The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist Ideology
Author(s): R. Judson Mitchell
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1972), pp. 190-209
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
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The Brezhnev Doctrine and
Communist Ideology
R. Judson Mitchell
A NNOUNCEMENT of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine by
Soviet spokesmen in 1968 has been widely regarded in the
West as a development marking a new epoch in the evolution
of the world communist system. The Doctrine has been commonly
viewed as a Soviet response to the exigencies of Great Power politics
in circumstances of continuing loss of revolutionary dynamism
or as a reaction to the threat to Soviet hegemony in its inner bloc
posed by uncontained polycentrism, or both.1 Much attention has
been devoted to the concept of "limited sovereignty," with this concept
being treated as the heart of the Doctrine and as evidence of
a major new departure in the Soviet approach to world politics
This assessment, interestingly enough, is generally favored both by
Western analysts and by anti-Soviet spokesmen within the world
communist system.2
Emphasis upon Soviet power interests in evaluation of the
Brezhnev Doctrine need not necessarily lead to a downgrading of
the ideological component since Marxist-Leninist ideology is, above
all, an ideology of power. Nevertheless, it appears that most Western
analyses of the Brezhnev Doctrine have buttressed the widespread
tendency to regard the Soviet version of Marxism-Leninism
as, at best, a function of the power interests of the ruling Soviet
elite.3 While political power within the system presumably can be
legitimized only by the ideology, any analysis that treats ideology
exclusively as a variable dependent upon power relationships
1 See Michel Tatu, "L'Invasion de la Tch6coslovaquie et la D6tente en
Europe," in Jerzy Lukaszewski (ed.), Les Dimocraties Populaires Apri
Prague (Bruges, 1970), pp. 95-106. Cf. Edward Weisband and Thomas M.
Franck, "The Brezhnev-Johnson Two-World Doctrine," Trans-action, VIII
(October, 1971), 36-44.
2 Ghita Ionescu, "Le Nationalisme en Europe de 1'Est," in Lukaszewski,
op. cit., pp. 223-250; cf. T. Davletshin, "Limited Sovereignty: The Soviet
Claim to Intervene in the Defense of Socialism," Bulletin of the Institute for
the Study of the USSR, XVI (August, 1969), 3-9.
s For a contrary view, stressing the priority of the ideological component,
written, however, before the Brezhnev Doctrine was fully elaborated, see Vera
Pirozhkova, "The Recent Events in Czechoslovakia and the Fundamentals of
Soviet Foreign Policy," in Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR,
XV (October, 1968), 5-13.
190
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 191
ignores the system's functional dependence
relationship between ideology and structur
Viewed from this standpoint, the ideologi
Brezhnev Doctrine appear as potentially
than any short-run changes in power relatio
inspired the Doctrine.
Soviet application of coercion against o
certainly nothing new; moreover, "limited
appear to be a real departure from actual
past. What is novel and rather startling abo
trine is the interpretation of the historical d
contained therein. The concept of the "weak
is the harbinger of a profound crisis in the
Marxism-Leninism and is the first major
theory since Khrushchev's reinterpretation o
ful co-existence.
I. What Is the Brezhnev Doctrine?
The Soviet position that later became celebrated as the Brezhnev
Doctrine was first provisionally advanced by S. Kovalev in an
article in Pravda, September 26, 1968. Leonid Brezhnev completed
the outline of the Doctrine in his speech at the Fifth Congress of
the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw, November 12, 1968.
Thereafter, the Doctrine was further elaborated and clarified by
Brezhnev and other Soviet spokesmen in speeches and articles in
the Soviet press. This was accompanied by repeated denials that
the Soviet Union had put forward a doctrine of "limited sover-
eignty."4
Kovalev's Pravda argument in support of Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia was organized around four basic concepts: (1)
the class basis of law; (2) two camps or the struggle between sys-
4 See Brezhnev's speech to the International Meeting of Communist and
Workers' Parties in Moscow, Prauda, June 8, 1969, p. 1; Sh. Sanakoyev,
"Proletarian Internationalism: Theory and Practice," International Affairs
(April, 1969), p. 9; Sh. Sanakoyev and N. Kapchenko, "Triumph of the
Principles of Proletarian Internationalism," International Affairs '(August,
1969), p. 35; 0. Selyaninov, "Proletarian Internationalism and the Socialist
State," International Affairs (November, 1969), p. 11; N. Lebedev, "Proletarian
Internationalism and its Bankrupt Critics," International Affairs (August,
1970), p. 63; 0. Selyaninov, "Internationalism of Soviet Foreign Policy,"
International Affairs (July, 1971), p. 14.
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192 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
tems; (3) the indivisibility of the socialist co
world socialism; (4) socialist self-determinati
commonwealth as the guardian of sovereignty.
(1) Kovalev argued: charges that the sover
slovakia had been violated were based upon a
approach to questions of sovereignty and self-d
class society there is no such thing as nonclass
must be subordinated to the laws of class strug
opment. To emphasize "legalistic considerati
of the socialist viewpoint is to use bourgeois la
stick."
(2) Each Communist Party is free
in its application of Marxist-Leninist and soci
it cannot deviate from these principles if it i
munist Party. This signifies concretely that each
must, above all, take cognizance of such a cruc
as the conflict between two antithetical social
and socialism. This conflict is an objective
upon the will of the people and is determined
the world between two antithetical social system
The other social system, that of world imperia
to Kovalev, seeking to export counterrevolution
and detach that country from the socialist com
(3) Kovalev maintained that every Communis
sible not only to its own people but to all socia
the entire movement of world socialism, wh
The sovereignty of any particular socialist coun
above the interests of the world revolutiona
weakening of any link in the world socialist sys
tire system and this must be taken into account
(4) Achievement of the imperialist goal o
Czechoslovakia from the socialist commonwealt
tradicted the right of the Czechoslovak peop
determination"; the destruction of socialism
by the loss of national independence. The int
socialist states was, said Kovalev, a fight fo
Socialist Republic's sovereignty against those
5 Pravda, September 26, 1968, p. 1.
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 193
take away this sovereignty by handing over
perialists."6
In a speech at Warsaw on November 12, 1968, Brezhnev developed
a framework of 6 concepts complementary to those of
Kovalev to justify the intervention in Czechoslovakia: (1) the
weakest links of socialism; (2) the contradictions of socialism; (3)
the possibility of the restoration of capitalism; (4) the vanguard
role of the Communist Party; (5) the common natural laws of
socialist development; (6) the revolutionary basis of sovereignty.
(1) According to Brezhnev, the imperialists are now resorting
to "different and more insidious tactics":
They are seeking out the weak links in the socialist front, pursuing
a course of subversive ideological work inside the socialist countries,
attempting to sow dissension, drive wedges between them and encourage
and inflame nationalist feelings and tendencies, and are
seeking to isolate individual socialist states so that they can seize
them by the throat one by one. In short, imperialism is trying to
undermine socialism's solidarity precisely as a world system.7
(2) Here Brezhnev used the euphemism "difficulties" to describe
social phenomena that are otherwise universally referred to
by Marxist theoreticians as "contradictions"; this substitution was
subsequently made by all Soviet spokesmen when referring to conditions
pertaining to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Notably, Brezhnev
referred to two types of contradictions, objective and subjective:
Some of them are of an objective nature, conditioned by historical,
natural and other factors. Others are of a subjective nature, caused
by the fact that particular problems of development failed to receive
the most felicitous solutions, i.e., some miscalculations and
mistakes were made - and by the fact that people have not yet
learned how to make full use of all the potentialities that, objectively
speaking, underlie the socialist system.8
Implied is the existence of conflicting social forces that concretely
express these contradictions or "difficulties" in the system. Even
more clearly implied is that, in the crisis situation of 1968, these
contradictions were intensifying within the socialist system.
6 Ibid.
7 Pravda, November 13, 1968, p. 1, quoted in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, XX, 46 (December 4, 1968), 3.
8 Ibid.
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194 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
(3) Brezhnev urged Communists to "st
from giving the enemies of socialism one i
been won." If the Communist Party we
position in society, that "would be very co
dream of turning development in all th
the direction of capitalism."9
(4) Intensification of the struggle bet
makes necessary a further strengthening o
the Communist Party and further develo
coercive potential, despite the high level o
that has been attained:
Experience bears witness that in present conditions the triumph of
the socialist system in a country can be regarded as final, but the
restoration of capitalism can be considered ruled out only if the
Communist Party, as the leading force in society, steadfastly pursues
a Marxist-Leninist policy in the development of all spheres of
society's life; only if the party indefatigably strengthens the country's
defense and the protection of its revolutionary gains, and if
it itself is vigilant and instills in the people vigilance with respect
to the class enemy and implacability toward bourgeois ideology;
only if the principle of socialist internationalism is held sacred and
unity and fraternal solidarity with the other socialist countries are
strengthened.10
(5) There are the common natural laws of socialist construction:
"... it is well known, comrades, that there are common natural
laws of socialist construction, deviation from which could lead
to deviation from socialism as such."l1
(6) Brezhnev emphasized to the class and revolutionary basis
of the "socialist self-determination" that according to Kovalev, the
socialist commonwealth was obliged to defend:
The forces of imperialism and reaction are seeking to deprive the
people first in one, then another socialist country of the sovereign
right they have earned to ensure prosperity for their country and
well-being and happiness for the broad working masses by building
a society free from all oppression and exploitation.12
9 Ibid.
1o Ibid. (Pratda, p. 2).
*" Ibid.
12 Ibid. pp. 3-4 (Pravda, p. 1).
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 195
What emerges from this framework of 10 l
by Kovalev and Brezhnev is a blend of we
Marxism-Leninism and new theoretical o
havior in a time of crisis. Confronted with
contained in the Brezhnev Doctrine, one
impression of a system legitimized by ideo
sure of its moorings and, veering from deter
is awash in the no longer certain seas of hist
II. The State, Sovereignty and the C
of International Relations
Western insistence that the Brezhnev Doc
novation referred to as "limited sovereignt
central element of the Doctrine, has been m
denials of the existence of such a concep
practice. Given the centrality of this point
mics, it seems advisable to deal with this mat
exploration of the Doctrine. "Limited sover
ately certain interesting questions: Is the
doctrine? If so, how is it related to the exis
Leninist theory? If so, what is its impor
these questions requires, first of all, a revie
thought on the state, sovereignty and inter
The general Marxist view of the state is w
the state was part of the superstructure, det
base of the substructure.13 In a class society
the interests of the dominant class and serv
pression against the exploited class or classe
festo, Marx and Engels proclaimed that "th
country";15 national distinctions reflected
simply served to obscure the vital class inter
Marx and Engels did admit that in both the
France" the state structure had tended to b
13 Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writi
losophy (New York, 1959), pp. 255-56.
14 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected W
1955), 262.
1x Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I (Mo
xe Elliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a
1957), p. 14.
17 Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, 333
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196 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
the material, social substructure. This raise
ably the problem of bureaucracy which was
in the context of Oriental despotism, and
fully came to grips with these developmen
tory to their general theory.s8
The general theory of the relationship be
however, remained unrevised. The "contrad
and the "driving forces of history" were le
the collapse of the capitalistic form of socia
it the bourgeois state. Following the seizure
tariat, the centralized state created by the
useful purpose during the stage of "dictator
to make "despotic inroads upon existing ri
last vestiges of capitalist power. The power
been broken, the state would rather quickly
leading to the eventual cooperative, noncoe
Lenin approached the matter of relation
society in a context modified somewhat
capitalism into a world-wide system and th
tionalism, particularly in Russia. His an
found in his formulation of "the right of n
tion" and in the famous phrase "national in
tent."21 The approach was purely instru
Bolsheviks should support demands for nat
in order to further the demise of the exis
the achievement of socialism, the earlier n
become superfluous. Such demands came
sonable under Stalin: the purge trials demo
constitutional provisions, a republic that
Union could not subsequently get out.22
Like Marx, Lenin saw the centralized bou
ily available vehicle for the dictatorship
tasks of administration, so he thought, had
under bourgeois bureaucracy that they cou
18 See Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New
19 Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, 53.
20 Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, 1
21 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXII
and 321-325.
22 Goodman, op. cit., p. 257.
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 197
by the ordinary working man,23 a view
abandoned after the Bolshevik Revolutio
popularization of administration did not m
period, that the vanguard would share its d
Lenin's attitudes and policies vis-a-vis the S
this abundantly clear.24
Lenin did add to the theory an analysis o
produced by the world-wide expansion of
The international development of capitalism
political system supporting capitalist intere
perialism, however, the contradictions of c
evitable conflicts among the capitalist state
for world proletarian revolution.25 But it
internationalism of capital to be met by a s
revolutionists' side:
Capital is an international force. To vanquish it, an international
workers' alliance, an international workers' brotherhood, is
needed.
We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to national
exclusiveness. We are internationalists. We stand for the close
union and the complete amalgamation of the workers and peasa
of all nations in a single world Soviet republic.26
Under Stalin, the emphasis shifted to a short-run stabilizati
of systems, as reflected in the concept of "socialism in one count
This was combined with a clearer elaboration of the basic idea
of a duality of systems. The concepts of "two camps" and "capita
ist encirclement" presented a picture of two distinct social system
with their accompanying legal superstructures, existing competi
tively within the general framework of a world political system
This was expressed most clearly by Maxim Litvinov to the Leagu
of Nations in response to a British delegate's question as to wheth
"it would be possible to find a single impartial judge in the whol
world." Litvinov replied: "It is necessary to face the fact th
23 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXV (Moscow, 1964), 420.
24 John S. Reshetar, The Soviet Polity (New York, 1971), pp. 189-94.
25 Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York, 1939
pp. 119-122.
286 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXX (Moscow, 1965), 293.
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198 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
there is not one world, but two, a Soviet worl
world."27
By the mid-1930's, then, Soviet spokesmen
comprehensive theory of the state, law and in
The state was regarded as, on one side, an agen
on the other a provisional instrument for revo
both camps, the state represented class interes
was the formal expression of those class intere
represented the norms of a dying class, wherea
manifestation of the underlying laws of histo
existential rather than normative judgments.2
this theory of functionally dependent legal an
ment was that the socialist system was the pro
power and revolutionary norms of the vangua
of the natural expansion of the capitalistic sy
defeating contradictions; forced moderniza
Marxist model of natural historical developme
Khrushchev made two notable additions to this theoretical
framework. First, he revised the theory of "peaceful coexistence"
to take into account the changed balance of forces in the world.
A vastly enlarged and powerful socialist camp had emerged from
World War II, to which had been added the anti-imperialist, newly
liberated countries that formed a third camp favorable to socialism.
The two together constituted the formidable "peace zone." Under
these conditions, it would be madness for the imperialists to unleash
war; "peaceful coexistence" was now not merely a matter of temporary
respite and stabilization, but a quasi-permanent feature of
international politics, pending the final collapse of capitalism.30
Implied was a newly protected position for the socialist system, particularly
for the Soviet Union. The implication was finally spelled
out in 1959 when Khrushchev declared that the victory of socialism
in the Soviet Union was both "complete and final," with no pos-
27 T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (New York,
1935), p. 296.
28 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and
Autocracy '(New York, 1966), p. 118.
29 Richard Lowenthal, "Development versus Utopia in Communist Policy,"
Survey, No. 74175 (Winter-Spring 1970), 12.
so Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York,
1961), pp. 60-66; W. W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence (Chicago, 1959), pp.
127-137.
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 199
sibility for the restoration of capitalism.3s
of the 81 Parties included the statement that the restoration of
capitalism had become "socially and economically impossible" i
the "other socialist countries as well."32
Secondly, Khrushchev defined the relationship among the socialist
countries in terms of a developing "commonwealth of socialist
states."33 In accord with the basic tenets of Leninism mentioned
above, this movement was seen as preliminary to the eventual emergence
of a single global commonwealth.34 Significantly, Khrushchev
predicted at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that the East European members of
this emerging commonwealth would all reach the state of communism
at about the same time.35 Implied was the assumption that,
whatever the differences in political or socioeconomic development
among these socialist states, these could be overcome through coordination
of the commonwealth.
Kovalev's concept of "socialist self-determination" appears to
be consistent with the framework of Marxist-Leninist thought on
law and international relations outlined above. And this was the
theoretical concept on the Soviet side that was translated into the
Western descriptive concept of "limited sovereignty." "Socialist
self-determination" simply refers to the "right" of the vanguard
to make and maintain a socialist revolutionary regime; such regimes
are legitimized not by popular sustenance but by the Marxist-Leninist
formulation of the laws of historical development. Kovalev's
initial defense of the intervention, moreover, was cast in terms of the
long-held position on the duality of world legal systems: one could
not use the "measuring stick" of bourgeois law; one must instead
take into account the class basis of socialist law.
By July, 1970, however, a decisive change in interpretation had
occurred. In International Affairs O. Khlestov stated: "The main
principle determining the relations between socialist countries is
31 Pravda, January 28, 1959, p. 9.
32 Dan N. Jacobs, The New Communist Manifesto (New York, 1961),
p. 19.
33 See Marshall D. Shulman, "The Communist States and Western Integration,"
Problems of Communism, XII (September-October, 1963), 54.
S40. V. Kuusinen, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow, 1960),
pp. 749-51. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist
Camp," World Politics, XIII (January, 1961), 208.
8s See R. Judson Mitchell, "World Communist Community Building,"
Stanford Studies of the Communist System (August, 1965), p. 19.
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200 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
the principle of socialist internationalism
a political principle, but also a principle
Since this statement occurred in the context of a discussion of
general international law, it seems clear that Khlestov was talkin
about something other than the heretofore orthodox view of
duality of legal systems. Indeed, Khlestov went on to describe th
"new international law" regulating relations among socialist state
as, in effect, an extension of the principles and rules of general international
law.37
While the Soviet Union has in the past accepted certain aspects
of general international law and has, in fact, at various times used
general international law to defend its own specific interests, the
conceptual framework for such usage has always been a duality
of systems and the class basis of law. It now appears, in the wake
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, that the Soviets were moving away from
the old conceptualization of a duality of legal systems and toward
an incorporative view of international law, an international law
that contains both bourgeois and socialist elements.
This incorporative tendency does not imply any extension of
the concept of peaceful coexistence; rather, it appears within the
general context of consistent Soviet argumentation concerning intensification
of the struggle between the two major social systems.
What it does suggest is, first, a certain fragility of the Soviet political
position vis-a-vis general international law; and, secondly, an
implication of questioning of the Marxist-Leninist view of the historical-developmental
basis of law.
The initial attack upon the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia
was based primarily upon legal considerations and Kovalev's
response, utilizing the conventional doctrine, was plainly inadequate.
Khlestov's "incorporative" approach can thus be viewed
as a search for stronger arguments concerning the legitimation of
political action, but something far more important is involved.
Behind Soviet theory of law, now as formerly, lies an analysis of
social development. An incorporative approach to international
law fits perfectly the analysis of social development underlying the
Brezhnev Doctrine. That analysis of social development is the
central concern of the remaining sections of this article.
08 O. Khlestov, "New Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty," International Affairs
(July, 1970), p. 12.
S7 Ibid., p. 13.
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 201
III. The Contradictions of Socialism and th
The Moscow Declaration of the 81 Comm
cember, 1960, pointed toward a socialist system
tradictions:
In contrast to the laws of the capitalist system
terized by antagonistic contradictions between
states leading to armed conflicts, there are n
the nature of the socialist system for contrad
between the peoples and states belonging to
leads to greater unity among the states and
consolidation of all forms of cooperation betw
Earlier, in 1958, a Soviet spokesman had dec
The world camp of socialism is a monolith
of free and sovereign states with common in
in which there is not and cannot be antagoni
Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Party Cong
claration of the 81 Parties, 1960, and the Com
the International Socialist Division of Labor
edged differences in levels of development of
within the socialist system but claimed that th
being rapidly eliminated to make possible the
taneous transition to communism."40
These apparently confident assertions of the Khrushchev era,
which belied the realities of the socialist system even then, offer a
striking contrast to the analysis of socialist development contained
in Kovalev's and Brezhnev's 1968 pronouncements, particularly
their references to the "weakest link of socialism." Although Brezhnev
and other Soviet spokesmen have used the euphemism "difficulties"
in referring to contradictions, they clearly recognize the
existence and a rising intensity of antagonistic contradictions. Even
if this were not the case, a rise in antagonistic contradictions is
necessarily inherent in the concept of the "weakest links of social-
38 Quoted in Jacobs, op. cit., p. 21.
39 Sh. Sanakoev, "The Basis of the Relations Between the Socialist Countries,"
International Affairs (July, 1958), p. 27.
40 See Jacobs, op. cit., p. 20 and Robert H. McNeal, International Relations
Among Communists (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), pp. 125-27.
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202 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
ism": if the path of development were cons
would be no "weak links." The "weakening
viewed as a threat to the entire system; a d
also necessarily threatens the Marxist-Lenin
ically the ideology's doctrine of historic
velopment.
Brezhnev and other Soviet spokesmen have identified 6 areas
of contradictions or potential disruption that are associated with
the "weakening of links": class antagonisms and bourgeois and imperialistic
resistance;41 nationalism and national interests;42 levels
of economic development;43 organizational problems;44 revisionist
ideology;45 and exposed positions and proximity to the capitalist
camp.46
This "weakening of links" provides the background for the
formulation of imperialist strategy in the contemporary epoch. The
balance of forces has shifted toward the socialist camp: the socialist
camp grows stronger while the contradictions of capitalism increase
in intensity. The weakening of imperialism, so the argument goes,
engenders among the capitalists a desperation which augments
their aggressiveness and inspires attempts to slow down the natural
processes of socialist development and to reverse the unfavorable
trend in the balance of forces. The strength of the socialist camp,
however, as well as the strategic situation in the world deters the
capitalists from overt warfare. Instead, they must adopt more
subtle tactics of ideological subversion, variously described by Soviet
spokesmen as "peaceful infiltration," "peaceful counterrevolution"
and "creeping counterrevolution." These tactics are employed
against the "weakest link of socialism" and are aimed toward bourgeois
restoration. If successful this will result in "reversing the
41 Gustav Husak, "Lenin's Teaching on the Party and Czechoslovak Reality,"
World Marxist Review, XIII (January, 1970), 7.
42 Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 6; Deszo Nemes, "Leninism and development
of the socialist world system," World Marxist Review, XIII (January,
1970), 17.
43 A. Sovetov, "The Present Stage in the Struggle Between Socialism and
Imperialism," International Affairs (November, 1968), p. 4.
44 Pravda, November 13, 1968, p. 1, quoted in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, XX (Dec. 4, 1968), 3; Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 3.
45 Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 3.
48 Miroslav Moc, "Czechoslovakia: out of the crisis," World Marxist
Review, XIII (October, 1970), 28; A. Zalyotny, "F.R.G. and Developments
in Czechoslovakia," International Affairs (November, 1968), 22.
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 203
course of history."47 Such a capitalist offen
outcome presumably in doubt, "even after
tions of socialist society."4s Although the
fined to detachment of the "weakest link,"
to the entire system and is really aimed
Union:
Needless to say, the main blow and the main trend of the
struggle are directed against the Soviet Union which has been,
and remains, the decisive force of the Socialist community and
the reliable mainstay of the world revolutionary and liberation
movement.49
Brezhnev's prescription for the crisis produced by the "weakening
of links" and the capitalist counterrevolutionary offensive is
fourfold: (1) increasing coordination of the activities of the socialist
countries in all fields or as Brezhnev put it, the "sharper the
confrontation between the new and the old world" the greater becomes
the importance of such coordination;50 (2) strengthening of
the role of the Communist Party throughout the system; (3) intensification
of ideological warfare against bourgeois ideology, that
is, increasing struggle against revisionism and emphasis upon ideological
conformity; (4) application of coercion to meet immediate
crises caused by "weakening of links"; this coercion is sanctioned
by "socialist internationalism," and is to be coordinated on
an international or interparty basis within the socialist commonwealth;
strengthening of the commonwealth's primary coercive
arm, the Warsaw Treaty Organization.51
A certain structural parallelism is at once apparent between the
theoretical formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and Lenin's
analysis of capitalist development in Imperialism; the Highest Stage
of Capitalism. In both cases there is an analysis of a system driven
by its own imperatives toward maximum development of the productive
forces, physical expansion and centralization and concentra-
47 See Brezhnev's speech to the International Parties Conference, Pravda,
June 8, 1969, pp. 1-4; Sovetov, op. cit., pp. 3-9; I. Oleinik, "Leninism and the
International Significance of the Experience Gained in Socialist Construction,"
International Affairs (February-March, 1970), pp. 27-34.
48 Oleinik, op. cit., p. 30.
49 Sovetov, op. cit., p. 4.
50 Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 2.
51 "In Defense of Socialism and Peace," International Affairs (September,
1968), p. 5.
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204 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
tion of power. In both cases contradictions with
marily a matter of uneven development, lead to
coercive response. And in both cases the une
ment produces a "weakest link" (in the case of
perialism, this was an addendum of the early C
was already clearly implied in Lenin's earli
existence threatens the overthrow of the syst
difference appears to be that Lenin's doctrine of
the contradictions of capitalism as inevitably l
fall of imperialism whereas Brezhnev's analysis
ment leaves the future open-ended and ambigu
relieved only slightly by ritualistic repetitions
the ultimate achievement of communism.
In terms of the plain language of Brezhne
spokesmen, one would be quite justified in ret
Doctrine "Imperialism: the Highest Stage of
developmental imperatives at an advanced st
velopment are now seen as requiring overt app
across national boundaries among socialist s
from this perspective, the Doctrine appears to r
and continuing tension within Marxism betwee
evolution on the one hand and contingency and
other. In revolutionary practice this has prim
necessity of finding a theoretical justification
ment.52 It will be recalled that the principal p
tion for the occurrence of revolution in R
Marx's earlier analysis was the doctrine of the "
perialism,"53 that is, the analysis of mature ca
justification for the coercive role of the van
Union. If, indeed, the balance of forces in th
decisively against capitalism, today's potential
ercion by the doctrine of the "weakest link of
appear to be minimal.
The doctrine of the "weakest link of socialis
temporary justification for the exercise of coer
of development. This doctrine, however, raises
can the completion of the construction of the f
ism and the change in the world balance of f
52 Cf. Lowenthal, op. cit., pp. 3-27.
53 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Un
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 205
with the strengthening of state and par
answer offered by Soviet spokesmen is that
aggressive and presumably more dangerous
sively weaker. But to claim that a dying cap
the basis of its own power, overthrow a pr
socialist system (and Khrushchev's 1959 a
encirclement is ended has not been disavow
and no Soviet spokesman makes this claim.
of danger lies in what Brezhnev calls "diffic
tradictions of socialism. Here, the princip
taneous development and the possibility
triumph of bourgeois ideology.
Lenin maintained that "spontaneity," if
lead directly to the victory of bourgeois id
was polarized, reflecting the polarization
taneity" was antithetical to socialism.54 Len
cerned the early stages of socialist struggle; i
sive development of socialism would lead to
norms antithetical to bourgeois ideology, as
cept of the "new man."55 In Brezhnev's form
becomes increasingly dangerous as the syste
achievement of the ideological goals.
The contrast between Brezhnev's and Leni
points on spontaneity is further heightened
fact that Czechoslovakia had, in 1960, mo
People's Democracy into the stage of the Soc
been consistently recognized by the Soviets
member of the commonwealth other than t
tification of Czechoslovakia as the "weakes
be attributed to primitiveness of developmen
as the "weakest link" was plausible in ter
spontaneous development and the restoration
A possible implication never admitted by So
the higher the level of development, the grea
bility to spontaneity and hence the greate
54 Lenin, What Is to Be Done? (New York, 1929)
55 Lenin, "Toward the Seizure of Power," Vol.
214.
58 See Ota Sik, "The Economic Impact of Stalini
munism, XX (May-June, 1971), 2.
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206 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
bourgeois ideology. Indeed, as Lowentha
pointed out, the functional devolution of
leads to the creation of structures antitheti
ism. Given the admitted differences of soc
of development, it seems reasonable to assu
between ideologically legitimized elites and
low ideological commitment would first
vanced countries. Designation of Czechos
link of socialism" by the Soviet leadersh
admission of the existence of such a problem
The concept of the "weakest link of so
explicit admission of much more than th
world politics underlying the Brezhnev
structurally similar but hostile systems en
survival, with the outcome in doubt. This f
quantitatively and qualitatively from th
camps" and "capitalist encirclement." While
has changed drastically to favor the sociali
contradictions of capitalism, strangely eno
as the necessarily ultimate decisive eleme
contradictions of socialism now open up the
victory. Since the objective factors of stren
guarantee victory and since overt direct m
the systems is precluded by the realities of wo
peaceful coexistence, the "driving forces o
dence to more subjective factors: organ
ideological dynamism are now the crucia
development.
Operationally, the preservation of favor
ideological struggle is dependent upon the
to inhibit the deleterious effects of the con
And this is, of course, precisely the Soviet view
contradictions of imperialism compel the cap
to maintain control over their camp as
emerges, then, is a view of the world outlin
two camps imperialistic both in their essen
internally and ideologically militant both in
That much of the world lies outside the two
57 Lowenthal, op. cit., pp. 21-24.
58 Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York, 1
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 207
is rather irrelevant given the Soviet viewpoi
ideologies.
Thus, the subjectivism that was first openly introduced into
Marxism by Lenin and was later brandished proudly by Mao now
becomes the central element in the Soviet apologia for the politics of
coercion. In the hands of Marx historical materialism was a tool
for the liberation of man: man became free by obeying history.
History now speaks with an uncertain voice and must be commanded.
Brezhnev has renounced the teleology of liberation in
favor of the politics of organizational survival.
IV. Functionalism versus the Ideology of Power
When one speaks of Marxism-Leninism, it is extremely misleading
to posit a dichotomy between ideology and power. This is
precisely the Leninist contribution to the ideology--the insertion of
organizational power as a crucial variable into an ideological
framework that was developmental, functionalist and teleological.
The current Soviet leadership appears to have extended the Leninist
approach to make organizational power the decisive variable.
Movement in this direction is a response to the problems of the
socialist system at a comparatively advanced level of development.
Behind these problems lies a contradiction within the ideology
pertaining to processes of development and this is the principle
"contradiction of socialism" that has led the Soviet leadership,
since 1968, to make the important theoretical departures I have dis-
cussed.
On the level of general world politics, the formulation of the
Brezhnev Doctrine and the subsequent Soviet discussion of it have
indicated a narrowing of Soviet concerns from the "three camps"
and "peace zone" analysis of the Krushchev era to a revised "two
camps" doctrine. What is most interesting about this narrowing
is its impact upon Marxist theory of development.
In the original Marxist analysis of social reality and development,
structural diffusion in the material substructure was reflected
in ideological diffusion in the superstructure of ideas and
institutions. The dominant ideology of each epoch, however, was
but a reflection of the dominant social force in the substructure. In
the epoch of capitalism the processes of history were producing a
simplification of elements in the substructure-the polarization of
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208 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
classes-and would eventually lead to a mon
the proletariat had become the single surv
structural monism would then be reflected i
for the first time in human history form an
would perfectly correspond and ideology
Marxism, foreseeing this development, alread
ideology, as a scientific formulation of devel
the self-interested alienation inherent in all p
Although the case is by no means closed on
whether the contradictions identified by Mar
defeating for the capitalist system, capitalism
staying power much greater than Marx an
foreseen. Surely a major reason for this longe
tural diversity and pluralism produced by
stronger than the tendencies toward the pola
monism predicted by Marx. Not surprisingly,
has come to power on the basis primarily of in
forces, it has done so in undeveloped countri
areas lacking the structural diversity produc
ditionally, in contrast to the Marxist model of
the structural monism presupposed by Marxi
duced by coercion. The efficacy of this proce
with low levels of previous infrastructural d
in Czechoslovakia, which had more capitalisti
than any other party-state at the outset, the
spectacularly successful as late as 1960.
This process, however, produces a result
original Marxist model of development: the
nomic modernization yields a new substructu
any good Marxist knows, substructural diffu
duce ideological diffusion. This is the real con
ism underlying the danger of the "restorat
ology."
Khrushchev made a halting practical attempt to deal with the
problem of the relationship between substructure and superstructure
through his various abortive decentralization schemes and also
offered an oblique theoretical approach to it in his announcements
concerning the "state of the entire people."59 On the theoretical
level, Khrushchev saw the necessity for change in the superstructure
59 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 103.
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THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 209
as the base changes, that is, as the substruc
achievement of communism are increasingly
tures that have induced the social chang
gradually phase out their coercive activi
approach was based on the assumption tha
structure was moving in the desired dir
contradictions had been eliminated or virt
regimes, and that the required substructu
throughout the Socialist Commonwealth
attempted to deal with the problem witho
that he understood its true nature.
Brezhnev and his associates have renou
mistic viewpoint of Khrushchev, which w
to the realities of the socialist system. Mor
compelled to deal with the real problem: it
a correlation between socioeconomic develo
ment of ideological goals, for antagonistic
ifest at advanced levels of development.
perceived that "socialism with a human fa
for bourgeois democracy and, as such, inv
required substructural monism.
Marx viewed the processes of moderniza
capitalism as inherently revolutionary and
power of the ruling elite and of its ideolog
Brezhnev Doctrine appears to be an admiss
to those described by Marx in his analysis
actually occurring under the forced moder
system. Thus, the Doctrine questions more
before, from within the system, the effica
struction of "socialism from above."
Faced with the basic contradiction betwe
ization and ideological goals, Brezhnev h
opposition to superstructural change. Suc
solve the basic problem, which is probab
Marxist-Leninist framework. That appro
volve the acknowledgement of the separatio
substructure at advanced levels of socialist
itself, may well be a striking indication of cha
system.
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