9. Penzijní reformy (ve východní Evropě) 9.1. Smysl reforem Parametry penzijního systému Ø náklady (podíl soukromých+veřejných výdajů na HDP) → příspěvková sazba Ø typologie (veřejný x soukromý; průběžný x fondový) Ø efektivita (podíl chudoby mezi starými?); pokrytí (% pojištěné populace) Ø průměrný náhradový poměr; zásluhovost (vazba mezi příspěvky a dávkami) Ø věk odchodu do důchodu →vliv na trh práce Ø saldo důchodového pojištění (deficit x přebytek) Ø odlišné prognózy populačního stárnutí → PENZIJNÍ SYSTÉMY JSOU MIMOŘÁDNĚ HETEROGENNÍ Nutnost reformy? 1. Co je špatné na existujícím systému? 2. Co je cílem reformy? 3. Jaká jsou rizika implementace? Proč reformovat evropské penzijní systémy? Ø snížení (veřejných) výdajů na penze? Ø zvýšení zásluhovosti? Ø vyrovnání příjmů a výdajů PS? Ø boj s důsledky populačního stárnutí? Ø protože „všichni“ tvrdí, že je nutné reformovat? Ø diverzifikovat riziko? # 1: Podíl penzijních výdajů na HDP # 2: Skladba penzijních výdajů # 3: Příspěvková sazba # 4: Věk odchodu z trhu práce # 5: Valorizace (indexace) důchodů Dva typy penzijních reforem a) Parametrické PŘÍJMY = VÝDAJE t ● Nw ● w = Nb ● B b) Systémové - NDC (notional defined contributions) - zavedení fondového pilíře Parametrické reformy Systémové reformy DB → DC Defined-benefit (DB) pension. A pension in which the benefit is determined as a function of the worker’s history of pensionable earnings. The formula may be based on the worker’s final wage and length of service, or on wages over a longer period, for example the worker’s full career. Full matching of funds and obligations is in principle preserved by adjusting funds to meet anticipated obligations. Defined-contribution (DC) pension. A pension in which the benefit is determined by the value of assets accumulated in the worker’s name over his or her career. The benefit may take the form of a lump sum, or a series of payments, or an annuity, but in all cases is determined by the size of worker’s lifetime pension accumulation. Full matching of funds and obligations is in principle preserved by adjusting obligations to available funds. NDC NDC = A recent innovation internationally, notional defined-contribution plans parallel traditional defined-contribution plans in the sense that a pension entitlement is accumulated, but differ from a funded system in two important respects: a) the interest rate is set by government rules (NDC plans are public programs), not market retuns b) the accumulation is only notional, in that the systém is not fully funded and may be entirely PAYG Zdroj: Barr-Diamond: Reforming pensions (2008) Švédská reforma (1998) Sweden is one of few countries in Europe to have introduced a comprehensive pension reform. In 1998, Sweden passed legislation that transformed its public pension system to a notional defined-contribution (NDC) plan— that is, a defined-contribution plan financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. In addition, a second tier of funded individual accounts was introduced. The reform had broad political support with more than 80 per cent of the votes in parliament. A. Sundén. The Swedish Expirience with Pension Reform. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2006 22(1):133-148 Povinný fondový pilíř Model Světové Banky 1) Veřejný PAYG DB pilíř 2) Soukromý fondový DC pilíř (povinný) 3) Dobrovolné soukromé připojištění Chilská reforma (1981) 70-léta; Chile → velké množství DB PAYG systémů, nespolehlivé dávky, velké rozdíly mezi pojistnými plány 1981 → zavedení povinného fondového pilíře pro zaměstnance 2009 → hodnocení: nejednoznačné 8.2. Penzijní reformy ve východní Evropě Zdroj: Kasek-Laursen-Skrok: Sustainability of Pension Systems in the New EU Member States and Croatia. WorldBank WP 128/2008 Demografie a trh práce ve východní Evropě Situace v postkomunistické Evropě Ø Pokles porodnosti, prodlužování délky života (populační stárnutí + demografická dividenda) Ø Všechny země východní Evropy prováděly parametrické reformy Ø Většina z nich však zašla dále a odklonila část příspěvků do fondových soukromých fondů Ø Přesun do nového systému je obvykle povinný pro mladší ročníky Skladba penzijních systémů ve východní Evropě Proč východní Evropa systémově reformovala? „The introduction of such mixed systems has been motivated mainly by risk diversification (spreading of wage bill and political risk to include financial market risk), but also the provision of greater incentives to contribute through a closer link between contributions and benefits, increased individual choice, capital market development and expected higher rates of return.“ „It is also sometimes hoped that the inflow of pension funds portfolio invested in private equities will boost aggregate investment rates, and improves prospects for economic growth rate in the future.“ Náklady reformy…. „At the same time, the switch from pure PAYG to mixed systems involves greater individual risks (investment risk), potentially higher transaction costs (fees to fund managers), and transition costs to the PAYG systems as part of contributions are diverted to private savings and partially invested in non-governmental financial instruments while current pensioners must still be fully financed from the PAYG system.“ Časování reformy… „The countries which have adopted mixed systems have sought to limit these transition costs through making the switch mandatory only for younger people and phasing in gradually higher contribution rates to the funded pillar. For example, Hungary began the funded pillar with a 6 percent contribution rate compared to the current 8 percent. Given the concern in the EU10+1 countries for maintaining fiscal discipline, none of the countries opted for an immediate or complete shift to the second pillar such as Mexico or Kazakhstan did.“ Základní charakteristika smíšených (reformovaných) systémů Hodnocení penzijních reforem 1. Co bylo cílem reformy? 2. Jak úspěšně byla implementována? 3. Jaké jsou její dopady na základní parametry PS? # 1: Dopad na výši penzijních výdajů # 2: Dopad na míru zaměstnanosti starších pracovníků # 3: Dopad na náhradový poměr Křížové dotace pro OSVČ Výnosy soukromých fondů Výnosnost penzijních systémů 9.4. Implementace penzijních reforem How not to implement: Hungarian pension reforms I. Guardiancich (2008) TIGER Working Paper „In the case of Hungary, its retirement system is a paradigmatic case of poor and hasty institutional design. The expectations of involved actors failed to adapt, as neither policymakers nor private pension providers play by the rules of the game. The former indulge in extreme political budget cycles and the latter cannot self-regulate, thereby distorting competition.“ „Furthermore, institutional complementarities are not gainfully exploited, since unfortunate policy solutions rendered the mandatory funded pillar costly, inefficient and disadvantageous with respect to the public scheme.“ How not to implement: Hungarian pension reforms I. Guardiancich (2008) TIGER Working Paper „As a consequence, Hungarian pensions are once again in dire need of a structural overhaul. However, at the time of writing, October 2007, a coherent solution is still nowhere in sight and the many weaknesses of PM Ferenc Gyurcsány’s government do not bode well.“ „Policymakers shall learn a lot from the Hungarian experience, since it clearly shows that correct implementation may be every bit as problematic as a successful legislative phase.“ How not to implement: Hungarian pension reforms I. Guardiancich (2008) TIGER Working Paper The funds’ average annual net real rate of return was 2.1% during 1998-2004 (Orbán and Palotai, 2005: 12-13) The reasons for such poor performance were a wildly swinging Budapest Stock Exchange, which got seriously shaken by the Russian, American and other crises, excessive conservatism on a very sharp market, and disclosure requirements, which prompted herding behaviour and short-termism. Distribuční efekty – reforma Slovensko „The 2004-05 Slovak reform substantially redistributed income across genders, cohorts and education levels such that the SSW of old women with elementary education fell by more than 4 average annual earnings while the SSW of young men with university education rose by more than 7 average annual earnings.“ Distribuční efekty – reforma Maďarsko (1997) The reform was clearly beneficial for women born between 1942-44 whose SSW rose by as much as 2 average annual earnings (Figure H.3). For the younger women, higher accrual and lower contributions did not compensate for the postponed retirement, and their SSW fell by approximately 0.4 (upper secondary education) and 0.8 (university education) average annual earnings. Men close to retirement lost between 0.7 (elementary education) to 1.66 (university education) average annual earnings. Younger cohorts lost gradually less, those just entering the labor market lost about 4 times less than their counterparts close to retirement.