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Guest Editorial

Political Marketing and Propaganda: Uses, Abuses, Misuses

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Although previous issues of well-respected marketing journals (e.g., Revue Française du Marketing, Psychology & Marketing, Journal of Marketing Management, European Journal of Marketing*) have focused on political marketing, and although there are now journals which regularly publish papers on political marketing including, of course, this one and the* Journal of Public Affairs*, none has focused exclusively on how the techniques developed for use in electoral and governmental campaigning, in lobbying and party fundraising campaigns, are now being used more generally in the military, in public diplomacy programs, and by companies, not-for-profit organizations, and even terrorist groups, with a focus on "winning hearts and minds." The aim of this special issue is to seek to fill in this gap in our knowledge and encourage further research into the political marketing/propaganda interface. In this special issue, we seek to elucidate the meaning of propaganda and political marketing by exploring their parameters, both contemporary and traditional.*

KEYWORDS propaganda, political marketing, Al Qaeda

USES: ORIGINS AND DEFINITIONS OF PROPAGANDA

The origins of the practice of propaganda lie in the ancient world. For example, Rome rested on a masterpiece of spin: Its corporate mantra— "Senatus Populusque Romanus" (the SPQR of the legionnaires' banner)—was

in fact a fib. Rome was not ruled by the senate and people at all: After Octavian/Augustus in 31 BC (see Tacitus 1956), it was ruled by the Emperor. But the charade, that ancient lie, remained and was perpetuated (O'Shaughnessy 2004). American negative political advertising is an example of the operation of propaganda today in an ostensibly more sophisticated age, although of course the dissemination of propaganda is by no means solely undertaken in the U.S. In an article entitled "The Power of Smears in Two American Presidential Campaigns," Vaccari and Morini analyze when the use of smears—the operation of making untruthful accusations against a political opponent—works. They look specifically at how the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth campaign damaged John Kerry's chance for presidency by making false accusations about his Vietnam War record. He did not rebut the accusations sufficiently early and in the right medium, whereas the "Obama is Muslim" campaign by various Republican websites was unsuccessful because Obama's campaign rebutted it effectively online and early on. Use of smears, and particularly untruthful information, to damage the image of a political opponent, is propaganda—not political marketing. But propaganda is, in fact, rife in the modern world. It is so rife that it is pervasive, yet it is also invisible. However, before we analyze its appearance in the modern world, we first need to define it.

The term "propaganda" is very definitely in the category of the "boo" rather than the "hurrah" words. For Schumpeter (1996), it referred in fact simply to any term with which we disagree. Because, it is part of the lexicon of rhetorical abuse, it is difficult to have an objective discussion about its meaning. The term now carries vernacular baggage, associated forever in the public mind with the strident polemics of totalitarian regimes, with World War II, with Hitler, with Stalin in the Cold War, and in the latter part of the 20th century with the North Korean regime, and with Al Qaeda, the global Islamist militant organization. This categorization of propaganda in extremis serves to restrict its operational definition and, in fact, desensitises us to its subtler, more sophisticated forms.

How does propaganda differ from other sorts of persuasion? Propaganda is often (a) simplistic and (b) didactic. Even if these features are not universally true of all propaganda texts, they are common to most of them. But above all, (c) the objective is persuasion and not truth, unlike the work of (for example) a scholar, a teacher, or even (in theory) the work of a journalist. Part of the problem with undertaking scholarship in propaganda studies is that there are a great many different types of propaganda and many different definitions. Table 1 illustrates just some of the different forms that propaganda may take.

Propaganda embodies what Plato most feared about rhetoric, that it could make the worse appear the better reason. The question of how and in what ways propaganda is distinct from mere advocacy, or a cultural artefact that happens to be constructed around some social or other message, is indeed an open one. Perhaps some notion of intensity or commitment is part of the distinction. The origins of the word lie

TABLE 1 Propaganda Types and Their Definitions

Type of propaganda	Explanation
Propaganda of enlightenment	Negation of false information
Propaganda of despair	Inducing fear of death and disaster
Propaganda of hope	Presenting to the enemy the hope of a better life if they cease hostilities or surrender
Particularist propaganda	Seeking to divide the enemy into individual groups and attacking them separately
Revolutionary propaganda	Aiming to break down an enemy from within
Integration propaganda	Aiming to unify and reinforce society
Agitation propaganda	Aiming to foment revolution within society
Atrocity propaganda	Containing graphic images of an adversary's savage or barbaric behavior toward the target audience to arouse their sympathies toward the propagandist
Sociological propaganda	The penetration of an ideology into a target audience through its sociological context
Political propaganda	The penetration of an ideology into a target audience through its political context
Vertical propaganda	Propaganda that makes use of the mass media
Horizontal propaganda	Propaganda made by a central organization that disseminates it for use by small groups

Sources: Bruntz (1972) and Ellul (1965).

in the Counter-Reformation and the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991) created by a church struggling (to put it crassly) to retain market share. Thus, the word had different connotations in different countries, more positive in Catholic lands, more negative elsewhere given its proselytizing nature. Perhaps this is also a key dimension in propaganda: The zealotry with which a proposition or concept is proposed is suggestive as well as persuasive—"you must believe" rather than the "here's why you should believe" typical of marketing, although in the latter case some have argued, particularly in its early years, that modern marketing is itself a form of propaganda (Packard 1956; Baudrillard 1968/1996).

Propaganda is an amalgam of myth (which Barthes 1957/1992 usefully outlines as false signifiers commonly accepted as fact), symbolism (when signs express meaning beyond their obvious content), and rhetoric (mixing word play and persuasion). The judicious propagandist gives the most serious attention to all three, recognizing that all of them are manufactured; old symbols can be refurbished, new myths can be fabricated. For an example of a refurbished symbol, consider the introduction by Belfast City Council of the "Titanic: Made in Belfast Festival," where tourists and residents alike are asked to celebrate the ship, the city, and the skills of the people who made her: a true example of the attempt at a reversal of a symbol of destruction (over 1,500 died when the Titanic sunk) into a symbol of artisan skill. An example of the creation of a new myth, perhaps more obscure but no less powerful an example, is that of the young Nazi Horst Wessel,

who was killed violently in unexplained circumstances and who became attributed, through Joseph Goebbels' offices, with the Nazi national anthem, having been said probably falsely to have written it.

The Effectiveness of Propaganda

The problem of writing about propaganda in history is the perennial problem of writing about any communication phenomena. How do we prove its effectiveness; where is the objective empirical evidence? The significance is easy to dismiss because the convincing data are indeed elusive. It is certainly possible to cite many influential propaganda campaigns. In World War I, for example, the famous Lord Kitchener poster helped recruit a volunteer army of three million men in the United Kingdom and has probably become the most famous poster in history. This example does not, of course, establish the effectiveness of the genre, merely of an individual campaign. The effects of propaganda however can be wider than the obvious intended audience. For example, Powell (1967), argues that while the Soviet Union's antireligious propaganda was unlikely to change adult people's religious views, it was likely both to contain much overt exercising of religion and was also likely to cement the views of existing atheists.

More significantly, the success of various historical movements cannot be detached from the competence of their acolytes as political evangelists. In a fascinating article entitled, "They Come Over Here…300 Years of Xenophobic Propaganda in England," Croft and Dean outline how xenophobic propaganda was used in 16th- to 18th-century England by specific groups, and often by the state, against economic rivals including the Dutch, Roman Catholics, Muslims, and Jews, concluding that propaganda was typically oral, was disseminated through such persuasive contemporary public media as the theatre, and had more powerful effects than their protagonists often intended, often lasting over generations.

In the 20th century, Communism and Fascism were proselytizing creeds, not mere systems of belief. Proselytization was fundamental to their meaning and embedded in their practice. Persuasion is the key political skill. Facts seldom speak for themselves. Always, there exists the possibility of fresh interpretation. Accordingly, historians have to assess a political figure's ability to manipulate myth, symbolism, and rhetoric ("propaganda") not as *a* leadership skill but as *the* leadership skill in order to "correctly" interpret historical events. The example of Britain's wartime leader, Winston Churchill, and the British Expeditionary Forces evacuation from Dunkirk (effectively a retreat turned into a triumph) is an obvious one. To change catastrophic defeat into a kind of victory via the alchemy of words, stories, and symbols ranks as one of the great achievements in history.

Propaganda might be said to work because of the apoliticality of most people, who look for heuristics or simple recognition devices to make sense

of perplexing political realities. Enthusiastically or not, the people go along with whatever public orthodoxy has been presented to them, as much of the American public did during the Iraq war, believing that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks until the various public enquiries indicated otherwise. In Britain, the government's presentation of a case for war, together with an inherent patriotism in the general public, added to the fact that the troops were successful in their mission, meant that the general public ended up supporting the troops, even if they did not support the war (see Baines and Worcester 2005).

But propaganda is also the special province of the single issue groups in history. From the Anti-Slavery Society to Greenpeace, the impact of their propaganda on the civic menu has been incalculable, and much that parties place on the agenda today arises from organized agitation, for example, the women's movement. In a most apposite article entitled, "If Seals Were Ugly, Nobody Would Give a Damn: Propaganda, Nationalism, and Political Marketing in the Canadian Seal Hunt," Marland, originally a director of communications for the Newfoundland government's department of fisheries and now a political science scholar at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, outlines, in contrast with Schleifer (also a contributor in this issue; see later in this editorial), that political marketing and propaganda are qualitatively different. In a discussion of seal hunting in Newfoundland, Canada, Marland argues that propaganda in this context has much to do with nationalism, with both sides—sealers and anti-sealers—using a nationalist appeal. He explains in his article how political marketing and propaganda fundamentally differ on an important dimension: Propagandists selectively use opinion polls to support their often vehement ideological arguments.

Historical memory is also a function of propaganda, and often we see the past through the prism of its own carefully crafted perceptual lens. We see Elizabeth I through the precise and organized image her artists were told to produce, we see the Third Reich through the depraved art of Leni Riefenstahl. We see them, in other words, as they would have wished us to see them. Much of the imagery of the blitz, for example, derives not from the event but from a 1941 film, *Fires Were Started* (Calder 1991).

Forms of Propaganda: Explicit

Propaganda comes in myriad forms, and what is usually referred to as propaganda is actually one variant of it, possibly the least important because it is the most barefaced. It proclaims its identity as propaganda (what psychologists of persuasion call perceived "manipulative intent"), and therefore it arouses the cognitive defenses of those who seek to preserve their own intellectual integrity. Explicit propaganda, therefore, while it needs to be discussed, might be seen as the creation of more naive causes and regimes; the propaganda that really matters is the propaganda that does not proclaim

itself as such. A genre that thrives on emotional manipulation cannot really succeed if that manipulation is obvious to its targets; it is the mysterious, camouflaged, semi-submersible propaganda that should concern us the most.

The category of explicit propaganda is the public identity of the concept, self-proclaimed; it repels because the craftwork of manipulation lies exposed. Such characterization—a parodied "other," two-dimensional, excessively symbolic, projected by a sanitized "home team," overly ritualistic and stylized—all these are indeed the stigmata of propaganda.

However, propaganda is frequently more effective when it is disguised as something else. For example, only 10% of Nazi films were "pure" propaganda and much of their cinematic oeuvre was ostensibly just entertainment. Thus, propaganda may be disguised as an action movie, for example, Goebbels' film *Kolberg*, produced in 1943–1945 at the cost of withdrawing 30,000 (most sources say 100,000) troops from a collapsing front (Hoffman 1996). Goebbels had a particular belief in the value of historical film. The reasons are not hard to fathom. Costume drama and the iconography of a distant age disguise propagandist intent: Intelligent defenses that would otherwise reject an explicit message are less able to do so when a message is repackaged and contextualized.

Much entertainment, even in wartime, is not, of course, propaganda. It can be "pure" entertainment, although there are even those who see this as propaganda since it celebrates, or at least fails to interrogate, the existing social order. There are, of course, even those who view all entertainment as propaganda. The Frankfurt School saw the economic competition origins of media texts as embodied in their ideological nature. In other words, what capitalism paid for would invariably celebrate the capitalist order (Kellner 1995). For the Frankfurt School, popular culture was therefore bourgeois propaganda that rejuvenated the dominant order. Were this to be accepted, of course, it would realize that threat of conceptual chaos that any debate about the meaning of the word propaganda threatens to bring. Isn't that just like saying everything is propaganda?

But previously "pure" entertainment vehicles can be hijacked for propaganda purposes; thus, Tarzan, Sherlock Holmes, Batman, Masked Marvel, and Secret Agent X-9 were all enlisted in the cause of anti-Facism. Holmes himself discourses with Watson on the virtues of liberty while driving through the streets of Washington (Taylor 1990). Walt Disney himself was even recruited into the anti-Nazi cause, producing a number of cartoons during the Second World War, including *Der Fuehrer's Face* (Donald Duck as a Nazi) and *Commando Duck* (Donald Duck against the Japanese).

Forms of Propaganda: Subtle

It is important to liberate the idea of propaganda from its popular understandings and from its conceptual prison; manifestly the categories of explicit propaganda we have discussed have been important in the history

of the genre, manifestly they continue to be. But better-educated populations demand more sophisticated manipulation; less naive, less persuasible, different, and more submerged devices are needed to affect their thinking. Beyond this, states and formations within them have generally less power of coercion as democracy advances and matures and authority is challenged. A general consequence of this movement is that both the scope of propaganda and its definition has to be broadened to include agents, agendas, and agencies not normally covered in the textbooks that claim to define the discipline. In addition, some things like education have always possessed propagandistic elements and drive, yet the scholarship in the field has really neglected this as part of its operational definition. Our demand is to broaden the understanding of propaganda both in the contemporary description of its activity and in the retrospective claims for the extent and comprehensiveness of the field. In other words, there are all kinds of things we need to consider if we are to have a mature and sophisticated understanding of what propaganda actually is, both today and in the past. Such claims do not represent some kind of pedagogic imperialism, attempting to advance the claims of propaganda to inflate its dimensions, but rather they represent a considered response to the question of what propaganda really is if we seek to travel beyond the obvious boundaries of explicit propaganda.

In relation to dictatorship and totalitarian systems, this point, the function of education as propaganda, seems hardly worth making. Everybody knows that under such regimes children are drilled with wooden rifles, sing hymns to the Great Leader and so on. The propaganda content of education in a democracy is much less visible, first because education is an ostensibly objective process focusing on the acquisition of technical skills so that the casual observer is not alerted to the extent of its propaganda content. But education syllabi are subject to State and therefore political influence since States control the funding of most schools: The very debate over what children should learn to prepare them for work and society is ultimately a debate about the sort of society we should be and is therefore political (Loewen 1996). The content of much secondary education, in terms of what its priorities are, what knowledge is discarded or excluded, who the heroes and villains are, has a definite political dimension which, in certain particular contexts, can indeed be called propaganda. Education is deeply implicated in propaganda and it always has been. The debates on what the school curriculum should contain are the echo of national debates on identity. But they are also a way for election-seeking politicians to persuade key elements in the voting constituencies by using contemporary education as a lenitive to soothe the raw wounds of the past. In doing this, the education output may have little to do with any truth-seeking mission and no basis in fact. Education also takes place in a context, that of the Nation State, and it is usually State-funded, so that the interests of that State are reflected in curricula. In no sense is the knowledge purveyed free

floating in curricula. In no sense is the knowledge purveyed free floating and cosmopolitan. One of the aims of States is to make their citizens believe in them as a precondition of a cohesive, contented, and malleable society, what Ellul (1965) called unification propaganda. There are various means by which governments and political parties can do this, but one is through the projection of fear and the other through the projection of hope (see Table 1). An example case of the former is outlined by Bove in her article, "For Whose Benefit? Fear and Loathing in the Welfare State," in which she argues that agitation propaganda is used, not by a terrorist group but by a democratic State, in fact by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) in the United Kingdom, to stigmatize benefit claimants and encourage citizens to inform on those making fraudulent claims in a government social marketing campaign. Eloquent and persuasive, she posits that the DWP's communications may actually reduce fraud less than the cost of undertaking the promotion, and that the key goal is actually to appear symbolically as if the government is in charge, even when it is not. Bove's ultimate sentence strikes a real chord in view of the recent riots in several UK cities and of course itself part of a wider trend around the world and particularly in the Middle East: "The government's approach to welfare…meets, in the form of the multitude, its projected other and its nemesis, resistant to social engineering, unidentifiable, non-representable, swarming, unaccountable, criminal, noncommittal, evasive, networked, and irreducible." The wider ethical question then is to what extent government communications should be employed to solve social problems. What are the limits of their use and under what circumstances should they be deployed?

Other Types of Propaganda

Some films rank as propaganda because the intent of their creators—financiers, producers, and so on—was propagandistic. *Lions of the Desert* with Anthony Quinn, about tribal resistance to the imperial Italian forces of Marshal Graziani, clearly had Libyan-nationalistic intent and was rumored to be financed by Gaddafi. Certainly it had all the visual stigmata of propaganda: snarling characters, imperialists, atrocities, noble rebels, dictators, and so on. There is also "Black propaganda," with the active employment of forgery and the weapons of deception, such as Britain's World War II secret radio station Gustav Siegfried Eins (Newcourt-Nowordowski 2005); the Tsarist forgery of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; the 1939 German newsreels claiming that the Poles were "invading" them; or the alleged British Conservative Party fabrication, in the 1924 general election, of a letter purporting to be from the Communist International leader Grigory Zinoviev to the Communist Party of Great Britain urging revolution, which damaged the reelection chances of Ramsay MacDonald's first socialist Labour government (who were trying to advance an Anglo-Soviet trade pact at the time).

Historical and political reality does not, as astute propagandists recognize, exist in some true and immutable form but is continually remade. If there were one final interpretation of events, then the craft of history would largely cease to exist. Thus, we possess an ability to actually manufacture reality. Walter Lippmann, a two-time Pulitzer prize–winning journalist, remarked that what matters is not the event but the received image of the event, "the pictures in our heads," as he called them (Lippmann 1921, pp. 1–17). Neville, Bolt, a scholar at the Department of War Studies at King's College London, illustrates, in his PhD thesis, that insurgent groups frequently purposely plan violent campaigns to maximize their subsequent reporting in the media precisely in order to affect and reframe the public's perceived perspective of the history of an issue (Bolt 2011). Falkowski and Michalak, in an article entitled, "Backward Framing and Memory Evaluation in Political Elections," outline precisely this phenomenon—defining it as backward framing—and explain how a subject's memories—the electorate's in this case—can be manipulated by the presentation of novel information, forcing the subject to assimilate that new information into the old. However, their work also illustrated that their new evaluation is not remembered as new; it is remembered as the old evaluation. This finding has profound implications: It illustrates the mechanism by which it is possible to reengineer people's opinions, importantly without them knowing that their opinions have changed.

Propaganda and New Media

But the rise of cyberspace has transformed both the meaning and opportunity for propaganda. Anyone can be a propagandist with, possibly, an ocean of influence at their command if a message goes viral. The significance of this cannot be underestimated; no longer is the individual voice limited by the difficulty of gaining media attention. A stimulating YouTube message, or outrageous allegations and lies, can likewise escape from the home of the manufacturer and go global in an instant. One is reminded of Mark Twain's aphorism that "a lie can go round the world while truth is still tying up its shoelaces." Hence, during the last U.S. presidential election, a U.S. army corporal was able to make an Internet speech critical of Obama and see it reach eleven million hits ("Dear Mr. Obama," www.youtube. com). Never before in history could an ordinary citizen amass such a magnitude of influence. At the same time, Internet propaganda is unmediated and unfiltered. Lies, fictions, and hatreds are not digested through some culture's media and review system but instead presented raw. The Internet exists with the propaganda product defining the primary space and the contextual criticism, the "posted" critical or adulatory comments, being secondary. Hence all kinds of distortion and false belief can escape into the larger civic consciousness, including such conspiracy theory beliefs, for example, that the CIA or Mossad were

somehow responsible for 9/11, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. by Al Qaeda militants.

We can conclude that whereas the first age of the Internet was producer-driven, so-called Web 1.0, the second age, Web 2.0, is consumer-driven. This has given rise to citizen-journalists, since all that is required is a mobile phone camera and a blog. The Virginia Tech massacre in April 2007, for example, was reported live by student bloggers as the events unfolded (O'Shaughnessy 2008). A case in point is the events of the Arab Spring, where spontaneous revolutions occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. At the time of writing, these popular revolutions were successful in Tunisia and Egypt, were put down in Bahrain (with Saudi Arabian support), and were ongoing in Libya (and which erupted into a full-blown civil war), Syria, and Yemen. Our knowledge of the potential for the use of social media as a revolutionary tool to incur regime change is limited; however, its influence should not be underestimated. Twitter was an important means by which Iranian dissidents protested in the turbulence occurring immediately after the Iranian presidential election in June 2009. Indeed, it was so important that American government officials asked Twitter executives to delay their site maintenance schedules so that Iranian dissidents could continue to use it to register their dissent (Grossman 2009). In a specially invited commentary article entitled "Revolution 2.0 in Egypt: Pushing for Change, Foreign Influences on a Popular Revolt," Kirsi Yli-Kaitala formerly of i to i research in London explains how social media were used to make the case, and agitate, for popular revolution in Egypt. She explains how social media helped consolidate opposition to the Mubarak government, coordinate resistance, and draw in international condemnation. Helpfully, Yli-Kaitala explains that social media—Facebook, Twitter, and the like—are not a panacea for the public diplomacy, military influence, or PSYOPS officer or for revolutionary terrorists and social agitators. They offer no shortcut, in her words, to regime change, but they do constitute a useful tool in a wider array of tools available for influence practitioners. A comprehensive study of the effectiveness of social media in such settings is not available and represents a useful area for further research given the likelihood that social media will become more, not less, ubiquitous within the world including in lesser-developed countries.

ABUSES: PROPAGANDA TODAY

It is a moot point as to whether propaganda can be abused given the bad reputation the word now holds, incorrectly in our view. Whether it is good or bad depends entirely on its application and its applicants, of course. However, we propose that propaganda is not bad or good per se (something Taylor 1990 also contends). It is how it is used and its consequences that

are either bad or good. Bernays, that great propagandist for propaganda, certainly felt it could be abused, in his view, "when it is used to over-advertise an institution and to create in the public mind artificial values" (Bernays 1928/2005, p. 145). We therefore take both a deontological (intentions-based) and a teleological (consequences) perspective and, although we recognize that there is a need to explore the philosophy of propaganda in much more detail, we sadly do not have space to consider this important dimension further here. From the above frame of reference, we posit that propaganda is abused when it is used for the long-term ill of humanity. One very current example of this is the use of propaganda by Al Qaeda, the global terror organization, seeking to develop a Caliphate State and revolt against the West and what it perceives to be Middle Eastern apostate client states. We turn to this case and that of Islamist propaganda more generally next.

AL QAEDA AND ISLAMIST PROPAGANDA

The notion that liberal democracy is in an ideological struggle against Islamist propaganda is very relevant today. The idea that a liberal democracy under threat can respond to that threat using specialist marketing/public relations techniques traces its application back to the father of the public relations industry, Edward Bernays, who outlined how America should use marketing and public relations techniques to get people to see the true alternatives between democracy and Fascism and Nazism (Bernays 1942). In Britain, during the Second World War, according to Tatham (2008), The Political Warfare Executive ran just such a campaign in the allies' fight against Nazi Germany. Tatham goes on to explain that there is an increasing need for innovative techniques for conflict prevention in an attempt to head off conflict. A RAND Corporation study in 2007 (Helmus, Paul, and Glenn 2007) also illustrates the direct application of marketing in the military setting.

Al Qaeda's propaganda is the most unanticipated consequence of the cyberspace order; few could have foreseen the propaganda employments of cyberspace, fewer still that a steroidal global terrorism would be the result. Al Qaeda has manufactured a myth, of a global conspiracy against Islam—a myth its cyberspace propaganda videos seek to perpetuate and deepen—the only antidote to which is to perform Jihad, self-defined as either the conduct of a martyrdom operation, the provision of financial or sympathetic support, or at the very least passive non-engagement with Al Qaeda (as opposed to actively working against them). Its approach is increasingly sophisticated both in terms of production values and in terms of its symbolic and rhetorical argumentation. Its audiences are various but include: Western citizenry targeted with fear appeals designed to sap their will and instigate electoral change; Western Muslims with the aim to convert

to Al Qaeda sympathizers, supporters, and suicide bombers; and similarly Arabs and Muslims (for example in Pakistan in 2008 and in Syria in 2011) and Western political elites to goad them and provoke foreign and security policy reaction and overstretch.

In that sense, the approaches adopted are principally agitation and atrocity propaganda. The aims are essentially covertly political rather than sociological but use both vertical (the mass media) and horizontal channels (small groups of individuals watching the material together in Madrassas or elsewhere). What is clear overall is that the West faces a sophisticated ideological battle against Al Qaeda propagandists, both in the core group and in their franchised partner groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Somali-based Al Qaeda–linked Al Shabab. Although we do not consider Al Qaeda propaganda further in this special issue, we urge fellow researchers to investigate both the use of political marketing/propaganda by Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the effectiveness of authority attempts to counter Al Qaeda influence in their own communities and countries.

WHAT THE SPECIAL ISSUE DID (NOT) COVER

Submissions were sought from a variety of academic fields, particularly including political science, communications, and marketing/business as well as from practitioners. Our stock of papers in the final selection was from academics from a mixture of backgrounds including war studies, marketing, and the political science fields. All articles were double-blind reviewed with the exception of the Egypt commentary article, which was specially invited and extensively reviewed by the editors and two reviewers. We would therefore particularly like to thank the following reviewers for the efforts in helping to put together this special issue:

Dr. Ming Lim—University of Leicester, UK
Conor McGrath—Independent scholar and consultant, Ireland
Dr. Mona Moufahim—University of Nottingham, UK
Dr. Declan Bannon—University of the West of Scotland, UK
Dr. David Betz—Kings College London, UK
Dr. Dominic Wring—University of Loughborough, UK
Professor John Egan—South Bank University, London, UK
Ann Stow—Defence Science Technology Libraries (Dstl)/Cranfield University, UK
Nigel Jones—Cranfield Defence and Security, Cranfield University, UK
Darren Lawrence—Cranfield Defence and Security, Cranfield University, UK
Professor Michael Saren—University of Leicester, UK
Dr. Ron Schleifer—Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Professor Chris Hackley—Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

Table 2 illustrates the key themes of the original call for papers, outlining how the final selection of articles included in this special issue either met or did not meet that call. Accordingly, we draw some conclusions about where further research might be directed.

While this issue has to some extent considered the interface between political marketing and propaganda (all those areas ticked in Table 2), it has only really touched the surface. In particular, our call for papers

TABLE 2 Key Themes Uncovered and Not Covered in This Special Issue

Theme	Considered in this issue? (×/√)	Author details/ further comments
1. The definition and scope of propaganda and political marketing, especially by nontraditional political actors	√	Marland; Croft and Dean, Schleifer; Vaccari and Morini
2. Conceptual and applied distinctions between political marketing and propaganda	√	Marland; Croft and Dean; Falkowski and Michalak; Schleifer
3. The use of propaganda by non-governmental organizations, charities, and corporations to advance a (social) cause or in the development of a values-based communication campaign	√	Marland; Vaccari and Morini
4. The use of marketing/propaganda methods in military/wartime environments and/or by terrorist groups; the political marketing of war; propaganda as an ancillary and alternative to military violence	√	Schleifer; Yli-Kaitala
5. The use of propaganda and political marketing in public diplomacy programs	×	See Kendrick and Fullerton (2004) and Fullerton and Kendrick (2006) for more on this theme; further research is needed in this field.
6. Historical uses and theatres of political marketing/propaganda	√	Croft and Dean
7. The employment of political marketing/ propaganda as an alternative to coercion and policing in the various assorted "wars" against drugs, terrorism, smoking, alcohol dependency, etc	√	Bove
8. The use of political marketing/ propaganda not just as an election resource but also as a mode of governing (i.e., the rise of "symbolic" government around the world)	√	Falkowski and Michalak; Bove

on the use of political marketing/propaganda and its use in terrorism/counterterrorism is deserving of further research, given it is still a nascent field and symbolism is so important in this sub-field, as we outline elsewhere (see Baines et al. 2010 and O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009). The use of propaganda by Far-Right groups is also on the rise, particularly in Eastern Europe (see Moufahim et al. 2010 for a discussion of this in the Belgian context), and as we have tragically seen in the Oslo massacre in Norway in July 2011, even an apparently stable society is not immune from the Far Right's influence. Whether or not propaganda had a role to play in the radicalization of the perpetrator, Anders Breivik, may come out in the public inquiry ordered as a result by the Norwegian government. We see therefore in both the Far Right and the Islamist movement two opposing sides, one adopting an ultranationalist ideology and the other adopting a Pan-Islamic anti-Western ideology. They, however, do not operate in isolation; they have the potential to feed dangerously into the other, extending its venomous reach. In such an environment what is the role of the authorities who seek to harmonize or at least pacify dangerously affected communities? In their political marketing/counter-propaganda efforts, what constitutes ethical and unethical communication approaches? These are important questions and ones we urge scholars and practitioners to consider in future.

The use of political marketing/propaganda is also relevant to the military context, particularly in the field of psychological operations. In Schleifer's article in this issue, an interesting parallel is drawn between political marketing and PSYOPs, where there is very limited published work. In an article entitled, "Propaganda, PSYOP, and Political Marketing: The Hamas Campaign as a Case in Point," Schleifer argues that propaganda, psychological operations, and political marketing are indistinct, "essentially the same," that they overlap in times of war. Western democracies must understand the propagandistic forces that democracies are subject to and respond accordingly, he argues. Similarly, there is also relatively little published on the link between marketing and public diplomacy, a related area. This is surprising, particularly given the famous Carl Von Clausewitz aphorism that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." Political marketing/propaganda must have particular relevance for NATO in Libya, for example, in legitimizing the role of the National Transitional Council and by the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, where there is an attempt to legitimize the role of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan among the people of Afghanistan, particularly in the restive southern provinces. These are only two of the many current conflicts operating in the world today. We therefore call on scholars to recognize the potential for the application of political marketing/propaganda to the military and public diplomacy contexts and to observe and write about their manifestations and potentialities accordingly.

A further context of the use of political marketing/propaganda is that undertaken by the use of police forces in countering various social ills. One award-winning campaign in the UK context is the campaign run by Trident, part of the (London) Metropolitan Police Service, which won an Institute of Practitioner's in Advertising Effectiveness Award in 2008 for its "Stop the Guns" campaign to disrupt gun crime by Black people against Black victims across London. Further research should be undertaken in this context to determine (a) the limits of communication vis-à-vis other police tactics, (b) how such communications can be made to be more effective, and (c) where the ethical boundaries lie in the use of such methods.

MISUSES OF PROPAGANDA

None of the articles in this issue clearly alluded to the unintended readings generated by much propaganda in the world today. A message carries a tone as well as content, and what we encode is not necessarily what is decoded; there is aberrant decoding, and propagandists may fail completely to negotiate the quicksands of public opinion. But beyond this, there are many texts, particularly in mass media, that elude any attempt to categorize them as anything. They operate on numerous levels for numerous targets, and their meaning is essentially fluid, sabotaging any effort to impose a dominant reading. Their meaning derives from multiple sources—the self-referentiality of the text within the genre, the uses of irony, the play of gesture and intonation, the associations of the actor chosen for that role, and so on.

Yet an understanding of how propaganda generates such unintended readings is critical to an assessment of its effectiveness. To some extent, an analysis of the (in)effectiveness of propaganda communications is possible using semiotic analysis (especially since this does not require an audience to be investigated rather it takes the communicative text as its unit of analysis). The use of semiotic analysis in propaganda studies is perhaps more limited than it should be. Accordingly, we urge researchers to use this method more as an extra means by which to decode propaganda texts, particularly their cultural implications. Semiotics, particularly Derrida's deconstruction technique, is particularly designed to analyze not just "what is there" in the communication but "what is not there" (Derrida 1967).

A case in point is that of Sefton Delmer, the famous Black propaganda practitioner acting for the British in the Second World War, who called the generation of intended readings, a "boomerang effect," where the unexpected consequences of the use of propaganda create a further problem (in his case, he created the myth of the good Wehrmacht officer (as a foil to the SS); however, after the war this myth frequently became used as a defence by Wehrmacht officers who argued that they had been anti-Hitler

all along in a bid to retain their previously exalted positions within postwar Germany (see Delmer 1962).

The following questions therefore arise: When does a propagandist communication lead to unintended effects? What are the most common (cultural) contexts, audience, and communicator types? What language needs to be used to best persuasive effect? How can existing persuasive language used by opponents be effectively countered? These are fundamental questions we have not really considered here but that we believe are worthy of further research.

CONCLUSION

Nobody is ever neutral about the idea of propaganda and there are consequences to its use, both malign and benign. On the debit side, the drive to persuade can frustrate effective government. There are serious issues for public policy when public policy is rhetorically driven, since the policy idea is invested with such persuasive velocity that the focus is taken away from the feasibility of that very idea. It is surely the case that, outside the realm of Euclid's geometry, we are permanently in the realm of persuasion. The value of the word "propaganda" is that it does duty as a sensitizing concept, alerting us to phenomena that we would not see if we did not possess a word for them, allowing us to create patterns and coherence and therefore meaning from the apparently disparate. Propaganda however can be effective or ineffective. Its impact is never foreordained, and only creativity can rescue the genre from mediocrity. There is good and bad propaganda, as we see in this issue. One can in fact be overly pessimistic about something that is really a permanent truth about the human condition. We cannot escape propaganda, it is all about us; instead, we must either seek to understand it and isolate its effects or seek to assimilate it and be subject to its effects; the key, however, is that we do not blindly accept ideological precepts and that we exercise our desire to choose, if not the experience of free will, at least freer will. We hope the seven articles in this issue help us to understand the operation of propaganda and its interface with political marketing more and that these excellent articles inspire you, the reader, to conduct further research in this important field of human communication.

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