

Auctions and the Price of Art

ORLEY ASHENFELTER *and* KATHRYN GRADY¹

1. *Introduction*

The value of most important works of art is established by public auction, either directly, by an actual sale, or indirectly, by reference to other sales. How the auction system works is thus a critical determinant of how the public's preferences are translated into the evaluation of artistic work. The auction system is central in the determination of the incentives for artistic work, and the efficiency of the auction system is a key determinant of the cost of creating and distributing works of art.

This paper contains a review of the burgeoning new research of the last decade that has been designed to shed light on how the art auction system actually works, what it indicates about price formation, and how well it performs. We begin our discussion in section 2 with a short description of the mechanics of the auction system and then organize the remainder of our discussion around two major topics. The first topic concerns how auction prices can be used to determine and compare overall price movements within the art market and other markets, and the second topic concerns how the auction mechanism influences prices. We

address both topics because a deeper understanding of how prices are affected by the auction mechanism is important for both economists and noneconomists seeking to understand these markets.

We begin section 3 on price-movement comparisons with a discussion of how art asset prices can be measured over time. Art objects are generally unique, so that measuring time-series movement in their prices requires careful thought and extensive data. Once time-series movement is accurately determined, the data can then be used for a variety of purposes. A primary goal of the measurement of time-series movement in art prices is to evaluate the benefits of including art assets in a balanced investment portfolio, and we review the key findings in section 3.1. We find that in recent years returns on art assets appear to be little different from returns on other assets. Some researchers have recently found that, because of the weak correlation between art asset returns with other returns, there may be a case for the inclusion of art assets in a diversified portfolio. Since the key parameters for making this decision are difficult to estimate, this issue deserves far more research.

A second use of time-series movement involves potential pricing anomalies in art market pricing. The evidence clearly suggests that, contrary to the view of the art

¹ Ashenfelter: Princeton University and NBER. Graddy: University of Oxford and CEPR. Our thanks to John McMillan and the referees for helpful comments, and also to Alan Krueger and Victor Ginsburgh for comments on a very early draft of this paper.

trade, “masterpieces” often underperform the market, although the precise interpretation of this finding is still open for study. In addition, there is considerable evidence that there are fairly long periods in which art prices may diverge across geographic areas and even auction houses. Finally, we address a controversial issue regarding price formation and study whether paintings that are “bought in” (i.e., those that do not meet their reserve price) at auction are “burned” (lose value in subsequent auctions).

In section 4, we turn our attention to the way the auction mechanism works. We begin by demonstrating how a misunderstanding of the auction mechanism resulted in a curious distribution of the proceeds from the settlement of the civil suit in the Christie’s-Sotheby’s price-fixing case. We show that, contrary to the way the proceeds from the settlement of the civil suit were distributed, buyers were almost certainly not injured by the collusion, but sellers were. We then review the extensive research on the effects of the auction institution on price formation. There is now considerable theoretical research on strategic behavior in auctions, much of it in response to empirical findings, and we review four key findings. First, the evidence suggests that art experts provide extremely accurate predictions of market prices, but these predictions do not optimally process the publicly available information. Second, high reserve prices and the resulting high unsold (“buy-in”) rates are best explained as optimal search in the face of stochastic demand. Third, the use of secret reserve prices remains a puzzle. Fourth, extensive research has documented that the prices of identical objects are more likely to decline than to increase when multiple units are sold, and this has led to considerable theoretical research. Subsequent empirical research has tended to document declining prices even when the objects are imperfect substitutes, although the empirical analysis required in this case must be more sophisticated.

In section 5, we conclude our review of studies on art auctions. Because of the unique nature of many art objects and the effect of the auction mechanism on price, the interpretation of market prices requires great care. Nevertheless, art auctions provide key information for the evaluation of artistic work, and they also provide a key laboratory for testing and refining economic models of strategic behavior.

2. *The Mechanics of Art Auctions*

Historically, the major auctioneers of art have been the English houses of Sotheby’s and Christie’s. What is called an English auction is, in fact, Roman. The word auction comes from the Latin “auctio,” which means to ascend. The English auction houses (Christie’s was founded in 1766) have practiced, refined, and developed many of the details of the modern auction protocol—and today they are the dominant forces in the auction market for art. Almost all art is auctioned in this ascending price format. Bidding starts low, and the auctioneer subsequently calls out higher and higher prices. When the bidding stops, the item is said to be “knocked down” or “hammered down,” and the final price is the “hammer price.”

Not all items that have been put up for sale and “knocked down” have been sold. Sellers of individual items will set a reserve price, which is usually secret, and if the bidding does not reach this level, the items will go unsold. Auctioneers say that an unsold item has been “bought in.” As we show below, sale rates vary tremendously across time and across different types of auctions.

An item that has not been sold is rarely, if ever, actually bought by the auction house. It may be put up for sale at a later auction, sold elsewhere, or taken off the market. It is a part of the auctioneer’s art to “get the bidding started,” and this may involve accepting fictitious bids (“off the chandelier” or “from the order book”) so long as the bidding has not exceeded the reserve price. Legally, the

auctioneer is bidding on behalf of the seller when this occurs, but must refrain from accepting further bids on behalf of the seller once the bidding exceeds the reserve price.²

Auction houses differ with respect to whether they announce during the sale whether an item has been “sold” or is merely “knocked down” and is unsold. In New York, all the auction houses have been compelled by law since the early 1980s to announce whether the bidding has resulted in a sale. The practice elsewhere varies by location and auction house, but there has clearly been a slow movement toward adopting the practice originally enacted by law in New York. While difficult, it is sometimes possible during an auction, if one listens carefully, to determine whether an item has been sold or “bought in.”

Prior to an auction, it is common for a pre-sale catalogue to be published with information on the individual items coming up for sale.³ Included in the pre-sale catalogue is information on the title of a painting, the artist, the size of the painting, and the medium. The auction houses also publish low- and high-price estimates for the work. The auction house does not publish, and indeed is very secretive about, the seller’s reserve price for the work of art. The auction houses do commonly observe an unwritten rule of setting the secret reserve price at or below the low estimate, but the auctioneer is careful about revealing anything about the reserve price during the bidding process.

Auction houses earn income primarily from commissions charged to buyers and sellers. The commission charged to buyers is

called the “buyer’s premium.” The total sale price to the buyer is thus the sum of the hammer price and the buyer’s premium. In recent years, published buyer’s premiums have typically hovered around 10 percent to 17.5 percent of the hammer price of an object, but they are often lower for large purchasers. Although buyers may attempt to negotiate special arrangements regarding buyer’s premiums, it is our impression that the typical buyer purchases such a small fraction of the objects on sale at a particular auction house that special terms for buyers are unusual.

Sellers also pay a commission to the auction house called the “seller’s commission.” Although the seller’s commission is often stated as a percentage of the hammer price (typically 10 percent), it is our impression that actual seller’s commissions are often negotiated arrangements that differ by seller. In some cases, sellers pay no commission and may even be guaranteed a minimum sale price. Some key issues related to the negotiation of seller’s commissions and the extent of competition and collusion in the setting of commission rates have recently surfaced in the trial of Alfred Taubman, former chairman of Sotheby’s, who was convicted of price fixing. We discuss issues related to the Christie’s-Sotheby’s price-fixing case in section 4. We now turn to our discussion of how prices from art auctions can be used to construct indices.

3. Art Prices

A key feature of art auctions is that the items on sale are typically unique, or nearly so. The result is that there will be some ambiguity in the construction of a single index of the movement of prices over time. One concern about simply using average prices is that price rises may be exacerbated during booms as “better” paintings may come up for sale. For example, Wynne Kramarsky, whose family formerly owned Van Gogh’s “Portrait of Dr. Gachet,” said of

² The contractual bases for these arrangements in the United States are a part of the Uniform Commercial Code, a set of rules which many states adopt all or part thereof for purposes of the law of commerce.

³ The auction houses charge a moderate fee for the catalogue, and participation in the auction without buying the catalogue would be quite difficult. For less expensive items that are auctioned, this fee could be thought of as an entrance fee. However, this interpretation is more difficult for art, as the cost of the catalogue is truly insignificant compared to the cost of the items being auctioned.

the London market prior to the poor sale of May 15, 1990: "I did not think that London was poor in terms of performance; I thought that the pictures were not up to it" (Peter Watson 1992, p. 10). In general, average art prices will indicate some variability over time that is better described as movements in the heterogeneity of the quality of the objects offered, rather than as movements in prices for the same objects.

3.1 *Art Price Indices*

The extent of heterogeneity, and thus the ambiguity in the construction of auction price indices, differs across the items typically offered for sale by auction. Identical prints may be offered for sale monthly, while a given impressionist painting, such as the "Portrait of Dr. Gachet," may not be offered at all in a single decade.

Most art auction indices are based on a model where the price of the i^{th} object sold in time period t is

$$p_{it} = p_i + p_t + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where p_i is the fixed component of the price that reflects the unique and fixed character (or "quality") of the object, p_t reflects the index of aggregate movements in prices, and the remainder is an idiosyncratic error term. The key distinction in the construction of price indices is whether the fixed component is treated as determined by a small number of hedonic characteristics, x , that may be controlled by regression, or whether it is treated as a parameter that must be controlled explicitly.

Hedonic models control for the fixed effect p_i with the assumption that $p_i = \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$, where ε_i is an error term independent of the p_i 's, and estimate

$$p_{it} = \beta x_i + p_t + \varepsilon_i + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

Alternatively, repeat-sale models include a dummy variable for each painting.

The great attraction of hedonic models is that all the data may be used in the estimation, including data on objects that are only

offered for sale once in the sample period. The disadvantage of these models is the strong assumption that a (typically small) set of x variables captures much of the variability in the fixed components of price (important if the estimates of the time effects are to be precise) and that the characteristics of the objects offered do not vary systematically over time (important for unbiased estimates of the time effects). Although the repeat-sale method overcomes the primary disadvantages of the hedonic model, it does so at the cost of discarding data. There must be at least two observations on a painting's price, or it provides no information to help identify the time index. Indeed, depending on the frequency with which repeat sales occur, it may not be possible to identify all the time effects in the model.

Olivier Chanel, Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, and Victor Ginsburgh (1996) compare results from repeat-sale and hedonic models. The overall results indicate that both hedonic and repeat-sales regressions yield estimates of real rates of return in art assets over long intervals that are the same magnitude. Hence, in some cases the hedonic model may provide adequate estimates of time-series movements in aggregate prices. However, the danger remains that systematic movements in the unobserved characteristics of the objects being offered for sale may bias the results.

The nature of possible systematic movements is made clear when we do a detailed comparison using our data on impressionist and modern art.⁴ When yearly price indices are constructed, the two types of indices at first appearance are similar. Figure 1 presents a graph of the hedonic and repeat-sales price indices for impressionist and modern art from 1980 to 1991. The correlation between the two estimates is .9559, the standard deviation of the hedonic price index is 1.024, and the standard deviation of the

⁴ See the data appendix for a full description of the data and the exact way in which the price indices were constructed.




Figure 1. Repeat-Sale and Hedonic Indices for Impressionist Art

repeat-sales index is 1.166. However, because of movements in the last year, the two indices give very different internal rates of return. The hedonic index gives a real return of about 4 percent, while the repeat-sales price index results in a real return of about 9 percent! Which is correct? For 1991, our data ends in May. The “major” impressionist sales are generally held in October. One explanation is that the hedonic index has underestimated the returns for this short period of time, because it was unable to correct for quality differences that occur during sales in the early part of the year. An alternative explanation is that, because the repeat-sales index is based on such a small number of paintings during that period, these paintings were unrepresentative (i.e., their price held up better in poor market conditions) of the market as a whole. Our hedonic model incorporates as many as 8792 observations, while the repeat-sale estimates are based on only 474 observations.

This criticism is not applicable to the sales of all types of art. For example, the number of observations that are discarded when using repeat sales is smaller when studying the market for prints, as many prints are virtually identical. James Pesando (1993) excludes less than one percent of the realized prices on modern prints when using the repeat-sale methodology to construct the print price index.

One can also measure the extent to which one type of index deviates from the other. Suppose, for example, that the repeat-sales index, x , is the true index, x^* is a measured hedonic index, and v^* is independent of x , so that

$$x^* = x + v^*.$$

If x were measured exactly, then a regression of x^* on x would give a slope of unity. If x is measured with error, the difference from unity provides an estimate of the measurement error as a fraction of the total variance in

the repeat-sales index. Computing the above regression, we find that x has a coefficient of .8400, and a standard error of .086, so the test for measurement error is on the borderline of statistical significance. The implication is that about 16 percent of the variance in the repeat-sales measure of prices is measurement error.

Authors who have calculated price indices for art include Robert Anderson (1974), John Stein (1977), William Baumol (1986), Bruno Frey and Werner Pommerehne (1989), Luc Buelens and Victor Ginsburgh (1993), Pesando (1993), William Goetzmann (1993, 1996), Madeleine Barre, Sophie Docclo, and Victor Ginsburgh (1996), James Pesando and Pauline Shum (1996), Corinna Czujack (1997), and Jiangping Mei and Michael Moses (2001). The details of these studies and the estimated rates of return on art assets they contain are presented in table 1.

The estimated returns to holding art are quite dependent upon the time frame actually studied, which would be expected. Even among authors looking at similar time frames, the returns can vary. The variation reflects differences in data, and differences in method. Furthermore, it is difficult to come to any broad conclusions about the differences in estimates when using repeat-sales or hedonic indices. Anderson (1974) finds a real return of 2.6 percent using hedonic indices and 3.0 percent using repeat sales on art data from 1780–1960; and Chanel, Gerard-Veret, and Ginsburgh (1996) find real returns of 4.9 percent and 5.0 percent for hedonic and repeat sales indices, respectively, for the period 1855–1969.

The research reviewed above has focused on accurate construction of indices that measure aggregate price movements of unique objects. As discussed below, these indices are crucial for answering a variety of economic questions.

3.2 *Art as an Investment*

A primary concern of many papers that construct indices is whether art outperforms

or underperforms stocks and bonds and the correlation of art investment returns with other investment portfolios. Once a rate of return on art assets is calculated based on one of the price indices above, it is possible to use this return to decide whether it may be sensible to include art investments in a diversified portfolio. Generally, art investments are more attractive—using the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM)—the greater is their return relative to the return on a risk-free asset and the weaker the correlation (or beta) between art investment returns and the return on other assets. Pesando (1993) used the standard market model to assess these two characteristics of art investments in the case of modern prints. Pesando estimates the model:

$$R_t^p - r_{ft} = \alpha + \beta(R_{m,t} - r_{ft}) + u_t$$

where R_t^p denotes the return on the print portfolio, $R_{m,t}$ denotes the return on the market portfolio (Pesando uses the S&P 500 stock index), and r_{ft} denotes the risk-free rate (Pesando uses 180-day treasury bills). Pesando estimates a β for the entire print portfolio of .315, and estimates negative, but insignificant, risk adjusted returns. This implies that print investments tend to reduce the riskiness of a portfolio comprised of stocks only.

Determining whether art outperforms or underperforms a market portfolio is not an easy question to address. First of all, as Goetzmann (1993) points out, there are many problems with the calculation of the returns to art, beginning with selection bias in the data. As all of the sales prices are drawn from auction records, only paintings that have been re-auctioned are included. This excludes both the high end and the low end of the return distribution. Paintings that fall drastically in value or are not generally in demand are generally not resold at auction; in addition, paintings that are donated to museums generally do not reappear. Furthermore, whether or not an owner decides to sell a painting at auction may be determined by whether or not the painting has increased in value. Other

TABLE 1
ESTIMATED RETURNS TO ART FROM VARIOUS STUDIES

Author	Sample	Period	Method	Nominal return	Real return
Anderson (1974)	paintings in general	1780–1960	hedonic	3.3%	2.6%*
	paintings in general	1780–1970	repeat sales	3.7%	3.0%*
Stein (1977)	paintings in general	1946–68	assumes random sampling	10.5%	
Baumol (1986)	paintings in general	1652–1961	repeat sales		0.6%
Frey and Pommerehne (1989)	paintings in general	1635–1949	repeat sales		1.4%
		1950–87	repeat sales		1.7%
Buelens and Ginsburgh (1993)	paintings in general	1700–1961	hedonic		0.9%
Pesando (1993)	modern prints	1977–91	repeat sales		1.5%
Goetzmann (1993)	paintings in general	1716–1986	repeat sales	3.2%	2.0%*
Barre et al. (1996)	great impressionist other impressionist	1962–91	hedonic	12.0%	5%*
		1962–91	hedonic	8.0%	1%*
Chanel et al. (1996)	paintings in general	1855–1969	hedonic		4.9%
	paintings in general	1855–1969	repeat sales		5.0%
Goetzmann (1996)	paintings in general	1907–77	repeat sales		5.0%
Pesando and Shum (1996)	Picasso prints	1977–93	repeat sales	12.0%	1.4%
Czujack (1997)	Picasso paintings	1966–94	hedonic		8.3%
Mei and Moses (2001)	American, impressionist, and old masters	1875–2000	repeat sales		4.9%
Graeser (1993)	antique furniture	1967–86	neither**	7.0%	
Ross and Zondervan (1993)	Stradivari violins	1803–1986	hedonic		2.2%

*As many of the surveys only report nominal returns, the authors calculated the real return rates as follows. For the Anderson and Baumol studies, an inflation rate of 0.7 percent a year was used. This number is based on Baumol's estimate of inflation during the 300-year period of his study using the Phelps–Brown and Hopkins price index. Goetzmann's estimate of inflation during the period of his study (also based on Phelps–Brown and Hopkins) is 1.2%. French price inflation between 1962 and 1992 according to OECD statistics was 7%.

**Assumes random sampling within a portfolio of fixed furniture types.

problems with estimating returns are that transaction costs are excluded, and in contrast to stocks and bonds, as we noted above, these can be quite high (as much as 25 percent of the value of the object, considering both buyer's premiums and seller's premiums).

Finally, there is significant theft and fire risk (and hence insurance costs) and cleaning costs involved in investing in art.

On the other hand, unlike stocks and bonds, art also pays some dividends in the form of the pleasure the viewer (and owner)

receives. In principle, the value of these dividends could be measured by the rental cost of similar art assets, but we are unaware of any study that has attempted to do this. Moreover, it seems unlikely that these returns would be significant for a large, diversified art portfolio that is not displayed.

Baumol (1986) and Goetzmann (1993) tend to concur that art is dominated as an investment vehicle. Goetzmann writes: "While returns to art investment have exceeded inflation for long periods, and returns in the second half of the twentieth century have rivalled the stock market, they are no higher than would be justified by the extraordinary risks they represent." Goetzmann (1993) does not formally estimate a CAPM, but simply reports correlations of art returns with inflation, the Bank of England Rate, consol bond returns, and the London Stock Exchange.

Although their estimates of the return to art are not significantly different from previous estimates, Mei and Moses (2001) take a different view. They argue that "a diversified portfolio of artworks may play a somewhat more important role in portfolio diversification than discovered in earlier research." They base their conclusions on their finding that their art price index has lower volatility and a lower correlation with other asset classes than reported in previous research. They report that these differences are partly due to sample selection and partly due to a different time frame studied. Although Mei and Moses (2001) estimate a more sophisticated form of CAPM than has previously been estimated for art, they primarily base their conclusions on their estimates of the art index and simple correlations with bond and stock portfolios.⁵

⁵ For the CAPM, Mei and Moses follow Campbell (1987) and estimate

$$r_{it+1} = E_t[r_{it+1}] + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{ik} f_{k,t+1} + \epsilon_{it+1},$$

where r_{it+1} is the excess return on asset i held from time t to time $t+1$. $E_t[r_{it+1}]$ is the conditional expected return on asset i , conditional on information known to market participants at the end of time period t . It is allowed to vary over time (see Mei and Moses 2001 for details). $f_{k,t+1}$ are excess returns on k different asset classes.

Some authors have looked at the financial returns to holding other collectible items. For example, Myron Ross and Scott Zondervan (1989) estimate the real returns to holding Stradivari violins between 1803 and 1987 to be 2.2 percent, and Paul Graeser (1993) estimates returns to holding antique furniture between 1967 and 1986 to be 7 percent. For a good survey of papers calculating the rate of returns in various markets, see Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1995).⁶

What can we conclude from these studies on the returns to art? The studies reviewed in table 1 all report positive returns. However, returns to art generally appear to be less than the real rate of return on common stock. Furthermore, as is clear from figure 1, investing in art over a short period of time can be risky.

From current research, however, it is difficult to conclude whether art should be included in a diversified portfolio. Many of the studies listed in table 1 show that the returns to art may outperform bonds. Furthermore, the correlation of art to other investment portfolios may be low. It appears that different views about the financial benefits of investments in art assets are primarily based on empirical issues that revolve, in part, around the temporal instability and sensitivity of the estimates of key parameters related to the market performance of art investments. This suggests that an important area for additional research is the development of a more general empirical model that will provide an explanation for temporal instability and thus lead to better-informed decisions.

3.3 *The Masterpiece Effect*

Pesando (1993) describes the "masterpiece effect" by quoting art dealer Edward

⁶ One other paper of interest is by William Landes (2000). He calculates the returns to art that two high profile collectors (Victor and Sally Ganz) achieved. Based on prices in each of three different auctions that were held between 1988 and 1997, the real average yearly return achieved by the Ganz's was between 12.06 and 21.49.

Merrin: “. . . it’s always better to buy one \$10,000 object than ten \$1,000 objects, or one \$100,000 object—if that is what you can afford—than ten \$10,000 ones.”⁷ There have now been several authors who have tested for the masterpiece effect.

Pesando tests for the effect by constructing a portfolio of the top 10 or 20 percent of prints by price, where price is determined during the first few years of his sample. If the art trade view is correct, the estimated price indices for these masterpieces should uniformly outperform the general portfolio. He finds no support for this view, and in fact finds that in part of his sample, masterpieces provide the lowest cumulative return. Mei and Moses (2001) find a similar negative effect for masterpieces, and in fact find this effect to be uniform across American, impressionist, and old master samples. Other authors have found no masterpiece effect (Goetzmann 1995, and Ginsburgh and Philippe Jeanfils 1996).

Using our data on impressionist and contemporary art, we find that it appears that masterpieces have underperformed in the contemporary art sample, but not in the impressionist art sample.⁸ We construct our index by dividing each sample into the top 20 percent of paintings sold by price, and the bottom 80 percent sold by price, and then construct a hedonic index. Our index is charted in figures 2 and 3. We find similar results to Pesando and to Mei and Moses in contemporary art, but find no effects in impressionist art. For contemporary art, masterpieces underperform the lower-valued paintings by about 5 percent on average per year, which is quite significant. There does not appear to be a difference in the impressionist art dataset.

As pointed out by Pesando (1993), there should not be a positive masterpiece effect. An efficient art market should capitalize

favorable properties into their prices, and their risk-adjusted rates of returns should not exceed that obtained on other art objects in the same class. However, the art market and its participants may not always be efficient. Werner Pommerehne and Lars Feld (1997) conclude that museums outside the United States pay above-average prices in auction markets. If museums generally purchase masterpieces and do not resell them, this could contribute to a positive masterpiece effect.

Various plausible reasons exist as to why there should be a negative masterpiece effect. Mei and Moses (2001) speculate that a negative masterpiece effect may be due to overbidding and then mean reversion. This explanation appears quite reasonable given the way that various studies above have defined masterpieces as the highest-priced paintings that were sold. If a masterpiece is defined purely by price, there may be some paintings in the masterpiece sample that randomly commanded a higher price, perhaps because two or more bidders had high private valuations for the paintings. At a later auction, the prices on these paintings revert to the mean, thus resulting in a negative masterpiece effect.

A different explanation for the negative masterpiece effect may be what Goetzmann (1996) terms “survivorship bias.” It is likely that the more expensive paintings remained in the sample throughout, even if they decreased in value, whereas less-expensive paintings dropped out of the sample. Hence it may appear that masterpieces have underperformed in the sampled data, but in actuality less-expensive paintings that have underperformed are no longer in the sample. The result that our sample shows a masterpiece effect for contemporary art but no masterpiece effect for impressionist art tends to support the survivorship bias explanation. As the impressionist art dataset consists only of “famous” impressionist artists (defined by those whose paintings are most often auctioned), it is unlikely that any of

⁷ Quote originally taken from *Art and Auction* [“Antiques”], Sept. 1988, p. 131.

⁸ Please see the data appendix for a description of these datasets and construction of the indices.




Figure 2. Contemporary Art




Figure 3. Impressionist Art

TABLE 2
THE MASTERPIECE EFFECT

Author	Sample	Period	Result
Pesando (1993)	modern prints	1980–92	Return of 11% less for masterpieces
Ginsburgh and Jeanfils (1995)	impressionist, modern and contemporary European masters, other minor European painters, contemporary U.S. painters	1962–91	No effect
Goetzmann (1996)	paintings in general	1897–1987	No effect
Barre et al. (1996)	impressionist	1962–91	Great impressionists return 4% more than other impressionists
Mei and Moses (2001)	American, impressionist, and old masters	1875–2000	A 10% increase in price reduces returns by 1%
Ashenfelter and Graddy (see appendix)	impressionist art contemporary art	1980–91 1982–94	No effect Return of 50% less for masterpieces

these paintings decreased by so much in value that they dropped out of the sample. In contrast, the contemporary art dataset consists of all paintings that were sold at auction. It is very likely in this dataset that some of the paintings in the bottom 80 percent of prices are no longer in the sample because they have decreased in value. This could lead to an upward bias in the estimation of the “other” sample for contemporary art, and hence a measured masterpiece effect.

We have summarized the findings of papers estimating a masterpiece effect in table 2. Out of the six studies reported, only one study, Barre et. al. (1996), finds a positive masterpiece effect. Interestingly, they constructed their subsamples slightly differently than most of the other studies reported, as they chose masterpieces by reputation of painter, rather than by price. Nonetheless, from current research, we can conclude that if a masterpiece effect exists, it is likely to be negative rather than positive.

3.4 *Is There Evidence that Paintings Are “Burned?”*

As Ashenfelter (1989) noted, it is often claimed that when an advertised item goes unsold at auction, its future value will be affected. Such items are said to have been “burned.” There has been surprisingly little work testing this proposition.

Using our repeat-sales data on impressionist art, we present summary statistics of artworks that appear twice in the data. We have looked at whether there appear to be any differences in prices and estimates for paintings that came to auction and did not sell during their first appearance at auction, but sold during their second appearance at auction (unsold-sold sample), vs. those that came to auction, sold during their first appearance, and were resold again during their second appearance at auction. We do this by comparing ratios in the two samples. The ratios we look at are the estimate during a painting’s second appearance at auction over the estimate of the same painting during its first

TABLE 3
REPEAT SALES OF SOLD VS. UNSOLD PAINTINGS

	Estimate 2 / Estimate 1	Sale Price 2 / Estimate 1	Days between Sales	Estimate 1	No. in Sample
Unsold-Sold Sample	1.41 (2.13)	1.75 (2.51)	768 (642)	83673 (131526)	178
Sold-Sold Sample	4.71 (12.84)	3.77 (9.85)	1167 (791)	201224 (762936)	231
t-statistic (comparing unsold-sold sample with sold-sold sample)	3.14	3.01	5.33	2.01	

(standard deviations in parentheses)

appearance at auction (estimate 2/estimate 1) and the sale price during the painting's second appearance at auction over the estimate of the same painting during its first appearance at auction (sale price 2/estimate 1). We average these over the unsold-sold sample and the sold-sold sample. We do not correct for the level of the art price index when the paintings came to market; hence, any results are only suggestive.

As reported in table 3, we find a significant difference between the unsold-sold sample and the sold-sold sample. We find that the sale price in the second sale is on average 1.75 the estimate in the first sale, if the painting was unsold in the first sale, and the sale price in the second sale is on average 3.77 the estimate in the first sale, if the painting was sold in the first sale. Furthermore, it takes longer for paintings to reappear in the sample if they were sold the first time around than if they went unsold the first time around.

These summary statistics suggest that the future value of a painting that goes unsold at auction is negatively influenced. More studies confirming this effect and estimating the magnitude of this effect would be useful.

3.5 *The Law of One Price*

The "law of one price" dictates that in the absence of different transactions costs, no

systematic price differences should exist between geographically distinct markets. Several authors have tested for price differences in different auction houses and in different geographical locations and have found that the law of one price does not always hold.

Pesando (1993) focused on the sale of identical prints in different markets that occur within thirty days of each other for the period 1977–92. For the entire period, he found that prices were 7 percent higher in New York than in London, and 10 percent higher in New York than in Europe. However, the difference was not statistically significant for the period 1977–89, while it was statistically significant at 11 percent and 17 percent in comparisons of New York and London and New York and Europe, respectively, between 1989 and 1992. Pesando (1993) describes the trade explanation as being the presence of Japanese buyers in the New York market during that period, though one would expect any systematic price differences to disappear when buyers respond to incentives. Pesando also finds significant differences among auction houses. For the entire period, he found that prices average 14 percent higher in Sotheby's in New York than at Christie's in New York, but there was no difference in the prices of prints at

TABLE 4
THE LAW OF ONE PRICE

Author	Sample	Period	Result
Ashenfelter (1989)	wine	1986	Differences in prices reflect differences in commission rates.
Pesando (1993)	modern prints	1977–92	Prices average 14% higher at Sotheby's NY than at Christie's NY. Prices were 7% higher in New York than in London; prices were 10% higher in New York than in Europe.
Pesando and Shum (1996)	Picasso prints	1977–93	Prices average 7% higher at Sotheby's NY than at Christie's NY. No significant differences in price between NY and London. Prices were 2% higher in New York than in London.
Mei and Moses (2001)	American, impressionist, and old masters	1875–2000	Mixed evidence on differences between Sotheby's and Christie's. Differences when they do exist are small.

Sotheby's and Christie's in London. Mei and Moses (2001) find mixed evidence on the law of one price. When they do find price differences, these differences tend to be small.

Ashenfelter (1989) studied differences in prices for wine between auction houses that were attributed to changes in buyers' premiums. In the spring of 1986, buyers' premiums were 10 percent at Sotheby's in London (and at other locations), but Christie's in London had no buyer's premium. In the spring of 1986, hammer prices (that is, not including the buyer's premium) at Sotheby's in London were 12 percent less than prices at Christie's in London, likely reflecting the difference in buyers' commissions. In the fall of 1986, Christie's instituted a 10-percent buyer's premium in the London auctions. In auctions held in the fall of 1986, there was no difference in prices, while in an auction held in the spring of 1987, prices at Sotheby's in London were 5 percent higher than at Christie's, and in the fall of 1987, prices at Sotheby's in London were 4 percent lower than at Christie's. In this situation, where

one house imposes a buyer's premium and the other house does not, the results clearly indicate that the incidence of the buyer's premium does tend to fall on the sellers! As described below, significant changes to sellers' commissions and buyers' premiums occurred during the 1990s. These changes may provide an interesting subject for study by economists.

A summary of papers testing for the law of one price is presented in table 4.

The papers reported above test for price differences between identical paintings sold at different times at different locations and houses, nearly identical prints sold during the same time period at different locations and houses, or identically described bottles of wine sold during similar time periods at different houses. Barre, Docclo, and Ginsburgh (1996) approach the question differently. They use the coefficient on auction house in a hedonic regression to test for price differences. As they point out, because quality is largely unobservable to the econometrician, it is very difficult in hedonic regressions to disentangle true price effects from quality effects.

4. *The Auction Mechanism and Price Formation*

In the above section, we have shown how auction prices can be used to determine and compare price movements. Ideally, these prices reflect the “true” value of a work of art, and are independent of the price discovery mechanism. As discussed below, however, the auction institution itself, with commissions, experts, pre-sale estimates, reserve prices, and sequential sales, can have a profound influence on the price of art. We begin this section with a discussion of how a misunderstanding of the effect of commissions on price resulted in a curious settlement of a civil suit. We then proceed to discuss other aspects of the auction mechanism in art and how it affects price.

4.1 *The Christie’s-Sotheby’s Price-Fixing Case*

Prior to 1995, Sotheby’s and Christie’s were in fierce competition for consignments from sellers. At times, they would drastically cut commission rates paid by sellers (in many cases to nothing), make donations to sellers’ favorite charities, and even extend financial guarantees to the sellers. In March 1995, this competition abruptly ended. Christie’s announced that it would charge sellers a fixed nonnegotiable sliding-scale commission on the sales price, and a month later Sotheby’s announced the same policies. Detailed documents kept by Christopher Davidge, Christie’s former chief executive, show that the abrupt change was due to a price-fixing conspiracy. Christie’s cooperated with the Justice Department, and Sotheby’s pleaded guilty to price-fixing sellers’ commissions but maintain their innocence with respect to fixing buyers’ premiums. In September 2001, a civil suit was settled where Sotheby’s and Christie’s agreed to each pay 256 million dollars to the plaintiffs. This class-action suit comprises anyone who had bought or sold items through the auction houses since 1993.

From an economist’s point of view, the settlement of the civil suit is interesting, but appears to be misguided. Although Sotheby’s did not admit to fixing buyers’ premiums in the criminal settlement of the case, both Christie’s and Sotheby’s agreed to each pay \$256 million to both buyers and sellers, with in all probability about two-thirds going to buyers and one-third going to sellers. This amount was calculated taking the price-fixing of buyers’ premiums into account. According to *In Re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation* (2001), “The proposed plan of allocation estimated the overcharges to sellers as 1 percent of the hammer price, and those for buyers to be 5 percent of the hammer price up to and including hammer prices of \$50,000, and \$2,500 for buyers at hammer prices exceeding \$50,000. The net settlement fund would be distributed to class members pro rata based upon each class member’s overcharges during the relevant period.”

Even if Sotheby’s and Christie’s admitted to colluding on buyers’ premiums, the usual theory of private value auctions implies that, to first order, buyers deserve no compensation! The reason is the following. When a buyer decides to bid in an ascending price auction, his strategy should be to bid up to his reservation price, if necessary. The price that the winning bidder has to pay is essentially (epsilon above) the reservation price of the second-highest bidder. When buyers’ commissions are raised, each buyer should reduce his reservation price by an equivalent amount, resulting in a reduction in revenue to the seller by the amount of the buyer’s commission. Hence, the entire increase in buyers’ commissions should fall on the sellers. Thus, the standard model of private value auctions implies that the entire settlement arrangement in the civil suit was misguided!

There are several caveats to this argument. If sellers’ supplies are elastic, some sellers may not offer their objects for sale due to the increased commissions. This

could result in more buyers competing for the same item, and the increase in the number of bidders for each item will push up the price paid by the winning bidder. Furthermore, in art auctions, the private value assumption doesn't strictly apply. If some bidders are factoring into their value estimate the likely future market value of the piece of art, bidders' values are correlated. Bidders may increase their reservation prices if they believe an increase in commissions will increase market value in the future. However, it is unlikely that either of these effects justifies buyers receiving two-thirds of the \$512 million. In addition, it can be argued that the real losers in this case were the buyers and sellers who did not manage to transact because of the price-fixing. Welfare was clearly reduced, as these transactions were lost.⁹

Based on the testimony of Diana Brooks at the criminal trial of Alfred Taubman, previously chairman of Sotheby's board, the buyers and sellers that managed to transact were fully compensated. Ms. Brooks estimated that collusion on sellers' commissions resulted in higher profits to Sotheby's of some \$10–15 million per year. Assuming that Christie's received the same increased profits implies that total damages suffered by sellers would be on the order of \$20–30 million per year. Assuming the conspiracy lasted five years (approximately the time period involved) would suggest total damages of \$100–150 million. Since price-fixing damages are, by statute, tripled, it appears that the plaintiffs as a group were amply compensated for the harm they incurred, especially in view of the fact that they did not have to proceed to the uncertainty of a trial.

4.2 *Role of Estimates and Experts*

Before an auction takes place, in their pre-auction catalogues, auction house experts

provide a low- and a high-price estimate for each item. Determining the accuracy of these estimates raises some important questions for the study of the role of expert opinion in economic decisions.¹⁰ Of especial interest is the motivation of the auctioneer in choosing the high and low estimates. The theoretical literature stresses that auctioneers should provide truthful information about the items being sold.

Ashenfelter's (1989) results generally show that auction houses are truthful; the average of the auctioneer's high and low estimate is highly correlated with the price actually received. Furthermore, John Abowd and Ashenfelter (1988) find that auctioneers' price estimates are far better predictors of prices fetched than hedonic price functions.

The details of the arrangement for price fixing revealed by Diana Brooks during the Christie's-Sotheby's price-fixing trial provide further insight into the role of experts at auction houses. Brooks reported that at one point her boss, Alfred Taubman, proposed that the auction houses collude in providing clients with similar estimates of the value of their art. Brooks reported that this was impossible because she could not simply tell Christie's departmental experts, who produce the estimates, to do a dishonest job.¹¹

While the regressions in Alan Beggs and Kathryn Graddy (1997) generally uphold these results, they do find systematic under- and over-predictions. For example, they find that for contemporary art, more recently

¹⁰ Ashenfelter (2000) defines expert opinion as efficient if it incorporates all of the publicly available information that is useful in making predictions. He also provides one example of inefficient expert opinion.

¹¹ As pointed out by an anonymous referee, this does not rule out that experts may have known that coordination was taking place between Christie's and Sotheby's. After the agreement, experts at Sotheby's began advising dealers and long-standing clients that concessions to the published sellers' fees were no longer available and that Christie's had adopted a similar policy. These statements indicate that experts in the various departments knew that both auction houses had changed their policies with respect to sellers' commissions at approximately the same time. It would have been relatively easy for the experts to infer that this change was the result of an illegal agreement.

⁹ Our thanks to Victor Ginsburgh, Patrick Legros, and an anonymous referee for pointing out exceptions to our argument.

executed artworks are overvalued and longer and wider paintings are undervalued. For impressionist and modern art, they find that wider, signed, and monogrammed paintings may be underestimated relative to their value. One explanation for these findings may simply be that auction houses are unwittingly overestimating consumer demand (and hence willingness to pay) for recent contemporary art, and underestimating consumer demand for size! Many people in the trade express surprise at the strong correlations that many economists have found between size and price (see Anderson 1974, and Beggs and Graddy 1997, for examples).

Other authors have also found that ex-ante valuations cannot be considered unbiased predictors of market prices, although it is our impression that biases are not quantitatively large when they are precisely estimated. Luc Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) study 1600 lots of English silver sold between 1976 and 1991 by Christie's and Sotheby's. They find that Christie's has a tendency to underestimate systematically, while Sotheby's overvalues inexpensive pieces and undervalues expensive ones. Chanel, Gerard-Varet, and Stephanie Vincent (1996) studied jewellery auctions, and found that experts have an ex-ante valuation that is lower than the hammer price for all types of jewels, except for some watches. They speculate that some strategic undervaluation is occurring. These results are interesting, in part because, as Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber (1982a) show, in general, for auctioneers, "honesty is the best policy."

If price estimates are biased, this raises some interesting questions about the reason for the bias. One possibility is simply that the "experts" make systematic errors because they are not as "efficient" as the linear predictors they are being tested against.¹² Evidence in favor of this hypothesis would be the finding that observed biases are not

stable and vary from one sample to another or from one time period to another. Judging from the results reported above, there is certainly some evidence to support this view.

Another possibility is that auctioneers engage in systematic manipulation of the estimates for strategic purposes. Brooks' testimony in the trial of Alfred Taubman provides some anecdotal evidence on this issue. Her testimony suggests that, even when the two leading auctioneers were engaging in price fixing, they did not attempt to influence the art appraisers who worked for them to assist in the conspiracy. However, Mei and Moses (2002) provide empirical evidence of possible estimate manipulation. They find that price estimates tend to have an upward bias for expensive paintings, and furthermore, high estimates at the time of purchase are associated with adverse future abnormal returns. They interpret these findings as evidence that auction houses strategically set estimates and that investors are credulous.

A related question is "what motivates the auctioneers when they determine the spread between the high and the low estimates that are published in the pre-sale catalogues?" One likely explanation of how the spread is determined is by the auctioneer's estimate of the uncertainty or possible variance in the price of the painting. In this case, the high estimate might reasonably be interpreted as the estimate of the mean price plus a multiple of the estimated standard deviation ($H = \mu + r\sigma$). Likewise, under this interpretation, the low estimate would be the mean minus a multiple of the standard deviation ($L = \mu - r\sigma$). With this interpretation the high estimate minus the low estimate divided by 2 is proportional to the estimated standard deviation ($(H - L)/2 = r\sigma$) and the average of the high estimate and the low estimate would be the estimated mean ($(H + L)/2 = \mu$).¹³ A large difference in the

¹² Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) test explicitly for "efficiency" of auctioneers' estimates. They find that experts do not seem to take advantage of all of the information that is contained in the sales catalogues.

¹³ In this formulation, we have implicitly assumed that the multiple of the standard deviation used to generate the high estimate is the same as the multiple used to generate the low estimate.

high estimate and the low estimate would therefore signal a high estimate of price variance or a lot of uncertainty. However, as the seller's secret reserve price, by convention, lies below the low estimate, it may be that the spread between the high and low estimate is not simply a reflection of the auctioneer's uncertainty surrounding the possible price. If the seller wishes to set a high reserve price, the auctioneer may increase the low estimate. Ashenfelter, Graddy, and Margaret Stevens (2002) find some evidence that this may be occurring. In their datasets of contemporary art and impressionist and modern art, a smaller spread between the high estimate and the low estimate is positively correlated with an item being bought in (i.e. the reserve price not being met). This finding can be interpreted as supporting the idea that the auctioneer may increase his low estimate if the seller wishes to set a high reserve price.

In summary, the evidence on the role of estimates appears to be divided. Some evidence indicates that auctioneers are simply trying to truthfully predict the price of a painting, while other evidence suggests that auctioneers may in some cases be altering the estimate from the true predicted value. A summary of papers addressing the role of estimates, along with the varied results, is presented in table 5.

4.3 Sales Rates and Reserve Prices

As we noted above, items that are put up for sale at auction often go unsold because the bidding in the auction does not meet the reserve price.¹⁴ Sale rates vary tremen-

dously over time and they also vary systematically across different types of auctions. Table 6 shows sale rates in different departments at Christie's in London in 1995 and 1996 along with average value of a lot sold.¹⁵ As can be seen from the table, 96 percent of items put up for sale in auctions of arms and armour were sold, 89 percent of wine at auction was sold, and 71 percent of impressionist and modern art items were sold.

Ashenfelter, Graddy, and Stevens (2002) provide a study of sale rates across time in art auctions and across different types of auctions. Based on the observation that an item is bought in if and only if it does not meet or exceed its reserve price, they develop a model of optimal reserve prices. The seller of a painting faces the following problem: if he participates in an auction, the highest bid for the painting can be regarded as a random draw from some price distribution. When a seller sets a reserve price, he must decide at what price he would be indifferent between selling now and waiting for the next auction. The optimal policy is to set a reserve price that is a constant proportion of the current expected price. Sale rates can then be modelled as being explained by price shocks and a constant, or "natural sale rate." This natural sale rate (which may vary across different types of auctions) depends only on the variance of log prices and the seller's discount rate. They estimate that the reserve price is generally set to be about 70 to 80 percent of the auctioneer's low estimate. Although reserve prices are generally secret, the available evidence suggests that this prediction is reasonably accurate.

David Genesove (1995) tests a related but somewhat different theory in the context of wholesale automobile auctions. He finds that on average sale rates in used auto auctions are actually quite low; between about 58 percent and 68 percent of automobiles go

¹⁴ There can be many explanations for why an art item fails to meet its reserve price. For example, new information might have become available during the preview regarding condition, amount of restoration, or another attribute that adversely affected market price. Alternatively, the auction house may have deferred to a consignee's desire to place an aggressively high reserve on an item. Another explanation may be that fewer bidders showed up than anticipated, due to either random events or a general economic downturn.

¹⁵ The authors obtained these data directly from Christie's in London.

TABLE 5
ROLE OF ESTIMATES

Author	Sample	Period	Result
Milgrom and Weber (1982a)			Honesty is the best policy.
Abowd and Ashenfelter (1988)	impressionist art	1980–82	Auctioneers' price estimates are far better predictors of prices than hedonic models.
Ashenfelter (1989)	impressionist art	1980–82	Auction houses are truthful.
Chanel et al. (1996)	jewelry	1993–94	Pre-sale estimates undervalue most types of jewelry, with the exception of some watches.
Beggs and Graddy (1997)	impressionist art contemporary art	1980–91 1980–94	Systematic over- and undervaluations (recently executed works of art tend to be overvalued; longer and wider paintings are undervalued).
Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000)	English silver	1976–90	English silver: Christie's systematically underestimates. Sotheby's overvalues inexpensive pieces and undervalues expensive pieces.
Ashenfelter et al. (2001)	impressionist art contemporary art	1980–91 1982–94	Examines whether spread between high and low estimate is indication of auctioneer's uncertainty or reflects seller's wish to set a high reserve price.
Mei and Moses (2002)	American, impressionist, and old masters	1950–2002	Auctioneers strategically set estimates in order to increase realized prices.

unsold. In his paper, he tests a result by Ronald Balvers (1990) that also states that an increase in variance decreases the probability of sale. He finds that an increase in the log-variance is associated with a lower probability of sale, and hence the “natural sale rate” is again dependent on variance of log prices.

A related question is whether the reserve prices that are set in art auctions are optimal. This question has not been looked at in the context of art auctions, but R. Preston McAfee, Daniel Quan, and Daniel Vincent (2000) derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price for a general auction model with affiliated signals, common components to valuations, and endogenous entry (all characteristics which can be applied to art auctions or other auctions of cultural

objects). They apply their computations to FDIC real estate auctions and find that the lower bound on the optimal reserve price for real estate is about 75 percent of the appraised value.

Overall, there has been little research into why sales rates differ between items and whether reserve prices are optimal. Given the persistent differences in sales rates between items (which suggests differing reserve prices), more research in these areas would be useful.

4.4 *Why Secret Reserve Prices?*

An important institutional detail in art auctions is the use of secret reserve prices. Auctioneers generally do not reveal the reserve price, and they make it as difficult as they can for bidders to infer it. A reserve

TABLE 6
AVERAGE SALE RATES BY DEPARTMENT

Department	Average Sold Lot Value		No. of Auctions in Sample	Sale Rate (% of Lots Sold)		% Sold by Value	
	1996	1995		Mean	Std. dev	Mean	Std. dev.
Impressionist	£122,820	£135,430	8	71%	(0.11)	80%	(0.10)
Old masters drawings	£50,670	£29,210	4	77%	(0.09)	89%	(0.08)
Contemporary	£36,820	£36,840	7	79%	(0.04)	87%	(0.06)
British pictures	£29,710	£23,560	7	78%	(0.14)	83%	(0.17)
Old master pictures	£29,180	£6,560	11	73%	(0.15)	82%	(0.15)
Continental pictures	£21,810	£10,450	7	72%	(0.11)	79%	(0.10)
Clocks	£14,340	£5,130	4	88%	(0.03)	89%	(0.07)
Jewellery	£12,190	£6,750	8	86%	(0.05)	89%	(0.04)
Furniture	£11,670	£8,220	25	85%	(0.09)	92%	(0.06)
Silver	£11,080	£5,910	10	87%	(0.11)	92%	(0.07)
Sculpture	£11,070	£6,340	5	78%	(0.21)	81%	(0.20)
Modern British pictures	£10,340	£7,190	9	70%	(0.05)	81%	(0.05)
Victorian pictures	£9,460	£8,400	6	66%	(0.13)	75%	(0.11)
British drawings & watercolors	£9,160	£3,400	14	72%	(0.14)	87%	(0.10)
Rugs & carpets	£9,160	£3,700	8	80%	(0.17)	85%	(0.14)
Topographical pictures	£8,640	£8,010	2	68%	(0.13)	81%	(0.00)
Islamic works	£6,670	£6,950	5	68%	(0.22)	82%	(0.12)
Cars	£5,750	£7,610	6	71%	(0.16)	65%	(0.22)
Chinese works of art	£5,640	£6,400	8	70%	(0.19)	79%	(0.16)
Books & manuscripts	£5,220	£4,270	15	81%	(0.12)	86%	(0.09)
Russian works of art	£4,490	£5,480	4	64%	(0.14)	69%	(0.15)
Japanese works	£4,410	£2,840	5	72%	(0.04)	76%	(0.05)
Musical instruments	£3,960	£4,110	5	77%	(0.05)	76%	(0.16)
Watches	£3,870	£2,190	6	71%	(0.09)	81%	(0.11)
Prints—old modern & contemp.	£3,850	£4,230	8	81%	(0.12)	92%	(0.09)
Miniatures	£3,350	£3,260	2	82%	(0.05)	92%	(0.07)
Antiquities	£3,260	£3,640	3	57%	(0.08)	66%	(0.13)
Porcelain and glass	£2,700	£2,600	14	76%	(0.12)	85%	(0.10)
Tribal art	£2,650	£2,090	3	67%	(0.08)	75%	(0.19)
Photographica	£2,580	£1,660	3	61%	(0.27)	79%	(0.08)
Modern guns	£2,510	£3,620	5	93%	(0.06)	94%	(0.04)
Garden statuary	£2,120	£1,540	4	91%	(0.10)	91%	(0.11)
Arms & armour	£1,890	£2,400	4	96%	(0.03)	99%	(0.01)
Frames	£1,800	£2,260	4	81%	(0.15)	85%	(0.14)
Stamps	£830	£650	22	78%	(0.13)	82%	(0.12)
Wine	£690	£580	37	89%	(0.09)	91%	(0.08)

price clearly contains information about the seller's valuation of an item; intuitively, revealing information matters if the items contain a common value component among buyers. While people buy art for enjoyment, there is an investment component to many buyers' motives; that investment component leads one to classify art as hav-

ing common-value components. Thus, the fact that auctioneers tend to keep reserve prices secret has been an interesting topic for discussion since the publication of Milgrom and Weber's (1982a) paper, which showed that it is optimal for a seller of a good at a common-value auction to reveal their valuation.

One reason that has been suggested for secret reserve prices is that these may be used to deter collusion. As Ashenfelter (1989) suggested, when the turnout is low, some sellers may prefer that their goods be bought in and offered for sale at a later date rather than risk a collusive ring bidding to depress the item's price. If there is a ring operating, a secret reserve price might encourage bidders to bid higher than they would have otherwise.

Vincent (1995) cleverly built upon (and overturned) the intuition from Milgrom and Weber's (1982a) original result. His explanation is based upon the inhibiting effect that the announcement of a reserve price may have on the participation of bidders in a given auction. This announcement could discourage some bidders from participating. As revelation of information is important for increasing revenues in a common value auction, the fact that these bidders are not participating prevents their information from playing a part in the auction and may lower overall bids. Hence, there is a trade-off between the reserve price revealing the seller's information, and a reserve price discouraging participation, which lowers total aggregation of information.

4.5 *The Declining Price Anomaly*

Since Ashenfelter (1989) showed that prices are twice as likely to decrease as to increase for identical bottles of wine sold in same lot sizes at auction, there has been a tremendous amount of study of the declining price anomaly in many types of auctions. The literature on the declining price anomaly is extensive. Pesando and Shum (1996) and Beggs and Graddy (1997) address declining prices in art auctions, and much of the other literature is applicable to art. We review this literature below. We begin with a brief review of the theoretical literature on why declining prices may occur, and then review the types of auctions where declining prices have been found.

Soon after publication of Ashenfelter's (1989) article, there were many theoretical papers written to explain declining prices. Jane Black and David deMeza (1992) claimed it was no anomaly; declining prices in wine auctions exist primarily because the winner of the first auction in a sequence has the option to buy the remaining objects at the winning price. However, this theory is unable to explain why the anomaly continues to exist even where this option is not permitted. McAfee and Vincent (1993) showed that risk aversion could create declining prices. One unappealing feature of their explanation is that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists only when there is nondecreasing absolute risk aversion, which is usually thought implausible. Mixed strategy equilibria are ex-post inefficient, which is sometimes also thought to be a weakness of this theory, but which may nevertheless be a correct characterization of the actual market. Beggs and Graddy (1997) attribute a declining price to pre-sale estimate ratio throughout an auction to the fact that the value of art auctioned (as measured by the pre-sale estimate), on average, declines throughout the auction.

Other theoretical papers are as follows. Nils-Henrik von der Fehr (1994) shows that participation costs could create declining prices through strategic bidding. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), Dan Bernhardt, and David Scoones (1994), Ian Gale and Donald Hausch (1994), and Paul Pezanis-Christou (2001) relate the price decline to heterogeneity among buyers, and Ginsburgh (1998) shows that the presence of absentee bidders can generate declining prices.

The declining price anomaly has been documented in a number of different types of auctions with different auction structures. Stephen Buccola (1982) found it occurring in livestock auctions; Milgrom and Weber (1982b) for transponder leases; McAfee and Vincent (1993) and Albert Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1994) confirmed Ashenfelter's (1989) wine findings; Stuart Thiel and Glenn

Petry (1990) in stamp auctions; Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) and Bruce Vanderporten (1992a,b) for condominiums; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles Kahn (1992) for dairy cattle; Kenneth Lusht (1994) for commercial real estate; Chanel, Gerard-Varet, and Vincent (1996) for gold jewellery; Pesando and Shum (1996) for Picasso prints; Norman Thurston (1997) for mink pelts; Pezanis-Christou (2001) for fish auctions; Gerard van den Berg, Jan van Ours, and Menno Pradhan (2001) for Dutch flower auctions; and Ginsburgh and van Ours (2001) for Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks. Penny Burns (1985) and Claudia Keser and Mark Olson (1996) set up experiments that have reached the same conclusions.

Several authors have also found increasing prices. Among them are Neil Gandal (1997) for Israeli cable television licenses, and Stephen Donald, Harry Paarsch, and Jacques Robert (1997) for Siberian timber-export permits. Chris Jones, Flavio Menezes, and Francis Vella (1996) found that prices could increase or decrease in sequential auctions of wool, as did Chanel, Gerard-Varet, and Vincent (1996) for watches; Milgrom and Weber (1982b) show theoretically that if bidders' valuations are affiliated, then prices will tend to rise over time in a sequence of auctions of identical objects. George Deltas and Georgia Kosmopoulou (2001) find in a sale of library books that expected prices increase over the auction, but that probability of sale decreases. They attribute their findings to "catalogue" effects: it is important how and where and item appears in the pre-sale catalogue. Plamen Natzkoff (2001) provides an excellent survey of papers on the declining price anomaly.

It is an interesting result that in a variety of different types of auctions, price direction throughout an auction can be predicted. As reported in table 7, declining prices (on average) have been documented in more types of auctions than have rising prices. A variety of economic theories have been

developed to explain price direction, and in all likelihood, the price direction results from a combination of these effects. Declining prices do not occur in every auction or every art auction, but they appear to be an important effect that the auction mechanism has on price.

5. Conclusion

The empirical study of art auctions really has two purposes. On the one hand, the auction mechanism provides a public report on the prices of art objects. As we have shown, because of the unique nature of many art objects, the interpretation of market prices requires great care. Nevertheless, this information is the primary way that art objects are valued and it provides us with our primary objective information on preferences regarding art. Although the market is surely not all that is important in the judgement of art and artists, it is certainly one of the key components of our understanding of what is good and bad.

The empirical study of art auctions also has another purpose. Art auctions provide data that may be used to test and refine strategic models of behavior. Here the object of study is the economic mechanism, and it makes very little difference what object is for sale. It appears that a great deal of what we know about the operation of auction mechanisms may also lead to the rather happy study of objects of considerable interest in their own right.

The empirical study of art auctions and the price of art assets has been a growth field in the last decade and has resulted in an increasing sophistication in the questions being asked and in the empirical methods being used. It seems likely that this trend will continue into the future.

Data Appendix

The dataset on impressionist and modern art auctions was constructed by Orley Ashenfelter and Andrew Richardson. This dataset is restricted to 58

TABLE 7
DECLINING PRICE ANOMALY

Empirical Work (Declining Prices)

Buccola (1982)	Livestock
Burns (1985)	Experimental results
Ashenfelter (1989)	Wine
Milgrom and Weber (1982b)	Transponder leases
Thiel and Petry (1990)	Stamps
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992)	Condominiums
Venderporten (1992a,b)	Condominiums
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1992)	Dairy cattle
McAfee and Vincent (1993)	Wine
De Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1994)	Wine
Lusht (1994)	Commercial real estate
Chanel et al. (1996)	Gold jewelry
Pesando and Shum (1996)	Picasso prints
Keser and Olson (1996)	Experimental results
Beggs and Graddy (1997)	Art
Thurston (1997)	Mink pelts
Pezanis-Christou (2001)	Fish
van den Berg et al. (2001)	Flowers
Ginsburgh and van Ours (2001)	Chinese porcelain from shipwrecks

Empirical Work (Increasing Prices)

Jones et al. (1996)	Wool auctions
Chanel et al. (1996)	Watches
Gandal (1997)	Israeli cable television auctions
Donald et al. (1997)	Siberian timber auctions
Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2001)	Library books

Theoretical Work

Black and de Meza (1992)	Declining prices in wine auctions are due to buyers' options.
McAfee and Vincent (1993)	Risk aversion could create declining prices.
Von der Fehr (1994)	Participation costs could create declining prices.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994)	Relate price decline to heterogeneity of objects.
Bernhardt and Scoones (1994)	Relate price decline to heterogeneity of objects.
Gale and Hausch (1994)	Relate price decline to heterogeneity of objects.
Beggs and Graddy (1994)	Ordering by value can generate price/estimate declines.
Ginsburgh (1998)	Absentee bidders can generate declining prices.

selected impressionist and modern artists and includes only paintings, not sculptures. These artists were chosen primarily because their work is well represented at auction. The period covered is 1980 to 1990, and the dataset includes over 16,000 items in 150 auctions that were held in London and New York, at both Christie's and Sotheby's. The auction prices were collected from public price lists, and the estimated prices and observable painting characteristics were collected from the pre-sale catalogues. This dataset does not include all items sold in each auction, only a sample of the 58 selected artists. Furthermore, we only have prices for items that were sold at auction. This dataset was used in Richardson (1992), Abowd and Ashenfelter (1989), Beggs and Graddy (1997), and Ashenfelter, Graddy, and Stevens (2002).

To construct a repeat-sales price index, we identified 230 paintings that sold at least twice during the period 1980–90 (for a total of 474 observations). To make a positive identification, we required that paintings have an identical title, medium, artist and painting date. As many paintings have identical titles, title and artist are not sufficient identifiers. We regress the log of the sale price of the painting on a dummy variable for each painting, and the time period in which the painting was sold. We include a dummy variable for each year. Using the antilogs of the coefficients on the time dummies, we construct our repeat sales price index for impressionist art as reported in figure 1.

For the hedonic price index in figure 1, the log of the sale price is regressed on the hedonic painting characteristics in addition to time dummies for each

period. The hedonic characteristics used for impressionist and modern art are painting date, length, width, signed, monogrammed, stamped, medium in which it was painted, and artist. We also include dummy variables indicating whether the painting was sold at Sotheby's or Christie's and New York or London. For figure 3, the sample is split into the top 20 percent of paintings sold by price and the bottom 80 percent sold by price and the index is constructed for these sub-samples as described above.

The dataset on contemporary art was constructed by Kathryn Graddy and includes all sales of contemporary art at Christie's auction house on King Street in London between 1982 and 1994. The data were gathered from the archives of Christie's auction house, and for each item, the observable characteristics were hand-copied from the pre-sale catalogues. The information on whether or not a lot is sold and the final bid from 1988 onwards was taken primarily from Christie's internal property system. Before 1988, many of the lots were missing from the internal system. It appeared that, after a certain period of time, some of the lots were deleted from the system, for no predictable reason. From December 1982 through December 1987, access to the auctioneer's books was obtained and used to track the missing items. The contemporary art dataset includes 35 auctions and approximately 4500 items for sale. This dataset was used in Beggs and Graddy (1997) and Ashenfelter, Graddy, and Stevens (2002).

In order to construct the hedonic indices for contemporary art that were used in figure 2, the sample is split into the top 20 percent of paintings sold by price and the bottom 80 percent sold by price, and the index is constructed as described above using the following hedonic characteristics: painting date, length, width, medium, artist, and whether or not a painting is subject to VAT. As many artists in the contemporary art sample have come up for sale just one or a few times, we use a dummy variable to indicate whether paintings have been included for sale four or fewer times rather than using artist dummies for artists with four or fewer sales. Only the prices of items that were actually sold at auction were included in the regressions.

REFERENCES

- Abowd, John and Orley Ashenfelter. 1988. "Art Auctions: Prices Indices and Sale Rates for Impressionist and Contemporary Pictures," mimeo, econ. dept., Princeton U.
- Anderson, Robert C. 1974. "Paintings as an Investment," *Econ. Inquiry* 12:1, pp. 13–26.
- Ashenfelter, Orley. 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," *J. Econ. Perspect.* 3:3, pp. 23–36.
- . 2000. "The Demand for Expert Opinion: Bordeaux Wine," *Les Cahiers de L'OCVE, Cahier Scientifique* 3:Mars.
- Ashenfelter, Orley and David Genesove. 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 82, pp. 501–505.
- Ashenfelter, Orley; Kathryn Graddy and Margaret Stevens. 2002. "A Study of Sale Rates and Prices in Impressionist and Contemporary Art Auctions," mimeo, econ. dept., U. Oxford.
- Balvers, Ronald J. 1990. "Variability and the Duration of Search," *Int. Econ. Rev.* 31:3, pp. 747–51.
- de la Barre, Madeleine; Sophie Docclo and Victor Ginsburgh. 1996. "Returns of Impressionist, Modern and Contemporary European Paintings 1962–1991," *Ann. Econ. Statist.* 35, pp. 143–81.
- Baumol, William J. 1986. "Unnatural Value: Or Art Investment as Floating Crap Game," *Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers Proceedings* 76:2, pp. 10–14.
- Bauwens, Luc and Victor Ginsburgh. 2000. "Art Experts and Auctions: Are Pre-sale Estimates Unbiased and Fully Informative?" *Rech. Econ. Lowain* 66:2, pp. 131–44.
- Beggs, Alan and Kathryn Graddy. 1997. "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," *Rand J. Econ.* 28:3, pp. 544–65.
- van den Berg, Gerard; Jan C. van Ours and Menno P. Pradhan. 2001. "The Declining Price Anomaly in Dutch Rose Auctions," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 91:4, pp. 1055–62.
- Bernhardt, Dan and David Scones. 1994. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 84:3, pp. 653–57.
- Black, Jane and David de Meza. 1992. "Systematic Price Differences between Successive Auctions Are No Anomaly," *J. Econ. Manage. Strategy* 1:4, pp. 607–28.
- Buccola, Stephen. 1982. "Price Trends at Livestock Auctions," *Amer. J. Agr. Econ.* 64:1, pp. 63–69.
- Buelens, Nathalie and Victor Ginsburgh. 1993. "Revisiting Baumol's 'Art as Floating Crap Game'," *Europ. Econ. Rev.* 37:7, pp. 1351–71.
- Burns, Penny. 1985. "Experience and Decision Making: A Comparison of Students and Businessmen in a Simulated Progressive Auction," in *Research in Experimental Economics: A Research Annual*. Vol. 3. Vernon Smith, ed. Greenwich, CT: JAI, pp. 139–57.
- Campbell, John. 1987. "Stock Returns and the Term Structure," *J. Finan. Econ.* 18:2, pp. 373–99.
- Chanel, Olivier; Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet and Victor Ginsburgh. 1996. "The Relevance of Hedonic Price Indices," *J. Cult. Econ.* 20:1, pp. 1–24.
- Chanel, Olivier; Louis-Andre Gérard-Varet and Stephanie Vincent. 1996. "Auction Theory and Practice: Evidence from the Market for Jewellery," in *Economics of the Arts: Selected Essays*. Victor Ginsburgh and Pierre-Michel Menger, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 135–49.
- Czujack, Corinna. 1997. "Picasso Paintings at Auction, 1963–1994," *J. Cult. Econ.* 21:3, pp. 229–47.
- Deltas, George and Georgia Kosmopoulou. 2001. "Bidding in Sequential Auctions: 'Catalogue' vs. 'Order of Sale' Effects (in a Sale of Library Books)," mimeo, econ. dept., U. Illinois.
- Di Vittorio, Albert and Victor Ginsburgh. 1994. "Pricing Red Wines of Médoc Vintages from 1949 to 1989 at Christie's Auctions," mimeo, U. Libre de Bruxelles.

- Donald, Stephen; Harry Paarsch and Jacques Robert. 1997. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Empirical Models of Sequential, Ascending-Price Auctions with Multi-Unit Demand: An Application to Siberian Timber-Export Permits," mimeo, Boston U., U. Iowa and U. Montréal.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard. 1994. "Sequential Auctions of Stochastically Equivalent Objects," *Econ. Letters* 44:1-2, pp. 87-90.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Charles Kahn. 1992. "An Empirical Analysis of Dairy Cattle Auctions," mimeo, U. Illinois.
- von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch. 1994. "Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions," *Oxford Econ. Papers* 46:3, pp. 345-56.
- Frey, Bruno S. and Reiner Eichenberger. 1995. "On the Rate of Return in the Art Market: Survey and Evaluation," *Europ. Econ. Rev.* 39:3-4, pp. 528-37.
- Frey, Bruno S. and Werner W. Pommerehne. 1989. *Muses and Markets, Explorations in the Economics of the Arts*. Oxford: Blackwells.
- Gale, Ian and Donald Hausch. 1994. "Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions," *Games Econ. Behav.* 7:3, pp. 318-31.
- Gandal, Neil. 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," *J. Indust. Econ.* 45, pp. 227-44.
- Genesove, David. 1995. "Search at Wholesale Auto Auctions," *Quart. J. Econ.* 110:1, pp. 23-49.
- Ginsburgh, Victor. 1998. "Absentee Bidders and the Declining Price Anomaly in Wine Auctions," *J. Polit. Econ.* 106:6, pp. 1302-19.
- Ginsburgh, Victor and Philippe Jeanfils. 1995. "Long-term Co-movements in International Markets for Paintings," *Europ. Econ. Rev.* 39:3-4, pp. 538-48.
- Ginsburgh, Victor and Jan van Ours. 2001. "On Organizing a Sequential Auction: The Case of Shipwreck Findings," mimeo, ECARES, U. Libre de Bruxelles.
- Goetzmann, William N. 1993. "Accounting for Taste: Art and Financial Markets over Three Centuries," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 83:5, pp. 1370-76.
- . 1996. "How Costly Is the Fall from Fashion? Survivorship Bias in the Painting Market," *Economics of the Arts: Selected Essays*. Victor Ginsburgh and Pierre-Michel Menger, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 71-83.
- Graeser, Paul. 1993. "Rate of Return to Investment in American Antique Furniture," *South. Econ. J.* 59:4, pp. 817-21.
- In Re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1713 (S.D.N.Y)
- Jones, Chris; Flavio Menezes and Francis Vella. 1996. "Auction Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," work. paper 303, Australian National U.
- Keser, Claudia and Mark Olson. 1996. "Experimental Examination of the Declining price Anomaly," in *Economics of the Arts: Selected Essays*. Victor Ginsburgh and Pierre-Michel Menger, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 151-75.
- Landes, William. 2000. "Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz Collection," *Recherches Economiques de Louvain* 66:2, pp. 111-130.
- Lusht, Kenneth. 1994. "Order and Price in a Sequential Auction," *J. Real Estate Finance Econ.* 8, pp. 259-66.
- McAfee, R. Preston; Daniel Quan and Daniel Vincent. 2000. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions," unpub. manuscript.
- McAfee, R. Preston and Daniel Vincent. 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," *J. Econ. Theory* 60:1, pp.191-212.
- Mei, Jianping and Michael Moses. 2001. "Art as an Investment and the Origin of the 'Master-piece Effect' Evidence from 1875-2000," mimeo, Stern School, NYU.
- . 2002. "Are Investors Credulous? Some Preliminary Evidence from Art Auctions," mimeo, Stern School, NYU.
- Milgrom, Paul and Robert Weber. 1982a. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," *Econometrica* 50:5, pp. 1089-122.
- . 1982b. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II," mimeo, Stanford U. and Northwestern U. Published with new foreword in *The Economic Theory of Auctions*. Vol. 2. Paul Klemperer, ed. 2000. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 179-94.
- Natzkoff, Plamen. 2001. "Sequential Auctions: Survey of the Literature and Empirical Analysis of Auctions of Raw Wool in Australia," M.Phil thesis, U. Oxford.
- Pesando, James E. 1993. "Art as an Investment. The Market for Modern Prints," *Amer. Econ. Rev.* 83:5, 1075-89.
- Pesando, James E. and Pauline Shum. 1996. "Price Anomalies at Auction: Evidence from the Market for Modern Prints" in *Economics of the Arts: Selected Essays*. in Victor Ginsburgh and Pierre-Michel Menger, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 113-34.
- Pezanis-Christou, Paul. 2001. "Sequential Auctions with Asymmetric Buyers: Evidence from a Fish Market," mimeo, econ. dept., Bonn U.
- Pommerehne, Werner W. and Lars P. Feld. 1997. "The Impact of Museum Purchases on the Auction Prices of Paintings," *J. Cult. Econ.* 21:3, pp. 249-71.
- Richardson, Andrew. 1992. "An Econometric Analysis of the Auction Market for Impressionist and Modern Pictures, 1980-1991," senior thesis, econ. dept. Princeton U.
- Ross, Myron H. and Scott Zondervan. 1989. "Capital Gains and the Rate of Return on a Stradivarius," *Econ. Inquiry* 27:3, pp. 529-40.
- Stein, John P. 1977. "The Monetary Appreciation of Paintings," *J. Polit. Econ.* 85:5, pp. 1021-35.
- Thiel, Stuart and Glenn Petry. 1995. "Bidding Behaviour in Second-Price Auctions: Rare Stamp Sales, 1923-1937," *Appl. Econ.* 27:1, pp. 11-16.

- Thurston, Norman. 1997. "Explaining the Declining price Anomaly: Empirical Evidence on Buyer Heterogeneity," work. paper, Brigham Young U.
- Vanderporten, Bruce. 1992a. "Strategic Behaviour in Pooled Condominium Auctions," *J. Urban Econ.* 31:1, pp. 123–37.
- . 1992b. "Timing of Bids at Pooled Real Estate Auctions," *J. Real Estate Finance Econ.* 5:3, pp. 255–67.
- Vincent, Daniel. 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May be Kept Secret," *J. Econ. Theory* 65:2, pp. 575–84.
- Watson, Peter. 1992. *From Monet to Manhattan: The Rise of the Modern Art Market*. NY: Random House.