Beyond Good and Evil in Policy
Implementation: Instrument Mixes,
Implementation Styles, and Second
Generation Theories of Policy Instrument
Choice
Michael Howlett
Abstract
Dichotomous sets of policy alternatives – like market vs state – and metaphors – like
carrots vs sticks – lend themselves to blunt thinking about instruments and their
modalities. Administrators and politicians need to expand the menu of government
choice to include both substantive and procedural instruments and a wider range of
options of each, and to understand the important context-based nature of instrument
choices. The paper illustrates the origins of the deficiencies of simple models of
instrument choice and suggests that, ultimately, both scholars and practitioners are
interested in the same thing: designing and adopting optimal “mixes” of instruments
in complex decision-making and implementation contexts.
1. Introduction: Policy Instruments, Instrument Mixes, and
Optimal Policy Design
Policy instrument choices are often viewed through an ideological or
conceptual lens which reduces choices to a “one size fits all” motif or,
more commonly, to a struggle between “good and evil” in which an
existing range of instrument uses is condemned and the merits of some
alternative single instrument trumpeted as the embodiment of all that
is good in the world. The unfortunate consequences of such
approaches, if adopted, is usually to wield that instrument – be it statedriven
public enterprises in the case of socialist and developing
countries in the first two-thirds of the 20th
century, or the virtues of
privatization, de-regulation and markets in the last third – less like the
scalpel of a careful surgeon working on the body politic, and more like
the butcher’s cleaver, with little respect for the tissue of the patient
falling under the knife.
Theorists and practitioners both need to move beyond simple
dichotomous zero-sum notions of policy instrument alternatives – like
2 - Michael Howlett
market vs state – and metaphors – like carrots vs sticks. These blunt
choices lend themselves to blunt thinking about instruments and their
modalities. Administrators and politicians need to expand the menu
of government choice to include both substantive and procedural
instruments and a wider range of options of each, and to understand
the important context-based nature of instrument choices. Scholars
need more empirical analysis in order to test their models and provide
better advice to governments about the process of tool selection and
how to better match the tool to the job at hand.
This article illustrates the origins of the deficiencies of simple
models of instrument choice and suggests that, ultimately, both scholars
and practitioners are interested in the same thing: designing and adopting
optimal “mixes” of instruments in complex decision-making and
implementation contexts. As Gunningham and his colleagues have
suggested, thinking about tools as bundled into “policy mixes” is a
promising direction in scholarly research.
This raises several questions for analysts, however, including :
(1) why specific mixes exist at present and (2) whether and to what
extent mixes can be designed to be optimally effective or, to put it
another way, understanding what are the constraints and impediments
blocking optimal instrument use. This article sets out some of the
background in instrument choice theory needed to address these ques-
tions.
2. From First to Second Generation Instrument Theory
“First generation” instrument choice theories tended to simplify the
political world of instrument choices in order to try to arrive at some
generalizations about instrument use and design. In so doing they
unwittingly contributed to some of the misunderstandings about the
nature of instrument use cited above.
Since policy instruments are techniques of governance which,
one way or another, involve the utilization of state authority or its
conscious limitation to provide services to the public and governments,
they properly fall within both the domain of both political science and
economics. Not surprisingly, therefore, the study of policy instruments
has long been characterized by the existence of two virtually
independent streams of literature. 1
Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation - 3
Both sets of investigators, however, are guilty of over-simplifying
instrument use and selection in their early works. “First generation”
economists studying the tools of government were concerned largely
with the study of business-government relations, and with the effects
of state regulation and economic policy formation on business
efficiency. Although internecine debates between neo-classical and
welfare economists over the concept were sharp, first generation
instrument choice economists concentrated their efforts upon
identifying the “market failures” which would “justify” government
“intervention” in market exchange.2
First generation political scientists rejected the deductive approach
to instrument choice put forward by economists, preferring to develop
their theories inductively from the empirical record of actual
government decision-making processes. Welfare models were viewed
as deriving rationales for policy instrument choice based on the
discussion of what governments ought to do, rather than on the basis
of empirical investigations into what they actually do. Political
scientists, as a result, never simply assumed that policy-makers chose
governing instruments in order to fine-tune the economy, but attributed
a political rationale to instrument selection (Salamon 1981; Balch
1980).3
Although it was acknowledged that, in some circumstances,
governments might well choose particular instruments based on their
technical efficiency and theoretical appropriateness it was argued that
this was likely to occur only in very specific circumstances; such as
when economists controlled the decision-making process and had a
relatively free hand in so doing – for example in areas such as fiscal
and monetary policy (Markoff and Montecinos 1993).
First generation studies of policy instruments conducted by
political scientists thus tended to be motivated precisely by the desire
to understand what economists assumed: the rationale for policy
instrument choice. Public policy makers were not generally thought to
be driven by questions of theoretical purity – especially when, as is
the case with economic theory, the theory is contested – but rather by
a more overt political calculus of electoral or ideological cost and
benefit.4
Both these currents in early, first generation work led to simplistic,
cleaver-like, recommendations for tool selection and promoted a
Manichean view of instrument options. This was especially true for
4 - Michael Howlett
economists, as most neo-classical accounts consider many governing
instruments to be inherently inefficient since they are viewed as
distorting production and consumption decisions in the marketplace.
As a result, proponents of this view would restrict governments to the
direct provision of pure public goods through government departments
and agencies (Wolf 1988; Wolf 1987; and Le Grand 1991). Although
the recommendations of political scientists were less sure, they too
tended to caution against the use of “too much” government authority
and expressed a definite preference for the use of “less coercive”
instruments (Hood 1983; Doern and Phidd 1988).Both these kinds of
early instrument analyses had two problems. First, they tended to
promote a misleading view of the technical nature of instrument
choices; as pointed out above, thus undermining the need to carefully
examine the contexts of instrument use. Second, they tended to portray
instrument choices in stark, “good and evil” terms, embracing “good”
pro-market choices and “evil” non-market ones (Woodside 1986).
Not all early studies shared these characteristics, of course, and
some scholars presented more complex and nuanced models and
analyses (Bressers and Klok 1988).Building on the base of case studies
and insights developed in these works, “second generation” students
of instrument choice have attempted to address the issues of both
context and mixes in their work (van Nidpen and Ringeling 1998; de
Bruijn and Hufen 1998; Bressers and O’Toole 1998). Promising new
work on instruments has attempted to apply different models of
economic thinking to instrument choices – such as transaction costs
(Wood and Bohte 2004) – and to assess the question of the potential
to develop optimal policy mixes (Grabosky 1994; Gunningham and
Young 1997). In the area of regulation in particular, second generation
authors have noted the increasing evidence of mutual exhaustion and
stalemate in the long-running debate between the defenders of
traditional regulatory approaches and the advocates of deregulation.
They have pointed out that, while the push for deregulation has been
extremely influential in shaping public policies in many countries across
different policy sectors, there is also a growing unease with simpleminded
hostility to government and faith in market-based solutions to
every policy problem. Proponents of “smarter” regulation such as Neil
Gunningham and his colleagues propose the development of
sophisticated policy instrument mixes in which government
Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation - 5
intervention continues to take place “but selectively and in
combination with a range of market solutions and public and private
orderings” (Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair 1998).
This second generation literature, while moving discussion of
instrument choices forward beyond the distorting dichotomies of most
first-generation work, remains at present somewhat idiosyncratic, with
the central concepts required to analyze instrument mixes somewhat
poorly defined. In the following section, one potential central organizing
concept – that of an “implementation style” – is developed and its
relevance to the study of instrument mixes set out.
3. The Concept of an Implementation Style: The Calculus
of Instrument Choice and the Importance of Choice Context
In a perfect world, there would be little trouble choosing the appropriate
tool for the governmental task at hand. Most policy objectives can, in
a technical sense, be accomplished by a number of instruments; in
other words, most instruments are to some degree ‘substitutable.” Thus,
in theory, a government seeking to promote health care for the
population could leave it entirely to the family to provide health
services, with the competence and availability of family members
determining who gets how much and at what cost. Or the government
might go to the other extreme and provide health services through its
own administrative agency, paid for directly out of its general tax
revenues, leaving no room for the market or other private organizations.
In between the two extremes lie a range of other instruments, including
exhorting the population to keep healthy, subsidizing those who are
poor, and regulating doctors and hospitals.5
If all the costs and benefits of a tool were context free and known,
and the goals of a policy clear and unambiguous, then a decision on
which instrument to use in a given circumstance would be a simple
maximizing one, and mistakes would not be made. However, in real
world situations, as information difficulties arise in determining
instrument effects and as the clarity and precision of goals diminishes,
it becomes more and more likely that policy means and ends will be
mismatched and policy failures occur.
Moreover, it has become more and more apparent to many
observers that the kind of precision required for such maximizing
6 - Michael Howlett
instrument choices will never be achieved, not just because of poorly
defined, ambiguous, decision-making circumstances and information
asymmetries but, more fundamentally, because the utility of the
instruments themselves, and hence the calculation of their
attractiveness, is heavily context dependent. That is, although
instruments may be, in some technical or theoretical sense,
“substitutable,” in the sense that any one could achieve any end –
albeit at differing levels of cost – in practice they differ in a number of
ways which makes the choice of instrument a complex matter.
Salamon and Lund, for example, suggest that different instruments
involve varying degrees of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, legitimacy,
and partisan support, and changes in a particular situation affects their
appropriateness (Salamon and Lund 1989). Thus some instruments
are more effective in carrying out a policy in some contexts than others.
Efficiency, for example, in terms of low-levels of financial and
personnel costs, may be an important consideration in climates of
budgetary restraint, but is a less significant aspect in free-spending
times. Legitimacy, is another critical aspect of instrument use which
varies with context (Beetham 1991; Suchman 1995). The ability of an
instrument to attract the support of the population in general and,
particularly, of those directly involved in policy-making in the issue
area or sub-system involved must also be taken into account. A
relatively heavy-handed approach to regulation of the financial dealings
of industry, for example, may be anathema in normal times in many
sectors, but in the wake of bank failures or scandals such as the Enron
affair in the U.S. or Parmalat in Europe, may find sudden popularity
among both the public and policy elites. Abstract notions of efficiency
and effectiveness may also find themselves less important criteria in
some contexts, like wartime, when the use of government departments
or public enterprises, simply because they remain under direct
government control (Borins 1982; Vining and Botterell 1983), or
because administrators may be more familiar with their use and risks,
are preferred tool choices (May 1993; and Hawkins and Thomas 1989).
Moreover, cultural norms and institutional or political arrangements
may accord greater legitimacy to some instruments than others. Thus
it is possible that in liberal democracies citizens and policy-makers
desiring high levels of individual autonomy and responsibility may prefer
instruments that are less coercive rather than other equally or perhaps
Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation - 7
more effective or efficient alternatives which do not promote these
values. Such societies can be expected, for example, to prefer voluntary
and mixed instruments to compulsory instruments on philosophical or
ideological grounds (Doern and Wilson 1974; Doern 1974; Howlett
1991). Moreover, instruments have varying distributional effects, and
so policy-makers in such societies may need to select instruments that
are, or at least appear to be, equitable. Tax incentives, for example, are
inherently inequitable because they offer no benefit to those (the poor)
without taxable income. Their use, therefore, will vary to the extent
that (a) societies are bifurcated along socio-economic or class lines,
and, (b) individuals are aware of their advantageous and pernicious
consequences.
In addition to these “external” contexts, there are also “internal”
constraints on instrument choices that must be considered. That is,
while instrument choice is clearly not a simple technical exercise and
must take into account aspects of the social, political and economic
contexts of instrument selection, it is also the case that the internal
configuration of instrument mixes alters the calculus of instrument
choice in significant ways. That is, some instruments may work well
with others – as is the case with “self-regulation” set within a regulatory
compliance framework (Gibson 1999; Graosky 1995; Trebilcock, Tuohy
and Wolfson 1979; Tuohy and Wolfson 1978) – while other
combinations – such as, notably, independently developed subsidies
and regulation (de Moor 1997; Myers and Kent 2001) – may not.
Both these “internal” and “external” contexts of instrument
behaviour and selection must be taken into account in efforts to theorize
optimality in the design of policy mixes (Minogue 2002) Moving
from a focus on single instruments, second generation analysis looks
instead at complementarities and conflicts within instrument mixes
and adopts a much more flexible and less ideological approach to
instrument use. For second generation scholars a key question is no
longer so much “why do policy-makers utilize a certain instrument?”
as it was for their first generation counterparts, but “why is a particular
combination of procedural and substantive instruments6
utilized in a
specific sectoral context?” 7
Moving well beyond considerations of “good and evil,” second
generation scholars have emphasized the need to design appropriate
instrument mixes. As the concept has evolved, second generation
8 - Michael Howlett
theory has come to focus on a small number of key precepts which
embody the “scalpel” approach to instrument use:
1. The importance of designing policies that employ a mix of policy
instruments carefully chosen to create positive interactions with each
other and to respond to particular, context-dependent features of the
policy sector.
2. The importance of considering the full range of policy instruments
when designing the mix rather than assuming that a choice must be
made between regulation and markets (Sinclair 1997).
3. In the context of continuing pressures on governments to do more
with less, to suggest the increased use of incentive based instruments,
various forms of self-regulation by industry, and policies that can
employ commercial and non-commercial third parties to achieve
compliance, such as suppliers, customers and a growing cast of auditors
and certifiers.
4. Finally, the importance of the search for new network-appropriate
procedural policy instruments to meet the challenges of governance is
stressed. “Next generation” policy instruments, such as information
instruments, and various techniques of network management such as
the use of advisory committees and public consultations are particularly
important here (Gunningham and Sinclair 2002).
These insights stress the importance of context in understanding
instrument choices and designing optimal, or at least noncounterproductive
instrument mixes (Bressers and O’Toole 2004). An
important aspect of this choice context is the set of previously existing
arrangements and any long-standing preferences for particular
instruments that may exist in a specific sector. In the literature on
comparative public policy, this is usually referred to an existing
“implementation style.”8
.An examination of how this issue been
addressed in the comparative literature promises to make a substantial
contribution to the development of second-generation instrument
choice theory.
3.1. Defining and Modeling Implementation Styles
Scholars such as Linder and Peters have noted that variables such as
political culture, and the depth of social cleavages have had an
Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation - 9
important impact on policy implementation and instrument selection.
They also found instrument choices to be circumscribed by the
organizational culture of the concerned agencies and the nature of
their links with clients and other agencies (Linder and Peters 1989;
and Linder and Peters 1990b).
This analysis suggests that the choice of policy instruments is
shaped by the preferences of state decision-makers and the nature of
the constraints within which they operate (Bressers and O’Toole 1998;
and Bressers 1998). States must have a high level of administrative
capacity, for example, in order to utilize authority, treasure and
organization-based instruments in situations in which they wish to affect
significant numbers of recalcitrant policy targets. When it has few of
these resources, they will tend to utilize instruments like incentives or
propaganda, or to rely on existing voluntary, community or family based
instruments (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). Similarly, a key feature
identified by students of procedural instrument use is the governments’
capacity to manipulate policy subsystem membership and activities
(de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1991; 1997; 1995). Undertaken in order
to retain the political trust or legitimacy required for substantive policy
instruments to be effective, implementation effectiveness is affected
by whether a government faces sectoral de-legitimation or more
widespread “systemic” problems. Such contextual factors affect the
choices made between, for example, creating a sectoral advisory
committee or using funding to enhance the overall interest articulation
system found in society (Mueller 1973; Mayntz 1975).
These observations and findings lead to the model of ideal-typical
implementation styles found in Table 1 below. In this model, context
is crucial and instrument preferences are linked to relatively long-term
aspects of the policy-making context. Instruments are not seen and
being chosen on, for example, ideological or technical grounds, but on
the basis of the empirical situation on the ground in the sector or issue
area concerned, especially pertaining to the nature of the constraints
and capacities of the political regime in which the decision is being
taken. Since the factors that affect styles – such as state capacities and
the nature of societal targets – are relatively long-lasting,
implementation styles can be expected to change infrequently.
10 - Michael Howlett
Table 1
A Model of Basic Implementation Styles as Combinations of Procedural and
Substantive Instruments
Source: Adapted from Howlett and Ramesh 2003.
3.2. Understanding Implementation Style Dynamics
An emphasis on long-standing patterns of instrument choices is not to
say, of course, that specific choices are inevitable or immutable, or
that substantial shifts in implementation styles do not occur. These
can happen as the nature of the constraints governments face changes
or if a governments decides to broaden or narrow their focus on specific
policy targets. Assessing how likely it is for existing implementation
styles to change, therefore, is an important question for second
generation analyses of policy instrument choices.
Certainly shifts in fundamental implementation styles have
occurred in many governments over the past century due to the
influences of activities like colonization and de-colonization, war, and
Nature of the Policy Target
(Exchange or Policy Actors)
Severity of State
Constraints
(Resources and
Legitimacy)
Large Small
High Institutionalized Voluntarism
Exhortation based manipulation of market
actors and institutionalization of policy
networks.
(e.g. “next-generation,” “steering” models
of state behaviour in healthcare –
promotion of “compliance” cultures)
Regulatory Corporatism
Regulation of market actors and
financial manipulation of interest
articulation systems.
(e.g. “corporatist” style economic
planning models in industrial policy-
making)
Low Directed Subsidization
Extensive use of financial instruments to
influence market actors coupled with the
use of authority to preferentially recognize
networks actors.
(e.g. industrial development promotions
models in new high-tech sectors –
biotechnology, aquaculture, internet etc.)
Public Provision with Oversight
Use of governmental organization
(personnel and structural) resources to
provide goods and services, combined
with manipulation of network actors
through information release and
distribution.
(e.g. wartime production, rationing
and mobilization models)
Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation - 11
other events which have wrought charges to the organizational
capacities of states and their societies. Even in governments less
affected by such dramatic events, such as those in North America,
implementation styles have moved from, for example, a preference for
directed subsidization in the 19th century and then to the regulatory
corporatism associated with the progressive movement in the 1920s
and 1930s (Raadschelders 1998; 2000; Eisner 1994; Lowi 1966).
Understanding why these changes occur and what they imply for
instrument choices remains a key research question for second
generation theorists (Eliadis, Hill and Howlett 2004).
4. Conclusion: The Need for Nuance and Precision in the
Analysis of Policy Instruments
It is time for both practitioners and academics to move beyond good
and evil in their assessments of instrument choices and their
recommendations for instrument selection. Both practitioners and
academics need to move beyond simple dichotomous and zero-sum
notions of instrument alternatives (such as “market vs state”) and
beyond even trichotomous notions of instrument categories (such as
“carrots, sticks and sermons”) when considering the relationship
between alternative policy tools.
This is especially the case as new governance arrangements are
needed in many sectors as increased governmental and societal use of
capacity-enhancing information technologies, coupled with the
increasing sophistication of networks of citizens and clients allow
experimentation with non-traditional means of policy implementation
(Kooiman 1993; and Lehmbruch 1991). Innovative policy design,
however, requires that the parameters of instrument choice be well
understood, both in order to reduce the risk of policy failure and to
enhance the probability of policy success (Linder and Peters 1990a;
Schneider and Ingram 1997). There is a need to expand the menu and
appreciate the nuances and complexities of implementation styles and
their effects on instrument choices, in order to ensure that the scalpel
triumphs over the cleaver in instrument design and use.
12 - Michael Howlett
Notes
1. For early works which sharply display the contrasting approaches taken to the subject
in the two disciplines see Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Kirschen et al. 1964; Edelman 1964.
2. Welfare economists argue that numerous market failures exist and legitimize extensive
government regulatory activities while neo-classicists tend to restrict such “failures” to
the provision of pure public goods. On the concept of market failures see Bator 1958;
and Zerbe and McCurdy 1999. On its application to instrument choices see Breyer 1979;
and Zeckhauser and Schaefer 1968.
3. On the aims and ambitions of these studies see Salamon 1981; and Balch 1980.
4. See Lowi 1966; and Wilson 1974. Many of these insights were extended by ‘public
choice’ economists working in the area. See Trebilcock and Hartle 1982.
5. On the range of available instruments see Salamon 1989; Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and
Vedung 1998 and Appendix I.
6. A list of examples of policy instruments is contained in Appendix 1. Substantive
instruments are those directly providing goods and services to members of the public or
governments. They include a variety of tools or instruments relying on different types
of governing resources for their effectiveness such as public enterprises, regulation,
subsidies, loans or advertising campaigns. For a comprehensive review see Salamon
2002. Procedural instruments are different from substantive ones in that their impact on
policy outcomes is less direct. Rather than affect the delivery of goods and services, their
principle intent is to modify or alter the nature of policy processes at work in the
implementation process. See Howlett 2000; and Dunsire 1993.
7. Hence, for example, the well-known implementation style found in many U.S. policy
sectors, dubbed “adversarial legalism” by Robert Kagan, is composed of a preferred
substantive instrument – regulation – and a characteristic procedural one – judicial review
– based on wide-spread, easily accessible, legal procedures. See Kagan 1991.
8. Generally speaking, comparative implementation studies have shown that governments
tend to develop distinct styles in areas which they regulate. See Knill 1998; Kagan and
Axelrad 1997; and Kagan 1997.
Beyond Good and Evil in Policy Implementation - 13
Appendix – Examples of Substantive and Procedural Policy
Instruments
A useful way to classify policy instruments is according to the type of
governing resource upon which they rely: nodality or information;
authority, treasure or financial resources, or administrative or
organizations ones.*
Figure 1
A Taxonomy of Substantive Policy Instruments
Source: Adapted from Hood 1986.
Figure 2
A Resource-Based Taxonomy of Procedural Policy Instruments
Source: Adapted from Howlett 2000.
* On the origins of this ‘resources’ approach to classifying instruments see Anderson
1977; and Baldwin 1985.
Nodality Authority Treasure Organization
Principle
Use
advice licences grants bureaucratic
Effectors training user charges loans administration
regulation tax public enterprises
certification expenditures
Detectors reporting census-taking polling record-keeping
registration consultants policing surveys
Governing Resource
Nodality Authority Treasure Organization
Principle
Use
education agreements interest- hearings
Positive exhortation treaties group funding evaluations
advertising advisory- research and institutionaltraining
group intervenor- bureaucratic
creation funding reform
misleading banning eliminating administrative
Negative information groups and funding delay
propaganda associations information
suppression
Governing Resource
14 - Michael Howlett
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