MACROECONOMICS cover art ROW 1 (90) C H A P T E R © 2008 Worth Publishers, all rights reserved SIXTH EDITION PowerPoint® Slides by Ron Cronovich N. GREGORY MANKIW Government Debt 15 Chapter 15 is short but fun. Lots of policy & real-world relevance, little theory (a nice breather after the analytically challenging chapters 10-13). This presentation includes a lot of data that complements the material in the chapter: To support the case study “the troubling outlook for fiscal policy,” I have included data on the proportion of the population 65+ years old, spending on Social Security and Medicare as a share of GDP, and CBO projections of the government’s debt over the next 50 years. To support the textbook’s discussion of the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit, I include a graph of CBO’s estimate of the cyclical component of the deficit, which is used to “correct” the deficit for the gap between actual and potential GDP. And finally, to support the textbook’s case study on inflation-indexed Treasury bonds, I include data on the yields on indexed and non-indexed 10-year T-bonds. The difference between these yields is a measure of expected inflation, which I also include on the graph. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt In this chapter, you will learn… §about the size of the U.S. government’s debt, and how it compares to that of other countries §problems measuring the budget deficit §the traditional and Ricardian views of the government debt §other perspectives on the debt > Indebtedness of the world’s governments Country Gov Debt (% of GDP) Country Gov Debt (% of GDP) Japan 159 U.S.A. 64 Italy 125 Sweden 62 Greece 108 Finland 53 Belgium 99 Norway 52 France 77 Denmark 50 Portugal 77 Spain 49 Germany 70 U.K. 47 Austria 69 Ireland 30 Canada 69 Korea 20 Netherlands 64 Australia 15 An abbreviated version of Table 15-1 on p.432 Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Despite all the alarms sounded by politicians and some economists, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio is moderate when compared to other countries. (Of course, the U.S. has the largest GDP, so in absolute terms U.S. debt is a whopper when compared to other countries’ government debts.) cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Ratio of U.S. govt debt to GDP 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1791 1815 1839 1863 1887 1911 1935 1959 1983 2007 Revolutionary War Civil War WW1 WW2 Iraq War Figure 15-1, p.433. The historical pattern: the debt-GDP ratio rises during wars and falls during peace-time. The exception is the substantial rise that occurred beginning in the early 1980s. This graph suggests that the recent (1981-1994) increase in the debt is not so horrible when viewed in the larger context of history. Nonetheless, the debt ratio was higher in the early 1990s than during any previous time, except for WW2. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The U.S. experience in recent years §Early 1980s through early 1990s §debt-GDP ratio: 25.5% in 1980, 48.9% in 1993 §due to Reagan tax cuts, increases in defense spending & entitlements §Early 1990s through 2000 §$290b deficit in 1992, $236b surplus in 2000 §debt-GDP ratio fell to 32.5% in 2000 §due to rapid growth, stock market boom, tax hikes §Since 2001 §the return of huge deficits, due to Bush tax cuts, 2001 recession, Iraq war > The stock market boom of the latter 1990s created huge capital gains, which helped bring down the budget deficit by increasing revenues. Even if the government budget had been balanced, rapid economic growth from 1995-2000 would still have brought down the debt-GDP ratio. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The troubling fiscal outlook §The U.S. population is aging. §Health care costs are rising. §Spending on entitlements like Social Security and Medicare is growing. §Deficits and the debt are projected to significantly increase… US Capitol Bldg(60) > This and the next few slides correspond to the case study on pp.434-435, which has been updated and expanded for the 6^th edition. If you prefer, “hide” or omit this slide from your presentation, and instead give the information verbally to students as you display the following slides. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Percent of U.S. population age 65+ Percent of pop. 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 actual projected Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, "U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin," Table 2a. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt U.S. government spending on Medicare and Social Security Percent of GDP 0 2 4 6 8 Source: Table 15.4--TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE: 1948-2005, page 314 of “Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007” From the Budget of the U.S., FY 2007 Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CBO projected U.S. federal govt debt in two scenarios 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 optimistic scenario pessimistic scenario Even in the optimistic scenario, the debt ratio more than doubles over the next 40 years. In the pessimistic scenario, the debt ratio increases from 40% today to over 250% in just 45 years! Source: “A CBO Study: The Long-Term Budget Outlook.” December 2005. Available at www.cbo.gov The CBO actually did projections for 6 scenarios, which differ in their assumptions regarding government spending and revenues. The report cited above explains the assumptions behind all six scenarios. I read the report and studied the six scenarios, and then picked two that I thought were reasonable for this graph. The “pessimistic scenario” on this graph is Scenario 2 in the CBO report. The “optimistic scenario” on this graph is Scenario 5 in the CBO report. For details of the CBO’s projections in the other scenarios, please see the report. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Problems measuring the deficit §1. Inflation §2. Capital assets §3. Uncounted liabilities §4. The business cycle Before we assess whether the debt is a problem, we first consider whether the standard measures of the debt & deficit are accurate. It turns out they are not, for these four reasons. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 1: Inflation §Suppose the real debt is constant, which implies a zero real deficit. §In this case, the nominal debt D grows at the rate of inflation: § DD/D = p or DD = p D §The reported deficit (nominal) is p D even though the real deficit is zero. §Hence, should subtract p D from the reported deficit to correct for inflation. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 1: Inflation §Correcting the deficit for inflation can make a huge difference, especially when inflation is high. §Example: In 1979, § nominal deficit = $28 billion § inflation = 8.6% § debt = $495 billion § p D = 0.086 ´ $495b = $43b § real deficit = $28b - $43b = $15b surplus > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 2: Capital Assets §Currently, deficit = change in debt §Better, capital budgeting: deficit = (change in debt) - (change in assets) §EX: Suppose govt sells an office building and uses the proceeds to pay down the debt. §under current system, deficit would fall §under capital budgeting, deficit unchanged, because fall in debt is offset by a fall in assets. §Problem w/ cap budgeting: Determining which govt expenditures count as capital expenditures. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 3: Uncounted liabilities §Current measure of deficit omits important liabilities of the government: §future pension payments owed to current govt workers. §future Social Security payments §contingent liabilities, e.g., covering federally insured deposits when banks fail § (Hard to attach a dollar value to contingent liabilities, due to inherent uncertainty.) > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 4: The business cycle §The deficit varies over the business cycle due to automatic stabilizers (unemployment insurance, the income tax system). §These are not measurement errors, but do make it harder to judge fiscal policy stance. §E.g., is an observed increase in deficit due to a downturn or an expansionary shift in fiscal policy? > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 4: The business cycle §Solution: cyclically adjusted budget deficit (aka “full-employment deficit”) – based on estimates of what govt spending & revenues would be if economy were at the natural rates of output & unemployment. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The cyclical contribution to the U.S. Federal budget -120 -80 -40 0 40 80 120 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Source: CBO. Obtained from: http://www.cbo.gov/Spreadsheets.shtml http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7060/03-07-CycMeas.pdf CBO includes this note: “The cyclical contribution to revenues is negative when actual GDP is less than potential GDP. The cyclical contribution to mandatory spending is positive when the unemployment rate is higher than the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment. The cyclical contribution to the budget surplus or deficit equals the cyclical contribution to revenues minus the cyclical contribution to mandatory spending.” In essence, the graph on this slide shows the size of the correction to the measured budget deficit due to the business cycle. The data are in billions of current dollars. The increasing magnitude of the cyclical contribution is due to inflation and economic growth, both of which increase nominal magnitudes of most macroeconomic variables. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The bottom line We must exercise care when interpreting the reported deficit figures. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Is the govt debt really a problem? §Consider a tax cut with corresponding increase in the government debt. §Two viewpoints: §1. Traditional view §2. Ricardian view > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The traditional view §Short run: Y, u §Long run: §Y and u back at their natural rates §closed economy: r, I §open economy: e, NX (or higher trade deficit) §Very long run: §slower growth until economy reaches new steady state with lower income per capita > The traditional view is just the viewpoint embodied in the models that students learned in chapters 3 through 13 of this textbook. This viewpoint is accepted by most mainstream economists. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The Ricardian view §due to David Ricardo (1820), more recently advanced by Robert Barro §According to Ricardian equivalence, a debt-financed tax cut has no effect on consumption, national saving, the real interest rate, investment, net exports, or real GDP, even in the short run. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt The logic of Ricardian Equivalence §Consumers are forward-looking, know that a debt-financed tax cut today implies an increase in future taxes that is equal – in present value – to the tax cut. §The tax cut does not make consumers better off, so they do not increase consumption spending. § Instead, they save the full tax cut in order to repay the future tax liability. §Result: Private saving rises by the amount public saving falls, leaving national saving unchanged. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Problems with Ricardian Equivalence §Myopia: Not all consumers think so far ahead, some see the tax cut as a windfall. §Borrowing constraints: Some consumers cannot borrow enough to achieve their optimal consumption, so they spend a tax cut. §Future generations: If consumers expect that the burden of repaying a tax cut will fall on future generations, then a tax cut now makes them feel better off, so they increase spending. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Evidence against Ricardian Equivalence? §Early 1980s: Reagan tax cuts increased deficit. National saving fell, real interest rate rose, exchange rate appreciated, and NX fell. §1992: Income tax withholding reduced to stimulate economy. §This delayed taxes but didn’t make consumers better off. §Almost half of consumers increased consumption. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt Evidence against Ricardian Equivalence? §Proponents of R.E. argue that the Reagan tax cuts did not provide a fair test of R.E. §Consumers may have expected the debt to be repaid with future spending cuts instead of future tax hikes. §Private saving may have fallen for reasons other than the tax cut, such as optimism about the economy. §Because the data is subject to different interpretations, both views of govt debt survive. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt OTHER PERSPECTIVES: Balanced budgets vs. optimal fiscal policy §Some politicians have proposed amending the U.S. Constitution to require balanced federal govt budget every year. §Many economists reject this proposal, arguing that deficit should be used to §stabilize output & employment §smooth taxes in the face of fluctuating income §redistribute income across generations when appropriate > The material on this slide is related to the material on the slide after the following one, entitled Other Perspectives: Debt and Politics. If you wish to save time, you can combine the two. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt OTHER PERSPECTIVES: Fiscal effects on monetary policy §Govt deficits may be financed by printing money §A high govt debt may be an incentive for policymakers to create inflation (to reduce real value of debt at expense of bond holders) §Fortunately: §little evidence that the link between fiscal and monetary policy is important §most governments know the folly of creating inflation §most central banks have (at least some) political independence from fiscal policymakers > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt OTHER PERSPECTIVES: Debt and politics §“Fiscal policy is not made by angels…” – N. Gregory Mankiw, p.449 §Some do not trust policymakers with deficit spending. They argue that §policymakers do not worry about true costs of their spending, since burden falls on future taxpayers §since future taxpayers cannot participate in the decision process, their interests may not be taken into account §This is another reason for the proposals for a balanced budget amendment (discussed above). > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt OTHER PERSPECTIVES: International dimensions §Govt budget deficits can lead to trade deficits, which must be financed by borrowing from abroad. §Large govt debt may increase the risk of capital flight, as foreign investors may perceive a greater risk of default. §Large debt may reduce a country’s political clout in international affairs. > cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CASE STUDY: Inflation-indexed Treasury bonds §Starting in 1997, the U.S. Treasury issued bonds with returns indexed to the CPI. §Benefits: §Removes inflation risk, the risk that inflation – and hence real interest rate – will turn out different than expected. §May encourage private sector to issue inflation-adjusted bonds. §Provides a way to infer the expected rate of inflation… > This slide and the next correspond to the case study “the Benefits of Indexed Bonds” that closes Chapter 15 (see pp.451-452). It might be worth taking a moment to help your students understand why inflation risk is an undesirable thing. It’s also a good idea to help your students understand why we can infer the expected inflation rate from the difference between the yields on standard and inflation-indexed bonds of the same maturity. A simple example might help: Suppose the inflation-indexed Treasury bond pays 3 percent after inflation, while a standard Treasury bond with the same maturity pays 5 percent. We can infer that the market expects 2 percent inflation during the term of the bond. If people expected less than two percent inflation, then the non-indexed bond would have a higher real return than the indexed bond, so everyone would try to buy the non-indexed bond. But this would drive up its price, and drive down its return, until the difference between the returns on the two bonds just equals expected inflation. cover R1,C4 slide ‹#› CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CHAPTER 15 Government Debt CASE STUDY: Inflation-indexed Treasury bonds 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2003- 01-03 2003- 07-04 2004- 01-02 2004- 07-02 2004- 12-31 2005- 07-01 2005- 12-30 2006- 06-30 2006- 12-29 2007- 06-29 rate on non-indexed bond implied expected inflation rate rate on indexed bond This graph presents the yields on 10-year constant maturity non-indexed and inflation-indexed U.S. Treasury bonds. The implied expected rate of inflation is simply the difference between the non-indexed (i.e. nominal) and indexed (i.e. real) bond yields. Expected inflation was 1.51% at the beginning of 2003. It was as high as 2.7% (nearly double the 1/2003 figure) in March 2005 and again in May 2006. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Obtained from: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ Chapter Summary §1. Relative to GDP, the U.S. government’s debt is moderate compared to other countries §2. Standard figures on the deficit are imperfect measures of fiscal policy because they §are not corrected for inflation §do not account for changes in govt assets §omit some liabilities (e.g., future pension payments to current workers) §do not account for effects of business cycles CHAPTER 15 Government Debt slide 31 cover R3,C1 > Chapter Summary §3. In the traditional view, a debt-financed tax cut increases consumption and reduces national saving. In a closed economy, this leads to higher interest rates, lower investment, and a lower long-run standard of living. In an open economy, it causes an exchange rate appreciation, a fall in net exports (or increase in the trade deficit). §4. The Ricardian view holds that debt-financed tax cuts do not affect consumption or national saving, and therefore do not affect interest rates, investment, or net exports. CHAPTER 15 Government Debt slide 32 cover R3,C1 > Chapter Summary §5. Most economists oppose a strict balanced budget rule, as it would hinder the use of fiscal policy to stabilize output, smooth taxes, or redistribute the tax burden across generations. §6. Government debt can have other effects: §may lead to inflation §politicians can shift burden of taxes from current to future generations §may reduce country’s political clout in international affairs or scare foreign investors into pulling their capital out of the country CHAPTER 15 Government Debt slide 33 cover R3,C1 >