The Little Entente
Author(s): Eduard Beneš
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Sep. 15, 1922), pp. 66-72
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028198
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THE LITTLE ENTENTE
By Eduard Benes
THE new states which in Central Europe have taken the
place of the Hapsburg monarchy owe their creation to the
living will of the peoples who tor centuries had been op
pressed in Austro-Hungary, and who had in vain endeavored to
secure within that state the necessary conditions for a free and
full development of their economic and cultural life. The revo
lutionary activities of these peoples?whether of a military or
diplomatic character, whether undertaken abroad, side by side
with the Allies, or at home?were the clear expression of this will,
which could only be acted upon successfully because the Euro
pean War created the pre-conditions for a new adjustment of
Europe and because the substitution of new independent states
for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was not only an act of
historic justice but at the same time in the interests of Europe
generally. The Danubian monarchy was the aider, abettor and
tool of Hohenzollern imperialism. It was, moreover, by its very
constitution, the outward expression of a German-Magyar
system of violence and the living negation of those ideals which
brought half Europe and America into the conflict. Its removal
became a manifest necessity as an insurance against future
dangers and in order to secure the triumph of the principles for
which the war was fought.
The changes which have thus been made in Central Europe are,
of course, greater than any which have taken place in other parts
of the continent. An entire great state has been obliterated from
the map of Europe, an ancient and mighty dynasty deprived of its
power and dominion; frontiers of new states have been de
limited, and with their creation there have been severed political
ties and, above all, economic ties of no mean importance.
It is not surprising that there are people who regard with
scepticism the capacity of the new states for independent exis
tence and who have doubts regarding their future destiny. The
question arises whether Europe has gained by this new adjust
ment of conditions at her very center. Has the dissolution of a
great economic entity, with a vast network of arteries and com
munications, and its severance into various fractions isolated
from each other by customs barriers, contributed to European
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THE LITTLE ENTENTE 67
development? Has not the creation of new independent states
sown in the very lap of Europe the seeds of fresh political con
flicts, arising on the one hand from a desire to avenge the
revolution in Austria and Hungary, and on the other hand from
the impossibility of drawing exact ethnographical frontiers and
from the fact that more or less considerable racial minorities had
to be left in all the states concerned?
It is for the policy of the new Central European states to supply
the answer to these questions and to demonstrate the capacity of
the new constellation for existence.
Czechoslovakia and her leaders have been from the very outset
conscious of the fact that it would be their task to convert into
positive^ creative effort that splendid determination for inde
pendent existence displayed so successfully by the whole nation
in its work for the revolution; that they would have to consolidate
the state within and secure it against dangers from without; that
on the basis of the peace treaties they would have to arrive at
just relations with all their neighbors and contribute, to the best
of their powers and abilities, to the pacification and consolidation
of a Europe unsettled by long years of warfare.
Such were, from the outset, the positive, fundamental prin
ciples determining the direction and the methods of Czecho
slovakia's foreign policy. There were not lacking, of course,
some moments of a negative character, brought on by the danger
arising from a reaction against the peace treaties, from the eco
nomic difficulties prevailing throughout Central Europe and from
the general political and economic chaos which succeeded the war.
All these dangers, and also the positive political aims above
outlined, were common to all the nations which had been liber
ated from the Hapsburg yoke. Nothing was more natural
than that there should come cooperation in the field of practical
politics. The work of bringing about the dissolution of the
Hapsburg monarchy had already been carried on with a certain
degree of contact and mutual understanding. The memorable
Congress of the Oppressed Nations of Austria-Hungary, held at
Rome in the spring of 1918, is one of the striking proofs of this
fact. At the Peace Conference, too, the liberated nations acted in
unison, maintaining a common front against their enemies and
pursuing a common fundamental aim.
The first stage of this common policy took a concrete form in
the agreement concluded between Czechoslovakia and Jugo
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68 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
slavia on the 14th of September, 1920, which is in substance a
defensive convention against the Hungarian menace. It is the
product of long negotiations that had been carried on from the
end of the year 1919.
Hungary had become the center of a reactionary monarchistic
movement which, with the restoration of the Hapsburgs as its
motto, aimed at overthrowing the new order of things in Central
Europe and threatened the security of the young succession states
?and with it, of course, the security of Europe as a whole. The
aristocratic and military elements, together with the reactionary
middle class, saw in the recall of the Hapsburg dynasty to the
Hungarian throne a means of evading the consequences of the
defeat they had suffered and the obligations arising from the
treaties of peace. Their designs for a restoration were bound up
with the hope for a renewal of the "integrity of the Kingdom of
Hungary"?that is, the return to them of Slovakia, Transylvania
and the Banat.
The Hapsburg menace became acute as early as August, 1919,
when Archduke Josef Hapsburg seized the reins of power.
Czechoslovakia at once sent a very emphatic note to the Peace
Conference on the dangers of a Hapsburg restoration for Central
European peace. The sequel to this step was the note of the
Supreme Council of August 21st, announcing the opposition of
the Allied states to a Hapsburg government in Hungary. The
Archduke's designs were thus checked. Hapsburg propaganda,
however, continued to do its work under the cloak of legitimism
and not even a fresh note sent by the Supreme Allied Council on
February 10,1920, was able to put an end to the plans which had
been laid between Budapest and Hertenstein, the seat of ex-King
Charles. The defensive Convention concluded between Czecho
slovakia and Jugoslavia provided that these two states should
mutually help each other in case of an unprovoked attack by
Hungary. That convention, supplemented by the assurance on
the part of Rumania, given on the occasion of the Bucharest
negotiations between Take Jonescu and myself on September
19th, that Rumania acknowledged a similar obligation even
though no formal treaty was as yet concluded (it was not signed
till April 23, 1921), created a strong and permanent bulwark
against the execution of the Hapsburg plans. It was against
this bulwark that the attempts at a Hapsburg "putch" twice
came to grief: the first time in April, 1921, and the second time in
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THE LITTLE ENTENTE 69
September of the same year. The alliance of the three succession
states for the purpose of defence against attacks from Hungary
thus successfully passed a practical test and proved itself a true
guardian of the dearly-bought liberty of the nations that had been
freed from the Austro-Hungarian yoke.
This defensive character of the alliance between these three
states?generally termed the "Little Entente"?does not, of
course, exhaust its entire political significance. In the negotia
tions leading up to the defensive agreement it was clear that a
common policy against Hungary must be merely part of a
broader political conception. It was a question, in concreto^ of
establishing a Central European group which, while carrying out
the work of its own consolidation, should aid the general task
of reconstruction.
The task was conceived in a very real and practical sense and
in the clear consciousness that it could not be accomplished at a
stroke, but only step by step. The evolution of the Little Entente
itself is a proof of this fact. In its first stage it was composed of
Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia alone and its aims were summed
up in the defensive treaty against Hungary. Rumania was joined
up with these two only by means of negotiations which took
place among the statesmen of the three countries, and through a
verbal acknowledgment that in the event of a fight against
Magyar aggression there would be a strong community of
interest. It was not until April 23, 1921, that a treaty was con
cluded between the three. The narrow, formal contents of the
accord between the three Central European states was supple
mented by an ever-growing political harmony in all that con
cerned the fundamental problems of Central Europe. Not only
did there exist an identity of opinion as regards relations with
Hungary?all three states desired to be on the very best terms
with Hungary?but there was a general accord on the Central
European problem as a whole, especially as regards the effort to
restore the Hapsburg monarchy under the cloak of a "Danubian
Federation." And, what was most important of all, there was
absolute unanimity as to the aims and methods of a common
policy?a unanimity which bestowed on the Little Entente its
European significance and enabled it to fulfil its general political
mission.
To the second stage of the evolution of the Little Entente
belongs the adjustment of its relations and the relations of its
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7o FOREIGN AFFAIRS
constituent members with neighboring states, and the drawing
in of several of those neighbors to the inner circle.
In this connection mention should be first made of the agree
ment arrived at between Italy and Jugoslavia in the Treaty of
Rapallo. This really signified the gaining over of Italy to the
Little Entente's policy of common defense against attempts at
Hapsburg restoration?an agreement supplemented, after nego
tiations conducted by Count Sforza and myself in Rome at the
beginning of February, 1921, by an understanding between
Czechoslovakia and Italy.
A no less significant extension of the political circle of the Little
Entente was the treaty concluded by Minister Skirmunt and
myself at Prague on November 6, 1921, on behalf of Poland and
Czechoslovakia respectively. That treaty definitively put an end
to the unsettled relations existing between the two states as a
result of the diplomatic controversies in respect to Teschen, and
laid the foundations for peaceful neighborly existence and col
laboration. Under the treaty the two states mutually recognized
each other's territories as defined in the peace treaties and
undertook, whenever necessary, to agree upon a common appli
cation of the terms of those treaties. They undertook mutually
to observe neutrality and t? settle disputes by arbitration.
The policy of friendly co-existence on the basis of a recognition
of the peace treaties, neutrality in case of a conflict with third
parties, and the settlement of disputes by arbitration made up,
also, the substance of the treaty concluded with Austria on De
cember 16th at Lany. This treaty did not make Austria a mem
ber of the Little Entente, but it signified an accord between the
policy of Austria and that of the Little Entente.
There can be no doubt about the political meaning of the coop
eration with the Little Entente of these three states. Central
Europe ceases to be a scene of political chaos and is growing into a
firm structure consolidated along the lines laid down by the peace
treaties?a structure whose central point is the alliance formed by
Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania.
It is true that there is one gap in the structure. Hungary still
stands outside. She has excluded herself by virtue of her policy,
directed as it is against the security of her neighbors. There is
little doubt that this isolation cannot be permanent, and that
Hungary too will one day take the place in this Central Euro
pean peace block which is hers both politically and economically.
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THE LITTLE ENTENTE 71
In her policy Czechoslovakia has already, more than once, dis
played her good will in the direction of collaboration even with
Hungary. She commenced economic negotiations with that
country in March, 1921, and reopened them for a second time in
June of the same year, but the attempts at a "putch" made by
the Magyar Legitimists defeated these manifestations of good
will. It depends on the future policy of Hungary, on her loyalty
to the obligations she has undertaken, and on her attitude toward
her neighbors, as to when it will be possible to fill up this gap in
the Central European system of states.
The significance of the Little Entente for peace and consoli
dation would not, of course, have been fully grasped if that group
had confined itself solely to its political programme and had not
demonstrated its no less important economic aspect. The con
sultations which preceded and which accompanied the negotia
tions for political agreement among the states of the Little
Entente and the states associated with them, contributed sub
stantially to facilitating and accelerating agreement on economic
matters as well. They went hand in hand with them, supple
mented, extended and indeed practically evoked them.
Central Europe, which previous to the war formed an economic
entity, naturally suffered economically on being split up into a
series of states. The connection of this dissolution with the un
fortunate post-war economic plight of the Central European
states is, however, frequently exaggerated. No single economic
territory was immune from the effects of the universal economic
crisis. The economic programme embraced in the policy pur
sued by the Little Entente states took cognizance equally of
both the universal and the special, or local, causes of the crisis.
Their policy was directed towards eradicating those causes by
means of economic agreements, collaboration and mutual help.
Following out this policy the states of Central Europe were
able to abandon the primitive "compensation" or barter agree
ments for the direct exchange of commodities, and to proceed to
a system of economic and trade conventions linking up all the
states?a system which is continually being supplemented and
extended. Czechoslovakia, in particular, as early as September
18, 1920, substituted for a previously existing "compensation"
agreement with Jugoslavia a regular commercial treaty, and
similar treaties followed with Rumania on April 23, 1921, with
Italy on March 23rd, with Austria on May 4th and with Poland
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72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
on September 20th of the same year. The more general economic
problems common to all the Central European states and issuing
from a common past were solved with undeniable success at the
economic conferences which took place at Rome (April 6th to
June 15th) and at Porto Rosa (October 29th to November 25th).
This policy of sympathetic economic cooperation also contributed
substantially to prevent the economic crisis in Central Europe
from attaining catastrophai dimensions, and to produce a
gradual but none the less unmistakable consolidation. Austria
alone continues to suffer under grievous difficulties, the alle
viation of which does not lie within the powers of her Central
European neighbors alone. They have, nevertheless, done their
best to relieve her situation by economic cooperation and by
direct help, such as the loan of five hundred million crowns
advanced to her by Czechoslovakia.
The evolution of the Little Entente is manifestly not yet com
pleted. Its third stage will doubtless consist of a deepening and
extending of the foundations upon which it has grown up and a
further strengthening of all the ties and connections already
formed. The practical tests which it has successfully stood?for
instance recently at Genoa?are adequate proof of its significance
and confirm the correctness of its methods.
To speak today of a "Balkanized" Central Europe is mere
distortion of facts. Central Europe has ceased to be a scene of
disorder and confusion; organization has taken the place of
chaos, and a new system of states has arisen whose mission it is
to preserve the results of the revolution of 1918 for the peoples of
the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to renew and to strengthen
law and order on the basis of the peace treaties, and to contribute
generally to the work of European pacification and consolidation.
To the Little Entente is due the merit of having created this
system; it is its center and driving force.
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