PV204: Disk encryption lab
May 12, 2016, Milan Broz <xbroz@fi.muni.cz>
Introduction
Encryption can provide confidentiality and authenticity of user data. It can be implemented on several
different layes, including application, file system or storage device.
Application encryption examples are PGP or ZIP compression with password.
Encryption of files (inside filesystem or through independent layer like Linux eCryptfs) provides more
generic solution. Yet some parts (like filesystem metadata) are still unencrypted. However this solution
provides encrypted data with private key per user. (Every user can have own directory encrypted by
own key.)
Encryption of the low-level storage (disk) is called Full Disk Encryption (FDE). It is completely
transparent to the user (no need to choose what to encrypt – the whole disk is encrypted). The
encrypted disk behaves as the same as a disk without encryption.
The major disadvantage is that everyone who knows the password can read the whole disk. Often we
combine FDE with another encryption layer. The primary use of FDE is to provide data confidentiality
in power-down mode (stolen laptop does not leak user data).
Once the disk is unlocked, the main encryption key remains in system, usually directly in system RAM.
Exercise II will show how easy is to get this key from memory image of system.
Another disadvantage of FDE is that it usually cannot guarantee integrity of data. Encryption is fully
transparent and length-preserving, the ciphertext and plaintext device are of the same size. There is no
space to store any integrity information. This allows attacks by direct modification of ciphertext.
The FDE works on the sector level, as the same as the block device. Atomic I/O access units for
encrypted devices are sectors. Sectors are encrypted independently by a symmetric cipher. Cipher block
size is (in most cases) smaller than the size of a sector. It means that inside sector we need to use an
encryption mode (suitable for storage encryption).
It is crucial that the same data in different sectors must produce different ciphertext pattern. This is
achieved by a per-sector tweak (IV, Initialization Vector) that is usually derived from logical sector
offset (sector number). Combination of properly used IV and encryption mode is critical for the
security of the FDE system. Figure 1 shows an example of wrongly used mode for encryption (here
ECB, Electronic Codebook). Another problems could appear with CBC mode [CBC] and predictable
IV. Then attacker can use predictability of IV and create watermarks and detect them directly from
ciphertext. We will show this flaw on legacy TrueCrypt device in Exercise III.
Today, the most used encryption mode for disks is XTS [XTS]. This mode is constructed such way, that
it can safely use predictable sector number directly as an IV. Schema of CBC and XTS encryption
mode is for reference in Appendix.
Figure 1. An image encrypted in ECB mode (without tweaked-sector encryption).
FDE can be implemented on hardware layer (self-encrypted disk, encryption inside controller chipset)
or in software [FDE].
Software implementation is for example Bitlocker for Windows systems, dm-crypt in Linux, FileVault
on MacOS or (abandoned) TrueCrypt. There are many other tools implementing this functionality
[COMP].
In the following exercises we will use two software FDE tools. The first one is LUKS/dm-crypt
[LUKS] which is primary solution for Linux based systems and CipherShed/TrueCrypt [TC].
Both tools can create a virtual encrypted block device within a partition or a regular file.
This virtual disk can be formatted as if it was a physical device and mounted.
TrueCrypt also supports trivial steganography and allows to create a hidden virtual volume within
another volume.
References
[FDE] Disk encryption
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption
[COMP] Comparison of disk encryption software
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_disk_encryption_software
[CBC] Cipher Block Chaining mode
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Cipher-block_chaining_.28CBC.29
[XTS] IEEE P1619™/D16 Standard for Cryptographic Protection of Data on Block-Oriented Storage
Devices (AES-XTS)
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf
[LUKS] Linux Unified Key Setup / cryptsetup
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/
[TC] CipherShed (former TrueCrypt), Free open-source disk encryption software
https://www.ciphershed.org/
Exercises
We will use prepared Virtual Machine PV204 (slightly updated Debian Linux 8).
VM can be run in Oracle VirtualBox.
The virtual machine has preinstalled LUKS disk encryption of the whole system, cryptsetup 1.7 (it
can open TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt devices as well), TrueCrypt 7.1a and VeraCrypt 1.17.
.
For experiments you can use /dev/sdb (512MB virtual disk).
User name: pv204
Password (also unlocking password for disk): pv204
Note: User pv204 can run superuser commands via sudo without need of entering password,
e.g. sudo ls /root.
Exercise I: Hardware keylogger use
"If you let your machine out of your sight, it’s no longer your machine."
In a context of disk encryption specialized hw device can be used to attack entered passphrase (BIOS
password, disk encryption unlocking passphrase).
Hardware keylogger is a device which intercepts data entered through keyboard and store it internally
for later analysis. The device can also transmit data using wireless network or another hidden channel.
If properly masked (e.g. in keyboard controller) it is very hard to reveal it by user because device is
completely transparent to BIOS and operating system (and power consumption is minimal).
Figure 2. Example keylogger module
We will use simple example of commercially available USB keylogger module (2010/2014) intended
for built-in applications. Used version has only 4MB internal memory for log but extended version
provides SD card for log store (enough storage for almost the whole physical life of the keyboard).
Log retrieval is activated by an activation shortcut, which switches keylogger into USB drive emulation
mode and provides direct access to log storage (file).
Figure 3. Log retrieval from the module
Your task
1. Connect provided USB keyboard through cable with USB keylogger module.
2. Check that system recognizes keyboard (as the same as it is connected directly).
3. Simulate some work where you need enter sensitive data, e.g. create new TrueCrypt encrypted
device, boot testing virtual machine and log in or try to enter some password in browser.
4. Switch to host system file explorer and press activation shortcut :
'K' + 'B' + 'S' key together.
The keyboard should detach and you should see new virtual USB flash disk.
5. Investigate "LOG.txt" file on the disk and compare it with your work in step 3.
6. Please delete the "LOG.txt" so your colleagues will not see your "sensitive" data :-)
Exercise II: Obtaining encryption key from VM memory image
For most of the software-based disk encryption applications the encryption run on the CPU, usually
inside OS context (optionally with HW acceleration like AES-NI instructions).
In this operating mode the encryption key is present in RAM during the operation. An attacker can
obtain image of physical memory and try to search for the encryption key. This image can be either
obtained though software (we will use VirtualBox debugger function) or through hardware (Cold boot
attack, i.e. recover memory content after force reboot/short powerdown or use FireWire hw debug
functions). The obtained key can be directly used for storage decryption (without password).
Next problem is to identify candidate keys in memory image. This can be done by recognizing internal
OS structures in memory or by a more generic approach, like reconstructing AES keys by identifying
specific round keys [COLD].
Your Task
1. Copy provided image and prepare Virtual Machine with some active and mounted encrypted
devices and understand the storage stack inside.
You should have two encrypted and active disks for this exercise in VM. One is system
encryption itself (LUKS/dm-crypt) and second will be TrueCrypt device created on /dev/sdb.
a) Start and login to VM.
b) Run VeraCrypt GUI (on desktop) and create new device directly on /dev/sdb (please use
AES only for encryption algorithm). Create volume within a partition/drive, standard volume,
select device /dev/sdb, use AES.
c) Mount device through VeraCrypt GUI and investigate used parameters (Volume Properties).
Keep it mounted to investigate key in memory later.
d) Investigate and understand storage stack, dump parameters about encrypted virtual devices.
Use lsblk command to get the whole picture:
In this example, sda5 is your system encrypted partition, sdb is the VeraCrypt (or TrueCrypt)
device.
Check VeraCrypt device - note the header is encrypted so you cannot get information using
blkid. Use cryptsetup TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt extension to get more info about device on-disk
header:
$ sudo blkid /dev/sdb
$ sudo cryptsetup tcryptDump /dev/sdb –veracrypt –dump­master­key ­q
Note: if you are using VeraCrypt (instead of TrueCrypt) modes, add ­­veracrypt
option to cryptsetup option above (otherwise cryptsetup will not recognize VeraCrypt
format).
Now, try to display encrypted keys directly from kernel (superuser can display full devicemapper
dm-crypt mapping table for active devices).
e) Repeat the same exercise for LUKS device (/dev/sda5 mapped to sda5_crypt), just use
luksDump command. Note LUKS has visible header on-disk.
2. While the VM is still running, obtain snapshot of memory core image.
You can use Vbox_save_memcore.bat script which uses internal VirtualBox debugger to dump
VM memory core (it is in fact ELF format dump, but it is enough for our use).
3. Analyze the memory core image with the provided aeskeyfind program. Note this program
search for specific AES structures. (In reality you have key in memory more times but in
different format, just think about screen buffer with text dumps executed in step 1.)
4. Compare possible encryption keys with information you obtained in step 1.
See XTS encryption mode definition [XTS] and think why you see two separate AES keys for
one device.
References
[COLD] Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys
https://citp.princeton.edu/research/memory/
[XTS] IEEE P1619™/D16 Standard for Cryptographic Protection of Data on Block-Oriented Storage
Devices (AES-XTS)
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf
Optional/Advanced Exercise III:
Revealing TrueCrypt hidden disk existence (CBC mode)
The goal of this exercise is to show that old CBC mode in TrueCrypt is vulnerable to watermarking
attack and that such attack could be used to reveal hidden disk existence just from ciphertext analysis.
Theory
The TrueCrypt (in version before 4.1) used
CBC mode with Initialization Vector
calculated from the sector number and
xored with secret key KIV. Also there is
additional whitening which is calculated
using several CRC32 operations over secret
key KW xored with sector number. Final
whitening value is then applied to the whole
plaintext sector with plain xor function.
Unfortunately, both operations are not
secure (IV is still partially predictable
because for consecutive sectors we know
which bits will change, and the whitening is
just linear transformation, CRC32 is not
cryptographically secure). The figure shows simplified attack with P (plaintext block) and C (ciphertext
block). For more info see [TC4].
This attack allows construct a special plaintext, which if aligned to proper sectors can propagate special
pattern (watermark) into ciphertext. Because filesystem aligns start of files to sector offset, we can just
use specially formatted file in hidden disk and then search for the watermark on ciphertext device. As
the exercise will show, this special file can be text file, so forcing user to store such file in the hidden
disk is not too complicated (imagine mail or picture in browser cache).
Your Task
For the task use TrueCrypt installed in Virtual Machine (VeraCrypt no longer supports CBC mode).
The exercise files are already copied to /home/task3 inside VM.
1. Use the provided TrueCrypt container in /home/task3/tc_hidden_cbc.tc and try to open it in
TrueCrypt.
The password to outer (decoy) volume is "password", password to hidden volume is "hidden".
2. Using the provided program /home/task3/create_file <name> (which implements attack
above) generate special file and copy it to hidden TrueCrypt disk.
3. Dismount the TrueCrypt device and run /home/task3/detect_file over the TrueCrypt container
image. It should find the pattern in special file and print the offset of this pattern.
4. See the create_file and detect_file source code (/home/task3/src) to better understand internal
operation.
References
[TC4] sci-crypt mailinglist, TrueCrypt 4.0 Out
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/sci.crypt/3DxOChZ0lrQ[1-25-false]
Assignment
There is assignment.zip in study materials which contains pv204_assignment.tc (TrueCrypt virtual
volume compatible with TrueCrypt 7.1a and VeraCrypt 1.17).
Note: the same files are in /home/assignment directory in provided VM used in Exercise II.
The volume is protected by a 9-character long password, which begins with "pv204_XXX" where X
means digit [0-9].
Your task
1. Find the password and unlock the volume.
2. Investigate the master encryption keys and primary header salt.
What's wrong with them?
3. Describe your findings in text file:
- The password to the volume.
- How did you find the password.
Attach the script or source code of your password search utility.
- Describe which cipher chain (names of ciphers) is used for the volume.
- Write in hexa format volume salt (for the primary TrueCrypt header, from the first sector).
- Write in hexa master keys for all used ciphers.
- Shortly describe (max. 10 sentences) what is wrong with the keys (or salt).
Are the keys independent and randomly generated?
- Bonus: try to check how the key(s) were generated (hint: just use Google).
Pack description text file and scripts or source files to <UCO>.zip archive and upload it to IS.
Notes
The volume uses cipher chain (more cipher in sequence), note the most password crackers do NOT
support this mode.
You can simply use wrapper script for TrueCrypt or cryptsetup commandline or generate candidate
password list and use dictionary search example in cryptsetup sources.
To display hexa keys you can use commands from Exercise II.
To display salt just check TrueCrypt header format (to see the salt position) and use hexa editor,
hexdump or similar tool. See Appendix for the on-disk format description.
Appendix – TrueCrypt on-disk header format