24/09/18   1   Economic  Policy  #02   Limits  of  Economic  Policy   The  expansion  of  the  role  of  the  public   sector      #1   The  20th  century  saw  a  gradual  but  large  expansion  in  the   role  of  the  state  in  the  economy  because  of   •  poliCcal  and  ideological  factors   •  marxist  and  socialist  thinking  (governments  should  play   significant  role  in  redistribuCng  income,  shiI  toward  a   “mixed”  economy)     •  Keynesian  thinking  (countries  with  large  public  sector   were  believed  to  be  less  subject  to  business  cycles)   •  technical  development  in  economics  (concept  of   government  failures)   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   2   The  expansion  of  the  role  of  the   public  sector      #2   It  was  implicitly  (if  not  explicitly)  assumed  that:   •  the  governments  had  abiliCes  lacking  in  the  private   sector  (beOer  managerial  skills,  higher  level  of   experCse,  sufficient  amounts  of  capital)   •  the  acCons  of  the  public  sector  were  driven  by  the   objecCve  of  promoCng  social  welfare   •  the  public  sector  was  monolithic  and  economic   decisions  were  made  in  raConal  and  transparent  way   •  policy  decisions  were  reversible   •  policymakers  have  all  relevant  info  and  full  control   over  the  policy  instruments   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   3   24/09/18   2   The  end  of  naive  picture   Governments  are  not  as  omniscient  and  omnipotent  as  was   implicitly  assumed  aIer  WWII  Cll  1970s.     There  are  four  main  limits  to  the  “tradiConal”  approach  to   EP:   1.  Governments  have  imperfect  knowledge  about  the   structure  of  economy  and  of  future  risks.   2.  Governments  may  not  be  able  to  convince  private  agents   that  they  will  actually  do  what  they  have  announced.     EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   4   The  end  of  naive  picture   3.  Policymakers  may  not  have  the  informaCon  they  need  to   take  decisions.   4.  Policymakers  may  not  pursue  the  general  interest.   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   5   1.  Uncertainty  and  risk   Government  is  not  able  to  predict  the  consequences  of   some  acCon  exactly   =>  uncertainty  about  adequate  choice  of  policy  tools     Many  policy  decisions  have  irreversible  consequences   =>  ‘precau1onary  principle‘  of  economic  policymaking  (e.g.   joining  eurozone),  creaCng  a  decision-­‐under-­‐uncertainty   framework   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   6   24/09/18   3   CS:  Surprises  and  ouOurns  in  15  EU   budgetary  plans,  1998-­‐2006     Nominal   GDP   growth,  %   Nominal   government   revenue   growth,  %   Nominal   government   expenditure   growth,  %   Nominal   government   balance  as   percentage   of  GDP,  %   “PosiCve”   surprises   50   58   76   36   “NegaCve”   surprises   50   42   24   64   In  spite  of  higher-­‐than-­‐expected  revenues,  frequent  expenditures   overruns  oIen  have  resulted  in  the  deficit  exceeding  target  =>   governments  do  not  manage  public  finances  in  a  way  to  take  into   account  risks  to  revenues  and  expenditures.     EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   7   2.  The  limits  of  confidence:  credibility   problems  #1     Credibility  problems  arise  from  intertemporal  inconsistency   (oIen  called  /me  inconsistency),  i.  e.  temptaCon  for   government  to  mislead  private  agents  in  the  name  of   general  interest  =>  ex  post  and  ex  ante  opCmal  policies  do   not  coincide.   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   8   The  limits  of  confidence:  credibility   problems     Example:   Government  announces  it  will  scrap  taxes  on  fixed  capital   to  encourage  investment.  Then  reneges  on  its  promise   because  it  is  socially  opCmal  ex  post  to  finance  public  goods   by  taxing  capital.  What  will  be  the  result?     Another  applicaCon  to  monetary  policy,  exchange-­‐rate   policy,  ..   Unfulfilled  promises  undermine  confidence  in  EP  and   hamper  its  effecCveness.   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   9   24/09/18   4   CS.  Responsible  and  irresponsible   credible  behaviour  #1   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   10   CS.  Responsible  and  irresponsible   credible  behaviour  #2   •  Shorter-­‐term  expectaCons  are  more  volaCle,  but   volaClity  decreases  as  the  expectaCon  horizon  lenghtens   >  ECB  has  achieved  a  high  degree  of  credibility.   •  But  someCmes  it  may  be  important  to  be  credibly   irresponsible  (e.g.  deflaConary  crisis)   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   11   The  limits  of  confidence:  credibility   problems  (cont.)   •  SoluCons:   –  DelegaCon  to  independent  agencies:  central  banks,   regulatory  agencies,…   –  Banish  discre1onary  policies  and  follow  fixed  policy   rules:  inflaCon  targeCng,  fiscal  rules,  currency   boards…   –  Transparency   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   12   24/09/18   5   The  limits  of  confidence:  moral  hazard   Moral  hazard  problems  arise  when  likelihood  of   government  intervenCon  alters  private  behaviour  and   induces  more  risk  taking.   Examples:  IMF  intervenCons  in  emerging  countries,  role  of   lender  of  last  resort  of  the  central  bank,  public  insurance   schemes…   SoluCon:   –  make  public  intervenCon  rare  and  costly  (e.g.  lender-­‐ of-­‐last  resort  doctrine)   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   13   3.  The  limits  of  informaCon  #1   •  Policymakers  do  not  have  full  access  to  informaCon  and   it  is  used  strategically  by  those  with  access  to  it   •  Risk  of  regulatory  capture   •  Major  issue  for   –  regulaCon  and  supervision  in  technical  areas   (telecom,  energy,  finance…)   –  contracts  (e.  g.  for  provision  of  government-­‐financed   services  such  as  health  care)   –  internal  organizaCon  of  government   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   14   The  limits  of  informaCon  #2   •  Theory:     –  principal-­‐agent  model:  the  principal,  who  delegates  a   task  to  the  agent,  does  not  have  full  info  about   agent’s  capabiliCes  and  performance  =>  subopCmal   results   •  SoluCon:     –  incenCve  contracts,  possibly  within  the  government   (such  as  performance-­‐related  compensaCon  and   promoCon,  e.g.  Walsh  contract  for  central  bankers)   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   15   24/09/18   6   4.  Conflict  of  interests  #1   Why  poliCcians  may  deviate  from  general  interest?     •  shortsightedness  (electoral  cycles)   •  pressures  from  interest  groups  (“pork-­‐barrel  poliCcs”)   •  reelecCon  moCvaCon  (poliCcal  business  cycles)   •  parCsan  behaviour   •  divided  electorate   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   16   Conflict  of  interests  #2   Models:     •  aOriCon  wars,  vote  theory     SoluCons:   •  IncenCve  contracts  for  poliCcians,  procurement  rules,   anCbribery,  delegaCon  to  independent  agencies   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   17   Evidence  of  poliCcally-­‐moCvated   decisions   The limits of benevolence politicians may deviate from ral interest: Shortsightedness (electoral cycles) Pressure by interest group (“porkbarrel politics”) Reelection motivation Evidence of politically-motivated decisions 26 Bénassy-Quéré, Economic Policy, 2012-13 Partisan behavior Divided electorate els: attrition wars, vote theory tions: incentive contracts for icians, procurement rules, antiery, delegation to independent cies… EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   18   24/09/18   7   The  median  voter   Voter  chooses  the  party  whose  preferences  are  close  to  his   or  her  own:  voters  V1  to  V4  will  for  example  vote  for   candidate  C1  and  voters  V5  to  V9  to  candidate  C2.             If  there  are  only  two  parCes  (leI-­‐wing  and  right-­‐wing),  they   will  converge  on  the  preference  of  the  median  voter  V5  =>   limited  program  differen/a/on   The median voter Hotelling, 1929; Black, 1948 • Voter chooses the party whose preferences are close to his or her own: voters V1 to V4 will for example vote for candidate C1 and voters V5 to V9 for candidate C2. 27 • Outcome = limited program differentiation • Suppose left-wing and right-wing parties disagree on the level of government transfers. Voters will choose the median level of transfers. Except under very specific assumptions, this coincides neither with the ‘Benthamian’ choice (maximize average welfare) nor with the ‘Rawlsian’ choice (concentrate transfers on the poorest) Bénassy-Quéré, Economic Policy, 2012-13 EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   19   Should  policymaking  be  delegated?   •  Technocrats  are  beOer  in  presence  of:   –  technical  complexity  (e.g.  financial/safety  regulaCon)   –  judicial  nature  of  decisions  (merger  control)   –  undesirable  trade-­‐offs  (public  health  and  safety)   –  intertemporal  concerns  (distribuCons  across   generaCons)   –  significant  internaConal  independence   –  benefits  to  groups  likely  to  engage  into  poliCcal   lobbying   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   20   Should  policymaking  be  delegated?     •  But  decision  needs  to  remain  poliCcal  when:   –  social  preferences  are  unstable   –  policy  involves  unavoidable  trade-­‐offs   –  policy  involves  significant  redistribuCons  within   generaCons     =>  Today’s  hot  topics:  balanced  budget  rules,  fiscal   councils   EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy   21   24/09/18   8   Reference  textbook   Bénassy-­‐Quéré,  A.  et  al.  Economic  Policy  :   Theory  and  prac1se.  Oxford  University  Press,   2010.  Chap.  2.1   22  EP#02:  Limits  of  Economic  Policy