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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
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PV204 Security technologies
Hardware Security Modules (HSM), PKCS#11
Petr Švenda        svenda@fi.muni.cz        @rngsec
Centre for Research on Cryptography and Security, Masaryk University

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)
Difference to smartcards
HSM security
API
Certifications (FIPS140-2, CC EAL)
Usage of HSM in cloud
Steps of HSM operations
Use-cases
Cryptography as a service
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE
•Hardware Security Module
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Hardware Security Module - definition
•HSM is trusted hardware element
–Contains own physical and logical protection
–May provide increased performance (compared to CPU)
•Attached to or put inside PC/server/network box
•Provides in-device:
–Secure key generation (and entry)
–Secure storage (and backup)
–Secure use (cryptographic algorithms)
•Should never export sensitive data in plaintext
–Especially keys = Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
You already know one example of HSM
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart cards     HSMs
•Price: $3-30
•2-5 RSA/ECC signs/sec
•USB/serial connection
•Mostly disconnected
•No battery
•3KB RAM, 100KB flash
•Limited algs. support
•$100-$10000
•100-10000 RSA/ECC signs/sec
•UTP/PCI connected
•Always connected
•Own battery (time…)
•MBs-GBs, SSD
•Wide range of algorithms
•Rich API + management
–Common applications
•Trusted input interface (smartcard reader)
•
5
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
hybridcard_2

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Typical use-cases for HSMs
•Payment industry (PIN and transaction verification)
•TLS accelerator (server’s private key)
•Certification authority (protection of CA private key)
•Key management (distribution, derivation)
•Software signing
•Custom uses (DRM…)
•
•Vendors - market is now consolidating
–IBM, nCipher , Thales, Safenet, Gemalto, Utimaco…
•
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Many HSM forms possible
•Stand-alone Ethernet boxes (1U/2U)
•PCI cards
•Serial/USB tokens
•SmartCards, TPMs…
•Note: we will focus on more powerful devices (smart cards already covered)
–
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
https://www.thales-esecurity.com/products-and-services/products-and-services/hardware-security-modu
les
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Hardware Security Module - specification
•Common functions
–Generate functions (generate new key)
–Load functions (import key, plain/wrapped by other key)
–Use key functions (various cryptographic algorithms)
–Export key functions (wrapping)
–Access control functions (public, login user, login admin)
–Destroy secrets functions
•Possibility to write custom “plugins”
–Custom code running inside HSM
–(usually invalidates certification)
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Hardware Security Module - protection
•Protections against physical attacks (tamper)
–Invasive, semi-invasive and non-invasive attacks
•Protection against logical attacks
–API-level attacks, Fuzzing…
•Preventive measures
–Statistical testing of random number generator
–Self-testing of cryptographic engines (encrypt twice, KAT)
–Firmware integrity checks
–Periodic reset of device (e.g., every 24 hour)
–…
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
HSM – tamper security
•Protection epoxy
•Wiring mesh
•Temperature sensors
•Light sensors
•Variations (glitches) in power supply
•Erasure of memory (write 0/random)
–After tamper detection to mitigate data remanence
•…
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
Which one is tamper resistance,
evidence, detection and/or reaction?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png
www.techbriefs.com
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
HSM – logical security
•Access control with limited/delayed tries
–< 1:1000 000 probability of random guess of password
–< 1:100 000 probability of unauthorized access in one minute
•Integrity and authentication of firmware update
–Signed firmware updates
•Logical separation of multiple users (memory)
–Additional protection logic for separate memory regions
•Audit trails
•…
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
CERTIFICATIONS
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Certifications: FIPS140-2
•NIST FIPS 140-2
–Verified under Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
–NIST FIPS 140-2 Level 1+2 – basic levels, tamper evidence (broken shell, epoxy), role-based
authentication (user/admin))
–NIST FIPS 140-2 Level 3 – addition of physical tamper-resistance, identity-based auth, separation
of interfaces with different sensitivity
–NIST FIPS 140-2 Level 4 + additional physical security requirements, environmental attacks (very
few devices certified)
–NIST FIPS 140-3 (2013, but still draft, now abandoned)
•Additional focus on software security and non-invasive attacks
•List of validated devices https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
•
–
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Certifications: NIST FIPS 140-2
•Requirements on hardware and software components of security modules to be used by US government
–Verified under Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
–Testing against a defined cryptographic module, provides a suite of conformance tests to required
security level
–List of validated devices http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html
•Common levels for HSMs
–NIST FIPS 140-2 Level 1+2 – basic levels, tamper evidence (broken shell, epoxy), role-based
authentication (user/admin))
–NIST FIPS 140-2 Level 3 – addition of physical tamper-resistance, identity-based authentication,
separation of interfaces with different sensitivity
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Certifications: NIST FIPS 140-2 (cont.)
•Common levels for HSMs (cont.)
–NIST FIPS 140-2 Level 4 + additional physical security requirements, environmental attacks
–http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
–Only very few devices certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 4
•NIST FIPS 140-3 (2013, but still draft)
–Additional focus on software security and non-invasive attacks
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
NIST FIPS 140-2 and RNG
•Truly random number generators (TRNG)
–No approved FIPS 140-2 TRNG
•Pseudorandom number generators
–ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4, 3DES/AES-based
•FIPS 140-2 requires testing of RNG
–Known-answer-tests (KAT), Diehard battery
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
“Random” FIPS 140-2 example
•https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
•Futurex EXP9000 HSM (07/2011)
–https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/Certificate/1577
–FIPS140-2, security level 3
–Approved algorithms
–Non approved algorithms
–Roles and authentication
–Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
–Physical security mechanisms
–…
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Certifications: Common Criteria EAL 4-5+
•CC does not directly measure the security of the system/device itself
–only states level on which the system/device was tested
–and against what Security Target
•To achieve particular level, system must meet assurance requirements
–Documentation, design analysis, functional/penetration testing
•CC certifies that system followed certain rules when implementing target goals
–Broader than FIPS 140-2
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Certifications: Common Criteria EAL 4-5+
•Common levels for HSMs
–EAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested and Reviewed
–EAL5: Semi-formally Designed and Tested
•Protection profiles
–Specifies generic security evaluation criteria to substantiate vendors' claims (more technical)
–Crypto Module Protection Profile (BSI)
–https://www.bsi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480256/publicationFile/29291/pp0045b_pdf.pdf
•+ means “augmented” version (current version + additional requirements, e.g., EAL4+)
•
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Certifications: PCI HSM version 1,2,3
•PCI HSM v1 (2009), v2 (2012), v3 (2016)
–https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/documents.php
•Focused on area of payment transactions
–Payment terminals, backend HSMs…
–Payment transaction processing
–Cardholder authentication
–Card issues procedure
•Set of logical and physical requirements relevant to payment industry
–Closer to NIST FIPS 140-2 then to CC (more concrete requirements)
•
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Cost of certification
•Certification is usually done by commercial “independent” laboratories
–Laboratories are certified by governing body
–Quality and price differ
–Usually payed for by device manufacturer
1.Certification pre-study
–Verify if product is ready for certification
2.Full certification
–Checklist if all required procedures were followed
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Cost of CC EAL (US GAO, 2006)
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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Motivation to keep already certified version longer in production
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Be aware what is actually certified
•Certified != secure
–Satisfies defined criteria, producer claims were verified to be valid
–Infineon’s RSA prime generation algorithm (BSI, CVE-2017-15361)
•Usually certified bundle of hardware and software
–Concrete underlying hardware
–Concrete version of firmware, OS and pre-loaded application
•Certification usually invalidated when:
–New hardware revision used (less common)
–New version of firmware, OS, application (common)
–Any customization, e.g., user firmware module (very common)
•Pragmatic result
–“I’m using product that was certified at some point in time”
–
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How is certified product used?
•Trade-off between security functionality and required data centre operations
•Certification FIPS 140-2
–users usually turn FIPS mode off (want use additional functionality)
•“Almost” FIPS 140-2 mode
–Everything FIPS except what user added (custom module)
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HSM PERFORMANCE
•
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HSM – performance I.
•Limited independent public information available
–Claim: “up to 9000 RSA-1024b operations / second”
•But…
–Real operations are not just raw crypto (formatting of messages…)
–Longer key length may be needed (RSA-2048b)
–Internal vs. external speed (data in/out excluded)
–Measurements in “optimal” situations (single pre-prepared key, large data blocks…)
–…
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
HSM – performance II.
•Relatively difficult to obtain fair comparison
•F. Demaertelaere (2010)
–https://handouts.secappdev.org/handouts/2010/Filip%20Demaertelaere/HSM.pdf
•RSA 1024 bit private key operation: 100 – 7000 ops/sec
•ECC 160 bit ECDSA signatures: 250 – 2500 ops/sec
•3DES: 2 - 8 Mbytes/sec
•AES: 6 - 40 Mbytes/sec (256 bit key)
•
•No significant breakthrough in technology since 2010
•Higher throughput achieved by multiple HSMs
•
–
–
–
–
•
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Recent update (Feb 2018)
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
http://go.thalesesecurity.com/rs/480-LWA-970/images/ThalesEsecurity_nShield_Connect_ds.pdf
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HSM - load balancing, failover
•HSMs often used in business critical scenarios
–Authorization of payment transaction
–TLS accelerator for internet banking
–…
•Redundancy and load-balancing required
•Single HSM is not enough
–At least two in production for failover
–At least one or two for development and test
–
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STEPS OF CRYPTO OPERATION
•Hardware Security Module
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Steps of cryptographic operation
1.Transfer input data
2.Transfer wrapped key in
3.Initialize unwrap engine
4.Unwrap data/key (decrypt/verify)
5.Initialize key object with key value
6.Initialize cryptographic engine with key
7.Start, execute and finalize crypto operation
8.Initialize wrap engine
9.Wrap data/key (encrypt/sign)
10.Erase key(s)/engine(s)
11.Transfer output data
12.Transfer wrapped key out
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png
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S1: One user, few keys
•No sharing, all engines fully prepared
D:\Documents\Obrazky\crypto_lifecycle.png
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S2: One user, many keys
•No sharing, frequent crypto context change
D:\Documents\Obrazky\crypto_lifecycle.png
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S3: Few users, few keys
•Device is shared ® isolation of users
D:\Documents\Obrazky\crypto_lifecycle.png
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S4: Few users, many keys
•Limited sharing, frequent crypto context change
D:\Documents\Obrazky\crypto_lifecycle.png
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S5: Many users, many keys
•High sharing, frequent crypto context change
D:\Documents\Obrazky\crypto_lifecycle.png
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HSM IN CLOUD
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security topics in cloud environment
1.Move of legacy applications into cloud
–Previously used locally connected HSMs
2.Protection of messages exchanged between multiple cloud-based applications
–Key exchange of used key without pre-distribution?
3.Volume encryption in cloud
–Encrypted block mounted after application request (e.g., Amazon’s Elastic Block Storage)
4.Encrypted databases
–Block encryption of database storage, encryption of rows/cells
5.Cryptography as a Service
–Not only key management, also other cryptographic functionality
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
39
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Use case: Microsoft Azure KeyVault
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
•
•
•
•
•
•
•REST API to generate keys, export pub, use keys…
–https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/keyvault/
•Language bindings (language specific wrappers)
–JS, PowerShell, C#…
•
•
40

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Microsoft Azure KeyVault
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
https://channel9.msdn.com/Events/Ignite/2015/BRK2706
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Use case: AWS Key Management Service
•AWS Key Management Service Cryptographic Details (2015)
–https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/KMS-Cryptographic-Details.pdf
•Centralized key management
–Used by cloud-based applications
–Used by any client application
–Replication of wrapping keys into HSMs in different datacenters
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Usage scenario: envelope encryption
•Protected message exchange between multiple (cloud-based) application
1.Random key generated in one application
2.Key protected (wrap) using trusted element (HSM)
3.Wrapped key appended to message
4.Key unwrapped in second application (via HSM)
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
What is difference to
PGP/S-MIME?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png
44

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Who is trusted?
•KMS Service to wrap envelope keys properly
•KMS Service not to leak wrapping key
•Cloud operator not to read unwrapped keys from memory
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Use case: Amazon AWS CloudHSM
•Amazon’s AWS CloudHSM
–Based on SafeNet’s Luna HSM
–Only few users can share one HSM (probably no sharing)
–=> High initial cost (~$5000 + $1.88 per hour)
•Note: significantly different service from AWS KMS
–“Whole” HSM is available to single user/application, not only key (un)wrapping functionality
–Suitable for legacy apps, compliancy requirements
–
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
D:\Documents\Obrazky\amazon_cloudHSM.png
46

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Use case: Amazon AWS CloudHSM
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
D:\Documents\Obrazky\amazon_cloudHSM.png
47

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Group activity: certification report (10 minutes)
•https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/Validated-Modules/Search
•‘Show all’ option, pick any hardware module, quick read report
•What FIP140-2 level was achieved?
•What is approved cryptographic functionality?
•How is physical security protected? Side-channels?
•What kind of self-test are executed?
•Is the module also certified within Common Criteria?
•Interesting results (5 minutes)
•
1.
•
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 19.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
CRYPTOGRAPHY AS A SERVICE
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Plain-Blue-icon.png
Offloading security operations…
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Plain-Blue-icon.png
WS API: JSON
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Plain-Blue-icon.png
… into secured environment
Cryptography as a Service (CaaS)
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png
How to import key(s) securely?
Which hardware platform to use?
High number of clients?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Computer_Icon.png
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Different levels of trust
•CaaS with trusted server
–Software operation only, HTTPS for in/out
–Trust to server, CaaS platform is target, insider attack
•CaaS with semi-trusted server
–HTTPS for in/out, decrypted by server
–Operation send into trusted hardware
–CaaS platform still target
•CaaS with untrusted server
–HTTPS for in/out, but inner protection
–Data decrypted/processed/encrypted inside device
–
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Requirements – client view
•Untrusted CaaS provider (handling secrets)
•Secure import of app’s secrets - enrollment
•Client<->CaaS communication security
–Confidentiality/integrity of input and output data
–Authentication of input/output requests
•Key use control
–Use constraints – e.g., number of allowed ops
•Easy recovery from client-side compromise
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Requirements – CaaS provider view
•Massive scalability
–W.r.t. users, keys, transactions…
•Low latency of responses
•Robust audit trail of key usage
•Tolerance and recovery from failures
–hardware/software failures
•Easy to use API
–also easy to use securely
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Hardware options for CaaS
•Use of general-purpose hardware (CPU, GPU)
•Use of generic programmable hardware (FPGA)
•Use of dedicated cryptographic circuits (ASICs)
•Use of secure processors (HSMs, smartcards)
•
•(use of additional tamper protection of device)
•(use of fully homomorphic encryption)
–
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
CaaS - implementation issues
•Security
–Software-only CaaS more vulnerable to attacks
–Access control and operation authorization critical
•
•Performance
–Classic HSMs are not build for high-level of sharing
–Performance degradation due to frequent context exchange (key scheduling, engine preparation)
–Logical separation only to few entities (16-32)
–Physical separation on device-level (=> very limited)
–
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Secure parallel multi-processor
•High number of secure processors
–Secure memory, secure execution, crypto engines
–FIPS140-2 Level 3/4, CC EAL 4+
•Secure channels between secure processors
•Untrusted controller
–Small trusted computing base
–Initialization/operational phase
•Restricted use and audit trail (=> state)
•High-speed I/O data interface
•High robustness due to high redundancy
–If one card lock or die, other will serve a request
•Physical separation of secure processors
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
HSM SECURITY API
•Hardware Security Module
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Application Programming Interfaces (API)
1.Proprietary API (legacy or custom functions)
2.Standardized API - but proprietary library required  (PKCS#11)
3.Cryptographic service providers – plugin into standardized API (CNG, CSP…)
4.Standardized API - no proprietary component (PIV, EMV CAP…)
5.Proprietary (service-specific), but public API (MS KeyVault, AWS..)
6.
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PKCS#11, (PKCS#15), ISO/IEC 7816-15
•Standards for API of cryptographic tokens
•PKCS#11
–http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2133
–software library on PC, rather low level functions
–widely used, TrueCrypt, Mozilla FF/TB, OpenSSL, OpenVPN…
•PKCS#15
–http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2141
–both hardware and software-only tokens, identity cards…
–superseded by ISO/IEC 7816-15 standard
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PKCS#15 (https://github.com/OpenSC)
•pkcs15-init
•
•
•
•
•
•pkcs15-tool --dump
•pkcs15-tool --list-keys
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
#!/bin/bash
sleep 5
pkcs15-init --create-pkcs15 --pin 12345678 --no-so-pin
sleep 5
pkcs15-init --store-pin --auth-id 01 --pin 12345678
            --puk 12345678 --label “PV204 Tutorial"
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11
•Standardized interface of security-related functions
–vendor-specific library in OS, often paid
–communication library->card proprietary interface
•Functionality cover
–slot and token management
–session management
–management of objects in smartcard memory
–encryption/decryption functions
–message digest
–creation/verification of digital signature
–random number generation
–PIN management
•Secure channel not possible!
–developer can control only App®PKCS#11 lib
User Application
Vendor library
Smartcard
PKCS#11 interface
proprietary interface
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11 library
•API defined in PKCS#11 specification
–http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2133
–functions with prefix ‘C_’ (e.g., C_EncryptFinal())
–header files pkcs11.h and pkcs11_ft.h
•Usually in the form of dynamically linked library
–cryptoki.dll, opensc-pkcs11.dll, dkck232.dll…
–different filenames, same API functions (PKCS#11)
•Virtual token with storage in file possible
–suitable for easy testing (no need for hardware reader)
–Mozilla NSS, SoftHSM…
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: role model
•Functions for token initialization
–outside scope of the specification
–usually implemented (proprietary function call), but erase all data on token
•Public part of token
–data accessible without login by PIN
•Private part of token
–data visible/accessible only when PIN is entered
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PKCS#11: Cryptographic functionality
•C_GetMechanismList to obtain supported cryptographic mechanisms (algorithms)
•Many possible mechanisms defined (pkcs11t.h)
–CK_MECHANISM_TYPE, not all supported
–(compare to JavaCard API)
•C_Encrypt, C_Decrypt, C_Digest, C_Sign, C_Verify, C_VerifyRecover, C_GenerateKey,
C_GenerateKeyPair, C_WrapKey, C_UnwrapKey, C_DeriveKey, C_SeedRandom, C_GenerateRandom…
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PKCS#11 - conclusions
•Wide support in existing applications
•Low-level API
•Difficult to start with
•Requires proprietary library by token manufacturer
•Complex standard with vague specification => security problems
–Hard to implement properly
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Play with HSM (without HSM J)
•SoftHSM
–Software-only HSM
–Open-source implementation of cryptographic store
–Botan library for cryptographic operations
–https://www.opendnssec.org/softhsm/
–https://github.com/disig/SoftHSM2-for-Windows
•Utimaco HSM simulator
–https://hsm.utimaco.com/download/
–Simulator of physical HSM (with PKCS#11 and other interfaces)
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
D:\Documents\Obrazky\SoftHSM-logo.png
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Microsoft CNG
•Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG API)
•Long-term replacement for CryptoAPI
•CNG API
–Cryptographic Primitives
–Key Storage and Retrieval
–Key Import and Export
–Data Protection API: Next Generation (CNG DPAPI)
•http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa376210%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Cryptographic Service Providers (CSP)
•Generic framework with API for providers of cryptographic functionality
–E.g., implementation of RSA
–Different underlying storage (software vs. hardware-based)
•Allows for runtime selection
–Connect to target provider (usually identification string)
–E.g., “Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0”
•Microsoft CSPs
–http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa386983%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
•Java CSPs (JCE)…
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Chip Authentication Program (CAP)
•Usage of chip-based banking card for additional operations
•Designed for backward compatibility
–existing cards can be used
–Separate on-card applet is preferred, but not required
•Designed by MasterCard as EMV-CAP
–https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chip_Authentication_Program
–Adopted by Visa as Dynamic Passcode Authentication (DPA)
•Hardware CAP readers available
•Python software implementation
–http://sites.uclouvain.be/EMV-CAP/Application/
–
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
CAP – supported commands
•Supported operations
–Code/identify
–Response
–Sign
•Variants:
–Mode 1: amount included in computed cryptogram
–Mode 2: no amount, used for logging into system
–Mode 2 + TDS
•With transaction data signing
•Multiple data fields of the transaction
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Custom API pro/cons
•Is design of own API better idea?
•Pros:
–derive api in line with use
–focused api, no overhead
–highly efficient implementation
•Cons:
–security holes by design
–high effort
–lost certification
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
ATTACKS AGAINST API
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
Attacks against PKCS#11
•Lack of policy for function calls
–functions are too “low-level”
–sensitive objects can be manipulated directly
•Key binding attack (C_WrapKey)
–target key with double length is exported from SC
–encrypted by unknown master key
–attacker divide key into two parts and import them as wrapped key for ECB mode
–perform brute-force search on each half separately
•Missing authentication of wrapped key
– attacker can create its own wrapping key
–and ask for export of unknown key under his own wrapping key
•Export of longer keys under shorter, …
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
RSA padding oracle attack
•Allows to recover content of encrypted message even when key is unknown
•Based on 1 bit leakage from correct/incorrect padding
–Error status returned by device
•(cycle) mess with encrypted message, send to card, inspect error
•30 minutes with HSM, hours/days with smart card
•See more at
–http://secgroup.dais.unive.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Practical-Padding-Oracle-Attacks-on-RSA.h
tml
–
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Tookan tool
•Formal verification with real device model
–probe PKCS#11 token with multiple function calls
–automatically create formal model for token
–run model checker and find attack
–try to execute attack against real token
•http://secgroup.dais.unive.it/projects/tookan/
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Conclusions
•Hardware Security Module is device build for security and performance of cryptographic operations
•Security certifications (but be aware of limits)
•Initially mostly for banking sector
–Now more widespread (TLS, key management..)
•As applications are moving to cloud, so do HSMs
–
•Diverse APIs, potential logical attacks
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PKCS#11 DETAILS
•
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: Function prototypes
•GetProcAddress() returns untyped function pointer
•We need to cast this function pointer to known function type
•Function types for PKCS#11 are in pkcs11_ft.h
typedef CK_RV CK_ENTRY (*FT_C_Encrypt)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,
  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,
  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedDataLen
);
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: Load and init library
•
int LoadAndInitLibrary(const char* path, HINSTANCE* phLib) {
    CK_RV   status = CKR_OK;
    FT_C_Initialize fInitialize = NULL;
       if (phLib) {
        if ((*phLib = LoadLibrary(path)) != NULL) {
            // INITIALIZE LIBRARY
            fInitialize = NULL;
            if ((fInitialize = (FT_C_Initialize) GetProcAddress(*phLib, "C_Initialize")) != NULL) {
                (fInitialize)(NULL);
            }
            else status = GetLastError();
        }
        else status = GetLastError();
    }
    else status = -1;
    return status;
}
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: Finalize and unload library
•
int FinalizeAndCloseLibrary(HINSTANCE hLib) {
    CK_RV   status = CKR_OK;
    FT_C_Finalize   fFinalize;
       if (hLib != NULL) {
        // UNINITIALIZE LIBRARY
        fFinalize = NULL;
        if ((fFinalize = (FT_C_Finalize) GetProcAddress(hLib, "C_Finalize")) != NULL) {
            (fFinalize)(NULL);
        }
        FreeLibrary(hLib);
    }
    else status = -1;
    return status;
}
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: List tokens in system
•Slots in system are equivalent to readers
–C_GetSlotList
–C_GetSlotInfo
•Slot can be empty or with inserted token
–C_GetTokenInfo
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: Connect to token
•When slot with token is found
–C_OpenSession
–public session is opened
•Switch to private session by inserting PIN
–C_Login
–C_Logout
•C_CloseAllSessions
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: arguments lists
•Most of the PKCS#11 functions accept parameters as CK_ATTRIBUTE[] array
•Every value is encoded in single CK_ATTRIBUTE
–CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type
–CK_VOID_PTR       pValue
–CK_ULONG            ulValueLen
CK_CHAR label_public[] = {"Test1_public"};      //label of data object
CK_CHAR data_public[] = {“PV204 Public"};
CK_ATTRIBUTE dataTemplate_public[] = {
       {CKA_CLASS, &dataClass, sizeof(dataClass)},
       {CKA_TOKEN, &ptrue, sizeof(ptrue)},
       {CKA_LABEL, label_public, sizeof(label_public)},
       {CKA_VALUE, (CK_VOID_PTR) data_public, sizeof(data_public)},
       {CKA_PRIVATE, &pfalse, sizeof(pfalse)}  // is NOT private object
};
BYTE    numAttributes_public = 5;
C_CreateObject(hSession, dataTemplate_public, numAttributes_public, &hObject);
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204: Hardware Security Modules
PKCS#11: Store/search/get data
•Data created in public/private part of the token
–CKA_PRIVATE attribute
–C_CreateObject()
•User must be logged when creating/read private objects
•You must find target object
–attribute template, must be logged when searching private objects
–C_FindObjectsInit()
–C_FindObjects()
–C_FindObjectsFinal()
•Read data from object
–C_GetAttributeValue()
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