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Do the Usual Results of Railway Returns to Scale and Density Hold in the Case of Heterogeneity in Outputs?

A Hedonic Cost Function Approach

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Abstract

This paper highlights the importance of modelling the interaction between returns to scale/density and heterogeneity of services when evaluating optimal size and structure of passenger rail operations. We propose and estimate a hedonic cost function which allows us to incorporate measures of train operator heterogeneity, which are central to evaluating the cost effect of merging heterogeneous train operators, and thus informing policy. We illustrate our model via three rail franchise mergers/remappings in Britain, and show that the wrong policy conclusion result could be obtained by only considering the scale and density properties, in isolation from heterogeneity.

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1.0 Introduction

The conventional result in transportation and in particular rail economics is that increasing the density of utilisation of infrastructure will lower average costs (per train-km) (Hensher and Brewer, 2000; Button, 2010). This may certainly be expected when we consider the costs associated with rail infrastructure (for example, Wheat and Smith, 2008; Andersson *et al.*, 2012; Smith and Wheat, 2012a). However, scale and/or density effects are also likely to be apparent in situations where industries are structured on an operation-only basis, as in the case where passenger rail services are subject to competitive tendering, such as in Europe. For example, Smith and Wheat (2012b) find constant returns to scale (RtS) and increasing returns to density (RtD) with respect to train operation costs only (excluding the cost of infrastructure).

Successive reforms within Europe have seen infrastructure separated from operations to a greater or lesser degree and, though not required yet by legislation, many countries (in particular, Britain, Sweden, and Germany) have introduced competitive tendering or franchising of passenger rail services. The further reforms announced in 2012 within the fourth railway package include compulsory tendering of public service contracts (European Commission, 2013). Competitive tendering in rail has also been used outside Europe — for example, in Melbourne, Australia, Latin America, and for some North American commuter services.

Understanding the optimal cost structure of train operations, within separated railway systems, is therefore an important input into policy formulation in railways around the world with respect to determining the optimal size and structure of rail franchises. In the British context, which is the focus of the empirical analysis in this paper, a current policy question is whether to remap existing train operating companies (TOCs) into fewer, larger TOCs.

In this paper we make a new and important contribution to the previous literature as follows. We argue, and show via an empirical example, that appealing to results from previous studies regarding the extent of RtS and RtD in passenger railways could give misleading information regarding the optimal size and structure of passenger rail franchises. This is because the methodology used in previous studies does not adequately consider whether heterogeneity in services provided by train operators affects the estimates of RtS and RtD. In other words, conditional on finding RtS and RtD, there is a question over whether these can still be exploited if the services provided by merging franchises are very different. Thus, previous estimates of scale and density properties in railways internationally (for both separated and vertically integrated systems) may have been biased, to the extent that they did not adequately model the interaction between scale/density and heterogeneity of services.

Our proposed methodology, which addresses the above problem, is to adopt a hedonic cost function approach, which allows us to incorporate measures of TOC heterogeneity which are central to evaluate the cost effect of merging heterogeneous TOCs, and thus inform policy with regard to what is optimal from a cost perspective.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 reviews the literature on the evidence of RtS and RtD in railway operations. Section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 outlines the data and the improvements in data relative to previous studies. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings relating to overall scale and density

returns, and the impacts of influence on costs of heterogeneity in outputs. It also presents, for illustration, predicted cost changes for three remappings and discusses the reasons for the each cost change. Section 6 concludes.

2.0 Literature Review

There is an extensive literature analysing the cost structure and productivity performance of vertically integrated railways around the world (Oum *et al.*, 1999; Smith, 2006). However, there has been relatively little work looking at the cost structure of the passenger train operations sector. To our knowledge, all except one are focused on Britain (Cowie, 2002a, 2002b, 2005 and 2009; Affuso *et al.*, 2002, 2003; Smith *et al.*, 2010; Smith and Wheat, 2012b). Merkert *et al.* (2009) studied railway operations in Britain, Sweden, and Germany. Preston (2008) provides a review of, *inter alia*, previous cost studies of the British rail sector.

An important issue is whether to include an infrastructure input in any analysis of train operating costs. Clearly the infrastructure input may be an important part of the transformation function and so should be considered for inclusion in any analysis. The four papers by Cowie all include some measure of infrastructure input in the analysis (route length or access charge payments). This in turn raises two important and related problems. First, the infrastructure input is hard to measure. Route length is hardly adequate to capture the quality and extent of investment in the infrastructure. On the other hand, access charge payments are essentially transfer payments from government to the infrastructure manager and are not reflective of the cost of network access for a given TOC (at least in a given year); see also Smith and Wheat (2012b). Second, the inclusion of this input turns the analysis into an assessment of rail industry costs/production, rather than being targeted on the TOCs.

For the above reasons, Smith and Wheat (2012b) argue that, given the measurement problems noted above, infrastructure inputs are best left out of the analysis. The dependent variable in their paper is thus defined as TOC costs, excluding fixed access charges. We follow this approach here (see Section 4). Route-km is also included as an explanatory variable in their model, not as a measure of the infrastructure input, but to distinguish between scale and density effects.

Given the focus of our paper, it is important to define returns to scale and density in the context of a separated, passenger train operation-only service.[1] It should be noted that these two definitions refer to the effect on train operation costs only and not anything to do with infrastructure costs. We distinguish between RtS and RtD, since there are two conceptual ways for a train operator to grow. First, a train operator can become geographically larger — that is, operating to and from more points. This is captured by the RtS concept. Second, a train operator can grow by running more train-hours over a fixed network. This is captured by the RtD concept (see also Cowie, 2002b; Smith and Wheat, 2012b).

The previous findings with regard to scale and density in train operations are as follows. Using a variable return to scale DEA (data envelopment analysis) model, Merkert *et al.*

[1]See Caves *et al.* (1981) and Caves *et al.* (1984) for use of the terms returns to scale (RtS) and returns to density (RtD) in empirical applications, including vertically integrated railways.

(2009) found that British and Swedish TOCs were below minimum efficient scale, while the large German operators were above. Using parametric methods, Cowie (2002b) found evidence for increasing RtS and these are increasing with scale, though there is no attempt to differentiate between scale and density returns in the analysis.

Again using parametric methods, Smith and Wheat (2012b) found constant RtS and increasing RtD. One limitation of their work was the inability to estimate a plausible translog function. Instead, a restricted variant was estimated selected on the basis of general to specific testing and on whether key elasticities were of the expected sign. This implicitly restricts the variation in RtS and RtD. We remedy this limitation by estimating a translog simultaneously with the cost share equations and adopt a hedonic representation of the train operations output in order to include characteristics of output in a parsimonious manner. As will be noted in Section 3, we also augment the output specification to get a much better representation of the technology compared to a previous study.

3.0 Methodology

A cost function derived from the behavioural assumption of cost minimisation is represented as:

$$C_{it} = C\left(\mathbf{y}_{it}, \mathbf{p}_{it}; \boldsymbol{\beta}\right) \quad i = 1, \ldots, N, \quad t = 1, \ldots T, \tag{1}$$

where C_{it} is the cost of firm i in year t, and $\mathbf{y}_{it}$ and $\mathbf{p}_{it}$ are $\mathbf{L}$ and $\mathbf{M}$ dimension vectors of outputs and prices, respectively, again for firm i in year t. Firms provide a great deal of different train service outputs — for example, TOCs provide train services with different stopping patterns and running speeds. Thus we could consider this an issue of economies of scope. However, we cannot specify the amount of each numerous output for a number of reasons. First, the data does not exist on outputs at such a level of disaggregation. Second, if data did exist, then the model would have vast numbers of parameters such that partial analysis would be imprecise. Third, the translog cost function cannot accommodate zero levels of outputs very satisfactorily. Instead we adopt the hedonic cost function approach first used by Spady and Friedlaender (1978), which provides a parsimonious method of incorporating output characteristics (termed 'output quality' in their paper) to characterise heterogeneity in outputs. This provides a means of incorporating measures of heterogeneity of output both across and within firms. The former is important for consideration of the cost effect of merging TOCs. As discussed in Jara-Diaz (1982), failure to account for output characteristics can result in incorrect policy recommendations in relation to optimal firm size.

Using the notation of Spady and Friedlaender (1978), replace the lth element of $\mathbf{y}_{it}$, y_{lit}, with ψ_{lit} where:

$$\psi_{lit}\left(y_{lit}, \mathbf{q}_{lit}\right) = y_{lit} \cdot \phi\left(q_{1lit}, \ldots, q_{blit}\right), \tag{2}$$

where y_{lit} is now the lth 'physical output' and q_{blit} is the bth quality characteristic of the lth physical output. ψ_{lit} is assumed homogenous of degree one in the physical output. This implies that a doubling of y_{lit} results in a doubling of ψ_{lit}; this is required for identification of the function within the wider cost function and sets y_{lit} to be the numeraire of ψ_{lit}. We consider $\phi_l \; \forall l$ to be Cobb–Douglas as in Bitzan and Wilson (2007) (as opposed to translog

as in Spady and Friedlaender's formulation), given the large number of quality variables in our formulation.

Spady and Friedlaender (1978) discuss the implicit restrictions associated with adopting the hedonic formulation. They term the function 'quality separable', since the impact of the quality variables on the associated primary output is independent of prices (and also of the level of other primary outputs). Ultimately this restriction is the price of adopting the hedonic function; however, it makes the model far more manageable in terms of parameters to be estimated (we estimate thirty-four parameters for the hedonic formulation, but the unrestricted translog would require estimation of circa 140 parameters; there are only 243 observations). Given the Cobb–Douglas form for ϕ_l in equation (2), an eloquent way to describe the implication of the 'quality separable' restriction is that the elasticity of cost with respect to the quality variable is proportional to the elasticity of cost with respect to the primary output.

We estimate a translog cost function in $\boldsymbol{\psi}_{it}$, $\mathbf{p}_{it}$, and, given that our model utilises panel data, a non-neutral technology trend:

$$\ln(C_{it}) = \begin{cases} \alpha + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \beta_l \ln(\psi_{lit}) + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \delta_m \ln(P_{mit}) + \gamma_T t + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{l=1}^{L}\sum_{b=1}^{L} \beta_{lb}(\ln(\psi_{lit}))(\ln(\psi_{bit})) \\ + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{m=1}^{M}\sum_{c=1}^{M} \delta_{mc}(\ln(P_{mit}))(\ln(P_{cit})) + \sum_{l=1}^{L}\sum_{m=1}^{M} \kappa_{lm}(\ln(\psi_{lit}))(\ln(P_{mit})) \\ + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \lambda_{Tl} t \ln(\psi_{lit}) + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \varphi_{Tm} t \ln(P_{mit}) + \gamma_{TT} t^2. \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

Shephard's lemma is applied to equation (3) to yield the cost share equations:

$$\frac{\partial \ln(C_{it})}{\partial \ln(P_{mit})} = S_m = \delta_m + 2\delta_{mm} \ln(P_{mit}) + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \kappa_{lm} \ln(\psi_{lit}) + \varphi_{Tm} t, \quad m = 1, \ldots, M. \tag{4}$$

We estimate the model parameters as a system of the cost function and the factor shares to aid both the precision of estimates and also to ensure that the estimated cost shares are as close as possible to the true cost shares (which by equation (4) is a requirement of economic theory). In addition to the cost shares, economic theory associated with the existence of a dual cost function provides a set of useful restrictions to aid estimation. First, symmetry of input demand with respect to price requires $\delta_{mc} = \delta_{cm}$, and also there is symmetry in the cross derivatives of outputs, $\beta_{lb} = \beta_{bl}$. Second, the cost function must be linear homogenous of degree 1 in prices. This requires:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \delta_m = 1 & \sum_{c=1}^{M} \delta_{mc} = 0 \quad m = 1, \ldots, M \\ \sum_{m=1}^{M} \kappa_{lm} = 0 \quad l = 1, \ldots, L & \sum_{m=1}^{M} \varphi_{Tm} = 0 \end{array} \right\}. \tag{5}$$

A convenient way of imposing equation (5) on equations (3) and (4) is to divide input prices and cost by one of the input prices.

Given there are parameters implicit in ψ_{lit}, estimation is undertaken using non-linear seemingly unrelated regression. To avoid the errors in the cost shares summing to zero for each observation, one of the cost shares has to be dropped. We drop the cost share for the Mth input (that is, the input whose price is used to divide cost and all other prices).

Therefore, after imposing symmetry and linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices on equations (3) and (4), the system of M equations to be estimated is:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \ln\left(\frac{C_{it}}{P_{Mit}}\right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \alpha + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \beta_l \ln(\psi_{lit}) + \sum_{m=1}^{M-1} \delta_m \ln\left(\frac{P_{mit}}{P_{Mit}}\right) + \gamma_T t + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{l=1}^{L}\sum_{b=1}^{L} \beta_{lb}(\ln(\psi_{lit}))(\ln(\psi_{bit})) \\ + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{m=1}^{M-1}\sum_{c=1}^{M-1} \delta_{mc}\left(\ln\left(\frac{P_{mit}}{P_{Mit}}\right)\right)\left(\ln\left(\frac{P_{cit}}{P_{Mit}}\right)\right) + \sum_{l=1}^{L}\sum_{m=1}^{M-1} \kappa_{lm}(\ln(\psi_{lit}))\left(\ln\left(\frac{P_{mit}}{P_{Mit}}\right)\right) \\ + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \lambda_{Tl} t \ln(\psi_{lit}) + \sum_{m=1}^{M-1} \varphi_{Tm} t \ln\left(\frac{P_{mit}}{P_{Mit}}\right) + \gamma_{TT} t^2 \end{array} \right. \\ S_m = \delta_m + 2\delta_{mm} \ln\left(\frac{P_{mit}}{P_{Mit}}\right) + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \kappa_{lm} \ln(\psi_{lit}) + \varphi_{Tm} t, \quad m = 1, \ldots, (M-1) \end{array} \right\}. \quad (6)$$

In addition to the symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices, the cost function has to be concave in input prices. This cannot easily be imposed on the translog function form, since the restrictions are a function of the data. Instead, we compute the matrix of second derivatives of input prices at each data point to verify if it is negative definite: a necessary and sufficient condition for concavity in prices (see Diewert and Wales (1987) for the expression for a translog function). A further condition that is not imposed, but checked post-estimation, is that the factor demand own-price elasticities are negative for all inputs. The Allen–Uzawa own-price elasticities and partial elasticities of substitution are given as:

$$\sigma_{mm} = \left(\delta_{mm} + S_m(S_m - 1)\right)/S_m^2, \quad (7)$$

and

$$\sigma_{mc} = \left(\delta_{mc} + S_c S_m\right)/S_c S_m, \quad (8)$$

respectively. If $\sigma_{mc} < 0$, the two inputs are complements; if $\sigma_{mc} > 0$, then they are substitutes.

4.0 Data

We utilise a panel data set of twenty-eight TOCs over eleven years (2000 to 2010).[2] The panel is unbalanced, with a total of 244 observations in total. The unbalanced nature of the panel reflects the re-franchising and, importantly, remapping of franchises over time.

We define TOC cost as total reported cost less access charge payments to Network Rail (the railway infrastructure manager). This definition follows from Smith and Wheat

[2]Quoted years are for year end to 31 March — for example, 2000 is April 1999 to March 2000.

(2012b). We net off access charge payments as they are (indirectly) merely transfer payments from government to the infrastructure manager and are not reflective of the cost of network access for a given TOC (at least in a given year). Importantly, TOCs are compensated for changes in the access charge payments over time by the construction of the franchise contracts.[3] It is therefore important to note that netting off access charge transfer payments to Network Rail does not mean that we estimate a variable cost function. We consider that we estimate a total cost function, since this cost represents the total cost under the control of the franchisee (for the duration of the franchise).

The cost data is sourced from the TOC's publicly posted accounts, while access charge payments are sourced direct from Network Rail. We believe these to be the best sources of these data, given that the TOC accounts do not report access charges in a consistent manner across TOCs.[4]

Regarding the explanatory variables, Table 1 summarises the data. There are three primary outputs: route-km, train-hours and number of stations operated. We consider TOCs producing train services (train-hours) and operating stations. In addition, route-km is included to distinguish between geographical size and intensity of operations. Thus it is analogous to the use of route-km in integrated railway studies to distinguish between scale and density effects (Caves *et al*., 1985). Conceivably, route-km could have been included as a characteristic of the primary train-hours output. However, adopting this approach would have imposed, *a priori*, a more restrictive relation between scale and density effects; the hedonic function adopted imposes proportionality between the cost elasticity with respect to the primary output and the cost elasticity with respect to the quality variable. Given the focus of this study towards optimal size/utilisation of TOCs, it was deemed that the more flexible approach should be adopted.

With respect to other studies, we note a number of improvements in our specification of outputs. First, we include both stations operated and train operation measures. Station operation is an important activity for some TOCs, but less so for others, and as such should not be ignored.[5] Only Smith and Wheat (2012b) considered stations within analysis. Second, we have train-hours available for this study. This, along with distance measures (incorporated via average speed measures) and train length measures are the key drivers of costs, since these measures include both time-based and distance-based cost drivers. We are not aware of any previous railway cost study, either of vertically integrated or separated railways, which has taken account of train-hours, length, and speed in the model.

A key element of this study is to consider the cost implications of merging TOCs that produce outputs with different characteristics. Therefore, in addition to including the

[3]It should also be noted that since 2001/2, Network Rail received some of its funding directly from central government via the Network Grant. As such, the sum of access charges over all TOCs does not reflect the full cost of infrastructure provision for years beyond 2002. This is another reason that access charges do not reflect the opportunity cost of network access.

[4]In particular, it is obvious that some TOCs are itemising in their accounts only variable access charges rather than the sum of variable and (generally the much larger) fixed charge.

[5]Two TOCs do not operate any stations. This is dealt with by modelling those TOCs as a cost function comprising only two outputs and the two input prices. Furthermore, we allow the coefficients with respect to the route-km (and the interactions with other variables) to be different for those TOCs that do operate stations.

Table 1
Variables Used

Symbol	*Name*	*Description*	*Data source*
		Generic outputs (ψ)	
$\psi_1 = y_1$			
y_1	Route-km	Length of the line-km operated by the TOC. A measure of the geographical coverage of the TOC	National Rail Trends
$\psi_2 = y_2 q_{12}^{\phi_{12}} q_{22}^{\phi_{22}} q_{32}^{\phi_{32}} e^{\phi_{42}q_{42}} e^{\phi_{52}q_{52}} e^{\phi_{62}q_{62}} e^{\phi_{72}q_{72}} e^{\phi_{82}q_{82}} e^{\phi_{92}q_{92}}$			
y_2	Train-hours	Primary driver of train operating cost	National Modelling Framework Timetabling Module
q_{12}	Average vehicle length of trains	Vehicle-km/train-km	Network Rail
q_{22}	Average speed	Train-km/train-hours	National Modelling Framework Timetabling Module
q_{32}	Passenger load factor	Passenger-km/train km	Passenger-km data from National Rail Trends. Train-km data from Network Rail
q_{42}	Intercity TOC	Proportion of train services intercity in nature	National Rail Trends for the categorisation of TOCs into intercity, LSE and regional. Where TOCs have merged across sectors a proportion allocation is made on an approximate basis with reference to the relative size of train-km by each pre-merged TOC
q_{52}	London South Eastern indicator	Proportion of train services into and around London (in general commuting services)	
q_{62}	$q_{42}q_{52}$	Interaction between Intercity and LSE proportions	
q_{72}	$q_{42}(1 - q_{42} - q_{52})$	Interaction between intercity and regional (non-intercity and non-LSE services) proportions	
q_{82}	$q_{52}(1 - q_{42} - q_{52})$	Interaction between LSE and regional proportions	
q_{92}	Number of rolling stock types operated	Number of 'generic' rolling stock types operated	National Modelling Framework Rolling Stock Classifications
$\psi_3 = y_3$			
y_3	Stations operated	Number of stations that the TOC operates	National Rail Trends
		Prices	
P_1	Non-payroll cost per unit rolling stock		TOC accounts for cost, Platform 5 and TAS Rail Industry Monitor for rolling stock numbers
P_2	Staff costs (on payroll) per number of staff		TOC accounts (both costs and staff numbers)

average characteristics of TOC output (train length, speed, and passenger load factor), we include two further sets of measures to account for diversity in TOC service provision. The first is the proportion of train-km that correspond to each of three service groups (intercity, London and South Eastern (commuting), and the remainder regional). q_{42} and q_{52} pick up systematic cost differences, over and above that captured by the other output characteristics, from TOCs providing intercity and commuting services, respectively (we drop the proportion for regional services, to prevent perfect collinearity). For example, we can expect that intercity TOCs will, all other things being equal, be more expensive due to such factors as the need to provide higher-quality rolling stock and better on-train services. As well as including these terms, we include interactions between the service group proportions. The majority of TOCs provide only one service group; thus the interaction variables are only non-zero for a select set of TOCs, the majority of which were formed from remappings of TOCs that provided a single service type, but in the same geographical area, and have subsequently been merged into one. Thus the coefficients on these interaction variables would provide an indication of any cost increasing (or decreasing) impact of TOCs providing heterogeneous service mixes, over and above any change in other service-level characteristics.

Second, we also include the number of generic rolling-stock types operated by a TOC. These are taken from the rolling-stock classifications within the Department for Transport's Network Modelling Framework model. Essentially they classify rolling stock into speed bands and traction source (electric or diesel), and whether they are multiple units or loco-hauled. The more rolling stock types that are operated, the more likely there is heterogeneity in service provided within a TOC.

It should be noted that when it comes to evaluating franchise remappings, it will not just be the rolling-stock type and franchise service type proportion heterogeneity that affect the cost change. Instead, the other average heterogeneity characteristic variables will be different. Thus it is difficult to assess the impact of changes in heterogeneity by looking at the signs on the service type and rolling-stock type variables in isolation. We shall return to this in the results section.

We have defined two input prices, relating to payroll staff costs and non-payroll costs. Payroll staff costs include all labour costs from staff who are directly employed by the TOC. Thus a natural price measure is staff cost divided by staff numbers. The divisor for non-payroll staff is less clear. First, once we net off access charge payments, the publicly available accounts only do not allow for costs to be consistently broken up any further than staff and non-payroll costs. Non-payroll costs include rolling-stock capital lease payments, rolling stock non-capital lease payments, other outsourced maintenance costs and energy costs, and other costs. The only divisor that we have available is number of rolling stock units, and we adopt this in the price. This is a limitation of the data; however, we believe that this is the best solution (because classification issues between rolling stock and other costs mean that it is not possible to compute two separate prices for rolling stock and other; see also Smith and Wheat, 2012b). We do check for concavity in input prices in our estimated model, and this is fulfilled at all data points, giving us some reassurance that our input prices data are not having perverse effects. Perhaps the most important implication of our definition of input prices is that we would expect there to be a reasonable degree of substitutability between the two inputs at the margin, since functions such as train maintenance can be outsourced and thus staff activity can be taken off the payroll.

5.0 Results

This section is divided into four sub-sections. First, we consider the suitability of the estimated model in terms of being consistent with economic theory and whether the model is suitably parsimonious. Such verification is important, since otherwise the scale, density, and heterogeneity properties of the model may originate from spurious accuracy rather than legitimate explanatory power. Second, we focus on the scale and density properties of the model. Third, we consider the impact of heterogeneity of output on costs and scale and density. Finally, we show how these three factors (scale, density, and heterogeneity) affect the expected cost changes for two specific mergers in our data set and also for one hypothetical (but currently highly topical) potential merger.

5.1 Consistency with economic theory

The parameter estimates are shown in Table 2. The R^2 measure of fit for the cost function equation and the cost share equation are 0.928 and 0.489, respectively. The higher R^2 for the cost function primarily reflects the fact that the dependent variable is in logarithms while it is in levels in the cost share equation. The fitted cost shares are all between zero and one, and we have evaluated the Hessian at each data point and found it to be negative definite for all observations; thus the function is concave in input prices over the relevant range.

Table 2
Parameter Estimates

Main parameters			*Hedonic output (ψ_2) parameters*		
Parameter	*Estimate*	*P-val*	*Parameter*	*Estimate*	*P-val*
α	7.729	0.001***	ϕ_1	0.701	0.000***
β_1	−1.831	0.000***	ϕ_2	0.856	0.000***
β_2	−0.464	0.256	ϕ_3	0.059	0.609
β_3	0.592	0.076*	ϕ_4	0.425	0.031**
δ_1	1.048	0.000***	ϕ_5	0.309	0.005***
γ_T	0.039	0.420	ϕ_6	−1.520	0.002***
β_{11}	0.100	0.003***	ϕ_7	−0.157	0.763
β_{22}	0.048	0.048**	ϕ_8	−0.463	0.631
β_{33}	0.109	0.000***	ϕ_9	0.021	0.139
β_{12}	0.078	0.045**			
β_{13}	−0.189	0.000***	*No-stations model free parameters*		
β_{23}	0.010	0.819			
δ_{11}	0.080	0.000***	β'_1	−1.170	0.011**
κ_{11}	−0.058	0.000***	β'_{11}	0.035	0.323
κ_{12}	0.067	0.000***	β''_{13}	0.050	0.335
κ_{13}	0.004	0.545	κ'_{11}	−0.046	0.000***
λ_{T1}	0.002	0.663	λ'_{T1}	0.005	0.278
λ_{T2}	−0.008	0.119			
λ_{T3}	0.002	0.545	R^2		
φ_{T1}	−0.006	0.000***	Cost Function	0.928	
γ_{TT}	−0.001	0.539	Share Equation	0.489	

Note: ***, **, * Statistically significant from zero at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels, respectively.

We have also computed the Allen–Uzawa own-price elasticities and partial elasticities of substitution (given in equations (7) and (8)). The mean estimated own-price elasticities are -0.297 and -1.345 for other expenditures and staff price, respectively, which are both negative and so in line with expectations. The own-price elasticities are negative for all observations. The cross elasticity is 0.632, which is positive, and thus indicates the two inputs are substitutes, and this is the case when the elasticity is evaluated for each observation. This may reflect the degree to which some labour activity can be taken in-house (therefore appearing on payroll costs) vs. being out-sourced (appearing under non-payroll costs). This is likely to be the case for non-capital rolling stock expenditure activities, where maintenance can be performed in-house or by a third party or ROSCO (rolling stock leasing company). More generally, at the margin it is reasonable that there are some substitution possibilities between staff and rolling stock (capital) (choosing rolling stock that requires less staffing costs). Other restrictions, such as homogeneity of degree one in input prices and symmetry, are guaranteed by imposition.

On the basis of the above, it thus appears that the estimated function does represent a cost function consistent with economic theory. As such, we can have confidence that the estimated cost function can be used to infer the properties of the underlying technology.

We test several restrictions on the translog both with a view of obtaining a more parsimonious function and to test economic hypotheses about the underlying technology. Of interest are the following:

- Homotheticity — The cost function is homothetic if it can be written as the product of a function in outputs and a function in input prices (and, since we have panel data, time); that is, $C(\boldsymbol{\psi}, \mathbf{P}, t) = f(\boldsymbol{\psi})g(\mathbf{P})h(t)$. Thus it requires that $\kappa_{1l} = 0$, $\lambda_{Tl} = 0$, $l = 1, 2, 3$, $\kappa'_{12} = 0$, $\lambda'_{T1} = 0$, and $\varphi_{T1} = 0$–9 restrictions.
- Homogeneity — This refers to homogeneity in outputs. It is a special case of homotheticity in the sense that it implies unchanging returns to scale; that is, constant output elasticity: $f(\boldsymbol{\psi}) = \psi_1^{\beta_1}\psi_2^{\beta_2}\psi_3^{\beta_3}$. It requires $\kappa_{1l} = 0$, $\lambda_{Tl} = 0$, $\beta_{lb} = 0$, $l = 1, 2, 3$, $b = 1, 2, 3$, $\kappa'_{12} = 0$, $\lambda'_{T1} = 0$, $\varphi_{T1} = 0$, and $\beta'_{l2} = 0$, $l = 1$, 2–17 restrictions.
- Unitary elasticity of substitution — This implies that $\sigma_{12} = 1$ in equation (8). This requires $\delta_{12} = 0$ which, given the restrictions imposed by linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices, implies $\delta_{11} = 0$–1 restriction.
- Homogeneity and unitary elasticity of substitution — This is the Cobb–Douglas restrictions (if we additionally impose homogeneity in the time trend) — nineteen restrictions (additional $\lambda_{TT} = 0$).
- No hedonic characteristics — This requires $\phi_i = 0$, $i = 1, \ldots, 9$. If this is supported, the model reduces to one which is linear in parameters — nine restrictions.

All hypotheses are rejected, as reported in Table 3. This shows that the flexible specification is required to describe the underlying technology. Thus we retain the model in Table 2 as our preferred model, and shall now discuss the findings on returns to scale and density.

5.2 Returns to scale and density

As described in Section 2, we have defined returns to scale (RtS) and returns to density (RtD) specifically for train operations. RtS measures how costs change when a TOC grows in terms of geographical size. RtD measures how costs change when a TOC grows by running more services (measured by train-hours) on a fixed network. When we apply

Table 3
Results of Specification Tests

	Homotheticity	*Homogeneity*	*Unitary elasticity*	*Cobb–Douglas*	*Hedonic*
Number of restrictions	9	17	1	19	9
Test statistic — Chi-sq	142.24	371.11	360.63	660.79	114.48
p-val	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

these definitions to the model in (6), then the expressions are:

$$RtS_{it} = \frac{1}{\left(\frac{\partial \ln C_{it}}{\partial \ln \psi_{1it}} + \frac{\partial \ln C_{it}}{\partial \ln \psi_{2it}} + \frac{\partial \ln C_{it}}{\partial \ln \psi_{3it}}\right)} \tag{9}$$

and

$$RtD_{it} = \frac{1}{\left(\frac{\partial \ln C_{it}}{\partial \ln \psi_{2it}}\right)}. \tag{10}$$

The definition of RtD and RtS adopted is in relation to the hedonic output. Given the normalisation of train-hours within the hedonic function, our findings on RtD and RtS with respect to ψ_2 can interchangeably be described in terms of variation in train-hours (holding stations operated and network length and other things, including output characteristics, as equal).

The rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity in outputs indicates that RtS and RtD will be non-constant and vary with the levels of the hedonic outputs, time, and the level of prices. Figure 1 plots RtS and RtD for all observations against train-hours; 27 per cent and 100 per cent of observations exhibit increasing RtS and RtD, respectively. The definitions of RtS and RtD are that there are increasing returns if the estimate is greater than unity, constant returns if the estimate is unity, and decreasing returns if the estimate is less than unity. RtS and RtD evaluated at the sample mean of the data are 0.891 and 1.209, respectively. Constant RtS is rejected in favour of decreasing RtS at the 1 per cent level (p-val = 0.0055), and RtD is rejected in favour of increasing RtD at any plausible significance level (p-val < 0.0000). Thus, from these statistics, it seems that British TOCs exhibit increasing RtD but decreasing RtS.

This is an economically plausible finding. TOCs are likely to be able to lower unit costs by running more services on a fixed network — that is, increasing RtD. For example, by better diagramming of rolling stock and staff, they can reduce wasted time. Thus it is likely that rolling stock can be used more intensively in a given time period, which spreads any fixed lease charges over more units of output (train-hours). Ultimately, inputs into the production process suffer from indivisibilities, and these can be more productively combined at higher usage levels.[6]

[6]Importantly, indivisibility of inputs is an RtD issue rather than a cost-efficiency issue, since the explanation relates to the characteristic of the production technology rather than the extent to which minimum cost conditional on a level of output is achieved.

Figure 1
Estimated Returns to Scale and Density Against Train-hours for the Sample



However, TOCs may struggle to make unit cost savings or even prevent unit costs increasing when the size of the network served increases, holding utilisation (train-hours per route-km) constant. This can arise since (to some extent) indivisibilities in inputs are route-specific rather than network-specific. For example, it can be envisaged that the utilisation benefits of running more trains between point A and B will be greater than utilisation benefits from running a set of services from A to B, and then adding a new service from two unrelated points C and D. The latter scenario (for the same total train-hours) is likely to require more rolling stock units and more staff hours than the former, since there are two operational routes rather than one. To provide a less abstract (but extreme) example, the addition of a branch line to an existing network would not be expected to exploit higher utilisation of rolling stock since it is (almost) an independent operation to the rest of the network.

RtS is actually found to be decreasing for some observations — that is, unit costs increasing as scale increases. To explain this, we appeal to the common theory of the firm, which considers that there is an optimal scale of a firm, and that at some output level it gets very difficult to coordinate inputs and thus unit costs start to rise (the firm is larger than the minimum efficient scale point). Note that the same pattern of variation in RtD is found; that is, there exists a minimum efficient density level, but no TOC (yet) operates at a high enough density to attain it.

We now break down the RtS and RtD findings by TOC types — intercity, commuting (into London (LSE — London South Eastern)), regional, and mixed TOCs. Figure 2

Figure 2
Returns to Density for Different TOC Types Holding Other Variables Constant



provides a plot that considers RtD against train density for different TOC types holding all other characteristics[7] at the TOC-type sample mean. We only plot over the density range of the central 80 per cent of the distribution observed for each TOC type. This avoids showing RtD estimates from the model that are clearly out of sample and not realistic — for example, intercity TOC services always operate at low densities due to the long-distance nature of the services and so are only plotted over this range.

Overall, holding characteristics at the sample mean and over the middle 80 per cent of the distribution, Figure 2 shows that all TOC types exhibit increasing RtD and that this does fall with density, although RtD are never exhausted within the middle 80 per cent of the sample. At any given train-hours per route-km level, intercity TOCs exhibit the lowest RtD, while LSE exhibit the strongest (and indeed even at the 90th percentile density in the sample, the RtD estimate is in excess of 1.2). Intuitively, the curve for mixed TOCs is somewhere in-between the curves for intercity and regional.

The policy conclusion from the analysis of RtD is that most TOCs should be able to reduce unit costs if there is further growth in train-hours in response to future increases in passenger demand. This is important, given the strong upward trend in passenger demand since rail privatisation in Britain, and also noting that the trend seems to be continuing, even during the recession at the end of the sample period (Office of Rail

[7]In this sub-section, 'characteristics' refers to all other variables in the cost function and not just the output characteristic variables in ψ_{2it}.

Regulation, 2012). It is also relevant for recent policy in Britain following Sir Roy McNulty's Rail Value for Money study, published in 2011, since unit cost reductions of around 25 per cent are targeted for the TOCs, and according to the results of our paper (increasing RtD), part of this unit cost reduction will occur naturally as train-hours increase on a fixed network (though other savings will also be needed, and the ability to grow volumes will be constrained to some extent by capacity and also by demand). In the wider EU context, the European Commission has aggressive targets for rail passenger usage and market share, which will increase passenger train density and therefore should reduce unit costs (assuming that train-km can be expanded without the need for investment in infrastructure). Our results show that the LSE service type has substantial scope for unit cost savings from increasing usage, and this also holds for many regional TOCs, given the large spread of usage levels across this group. However, there is less scope for unit cost savings (and possibly a risk of decreasing RtD from large increases in usage) for intercity TOCs and regional TOCs at the high-usage end of the spectrum.

Figure 3 provides a similar plot for RtS. This shows that for all of the central 80th percentile of the train-hours distribution, intercity (and mixed) TOCs exhibit decreasing RtS. LSE TOCs exhibit increasing returns to scale only for the very smallest in the sample, while regional TOCs are the only TOC type to have an appreciable range of scale exhibiting increasing returns to scale. Thus our results are consistent with a u-shaped average cost curve, although it would appear that most TOCs are operating at or beyond the minimum unit cost point.

Figure 3
Returns to Scale for Different TOC Types Holding Other Variables Constant



This finding has important implications for examining the optimal size of TOCs and is relevant to the recent franchise policy change that has resulted in substantial franchise remapping. The chief aim of many of these mergers was to capture the benefits of sharing of staff and rolling stock between services, and to reduce the number of operators running out of London stations. This has tended to result in larger franchises — for example, Great Western remapping — which implies an increase in the size of TOCs which, given our findings on RtS, is likely to increase rather than reduce unit costs. However, there are a number of other factors that change through remapping TOCs relevant to our model, notably possible reduction in the overlap of franchises (which increases the density of operation) and a move to a mixture of the type of services provided. We have demonstrated that TOCs tend to have increasing RtD, which acts to reduce unit costs following TOC mergers. As discussed above, there are also important heterogeneity factors to take into account. Which effect will dominate in a given situation is an interesting research question. Once we have described our findings regarding heterogeneity, we return to the cost implications for mergers, via a set of real-world examples.

Finally, in considering the policy implications of our findings on RtD and RtS, it must be remembered that our analysis concerns the costs of passenger train operations only. Just because unit costs can be reduced by running more train-hours or by franchise remapping does not mean that this is the best course of action, from the perspective of either minimising whole system cost or maximising welfare. There may be demand-side constraints such that running extra train services may not yield a sufficiently large increase in passenger usage to justify the extra cost. There may also be a reduction in competition between franchises if franchise overlap is reduced, which may result in a net disbenefit. Finally, running extra train services may have negative externalities to other services due to infrastructure congestion and other infrastructure costs. Thus, this analysis should be used alongside analyses of other aspects of the railway system to evaluate the merits or demerits of specific interventions. Note that when we consider merging/remapping TOCs in Section 5.4, these issues of congestion and demand-side constraints are less important, given we are simply rearranging the provision of existing services.

5.3 Implications of heterogeneity

We now turn to the impact of TOC heterogeneity on costs, the other variables populating the hedonic cost function — that is, the $\phi_{j2}, j = 1, \ldots, 9$ variables and related coefficients in Table 1. First, the elasticity of cost with respect to average train length, train speed, and passenger load factor are proportional to the elasticity with respect to train-hours, with the coefficient on the characteristic acting as the proportionality constant:

$$\frac{\partial \ln C_{it}}{\partial \ln q_{j2it}} = \phi_{j2} \frac{\partial \ln C_{it}}{\partial \ln \psi_{2it}} \quad j = 1, 2, 3. \tag{11}$$

All $\phi_{j2}, j = 1, 2, 3$ coefficients are less than unity, indicating the cost elasticities with respect to these characteristics are lower than for train-hours. This is intuitive. Generally, from an operations perspective, it is cheaper to add vehicles to existing trains (q_{12}) rather than to run more train services (for example, there is still only one driver). Likewise, the passenger load factor coefficient (q_{32}) is very low, which indicates the very low marginal cost of carrying extra passengers once the number of train-hours and train length are controlled for. Finally, the train speed coefficient (q_{22}) implies that running trains a greater distance,

holding train-hours constant, increases costs less than increasing train-hours and distance together. This result will primarily be due to staff costs being time-based rather than distance-based, all other things being equal.

In terms of implications for RtD and RtS, given the findings of decreasing RtD and RtS with the size of ψ_{2it}, a TOC operating the same train-hours can be expected to have greater RtD and RtS if it operates shorter trains, slower trains, and/or has a lower passenger load factor. This follows from the fact that the level of the hedonic output, ψ_{2it}, is found to be an increasing function of q_{12}, q_{22}, and q_{32}. Furthermore, these findings are intuitive.

Turning to the findings specifically on the effect of TOCs providing a mixture of service types, which is given by the coefficients on the interaction proportion variables and number of generic rolling-stock types operated; that is, $q_{j2it}, j = 4, \ldots, 9$. To explain the findings, it is useful to consider some stylised examples. Table 4 presents the growth in the hedonic output ψ_2 from the base case of a wholly regional TOC. Table 4 first considers the impact of mixing service types and then considers the additional impact of a TOC operating more rolling-stock types, which is likely when TOCs provide more service types (highlighted grey). Importantly, it shows that while mixed TOCs are more expensive than regional TOCs, they are not more expensive than exclusively intercity or LSE TOCs, all other things being equal. Adding in the effect of increasing rolling-stock types increases the growth rate in the hedonic output further relative to a wholly regional TOC; however, mixed TOCs still are less costly than pure intercity and LSE TOCs.

Thus, Table 4 would indicate that allowing TOCs to produce mixed services is beneficial. However, it should be noted that heterogeneity and changes in heterogeneity are captured in our model via a complex set of variables (including train speed, train

Table 4

Heterogeneity Findings — Growth in Hedonic Output (ψ_2) Relative to a Regional-only TOC

TOC type composition (%)			*Increase in rolling-stock types*	*Growth rate (%)*	*p-val*
Regional	*LSE*	*Intercity*			
100	0	0	0	0.0	0.000***
0	100	0	0	36.2	0.000***
0	0	100	0	52.9	0.000***
33	33	33	0	0.7	0.588
50	50	0	0	3.9	0.563
0	50	50	0	−1.3	1.603
50	0	50	0	18.9	0.000***
33	33	33	6	14.5	0.000***
50	50	0	3	10.8	0.157
0	50	50	3	5.2	0.002***
50	0	50	3	26.8	0.000***

Notes:

a) The growth rate is constructed as the percentage increase in ψ_2 resulting from a change in the composition of the TOC relative to the base case (a 100 per cent regional TOC). Formally growth rate = $(e^{\phi_{42}q_{42}}e^{\phi_{52}q_{52}}e^{\phi_{62}q_{62}}e^{\phi_{72}q_{72}}e^{\phi_{82}q_{82}}e^{\phi_{92}q_{92}}) - 1$.

b) The computation is indifferent to the number of rolling-stock types in the base case.

c) We illustrate the impact of combining rolling-stock types by implicitly assuming each TOC type operates three unique rolling-stock types.

length, and passenger load factor), as well as the TOC type dummies/number of rolling stocks and so on. All these characteristics will change following a franchise remapping (and not just the TOC type dummies/rolling-stock variable). Thus the overall effect is a complex interaction of all heterogeneity characteristics, density, scale, and input prices. As such, when we actually consider specific remappings that result in mixed TOCs, the overall heterogeneity effect may actually be cost increasing (as is indeed the case in the Greater Western example we consider in the next sub-section).

5.4 The impact of franchise remapping

In this sub-section, we consider how the estimated model predicts the cost change from remapping franchises.[8] The franchise remapping in recent years has, in most cases, had the following implications:

- In general, there has been a rationalisation to larger franchises. Thus there will be scale effects, which, given the finding of decreasing RtS for large TOCs, could increase unit costs.
- Irrespective of whether the remapped TOC(s) are larger, the move to integrating TOCs of various service types results in a removal of franchise overlap, which implies that the sum of the route-km for all the remapped TOC(s) will be less than the sum of the route-km for the previous TOCs. This implies that for a given usage level (train-hours), density of usage increases. Thus there will be density effects, which, given the finding of increasing returns to density, implies a decrease in unit costs.
- The remapped franchises now provide more than one service type, as opposed to the previous TOCs which, for the most part, operated only one service type. Thus the TOCs formed from remapping will have TOC heterogeneity measures (length of train, average speed, and so on), which are weighted averages of the previous TOCs. This will not necessarily be cost neutral, given the flexible form that the quality variables enter into the model (there are non-constant elasticity effects in the model). The new TOCs will also have non-zero values for some of the TOC service-type heterogeneity interaction terms; that is, there will be effects from the TOC providing a mixed service. Furthermore, they may be operating different numbers of rolling-stock types (see Table 4).
- The extent to which mergers can deliver cost savings through exploiting increasing RtD depends on the relative heterogeneity characteristics before and after remapping. We quantify this effect by providing the evaluated ψ_2 divided by route-km for the TOC, which is termed the 'heterogeneity adjusted (HA) density' measure. It is this that determines the extent to which a TOC can exploit any increasing RtD, since RtD is defined with respect to the hedonic output. It should be noted that it is the proportional change in this measure from before to after the remapping situation which gives the extent to which density is changing; the absolute number is meaningless (it is a function of the units of the data). If the proportional change in HA density is greater than the

[8]Note that we cannot simply compare the sum of costs for the pre-remapped TOCs with those from the post-remapped TOCs because there is output, input price, and technical change growth between the time periods that they are observed in our data set. Further, the last year and first year of data are often cost data with the most measurement error, given the required adjustments to align costs to match standard financial years (when, in fact, remappings occur within years). Thus we use the model to predict the cost change.

proportional change in train-hours density, then we say heterogeneity is reinforcing the returns to density (and scale) effects. This is because the density measure that is actually driving RtD/RtS is increasing more than the naive measure of density (train-hours density). Similarly, if the reverse is true, we say heterogeneity is dampening the RtD (and RtS) effects.

Clearly, *a priori* for a given merger, there are conflicting effects; with increasing density generally reducing costs, increasing scale of operations increasing costs, and the impact of changes in heterogeneity being ambiguous. We consider two real-world mergers and also a hypothetical merger, which is quite topical at present, due to the policy aspiration of several northern English regions to expand and become the franchisor of the enlarged Northern franchise. The characteristics of each merger are described in Table 5, alongside the predicted cost changes. We can make the following observations:

- Greater Western merger — This is found to increase costs. This is for two reasons. First, there is an exhaustion of RtS — that is, the new franchise is simply too large. Second, there is a large fall in the impact of heterogeneity on ψ_2. The result is that while train-hours density increases by 57 per cent, heterogeneity-adjusted train density increases by only 12 per cent. This implies that the Greater Western TOC is unable to exploit increasing RtD as much as we would expect, based on the large increase in train density; thus there is only a weak off-setting cost reduction effect from density relative to the cost-increasing scale effect (the impact of heterogeneity is to dampen any density effect).
- London Eastern remapping — This is found to decrease costs. Importantly, both the new franchises have substantial increasing RtD and one TOC still has large increasing RtS (the other has constant returns to scale). Thus we conclude that these TOCs are not past the minimum-efficient scale points.
- New Northern franchise — This results in a small increase in costs. This seems to be due to the decreasing RtS faced by both the Northern and New Northern TOCs. Furthermore, it is predicted by the model that the New Northern franchise will have exhausted RtD. Overall, the effect of heterogeneity changes is approximately neutral from one mapping to the other.

6.0 Conclusion

The contributions of this paper are as follows:

(1) It has been argued from a theoretical perspective, and demonstrated via an empirical example, that econometric estimation of economies of scale and density in passenger train operations requires careful attention to the modelling of heterogeneity between train operators. In particular, the power of a hedonic translog cost function containing train-hours (in place of train-km) — a data innovation in itself — together with a number of TOC characteristics within the hedonic function, is demonstrated. Based on this approach, it is possible to distinguish between different scale and density effects, depending on the output characteristics of the TOC, and not just the usual overall output level and input price level as in a simple (non-hedonic) translog cost function.

Table 5
The Predicted Cost Impacts of Franchise Remapping

Year of remapping	*Name*	*TOC type*	*Route-km*	*Train-hours*	*Train-hours density*	*Heterogeneity-adjusted density*	*EoS*	*EoD*	*Predicted cost*
				Pre-remapping TOCs					
2006/7	Great Western	Intercity	1,368	598	0.437	165.1	1.519	1.573	278
	Great Western Link	LSE	581	550	0.947	108.1	1.578	1.729	138
	Wessex	Regional	1,394	529	0.380	26.2	1.183	1.421	92
	Total		*3,343*	*1,677*	*0.502*	*97.3*			*508*
2004/5	Anglia	Regional	669	312	0.467	69.2	1.416	1.614	47
	Great Eastern	LSE	235	555	2.362	404.8	1.492	1.808	95
	WAGN	LSE	414	886	2.139	300.8	1.290	1.620	167
	Total		*1,318*	*1,753*	*1.330*	*201.8*			*308*
2010/11 (hypothetical)	Northern	Regional	2,746	2,597	0.946	48.5	0.807	1.108	389
	Transpennine Express	Regional	1,251	633	0.506	40.4	2.069	1.790	137
	Total		*3,996*	*3,230*	*0.808*	*46.0*			*527*
				Post-remapping TOCs					
2006/7	Greater Western	Mixed	2,129	1,677	0.788	109	0.892	1.188	554
	Total		*2,129*	*1,677*	*0.788*	*109*			*554*

2004/5	ONE Great Northern	Mixed LSE	1,001	1,028	1.027	142	0.996	1.339	170
	Total		*1,276*	*1,753*	*1.374*	*194*			*290*
2010/11 (hypothetical)	New Northern	Regional	3,019	3,230	1.070	62	0.724	0.990	579
	Total		*3,019*	*3,230*	*1.070*	*62*			*579*

Year of remapping	*Name*	*Route-km*	*Train-hours*	*Train-hours density*	*Heterogeneity-adjusted density*	*Cost change*	
						£000	*Percent*
Percentage change in characteristics (+indicates increase)							
2006/7	Greater Western	−36%	0%	57%	12%	45.6	9%
2004/5	ONE/Great Northern	−3%	0%	3%	−4%	−17.9	−6%
2010/11 (hypothetical)	New Northern	−24%	0%	32%	34%	52.6	10%

Notes:
1) Method for calculating metrics for post-remapping TOCs: route-km — taken from actual values in subsequent years; train-hours — sum of pre-remapping TOCs allocated to post-remapping TOCs through proportion split between post-remapping TOCs in a subsequent year; predicted cost — in addition to the aforementioned variables, assumptions needed to be made regarding the level of other variables in the function: i) input prices — averages of input prices for premapping TOCs; ii) levels of other variables in the hedonic output function — taken from actual data for post-remapping TOCs in the subsequent year; iii) number of stations operated is taken from subsequent year data for post-remapping TOCs.
2) The New Northern TOC is hypothetical: measures are calculated as in 2) with these exceptions: i) route-km is given as the Northern route-km plus the additional route length of Transpennine Express of the North West route to Glasgow; ii) number of stations operated is the sum of the stations operated by the two merging TOCs.

(2) In the British policy context, we use our model to study the cost implications of the cost implications of three actual (or proposed) TOC mergers. This analysis demonstrates the importance of modelling the intricate relationship between cost and scale, density and heterogeneity explicitly. In particular, changes in heterogeneity characteristics played a substantial role in the Great Western remapping, since these changes prevented exploitation of the returns to density. Since franchise mergers also reduce rail competition which may be undesirable (Jones, 2000), the supposed cost savings from exploiting RtD are important in supporting the case for mergers. It is therefore illuminating that our study suggests that these returns may not be realised in all cases.
(3) Though our empirical example is focused on the British TOCs, it also has wider implications. Our findings suggest that previous estimates of scale and density properties in railways internationally may have been biased, to the extent that they did not adequately model the interaction between scale/density and heterogeneity of services. In terms of regulatory policy, in interpreting evidence on scale and density returns in railways, our model suggests that policy makers need to take service heterogeneity into account. Failure to do so may mean that policy decisions are made on the basis of supposed scale/density returns that cannot be realised in practice. Modelling railway operations is complex and thus to address specific policy questions (such as the cost implications of mergers) a rich model, such as that developed in this paper, is required.

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