Ulbricht's Grand Design: Economics, Ideology, and the GDR's Response to Detente — 1967- 1971 Author(s): MICHAEL J. SODARO Source: World Affairs, Vol. 142, No. 3 (Winter 1980), pp. 147-168 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671824 Accessed: 05-05-2019 06:55 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Affairs This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MICHAEL J. SODARO Ulbricht's Grand Design: Economics, Ideology, and the GDR's Response to Detente - 1967-1971 S tudents of the critical phase of rapprochement between theSoviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) generally agree that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) engaged in energetic efforts to obstruct the process of detente. Especially at the time of the Grand Coalition government in Bonn (1966-1969) and during the period of the intense negotiations con ducted by the Brandt-Scheel government with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970, the GDR exerted constant pressure on the Soviet Union to obtain full de jure recognition of the GDR and of Germany's post war borders by the government of the Federal Republic. In addition, the GDR expressed considerable reluctance to open its borders to West German visitors or to provide the West with special guarantees of unhindered access to West Berlin. Ultimately, of course, the Soviets proved willing to grant its Western negotiating partners important concessions in each of these areas, thus overriding the GDR's objections. Moreover, the chief advocate of East Germany's obstructionist policy, Walter Ulbricht, fell from power in May 1971, quite possibly at the instigation of Soviet authorities and certainly with their concurrence. Although the GDR's misgivings about detente by no means dissipated once Erich Honecker assumed the 147 This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 148 MICHAEL J. SODARO leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of ability to impede the progress of Soviet a diminished appreciably thereafter. Though the lion's share of scholarly atte focused on the importance of such questi and inter-German relations for the GDR represented only part of a larger picture. attempt to show, the GDR under Ulbrich seriously concerned about the economic This concern proved to be so far-reaching regime actually made important adjustme economic policies in response to what wa foreign policy danger. The prospect that ment would seek to use its. technological bargain for political concessions with th Pact states constituted a serious challeng term East German interests. In view of th GDR in 1968 launched a spirited campaig intensify their economic development "b practice, this exhortation meant that the refrain from making major political conc exchange for economic (and political) ben concentrate on accelerating their own eco its own contribution to this program, th accelerating its domestic growth efforts, technology sectors deemed crucial to the growth and political independence. In th GDR's highly acclaimed economic reform nomic System (NES), underwent a series recentralization measures were introduce expediting the implementation of the acc key features of the GDR's domestic econ treated here came to reflect the Ulbricht foreign policy interests. This close linkage between foreign polic economic system, while not an entirely n GDR,2 nevertheless represented an unusu tions. Whereas the factors influencing ec This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 149 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) coun the GDR normally are derived from. domestic considerati thesis presented here is that, during the years 1968-70, t ordinary salience of Bonn's Ostpolitik exercised an excep high degree of influence in shaping East Germany's econo strategy. Methodologically, this linkage between foreign policy concerns and domestic economic policies can be established above all by examining the publicly expressed perceptions of the situation by East German leaders themselves.The Ulbricht regime consistently justified its changing economic policies of 1968-70 by the mount ing challenges of Bonn's Ostpolitik. At least two factors support these justifications as the GDR's "true" motivations for the poli cies in question. For one thing, the SED elite's concern about the political dangers inherent in Bonn's economic Ostpolitik had a legitimate basis in fact. Although East German spokesmen were often prone to exaggerate these dangers for rhetorical effect, in fact there did exist a fairly close "match" between GDR percep tions of the perils of economic inferiority and certain demon strable realities. Second, there appear to be few, if any, plausible reasons accounting for the substantial changes in the GDR's eco nomic growth policies taking place in that period other than the ones offered by the leading East German decision makers them selves. As we shall see, the acceleration policies of 1968-70 were neither mandated by the prevailing five-year plan nor justified by the material capabilities or the actual performance of the East German economy. Rather, they appear to have been launched for reasons other than those of pure economic rationality. In the absence of supportable evidence to the contrary, it appears most likely that these policies were adopted for the very reasons advanced by Ulbricht and his followers, that is, as responses to an acute foreign policy predicament. Meanwhile, in a separate, but related, development, the Ulbricht regime in its final four years in power articulated a number of significant ideological innovations. Centered on Ulbricht's notion that the GDR constituted a prototype of what he called the "developed social system of socialism," these innovations were patently aimed at establishing the GDR's status as a model of This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 150 MICHAEL J. SODARO advanced socialism. As will be shown cant role both in the GDR's foreign p as in its domestic economic developm Ultimately, Ulbricht's policy of acc development and his efforts at ideolo tracing the evolution and collapse of appreciate some of the events that, o tical obstructionism, may have contr Moreover, a close analysis of this pe appreciation for the limits within w must work, both in the economic an addition, by examining these aspects called Ulbricht's "counterdetente" str to shed further light on some of the f formative period of detente between Pact states. The Czech Crisis and its Impact on the GDR's Economic Policies The Czech crisis of 1968 sparked the Ulbricht's regime's deci sion to accelerate high-technology growth. Although the SED's interpretation of the Czech reform movement took full account of the political dangers inherent in such developments as demo cratization and the abolition of press censorship, it also included a strongly critical evaluation of the Dubcek regime's economic poli cies. Above all, the SED leadership was alarmed at the prospects for a significant expansion of economic relations between Czechoslo vakia and the Federal Republic. Shortly after assuming power, the Dubcek regime had moved quickly to seek outside assistance for a major effort to overhaul the Czech economy. The reform-minded economist Ota Sik announced that an initial sum of $500 million would be necessary to launch the enterprise. When the Soviet response proved unsatisfactory, the Czechs let it be known that they would look to the West for the desired funds. Under the circumstances, this meant a move toward improved relations with West Germany. The GDR's reaction to these developments was swift and cate gorical. Ulbricht himself set the tone for East Germany's response when, in a visit to Prague in February, he declared that Czechoslo This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 151 vakia was running the risk of falling into "economic depe on the FRG. This parlous condition was seen as leading in to "political dependence." Throughout the course of the crisis, and even after the Soviet-led invasion of August 20 authoritative East German spokesmen as well as the SED kept up a steady stream of warnings about the twin perils economic and political dependence on the West.3 To be sure, it was the political ramifications of expanded with the FRG that were at the root of the GDR's concern itself, trade with the West was recognized as a vital requirem all COMECON countries, and Ulbricht himself freely ackn its necessity. Even the GDR, it was admitted, carried on a merce with the FRG and other capitalist nations.4 What garded as distressing in East Berlin was the immediate pos of a trade-off between economic aid and unacceptable po concessions. Indeed, even before the Czech events of 1968, the Ulbricht regime had advertised its opposition to such politically detrimental exchanges. In 1967, for example, the GDR made a major effort to blunt the thrust of the Grand Coalition's Ostpolitik. Bonn's new policy was predicated, in part, on the assumption that the need for advanced technology and other goods was so great in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that at least some of these states might be induced to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG in return for economic and political benefits.' This strategy was regarded with consternation in East Berlin, as leading spokesmen of the Grand Coalition government explicitly renounced any inten tions of formally recognizing the GDR or of abandoning the FRG's proclaimed right of sole representation of the German people. To the East German regime, it was apparent that Bonn's primary in tention was to isolate the GDR from its allies by offering them a combination of political and economic advantages. When Romania responded to the Grand Coalition's initiatives and established diplomatic relations with the ERG in Eebruary 1967, the GDR reacted vigorously. With Soviet backing, East Germany concluded new mutual assistance treaties with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hun gary, and Bulgaria, and won the endorsement of most of the War saw Pact States (Romania being the notable exception) for the This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 152 MICHAEL J. SODARO so-called "Ulbricht Doctrine." This m these four states from normalizing r Bonn agreed to recognize the GDR. Despite these political successes, ho scious of a growing desire for expand on the part of several of its key allie Czechoslavakia. Leaders of both state tinuing interest in closer economic t the Ulbricht Doctrine, and failed to about the sinister political intent of Ostpolitik.' Czechoslovakia, in fact, m missions with the FRG in August 19 It is against this background of mo about the economic component of B GDR's reactions to the Czech reform The Czech events of 1968 fit into th which the GDR had already come to efforts at detente. In addition to un party rule from within, the Czech re the GDR for succumbing to Bonn's e enticements. The GDR's admonitions about the dependence" in response to these occ debate taking place inside the USSR significantly expanding trade with th debate was the question of whether t enjoyed superiority over capitalism i advancement. While certain more tr men (such as Suslov) argued that th advantages" over the capitalist world ments, others (notably Kosygin) poin strength in these fields.7 By implica ostensibly more interested than the t technology gap by means of expande his part, Brezhnev generally sided wi until the middle of 1968. Speaking in Brezhnev criticized those Communis scientific-technical accomplishments This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 153 exaggerating the quality of Western technology. As long argued this point, Brezhnev struck a responsive chord in This was precisely the kind of logic the Ulbricht regime w in its policies with the Czech reformers, and the fact tha daily, Neues Deutschland, prominently displayed Brezhn marks was probably not unrelated to the Czech events.8 At any rate, the SED's interpretation of the Czech crisi have distinct policy consequences on the GDR's economic Evidence for this connection centers on the Ulbricht regi that, in order to avoid falling into "economic dependence West, the socialist states would have to solve their princip nomic problems "by their own means." This view was firs lated in Neues Deutschland in July 1968, as the Czech cris reaching its climax. The SED organ instructed the Czechs instead of asking for credits in Bonn or Moscow, they sho the principle of "building on one's own strength."9 The tion of this message was clear: in the last analysis, the soc states would have to take decisive economic action of thei they wanted to avoid the perilous political consequences ting economic inferiority to the West. Having just witness disturbing domestic and foreign policy effects of prolong nomic stagnation in Czechoslovakia, the GDR apparently that some kind of special action in the economic domain needed in order to avoid a future repetition of the Czech whether in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in the socialist blo Accordingly, in the fall of 1968 the Ulbricht regime beg ing to accelerate the growth of its high-technology industrie represented a distinct and abrupt change from previously policies. In fact, the GDR now decided to scrap its curren tive five-year plan, which had been promulgated only eigh months earlier for the purpose of specifying East German targets up to the end of 1970.10 The decision to abandon bitious targets and aim for even higher ones in key sector sented a significant policy shift that requires some explan Conceivably, domestic factors may have been at work. Giv economy's success in meeting the growth targets projected 1968, some East German functionaries may have argued t higher targets could be attained. However, there is not suf This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 154 MICHAEL J. SODARO information to support such a hypoth positive results of the 1968 plan did n assumption that the still higher goals leadership could in fact be met. What more clarity is the fact that the SED r Walter Ulbricht himself, consistently policy through the need to promote e our own means." Moreover, this task "political necessity" imposed on the so present in Bonn's Ostpolitik. Nowhere was this linkage between fo and economic policy changes more cle 9th plenum of the SED Central Comm This postmortem session on the Czech lengthy discourse by Ulbricht that up development "by our own means" as " class struggle." Ulbricht castigated exc imports as a seemingly "comfortable w that carried with it intolerable politi scribed antidote to this condition was agreements with the West that includ ditions, and, above all, to stimulate th states to the maximum degree. The G ready to do its own part to meet thes junction to promote economic develop was no mere slogan. As advanced by U 1968, it was most probably intended policy." The magnitude of the policy tiated became evident with the public plan in December 1968. Overall "pro set to grow by 6 percent, an increase target levels adopted in May 1967 in t plan. Primary responsibility for achiev so-called "structure-determining area nologically advanced sectors of the ec industries as electronics, chemicals, pl to the progress of an advanced econom sectors were now raised to as much as This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 155 year plan's projected annual goals (see Table 1). Considering difficulty any advanced industrial economy experiences in annual growth rates by even one-tenth of one percent, thes creases must be regarded as substantial. The decision to speed up growth in the high-technology a appears to have had an impact on the command structure o East German economy. As the GDR moved to implement t policy, new measures were introduced for the purpose of c ing decision-making procedures in the very "structure-deter areas" targeted for more rapid development. This step sign least a partial reversal of the decentralization tendencies ini by the NES reforms. Although these reforms had, from the ception, followed a zig-zag course, reflecting the SED's effo curb certain undesirable consequences of decentralization, centralization measures of 1968 appear quite unmistakably been aimed at raising production levels in specific high-tech sectors.'2 Even before 1968, complaints had been frequentl expressed by GDR officials about the inadequacy of econom performance in these sectors. As late as December 1967, how the regime continued to place its hopes in further decentra in trying to resolve these problems.'3 The decision to instit measure of recentralization in 1968, confined 'to the "struct determining areas," thus seems to have been taken with the of assuring that the GDR's policy of stepping up high-techn development operated with maximum efficiency.14 In sum, the Czech crisis appears to have been instrumenta inducing the East German leadership to make significant ch in its domestic economic policies, above all by triggering th celeration of high-technology growth. The GDR's economic ures of 1968, and the regime's own justification for them, w fully consistent with the leadership's analysis of the Czech c as an example of the dangers of "economic dependence" on West. While it was presumably clear to the Ulbricht regime complete economic independence from the West was out of question for the foreseeable future, apparently it was decide immediate action was necessary to begin moving toward thi more rapidly than in the past. At the very least, the SED m hoped that unprecedented successes in speeding up growth a This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 156 MICHAEL J. SODARO would demonstrate that the econom COMECON states were far greater t a demonstration would perhaps weak the USSR and Eastern Europe who f from the West. Though the effects growth, combined with greater eco COMECON states, would not be felt evidently believed that urgent measu of the enormity of the Czech crisis The Continuity of Ulbricht's Strate Over the course of the next two ye eign policy perceptions and domest to play a central role in the Ulbrich process. As in 1968, the East Germa its allies to avoid entering into econ Germany that involved political con terest to the GDR. (Once again, this calling for an end to trade relations clearly unfeasable, especially for th As it happened, however, the SED ning its allies to this counterdetente turned an about-face in its German Gomulka regime, heretofore the sta hard-line policy toward the FRG, su ness to show flexibility in its dealin Oder-Neisse issue. No less importan Poland's almost desperate need for economic situation weighed heavily which was quickly followed by disc cials concerning a substantial expan tween the two countries.'5 The Soviet Union soon followed su Brezhnev had changed course in the competition with capitalism. Arguin possessed considerable advantages in Brezhnev increasingly differed with began moving closer to the view tha This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 157 would be necessary to offset Soviet inadequacies in this area.16 This attitude was reinforced at the end of 1969, when a secret Central Committee session was held at which Brezhnev sternly criticized the failings of Soviet production techniques." In accordance with these shifts, the Soviets made new overtur to the FRG for talks on economic issues. By the summer of 196 negotiations were under way for the purchase of steel pipe for USSR's Druzhba pipeline project. Even more importantly, the formation of the Brandt-Scheel government in the fall of 1969 broadened the possibilities for major political agreements betwe Bonn and the USSR, as well as for economic accords. The close connection between the economic and the political aspects of d tente between Moscow and the FRG became strikingly evident 1 February 1970 as the two governments signed the largest Eas West trade deal ever concluded to that time.'8 Coming at the sta of the Bahr-Gromyko talks in Moscow on the renunciation of force treaty, the trade agreement was clearly meant to improve the atmosphere for substantial political agreements. It was precisely such politically portentious economic exchang that profoundly disturbed the GDR. Unfortunately for the SE leadership, its campaign to convince its allies of the need to acc erate development "by our own means" never elicited a positive response.'9 Moreover, the GDR's determined efforts to induce Soviets to permit a "qualitatively" higher degree of technologic cooperation between the GDR and the Soviet Union seemed to meet with only partial success for the Ulbricht regime.20 As the Soviets moved to conclude the pipeline agreement wit Bonn in 1970, the GDR's dissatisfaction with Soviet policy bur out into the open. At an ideological conference held shortly be fore the conclusion of the accord, Soviet and East German del gates presented diametrically opposed views on the subject of economic dealings with the West. Herbert Kr~ger, representing GDR, admitted the existence of diverse interests on the part of socialist states in this question, and emphasized the elements of confrontation existing in the current economic rivalry "betwee socialism and imperialism." In contrast to this view, one of the Soviet delegates, Bogomolov, played down the confrontationist aspects of East-West relations, and underscored the need to ach This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 158 MICHAEL J. SODARO "the completion of the system of the soc tions with the capitalist states." Even mor Bogomolov fully acknowledged that certa not see eye-to-eye on this issue." After th agreement of February 1, articles appear veyed the strong impression that Moscow cluding it.22 The growing divergence in 1969 and 197 and its chief allies not only on the genera West Germany, but also on the economic firmed the SED's perceptions of 1968. Th economic debilities were once again seen acceptable political arrangements with the was in the context of these events that th tinued to push the accelerated developme determining" sectors of the GDR's econom In fact, the leadership decided in the cour even higher plan targets than those set in duced national income was planned to gro 1970, the highest figure ever set by the G growth. Increases in planned output in th were set at correspondingly high levels (s As with the formulation of the 1969 pla difficult to find within the domestic syst rationale for these substantial leaps in pla the results of the economy's performance counseled a far more moderate course. Pe placed severe strains on the economy, resu energy supplies as well as other deficienc leaders themselves admitted that complain heard among various economic functionar jected plan targets were being fixed at un In the end, the economy failed in 1969 to been set for it during the previous year in growth sectors. Nevertheless, the regime vowed to .push faster rates of growth than those that fa This decision appears quite clearly to hav This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 159 Table 1.-Economic Growth in the GDR: Plans and Results Annual growth, 1969 1969 1970 1970 1971 Sector 1966-70 plan plan results plan results p Produced Na tional Income 5% - 5.7% 6% 5.2% 6.3% 5.2% 4.9% Industrial Goods Production 6.5% - 7% 7% 8% 8.5% 6.4% 5.6% Electronics/Electro mechanics 10.4% - 10.8% 13% 11.9% 15.1% 11% 10.7% Chemical Industry 8.4% 9% 7.6% 11.3% 8.3% 7.3% Labor Productivity in Industry 7% - 7.7% 9% 8% 9.4% 5% 5.4% Sources: Gesetzblatt der DDR, 1967, Part I, no. 8, pp. 65-87; Neues Deutschland, 14 December 1968, p. 2; Die Wirtschaft, 51-52/1968, p. 3;DDR-Wirtschaft: Eine Bestandsaufnahme (1974), pp. 355-56; Die Wirtschaft, 1/1970, Supplement 2; Neues Deutschland, 22 January 1971, pp. 3-4; ibid., 16 December 1970, p. 3. est decision-making levels in the GDR, with Ulbricht himself act ing as its prime advocate. In view of the great difficulties the eco nomy was experiencing in trying to meet its assigned targets, the regime's policies were manifestly motivated by considerations other than those of strict economic rationality. In fact, it was the political importance of accelerated growth that Ulbricht and other leading SED officials themselves emphatically underscored when presenting the 1970 plan.24 The growing successes of Bonn's Ostpolitik thus continued to have a perceptible impact on the GDR's economic policy decisions, and leading SED officials ex plicitly acknowledged this linkage. After the conclusion of the Bonn-Moscow trade agreement of February 1, the linkage struck new roots. Scarcely three weeks later, Ulbricht announced a new goal for the East German economy. Pointing to the GDR's chronic inability to raise labor productivity to acceptable levels, the SED chief proclaimed the lofty aspiration of overtaking the Federal Republic in this category. The hyperbolic slogan "Overtake without catching up" ("Uberholen ohne einzuholen") spearheaded the new campaign. While no timetable This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 160 MICHAEL J. SODARO was established for achieving this impossi the Ulbricht regime appeared determined urgency into the GDR's economic efforts Both the timing of this action and state himself indicated that the latest successe nomic diplomacy had provided a consider "overtake without catching up" campaign launched the enterprise, Ulbricht lashed Scheel for imagining that the USSR's pre ties opened the way to "the penetration a the states of the Warsaw Pact. Several we stated this view and asserted the GDR's r nomic performance rapidly for the preci economic dependence and political manip the West.26 It may, therefore, be hypoth momentum of detente reinforced the GD economic vulnerability and, thus, induce speed up its efforts to boost labor produc might otherwise have been attempted. For about the first eight months of 19 policies continued to be guided by the pr growth in effect since 1968, with the add ically raising labor productivity. Plans we this growth strategy for at least the next f throughout 1969 and 1970 the acceleratio take its toll on the economic reform proc investment resources in the "structure-d ued to be accompanied by the recentraliz powers in these same key industries. Con provided the occasion for intensified rece Ulbricht's Ideological Innovations Throughout this period, the SED leader serious effort to revise prevailing commu the nature of socialism. The key concept changes revolved was that of the "develo cialism." Ulbricht formally unveiled this address before the VIIth SED Party Cong This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 161 From the outset it was evident that the SED chief intended t this concept to project the image of the GDR as a model of vanced socialist society. The GDR's claim to a model character had important impli tions for the social structure of virtually all the states of the Warsaw Pact. In essence, the "developed social system of soci took account of the growing social significance of the techno elites of these countries, and conferred on them a higher leve ideological legitimacy than had previously been accorded them Soviet-inspired doctrinal orthodoxy. By advancing the notion advanced socialist society must be thought of in cybernetic te as constituting a "total system" (Gesamtsystem) composed of or less equally indispensable subsystems (for example, politics economics, education, and culture), Ulbricht in effect broad the orthodox conception of socialism to include contribution from all sectors of society. Although the GDR was still descr as a "Workers' and Peasant's State," the doctrine now lost its traditional preoccupation with the working class as the preem social group. Instead, the technocrats were exalted as at least ideological co-equals of the working class, a status that reflec their enhanced importance in building a technologically advan economy.30 Several months after introducing the "developed social system of socialism," Ulbricht brought forward another ideological inno vation. In September 1967, the SED leader expounded the propo sition that socialism constituted a "relatively independent his torical formation," and added that its duration would be much longer than had been previously imagined.31 These ideas departed from the traditionally held notion that socialism would gradually develop into communism in a fairly smooth transition process. The view that socialism and communism were separated by a distinct demarcation was a new one, and its accompanying suggestion by Ulbricht that socialism even had its own laws of development served to reinforce the GDR's claims to theoretical ingenuity. At bottom, the GDR was asserting that it had discovered a number of these laws in the course of its own development, especially in the management of the economy, and strongiy hinted that other socialist states might do well to study the East German example.32 This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 162 MICHAEL J. SODARO The suggestion that the GDR was a important implications for its relat public and with its own allies. As in veloped social system of socialism" response to the Grand Coalition's O pointedly that, as a fully developed no longer in a position to consider r many unless the FRG adopted the s Soviet alliance, the GDR's pretensio were clearly aimed at raising the G Ulbricht's own influence among fel yond this, the East German innovat ideological problem faced by nearly centered on Ulbricht's search for a contemporary socialism that took a technical revolution" while at the sa predominance of one-party rule. Th became especially acute in light of 1966, prominent Czech intellectuals a new model based on cybernetic con but their thinking also included suc free discussion and the autonomy o ment entitled "The Czech Model of 1968, placed even greater emphasis bricht's "developed social system of part, a reaction to these ideas. It com conceptualizations with a strong de the party." The emphasis on the pri more pronounced after 1968. In September 1969, the GDR went sive book that spelled out in conside foundations of the "developed socia Political Economy of Socialism and the volume went beyond the initial and reaffirmed the more recent view develop their economies "by their o thus, using its ideological innovation crisis economic policies, and to conv This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 163 eschew "economic dependence" on the West. Ideology w being pressed into the service of the GDR's foreign and policies with even greater emphasis than before 1968. With the publication of this weighty tome, the GDR in its efforts to gain acceptance of its model character amo other Warsaw Pact states. Ulbricht himself was repeatedl out as having made a major personal contribution to the Over the course of the following months, East German r tives enthusiastically promoted the "developed social sys socialism" at a series of ideological conferences.39 These however, did not meet with much success. On the contra Soviet Union openly indicated its displeasure at the SED vations. Although Political Economy of Socialism and It tion in the GDR was translated into Russian, it was criti review in Pravda.40 Even sharper criticisms followed as a delegate roundly condemned the GDR's ideological posit ideological conference in Prague.41 Presumably incensed bricht's presumptuousness in encroaching on the USSR' as the sole source of ideological legitimacy within the Wa alliance, Moscow flatly rejected the GDR's bid to present a model of advanced socialism. Ulbricht's Fall and Honecker's Retrenchment By the end of 1970, Ulbricht was in trouble on several In addition to encountering intense Soviet pressures to s line in ideological matters as well as in the larger questio tente with the FRG, the SED leader witnessed the collaps economic acceleration policy. Figures issued in July show the economy's performance was falling far short of the 1970 plan targets.42 During the next several months, high-l East German officials as well as economic functionaries increasingly outspoken in their denunciations of "dispro in the economy and unrealistically high plan targets. On member pointed specifically to "exaggerated ideas and w which do not correspond to the material possibilities" as ciple cause of the difficulties. Premier Stoph and plannin Schiirer were equally critical of the economic priorities o past two years.43 Statements of this kind were clear sign This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 164 MICHAEL J. SODARO as a result of the country's economic ambitious policies, Ulbricht's interna seriously weakened. Corrective measures began to be tak annual plan for 1971 was revealed at targets were fixed well below the lev (see Table 1). Moreover, emphasis wa balanced growth strategy ("plan-base marked departure from the "dynami characterized Ulbricht's excessive con sectors. When Honecker came to pow of economic balance, and personally "miracles outside the plan."44 The ne that the "chief task" of the next five "further increase of the people's mat living," a distinct shift in emphasis aw boasting about the GDR's technologic the new regime initially continued th decision-making structures in select a rect the imbalances and efficiencies t 1968-70 phase of taut planning.46 Ulbricht's ideological initiatives wer Honecker's accession. In his first majo the SED, Honecker replaced the term socialism" with the "developed social formally employed by the Soviet Un repudiated Ulbricht's notion of social phase.47 Several months later, Wolfg ideological specialist, followed up thi assault on Ulbricht's theories.48 Hage bricht's confrontationist standpoint between socialism and capitalism, and italism's recent technological achievem latter attitude served as the Soviets' trade with the West. The retreat of U was virtually complete when Politica Its A pplication in the GDR was with replaced with a more orthodox Sovie This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 165 Conclusions Ulbricht's "grand design" involved a mixture of political, eco nomic, and ideological elements. As this study has endeavored to show, East Germany's economic and ideological policies in this period represented, in varying degrees, a response to the political dangers the Ulbricht regime perceived in the process of East-West detente. They also combined to buttress the GDR's claim to con stitute a model socialist state, an effort that, at times, also ful filled distinct foreign policy functions. In the end, however, Ul bricht's excessively ambitious policies foundered on the GDR's in ternal economic limitations and on the Soviet Union's express opposition. The conditions under which the Honecker administration took power were very different from those during Ulbricht's final years. By 1971, the Soviets were firmly committed to detente with Bonn, and the GDR was compelled to adjust its positions accord ingly. The Soviets had also made known their objections to Ul bricht's ideological heresies. Finally, with the failure of the ac celerated growth policies of 1968-70, the Honecker regime was forced to recognize the inherent limits of the GDR's economy. In all three of these areas, the GDR under Honecker has endeavored to avoid the extremes pursued by Ulbricht in the earlier period from 1967 to 1971.49 In a broader, comparative perspective, the study of the GDR presented here illuminates a critical dilemma confronted by nearly all the Warsaw Pact states. Continuing economic inferiority to the West in critical sectors places most of these states at a distinct political disadvantage. Ulbricht recognized this at a time when the relationship between economics and East-West diplomacy was more intense than it appears to be now, and its ultimate conse quences less foreseeable. But whereas Moscow, Warsaw, and others were willing to trade off political concessions for a combination of political and economic gains, Ulbricht held that political con cessions should be deferred and the Soviet bloc's indigenous tech nological development accelerated. For the other Warsaw Pact states, the need for economic modernization increased the pres sures for detente. For the GDR, detente increased the pressures for economic modernization. This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 166 MICHAEL J. SODARO Notes 1. See, for example, Gerhard Wettig, Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975) and N. Edwina Moret?n, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978). 2. In the early 1960s, the GDR launched the so-called St?rfreimachen campaign, designed to make the GDR's economy "disturbance-free" from the effects of the economic diplomacy of West German Foreign Minister Schr?der. 3. Neues Deutschland, 23 February 1968, pp. 3-4. Also ibid., 30 July, p. 6. For other expressions of the GDR's alarm at the prospect of close Czech economic ties with the FRG, see ibid., 8 June, pp. 5-6; 21 June, pp. 3-4. Here after this source will be cited as ND. 4. Ibid., 24 May 1968, p. 6; 30 July, p. 6; 25 August, p. 2. 5. A leading Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokes man summed up this attitude with the statement that "(m)odern diplomacy has largely become economic diplomacy." See Ernst Majonica, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966), p. 9. For Brandt's views on economic diplomacy, see Friedenspolitik in Europa (Frank furt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), pp. 77 ff. 6. See the speeches made at the Karloby Vary conference by Novotny in ND, 26 April 1967, pp. 5-6, and Kadar, ibid., 28 April, p. 4. See also Ul brichts speech, ibid., 27 April, pp. 3-4. 7. Bruce Parrott, "Technological Progress and Soviet Politics," Survey 23, no. 2 (Spring 1977-78): 40-42. 8. ND, 31 March 1968, p. 5. 9. Ibid., 30 July 1968, p. 6. 10. Gesetzblatt der DDR, Part I, no. 8 (7 June 1967): 65-87. 11. See Gunter Mittag's speech in ND, 27 October 1968, p. 4. On the 1969 plan, see ibid., 14 December 1968, p. 2, andD/e Wirtschaft, 51-52/1968, p. 3. 12. Angela R?ger, Die Bedeutung "strukturbestimmender Aufgaben" f?r die Wirtschaftsplanung der DDR (West Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1969). 13. ND, 24 November 1967, p. 4; 16 December, p. 3. 14. For the first official announcement of plans to recentralize decision making procedures in the "structure-determining areas," see ND, 23 April 1968, p. 3. More detailed regulations followed in July. See Gesetzblatt der DDR, Part II, 1968, no. 66, pp. 433 ff. The timing of these actions suggests that the decision to upgrade performance in the high-technology sectors by means of recentralization had been taken several months after the Ulbricht regime began developing the theme of "economic dependence" in the con text of the Czech crisis. 15. On Gomulka's motivations, see Peter Bender's article in Der Monat, August 1969, pp. 8 ff., and Nicholas Bethell, Gomulka (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 270-74. On the Polish-FRG economic discussions, set Der Spiegel, 24/1969, p. 34, and 25/1969, p: 31. 16. Parrott, "Technological Progress and Soviet Politics," pp. 41-43. See also the contrasting statements by Brezhnev and Ulbricht at the international Communist party meeting in ND, 8 June 1969 (Brezhnev) and 10 June, pp. 5-7 (Ulbricht). This content downloaded from 89.24.155.118 on Sun, 05 May 2019 06:55:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE GDR'S RESPONSE TO DETENTE 167 17. Christian Dueval, "Brezhnev's Secret Report," Radio Liberty Res CRD 29/70 (29 January 1970). 18. The accord provided for the exchange of 52 billion cubic meter Soviet natural gas for 1.2 million tons of large diameter steel pipe from FRG. In addition, West German banks agreed to extend the Soviets $4 million in credit at favorable interest rates. 19. See the speeches made at the April 1969 COMECON meeting in Wirtschaft, 4/1969, pp. 3-6. 20. In July 1969, a high-ranking GDR delegation visited the USSR t cuss greater technological cooperation, but the final communique fail mention certain agreements the GDR was actively seeking. On the GD sires, see TVA 2 July 1969, pp. 1-2. For the communique, see ibid., 5 J p. 1. Later, the GDR acknowledged that the Soviets had not as yet acc to East German wishes for more direct forms of collaboration on rese development projects. See Klaus Stubenrauch and Dietrich Austel, "?be ohne einzuholen," Einheit, 6/1970, p. 741. 21. Einheit, 3/1970, pp. 303-04; 4/1970, pp. 353-60. 22. ND, 24 January 1970,#