Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas
In-Between
ALLAN MCONNELL Government and International Relations,
University of Sydney
ABSTRACT
Policy protagonists are keen to claim that policy is successful while
opponents are more likely to frame policies as failures. The reality is that
policy outcomes are often somewhere in between these extremes. An
added difficulty is that policy has multiple dimensions, often succeeding
in some respects but not in others, according to facts and their
interpretation. This paper sets out a framework designed to capture the
bundles of outcomes that indicate how successful or unsuccessful a policy
has been. It reviews existing literature on policy evaluation and
improvement, public value, good practice, political strategy and policy
failure and success in order to identify what can be built on and gaps that
need to be filled. It conceives policy as having three realms: processes,
programs and politics. Policies may succeed and/or fail in each of these
and along a spectrum of success, resilient success, conflicted success,
precarious success and failure. It concludes by examining contradictions
between different forms of success, including what is known colloquially
as good politics but bad policy.
Key words: policy success, policy failure, policy evaluation
Analysis of public policy involves a range of actors and takes place in
many forums with outcomes entering the public domain through
means such as government statements, newspaper editorials, nongovernmental
briefings and academic articles. Yet despite the seemingly
never-ending scrutiny and claims ‘policy has been successful’, authoritative
closure on the issue of a policy’s success or otherwise can be
difficult to achieve. As Dye ( p. ) argues:
Does the government generally know what it is doing? Generally speaking,
no ... (E)ven if programs and policies are well organized, efficiently operated,
adequately financed, and generally supported by major interest groups, we may
still want to ask, So what? Do they work? Do these programs have any
beneficial effects on society? Are the effects immediate or long range?...
Unfortunately, governments have done very little to answer these more basic
questions.
Jnl Publ. Pol., , , –  Cambridge University Press, 
doi:10.1017/S0143814X10000152
Of course, politics is frequently partisan, and policies framed as
successful by some political actors may be framed as unsuccessful by
others (Stone ; Fischer ).
Intuitively, we know that the ideal of complete success is rarely met.
Some shortcomings or failings permeate virtually all policies. Some are
small such as a five-year bridge building project that is a few months
late or achievement of a  per cent budget cut instead of a target of
. per cent. Others are considerable, such as a public health warning
containing erroneous and potentially life-threatening information for
some individuals, or train services aiming for  per cent punctuality
but only achieving  per cent. The policy sciences lack an overarching
heuristic framework which would allow analysts to approach
the multiple outcomes of policies in ways that move beyond the often
crude, binary rhetoric of success and failure.
The purpose of this paper is to advance our understanding by
building on recent work (e.g. Marsh and McConnell a, b;
Bovens ) by clearly defining policy success and developing an
analysis which unfolds from this definition to its polar opposite, failure,
and various shades in between. It draws on a wide range of literature
to illustrate why success and failure are bound inexorably with each
other.
The word government is used throughout this article, whilst
recognising that modern public sectors are characterised by multifaceted
systems of governance, (see e.g. Bell and Hindmoor ; Osborne
). The term is useful because it captures that aspect of success
which relates to the values, aims and policies of elected governments.
The paper first provides a brief overview of a variety of literature on
success and failure in order to identify gaps and themes to build on.
Second, it shows that dividing policy into process, program and
political dimensions, allows us to conceive of successful and unsuccessful
outcomes in each of these realms. Third, it defines policy success on
the basis that it is a matter of fact as well as of interpretation. Fourth,
it details a spectrum of outcomes from success to failure. Finally, it
suggests that there are several main contradictions evident in the
overlap between the three different realms of policy, including what is
known colloquially as good politics but bad policy.
Why We Need a New Approach
Six important strands can be highlighted as the contributions to our
thinking about success and failure. First, literature on policy evaluation
and policy improvement is close to Lasswell’s (, ) vision of a
 McConnell
policy sciences which contributes to societal betterment. Indeed, he
devotes over seven pages in A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, to more than
 detailed ‘criteria of policy’, which are designed to provide guidance
to policy scientists to ‘bring about improved capability in the formation
and execution of policy’ (Lasswell  p. ). Criteria range from
providing dependable information to all members of the decision
making process, through to the need for internal appraisal to be
supplemented by external appraisal. Political criteria are beyond the
scope of his study on the assumption that political decisions are a
given. Failure is also beyond his scope, other than a general recognition
that goals might not be met.
Contemporary writings are plentiful on the role of evaluation as a
process for policy refinement and learning, and on tools and techniques
for achieving this (Gupta ; Weimer and Vining ; Miller and
Robbins ). As policy analysis has developed, so too has its debates
and methods. The logic is that achieving policy success resides in good
policy design, evaluating the ex ante likely impact of proposed policies,
rather than relying simply on ex post evaluation to produce a stamp of
success or failure, or something in between that is followed by policy
refinement, change or even termination. More generally, the literature
on policy evaluation and improvement contains different views on
success (usually implicit), taking political goals as a given and hence
success resides in meeting targets and achieving outcomes (Sanderson
; Boyne , ). Others are more sceptical of leaving politics
out of evaluation because doing so avoids questioning societal power
frameworks. They tend to assume that successful policy is one which
redresses power imbalances, reduces inequalities and involves stakeholders
in formulating policy goals and evaluating results (Fischer ;
Taylor and Balloch ; Pawson ).
Second, there is the concept of public value. It originates with Mark
Moore () as an antidote to the assumptions pervading American
discussion of government tending to be wasteful and bureaucratic. His
strategic triangle framework is a surrogate for what a successful public
sector looks like. Public value rests on three tests being met: (i)
production of things of value to clients and stakeholders (ii) legitimacy
in being able to attract resources and authority from the political
authorising environment and (iii) being operationally and administratively
feasible (Moore  p. ). Subsequent case studies and debate
show that public value is something of a slippery concept (see Rhodes
and Wanna , , ; van Gestel et al. ; Steenhuisen and
van Eten ). Moore doesn’t define public value and it is as
contested as the term public interest. The reality of public bodies is
that they need to provide many and often conflicting values. In
Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between 
Moore’s work, there is clear recognition that public value (as a
surrogate for successful policy) does not rest on value being completely
achieved, but there is no indication of how analysts may capture value
shortfalls or conflicts. A new framework is needed which helps deal
systematically with degrees of success and failure.
Third, a group of writings deal with good practice in the process of
policy making and management. The field includes writings on the
benefits of policy design (Schneider and Ingram ), deliberation and
public engagement (Gutmann and Thompson ), incremental
bargaining (Lindblom ), problem definition (Bardach ) and
people skills (Mintrom ). The term success is virtually absent but
the broad implication is clear. Good or successful process (which for
example, engages stakeholders in dialogue in order to pre-empt
implementation problems and cultivate policy legitimacy) results in
viable and successful programs. However, the nature of what constitutes
successful policy process can prove just as contested as policy
improvement or public value. For example, deliberation and public
engagement have been criticised as little more than an exercise in the
legitimation of dominant power (Shapiro ; Bishop and Davies
).
Fourthly, writings on the political aspects of policy have implications
for what constitutes political success. Programmes may assist or
frustrate leaders and governments in the pursuit of their agendas and
aspirations. The nature of success is almost always implicit because
conventions, constitutions and realpolitik are such that programs
should be (or at least be portrayed as) in the public interest, as opposed
to that of a party’s electoral prospects, elite interests or individual
career ambitions (Machiavelli ; Edelman ; Bachrach and
Baratz ). This conceptualisation calls attention to evaluating
policies in terms of their ability to produce benefits for particular
political actors or groups.
Fifth, the explicit treatment of policy success is marginal. In an early
article entitled ‘The Logic of “Policy” and Successful Policies’, Kerr
() concentrated primarily on failure, perhaps understandably so, in
the climate of mid-s political and economic turmoil. She argued
that because policies can fail because they are inadequately implemented,
or do not achieve their intended purpose or normative
justification, they therefore can be said to succeed when they do not
fail. Ingram and Mann () in an edited book entitled Why Policies
Succeed or Fail were similarly pre-occupied with failure. Stuart Nagel
() defined success in its editorial introduction as the achievement of
goals and the maximization of benefits minus costs. Bovens, ’t Hart and
Peters (a) in their mammoth edited volume on success in
 McConnell
governance likewise argue that success has two dimensions. The first is
programmatic, ‘the effectiveness, efficiency and resilience of the specific
policies being evaluated’ (Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters b p. ). The
second is political, ‘the way policies and policy makers become
evaluated in the political arena’ (Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters b
p. ). Some writings mention non-failure (Bovens et al. c), mixed
success (O’Neill and Primus ) and partial success (Pollack ),
but these are typically ad hoc terms used to describe specific cases, and
are not located within a broader framework that is able to capture the
diversity of outcomes produced by policies. Some case studies define a
programme’s success according to the value judgements of the author
being the standard. Others focus on standards such as goal achievement
and benefits to key sectoral interests (see for example Schwartz
, Hulme ; Gupta and Saythe ).
Finally, there is an extensive literature on failure, including policy
fiascos (Dunleavy ; Bovens and ’t Hart ), scandals (Tiffen ;
Thompson ), crises (Boin et al. ) and disasters (Handmer and
Dovers ; McEntire ). However, the debates more or less
mirror those dealing with aspects of success and its surrogates. Some,
particularly those writings dealing with organisational pathologies and
human error (e.g. Reason ; Auerswald et al. ) and critical
infrastructure breakdown tend to treat failure as an objective fact while
others dealing with policy fiascos (e.g. Bovens and ’t Hart ) focus
heavily on competing constructions of goals to the point that failure is
largely in the eye of the beholder. There is also little recognition of
forms or degrees of failure, other than an implicit assumption (for
example) that failures get worse as we move from emergencies and
crises, to disasters and catastrophes.
Three Strands of Policy: The Basis for Succeeding and Failing
We need to comprehend different dimensions of policy in order to
grasp the ways in which success and failure may be manifest within
them. Also, tensions between them help explain some of the most
interesting features and dynamics of policy. These differences can be
found in process, programs and politics. They can overlap, but for
analytical purposes can be treated separately.
Process is a traditional major concern of public policy analysts such
as Lasswell (), Lindblom (, ) and Easton (, ),
concerned with understanding the means by which societies could and
should make collective choices in the public interest. The tradition
continues today in works concerned with deliberative engagement
Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between 
(Gutmann and Thompson ; Gastil ), policy design (Schneider
and Ingram ), resolving controversies (Schön and Rein ),
solving problems (Bardach ) and the policy cycle (Althaus
Bridgman and Davis ). In essence, what governments do is identify
problems, examine potential policy alternatives, consult or not as the
case may be, and take decisions. All such activities involve weighing the
pros and cons of different choices such as who, when and how to
consult and weighing the opportunities and risks of different policy
solutions before taking a decision. Governments do process and they
may succeed and/or fail in this realm.
Second, programs are what governments do (Rose : chapter ).
They give concrete form to the generalized intentions of statements of
policy. For example, health policy involves dozens of programs dealing
with everything from ante-natal care through preventive medicine to
death. Programs combine in different ways the basic resources and
tools of government – laws, public personnel, public expenditure, tax
incentives and exhortation (Rose ; Hood and Margetts ;
Howlett ).
There is also politics. Some policy analysts prefer to keep politics at
arms’ length, because it is seen as a distraction from a rational form
of policy analysis (Davidson ; Weimer and Vining ). Yet if we
are to fully grasp the multi-dimensional nature of policy and what
governments do, we need to recognize that programs have political
repercussions. The choices of government (including timing of decisions
and the symbolism of particular forms of action or inaction) have
consequences for the reputation and electoral prospects of politicians
and their capacity to manage political agendas. Many political analysts
have examined the political repercussions of policy action and studies
of political behaviour normally evaluate policies in terms of their
relevance to winning votes. Governments do politics and they may
prove successful and/or unsuccessful in this realm.
Defining Policy Success
Assumptions of what constitutes success take many forms. The
foundationalist/scientific tradition, associated broadly with the rationalist
strand of policy evaluation (Gupta ; Davidson ) leads us
towards seeing success being a fact amenable to positive identification.
For example, a government can aim to build a school and do so, or
introduce a new tax and achieve this immediate goal. A different
tradition is constructivist or discursive, emphasising the importance of
interpretation and meaning (e.g. see Edelman ; Stone ;
 McConnell
Fischer ). The corollary of such approaches is that success is in
the eye of the beholder, depending on factors such as a protagonist’s
values, beliefs and extent to which they are affected by the
policy.
The approach here is a pragmatic combination of elements of these
two approaches. The more tangible aspect of policy success relates to
goal achievement. Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that a policy is
successful insofar as it achieves the goals that proponents set out to
achieve. However, given the positive connotations of the word success,
only those who regard the original goal as desirable are likely to
perceive its achievement in this way. The two approaches are
combined in arriving at the following definition of policy success:
A policy is successful if it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve
and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually
universal.
The first advantage of this definition is that it recognizes that
government can and sometimes does attain the goals it seeks in each
of its three realms of policy. For example, a government can succeed
in putting together an agreement in order to get a key decision or
legislation approved. It can put in place a program with policy
instruments that produce intended outputs and outcomes. Government
may also succeed in producing a policy which boosts electoral fortunes.
Second, the definition also recognizes that not everyone will
perceive government’s achievements as successful. An extreme example
is the statement of success by an architect of the US rendition program
of interrogating terrorist suspects:
... the Rendition Program’s goal was to protect America, and the rendered
fighters delivered to Middle Eastern governments are now either dead or in
places from which they cannot harm America. Mission accomplished, as the
saying goes (Committee on Foreign Affairs  p. ).
Critics have viewed the policy instruments to achieve this (sic)
success as a crime that ‘violates international law’ and ‘involved
multiple human rights violations’, (Amnesty International 
p. ).
Third, the definition reconciles, at least for heuristic purposes, the
tension between the objective and dimensions of success. A definition
that portrays success as purely a matter of interpretation will fail to
capture the objective dimensions of goal attainment. Equally, a
definition that portrays success purely as objective will fail to capture
the subjective dimension of success. Therefore, both the objective and
subjective dimensions of success need to be built into the definition
rather than avoided or one included and the other excluded.
Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between 
The Spectrum From Policy Success to Policy Failure
A spectrum makes it possible to differentiate intermediate categories
between complete success or failure. The fivefold typology set out here
does not deny the existence of difficult methodological issues which are
best discussed elsewhere (see McConnell ).
Success. Government does what it sets out to do and opposition is
virtually non-existent and support near universal. Many matters of low
politics and bureaucratic implementation of routine non-controversial
issues will fall into the category of policy success as government
achieving what it sets out to do. The absence of opposition and/or the
T . Policy as Process: The Spectrum From Success to Failure
Process Success Resilient Success Conflicted Success Precarious Success Process Failure
Preserving
government policy
goals and
instruments.
Policy goals and
instruments
preserved, despite
minor
refinements.
Preferred goals
and instruments
proving
controversial and
difficult to
preserve. Some
revisions needed.
Government’s
goals and
preferred policy
instruments hang
in the balance.
Termination of
government policy
goals and
instruments.
Conferring
legitimacy on the
policy.
Some challenges
to legitimacy but
of little or no
lasting
significance.
Difficult and
contested issues
surrounding
policy legitimacy,
with some
potential to taint
the policy in the
long-term.
Serious and
potentially fatal
damage to policy
legitimacy.
Irrecoverable
damage to policy
legitimacy.
Building a
sustainable
coalition.
Coalition intact,
despite some signs
of disagreement.
Coalition intact,
although strong
signs of
disagreement and
some potential for
fragmentation.
Coalition on the
brink of falling
apart.
Inability to
produce a
sustainable
coalition.
Symbolizing
innovation and
influence.
Not ground
breaking in
innovation or
influence, but still
symbolically
progressive.
Neither innovative
nor outmoded,
leading at times to
criticisms from
both progressive
and conservatives.
Appearance of
being out of touch
with viable,
alternative
solutions.
Symbolizing
outmoded, insular
or bizarre ideas,
seemingly
oblivious to how
other jurisdictions
are dealing with
similar issues.
Opposition to
process is virtually
non-existent
and/or support is
virtually universal.
Opposition to
process is stronger
than anticipated,
but outweighed by
support.
Opposition to
process and
support are
equally balanced.
Opposition to
process outweighs
small levels of
support.
Opposition to
process is virtually
universal and/or
support is virtually
non-existent.
 McConnell
existence of universal support may be hard to come by for many higher
issues but it is still possible. For example, the Dutch system of dikes and
dams prevents more than half the population, living below sea level,
from drowning. For pragmatic purposes, I include in the outright
success category, policies with minor delays or errors that can be
corrected. The remaining measures or benchmarks of success can be
identified across the process, program and political dimension of policy.
Process success rests first of all on the preservation of government’s
policy goals and instruments. For example, amendments to a government
bill may facilitate the achievement of its goals rather than acting
as a barrier. Second there is attaining legitimacy through a general
acceptance that the policy has been produced through means that are
legal and normal procedures, such as consultation with stakeholders.
Third is the marshalling of a sustainable coalition of supporting
interests and not just an ad hoc coalition securing the initial adoption of
a policy (Patashnik ). Fourth, success may stem from a process
which encourages innovation, as in the case of Japan seeking to draw
lessons from foreign experiences (see e.g. Goldfinch ).
Program success occurs if the measure that government adopts,
including a stance of doing nothing, produces the results desired by
government. Again, such outcomes can be captured in specific criteria
such as implementation in a manner that produces the desired
outcome. Benefiting a target group is a further criterion e.g. lowering
the incidence of breast cancer in women over -years-old as a result
of a new screening program. Satisfying criteria valued in a particular
policy community is also a measure of success, for example, efficiency
in public budgeting or secrecy on issues of national security.
Political success is the holy grail of political elites. One outcome of
policies that provide significant political benefits and no problems to
speak of is the enhancement of the reputation of the government, its
leaders and its electoral prospects. A further criterion of no less
importance is controlling the policy agenda by giving the impression of
tackling a problem and marginalizing critics. For example, an urban
riot can be defined as a ‘manageable’ law and order problem, as
opposed to a ‘wicked problem’ involving long-term racial discrimination
and urban deprivation. A final marker of political success is
helping maintain broad values of government. For example, a clampdown
on welfare fraud can contribute to a broader government agenda
of reducing waste in public resources.
Resilient success. Opposition and shortcomings make this a second
best outcome. However, as long as the measure is resilient it will not
fail. In this situation, the level of opposition is more than government
bargained for, but is nevertheless outweighed by levels of support.
Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between 
T . Policy as Program: The Spectrum From Success to Failure
Program Success Resilient Success Conflicted Success Precarious Success Program Failure
Implementation in
line with
objectives.
Implementation
objectives broadly
achieved, despite
minor refinements
or deviations.
Mixed results,
with some
successes, but
accompanied by
unexpected and
controversial
problems.
Minor progress
towards
implementation as
intended, but
beset by chronic
failures, proving
highly
controversial and
very difficult to
defend.
Implementation
fails to be
executed in line
with objectives.
Achievement of
desired outcomes.
Outcomes broadly
achieved, despite
some shortfalls.
Some successes,
but the partial
achievement of
intended
outcomes is
counterbalanced
by unwanted
results, generating
substantial
controversy.
Some small
outcomes
achieved as
intended, but
overwhelmed by
controversial and
high profile
instances or
failure to produce
results.
Failure to achieve
desired outcomes.
Creating benefit
for a target group.
A few shortfalls
and possibly some
anomalous cases,
but intended
target group
broadly benefits.
Partial benefits
realised, but not
as widespread or
deep as intended.
Small benefits are
accompanied and
overshadowed by
damage to the
very group that
was meant to
benefit. Also likely
to generate high
profile stories of
unfairness and
suffering.
Damaging a
particular target
group.
Meets policy
domain criteria.
Not quite the
outcome desired,
but close enough
to lay strong
claim to fulfilling
the criteria.
Partial
achievement of
goals, but
accompanied by
failures to achieve,
with possibility of
high profile
examples e.g.
ongoing wastage
when the criterion
is efficiency.
A few minor
successes, but
plagued by
unwanted media
attention e.g.
examples of
wastage and
possible scandal
when the criterion
is efficiency.
Clear inability to
meet the criteria.
Opposition to
program aims,
values, and means
of achieving them
is virtually
non-existent,
and/or support is
virtually universal.
Opposition to
program aims,
values, and means
of achieving them
is stronger than
anticipated, but
outweighed by
support.
Opposition to
program aims,
values, and means
of achieving them
is equally
balanced with
support for same.
Opposition to
program aims,
values, and means
of achieving them,
outweighs small
levels of support.
Opposition to
program aims,
values, and means
of achieving them
is virtually
universal, and/or
support is virtually
non-existent.
 McConnell
There are departures from one or more of the bundle of goals across
the process, program and political realms.
Resilient process success means that government achieves its policy
in broad terms notwithstanding small modifications and setbacks, for
example, some opposition amendments are added to a bill. Resilient
programs are survivors. Shortfalls, although not insignificant, do not
undermine their core achievements. For example, a program in 
countries to vaccinate against measles, mumps and rubella, has led to
a substantial reduction in the incidence of the disease(s), despite
exposing a small number of children to health risks. Insofar as political
bargaining leads to compromise, politics must be prepared to settle for
a second best outcome or else see their aims frustrated for a lack of
agreement.
Conflicted success is a struggle for government. It achieves its policy
making goals in some respects, but has to backtrack or make significant
modifications along the way. Conflicted program successes are not
what was intended. Proponents are troubled by substantial time delays,
considerable target shortfalls, resource shortfalls, and communication
failures. The program generates substantial controversy, galvanizing
opposition parties and forcing government into a defence of core values
and aims of the program, often coupled with program reviews and
amendments.
Notwithstanding conflicts, political outcomes for government certainly
have elements of success, even if accompanied by substantial
controversy. Conflicted politics, as Lasswell () recognized, is in part
a product of competing values. Fischer’s () work indicates that to
achieve political stability requires resolving value conflicts by advocates
of a program backtracking and accepting a modicum of conflicted
success. In sum, conflicted successes allow government partially to
achieve its goals, but it gets less than it bargained for in terms of
outcomes, and more that it expected in terms of opposition.
Precarious success operates on the edge of failure. Policies do exhibit
small achievements, but departures from goals and levels of opposition
outweigh small levels of support. They often amount to a pyrrhic
victory for policymakers. Initially government does fulfill some of its
policy making goals, but the costs of doing so become such that
short-term success cannot be sustained.
Precarious program successes have some merits for proponents but
outcomes fall well short of intentions and controversy is substantial,
Even supporters seriously question the future of the policy. Precarious
successes are often transient, en route to failure and termination. For
example, the Child Support Agency in the UK, introduce in ,
struggled, with its achievement in making ‘absent fathers pay’ counPolicy
Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between 
tered by scandals, controversy, mismanagement and errors on a scale
unprecedented for a government agency, leading to its closure in 
(Harlow ).
Precarious political successes are a substantial liability for government,
even if there are small benefits. The political benefits of hanging
onto a policy exist and are small (the benefit may be saving face and
avoiding an admission of failure) but the costs are greater. The Nixon
administration and the final years of the Vietnam war is arguably one
such example.
Failure is the mirror image of success: A policy fails if it does not achieve
the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support
T . Policy as Politics: The Spectrum From Success to Failure
Political Success Resilient Success Conflicted Success Precarious Success Political Failure
Enhancing
electoral prospects
or reputation of
governments and
leaders.
Favourable to
electoral prospects
and reputation
enhancement,
with only minor
setbacks.
Policy obtains
strong support
and opposition,
working for and
against electoral
prospects and
reputation in
fairly equal
measure.
Despite small
signs of benefit,
policy proves an
overall electoral
and reputational
liability.
Damaging to the
electoral prospects
or reputation of
governments and
leaders, with no
redeeming
political benefit.
Controlling policy
agenda and easing
the business of
governing.
Despite some
difficulties in
agenda
management,
capacity to govern
is unperturbed.
Policy proving
controversial and
taking up more
political time and
resources in its
defence than was
expected.
Clear signs that
the agenda and
business of
government is
struggling to
suppress a
politically difficult
issue.
Policy failings are
so high and
persistent on the
agenda, that it is
damaging
government’s
capacity to
govern.
Sustaining the
broad values and
direction of
government.
Some refinements
needed but broad
trajectory
unimpeded.
Direction of
government very
broadly in line
with goals, but
clear signs that
the policy has
promoted some
rethinking,
especially behind
the scenes.
Entire trajectory
of government is
being
compromised.
Irrevocably
damaging to the
broad values and
direction of
government.
Opposition to
political benefits
for government is
virtually
non-existent
and/or support is
virtually universal.
Opposition to
political benefits
for government is
stronger than
anticipated, but
outweighed by
support.
Opposition to
political benefits
for government is
equally balanced
with support for
same.
Opposition to
political benefits
for government
outweighs small
levels of support.
Opposition to
political benefits
for government is
virtually universal
and/or support is
virtually
non-existent.
 McConnell
is virtually non-existent. Failures can be issues of high media interest or
low-level bureaucratic concerns. They include policies that have small
successes overshadowed by large scale failures.
Process failures occur when the government is defeated in its
ambition to enact legislation or make a decision. It may be a
consequence of the ‘mobilization of bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz )
preventing government from doing what it thinks desirable or it may
be due to the lack of a sufficient coalition of interests in order to realize
governmental goals.
Program failures, in essence, not only fail to accomplish what they
were intended to do but can also threaten the position of politicians
and parties that sponsor failed programs. The British poll tax
introduced in  is an example. It was a local government tax levied
on a per-capita basis, only marginally related to income. It produced
high rates of non-collection, severe and costly administrative problems,
and generated very visible political protests. The result was a rise in
political costs and a loss in revenue. It was a significant contributing
cost to Conservative MPs ejecting Margaret Thatcher from Downing
Street and it was abandoned by her successor (Butler, Adonis and
Travers ).
Contradictions Between Different Forms of Success
Locating policies in particular categories involves judgement rather
than scientific precision (Wildavsky  p. ). Judgment is necessary
because policy outcomes do not always have tidy results. Divergent
outcomes may occur within one particular realm or there can be
different outcomes across the process, program and political dimensions
of policy. The result is that a policy can be much more successful in
one realm than in another. Indeed, there is often a trade-off for
policymakers between three realms of policy which at times sit uneasily
alongside each other. Striving for success in one realm can mean
sacrificing, intentionally or through lack of foresight, success in another.
Such trade-offs and tensions are at the heart of the dynamics of public
policy. Here I identity three key contradictions.
Successful Process vs. Unsuccessful Programs. A key concern of policymakers
is to get decisions taken and legislation passed, using executive
powers to steer the policymaking process towards such goals. These are
process successes because government gets the policy it wants, in a
legitimate manner and with the support of a coalition of interests.
However, success at the process stage is no guarantee of success at the
program stage. Policymaking without sufficient checks and balances is
prone to producing flawed policies because goals and/or instruments
Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between 
have not been refined in order to produce workable policies through
incremental bargaining (Lindblom ; Braybrooke and Lindblom
), deliberative engagement (Carson and Martin ; Gutmann and
Thompson ) partisanship and plurality (Crick ; Stoker )
and careful policy design (Schneider and Ingram ). To paraphrase,
government may win the battle (process) and lose the war (program).
Successful Politics vs. Unsuccessful Programs. A particular program may
tilt towards the failure end of the spectrum, but produce successful
political outcomes. Why would such outcomes occur? The answer lies
in recognizing that political success sometimes necessitates programs
that leave much to be desired in terms of tackling policy problems.
If we think about the three criteria for political success, this point
is easier to make. One criterion is enhancing government or leaders’
reputation/electoral prospects at the expense of programs. For example,
the Anglo-French agreement to build the supersonic Concorde jet
helped improve relations between Britain and France at a time in the
s when relations were otherwise strained, but after the Concorde
became airborne it was not an economic success and airlines abandoned
its use (Hall ).
The second criterion is easing the business of governing through the
agenda management of wicked issues (Rittel and Webber ; Head
). They are complex problems such as poverty and drug abuse
with multiple causes and no clear solutions. Pragmatically, it is often
easier for governments to deal with symptoms rather than tackle
underlying social causes. Such policies have a strong symbolic or even
placebo element (e.g. Stringer and Richardson ). They demonstrate
that government is trying to deal with the problem and responding to
popular concerns can become the definition of success, whether or not
the response effectively engages with a wicked problem.
Maintaining governance and policy trajectories often requires
compromising of programs. A plausible argument could be put forward
that the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the US,
proved far more successful for the Bush administration as evidence of
its commitment to fight a War or Terror than in enhancing US
security, because it created a super-agency which has done little to
disturb long-established policy sub-systems (May, Sapotichne and
Workman ).
Successful Programs vs. Unsuccessful Politics. Programs which produce the
results desired by policy makers do not always result in political success.
Well run programs can backfire on political desires. Efficiency drives, for
example, can be executed successfully and desired outcomes achieved,
but encroach on politics, thwarting leadership and/or electoral ambitions.
Successful programs may even rebound on government agendas
 McConnell
because of unintended consequences of an excess of success. The
example of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy is a case in point. It
was so successful by the mid-s in achieving the aim of self-sufficiency
that it generated infamous ‘butter mountains’ and ‘wine lakes’.
Conclusion
When analysts assess the success or otherwise of a particular policy,
they can invoke different criteria that lead to different conclusions.
Career policy analysts may be more concerned with program design
and program implementation issues. Political parties may be concerned
with such issues but are also likely to enter into political realms. The
world of policy analysis has lacked a framework that allows analysts to
capture the diversity of outcomes from success to failure, in each of
these three realms.
This paper has brought the three strands of policy analysis together.
First, in recognizing that success and failure are not mutually exclusive,
the article moves beyond the polarized portrayal of outcomes as success
or failure. Second, it recognizes that there may be differences in success
and failure in terms of processes, programs and policies. Third and
finally, the framework allows for meaningful cross-sectoral and crosspolicy
comparison.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to three anonymous referees and the editors for their
comments and guidance, and to Mark Bovens, Paul ’t Hart, Mike
Howlett and Dave Marsh for helping shape my thinking on this topic.
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ALLAN MCONNELL
Address for Correspondence
Professor Allan McConnell
Department of Government and International Relations
University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW , Australia
e-mail: allan.mcconnell@sydney.edu.au
also at
School of Government and Public Policy,
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow
 McConnell