

Organizational Behavior

Knowledge Management: introduction

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overview I

cognitive success

knowledge

justification

the structure of justification

ways of knowing

sources of knowledge

skepticism

collective knowledge

introduction

(Anonymous, 2019)



questions

What can be known?

When do we know,
that we have known
something?

cognitive success

problems

- What kinds of things are knowable?
- Can knowledge be known (by cognition)?
- Are there different kinds of cognitive achievement?
 - (e.g., by other justifications or in the distinction between cognitive – individual, collective – etc.)
- ...

defining success

What is cognitive success?

- contractualism
- consequentialism
- constitutivism

contractualism

contractualism

(Craig, 1990)

A certain cognitive state is a cognitive achievement,
because it serves some practical interest.

examples

- testimonials
- activity
- ...

consequentialism

consequentialism

(BonJour, 1985; Brogaard, 2009)

A certain cognitive state is a cognitive achievement,
because it supports certain core beliefs.

examples

- understanding the world
- the good life
- ...

constitutivism

constitutivism

(Korsgaard, 2009)

A certain cognitive state is a cognitive achievement,
if it is the constitutive goal of an endeavour.

examples

- understanding (reasoning)
- practical wisdom (everyday life)
- ...

knowledge

knowledge

different knowledge?

(Boër & Lycan, 1975; Ryle, 2009)

- knowing who
- knowing which
- knowing why
- knowing where
- knowing when
- knowing how

traditional notion of knowledge of facts

Knowledge is
(sufficiently) justified
true belief.

Gettier's problems

(Gettier, 1963)

- problems of modes of justification
 - the relationship between reasons and inference
- problems of truthfulness
 - Can only the truth be known?
- epistemic luck
 - testing students

justification

justification

question

How can one justify
our beliefs?

possibilities

- positive
- negative

positive

(Alston, 1988)

A given belief is justified, if there are good reasons, to hold it.


negative deontological justification

(Feldman, 1988; Haack, 2013; Plantinga et al., 1993)

A given belief is justified, unless there are reasons, not to be.

the structure of justification

fundacionalism




fundacionalism: possible assumptions

(BonJour & Sosa, 2003)

- basis/bases
 - A justified belief p is a basic or base belief if and only if the belief p is not justified by another belief.
- justified belief
 - Every justified belief p is a basic or base belief or is justified by another belief q .

coherentism




coherentism: possible assumptions

(Davidson & LePore, 1986)

- coherence

- Every justified belief p is justified by others beliefs in its epistemic environment.

infinetism



infinetism: possible assumptions

(Aikin, 2008)

- infinite chain
 - Every justified belief p is justified by others preceding beliefs.
- actuality vs. possibility


specification of justification structures

(Aikin, 2008)


- COST
 - strong/weak
- PURITY
 - pure/mixed
- AVAILABILITY
 - diachronous/synchronous
- ORIGIN
 - transmissive/emergent

ways of knowing

apriori




aposteriori




analytic




synthetic



direct realism



indirect realism



basic approaches

empiricism | rationalism | constructivism

sources of knowledge

perception

argument from sensory imperfection

■ ILLUSION

- False perceptions that have a real stimulus at their base and are usually caused by physical laws of the environment.

argument from hallucination


- HALUCINATION

- Fallacious perceptions that have no real stimulus.

the argument from sensory illusion

- sense delusions
 - Fallacies of perception that are due to imperfections of the senses.

the argument from sensory illusion




argument from non-existent objects

- NON-EXISTENT OBJECTS

- Misperceptions that are primarily culturally determined and are based on perceptual schemas.

argument from non-existent objects



argument from perspective

- the position of the divine eye

argument from perspective

- causal or scientific argument
- pragmatic arguments
- evolutionary argument

introspection

introspection

(Moran, 2001)

- Descartes (2020)
 - methodological scepticism
- Behaviorism (Watson, 1913)
- Wittgenstein (1953)

memory

memory problems

- storing
 - déjà vu (déjà entendu, déjà éprouvé, etc.)
- preservation, conservation
 - efekt spáče (sleeper efekt)
- recalling, remembering
 - memory illusion
 - confabulation
 - cryptomnesia

reasoning

reasoning

- thought experiments

Ex. (Bostrom, 2003):

- Humanity will become extinct before it reaches the posthuman stage.
- No posthuman civilization will be interested in simulating its ancestors.
- We live in a computer simulation.

video

testimony

testimony

- Aristotelés

skepticism

radical scepticism

- George Berkley
- David Hume

methodological scepticism

- René Descartes
- Edmund Husserl

fallibilism

- Karl Raimund Popper

collective knowledge

- social epistemology
- rules, assumptions and collective experience

the formation of collective knowledge

- collective experience and assumptions

example

- the problem of collective reasoning and action
 - Where and what time do you go to lunch if you don't want to meet your acquaintances?

the danger of collective knowledge

- false assumptions and conformity

- Epistemology of Virtue
- Naturalized Epistemology
- Religious Epistemology
- Moral epistemology
- Social epistemology
- Feminist epistemology

What to take away?

One needs to be careful
with this,
what we call knowledge.

Zdroje I

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**M A S A R Y K
U N I V E R S I T Y**