PA160: Net-Centric Computing II. Network Security Luděk Matýska Slides by: Tomáš Rebok Faculty of Informatics Masaryk University Spring 2015 Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 1 / 125 Course Introduction PA160 - Course Introduction Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 2 / 125 Course Organization • attending the lectures is optional • the knowledge acquired during PB156 & PA159 courses is assumed • course materials will be published on the course webpage (more or less in time ;-) ) • assessment methodology: • final exam (written form) • course literature: • slides, RFCs, . .. • literature being announced in relevant course parts Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 3 / 125 Course Overview • the course goal: • to provide an advanced insight into the area of computer networks and their applications • discussed topics: • network security • network management and monitoring • parallel and distributed applications, grids • service-oriented architectures • specification and verification of communication protocols • network simulators and emulators • etc. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 4 / 125 1. Network Security 1. Network Security 1. Network Security Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 5 / 125 Lecture overview Introduction 0 Motivation 0 Network Security Elements ^J}f Cryptography Introduction 0 Symmetric Cryptography 0 Asymmetric Cryptography Network Security Mechanisms 0 Entity Authentication 0 Message Confidentiality (Security) 0 Message Integrity 0 Message Authentication 0 Digital Signature 0 Key Management and Distribution Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet 0 Application-layer Security 0 Transport-layer Security 0 Network-layer Security 0 Link-layer Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability 0 Firewalls 0 Intrusion Detection Systems 0 Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 0 Virusses &i Worms 0 Network &i Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Conclusion Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Lecture overview Introduction 0 Motivation 0 Network Security Elements fj^l Cryptography Introduction 0 Symmetric Cryptography 0 Asymmetric Cryptography ^j^f Network Security Mechanisms 0 Entity Authentication 0 Message Confidentiality (Security) 9 Message Integrity 9 Message Authentication 0 Digital Signature 0 Key Management and Distribution Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet 0 Application-layer Security 0 Transport-layer Security 0 Network-layer Security 0 Link-layer Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability 0 Firewalls 0 Intrusion Detection Systems 0 Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 0 Virusses &i Worms 0 Network &i Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Security • most of computer science is concerned with achieving desired behavior • in some sense, security is concerned with preventing undesired behavior • different way of thinking! • an enemy/opponent/hacker/adversary may be actively and maliciously trying to circumvent any protective measures one put in place • computer vs. network security • computer security - focuses on security aspects of systems in isolation • viruses, secure data storage, OS security, etc. • network security - focuses on security of data as it is transmitted between networked systems • authentication protocols, encryption of transmitted data, firewalls, etc. • not always a clear-cut dividing line.. . Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 8 / 125 Introduction Motivation What can go wrong? o when your computer y receives or is waiting for a message ml Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 9 / 125 Introduction Motivation What can go wrong? Message loss Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 10 / 125 Introduction Motivation What can go wrong? Message interception o adversary A can get a copy of m when m passes by Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 11 / 125 Introduction Motivation What can go wrong'i lessage modification o adversary A can arbitrarily modify the content of m to become Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Introduction Motivation What can go wrong? Message insertion o adversary A can arbitrarily fabricate a message m, pretending that m was sent by x Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 13 / 125 Introduction Motivation What can go wrong? Message replay o adversary A can replay a message m that has been sent earlier by x and received by y Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 14 / 125 Introduction Motivation What can go wrong? Denial-of-Service attack © adversary A can send huge amount of messages to y to block m from arriving at y o in the case of botnet attack, the adversary instructs many bots to send messages to y simultaneously Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 15 / 125 Introduction Motivation What is needed? Reliable transmission I o y wants to receive all messages sent by x to her o both x and y want to make sure the message is not tampered with o eventually they both want the message not to be overheard by any third party Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 16 / 125 What is needed? Sender verification Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 17 / 125 What is needed? Message non-repudiation • x wants to be able to prove to third party z that y has received message m from x • y wants to be able to prove to third party z that x has sent a message m to y Network Security Network Security is great... • protects messages from interception in their transit a provides desired level of privacy for users or data • detects and discards messages that had been modified, inserted, or replayed • disallows unauthorized access to local system resources and sensitive data . .. but hard to achieve • many layers in network architecture • many different media of network connection • adversary's location hard to determine • new attacks keep emerging a cryptographic overhead Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 19 / 125 Introduction Network Security Elements Network Security - Basic Elements A secure communication network should provide the following mechanisms/services: • AAA • Authentication • Authorization • Accounting • + secured communication • Confidentiality • Integrity • Non-repudiation a + Availability Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 20 / 125 Introduction Network Security Elements Network Security - Basic Elements Authentication Authentication • in Czech: autentizace • NOT autentikace, autentifikace, . . . • several perspectives: • a process verifying that someone is who they claim they are (= entity authentication) • a process assuring the recipient that the message is from the source that it claims to be from (= message authentication) • requires a determination of the entity's identity • several methods for identity determination exist: • based on what a user knows - a proper pair of username and password/PIN • based on what a user has - a tool which a user owns (USB dongle, smart card, private key, etc.) • based on what a user is - a user has characteristics, which can be verified (fingerprint, retinal images, etc.) • based on what a user can - a user is able to answer particular verifying questions Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 21 / 125 Introduction Network Security Elements Network Security - Basic Elements Authorization and Accounting Authorization • process of granting the user access to specific system resources • based on user's profile and the local/global policy controlling the resource access • follows the authentication process • ensured by access control lists (ACLs) • define permissions to perform particular operation or to access particular resources Accounting • monitoring the users' usage of network services • the information can be used for management, planning, billing, or any other purposes Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 22 / 125 Introduction Network Security Elements Network Security - Basic Elements Confidentiality, Integrity, and Non-repudiation Confidentiality • protects data and information from unauthorized disclosure (sniffers) • data during transmission cannot be read by any unauthorized user • just the sender and receiver understand the content of the transferred message • ensured by message encryption Integrity • protects data from unauthorized modification • data during transmission cannot be modified or fabricated by any unauthorized user • usually based on encryption and hashing algorithms Non-repudiation • sender nonrepudiation and receiver nonrepudiation serves the receiver/sender for the purposes of proving origin/delivery of the message • neither the sender of a message can deny the transmission of the message nor the receiver of a message is able to deny the reception of the message • ensured by digital signatures Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 23 / 125 Introduction Network Security Elements Network Security - Basic Elements Availability Availability • property of a system, network, or a resource being accessible and usable any time upon demand by an authorized system entity • i.e., a system is available if it provides services according to the system design whenever users require them • has to be associated with various security services • such as services protecting from denial of service (DoS) attacks Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 24 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Lecture overview O Introduction 0 Motivation 0 Network Security Elements ^JJf Cryptography Introduction 0 Symmetric Cryptography 0 Asymmetric Cryptography ^j^f Network Security Mechanisms 9 Entity Authentication 0 Message Confidentiality (Security) 9 Message Integrity 0 Message Authentication 0 Digital Signature 9 Key Management and Distribution Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet 0 Application-layer Security 0 Transport-layer Security 0 Network-layer Security 0 Link-layer Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability 0 Firewalls 0 Intrusion Detection Systems 0 Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 0 Virusses &i Worms 0 Network &i Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Cryptography Introduction Cryptography Introduction o network security is mostly achieved through the use of Cryptography Cryptography: o the science and art of transforming messages to make them secure and immune to attacks o basic cryptography mechanisms: o symmetric (secret-key) cryptography Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 26 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography o the same key is used by both parties for both encryption and decryption o advantages: o low computational demands o suitable for encryption of large messages o drawbacks: o a necessity to share the secret key (—>• a mechanism for key distribution is required) o can lead to many keys required to be maintained (e.g., many-to-one communication in distributed environment) )ES, 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish, Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4), AES, etc. Shared secret key Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 27 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography Simple Symmetric Ciphers Character-oriented • operate on characters of an alphabet • substitution ciphers - substitutes one symbol with another • monoalphabetic - a character/symbol in the plaintext is always changed to the same character/symbol in the ciphertext (e.g., Caesar cipher) • polyalphabetic - each occurrence of a character can have a different substitute • transposition ciphers - reorders (permutes) symbols in a block of symbols • instead of substitutions, locations of characters change Bit-oriented • operate on blocks of bits • e.g., XOR cipher, rotation cipher, etc. Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 28 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography DES (Data Encryption Standard) DES (Data Encryption Standard) • designed by IBM and adopted by the U.S. government as the standard encryption method for nonmilitary and nonclassified use • the algorithm encrypts a 64-bit plaintext blocks using a 64-bit key • in fact, the key is just 56-bits long (every eighth bit is used for parity checking and is ignored) • DES has two transposition blocks (so-called P-boxes) and 16 complex round ciphers • although the 16 iteration round ciphers are conceptually the same, each uses a different key derived from the original key • not considered to be secure any more • because of the key length (too short) • see details in the animation: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/ research/projects/lemsys/DES/DESPage.j sp Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 29 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography DES (Data Encryption Standard) - Algorithm outline I. Cryptography Introductioi in Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography DES (Data Encryption Standard) - Algorithm outline II. (single round) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 31 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography Triple DES (3DES) Triple DES (3DES) • has been proposed and implemented to lengthen the DES key • uses three DES blocks • encryption: DES encryption-decryption-encryption • decryption: DES decryption-encryption-decryption • different variants: » 3DES with three keys —>• the size of the key is increased to 168 bits • 3DES with two keys (Keyi — Keys) the size of the key is 112 bits • if (Keyi — Key2 — Keys) standard DES Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 32 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography Triple DES (3DES) 64-bit plaintext Encrypt DES Q a Decrypt DES Encrypt DES 'Key, 'Key, !Key3 64-bit ciphertext Encryption Triple DES 64-bit plaintext Decrypt DES Encrypt DES Decrypt DES I Key, iKey2 iKey3 f 64-bit ciphertext b. DecryptionTriple DES Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) 9 proposed as a reaction to competition for selecting a successor to DES (1997) • originally called Rijndael • standardized in 2001 • three variants: AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 • the number indicates the key length a the keysize has no theoretical maximum • operates on a 4 x 4 array of bytes (= 128 bits) • AES performs a number of repetitions of transformation rounds that convert the input plaintext into the final output of ciphertext • each round consists of several processing steps, including one that depends on the encryption key • can be effectively implemented in HW • see details in the animation: http://www.formaestudio.com/rijndaelinspector/ Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 34 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) - Algorithm outline I. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 35 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Symmetric Cryptography Symmetric Cryptography AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) - Algorithm outline II. (single round) Round i 128-bit data SubByte i Byte substitution ShiftRow I MixColumn Byte permutation Complex operation (missing in round 10) Add RoundKey I Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 128-bit data 1. Network Security Cryptography Introduction Asymmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography • also known as Public-key Cryptography • uses different keys for encryption and decryption • both keys are denoted as keypair • the public key is used for encryption, while the private key is used for decryption • the message encrypted by a public key can be decrypted only by the appropriate private key • advantages: • no secret key is passed between two communicating parties =^> lowers the risk of its disclosure • the public key can be published a drawbacks: • the speed =^> asymmetric ciphers are suitable for small messages • for example, for a symmetric key exchange • suffer from the man-in-the-middle attack • the public keys have to be provided by a trusted party a e.g., RSA, Diffie-Hellman (key exchange), etc. Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 37 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Asymmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Illustration Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 38 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Asymmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman algorithm) I. RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman algorithm) • the most common and popular public key algorithm • RSA gets its security from the difficulty of factoring large numbers • uses two (large) numbers, e and d, as the encryption and decryption keys • public/private keys generation: • choose two random large prime numbers, p and q (ideally of equal length, e.g., 200 digits) • compute the product N = p ■ q • then randomly choose the encryption key, e (between 1 and N — 1), such that e and (p — l)(q — 1) are relatively prime » then compute the decryption key, d. d = e_1 mod ((p — l)(q — 1)) • i.e., d ■ e — 1 mod ((p - l)(q - 1)) • p and q are no longer needed • public key: (e, N) • private key: (d, N) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 39 / 125 Cryptography Introduction Asymmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman algorithm) II. RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman algorithm) cont'd • message encryption • to encrypt a message m, it has to be divided into numerical blocks smaller than N • each block is then individually encrypted: c — rrf mod N 9 message decryption • decrypt every block by: m — cd mod N • see all the details in the RSA animation: http://cryptool.org/media/RSA/RSA-Flash-en/player.html Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Network Security Mechanism Lecture overview ■Jf Introduction • Motivation • Network Security Elements ■Ev Cryptography Introduction 9 Symmetric Cryptography Network Security Mechanisms 9 Entity Authentication 9 Message Confidentiality (Security) 9 Message Integrity 9 Message Authentication 9 Digital Signature 9 Key Management and Distribution ark Security in the Internet • Transport-layer Security • Network-layer Security • Link-layer Security Network & Data Protection - Maintaining the Availal 0 Tirewalls 9 Intrusion Detection Systems • Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Se 9 Virusses &i Worms 9 Network & Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Network Security Mechanisms Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Passwords Password authentication: • the simplest and the oldest method • Alice authenticates to Bob by sending a password • fixed passwords - subjects to several attacks: • eavesdropping, stealing a password, accessing a file with passwords, guessing (dictionary attacks), etc. • can be (partially) solved by: • hashing the passwords • hashing salted passwords • e.g., PAP (Password Authentication Protocol) - transmits unencrypted ASCII passwords (assumes out-of-band control channel) • one-time passwords - passwords valid just for only one login session • new password generated based on previous password • new password generated based on a challenge • specialized electronic tokens, out-of-band channels (SMS), etc. Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 42 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Challenge-Response Authentication • in password authentication, the claimant proves her identity by demonstrating that she knows a secret (the password) • however, since the claimant reveals this secret, the secret is susceptible to interception by the adversary a in challenge-response authentication, the claimant proves that she knows a secret without revealing it • the challenge is a time-varying value (a random number or a timestamp) sent by the verifier • the claimant applies a function to the challenge and sends the result (response) to the verifier • the response shows that the claimant knows the secret Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 43 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Challenge-Response Authentication - Symmetric keys using a nonce • Alice asks Bob for sending a nonce (a random number, timestamp etc.) • Alice encrypts the nonce by shared secret key (the password) and sends it back to Bob Alice Bob IT" Alice Kab'-. -|_J Alice sends data to Bob using KAB Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Network Security Mechanisms Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Challenge-Response Authentication - Symmetric keys using a nonce (mutual auth. same as the previous one, but with the mutual authentication Alice n. Bob lr" -| Alice, RA~Y K, rb, I ra K.J-, I rbH Alice sends data to Bob using KAB Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Network Security Mechanisms Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Challenge-Response Authentication - Hash functions usage • instead of encryption/decryption, one can also use a hash function for entity authentication • hash function - a one-way function generating a message digest • details on hash functions - see Message Integrity part • e.g., MS CHAP (Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol) Alice (user) Bob (server) Alice, T Hash Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 46 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Entity Authentication Entity Authentication Asymmetric keys - Public key usage • instead of symmetric-key ciphers, asymmetric-key ciphers can be also used for entity authentication • the secret is the private key of the claimant • she must show that she owns the private key related to the public key • the nonce can be encrypted either by the claimant's public key Bob Alice -► °J_J R2 = Gl mod N K= (R2)* modN| Q Shared secret key 0 | K = (Rl)y mod N | K = G' mod N • G and N are prime numbers, which both parties have to agree on • can be freely transmitted through the network • the x and y are (private) large numbers chosen by the parties independently on each other • the computed K becomes the shared key used for the following symmetric encryption • employed principle: (Gx mod NY mod N = (Gy mod NY mod N = Gx^ mod N Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security .pring 2015 51 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Message Confidentiality (Security) Message Confidentiality/Security - Data Encryption Diffie-Hellman algorithm for session key generation II. • a weakness - suffers from a man-in-the-middle attack • can be avoided if Bob and Alice first authenticate each other p and g are public. a. K^Oymodp K, = (R1)zmodp K2={R3)zmodp a R; - q'l mod p K2= (R2)v mod p K, = g" mod p K2 = gz* mod p Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 52 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Message Integrity Message Integrity Hash functions Io encryption provides confidentiality, but not integrity o sometimes, the message does not need to be hidden (encrypted) - the only need is to keep it safe from any tampering o to preserve the integrity of a message, the message is passed through a hash function o an algorithm that creates a compressed "image" (fingerprint) of the message o so-called a message digest or a modification detection code (MDC) o the digest needs to be kept secret Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 53 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Message Integrity Message Integrity Hash function criteria • to be eligible for a hash, a function needs to meet the four criteria: • one-wayness - a message digest is created by a one-way hashing function • it must be impossible to recreate the message from the digest • resistance to weak collision - ensures that a message cannot easily be forged • one cannot easily modify the original message so that the new message hashes exactly to the same digest • resistance to strong collision - ensures that we cannot find two messages that hash to the same digest • called "strong" because the probability of a collision is higher than in the previous case • computation ease - it must be easy to compute the hash value for any given message • hash function examples: • MD5 (broken not secure), SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, etc. Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 54 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Message Integrity Message Integrity Message integrity check Alice I Bob Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Network Security Mechanisms Message Authentication Message Authentication Message Authentication • a process assuring the recipient that the message is from the source that it claims to be from • can be provided by: • symmetric cryptography - keyed hash functions, HMAC » asymmetric cryptography - digital signature Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 56 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Message Authentication Message Authentication Symmetric cryptography • keyed hash functions are used • when creating the digest, such a function includes the symmetric key between the sender and receiver into the computation • =^> so-called Message Authentication Code (MAC) is computed • besides the message authentication, the message integrity is obviously ensured as well Alice Bob Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 57 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Message Authentication Message Authentication Symmetric cryptography - HMAC • instead of keyed hash functions, a keyless hash function can also be used for message authentication • = hashed MAC (HMAC) • creates a MAC by applying a keyless hash function to the concatenation of the message and a symmetric key • i.e., a copy of the symmetric key is prepended to the message and this combination is hashed using a keyless hash function (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, etc.) II Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 58 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Digital Signature Digital Signature • MAC's/HMAC's main drawback: they require a symmetric key to be established between the sender and the receiver • =4> Digital Signatures - employ asymmetric cryptography to provide message authentication and integrity • besides, the message nonrepudiation is also provided Digital Signature • a message is "signed" (= encrypted) using the sender's private key • and "verified" (= decrypted) using the sender's public key • can be achieved in two ways: • signing the whole document - easier, but less efficient (for long messages) • signing a digest of the document • most commonly used • instead of signing the whole document, just the message's digest is signed Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 59 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Digital Signature Digital Signature Sender's side Alice Message Hash ] Alice's private Message To Bob □ Digest Encrypt Message plus signed digest Signed digest Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 60 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Digital Signature Digital Signature Receiver's side Bob From Alice ■ Alice's public Í Message Decrypt Compare -*- Digest Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Network Security Mechanisms Digital Signature Digital Signature Summary Remember In a cryptosystem (to provide message confidentiality), we use the private and public keys of the receiver; in digital signatures (to provide message authentication/integrity/nonrepudiation), we use the private and public keys of the sender. • to combine both, the message is signed at first and later both the message and the signature are encrypted Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 62 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Key Management and Distribution How secret keys in symmetric-key cryptography and how public keys in asymmetric-key cryptography are distributed and maintained? Symmetric-key Distribution a the symmetric key needs to be shared between every two communicating parties • if Alice needs to exchange confidential messages with N people - she needs to maintain N different keys • if N people need to communicate with one another - a total of N ■ (N - l)/2 keys is needed • (each person needs to maintain N — 1 keys; since the keys are shared, we need "only" N ■ (N — l)/2 keys) • moreover, the keys' distribution is another problem • a trusted party - Key Distribution Center (KDC) - is needed to reduce the number of keys Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 63 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Symmetric-key Management and Distribution Key Distribution Center (KDC) I. Key Distribution Center (KDC) • each person/entity establishes a shared secret key with the KDC Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Symmetric-key Management and Distribution Key Distribution Center (KDC) II. Key Distribution Center (KDC) cont'd. • the process of sending a confidential message from Alice to Bob may proceed as follows: O Alice sends a request to KDC, stating that she needs a session (temporary) secret key between herself and Bob O KDC informs Bob of Alice's request O If Bob agrees, a session key is created between the two • once the communication is terminated, the session key is no longer valid • several approaches of creating the session key based on the previous ideas have been proposed • e.g., basic approach, Needham-Schroeder protocol, Otway-Rees protocol, etc. • for the following three slides, the following holds: • K/\ (Kg) ... a symmetric key known only to A and S (resp. B and S) • R, RA, RB, Ri, R2 ■ ■ ■ nonces • K/\g . .. the symmetric session key • example real implementation - Kerberos Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 65 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Symmetric-key Management and Distribution Key Distribution Center (KDC) III. - Needham-Schroeder protocol Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Sprin Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Symmetric-key Management and Distribution Key Distribution Center (KDC) III. - Otway-Rees protocol Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Public-key Management and Distribution Public-key Distribution • in public-key cryptography, everyone shields a private key and advertises a public key • the public-key is freely available • Why a public-key distribution mechanism is needed, when the public-keys can be freely announced? • to protect the keys from forgery • the mechanism: the use of a trusted center - Certification Authority Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 69 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Public-key Management and Distribution Certification Authority (CA) Certification Authority (CA) • issues so-called public-key certificates • bind an entity (human, server, etc.) with its public key • to prevent the certificate itself from being forged, the CA signs the certificate with its private key • such a certificate can be freely published and distributed • anyone who wants to extract the public key from the certificate uses the CA's public key to extract it • when compromised, the previously issued certificates can be revoked • example: X.509 certificates • supports hierarchical structure to allow the use in the wide Internet • (— hierarchical trust model) • called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 70 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Public-key Management and Distribution X.509 Certificates I Certificate Version Certificate Serial Number Certificate Algorithm Identifier for Certificate Issuer's Signature Issuer Validity Period Subject Subject Algorithm Identifier Public-Key - Information Public-Key Value Issuer Unique Identifier Subject Unique Identifier Extensions Certification Authority's Digital Signature Extension Fields (optional) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 71 / 125 Network Security Mechanisms Key Management and Distribution Public-key Management and Distribution Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Level-2 Level-2 Level-2 1 CA1 CA2 CA3 1 Level-2 Level-2 Level-2 1 CA4 CA5 CA6 1 One of many definitions: a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke certificates based on public key cryptography each certificate is issued (and signed) only by a single party (— CA) o each CA certifies only its children o the CA's certificate itself may be signed by a different CA (all the way up to a "self-signed" root certificate) root certificates must be available to those who use a lower level CA ertificate (root certificates are typically widely distributed) Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 72 / 125 ample Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internel Lecture overview • Motivation 0 Network Security Elements Cryptography Introduction 0 Symmetric Cryptography 0 Asymmetric Cryptography Network Security Mechanisms • Entity Authentication • Message Confidentiality (Security) 0 Message Integrity 0 Message Authentication 0 Digital Signature Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet 0 Application-layer Security 0 Transport-layer Security 0 Network-layer Security 0 Link-layer Security Network & Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability 0 Firewalls 0 Intrusion Detection Systems 0 Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 0 Virusses &i Worms 0 Network it Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet • all the presented concepts can be realized on: • application layer - security mechanisms provided by applications (application protocols) themselves • e.g., PGP, SET, S/MIME, S-HTTP, etc. • transport layer - SSL and TLS • network layer - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) • link layer - e.g., PPP Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Application-layer Security Application-layer Security Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) • a de-facto standard proposed by Phil Zimmermann (1991) • the mechanism providing secure email communication channels • originally uses an alternative approach to PKI for distributing user's public keys -Web of Trust • decentralized trust model • identity certificates are digitally signed by other users who, by that act, endorse the association of that public key with the person/entity listed in the certificate • => leaves the trust decisions in the hands of individual users • there are several levels of confidence which can be included in such signatures • later versions are able to use PKI as well • involves all the basic security mechanisms: • email confidentiality (using a symmetric one-time key because of performance — 3DES, IDEA, etc.) • integrity (hash functions - MD5, SHA) • authentication (asymmetric cryptography — RSA) • non-repudiation (through the use of PKI) • « Digital Signatures Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 75 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Application-layer Security Application-layer Security - PGP Sender's side Sender site (Alice) Digital signature Privacy Figure : The mechanism of signing and encrypting the sending message (sender's side). Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 76 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Application-layer Security Application-layer Security - PGP Receiver's side message + digest) Receiver site (Bob) Bob's private Encrypted Encrypted (secret key (secret key) & Decrypt Encrypted (message + digest) One-time secret key Decrypt Alice's public i Email Decrypt Hash - Compare -Digest Digest Figure : The mechanism of decrypting and verifying the received message (receiver's side). Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 77 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Application-layer Security Application-layer Security Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) I. Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) • a specialized cryptographic protocol developed by a group of companies (Visa, Microsoft, IBM, MasterCard, etc.) • designed for securing credit card transactions over insecure networks • NOT for a general encryption • design goals: • confidentiality of payment and ordering information • integrity of all transmitted data • authentication of all card holders • ensuring that a merchant can accept card transactions based on buyer's relationship with her financial institution • the merchant does not need to know the buyer's identity • creating protocols that neither depend on transport security mechanism nor prevent their use Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 78 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Application-layer Security Application-layer Security Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) II. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) bt I transactions ou 1. Network Security Spring 2015 79 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Application-layer Security Application-layer Security S/MIME and S-HTTP Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) • a standard for public key encryption and signing of MIME data • MIME - Internet standard that extends the format of e-mail to support, e.g., text in character sets other than ASCII, non-text attachments (pictures, video, audio, etc.), message bodies with multiple parts, etc. 9 provides authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation of origin (using digital signatures) and privacy and data security (using encryption) Secure-HTTP (S-HTTP) • extends the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to support encryptions and digital signatures • extends the negotiation between the client browser and the server to include the negotiation for security matters • uses additional headers for message encryption, digital certificates, and authentication in the HTTP format • the HTTP headers are encapsulated into the S-HTTP headers • has been bundled away by the HTTPs (HTTP over SSL/TLS) Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 80 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Transport-layer Security Transport-layer Security - SSL/TLS I. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) • the protocols for ensuring secure communication channels on the transport layer • (SSL precedes the TLS) • SSL 3.0 « TLS 1.0 • SSL/TLS provide secure and authenticated data paths between servers and clients: • data encryption - protect data in transport between the client and the server from interception (making them readable only by the intended recipient) • server and client authentication - the SSL uses standard public key encryption to authenticate the communicating parties to each other • message integrity - achieved through the use of session keys so that data cannot be intentionally/unintentionally tampered • main drawback: the necessity to adapt the applications (applications' protocols) • HTTP -> HTTPS (HTTP Secure) • FTP -> FTPS (FTP Secure) a etc. Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 81 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Transport-layer Security Transport-layer Security - SSL/TLS II. Application Layer Change Cipher Specification SSL Alert Protocol SSL Handshake Protocol ^ V SSL SSL Record Protocol TCP Protocol IP Protocol Figure : The SSL protocol stack. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 82 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Transport-layer Security Transport-layer Security - SSL/TLS III. Before any SSL connection can be established, there must be a handshake performed: Browser Web Server Algorithms I support. My random number. Compute secret hey. Verify certificate and extract server's public key. Encrypt pre-master secret with server's public key. Send checksum of handshake messages us inn secret key. Use this algorithm. My random number. My digital certificate. Decrypt pre-master ■ secret with server's private hey. Compute secret key. Send checksum of handshake messages using secret key. Figure : The SSL handshake (steps 5 and 6 verify the integrity of the handshake; the connmunication is encrypted using a svmmetnc^sessicjj^kev^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 83 / Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Network-layer Security Network-layer Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) I. IP Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) • a set of protocols providing secured communication channels on the network layer • Authentication Header (AH) protocol - designed for ensuring sender's and receiver's authentication and communication integrity (NOT for communication confidentiality) • Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol - designed for providing sender's authentication, communication integrity and confidentiality • can be used independently or in combination • establishes logical channels (called Security Associations, SAs) • always one-way channels (two channels are needed for duplex communication) • identified by: • protocol identifier (AH or ESP), source IP address, and channel identification (so-called Security Parameter Index, SPI) • operates in 2 modes: • Transport mode - IPSec header is inserted between IP header and message body • Tunnel mode - IPSec header is inserted in front of the original IP header; subsequently, a new IP header is created Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 84 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Network-layer Security Network-layer Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) II. IP Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) cont'd. • key distribution: • Internet Key Exchange (IKE) - used to set up an SA (RFC 4306 for v2) • uses X.509 certificates for authentication and Diffie-Hellman key exchange to set up a shared session secret • Internet Security Association and Key management Protocol (ISAKMP) - a framework for authentication and key exchange (RFC 2408) • designed to be key exchange independent (IKE or other protocols can be used to provide authenticated keying material) • advantages: secures all the data flows between two communicating parties; it is not necessary to adapt applications (application protocols) • drawbacks: there are no automated mechanisms for cryptographic keys' management • further information: • see IPv6 section in PA159 • see the animation (ongoing BP Thesis => will be available in a month): http://irakira.fi.muni.cz/~jeronimo/vyuka/IPSec Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 85 / 125 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Network-layer Security Network-layer Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) III. Transport vs. Tunnel mode IP Header The rest of the packet IP Header IPsec Header The rest of the packet Figure : Transport mode. IP Header The rest of the packet I New IP Header IPsec Header IP Header The rest of the packet Payload for new IP header Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) Figure : Tunnel mode. Network Security Spring 2015 Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Network-layer Security Network-layer Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) IV. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) I. Virtual Private Network (VPN) • a computer network that uses a public telecommunication infrastructure (such as the Internet) to provide remote offices or individual users with secure access to their organization's network • using a secure cryptographic method, it encapsulates data transfers between two or more networked devices which are not on the same private network • in order to keep the transferred data private • the VPN technology provides the following activities: • IP encapsulation - involves enclosing TCP/IP data packets within another packet with an IP-address of either a firewall or a server that acts as a VPN endpoint O various tunneling mechanisms: IPSec ESP tunnel, Point-to-Point Tunneling protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), PPP over SSL and PPP over SSH, etc. • Encryption - used to obfuscate the contents of the encapsulated data • Authentication - used to determine whether or not the endpoint can participate in the encrypted tunnel • may also be used to exchange the secret or public key used for payload ^^^^^^^^encrvrrtiori^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 87 / 125 ample Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Network-layer Security Network-layer Security - IPv6 & IPSec (IPv4) IV. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) II. Protected Network Protected Network Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet Link-layer Security Link-layer Security Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) • a data link protocol commonly used in establishing a direct connection between two networking nodes • limited to a single data link • provides connection authentication, transmission encryption (confidentiality), and compression • several authentication protocols can be used (PAP, CHAP, EAP, etc.) • transmission encryption - DES or 3DES • most commonly used forms: a Point-to-Point Protocol over ATM (PPPoA) • Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) • both serve to establish a DSL line connection with an ISP Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 89 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Lecture overview O Introduction 9 Motivation 9 Network Security Elements fj^l Cryptography Introduction 0 Symmetric Cryptography 9 Asymmetric Cryptography ^j^f Network Security Mechanisms 9 Entity Authentication 9 Message Confidentiality (Security) 9 Message Integrity 9 Message Authentication 9 Digital Signature 9 Key Management and Distribution Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet 9 Application-layer Security 9 Transport-layer Security 9 Network-layer Security 9 Link-layer Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability 9 Firewalls 9 Intrusion Detection Systems 9 Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 9 Virusses &i Worms 9 Network &i Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Network&Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability I. • all the previous security mechanisms cannot prevent Eve from sending a harmful message to a system • network & data protection - a complicated problem without a simple solution • authentication and encryption mechanisms are just technical fundamentals • organizational and social aspects are needed • humans (users) are usually the weakest elements => social engineering • possible threats: • accessing private data • modification of private or public data • including their removal (e.g., web pages) • undesired interferences to the network traffic/operation • including services' denial (so-called Denial of Service attacks) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 91 / 125 Network & Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Network&Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability I. A bit of History I First microti:: mpiiteis: createc :i-'st s-iiřiil ness.vie sen" Intel develops first' Modena i.eh;r in Era of Hacking DES enciyotion developed Pub ic key ererypTian developed IDARPA Irternet prs jest ■:■ Iran ■' Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 92 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Network&Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability II. Attack/Intrusion a deliberate unauthorized attempt, successful or not, to break into, access, manipulate, or misuse some valuable property and where the misuse may result into or render the property unreliable or unusable The attack/intrusion process consists of few stages: • Reconnaissance - the process of gathering information about the target system and the details of its workings and weak points • a scanning program sends network traffic to all/selected computers and expects receiving return traffic that will indicate whether those computers have known vulnerabilities • Physical Intrusion to acquire/modify private information, and/or • Denial of Service to crash a service (or a machine), overload network links or machines' CPU, fill up a disk, etc. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 93 / 125 Network & Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Network&Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability m. The protection from exploits has to be implemented on: • physical level • access protection • software level • authentication • encryption • traffic monitoring and instant reaction to incidents • juridical level • a definition of desired and undesired behaviour The basic security mechanisms for network protection: • Firewalls • Intrusion Detection Systems • Antiviruses Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 94 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls I. Firewall o a primary mean of securing a private network against penetration o firewall = a hardware, software, or a combination of both that monitors and filters traffic packets that attempt to either enter or leave a protected private network o i.e., interconnects networks with different trust o creates a perimeter defense designed to protect information resources organization Outgoing i Incoming i i i i ( Global /- - 71 / Internal \ ■ I *v Internet f \ network(s) J ___s :irewall Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 95 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls II. What a firewall can do... • implement security policies («s network access protection) at a single point • only authorized traffic is allowed to access the network/services • (or leave the network) • monitor security-related events (audit, log) • alarms for abnormal behavior can be implemented Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 96 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls III. and what a firewall cannot do... • protect against attacks that bypass the firewall • e.g., dial-out from internal host to an ISP • protect against internal threats • disgruntled employee • an insider cooperates with an external attacker • protect against the transfer of virus-infected programs or files • not including application gateways, which may be able to do so Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 97 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls IV. Firewalls' Classification Basic firewalls' classification: • Packet filtering firewalls - operate on network layer • Circuit level gateways - operate on session/transport layer • Application gateways (or proxy servers) - operate on application layer • Dynamic packet filtering firewalls (or Session filtering firewalls) • a combination of the three above • these technologies operate at different levels of detail, providing varying degrees of network access protection Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 98 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Packet Filtering firewalls Packet Filtering firewalls • decisions are made on per-packet basis • no state information is maintained • applies packet filters based on access rules defined by the following parameters: • source address • destination address • application or protocol/next header (TCP, UDP, etc.) • source port number • destination port number • advantages: • simple, low cost, fast, transparent to users • disadvantages: • cannot prevent attacks that employ application-specific vulnerabilities or functions • because they do not examine upper-layer data Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 99 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Dynamic Packet Filtering (Session Filtering) firewalls I. Dynamic Packet Filtering (Session Filtering) firewalls • traditional packet filters do not examine higher layer context • i.e., matching the incoming (returned) packets with an outgoing flow • dynamic packet filtering examines and maintains a context of each packet • they keep track of client-server connection • ^> a connection table (so-called State table) is maintained • packet decision is made in the context of a connection • if a packet establishes a new connection, it is checked against a policy • if a packet is a part of an existing connection, it is matched up in the state table • advantages: • transparent to users • low CPU overheads • for all the packets (except the first one) belonging to the same connection, no policy database lookups are performed Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 100 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Dynamic Packet Filtering (Session Filtering) firewalls II. Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Circuit Level Gateways I. Circuit Level Gateways • work at the session layer of the ISO/OSI model (TCP layer of the TCP/IP model) • monitor TCP handshaking between packets to determine whether a requested session is legitimate • do not permit an end-to-end TCP connection • rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections • one between itself and a TCP user on an inner host, and • one between itself and a TCP user on an outside host • once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP segments from one to the other without examining the contents • usage example: • hiding information about internal/protected networks • non-requested data from outside the firewall is not allowed in — all ports are closed until the firewall opens them • e.g., requests from protected network pass through the gateway, which intercept and record them • once the answer reaches the gateway, it is compared to the original request to _see if the IP address and the port match up_ Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 102 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Circuit Level Gateways II. Circuit Level Gateways cont'd. • a combination of circuit-level gateway with Internet sharing — Network Address Translation (NAT) • originally a reaction to IPv4 address exhaustion • but the NAT is not a firewall on itself! Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 103 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Circuit Level Gateways III. 5 Application . Transport Control, Protocol (TCP) ( 3 Internet Protocol (IP) 2 Data Link 1 Phystcal - Dissailowed Allowed Traffic is filtered based on specified session rules, such as when a session is initiated by a recognised computer Unknown traffic is only allowed up to level 4 of the Network Stack Incoming Traffic Allowed Outgoing Traffic Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls V. Application Gateways I. Application Gateways o similar to circuit-level gateways except that they are application specific o i.e., tailored to a specific application program o every connection between two networks is made via an application program called a proxy o proxies are application/protocol specific o they investigate the content of the passing flows o connection state is maintained and updated o only protocols that have specific proxies configured are allowed through the firewall (all other traffic is rejected) ° e.g., a gateway that is configured to be a web proxy will not allow any FTP, telnet or other traffic through Application-leve gateway rfffl Du t s do lower performance • require high performance host computer • more vulnerable to DoS attacks (see later) • problematic for encrypted data (including IPSec) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 106 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Firewalls Firewalls VI. Concluding Remarks • firewalls cannot serve as a panacea to network security threats • many security attacks led from within the internal (not protected) network • increase the risk of rapid infection spread • false safety feeling • the internal network is not usually sufficiently protected • users become lazy • usually cause a slowdown on high-speed networks • their functionality is very useful for interrupting the ongoing attack • application proxies: • risk of faults (e.g., false virus detection) • the importance of privacy protection Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 107 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) I. • network perimeter security technologies (i.e., firewalls) and anti-malicious software technologies (i.e., antiviruses, see later) cannot stop attackers if they obtain authenticated access to target computers and log on to them as if they are legitimate users • (i.e., they had obtained login information of a legitimate user) • it is desirable (and often necessary) to detect intrusion activities by monitoring ingress packets that have passed through firewalls and analyze how users use their computers • => Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Honeypots Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) • a system used to detect unauthorized intrusions into computer systems and networks • based on an assumption that the behavior of the intruder differs from that of a legitimate user • they collect information from a variety of system and network sources and look for attack signatures • = specific patterns that usually indicate malicious or suspicious intent Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 108 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) II. Classification IDS classification: • different ways of classifying an IDS • IDSs based on detection model: • anomaly detection • signature based misuse (misuse detection) • hybrid • IDSs based on scope: • host-based • multihost-based • network-based • IDSs based on operation: • offline - inspect system logs at set intervals • online - monitor the system continuously Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 109 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) III. Anomaly Detection Anomaly Detection IDSs: • model the normal usage of the network as a noise characterization • anything distinct from the noise (atypical behavior) is assumed to be an intrusion activity » e.g., flooding a host with lots of packet • the primary strength is its ability to recognize novel attacks • drawbacks: • assume, that intrusions will be accompanied by manifestations that are sufficiently unusual • generate many false alarms • => compromise the effectiveness of the IDS Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 110 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) III. Misuse Detection Misuse Detection IDSs: • recognize known attacks based on signatures • a set of attack signatures has to be defined (and updated) • if an action matching a signature is detected, it is considered to be an attack • drawbacks: » unable to detect novel attacks • suffer from false alarms » have to be programmed again for every new pattern to be detected Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 111 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) III. Host-based & Multihost-based IDSs I. Host-based IDSs: • host operating system (or an application) logs in the audit information • e.g., use of identification and authentication mechanisms (logins, etc.), file opens and program executions, admin activities, etc. • the audit is then analyzed to detect trails of intrusion Multihost-based IDSs: • audit information is analyzed from multiple hosts • analysis architecture: • centralized - all data shipped to a central location for analysis • hierarchical - data is analyzed as it passed up through the layers • distributed - distributed analysis of the data Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 112 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) III. Host-based & Multihost-based IDSs II. Host-based & Multihost-based IDSs: cont'd. • advantages: • can detect data that are encrypted during transmissions • do not need special hardware devices • check system logs and so can analyze system behavior more accurately • disadvantages: • are installed in the target systems, and so they require extra system managing • may consume extra computing resources on the systems • might become affected by attacks that affect the host computers/servers they are installed in Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 113 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) III. Network-based IDSs Network-based IDSs: • look for attack signatures in network traffic via a promiscuous interface • a filter is usually applied to determine which traffic will be discarded or passed on to an attack recognition module • to filter out known un-malicious traffic • advantages: • low cost - usually small number of selected points to monitor the entire network • no interference - packets are monitored passively (it does not interfere normal network traffic) • intrusion resistent - usually a small system, which can be easily made to resist an intrusion • disadvantages: • may not be able to analyze encrypted packets • may not be able to handle large volume of network traffics in time » some intrusion activities (e.g., fragmentation-attack) are hard to identify • hard to determine, whether the intrusion activity has been successfully carried out Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 114 / 125 Network & Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) IV. Concluding Remarks • Intrusion Detection Systems are only one piece of the whole security puzzle • they must be supplemented by other security and protection mechanisms • they are a very important part of security architecture but do not solve all the potenciál problems Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 115 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Honeypots Honeypot • a system designed to teach how intruders probe for and exploit a system • by learning their tools and methods, one can better protect her network and systems • usually used for: • diverting an attacker from accessing critical systems • collecting information about the attacker's activity • encouraging the attacker to stay on the system long enough for administrators to respond • based on virtual or real systems Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 116 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Honeypots "Tracking Their Moves" I. "Tracking Their Moves" • do not log information on the honeypot itself • the fewer modification you make to the honeypot, the better • the more changes you make, the better the chance an intruder will discover something is up • you can easily lose the information • track in layers, do not depend on a single source of information • first layer of tracking is the firewall logs • second layer is the system logs » third layer of tracking is to use a sniffer • it picks up all keystrokes and screen captures • run, e.g., the Tripwire on the honeypot • to discover what binaries have been altered on a compromised system Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 117 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Intrusion Detection Systems Honeypots "Tracking Their Moves" II. "Tracking Their Moves" cont'd. • do not mindlessly reinstall the compromised system!!! • otherwise you'll lose the information about the security hole the intruder had exploited • if possible, do not reboot the compromised system • running malicious programs may not automatically start after the reboot • if possible, do not disconnect the compromised system from the network • the system, once being disconnected from the network, may close all the active network connections • better way is to cut off the system on the closest firewall • or disconnect it behind first network element (switch, router, etc.) Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 118 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability attacks Denial of Service (DoS) & Distributed DoS (DDoS) I. Denial of Service (DoS) attack: • an attack that causes a loss of a service to users • typically the loss of network connectivity and services by consuming the bandwidth of the victim's network or overloading the computational resources of the victim's system • the flood of incoming messages essentially forces the target system to shut down (thus denying the service) • attack lead from a single source • not too dangerous - can be stopped in the closest active network element • attack lead from many sources — Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack • a synchronized attack from many sources (e.g., Botnets) • hard to discover - all the requests appear to be sent by legitimate users • much more dangerous • stopping requires a cooperation in the network • stopping in active networks — consecutive cut of flows against their direction Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 119 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability attacks Denial of Service (DoS) & Distributed DoS (DDoS) II. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 120 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Virusses &i Worms Virusses & Worms I. Computer a self-propagating computer program designed to alter or destroy a computer system resource J a self-replicating program, similar to a computer virus - a virus attaches itself to, and becomes part of, another executable program; however, a worm is self-contained and does not need to be part of another program to propagate itself (through security holes of a networked system) Virus/Worm attacks: • some sort of trigger will activate the attack phase, and the virus will then "do something" • trigger = a specific date, or the number of times the virus has been replicated, or anything similar o "do something" = anything from printing a silly message on the screen to erasing all of your data Ludek Matyska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 121 / 125 Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Virusses &i Worms Virusses & Worms II. Protection from virus/worm attacks: • run a secure operating system with access right • security features keep viruses away • run virus protection software • in end-nodes and/or application gateways • avoid programs from unknown sources • educating the users is a must • — computer hygiene Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability Network &i Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Network & Data Protection - Concluding Remarks • attacks/intrusions - an effort to acquire an access to a network or its services • reasons range from boyish fun ("testing neighbor's pears") to military/terroristic actions • usage: • private data access/modification • source platform for subsequent activity (e.g., DDoS) • protection: » access control on all possible levels • regular maintanance (patches, upgrades, etc.) • network traffic monitoring • monitoring of processes running on the servers/end-nodes • users' education Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 123 / 125 Lecture overview O Introduction 9 Motivation 9 Network Security Elements fj^l Cryptography Introduction 0 Symmetric Cryptography 9 Asymmetric Cryptography ^j^f Network Security Mechanisms 9 Entity Authentication 9 Message Confidentiality (Security) 9 Message Integrity 9 Message Authentication 9 Digital Signature 9 Key Management and Distribution Example Protocols Ensuring Network Security in the Internet 9 Application-layer Security 9 Transport-layer Security 9 Network-layer Security 9 Link-layer Security Network &i Data Protection - Maintaining the Availability 9 Firewalls 9 Intrusion Detection Systems 9 Denial of Service (DoS) &i Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 9 Virusses &i Worms 9 Network &i Data Protection - Concluding Remarks Conclusion Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Recapitulation - Network Security • AAA mechanisms + secured communication mechanisms + data/services protection/availability • features of a secured communication network: • Confidentiality • Integrity • Non-repudiation • symmetric (shared key) and asymmetric (key pair - private and public) cryptography • secured communication mechanisms can be provided on various ISO/OSI layers (application, transport, network, data link) • further information: • PV017: Information Technology Security (doc. Staudek) • PV079: Applied Cryptography (prof. Matyáš et al.) • PV080: Protection of Data and Information Privacy (prof. Matyáš) • PV157: Authentication and Access Control (prof. Matyáš and dr. Říha) • PV210: Security analysis of network traffic (RNDr. Vykopal) • etc. Luděk Matýska (Fl MU) 1. Network Security Spring 2015 125 / 125