

ECONOMIC TRANSITION OF RUSSIA

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John Maynard Keynes in 1925



- “The economic system of Russia has undergone such rapid changes that it is impossible to obtain a precise and accurate account of it... Almost everything one can say about the country is true and false at the same time”

Key factors of Russian economic development

- The largest country in the world - 17,075,400 square kilometres



Key factors of Russian economic development

- The world's largest reserves of mineral and energy resources



Key factors of Russian economic development

- Conflict between the center and the periphery (diversity of population, nationality and religion)
 - 160 different ethnic groups and indigenous people
 - Religion groups – Russian Orthodox Christianity, Muslim, Buddhism, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, beliefs (shamanism, pantheism, paganism, etc.)
 - Induction into religion takes place primarily along ethnic lines
 - Majority of ethnic groups are settled in certain areas
 - In modern Russia these ethnic group have a partial sovereignty – 21 republics with its own constitution, president, and parliament within the Russian Federation
 - The public finances are generated in the regions, transferred to the center, and only then re-allocated back to the regions


Key factors of Russian economic development

- Conflict between the center and the periphery (diversity of population, nationality and religion)



Key factors of Russian economic development

- Lack of investment in infrastructure
 - One of the world's longest webs of railways, highways and subways
 - the European part is more developed than the Asian part



Key factors of Russian economic development

- Vast territory
- Natural resources
- Conflict between the center and the periphery
- Lack of investment in infrastructure
- Authoritarian nature of governance to control the territory
- Huge expanses on defense and military
- The origins of investments are mainly internal

Starting conditions of the transition in late 1980s - social

- Low level of social inequality
 - as low as in Scandinavian countries
- Relatively low level of corruption
- Relatively low crime and mortality rates
- Immense investments in the human capital
 - Free high-quality education in every level
 - One of the best education system in the world
 - Free health care to all citizens
 - Relatively high life expectancy level
 - Highly developed pure science and innovation at the theoretical level

Starting conditions of the transition in late 1980s - economic

- Centralized bureaucratic allocation replaced market allocation
- Economic policy making was strictly hierarchical
- Macroeconomic situation – closed economy with the volume of money exceeded the volume of goods;
- Microeconomic situation – people demanded other goods than those supplied
- No initiative behavior among people and enterprises
- Economic distortion of prices
- Structural dysfunction of the economy (with prevailing heavy-industries enterprises)
- Large budget deficit – more than 6% of GDP
- Excessive foreign debt – 30 to 40% of GNP
- Falling oil prices
- Economic growth – 1 to 3%

USSR economic experiments of systematic changes

- 1920s – NEP – New Economic Policy
- 1930s – Industrialization & Collective farming
- 1950s – Khrushchev's reforms
- 1960s – Brezhnev's reforms
- 1980s – Gorbachev's reforms – transition to indicative planning; introduction of some market mechanisms – leased enterprises, family farming, joint ventures with foreign capital
 - ended up with political democratization
- Reforms did not change the planned nature of the economy

Objectives

- Restructuring of the national economy
- Macroeconomic stabilization

Goals

- Deregulation and promotion of competition
- Prices and interest rates liberalization (if to let go the prices, the output might be saved)
- Liberal foreign trade policy (open market)
- Establishment of property rights
- Development of the market economy institutions

Starting the transition




Boris Yeltsin



Yegor Gaidar


Price liberalization – early 1992

Average monthly growth rates of money supply (M3), prices and industrial output by quarters, %



External liberalization - 1992

Russia's foreign trade, billion \$



Privatization – since 1988


- Spontaneous privatization (1988-1991)
 - control over some industrial assets was acquired by their managers
 - this accounted for only several thousand enterprises, a small part of the Soviet industry
- Voucher privatization (1992 - 1994)
 - each voucher were corresponding to a share in the national wealth
 - vouchers were distributed equally among the population, including minors
 - vouchers could be exchanged for shares in the enterprises to be privatized
 - low price of vouchers \$7-10 – less than an average monthly wage
 - most shares were acquired by the management of the enterprises

Privatization – since 1988

- Loans for shares (1995)
 - included most oil, gas and other natural resource-based companies, which were highly profitable ones and were supposed to be sold for cash
 - industrial assets were leased through auctions for money lent by commercial banks to the government
 - the auctions lacked competition, as they were largely controlled by favored insiders
 - scheme that gave rise to the class of Russian business oligarchs, who have concentrated enormous assets
 - banks and enterprises involved in the scheme stopped seeing an interest in maintaining high inflation

Macroeconomic instability

Annual inflation rates in Russia
(December-to-December increase in CPI, log scale)




Anti-inflation policy – 1992-1998

- First half of 1992 (Gaidar). Growth of money supply was restricted; inflation fell to 10% a month in summer 1992; as a consequence, massive non-payments emerged
- First half of 1994 (Chernomyrdin). Tightened monetary policy allowed to bring down inflation to 5% a month in summer 1994; again, non-payments increased
- mid 1995: exchange rate based stabilization; inflation brought down to 6% a year (July 1998 to July 1997); currency crisis in August 1998, acceleration of inflation

Why high inflation was so persistent?

- There was no consensus among major lobbying groups, how to finance reforms, therefore it was impossible to balance the budget
- Problems with tax collection: high level of tax evasion in the 1990s. The government was willing, but not able to increase tax revenues
- Attempts to tighten monetary policy caused non-payments


What was expected?




Results (1991-1998)

- Free market
- Private business – 70% of GDP
- Huge fall in output
- High inflation
- Income redistribution
- Privatization – controversial results
 - people's disapproval & emergence of oligarchs
- Organized crime and corruption
- Capital flight – \$20 billion a year
- The development of barter economic relations and dollarization
- Unemployment and poverty
- Deterioration of education system, health care, demographics
- Inadequate pension system
- Inefficient legal system
- Corruption
- Existence of shadow economy

GDP growth rates, %




Personal incomes - % of level in 1991




Human development

Population of Russia




Human development

Russian Life Expectancy




Human development

Natural Population Growth of Russia




Russian financial crisis – August 1998

Consolidated government revenues and expenditure,
% of GDP



Russian financial crisis – August 1998

Government debt, % of GDP



Russia's 1998 financial collapse

- In a matter of days the exchange lost over 60% of its value
 - more than in all most Latin American and Southeast Asian countries (except for Indonesia)
- Prices increased by nearly 50% in only 2 months after the crisis
 - as compared to less than 6% annual inflation July 1998 to July 1997 before the crisis
- Real output fell by about 6% in 1998
 - after registering a small increase of 0.6% in 1997 for the first time since 1989, it fell in January - September 1998, i.e. mostly before the August 1998 crisis

Why was the drop so drastic?

- Some of the standard explanations
 - Bad institutions
 - Natural resource dependence
 - Bad policies
- For a medium income level country, Russia is trade wise open
- For a resource dependent country, it has a large population
- Financial dependence proved important
 - Short-term debt was concentrated and fast growing
 - Dependence of financial intermediation on foreign funding
 - The dual financial system: households and most companies using domestic markets; some big companies and banks dependent on foreign markets

So why the talk of a safe haven?

- Politicians were not in the business of doom-saying
- Shifting blame to where it belonged: global imbalances
- Good grounds why a pure financial crisis might handle Russia softly
 - Small financial sector; meager role in investment finance
 - Strong public sector financial position – taxation reform
 - Households with no financial wealth, little debt: no wealth effect on consumption
 - Labor markets expected to be very flexible


After the crisis

- Boom in industry
- After devaluation domestic producers are taking advantage of new export opportunities and the shift in demand from foreign to Russian made goods
- Devaluation of the previously overvalued currency restored the previously lost competitiveness
- Output was falling in the beginning of 1998, but started to grow in October (unlike in East Asia, where output fell after the currency crises)

Economic growth – 1999-2008

Russian GDP (PPP) Since Fall of Soviet Union


Billions of International Dollars (2008)



Source: International Monetary Fund (<http://www.imf.org>)

Output is growing, inflation is under control

GDP growth rates and inflation (right axis, log scale), %



Challenges for the future

- Unpredictable export revenue
 - Oil price
 - Energy efficiency needed for maintaining export volumes
 - Change in gas markets
- Regaining budget surplus
 - Re-accumulating reserve funds a high priority
 - Expenditure pressure due to recent hikes, long-term needs
 - Revenue problem due to declining share of energy sector in GDP
- Exchange rate policy
 - Increased flexibility of nominal rate, no pure inflation targeting
 - Real exchange rate appreciation pressure as financial inflow resumes
- Financial system development
 - Rolling back the state
 - Need for long-term domestic funding
- Pension reform
 - Increasing dependency ratio
 - Previous failures to depart from pay-as-you-go
- Competitiveness of jobs