuals and small groups’ in the
country undergoing socialization. These ‘intermediate agents’ – intergovernmental
or nongovernmental organizations, different forms of international interest groups,
networks or social and religious movements – convey the message into the domestic
setting (Flockhart, 2006, p. 104). The socialization process can be successful at the
society level even if it fails at the elite level. The following two case studies suggest
that this pattern correctly describes the evolution of Slovakia and Romania. I would
add that ‘intermediate agents’ were indeed represented by certain components of
local civil society but also – and frequently – by prominent Western representatives
(the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities being, of course, the most
visible one).
Finally, it is important to note that the HCNM-style persuasion cannot be
presented as exclusively incentive-free. Its efficiency is at least in part due to the fact
that it made clear to the general public the negative consequences of supporting
undemocratic regimes. Both Meciar and Iliescu resisted Western pressure to
democratize but constantly assured their electorates of Slovakia’s and Romania’s
imminent EU accession. For a time, they succeeded in hiding the fundamental
incompatibility between accession (which implied prosperity) and their own rule and
values. Western discourse targeting Slovak and Romanian society simply revealed
this contradiction. Therefore, in this case persuasion efforts at the society level had
an important dimension of conditionality and also acted as an incentive-based
instrument. This leads to the conclusion that the three mechanisms of strategic
calculation, role playing and normative suasion in fact functioned simultaneously.
The West’s strategy was based on both incentives and persuasion and targeted both
the elites and the society levels. In Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic, elites
responded positively and the rapid democratization that ensued made the society
level less visible. But the cases of Slovakia and Romania show that the socialization
of this latter level also took place and was strong enough to override the elite’s
resistance to externally-induced democratization. Therefore, the democratization
process was a complex interaction between Western international organizations and
states and each of the two levels of the CEE Wendt-style state–society complexes.
The next two sections analyze the tortuous process of democratization in Romania
and Slovakia. Unlike the Central European states, these were the CEE ‘bad pupils’
that initially gave preference to ‘soft’ authoritarian neo-communist or ultranationalist
regimes. Nevertheless, they were members of the CSCE/OSCE and
signatories of the Europe Agreements and the Partnership for Peace. The following
sections illustrate the role of these international structures in the progressive identity
change that finally determined the fall of authoritarian regimes and the adoption of a
genuinely democratic, pro-Western course.
4. The Neo-Communist Regime of Ion Iliescu in Romania
In December 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu’s sultanistic rule was replaced by a ‘soft’
authoritarian regime led by Ion Iliescu, a former minister and ex-university colleague
of Gorbachev’s. This was a neo-communist regime. However, it also persecuted the
92 T. Tudoroiu
Hungarian minority (Ivanciuc, 1996; Tismaneanu, 1997; Bugajski, 2002; SianiDavies,
2005). Figure 1 shows the Freedom House quantitative evaluation of the
desperate state of political rights and civil liberties in Iliescu’s Romania. A one-toseven
scale is used, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the
lowest; 3.0 is the limit for ‘partly free’ states and 5.5 for ‘not free’ ones. Romania
remained ‘partly free’ until the fall of Iliescu.
Perhaps more than Iliescu’s neo-communist practices, actions clearly increasing
ethnic tensions and potentially preparing a regional conflict (Ionescu, 1993, p. 45;
Reisch, 1993, p. 22) generated serious Western concern. This is why the High
Commissioner for National Minorities of OSCE, Max Van der Stoel, was one of the
most visible actors involved in moderating Iliescu’s undemocratic attitude. Between
1993 and 1996 he visited Romania eight times, playing a major role in reducing
ethnic tensions in Transylvania (Michalchuk, 1998, p. 114, Ramelot & Remacle,
1995, p. 52). He made recommendations on new legislation for minorities and
education while trying to convince the political party of the Hungarian minority not
to start a civil disobedience campaign. Most importantly, he promoted a trilateral
approach including negotiations with the government in Bucharest, the Hungarian
minority in Transylvania, but also the government of Hungary. This finally led to the
conclusion in August 1996 of the Romanian–Hungarian Friendship Treaty, which
had a major impact on reducing regional tensions (Kemp, 2001, p. 237).
NATO’s Partnership for Peace was another institutional framework that proved
efficient in influencing the Romanian debate about the country’s relations with the
West. In January 1994 Bucharest was the first to sign a PfP framework agreement
and actively involved itself in NATO-led actions (Ionescu, 1994, p. 43). This was
precisely because Iliescu perceived PfP as an alternative to and not as a preparation
Figure 1. Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties average scores for 10 CEE states,
Romania, and Slovakia (1990–2007).
Source: Freedom House (2007, 2008).
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 93
for NATO accession. However, within Romanian society the PfP fuelled a process
that the neo-communists were unable to foresee or stop:
Romanian political [democratic] elite exploited the myth of the country’s
naturally belonging to the Western cultural sphere, NATO membership being
perceived as a matter of reaffirmation of this . . . According to the former
President Constantinescu, ‘Romania society does not regard the accession to
the NATO as a form of protection against a threat, but rather as a way to
regain an identity which had been unjustly denied to it for five decades’. The
political elite claims that Romania’s culture is European, sharing the same
values: democracy, rule of law, human rights, free market economy etc.
(Vankovska & Wiberg, 2003, pp. 131–132)
The Europe Agreement concluded in 1993 by Romania and the European Union
had similar consequences. Its effect was increased by the economic advantages it
provided and by the promise of future EU membership. This allowed the
introduction of conditionality that contributed greatly to Romania’s overall change.
European conditionality determined political as well as market reforms. It equally
concerned changes in public administration and the legal system that visibly
contributed to the progressive Europeanization of the country. And it allowed
Brussels to put pressure on Romania’s government in special circumstances. The
already mentioned conclusion of the friendship treaty with Hungary, mediated by
Max Van der Stoel, is perhaps the best example.
In fact, there was a further reason that made Iliescu sign this treaty. By 1996,
persecuting ethnic minorities had ceased to be an electorally profitable policy.
Romanian society had changed and the very survival of the undemocratic regime
became problematic.
The End of Iliescu’s Regime
In 1990, Stalinist communism had been replaced by a mix of neo-communism and
ultra-nationalism. These two ideologies, however, started to lose ground under the
constant influence of the democratic system of values whose diffusion was facilitated
by OSCE, the Europe Agreement, and NATO’s PfP. In 1992, 49.8% of Romanians
were not favourable to the Hungarian minority (Abele, 1996, p. 148). But Table 1
shows the constant improvement of attitudes toward minorities and related
Table 1. Perception of threats from ethnic groups and minorities and perception of threats
from neighbouring countries (Selected countries, 1992–1998, %)
1992 1996 1998
Perception of threats from ethnic groups and minorities
Romania 60 32 32
Slovakia 53 48 43
Perception of threats from neighbouring countries
Romania 67 35 27
Slovakia 46 36 30
Source: Haerpfer (2002, pp. 98, 100).
94 T. Tudoroiu
neighbouring countries. This clearly reflects an important reduction of ultranationalist
convictions. As Table 2 shows, support for neo-communist parties and,
implicitly, the extent of neo-communist convictions followed a similar trajectory.
In 1997, Romania’s new President, Emil Constantinescu, noted that ‘the popular
mentality has changed a great deal in the past seven years. People are ready for real
change and reform and are prepared to bear the costs’ (Woodard, 1997, p. 42). The
change was most visible at the level of civil society. Nonexistent in 1989 and
unimpressive in 1992, it had rapidly expanded afterward. By 1996 there were no
fewer than 8,000 NGOs. It is true that only about 200 – most of them Westernfinanced
– were very active (Tismaneanu, 1997, p. 409). But analysts constantly
emphasize the impressive dynamics of Romania’s new civic sector (Marrie´ , 1996, p.
166). It includes ‘places of dialogue’, dominated by intellectuals trying to stimulate
the development of civil society by the dialogue between its different components;
‘places of memory’, exposing the crimes of the communist regime and emphasizing
elements of continuity between the totalitarian past and the neo-communist regime;
and ‘places of democratic vigilance’, monitoring the respect for democratic principles
and the development of democracy (Ibid.). Independent mass media and, more
specifically, independent newspapers were equally important in criticizing the
government’s undemocratic practices and reducing electoral support for the ruling
parties (Tismaneanu, 1996, p. 11). Syndicates also organized large-scale protest
movements against the regime (see Ionescu, 1992).
Until 1996, pro-democracy political parties were weak and divided. In many cases,
their leadership had been infiltrated by agents of Iliescu’s secret services.
Consequently, the Romanian political elites were unable to assume the democratizing
role of their Czech or Polish counterparts. Instead, it was the civic sector that
assumed the mission of diffusing democratic values. Nongovernmental organizations
became the main intermediary between external factors of democratization and
Romanian society (Flockhart’s ‘intermediate agents’). The ensuing process of
socialization was of course slower than that experienced by Central European
society. Still, in the long run it had the same effect as the general progress of
democratic norms and values and the mobilization led by civil society resulted in the
total defeat of Iliescu and his party in the 1996 general elections (see Table 2). The
neo-communist regime came to an end. Democratic political forces resolutely
oriented Romania toward a pro-democratic, pro-Western trajectory. More
importantly, the neo-communists themselves realized the irreversibility of the
change. It was clear that the support for an undemocratic regime was now
insignificant. When the 2000 elections brought them back to power, they carefully
avoided anti-democratic or anti-Western moves. In 2004 Iliescu even managed to
Table 2. Romania – vote for neo-communist parties in legislative elections (Chamber of
Deputies), 1992–1996 (%)
1990 1992 1996
NSF/NSDF 66.31 27.72 21.52
Socialist Party of Labour – 3.03 –
Total 66.31 30.75 21.52
Source: Bugajski (2002, pp. 876–868).
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 95
secure Romania’s accession to NATO, which he had opposed ten years earlier. At
that moment, the identity change of Romania’s state–society complex was obvious.
But this change had started much earlier. In 1991, Iliescu signed a Romanian–Soviet
friendship treaty preventing his country’s accession to NATO. Domestic criticism
was limited enough to be ignored. In 1996, the same president tried to conclude a
much less ambitious friendship treaty with Russia. This time, domestic opposition
was so vocal that the plan had to be abandoned. Relations with Hungary followed a
similar trajectory, from the anti-Budapest ‘axis’ reuniting Iliescu and Meciar to the
conclusion of the Romanian–Hungarian friendship treaty. Society’s values were
progressively changing due to the external influence intermediated by the civic sector.
In turn, this change forced the neo-communist regime to moderate its anti-Western
foreign policy. Romania’s identity as an International Relations actor started to
change before the 1996 elections. The neo-communist elite was still in power and did
its best to preserve the authoritarian regime. But it was facing both external pressure
and the increasingly vocal opposition from its own civil society. The only choice was
to give up openly anti-Western foreign policies. But this only increased Western
influence in the country, thus accelerating the diffusion of the democratic values.
Iliescu was caught in democratization’s virtuous circle that, with a delay of six years,
finally placed Bucharest in the category of genuinely consolidating democracies.
5. The Ultra-Nationalist Regime of Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia
After the ‘velvet’ vanishing of Czechoslovakia (1 January 1993), the Slovak
nationalist movement responsible for the dismantlement of the federation did not
disappear. Its main target became the Hungarian minority (10.8% of the
population), accused of endangering national independence. In 1992, 58.4% of the
Slovaks had a negative attitude toward this minority. In the parliamentary elections
of the same year nationalist parties were voted for by 45.19% of the population
(Abele, 1996, p. 148). Opinion polls conducted in 1991 and 1994 showed that
respectively 55% and 62% of the Slovaks were ‘dissatisfied with democracy’
(Samson, 2001, p. 370). This allowed the nationalist Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS) and its leader, Vladimı´r Meciar, to progressively impose their
control on the country. The landslide victory in the 30 September–1 October 1994
election gave Meciar – in alliance with an ultra-nationalist and a neo-communist
party – full control of the Parliament (Bugajski, 2002, p. 292). He took the
opportunity to build an authoritarian regime unparalleled in post-communist
Central Europe. Figure 1 clearly shows the disastrous effects of Meciar’s regime on
democracy.
International Pressure and Its Consequences
While having little ideological affinity with the West, the government in Bratislava
could not simply adopt an openly anti-Western stance. Slovakia needed international
recognition while economic support from the EU and the International
Monetary Fund was essential. The perspective of EU accession was also very
popular: in 1997 it was supported by two-thirds of the Slovaks, while only 8%
opposed it (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer no. 8, 1998, Annex, figure 32).
96 T. Tudoroiu
Consequently, Western decision-makers hoped that criticism of Meciar’s authoritarian
practices would make him adopt a more moderate attitude.
In 1994/95 the European Union’s condemnation of Bratislava’s anti-democratic
actions did not seem very credible as Brussels was in fact increasing PHARE and
Action Plan aid to Slovakia (Kelley, 2001, pp. 247–248; Henderson, 1999, pp. 231–
232). Therefore, a more resolute attitude was adopted:
When Slovakia passed harsh amendments of the penal code, the EU protested
in a presidency declaration. The EU also criticized ‘the continuing absence of a
new law on minority languages’. . . . Commissioner Van den Broek and
European Commission president Jacques Santer reminded Slovakia of the
EU’s demands on Slovak reform. Hans van den Broek said in meeting with the
Slovak Deputy Prime Minister that ‘it would be regrettable if doubts over
Slovakia’s ability to satisfy the political criteria for membership jeopardized its
accession to the EU.’ During the spring of 1997, several other EU officials
added their voices to the criticism. When Slovakia held a problematic
referendum on NATO membership and direct presidential elections, the EU
issued a presidency declaration, and Van den Broek went to Slovakia and
talked with the top officials. (Ibid., pp. 249–250)
These warnings culminated in the EU Commission’s opinion on Slovakia’s accession
to the European Union, which identified Bratislava as the only candidate state not
fulfilling political (and, more precisely, democratic) conditions for accession (Avis de
la Commission sur la demande d’adhe´ sion de la Slovaquie a` l’Union europe´ enne,
1997). Consequently, the European Council of Luxembourg excluded Slovakia from
the first wave of the EU’s Eastern enlargement.
A similar stance was adopted by the United States. As early as October 1993 the
Helsinki Commission of the US Congress published a very critical Report on Human
Rights and Democratization in Slovakia (Samson, 2001, p. 372). It was in the
framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, of which Bratislava had become a
member, that American and NATO officials frequently expressed their criticism:
During a September 17–18, 1995, visit, U.S. Secretary of Defense, William
Perry discussed Slovakia’s progress in implementing the PfP program and its
preparations for integration into NATO. After reiterating general standards
for NATO membership, Secretary Perry urged Slovakia to make more progress
in democratization and toleration of a diversity of opinions. (Simon, 2004,
p. 164)
On 30 April 1996 Secretary General Javier Solana visited Bratislava and
stressed that NATO is a democratic organization that ‘associates countries that
respect democratic values, human rights, and differences between ethnic
minorities’. (Ibid., p. 165)
On July 14, 1997, U.S. Ambassador Ralph Johnson explained to a select
Slovak audience why the United States could not support Slovakia’s NATO
membership at that time. Simply put, the reason was ‘concern about Slovaka’s
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 97
democratic development’ and ‘the intolerant and unfair treatment of those with
opposing points of view and the increasing centralization of power. (Toma &
Kovac, 2001, p. 319)
As there was no positive reaction from Bratislava, the US State Secretary, Madeleine
Albright, went as far as stating that ‘Slovakia is a hole on the map of Europe’
(Deegan-Krause, 2003, p. 66). Finally, the 1997 Madrid Summit excluded Bratislava
from the first wave of NATO’s Eastern enlargement.
Criticism was also formulated by the High Commissioner for National Minorities
of the OSCE, Max Van der Stoel, and the Council of Europe. They were addressing
Meciar’s hostile attitude toward the Hungarian minority. Van der Stoel first visited
Slovakia in February 1993, one month after assuming the capacity of HCNM.
During the following years, he made frequent visits to meet officials in Bratislava and
representatives of the Hungarian minority, trying to help them open a dialogue. He
made comments and recommendations on newly adopted language and minority
legislation and tried to convince both Meciar and Slovak citizens of the negative
effects of discriminatory policies (Kemp, 2001, pp. 252–253; Pappagiani, 2003, p.
287). By 1997/98,
Van der Stoel’s constant insistence on respect for human rights made him
something of a nemesis for Meciar. His criticisms of the Meciar Government
were influential in shaping the opinion of the OSCE community towards
Slovakia. One could argue that Van der Stoel’s constant criticism of the Meciar
regime effectively . . . re-enforced Slovakia’s isolation from Western Europe.
(Kemp, 2001, p. 253)
The Slovak government and the Prime Minister himself were not pleased with these
waves of criticism and were aware of the fact that their public image might be
affected. An analyst even mentioned ‘Slovaks’ heightened sense of isolation’
(Jenkins, 2003, p. 137). Still, the regime’s authoritarian character did not change
at all. Even Iliescu-style superficial concessions were rejected. In fact, the only
immediate consequence of Western pressure was the creation of a pro-Russian
foreign policy similar to those of Ion Iliescu in Romania and Zhan Videnov in
Bulgaria.
The End of Meciar’s Regime
The EU, NATO and the OSCE were completely unable to influence the antidemocratic
practices of the government in Bratislava. But they were very effective in
influencing Slovak society itself. The country’s non-inclusion in the first wave of EU
enlargement, for example, had an immediate and undeniable impact on popular
support for Meciar and precipitated his fall. Equally important, the constant efforts
of the three organizations largely contributed to the diffusion of the Western system
of values. Ultra-nationalism progressively lost ground. As Table 1 shows, between
1992 and 1998 the majority of the population ceased to perceive ethnic groups and
minorities as a threat. Neighbouring countries to which these minorities were related
were seen as a menace by only 30% in 1998 compared to 46% six years earlier. This
98 T. Tudoroiu
does not mean that ultra-nationalism completely disappeared. By 1998, however, it
had lost the dominant status acquired in the early 1990s. The immediate consequence
was the constant decrease of electoral support for Meciar and his allies illustrated by
Table 3. The leading political forces at the time of Slovak independence became, ten
years later, unable to reach 20% of the votes.
Another, less visible but equally important process was the impressive development
of Slovak civil society and its mobilization against Meciar’s anti-European
authoritarianism. In the 1990s, Slovak NGOs had the most talented and imaginative
leaders in the region. This sector was very diversified and sophisticated. It was also
very cohesive and one of the most dynamic in all CEE states. Table 4 shows that the
1996 density of Slovak NGOs was not yet similar to those of Hungary or the Czech
Republic; but it was highly superior to those of Poland, Romania or Bulgaria.
Furthermore, these NGOs were very diversified with respect to their field of activity
and were successful in building a national cooperation network coordinated by a
national committee (Drauss, 2002, p. 62).
Civil society opposition to the Meciar regime was encouraged by the prodemocratic
attitude of the Slovak Catholic Church. In May 1995, the Conference of
Slovak Bishops stated that the government’s action ‘means to damage the
foundations of the state and to create an atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust and
tension. Slovakia, as a young country, cannot allow such a political development’
(Fisher, 1996a, p. 40).
The Slovak Ecumenical Council of Churches equally emphasized the importance
of ‘the respect of the principles of democracy, of freedom of ideas, of cultural
development, and of tolerance’ (Ibid.). The architect of the anti-Meciar policy, the
bishop of Banska Bytrica, Rudolf Balaz, received threats, was accused of trafficking
Table 3. Results of Slovak nationalist parties in parliamentary elections, 1992–2002 (%)
1992 1994 1998 2002 2006
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Meciar) 37.26 34.97 27.00 19.5 8.8
Slovak National Party 7.93 5.40 9.07 – 11.7
Nationalist Parties – Total 45.19 40.37 36.07 19.5 20.5
Source: Abele (1996, p. 148); Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2009).
Table 4. Development of NGOs in CEE (end 1996)
Country
NGOs per million
inhabitants
Slovakia 1797
Romania 529
Hungary 3921
Czech Republic 2669
Poland 648
Bulgaria 345
Albania 88
Macedonia 71
Source: Gill (2002, p. 115).
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 99
religious art, and had his home and office searched by the police (Fisher, 1996a, pp.
40–41). But this did not stop church support for democratic forces, which
significantly contributed to the delegitimization of Meciar’s regime.
Another major actor was independent mass media. Government’s strict control of
most media generated frequent protests. In March 1995, almost 120,000 Slovaks
signed a petition in favour of national TV programmes banned by Meciar. Two large
demonstrations were organized in Bratislava in support of the same demand
(Skolkay, 1996, p. 19). Anti-regime activism was championed by the SME
newspaper and the TV Markı´za television station, which had to face authorities’
hostile and often abusive measures. For SME,
Meciar’s regime used various legal and semi-legal methods to undermine its
position, and ruin this newspaper. For example, it arranged that SME could
not print in a printing house that was privatized by people closely connected to
MDS. The Editor-in-Chief, Karil Jezik, was arrested and interrogated several
times over published articles and news reports criticizing the government.
(Abraham, 2000, p. 202)
The case of TV Markı´za was more spectacular, as it culminated in a direct
confrontation between authorities and civil society:
The government tolerated TV Markı´za until the election campaign in August
1998 when the Slovak Intelligence Agency (SIS) masterminded a plan to shoot
down or neutralize the TV station. It failed mainly because for several days
thousands of Slovak citizens came to its defence occupying its premises and
demanded the resumption of free broadcasting . . . Thus, although important
in defeating Meciar’s regime, TV Markı´za benefited from the already sprawling
civil society that needed an independent source of information regarding the
government and the opposition. (Abraham, 2000, p. 204; see also Fisher,
1996b)
Overall, the dramatic decrease of ultra-nationalist convictions as well as the active
opposition of Slovak NGOs, Catholic Church, and independent media highly
delegitimized Meciar’s regime. The 1998 elections brought to power democratic
forces that put an end to authoritarian practices. The change was so profound that
even nationalist parties had to take it into consideration. Before the 2002 elections, a
leader of the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party (which had been part of
Meciar’s ruling coalition) widely known for his attacks against the Hungarian
minority was asked to state his party’s main electoral theme. Without hesitation, he
answered ‘Unemployment!’ Nevertheless, this was not enough to save his party,
which received less than 5% of the votes and had to quit the Parliament (DeeganKrause,
2003, p. 76). Similar to the Romanian case, Slovak authoritarianism was
overthrown by the profound change in Slovakia’s society. The 1998 democratic, proWestern
turn created the conditions for further deepening this transformation, which
became irreversible.
An interesting development, however, was triggered by the 2006 parliamentary
election. The Slovak National Party recovered from its 2002 internal crisis and
100 T. Tudoroiu
achieved 11.7% of the vote. Meciar’s party, on the contrary, continued its descent to
below 9%. Overall, the nationalist vote stabilized at its 2002 level of about 20%
(Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2009). The victor of the 2006 elections was
Robert Fico’s Smer-Social Democracy party. As its score of 29.14% imposed the
formation of a government coalition, Fico took the surprising step of allying himself
with the nationalists. Both the SNP and Meciar’s party entered the government,
causing widespread internal and external criticism.
Smer-SD is often described as ‘a populist outfit calling itself social democrat’ (The
Economist, 2006) while its leader is sometimes compared with the Kaczynski
brothers in neighbouring Poland. Fico was fully aware of the negative consequences
of this coalition choice, but decided to assume the costs. The Slovak National Party’s
attitude toward the Hungarian minority led to the rapid deterioration of relations
with Budapest. Other undemocratic moves followed. The 2008 new media law was
qualified as ‘the most punitive and, potentially, arbitrary’ in all Central and Eastern
Europe (The Economist, 2008a). It is clear that Smer’s choices would have been
different before EU accession. As Olli Rehn, the enlargement commissioner had to
admit, ‘after a country has a seat round the table, it is much harder to apply pressure
to it’ (The Economist, 2008b). Reduced external constraint and Fico’s populism and
propensity for extremist alliances were in fact a good starting point for an
authoritarian drift. Under different circumstances, the Slovak leader would most
likely have become a second Meciar. But, despite his questionable choices, Fico is
not building an authoritarian regime. As a pragmatic politician, he understands that
such a regime would simply not find enough supporters. It is this self-restraint that
illustrates the fundamental change of post-communist Slovakia and the irreversibility
of its democratic trajectory.
6. Explaining the Case Studies
It is striking that, despite differences in local circumstances and ideological
orientation, the Romanian and Slovak non-democratic regimes had almost identical
ends. Specific conditions allowed Iliescu and Meciar to attract public support, which
they used to build and consolidate authoritarian regimes. However, authoritarianism
had to be ‘soft’. Ultra-nationalism and neo-communism had the upper hand, but
democratic values were nevertheless adopted by important minorities. These as well
as Western pressure forced the two strongmen to moderate their actions (which was
not the case in Belarus or Central Asia). Repression was limited and an appearance
of democracy was maintained. In turn, this moderation allowed the two countries’
full inclusion in the CEE-10 group that concluded Europe Agreements and took part
in NATO’s PfP. In a way, this was the beginning of the authoritarian regimes’ end.
The diffusion of democratic norms and values was accelerated. By 1995/96 neocommunism
and ultra-nationalism had lost predominance within the two societies.
The democratic system of values had been assimilated by the majority of the
population. Despite their full control of the state apparatus and their efforts to
counter the development of a vocal civil society, the two strongmen were now
completely delegitimized. Their fall was only a question of time.
It was quite normal that new leaders in Bucharest and Bratislava dismantle the
authoritarian regimes and adopt the democratic, pro-Western orientation
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 101
demanded by the majority of the electorate. This reinforced the effect of Western
influence (and especially that of EU conditionality), thus accelerating the process
that finally allowed EU and NATO accession. The change is also illustrated by
the evolution of the former ruling parties. In Romania, neo-communists finally
understood the need to reform. When they returned to power after the 2000
general elections, they did not try to reconstruct the authoritarian regime, despite
the fact that most important positions of the state were again occupied by Iliescu
and his associates. In Slovakia, Meciar did not show the adaptability of Iliescu
and his party could not eliminate him. Consequently, the party is supported
today by less than 9% of the electorate. Even as a member of the post-2006
ruling coalition, it has a very limited influence. Overall, the 1996–98 episode put
an end to the existence of all major anti-democratic political forces in the two
countries.
One point has to be made with regard to the two-level character of the external
influence. As already mentioned, most Europeanization theorists see externally
induced change within post-communist societies as the result of a process that
involves mainly the political elites. These are in direct contact with the
international environment and represent the most obvious targets of persuasive
Western efforts. As elites’ reactions are very visible, it is easy to assess the effects
of their international socialization and to conclude that these elites represent the
essential transmission belt between Western, democratic norms and values and
Eastern societies. However, the Romanian and Slovak cases show that ruling
elites can adopt ‘politics of ambiguity’ or even become openly hostile to
democratization incentives or pressure. Opposition leaders and political parties
can be too weak and divided to successfully replace them in this task. And still,
societies change and democratization occurs. This is due to the fact that external
factors directly influence the post-communist societies. In the two case studies,
most of the intermediation of democratic values transfer was assumed by two
types of non-elite ‘intermediate agents’: on the one hand, Western political
personalities such as the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; on
the other, a nascent civil society – NGOs (many of which were Western-funded),
churches, trade unions, and independent mass media. These channels made simple
citizens familiar with the values rejected by their elites but also aware of the
consequences of their undemocratic behaviour. They were exposed to both the
incentive- and persuasion-based mechanisms put in place by Western international
organizations and, unlike Meciar and Iliescu, became fully involved in the
socialization process. A clear element substantiating the fact that external factors
represent indeed the very engine of post-communist democratization is the
identical and simultaneous character of changes illustrated by Tables 1–3. Despite
their common communist past, these societies do not have identical political,
socio-economic, cultural and religious characteristics. They are not linked by
significant cultural, economic or information flows. Nevertheless, there is no
difference in the progressive adoption of democratic norms and values by these
two societies. This can hardly be the consequence of national, internal causes.
Romania and Slovakia experienced identical democratization processes taking
place at the same time in the presence of the same international factors. External
influence is the only credible explanation.
102 T. Tudoroiu
7. Fast, Slow and No-Democratizers
While it is difficult to deny the importance of external factors presented in the two
case studies, one might be tempted to formulate the hypothesis that only
authoritarian or ‘ethnocratic’ post-communist regimes (such as those in Romania,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia) democratize under external influence while
the democratization of other CEE-10 has internal causes. But this would lead to the
conclusion that the three very similar Baltic states experienced fundamentally
different democratization mechanisms: externally triggered in Estonia and Latvia
and internally-based in Lithuania. The same improbable difference would have
existed between the Czech and Slovak parts of former Czechoslovakia.
Of course, there is a difference between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ democratization processes
in Central and Eastern Europe. The speed was determined by the level of the state–
society complex that was first socialized by the West. In the early 1990s, the Poles,
Hungarians and Czechs were targeted by the same Western actions as their postcommunist
neighbours. Their elites responded enthusiastically to the incentive- and
persuasion-based mechanisms and were rapidly socialized, acquiring fully democratic
convictions. They immediately assumed the mission of ‘transmission belt’ and
became the ‘intermediate agents’ that diffused democratic norms and values to the
rest of the society. The latter was also socialized directly by the West in a way similar
to Slovakia and Romania. However, this process lacked visibility due to the efficient
actions of the elites. The slowly-democratizing states, for their part, could not take
advantage of the high-speed, elite-powered intermediation and had to rely on the less
rapid international socialization of society. But in both cases the state–society
complex was influenced by external factors and finally came to be successfully
socialized, changing its identity both domestically and internationally.
The difference, then, comes from the attitude of the elites, which is determined by
domestic factors well described by classical transitology. Lack of space prevents me
from exploring this subject more fully. I will only say that internal factors shaped the
post-communist democratization processes by determining the receptivity of CEE
elites and societies to the process of international socialization. Due to specific
domestic causes, the Central European elites had different predispositions from their
counterparts in Slovakia or Romania. But differences were even bigger between the
societies of the CEE-10 states and their southern and eastern neighbours. The former
could take advantage of a nascent civic culture that rapidly developed under the
influence of the Western incentives and persuasion, generating widespread civic
engagement that in turn favoured full democratization. This is substantiated by the
fact that both the fall of communism and subsequent democratic consolidation were
marked by massive public support and participation. CIS and Balkan societies, on
the contrary, preserved their historical passivity, being reluctant over civic
engagement and tolerant toward authoritarian practices. Especially in the CIS, the
end of communism was perceived far less enthusiastically than in Central Europe
and did not bring the same fundamental changes. Against this different background,
the same international mechanisms were able to efficiently diffuse democratic values
in CEE-10 countries while only superficially affecting CIS and Western Balkan state–
society complexes (see Fritz, 2005). Internal factors were therefore important, but
only as preconditions for successful international socialization.
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 103
Of course, this view is not shared by most transitologists who remain unimpressed
by theories of international socialization. This is why a counterfactual scenario
might be useful. Let us suppose for a moment that World War II ended differently.
In 1989, communism is dismantled, but the West is dominated by ultra-nationalist
values. Western states have authoritarian political systems ruled by ultra-nationalist
parties. Their public opinion abhors democracy. Both NATO and the European
Union promote openly ultra-nationalist authoritarianism. In post-communist
Warsaw, Budapest and Prague local democratic and ultra-nationalist political forces
struggle to impose their own system of values. But the democrats are not supported
by anyone outside their own borders. Furthermore, their ideology is condemned by
all Western states. The ultra-nationalists, on the contrary, are able to claim that
embracing their values will bring Western protection against weakened but still
dangerous Moscow. Moreover, Western states and organizations vocally encourage
Central European ultra-nationalism. The European Union uses political conditionality
to promote ultra-nationalist values. NATO’s Partnership for Peace is open only
to ultra-nationalist states. The OSCE’s High Commissioner against National
Minorities tours Central Europe giving public speeches and TV interviews marked
by ultra-nationalist propaganda. He makes simple citizens clearly understand the
price of supporting democratic regimes. Both Western states and NGOs generously
support Central European ultra-nationalist nongovernmental organizations that are
very active in spreading ultra-nationalist ideas.
If the democratization of Central Europe were a domestic process, all these
external factors should have no consequence. Due to purely internal causes, both
elites and society in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would resist
geopolitical constraints, reject incentives, ignore persuasion, turn their back on
visiting Western politicians, avoid Western-financed NGOs and become islands of
democracy in an overwhelmingly ultra-nationalist (and implicitly hostile) Europe.
Such a result, however, is not very plausible. More probably, the international
environment would determine the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs to adopt the
dominant, ultra-nationalist values. Of course, this is pure speculation. But, as all
counterfactuals, it has a certain illustrative value. It suggests that domestic factors
are important in predisposing a society to democratize. But even the countries with
the most favourable internal conditions will fail to democratize in an international
environment lacking the appropriate external determinants.
8. Conclusion
While recognizing the importance of the internal factors as preconditions for
democratization, this article argues that the post-communist democratization and
democratic consolidation were generated by external causes. The ideological and
identity void left in Central and Eastern Europe by the fall of communism was filled
by the democratic system of values due mainly to the action of the triple institutional
structure formed by the CSCE/OSCE, EU’s Europe Agreements, and NATO’s PfP.
This framework efficiently interacted with the CEE state–society complexes in a
process of international socialization that used both incentive- and persuasion-based
strategies. The mechanisms involved were strategic calculation and role playing for
the former strategy and normative suasion for the latter. The most efficient – and
104 T. Tudoroiu
most visible – incentive-based instrument was of course the European Union’s
democratic conditionality. Normative suasion took more subtle forms that included
such techniques as consistency, authority and social proof. However, persuasion did
not lack visibility. On the contrary, it was promoted by prominent Western
representatives such as the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities. Their
persuasive efforts were directed not only at the elites but also at simple citizens,
making frequent use of public speeches and TV interviews. In fact, the two Western
strategies targeted from the very beginning both the elites and the society of CEE
states. Consequently, two parallel processes of international socialization were
initiated. One was meant to modify the system of values of the CEE elites. When
they responded positively, rapid democratization followed as the elites became the
‘intermediate agents’ efficiently diffusing democratic norms and values to the rest of
the society. The slower, parallel process of international socialization of simple
citizens was therefore much less visible. But the Slovak and Romanian case studies
show that the elites hostile to democratization that resisted Western socialization
were unable to stop the international socialization of their societies. This was a
slower process whose ‘intermediate agents’ were components of local civil society as
well as the Western representatives themselves. The latter successfully used
persuasion and incentive-based instruments, making simple citizens understand the
costs of supporting their undemocratic leaders. Overall, the entire state–society
complex was involved in an international interaction similar to that described by
Wendt’s sociology of international relations. Faced with the progressive change of
the values shared by their societies, authoritarian regimes lost their legitimacy and
were finally overthrown by ‘electoral revolutions’. Their successors further opened
their countries to international influence. This cercle vertueux led to genuine
democratization and Europeanization, which explain subsequent EU and NATO
accession.
The Western Balkans (except Slovenia) and CIS republics, on the contrary, failed
to genuinely democratize. This is due to a different set of internal causes that
constrained the international diffusion of democratic norms and values. The initial
lack of predisposition toward accepting democratic values determined the noninclusion
of the Western Balkans and CIS states in the Europe Agreements as well as
the inefficiency of the CSCE/OSCE and NATO’s PfP. With no international
socialization process able to diffuse efficiently the Western system of democratic
values, these societies were conquered by ultra-nationalism and neo-communism.
Non-democratic regimes sharing these ideologies were put in place, reinforcing
authoritarian trends. The CEE cercle vertueux was replaced by a vicious circle that
made democratic consolidation impossible. However, this is by no means a
pessimistic ‘end of history’. If local conditions change and the appropriate
international framework is put in place, the post-communist states in the Western
Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States might one day follow the
democratization trajectory of their Central and East European neighbours.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Ste´ fanie Von Hlatky-Udvarhelyi (Research Group in
International Security) for her helpful suggestions.
Post-Communist Democratization Revisited 105
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