microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. microtitle.jpg microedition.jpg varianname.jpg 12 Uncertainty microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Uncertainty is Pervasive uWhat is uncertain in economic systems? –tomorrow’s prices –future wealth –future availability of commodities –present and future actions of other people. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Uncertainty is Pervasive uWhat are rational responses to uncertainty? –buying insurance (health, life, auto) –a portfolio of contingent consumption goods. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› States of Nature uPossible states of Nature: –“car accident” (a) –“no car accident” (na). uAccident occurs with probability pa, does not with probability pna ; pa + pna = 1. uAccident causes a loss of $L. u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Contingencies uA contract implemented only when a particular state of Nature occurs is state-contingent. uE.g. the insurer pays only if there is an accident. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Contingencies uA state-contingent consumption plan is implemented only when a particular state of Nature occurs. uE.g. take a vacation only if there is no accident. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints uEach $1 of accident insurance costs g. uConsumer has $m of wealth. uCna is consumption value in the no-accident state. uCa is consumption value in the accident state. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca 20 17 A state-contingent consumption with $17 consumption value in the accident state and $20 consumption value in the no-accident state. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints uWithout insurance, uCa = m - L uCna = m. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m The endowment bundle. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints uBuy $K of accident insurance. uCna = m - gK. uCa = m - L - gK + K = m - L + (1- g)K. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints uBuy $K of accident insurance. uCna = m - gK. uCa = m - L - gK + K = m - L + (1- g)K. uSo K = (Ca - m + L)/(1- g) microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints uBuy $K of accident insurance. uCna = m - gK. uCa = m - L - gK + K = m - L + (1- g)K. uSo K = (Ca - m + L)/(1- g) uAnd Cna = m - g (Ca - m + L)/(1- g) microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints uBuy $K of accident insurance. uCna = m - gK. uCa = m - L - gK + K = m - L + (1- g)K. uSo K = (Ca - m + L)/(1- g) uAnd Cna = m - g (Ca - m + L)/(1- g) uI.e. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m The endowment bundle. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m The endowment bundle. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m The endowment bundle. Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty uThink of a lottery. uWin $90 with probability 1/2 and win $0 with probability 1/2. uU($90) = 12, U($0) = 2. uExpected utility is microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty uThink of a lottery. uWin $90 with probability 1/2 and win $0 with probability 1/2. uU($90) = 12, U($0) = 2. uExpected utility is microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty uThink of a lottery. uWin $90 with probability 1/2 and win $0 with probability 1/2. uExpected money value of the lottery is microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty uEU = 7 and EM = $45. uU($45) > 7 Þ $45 for sure is preferred to the lottery Þ risk-aversion. uU($45) < 7 Þ the lottery is preferred to $45 for sure Þ risk-loving. uU($45) = 7 Þ the lottery is preferred equally to $45 for sure Þ risk-neutrality. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 2 12 $45 EU=7 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 U($45) U($45) > EU Þ risk-aversion. 2 EU=7 $45 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 U($45) U($45) > EU Þ risk-aversion. 2 EU=7 $45 MU declines as wealth rises. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 2 EU=7 $45 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 U($45) < EU Þ risk-loving. 2 EU=7 $45 U($45) microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 U($45) < EU Þ risk-loving. 2 EU=7 $45 MU rises as wealth rises. U($45) microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 2 EU=7 $45 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 U($45) = EU Þ risk-neutrality. 2 U($45)= EU=7 $45 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth $0 $90 12 U($45) = EU Þ risk-neutrality. 2 $45 MU constant as wealth rises. U($45)= EU=7 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty uState-contingent consumption plans that give equal expected utility are equally preferred. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Cna Ca EU1 EU2 EU3 Indifference curves EU1 < EU2 < EU3 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty uWhat is the MRS of an indifference curve? uGet consumption c1 with prob. p1 and c2 with prob. p2 (p1 + p2 = 1). uEU = p1U(c1) + p2U(c2). uFor constant EU, dEU = 0. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Preferences Under Uncertainty Cna Ca EU1 EU2 EU3 Indifference curves EU1 < EU2 < EU3 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Choice Under Uncertainty uQ: How is a rational choice made under uncertainty? uA: Choose the most preferred affordable state-contingent consumption plan. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m The endowment bundle. Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m The endowment bundle. Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? Affordable plans microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? More preferred microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m Most preferred affordable plan microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m Most preferred affordable plan microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m Most preferred affordable plan MRS = slope of budget constraint microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› State-Contingent Budget Constraints Cna Ca m Most preferred affordable plan MRS = slope of budget constraint; i.e. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uSuppose entry to the insurance industry is free. uExpected economic profit = 0. uI.e. gK - paK - (1 - pa)0 = (g - pa)K = 0. uI.e. free entry Þ g = pa. uIf price of $1 insurance = accident probability, then insurance is fair. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uWhen insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy u u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uWhen insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy u u uI.e. u u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uWhen insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy u u uI.e. uMarginal utility of income must be the same in both states. u u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uHow much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uHow much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? u uRisk-aversion Þ MU(c) ¯ as c . microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uHow much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? u uRisk-aversion Þ MU(c) ¯ as c . uHence microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Competitive Insurance uHow much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? u uRisk-aversion Þ MU(c) ¯ as c . uHence uI.e. full-insurance. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› “Unfair” Insurance uSuppose insurers make positive expected economic profit. uI.e. gK - paK - (1 - pa)0 = (g - pa)K > 0. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› “Unfair” Insurance uSuppose insurers make positive expected economic profit. uI.e. gK - paK - (1 - pa)0 = (g - pa)K > 0. uThen Þ g > pa Þ microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› “Unfair” Insurance uRational choice requires u u u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› “Unfair” Insurance uRational choice requires u u uSince u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› “Unfair” Insurance uRational choice requires u u uSince uHence for a risk-averter. u u u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› “Unfair” Insurance uRational choice requires u u uSince uHence for a risk-averter. uI.e. a risk-averter buys less than full “unfair” insurance. u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Uncertainty is Pervasive uWhat are rational responses to uncertainty? –buying insurance (health, life, auto) –a portfolio of contingent consumption goods. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Uncertainty is Pervasive uWhat are rational responses to uncertainty? –buying insurance (health, life, auto) –a portfolio of contingent consumption goods. ü microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Uncertainty is Pervasive uWhat are rational responses to uncertainty? –buying insurance (health, life, auto) –a portfolio of contingent consumption goods. ü ? microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Diversification uTwo firms, A and B. Shares cost $10. uWith prob. 1/2 A’s profit is $100 and B’s profit is $20. uWith prob. 1/2 A’s profit is $20 and B’s profit is $100. uYou have $100 to invest. How? u microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Diversification uBuy only firm A’s stock? u$100/10 = 10 shares. uYou earn $1000 with prob. 1/2 and $200 with prob. 1/2. uExpected earning: $500 + $100 = $600 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Diversification uBuy only firm B’s stock? u$100/10 = 10 shares. uYou earn $1000 with prob. 1/2 and $200 with prob. 1/2. uExpected earning: $500 + $100 = $600 microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Diversification uBuy 5 shares in each firm? uYou earn $600 for sure. uDiversification has maintained expected earning and lowered risk. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Diversification uBuy 5 shares in each firm? uYou earn $600 for sure. uDiversification has maintained expected earning and lowered risk. uTypically, diversification lowers expected earnings in exchange for lowered risk. microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Risk Spreading/Mutual Insurance u100 risk-neutral persons each independently risk a $10,000 loss. uLoss probability = 0.01. uInitial wealth is $40,000. uNo insurance: expected wealth is microlower.jpg © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. ‹#› Risk Spreading/Mutual Insurance uMutual insurance: Expected loss is u uEach of the 100 persons pays $1 into a mutual insurance fund. uMutual insurance: expected wealth is u uRisk-spreading benefits everyone.