**1.** **Krishnan, S., Subramanian, S., & Iyer, S. (2020).** „**Can waste aversion affect demand for insurance? Evidence from experiment and survey”. *Economics Letters*, 216, 110594.**

In their study, Krishnan et al. (2020) examine the waste aversion effect on insurance demand using experiment and survey in India. Overall, the results of the study demonstrate the measurement of policyholders’ waste aversion and the interconnection of their demand for a potential insurance policy to show the impact of waste aversion on respondents’ insurance decisions. Furthermore, experiment and survey show that waste-averse groups purchase fewer insurance policies in comparison to non-waste-averse ones. A strength of this study is conducting an incentivized approaches describing waste aversion theory causes and effects. The results achieved have external and internal credibility. A weakness of the study is no waste aversion exact measurement in the survey because there were no measures that could be taken in the insurance context. The study is valuable because it provides consistent evidence of waste aversion theory stating policyholders do not purchase fair insurance policies because of hypothetical losses in case an insured event does not happen.

**2.** **Heinrich, T., Seifert, M., & Then, F. (2020).** „**Near-losses in insurance markets: An experiment”. *Economics Letters*, 186, 108781.**

Heinrich et al. (2020) investigate an insurance market near-loss experimentally. The results reveal that strategic uncertainty affects audacity consequent to near-loss experience, which can be impacted by competitiveness or other market settings. The incentivized Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism is used to obtain valuations for insurance policies protecting potential policyholders from hypothetic losses. The outcomes are achieved with the use of a roulette wheel, lottery, and incentives. A weakness of the study is that social influences are not taken into consideration. A strength of this study is that the experiment is the first one in the near-loss events in the insurance field, considering stronger or weaker risk-averse behaviour, depending on the position of the roulette wheel: before or after the hypothetic loss. This paper can still be useful because of its relevance to the near-loss effect, which influences supply and demand for insurance in strategic uncertainty conditions but not in an individual estimation.

**3. Larrimore, J., Splinter, D. (2019).** „**How much does health insurance cost? Comparison of premiums in administrative and survey data”. *Economics Letters,* 174, 132-135.**

In their article, Larrimore and Splinter (2019) examine the cost of health insurance using premiums comparison in administrative and survey data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the USA. The results demonstrate the health care premiums distribution sponsored by the employer. Authors compare data from IRS and Current Population Survey (CPS), that result in many differences. CPS downplays the premium distribution upper tail and subsequently downplays average premiums. For workers with middle income, these downplays represent two per cent of the gross compensation. In addition, the underestimates are accumulated among workers with higher income showing higher total inequality in compensation. Weaknesses of the study include statistical biases and uncertainty. The study is valuable because it provides consistent evidence about compensation inequality and shows the contrast between two USA data sources. Moreover, the study provides evidence the increasing health insurance value may counterbalance the potential wages of workers with middle income, which is important for future research.