možné další obrázky 0919_5, 0919_6, 0925_6, 0936_1, 0937_2, 0937_4, 0937_5, 0937_6, 0937_7, 0939_2, 0941_2, 0941_5, 0944_2, 0946_1, 0947_5, 0950_3, 0951_3, 0954_2, 0955_5, 0959_1, 0964_2, 0965_1, 0967_2, 0969_2, 0976_3, 0977_2, Content A.Great Depression B.Economic development after the crisis C.Germany in 1930s Great Depression 1.USA 2.World A1. Course of the Great Depression in USA •sources already in 1920s •banks + agriculture + speculations on the stock exchange • ò since1928 ð BUT decline at the end of 1929 •mid-1929 Eur (GB, DE and IT) already in crisis •X USA positive expectations in connection with the stock exchange BUT already at that time ò building and automobile production •after the collapse of the stock exchange momentary ñ and then sharp òò •1929/33 in USA •ò GNP by 30 % (bigger decline according to certain authors) •ò industrial production by 50 % •U in 1933 = 25 % without sign of decline •ò price level by 1/3 •ò prices of agricultural production by 60% •banking crisis •1929 = 24 000 small - 3 waves of depression: 1. turn of 1930/31-- 2. later in 1931 -- 3. mid-1932 – winter 1933 ð bankruptcy of S 9 000 banks + deposits total of 7 000 millions $ •FED did not help – did not fulfil its function •ò EX by 69% (ò AD) •ò gross domestic INV by 90% (ò AD) •ò consumption by 20% (ò AD) •ò stock exchange + financial crisis+ bad situations ðñuncertainty ðñ savings of households • ð òAD ð Keynes • Economic indicators in the USA, 1929 – 1940 •Year •U •Real •GDP •C •I •G •Money •supply •Price •level •Inflation •1929 •3.2 •203.6 •139.6 •40.4 •22 •26.6 •50.6 •- •1930 •8.9 •183.5 •130.4 •27.4 •24.3 •25.8 •49.3 •-2.6 •1931 •16.3 •169.5 •126.1 •16.8 •25.4 •24.1 •44.8 •-10.1 •1932 •24.1 •144.2 •114.8 •4.7 •24.2 •21.1 •40.2 •-9.3 •1933 •25.2 •141.5 •112.8 •5.3 •23.3 •19.9 •39.3 •-2.2 •1934 •22 •154.3 •118.1 •9.4 •26.6 •21.9 •42.2 •7.4 •1935 •20.3 •169.5 •125.5 •18 •27 •25.9 •42.6 •0.9 •1936 •17 •193.2 •138.4 •24 •31.8 •29.6 •42.7 •0.2 •1937 •14.3 •203.2 •143.1 •29.9 •30.8 •30.9 •44.5 •4.2 •1938 •19.1 •192.9 •140.2 •17 •33.9 •30.5 •43.9 •-1.3 •1939 •17.2 •209.4 •148.2 •24.7 •35.2 •34.2 •43.2 •-1.6 •1940 •14.6 •227.2 •155.7 •33 •36.4 •39.7 •43.9 •1.6 Stock Exchange •Black Friday on October 24 •next Tuesday on October 29 another ò = Black Tuesday •huge ò prices of stocks and indexes •record in the amount of traded shares •problem: 4/5 of shares purchased at loan •demand of banks to immediately pay the debtsð investors issued new sharesð another ò prices + removal of assets from Eur ð strangling of Eur markets •crash might lead to decline BUT not to 10 years problems !!! Development of the Dow-Jones Index (1923-1938) – monthly values Causes of the depression •ò international trade •responsibility of USA= Smoot-Hawley Tariff 1930 •worldwide reactions •+ USA before the crisis EX > IM ð more than proportional impacts •+ decline of US share in the world trade •weak banking system •anti-monopoly laws •stock Exchange •indebted agriculture and consumers •weak control of the banking sector •+ prosperity as cover for problems •considerable concentration of production •bankruptcy of certain companies ->huge impact on the economy •monetary policy •restrictive policy of FED •sterilization of gold inflow •reduction of money supply in 1929/33 by 25% (certain authors – by 31%) •high interest rates ð òINV • ð deepening of the crisis •FED did not help banking sector • •fiscal policy •restrictive (insufficiently expansive) – Hoover - ñ T •Attempt of balanced budget (also Roosevelt) •not only one cause BUT coincidence of various causes •+ •impossible to avoid crisis X its deepness b/c econ. policy • A2. World in crisis •enormous decline of GDP, industrial production and international trade •BUT considerable differences among countries •content •reasons for the spread •impact of USA •course •financial crisis •international policy •economic policy Reasons for the spread impact of USA •USA superpower ð large impact on the rest of the world •BUT did not play the role of superpower •no stabilization of the system X own problems •restrictions on IM of goods •Smoot - Hawley = isolationism ð limited possibilities to gain $ ð problems with debt and BofP ð protectionism – chaotically – not in line with agreements + take away form AU currencies •restrictions on EX of capital •borrowings of other countries (with exception of DE) •C for INV + for debt payments + for problems with BofP •reasons of ò US foreign INV •speculations on the stock exchange •US conjuncture FED - ñ r The total of US foreign investments, 1924-1929 (USD million) •Year •1924 •1925 •1926 •1927 •1928 •1929 •Investments •969 •1.076 •1.125 •1.337 •1.251 •671 Other reasons for the spread •disruption of international system after WWI •protectionism •reparations •debts • •after-war instability of currencies •overvalued pound •undervalues franc, … Course of the crisis •differences among countries •the mostly affected USA, DE and PL X VB and JP not much •FR not too deep, but long-term •DE deep and short-term •GB small ò + already in 1934 = 1929 •USSR not affected – isolation from WE Industrial production in selected countries (1929=100) Price drop in selected countries, 1928-1931 (price level in 1928=100) •France •Germany •Italy •Japan •Switzerland •USA International financial crisis •1920s franc undervalued ð FR + USA inflow of gold •X pound overvalued ð outflow of gold •220 years stable exchange rate •1931 crash Credit-Anstaltu ð financial panic in AT ð connection with DE = crash of one of the largest DE banks Darmstädter und National (Danatbank) ð financial rehabilitation of banks = nationalization • ð spread of panic to GB ð pound unable to resist = devaluation by 10% ð turning point ð economy of GB ñ + other countries loss of 10% deposits •ð majority of countries renounced the gold standard International trade •complete collapse of trade •trade barriers •collapse of the monetary system •1929 – 1933 – ò trade to 1/3 •importers of raw materials – no demand for raw materials ð no purchases of manufactures by producers of raw materials … •1938 total amount of EX < 1913 Monthly exports of 75 countries (in mil. gold dollars) Economic policy •emphasis on balanced budget •recession - ò collected T+ ñ U ð ò G and ñ tax rates •relatively limited options of the government •insufficient LF in public sector •G relatively low •monetary policy of certain countries inconvenient Economic development after the crisis 1.In general 2.GB 3.FR 4.USA U as % of LF in 1929-1938 Level of industrialisation p.c., 1880 - 1938 (GB in 1900=100) • • •1880 •1900 •1913 •1928 •1938 •ranking •1 •Great Britain •87 •100 •115 •122 •157 •2 •2 •USA •38 •69 •126 •182 •167 •1 •3 •France •28 •39 •59 •82 •73 •4 •4 •Germany •25 •52 •85 •128 •144 •3 •5 •Austria-Hungary •15 •23 •32 •- •- • •6 •Italy •12 •17 •26 •44 •61 •5 •7 •Russia •10 •15 •20 •20 •38 •7 •8 •Japan •9 •12 •20 •30 •51 •6 Overall industrial potential, 1900 - 1938 (GB in 1900 = 100) •Countries •1900 •1913 •1928 •1938 •Great Britain •100 •127.2 •135 •181 •USA •127.8 •298.1 •533 •528 •Germany •71.2 •137.7 •158 •214 •France •36.8 •57.3 •82 •74 •Russia •47.5 •76.6 •72 •152 •Austria-Hungary •25.6 •40.7 •- •- •Italy •13.6 •22.5 •37 •46 •Japan •13 •25.1 •45 •88 Europe in 1937 B2. Great Britain •EP very orthodox – balanced budgets •no massive program of community service •no ñ interventions •devaluation ð no big ñ EX (devaluation of other currencies) •protection of domestic market – relatively low •policy of cheap money - òr • •after 1932 - econ. growth •BUT uneven development • ò textile, ships X ñ automobiles, chemicals, elektricity, construction of railways + construction •persisting structural U •Ottawa Agreements (1932) = system of Imperial Preference •free trade within the British Empire •unified tariffs against third countries •effort – raw materials to GB and manufactures from GB X own industry... B3. France •ò later and weaker •in 1920s: strong growth + BofP surplus + huge reserves •ð strong econ. ð ability to keep the gold standard •concern about P •econ. policy •devaluation in the world ð need of ò price level ð high r •ò G + ñ protection of domestic market •ò prices ð ò wages ð òAD •high r + ò prices ð ò INV •until 1936 ò production and U •1936 new government - like a small New Deal •expansion + gold standard abandoned+ devaluation + limited program of community service+ ñ wages and ò working hours B4. USA •1933 FDR elected for promises to get the country out of the crisis •public investments •large amount of acts already in the first 100 days of its presidency •foreign policy •isolationism •ban on loans to countries with unsettled military loans (1934) •1935 - military embargo •1934 - Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act – possibility to negotiate bilateral tariff reductions •not too successful (although some agreements concluded) New Deal •not coherent – e.g. demand of ñ wages + òU •finding the way = trial-and-error method •promise of balanced state budget •during the government – continuous deficit •X ò real wages •ñ G ð share of gov. on GDP •intensive state interventions under the form of laws such as AAA and NIRA •planning, regulation of competition, distribution of markets,, price and production directives, minimal wage, maximal working hours, etc. • declared unconstitutional •with AAA a small remark to congress about the end of convertibility of $ for AU (1933) ð congress forced to accept both •after inauguration – 4 weeks of bank holiday + law designed to help banking system ð ñ confidence ð deposits > withdrawals The USA federal income and expenditures, 1929 - 1939 •Fiscal year •Expenditures in USD billion •Income in USD billion •Surplus/ deficit •GNP in USD billion •Expenditures as % of GNP •Income as % of GNP •1929 •3.3 •4 •+0.7 •104 •3.2 •3.9 •1930 •3.4 •4.2 •+0.7 •91 •3.8 •4.6 •1931 •3.6 •3.1 •-0.5 •76 •4.7 •4.1 •1932 •4.7 •1.9 •-2.7 •59 •8.0 •3.3 •1933 •4.6 •2.0 •-2.6 •56 •8.3 •3.6 •1934 •6.7 •3.1 •-3.6 •65 •10.3 •4.7 •1935 •6.5 •3.7 •-2.8 •73 •9.0 •5.1 •1936 •8.5 •4.1 •-4.4 •83 •10.0 •4.9 •1937 •7.8 •5.0 •-2.8 •91 •8.5 •5.5 •1938 •6.8 •5.6 •-1.2 •85 •8.0 •6.6 •1939 •8.9 •5.0 •-3.9 •91 •9.7 •5.5 •New Deal as turning point- ñ role of government in national economy •BUT questionable outcomes + inconsistent goals •slow recovery •pre-crisis level reached in 1937 •BUT immediately other (weaker) crises •Prior to WWII large unutilised capacities •in industry •U (1939 = 10 mil) Share in international industrial production, 1929 - 1938 (in %) •Countries •1929 •1932 •1937 •1938 •USA •43.3 •31.8 •35.1 •28.7 •USSR •5 •11.5 •14.1 •17.6 •Germany •11.1 •10.6 •11.4 •13.2 •GB •9.4 •10.9 •9.4 •9.2 •France •6.6 •6.9 •4.5 •4.5 •Japan •2.5 •3.5 •3.5 •3.8 •Italy •3.3 •3.1 •2.7 •2.9 Germany in 1930S 1.Economic situation 2.Economic policy 3.Prices and wages C1. Germany in 1930s •1920s instability + ñ indebtedness + since 1928 restrictions on for. INV ð òG, private INV and EX •gold standard abandoned + ñU ð radicalization •1931 monetary and simultaneous banking crisis - practically insolvable •1932 •industrial production 50% of pre-war level + only 8,9% world 1928 = 14,6% •agriculture 31% •EXò by 60% = 50% before WW •as causes considered •reparation •Treaty of Versailles + inner enemy •1930 elections = ñ national socialistic parties •program = nationalism, racism, chauvinism + demagogy •voters = workers + poor middle classes •1932 elections - NSDAP winner ð 30. 1. 1933 president Hindenburg appointed Hitler the Chancellor •expansionistic plans •in the autumn 1933 DE withdrew from the Disarmament Conference + parted from the League of Nations •1935 introduction of compulsory military service X System of Versailles NSDAP election results in Parliamentary Elections •Date of elections •% •Number of seats •May 1924 •6.6 •32 •December 1924 •3 •14 •May 1928 •2.6 •12 •September 1930 •18.3 •107 •July 1932 •37.3 •230 •November 1932 •33.1 •196 •March1933 •43.9 •368 •Goal - territorial changes •concentration of German people into one state + acquisition of ‘living space in the east’ •Anschluss of AT in March 1938 •Munich Conference and occupation of Czechoslovakia •Sept. 1939 invasion of Poland = WWII C2. Economic policy •rapid recovery • ò U 1932 by 44% ð 1934 = 14,1% (1932 6 mil ð July 1933 below 5 mil ð 1936 only 1 mil.) •fiscal expansion •community service ð ñ role of state in the economy •release of deflationary policy •positive expectations •ñ production 1929/37 by more than 1/3 •rapid recovery ð favourable for the position of the Nazis •after 1936 military economy •big ñ military expenditures Level of industrialisation p.c., 1880 - 1938 (GB in 1900=100) • •Countries •1880 •1900 •1913 •1928 •1938 •ranking •1 •Great Britain •87 •100 •115 •122 •157 •2 •2 •USA •38 •69 •126 •182 •167 •1 •3 •France •28 •39 •59 •82 •73 •4 •4 •Germany •25 •52 •85 •128 •144 •3 •5 •Austria-Hungary •15 •23 •32 •- •- • •6 •Italy •12 •17 •26 •44 •61 •5 •7 •Russia •10 •15 •20 •20 •38 •7 •8 •Japan •9 •12 •20 •30 •51 •6 Ownership •no large scale nationalisation X CPE •during the whole period – existence of private ownership BUT limited •the owner did not decide the production (what to produce) and customers + restrictions on the use of resources Planning •4-year plans •1933/36 •program of community services = building of motorways, canals, modernization of railways •private firms under state supervision •state control of banking system, production and distribution of resources •limited mobility of workers in agriculture and industry •1937/1941 preparation to the war ð armament, raw materials, food Economic regulation •forced creation of cartels •obligatory membership •decisions about prices, wages, FT and production •INV decisions at the central level ðñ share of INV a ò C C3. Prices and wages •freeze of prices and wages in 1936 (until 1948) • prohibition of strikes nad collective wage negotiations •prohibition of trade unions (1933) •mandatory membership in the German Labour Front •restrictions on wages ðñE ð labour shortage •freezing of ñ prices ð D > S •suppressed P ð households with cash ð to purchase anything regardless the quality •rationing economy •for manufacturing (raw materials) •for personal use •efforts of self-reliance (autarchy) •regulation of foreign trade – control of EX and IM •East Europe – barter trade = German manufactures for food and raw materials Military expenditures 1929/32 – 1938 as % of GNP • •Germany •Italy •France •UK •USA •USSR •Japan •1929/32 •0.9 •3.7 •3.8 •2 •0.9 •3.4 •2.5 •1933 •3.2 •5.5 •4 •2.1 •1 •4.1 •1.6 •1934 •4.4 •6.8 •6.3 •3.9 •1.2 •18.3 •2.4 •1935 •8.9 •7.3 •7.4 •5.1 •1.1 •26.5 •2.3 •1936 •11.4 •15.7 •8.2 •7.1 •1.1 •- •2.1 •1937 •14.4 •16.1 •7.1 •9.4 •1.1 •13.7 •5.2 •1938 •28.2 •9.2 •7.2 •12.8 •1.3 •19.7 •9.8 National income (in USD billion) and a share of defence expenditures in 1937 •Countries •National income •% of defence expenditures •USD billion •USA •68 •1.5 •1.0 •British Empire •22 •5.7 •1.3 •France •10 •9.1 •0.9 •Germany •17 •23.5 •4.0 •Italy •6 •14.5 •0.9 •USSR •19 •26.4 •5.0 •Japan •4 •28.2 •1.1