651
THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY OF 1955
AND THE COLD WAR
ROBERT L. FERRING
Loras College
N MAY 15, 1955, the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain,
~ ~ France, and the Soviet Union announced to a cheering crowd gathered
0 outside the baroque Belvedere Palace in Vienna that they had put their
signatures to a State Treaty for Austria.’For
Austrians, the significance of the treaty was that seventeen years of occupation
by foreign troops would soon end. Austrians could look forward to complete
sovereignty for the first time since mid-March of 1938 when Nazi Germany’s war
machine lumbered across the Austrian border. For the rest of the world, the significance
of the treaty lies elsewhere.
In Austria, as in other regions of central Europe, the Soviet Union and the
United States and its allies came into conflict following the second world war. On
its face the Austrian conflict concerned a basic disagreement over the terms according
to which Austria would be given her independence. The disagreement led to
protracted negotiations, and was settled at last through the agreement of the United
States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union - as well as Austria to
the
terms of a treaty. Thus the situation was a conflict which led to protracted negotiations
of eight years and approximately four hundred four-power meetings at various
levels,2 and finally to a peaceful accommodation of the conflict. Such a course of
events is not unusual in the world of diplomacy. What is interesting and significant
about the Austrian treaty, however, is that negotiations themselves, concerning the
specific points at issue, had only slight relevance to the final agreement.
Because of her small geographical size, her relatively small population of
seven million, and her limited resources, Austria was not a prize over which the
powers would be inclined to fight. Consequently, the four powers could be expected
to deal with Austria not within the narrow confines of the Austrian question itself,
but in terms of the Austrian question as a part of the whole range of questions
dividing the Soviet Union from the three Western powers; that is, in terms of what
is called &dquo;the cold war&dquo; in Europe.
The conflict over Austria is not the only East-West dispute which his been
settled peacefully since the cold war began, but it is the only one, between the
conclusion of the treaties of peace with the former Axis powers in 1947 and 1959,
which resulted in a treaty observed by both the United States and its Western allies
and the Soviet Union. Thus, this particular dispute provides a unique study in the
peaceful settlement of a cold-war issue. As such, it ought to be studied more carefully
to see if the dispute and its resolution provide information helpful to the
1Provisions of the treaty are explained in detail in Felix Ermacora’s Dokumente Osterreichs
Staatsvertrag und Neutralitat (Berlin, 1957).
2See statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on June 10, 1955, quoted in Paul E. Zinner, Documents on American Foreign
Relations (New York, 1956), p. 158.
652
understanding of Soviet policy objectives and techniques. For example, broadly
speaking, study of the dispute again raises the question whether Soviet policy gets
its direction and motivation from the realities of world politics perhaps more than
from communist theory.
This study undertakes to present a brief historical background account of the
conflict over the Austrian treaty question and to analyze the significance of that
conflict as it was related to over-all East-West conflicts and world politics generally.33
HISTORY:I POSTWAR CONTROL OF AUSTRIA
The origins of the Austrian conflict lie in the Anschluss Austria’s
annexation
in 1938 by Germany - and the subsequent participation by Austrians as soldiers in
Nazi Germany’s armies during the second world war.~4
Austria occupied a unique position among the victims of Nazi aggression. She
was the only nation which was formally annexed in its entirety by Germany. For
this reason, from the point of view of the Allies, Austria was a question mark: was
Austria during the war an unwilling captive of the Axis, terrified under the circumstances
into cooperating with Germany, or was Austria an enthusiastic partner in
Hitler’s war? Or, perhaps a little of both? The Allies did not know. This postwar
indecision had its history.
In April 1938, the United States recognized the annexation of Austria as an
accomplished fact to be dealt with only as a fact and not as a cause for action to
remedy the injustice done by the annexation. The annexation was regarded as too
slight a provocation for war. Only when the United States entered the war in 1941
did her policy begin to shift from one of informal protest to one of action which
could result in restoration of Austrian independence. The shift toward a more
active policy began in August of 1941 with the Atlantic Charter. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill concluded their
meeting in the Atlantic with a joint declaration that their nations sought no
aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise, and that they wished to see no territorial
changes which did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
They then declared that they &dquo;respect the right of all peoples to choose
the form of government under which they will live&dquo; and that they &dquo;wish to see the
sovereign right and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them.&dquo; 5
That Austrians were later correct in interpreting this charter statement to
include them is clear from President Roosevelt’s radio message of December 9,
1941.6 When explaining the necessity for the United States to enter the war, Roosevelt
listed Hitler’s aggressions, among them, Austria, as justification for United
States entry.’
3
Lengthy amplification of details is not necessary here since excellent detailed studies are
available; see, for example, William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation
ofAustria (Bonn, 1961).
4Hans Kohn, The Future of Austria (New York, 1955).
5United States Department of State, Press Releases, 18 (April 6, 1938), 624.
6Red-White-Red Book, Justice for Austria, First Part (Vienna, 1947), p. 23.
7
Department of State Bulletin, 5, No. 129 (Washington, 1941), 477.
653
The United States went only two steps further in clarifying its policy toward
Austria during the period prior to early 1945, when it was clear that the war was
almost won. The first was a promise in early 1943 to restore seized property, and
the second was a joint promise, entered into in the fall of 1943 by the four major
Allies, to li.berate Austria.
By October 1943, the need for coordinated planning by the major allies for the
postwar period had become pressing as the Soviet army was about to liberate Kiev,
and the forces of the Western Allies were pushing up the Italian peninsula. The
foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain met in
Moscow late in the month, and, at one of the first sessions, Anthony Eden, Cordell
Hull, and V. M. Molotov agreed on a declaration on Austria. The declaration did
not attempt to determine the future physical form of Austria. It was essentially a
compromise. Austria was referred to in the declaration as &dquo;the first free country
to fall a victim of Hitlerite aggression.&dquo; 8 The three governments promised to liberate
Austria from German domination; the annexation of Austria was declared null
and void; and the Allies stated that they considered themselves in no way bound
by any changes effected since the date of the Anschluss. The three declared that
they wished to see re-established a free and independent Austria. In addition, they
indicated it would be necessary to help Austria and her neighboring states regain
political and economic security.
In order that joint planning of some sort could begin, provision was made at
the Moscow Conference for the establishment of the European Advisory Commission.
With headquarters in London, the E.A.C. was to undertake the study of
European political problems in the postwar world and to make recommendations
to the three major Allies.99
The Commission began its planning in January 1944 on the basis of Austria’s
boundaries as they existed prior to the Anschluss, for want of any other agreement
on Austria Agreement was not reached on occupation controls and zones until
July 1945, three months after Austria had fallen to the Allies. The United States
obtained a northwest sector, the Soviet Union a northeast sector, France the southeastern
tip, and Great Britain a southwest sector. Soviet amendments gave the
Soviet Union that part of Upper Austria north of the Danube and the Styrian
section of the province of Burgenland.’-1 The amendments isolated Czechoslovakia
from the West and gave the Soviet Union control of the whole course of the
Danube River through Austria and thus from the German border to the Black Sea.
The United States entered into the occupation of Austria late in April with
one serious disadvantage. The other three occupation powers were vitally interested,
because of their proximity to Germany, in Germany’s future, which included
Austria’s future. Additionally, they were willing to take vigorous action to preserve
that vital interest. The United States, on the other hand, obviously viewed its
8
Ibid., 9 (1943), 310. The declaration was issued November 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the
Moscow Conference and was accepted by the French Committee of National Liberation,
the French government in exile, on November 16 in Algiers.
9Philip Moseley, "The Occupation of Germany," Foreign Affairs, 28 ( July 1950), p. 582.
10
Ibid.
11
Edgar L. Erikson, "The Zoning of Austria," Annals of the American Academy of Political
Science, 267 ( January 1950), 112.
654
involvement in the occupation of Austria with distaste, as a chore to be completed
quickly, as a moral commitment but not a vital interest. As a result, there was not
at this time a rigorous analysis of the importance of a free and independent Austria
to a stable order in Europe, in which the United States did have a vital interest.
On the other hand, Soviet plans were clear. Germany and Austria were to be
weakened while Soviet power was to be increased. Thus, the story of the Austrian
treaty negotiations is the story, in great part, of the Soviet effort to fulfill those
plans and of the efforts of the Western powers to save Austria from becoming the
victim of those plans. It must be added that the clear revelation of these plans in
the period from 1945 to 1947 brought the United States to the realization that its
own national interest was involved in the question of Austria’s future.
SOVIET AND ALLIED OCCUPATION
The commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops entering Austria, Marshal F.
Tolbukhin, issued a proclamation on April 8, 1945 the
day after his troops had
reached the suburbs of Vienna. The proclamation declared that the Austrians had
welcomed the Soviet troops as liberators and that the Soviet Union did not intend
to appropriate any Austrian territory that
the Soviet Union was in full accord
with the Moscow Declaration, and that the Red Army was fighting against German
fascism and not against the Austrian people. Finally, he stated that the Red Army
had come to Austria as an army of liberation desirous of the independence of
Austria. 12
While the West was reassured by the Tolbukhin declaration, another action of
Soviet authorities gave the Western powers cause for alarm. Without consulting
its Western Allies and without prior planning in the European Advisory Commission,
the Red army undertook to organize a provisional government in Austria. 13
Western fear that Austria might go the way of other eastern European nations
&dquo;liberated&dquo; by the Soviet Union was increased first by the Soviet unilateral organization
of a provisional government and later by the steady Soviet refusal to allow
Allied missions to go to Vienna to take up their zones of occupation.’-4 Despite the
fact that all necessary formal steps had been taken for joint Allied occupation,
more than two months elapsed before the work of the Allied Commission began.
The common view among the Allies was reported to be that the Russians were
delaying Western Allied entry until they could take for themselves whatever they
wanted in eastern Austria in the form of machinery and raw and finished materials.
In addition, the Red Army was living off the land.15 After many forced delays, the
Allied forces moved into Vienna late in Augusts Vienna was placed under quadripartite
control September 1, 1945, and the Allied Council held its first meeting
September 11.
After joint occupation became effective, discussion about the provisional
government, headed by Karl Renner, began in London. The British objected to the
12
Red-White-Red Book, p. 201.
13
Stearman, op. cit., pp. 20 to 23.
14
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951), p. 518.
15New York Times, July 16, p. 7 and July 18, 1945, p. 4.
16Ibid., August 24, 1945, p. 7.
655
government, saying it represented only eastern Austria and that Communists were
overrepresented in the cabinet. In particular, the British objected to having a
Communist in charge of the Interior Ministry, which controlled the police and thus
could control future elections. 1-7 The United States was dissatisfied with the regime
on the same grounds Taking note of the Western objections, Chancellor Renner
called a conference in Vienna, with the approval of the Allied Council, of political
leaders from all of Austria.19 The conference approved the Renner government
while adding several ministers from the western zones. Control of police and elections
was taken out of the hands of the Communist Minister of Interior
In late October, the Allied Council authorized the extension of the authority
of the provisional government throughout Austria, reserving to itself, however,
supreme authority. While approving the government, the Council called for free
elections,21 which were held November 25, 1945, with a resounding defeat of
Communist party candidates.
Allied Council recognition of the provisional government came shortly after
evidence became available that Soviet authorities were no longer prepared to
cooperate at all with the Renner government, following that government’s refusal
to be drawn into an oil company agreement. The Red Army, therefore, took forcible
possession of the Zisterdorf oil fields near Vienna.22 The Soviet Union’s excuse
for this seizure was the claim that it was entitled to all property which had become
German since 1938 as well as that which was German prior to 1938, regardless of
how it came to be German.23 Immediately after taking possession of the oil fields,
the Soviet Union seized much of Austria’s heavy industry and shipping, as well as
her two big commercial banks, the Creditanstalt and the Laenderbank, whose
deposits they had confiscated early in 1945.24 (The banks had been absorbed by
German banks shortly after the Anschluss. )
Shocked by these seizures, the Western powers, especially the United States,
felt an urgent need to conclude some sort of agreement liberating Austria in order
to save it from further Soviet claims. Saying that an elaborate peace treaty was not
necessary, the United States, in October of 1946, called for such an agreement, thus
initiating negotiations which lasted eight years.25
The Austrian treaty negotiations which went on from 1947 to 1955 followed
the general pattern of the cold war. Negotiations began just as it was becoming
fully evident that the Soviet Union did not intend to cooperate with the three
Western powers, its former allies, in Europe or elsewhere. Negotiations broke down
late in 1949 as the Soviet Union began to react strongly to the success in Europe
17Ibid., September 11, 1945, p. 11.
18Ibid., September 13, 1945, p. 13.
19Ibid., September 21, 1945, p. 7 and September 24, 1945, p. 4.
20Ibid., September 27, 1945, p. 4.
21Ibid., October 21, 1945, p. 6.
22Ibid., October 8, 1945, p. 3.
23See Department of State Bulletin, 15 (1946), 123, for the full text of Soviet "Order no. 17"
which declared that, in accordance with the Potsdam Conference, any German property
located in eastern Austria became the property of the U.S.S.R. as German reparation
payment.
24New York Times, October 27, 1945, p. 5.
25Ibid., November 1, 1946, p. 5.
656
of the United States policy of containment, as represented by the highly successful
Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the establishment of a separate but still
not sovereign West-German state. The negotiations were in a state of suspension
from mid-1950 through 1953, when the cold war was most intense, both in Europe
and in the Far East, where the Korean War was in progress.26 Treaty talks were
resumed in 1954.
SOVIET MOTIVES FOR SIGNING THE TREATY
By the end of 1954, Germany was well on its way toward rearmament within
NATO. This fact plus the related Western European Union, then in the process
of being established, promised to strengthen the Western Alliance. Faced with a
rearmed West Germany and a stronger Western alliance, the Soviet Union needed
to reassess its position especially in view of its commitment, or at least its ostensible
commitment, to a policy of seeking accommodation with the West. Agreement to
Western terms for German reunification was not possible. Free all-German elections
were too great a risk from the Soviet point of view. Such elections might force
a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany which conceivably might seriously damage
or destroy the Soviet satellite system, an eventuality which would impair the Soviet
Union’s prestige and security.
Thus, while something might be gained by negotiation on the German question,
the U.S.S.R. could gain nothing by agreement to Western terms. Nor could
the West be expected to agree to Soviet terms since to do so could be taken as an
admission of Western weakness, with resultant damage to Western prestige. As for
Austria, agreement by the Soviet Union to Western terms without compensation
elsewhere might appear to be a retreat before the developing new Western unity.
However, one course the Soviet Union could follow was to refuse further negotiations
or continue to be willing to negotiate on all issues but refuse to agree on any.
Such action could be justified in terms of the increasingly hostile Western alliance,
as evidenced by the signing of the Paris Pacts, and would have two distinct advantages.
First, no Soviet withdrawal would be called for anywhere in Europe, and
second, the Soviet Union would have an excellent excuse to strengthen its own
alliance and military might in view of the Western &dquo;threat.&dquo;
However, this alternative also had a number of disadvantages. It would
seriously impair the continuation of the &dquo;new look,&dquo; expressed by Joseph Stalin in
the spring of 1952, and might cost the Soviet Union the respect of those nations
26During this period the Western nations were busily negotiating the European Defence
Community, an eventuality which the Soviet government wished to prevent. Russia,
therefore, tried to distract German attention from E.D.C. by raising hopes of German
reunification and a peace treaty. See The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle
(London, 1960), p. 45. The Soviet press made numerous "promises" of German unification
during the E.D.C. negotiations. A good example was the statement by German
prisoner Field Marshal Paulus, before leaving the Soviet Union to take up residence in
the German Democratic Republic, sent to the U.S.S.R. government: "... The Soviet
government’s magnanimous decision on August 23 on the war prisoner question is fresh
proof that in its policy toward Germany the Soviet government is not guided by a feeling
of revenge for the innumerable sufferings we caused the Soviet people as a result of the
war we unleashed. On the contrary, by the peaceful policy to which it has once again
given expression in the aforementioned decision, it is facilitating the movement of the
entire German people on the path of peace toward German unity and therefore toward
a happy future." Pravda, November 1, 1953, p. 4.
657
outside Europe which had been encouraged by the &dquo;new look&dquo; of &dquo;coexistence&dquo;
to believe that the cold war could be alleviated.27 Second, refusal to negotiate
might indicate to satellite nations and others that the success of the West in incorporating
Western Germany in the Western alliance had been a severe defeat for
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would thus suffer a serious blow to its prestige
both at home and abroad. Third, the Western powers, having had success with
Germany, might also undertake to include Austria in the Western military alliance,
which, together with German rearmament, could only be understood as a defeat
for Soviet policy.28 Finally, German rearmament was not yet accomplished as 1955
opened. That would require much action. A too obviously rigid Soviet policy
could only hasten the day when West Germany again would be a mighty power.
Soviet threats had proved unsuccessful in keeping West Germany out of the alliance
and probably would have no more success in delaying German rearmament or in
stopping it altogether.
Soviet consideration of the disadvantages of non-cooperation with the Allied
powers apparently led to the rejection of such a policy because it would be both
inconsistent with over-all policy lines as well as ineffective in the accomplishment
of both short-run specific aims and long-term goals. In the short run, it would
probably fail to halt German rearmament and would increase Western pressure
on the Soviet Union in Austria. In the long run, it would almost certainly lose the
Soviet Union friends won by its &dquo;new look&dquo; policy and cost it prestige as a result of
its failure to bar German integration into the Western alliance.
German rearmament probably could not be halted short of war, which would
be too costly and destructive of the image the Soviet Union desired to project as
peace-loving. However, whatever policy was followed with regard to Europe’s
problems could perhaps put at least some pressure on the Germans to delay, if not
halt completely, rearmament.’9
The alternative policy that was in fact chosen was a simple one. A treaty
neutralizing and freeing Austria would be negotiated by Soviet and Austrian
officials in bilateral discussions and then presented to the three Western powers for
27Sir Anthony Eden suggests that world sympathy for the Austrian position influenced the
Soviets to modify their policies towards Austria since the Russians were anxious to
present a "reasonable countenance" to the world. "Its expression could not seem
sincere, even to those most ready to smile back, while Austria was occupied by foreign
troops and the Western offer to accept the Soviet terms was ignored." Full Circle, p.
290.
28In his report to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on February 8, 1955, Molotov reiterated
Russian concern that Western "plans to re-militarize Western Germany signify...
dangers for Austria." This was why, he continued, the Soviet government must "consider
any further delay in the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria unjustified."
Only a peace treaty with Austria could "preclude the possibility of Germany carrying
out a new Anschluss...." Soviet News, February 17, 1955. Numerous press statements
during 1954 expressed Soviet fears that Austrian "independence" was being threatened
by Western economic and military Anschlusses. See Pravda, December 8, 1953, March
3, April 17, May 30, and June 14, 1954.
29Even after the ratification of the Paris accords, Pravda (April 16, 1955, p. 1) was speaking
softly to the Germans; "This [the neutrality of Austria] cannot help but be considered
by certain other European peoples, primarily the German people who are legitimately
demanding that the German problem be settled both in Germany’s interests and in the
interests of the security of all other European peoples." At a July, 1955, dinner given
by the English delegation for the Soviet leaders at the Geneva summit meeting, Bulganin
explained to Eden how real were Soviet fears of a German recovery. Full Circle, p. 300.
658
their signatures. The policy resulted in negotiation of the treaty in April and its
signature in May of 1955.
There was, in the main, a two-fold propaganda as well as a military advantage
in pursuing the policy chosen. The first propaganda advantage concerned the
Soviet policy of the new look. The new look, involving a tolerance of neutralism
outside the Soviet bloc and a stated willingness to reach accommodation with the
Western powers, resulting in lessening of cold war tensions, could be improved upon
by Soviet agreement to an Austrian treaty. In Europe, but more especially outside
Europe in
Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia the
Soviet
Union could present Austria as a concrete example of Soviet willingness to collaborate
with a neutral nation. This policy could have long-term advantages in competition
with the Western powers, especially the United States, in terms of the
struggles for influence in areas outside Europe. Indeed the new look really had
little concrete application in Europe. The most that could be hoped for there
would be some weakening of Western resolve and unity, and perhaps a favorable
impression upon West Germany, with whom the U.S.S.R. was about to open
diplomatic relations.3° At the same time, the Soviet Union could attempt to
achieve, through trade with and aid to nations outside Europe, a flexible position
which would enable it to penetrate them politically in the hope of a peaceful or
violent overthrow of the local government some time in the future. If overthrow
could not be brought about, at least a strong pro-Soviet and/or non-Western
oriented bloc within individual nations would keep those nations out of the Western
alliance.
Additionally, an Austrian treaty would represent Soviet fulfillment of a Western
prerequisite for a &dquo;summit&dquo; meeting. This would increase pressure on the West
for such a meeting, add to the desired &dquo;peace-loving&dquo; image of the Soviet Union,
and would allow the Soviet Union a broader stage on which to play out its new
role as chief world peace-promoter.31 In short, then, this policy would make the
new look still more attractive and more credible. It could possibly add to the Soviet
empire, or, falling short of that, possibly halt the expansion of the Western alliance
in Asia and parts of Africa areas
near Soviet borders. Finally, it might force a
summit meeting where the Soviet Union would have new opportunity to present
itself to the world in a favorable light.
The second propaganda advantage derived from the bilateral character of the
negotiations for the treaty was its &dquo;evidence&dquo; that the Soviet Union could not reach
agreement with a recalcitrant West, despite its best efforts.32 Such propaganda
30Eden, op. cit., p. 290.
31Official Soviet press editorials emphasized this new role both prior to and after signing the
treaty. Typical was this extract from a Pravda editorial of May 22, 1955, p. 1: "The
peoples of the world have long demanded that the policy-making state figures of the
United States, Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. meet around a table, examine outstanding
international problems and make the necessary efforts to settle them. The
peoples demand an end to the ’cold war’ and the re-establishment of an atmosphere of
international faith in which it be possible to eliminate the burdensome arms race, obtain
a considerable reduction in armaments and armed forces, ban atomic and hydrogen
weapons, create an effective system of collective security, re-establish normal relations
and extend peaceful cooperation among peoples in all fields."
32Already in 1953 Russia was publicly blaming the West for delays in settling the "Austrian
question." See the editorial by I. Alexandrov in Pravda, December 8, 1953, p. 3.
659
would be especially opportune in view of the &dquo;rigidly anti-Soviet action&dquo; of the
Western powers in incorporating West Germany into the Western alliance. The
Soviet Union would thus acknowledge that it had been defeated by the Western
powers in its efforts to keep West Germany out of that alliance, but would attempt
to make it clear that the defeat belonged to the &dquo;forces of peace.&dquo; The bilateral
action probably also was intended as a lesson to other neutral nations and to Germany
that perhaps their interests could be served through bilateral negotiations
with the Soviet Union (a preferable policy of Russia in the formation of nonaggression
pacts or treaties of neutrality33), but nothing could be achieved in negotiations
between the two blocs.34 At least in Europe the Soviet Union might hope
to divide the Western alliance in that way and weaken the resolve of the alliance
members to place their faith in combined strength. In addition, as with the first
propaganda advantage, neutral nations would be encouraged to remain outside the
Western alliance. In short, the policy would attempt to turn a Soviet defeat on
Germany into a propaganda triumph while, at the same time, it would point out
the value of bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, with the consequent dual
hope that the Western alliance would be divided and/or kept from expanding.
The third advantage foreseen by the Soviet Union was that a treaty neutralizing
as well as freeing Austria would obviously mean that Austria could not be
rearmed within the Western alliance.35 On the other hand, without a treaty, the
Soviet Union could not be sure that Austria would not eventually join the Western
military alliance. A treaty merely freeing Austria would run the risk that all Austria
might eventually be rearmed by the West.36 A neutralized Austria, on the other
hand, would eliminate the danger of Western rearmament of that state. (This
advantage apparently had been foreseen at the time of the Berlin Conference in
1954, when the Soviet Union had first insisted on a neutralized Austria.) Thus,
while the Soviet Union would be required to withdraw her troops from Austria,
there would be no concomitant Western advance and consequent threat to the
Soviet satellite system from such an advance. Rather there would be a Western
withdrawal which would have an additional advantage in that it would interrupt
Western lines of communication and transportation from Western Germany to Italy
through Austria. Also to be considered was the probability that a neutralized
33Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties
(Stanford, 1962), chapter 17.
34Pravda’s New York correspondent E. Litoshko’s report in Soviet News, April 19, 1955, p. 4,
refers to the Christian Science Monitor "openly" saying that the example of Austria
"will undoubtedly increase the already numerous ranks of Germans who are loudly
demanding the re-unification of their country and peace with the Soviet Union, and who
are ready, in exchange, to agree to neutrality and demilitarisation."
35Even before the Berlin Conference the Soviet Union had spoken of the dangers of a rearmed
Austria either within the Western alliance or as part of a rearmed Germany. These
remonstrations continued throughout 1954. See New York Times, January 25, 1954,
p. 3; January 27, p. 9; February 19, p. 2; November 28, p. 5; December 10, p. 6; and
December 30, p. 11.
36
This eventuality was a real fear of the Russians. In fact, at the regular meeting of the
Allied Council (May 28, 1954), Ilyichev, the Soviet High Commissioner in Austria,
stated that soldiers’ associations led by active Nazis and "Hitlerite" generals had been
established in the Western zone of Austria and were increasing their activity, and that
the High Commissioners should adopt "appropriate measures" for banning the activity
of fascist and military organizations. Reported in Pravda, May 30, 1954, p. 6.
660
Austria would be much less a threat than an Austria still occupied and chafing
under a Soviet rule, which it, like no other nation under Soviet rule, was able to
criticize freely because of its peculiar position. 37 In short, a neutralized Austria
would end once and for all the possibility that Austria would become committed
militarily to the West, would end Austrian criticism of the unpopular Soviet occupation,
and could be represented as a victory for the Soviet Union since Western
forces were driven out of Austria and their lines of communication cut.
Although German rearmament was probably regarded as something the Soviet
Union could not hope to stop without paying too high a price, there was certainly
at least a hope however
slight that
the lessons of the Soviet policy with regard
to the Austrian treaty would not be lost on Germany. The least the Soviet Union
could offer in this regard was to lend support to those interests in Western Germany
urging neutrality as the only feasible course to obtain German unity. The most
that could be hoped for would be a delay in Western Germany’s rearmament. If
followed through logically in Germany, this policy would have meant a Soviet
willingness to reunify all Germany on something like the Austrian model. This the
Soviet Union was clearly unwilling to do since the loss of East Germany would be
too great a blow in terms of Soviet prestige and Soviet material advantage, but
probably most of all in terms of its effect on the other satellites.
This last point leads to consideration of the chief disadvantage, or of the costs
and risks involved in the policy. Probably, the most important risk for the new
look was its effect on the Soviet bloc in Europe and its concrete exemplification in
Austria. If Austria could be neutralized and freed of Soviet control, why could not
the same policy be applied to other members of the Soviet bloc, especially in view
of the fact that Soviet troops were in Hungary and Rumania only because of the
necessity of maintaining Red Army supply lines to Austria? 38 Once the occupation
of Austria was over, what reason was there for the continued presence of Soviet
troops?
From the point of view of the people of satellite nations, restless under Sovietcommunist
rule, this argument would seem logical, especially in view of the new
look which stated Soviet approval of neutrality as one way to reduce cold war
tensions. From the Soviet point of view, however, things looked different. The new
look applied in Europe only to Austria for
various reasons which will be discussed
shortly and
not other European nations, satellite or otherwise. In Europe,
outside the Soviet bloc, the battle had been lost. However, loss of the satellites,
which could result from the application of the new look to them, could be disastrous
to Soviet power, security, and prestige. In part, the questions raised by the
satellite nations were answered by Soviet references to Western hostility in Europe,
necessitating a strong communist front against the West.39 However, there was a
37
Philip E. Mosely suggests that already in 1949, the U.S.S.R. had adopted a more "conciliatory
position" on the Austrian problem because of "the grim attachment to the western
concept of democracy which was displayed by the Austrian electorate and parties." See
p. 234 of his "The Treaty With Austria," International Organization, Vol. IV., 1950.
38Cary T. Grayson, Jr., Austria’s International Position, 1938-1953 (Geneva, 1953), pp.
242-43.
39
After the Paris Agreements were signed in October, 1955, Russia invited the United States
and European countries to a European Security Conference at Moscow to discuss the
661
risk that this answer would not satisfy the satellites if Austria were granted freedom.
There was also the risk that concessions on the Austrian question might really be
regarded as a Soviet defeat in the fact of the newly achieved Western unity, which,
in turn, might result in a loss of Soviet prestige and might make neutrals outside
Europe desire cooperation not with the Soviet Union but with a Western alliance
considered more powerful in view of the Soviet &dquo;defeat.&dquo;
Finally, there were the material costs involved in withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Austria. Those apparently were very slight, and consequently can be discounted,
leaving only two possible risks. First, the Soviet satellite empire would be
shaken by the example of Austria’s liberation, and, second, this liberation might,
despite Soviet propaganda to the contrary, be regarded as a Soviet defeat, resulting
in loss of prestige.
The statement that material costs of Soviet withdrawal were very slight needs
further explanation. Indeed, this point leads to considerations which explain in
great part why the Soviet Union was able to adopt the policy it did in 1955. The
fact that Soviet need for Austrian oil by 1955 was so marginal that it would easily
be met in other ways accounts in large part for the ability of the Soviet Union to
use Austria in 1955 to make more credible and more attractive its &dquo;new look.&dquo;
Soviet oil production in 1953 was approximately double that of 1947.4° The 1955
level was almost three times that of 1947. 41 In addition, apparently the Soviet
Union was losing money on the other assets it had seized in Austria.42 So, no serious
material loss was likely if the Soviet Union should withdraw, particularly if it
obtained recognition of its right to the oil and the payment by Austria in goods and
oil for returned assets. And, since there were no substantial communist elements
within the government or among the Austrian people, no possible political loss
within Austria would be sustained. Thus, materially and politically, Austria, in
itself, had no great positive value to the Soviet Union by 1955. The Soviet Union
could feel free to use Austria for political or other advantages outside Austria. This
freedom of action due to Austria’s unique position between
East and West, but
part of neither coincided
in time with the development of the Soviet Union’s
policy of promoting itself as a chief advocate of world peace. 13 Together these
factors made possible the new Soviet policy toward Austria and explained why the
new look could apply there and not elsewhere in Europe.
In the West, the United States and its allies had a simpler policy. No further
discussions on Austria were to take place until the Paris Pacts had been completely
Agreements. Only Soviet Bloc countries attended the Conference at which it was decided
to form a formal Eastern counterpart to NATO. See TASS, December 2, 1955.
40United States Bureau of Mines, Economic and Statistical Branch, International Petroleum
Trade, XVII, 216 (for 1946-47) and XXV, 105 (for 1953).
41Ibid., XVII (1948), 216 and XXV (1956), 105.
42New York Times, January 10, 1955, p. 5 and April 17, 1955, p. 7.
43The Soviet press was filled with "peace" propaganda as early as 1952. Pravda (October 6,
1952) reported the following peaceful words of Georgi Malenkov, five months before
the death of Stalin, in a speech before the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress:
"The Soviet policy of peace and security for nations is based on the premise that
peaceful coexistence of capitalism and Communism and cooperation are quite possible."
662
ratified.44 Any negotiations before that time would perhaps lead, so the United
States feared, to a reduction within the Western alliance of the will to continue and
to strengthen the alliance.
THE TREATY AND SOVIET STRATEGY
The first indication of a serious change in Soviet policy with regard to Austria
came in a foreign policy speech by Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov on
February 8, 1955. He stated that the withdrawal of the armed forces of the four
powers from Austria could be achieved without awaiting conclusion of a peace
treaty with Germany. This was a complete reversal of the Soviet position at Berlin
in 1954. Molotov proposed a four-power conference to meet immediately to discuss
the German and Austrian questions. 45 In early March, Molotov asked the
Austrian government for its views on the proposals. Austria’s answer was swift and
favorable. The Austrian government stated that it favored a four-power conference,
that it did not intend to join any alliances, allow any foreign bases on Austrian
soil or seek any Anschluss, and that it was willing to give whatever formal
guarantees of these assurances the Soviet Union considered necessary.~6
The Soviet Union’s response was electrifying. On March 24 the
same day
on which Germany completed ratification of the Paris Pacts Foreign
Minister
Molotov invited the Austrian Chancellor, Julius Raab, to Moscow to discuss an
Austrian treaty. (The West would not be included because it was held responsible
for the situation which required guarantees of neutrality.) The Austrians accepted
the Russian invitation, and negotiations began on a bilateral basis April 12, 1955,
and ended April 15 in complete agreement on treaty termS.47 The West’s surprise
indicated that the full implications of Soviet willingness to negotiate a treaty had
not been understood by the West.
The concessions offered by the Soviet Union were indeed considerable in view
of its previous terms for a treaty. Every Soviet economic privilege within Austria
envisaged in the earlier treaty draft was eliminated. The Soviet Union agreed:
(1) to accept 150 million dollars in Austrian goods for &dquo;German assets,&dquo; the goods
to be delivered to the Soviet Union at the rate of 25 million dollars a year for six
years; (2) that Austria would receive the oil fields and oil exploration rights and
refineries held by the Soviet Union, and would, in return, deliver crude oil to the
extent of ten million tons - one million tons annually for 10 years; (3) to accept
two million dollars in payment for all properties of the Danube Shipping Company
in Eastern Austria. Once the transfers were made, Austria was to be bound not
to allow the former Soviet properties to come into foreign possession. The final
economic clause was (4) an agreement to conclude a trade treaty between the
Soviet Union and Austria for a period of five years. With regard to guarantees of
Austrian neutrality, the Soviet Union agreed (5) to accept a declaration by the
44
See the statement by Secretary of State Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
June 10, 1955, in Paul E. Zinner, Documents on American Foreign Relations
1955 (New York, 1956), p. 158.
45New York Times, February 9, 1955, p. 1.
46
Ibid., March 17, 1955, p. 3.
47
Ibid., March 25, 1955, p. 2, and April 16, 1955, p. 4.
663
Austrian federal government &dquo;in a form which will obligate Austria internationally
to practice in perpetuity a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland.&dquo;
Austria was to seek to obtain international recognition of the declaration after it
was confirmed by the Austrian parliament, and would &dquo;welcome a guarantee by
the four powers of the inviolability and integrity of the Austrian state territory.&dquo;
The Soviet Union further agreed (6) that all occupation troops should be withdrawn
from Austria no later December 31, 1955. Finally, the Soviet Union stated
its willingness (7) to agree without delay to sign the Austrian State Treaty.48
The Western powers generally credited two circumstances for the Soviet agreement
to these terms. United States and Western policy-makers rather generally
assumed Germany alone to be the object of the Soviet Union’s generous terms.49
Confirmation of this view came quickly in the form of editorials in two Soviet newspapers,
Pravda and Izvestia, suggesting that Germany might find it advantageous
to adopt a neutral position like Austria’s.5° The second circumstance credited for
the agreement was the steadfastness of the Austrian people who refused to succumb
to Soviet pressures and had time and again rejected communism. There is at least
some truth in both. However, as stated above, in all probability Germany was a
side issue in Soviet calculations. As for Austrian courage, certainly it was a factor
in both Soviet and Western calculations. But more about this later.
Since the Soviet terms were so generous, the Western powers could scarcely
refuse to negotiate, and, for the same reason, could scarcely refuse to agree to a
treaty. Four-power negotiations began May 2, 1955, in Vienna, following acceptance
by the Western powers of a Soviet invitation to preliminary talks aimed at
determining whether agreement to a treaty was possible. At the same time, the
United States and its allies hastened action on the Paris Pacts. All ratifications were
accomplished and Germany was made sovereign by May 1955. Assurances were
quickly obtained from the West German government that the Austrian example
would have no effect on Germany, and that neutralism or a desire for neutralism
was not rampant in West Germany.51 The West clearly intended that any agreement
on Austria should not impair Western defenses.
Several obstacles to agreement arose in the course of nearly two weeks of discussions
by the ambassadors of the four occupation powers in Vienna. However,
they were quickly disposed of.52 Chief among the obstacles was Soviet reluctance
to include the Austro-Soviet agreement on &dquo;German assets&dquo; as part of the treaty.
The West feared the Soviet Union might at some future date renounce the treaty
and reoccupy Austria. Following strong Western insistence that the agreement be
48Ibid., April 16, 1955, p. 5; April 18, 1955, p. 5; and April 29, 1955, p. 8 and United States
Department of State, The Austrian State Treaty, translation of the memorandum "Concerning
Results of the Conversations Between the Government Delegations of the Republic
of Austria and The Government Delegations of the Soviet Union," pp. 79-82. Also,
Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska, A Calendar ofSoviet Treaties: 1917-1957 ( Stanford,
1959).
49New York Times, April 16, p. 3; April 18, p. 5; April 27, p. 6; April 28, p. 6 and April 29,
p. 4 (all of 1955).
50See footnote no. 34.
51New York Times, April 30, 1955, p. 1.
52Ibid., April 26, p. 4; April 30, p. 4; May 1, p. 3; May 3, p. 7; and May 4, p. 6 (all of
1955).
664
included, the Soviet Union finally consented.53 Thus the treaty both awarded the
assets to Russia, on the Soviet Union’s terms, and returned them to Austria for
payments - payments made possible by American aid which had made Austria
sufficiently strong economically to undertake to make the payments.
The ambassadors then completed the draft and notified their governments
that their work was done. The Soviet Union had given in on nearly every disputed
point. She no doubt felt that once the decision had been made to secure the treaty,
action must be completed unless Western demands were totally unacceptable.
Clearly Western demands restricted Soviet freedom of action in Austria more than
the Soviet Union desired, but the restrictions were not crucial to Soviet security.
On May 13, the ambassadors held their last meeting, and on the same day the
four foreign ministers arrived at Vienna. Following a brief meeting during which
they agreed to the Austrian request for deletion of a paragraph in the Preamble
concerning Austria’s war guilt something
the Soviet Union had insisted on for
ten years the
final text of the treaty was signed May 15, 1955.54 In a matter of
a little more than two months, the treaty was ratified by the five signatories and
entered into force on July 27, 1955. The last occupation troops were withdrawn
from Austria on October 25, 1955.55
Three events just prior to the treaty signing were to aid the Soviet Union in
implementing the policy outlined above. The first of these was a meeting in Warsaw
of Soviet bloc members who laid the foundation of what came to be called the
Warsaw Pact and was termed by the Pact members &dquo;a defensive alliance.&dquo; 56
The
excuse for the Pact obviously was the rearmament.of West Germany by the Western
allies. It indicated to Soviet satellites in Europe that the &dquo;new look&dquo; meant very
little there, that no relaxation was planned in Europe because of Western hostility,
and that consequently the satellites were not to think that Soviet tolerance of neutrality
and non-alignment in Austria’s case or elsewhere applied to the Soviet
Union’s European satellites. Given the Austrian Treaty, the Warsaw Pact was a
propaganda necessity for Russia.57 It could be expected to provide a legal excuse
for the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania, where,
according to the Potsdam agreement, Soviet troops were to remain only so long
as necessary to provide supply routes to the Soviet zone of Austria.
The second event which later aided the Soviet Union was Egypt’s announcement
that it had entered into barter trade agreements with the Soviet Union and
Rumania.58 Thirdly, on the day before they met in Vienna to sign the treaty, the
four foreign ministers agreed to a heads of government meeting in July. Pressure
on the United States and on the Western allies for such a meeting was great both
from within the alliance and from the so-called &dquo;uncommitted&dquo; or neutralist
53Ibid., May 13, 1955, p. 4.
54Ibid., May 15, 1955, p. 1 and May 16, 1955, p. 1.
55
Ibid., October 26, 1955, p. 6.
56
See footnote no. 39.
57As Stearman points out (op. cit., p. 161), this pact had little significance since Russia was
already in de facto control of satellite armed forces, and by March 1948 had concluded
bilateral military pacts with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.
58
William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Goblenz, United States Foreign
Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington, 1956), p. 408.
665
nations. The signature of the Austrian State Treaty had increased the pressure on
the West, as the Soviet Union had hoped it would, because it was viewed both as a
sign of increased Soviet willingness to make an accommodation with the West and
as a &dquo;deed&dquo; rather than &dquo;words&dquo; by which the West could judge the &dquo;sincerity&dquo; of
Soviet desires for peace.
At Vienna the Soviet Foreign Minister encouraged this pressure on the West
by stating that the treaty proved that possibilities exist for settling other current
international problems. Also, he wasted no time in making clear that the Austrian
solution was regarded by the Soviet Union as a desirable one for other nations.
In so many words, he stated: &dquo;Allow me to express the conviction that other states
also will follow the pattern of Austria’s position of honest neutrality.&dquo; Germany
was specifically mentioned, but the solution was not one which would be limited
to Germany.59
Thus far the Soviet policy had met with success. The treaty had been signed,
its lesson had been stated in clear terms, and the possibility of repercussions in the
satellites had been, the Soviets hoped, lessened if not eliminated by the Warsaw Pact
beginnings and by emphasis on the dangers in Europe of German militarism.60
The Soviet campaign to establish its image of peace-seeker was continued
when, immediately after the Austrian treaty was signed, the two highest Soviet
ofbciais paid a visit to Yugoslavia in an effort to restore relations with Tito. They
returned to Moscow with a declaration of friendship and a pledge of collaboration.6~
And, following the July Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union encouraged the
popular reaction to the conference which was well expressed by a journalist’s
phrase, &dquo;the Geneva spirit.&dquo; The phrase expressed the illusions which the Western
powers feared might lead to divisions in the Western alliance, precisely the result
that the Soviet Union had hoped for.
Thereafter, the Soviet Union moved to sell its modus vivendi policy of neutralism
through a series of actions; there were many visits by Soviet leaders to neutralist
states and a continuous stream of statements emphasizing the Soviet position on
neutralism. Perhaps the key to the new policy was an assertion by Nikita S. Khrushchev,
then first secretary of the Communist party, repeated several times and in
various contexts, that the Soviet Union would triumph over capitalism without
war. 62 The conclusion apparently had been reached by the Soviet leaders that,
because of the existence of the tremendous destructive power of both the Soviet
Union and the West, war as an instrument of achieving Soviet short-range, if not
long-range, goals was of very little and perhaps no utility. The alternative method
of seeking realization of goals consisted in great part of an effort to convince the
non-Western, non-Soviet world that only in cooperation with the Soviet Union
could peace be realized.
To make the original example of a neutralized Austria still more attractive,
in the summer of 1958 the Soviet Union renounced its rights to half of the remain-
59New York Times, May 16, 1955, p. 5.
60
The Soviet press made frequent mention of signs in the West of fear of German militarism.
See Pravda of June 14, 1954, p. 4, and Soviet News of February 21, 1955, p. 4.
61
They arrived May 19, 1955, in Belgrade. See New York Times, May 20, 1955, p. 5.
62New York Times, September 13, 1955, p. 11, and February 5, 1956, p. 9.
666
ing oil deliveries from Austrian. 63 At the same time, trade and cultural relations
were to be extended. The reduction of the oil quota and the deliberate refusal to
push for conditions or advantages within Austria, other than the trade agreement,
were the logical steps in a policy aimed at making neutralism attractive elsewhere.
In part, also, the reduction was an effort to remove the stain on the Soviet Union
which had resulted from Soviet action in quelling so bloodily the Hungarian revolt
in the fall of 1956.
If prior to October 1956 the Soviet Union had reaped only gains from its &dquo;new
look&dquo; policy, it suffered certain losses in late 1956 because of the effects of actions
on its satellites in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Hungary and Poland. The
Soviet Union discovered that its &dquo;new look&dquo; had resulted in a threat to the solidity
of its Eastern European satellite empire, and that it had been exposed exactly for
what it was a
policy aimed at wooing neutralist nations while maintaining an
iron grip on the satellite nations, through violence when necessary.
Adding to the cost within the satellites was the non-violent revolt in Poland.
The situation there was stabilized in part by an agreement to allow Poland more
liberty in determining national policies, but such an agreement was tantamount to
an admission of weakness, something which the Soviet Union quite clearly disliked.
Despite these serious reversals, however, the &dquo;new look&dquo; was not, from the
Soviet point of view, a total loss or a serious mistake. The crucial point for nations
outside the Soviet bloc apparently was not so much how the peoples within the
Soviet bloc were treated by the government but rather how the Soviet Union
planned to treat the nations outside the Soviet bloc. No major changes appeared
in Soviet behavior toward these nations, and, while there was some uneasiness over
and condemnation of the Soviet actions of 1956, other later Soviet actions in extending
further aid and making additional trade agreements seemed to reduce this
uneasiness and criticism. The renunciation of half the promised Austrian oil
deliveries was an action of this sort. Thus, Soviet gains in neutralist nations
remained on the whole intact; the policy of appealing to neutrals by presenting the
image of chief peace-makers was largely a success despite the cost of this policy in
the satellites.
Austria’s part in the execution of this Soviet policy, as stated above, was that of
a shining example of Soviet willingness to cooperate with neutralists. The Soviet
Union would attempt to win the struggle with the West and capitalism not through
violent attack on the West but through a policy aimed at showing that the Western
nations were incapable of surviving peaceful competition with the Soviet Union
and communism. The Soviet Union would &dquo;bury&dquo; the West not after the violent
death of the West, but after the West succumbed to its own internal weaknesses,
which the Soviet Union would expose and, by exposure, intensify, thus hastening
the day of Western collapse. The future lay with the Soviet Union, and AustroSoviet
relations were the prime example of what the future would be like.
Obviously the Soviet decision to neutralize Austria was little more than a
propaganda tactic which conveniently supplemented the Soviet prime strategic
63
Ibid., July 25, 1958, p. 5. Austria had agreed in the Austro-Soviet agreement to deliver one
million tons of oil a year for 10 years. By July, 1958, three million tons had been
delivered. The remaining requirement —
seven million tons —
was cut in half.
667
need to clearly delineate her sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in the face of a
challenging remilitarized Western Europe. Communist ideology and strategy and
the realities of Western politics dictated that world conquest could not proceed
until its means defense
of the Soviet base was
secured.
It is, of course, never possible to identify positively the motivations and proximate
goals of Soviet policy, but it seems clear that the U.S.S.R. promoted the
Austrian State Treaty because, based on her assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of both the Communist and &dquo;Capitalist&dquo; camps, neutralization of Austria
and other nations was the immediate prerequisite of Soviet strategy. The Kremlin’s
acceptance of Austrian neutrality seems to have been the result of sober calculations
by Soviet leaders and their belief in the necessity of adjusting to the changed
world conditions occasioned by such things as new weapons and communications
The treaty explains and epitomizes Soviet foreign policy as a balance of national
and revolutionary interests. In terms of Communist dialectics, &dquo;neutralization,&dquo; like
&dquo;coexistence,&dquo; meant that the cold war had become no less a war - only colder.
64
Sven Allard, Diplomat in Wien (Cologne, 1965).