PV204 Security technologies
File and disk encryption
Milan Brož xbroz@fi.muni.cz
Petr Švenda svenda@fi.muni.cz
Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University

Data storage encryption
•Lecture
–File and disk encryption
–Distributed storage encryption
–Abstraction layers, hardware acceleration
–Cryptography basic principles
–Confidentiality and integrity protection
–Encryption modes
–Key management
–Tool examples
–Attacks and common issues
•Lab – disk encryption attack examples
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MOTIVATION &
STORAGE LAYERS OVERVIEW
File and disk encryption
| PV204 File and disk encryption
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Motivation
Offline, "Data at Rest" protection
notebook, external drives, data in cloud, backups
Key removal = easy data disposal
Confidentiality protection
company policy to encrypt all mobile devices
prevents data leaks (stolen device)
Integrity protection (not often yet)

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Overview
(Distributed) Storage Stack
layers accessing storage through blocks (sectors)
near future: non-volatile byte-addressable memory
distributed => adding network layer
Full Disk Encryption (FDE)
self-encrypted drives
(software) sector-level encryption
Filesystem-level encryption
general-purpose filesystem with encryption
cryptographic file systems

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Storage stack & encryption layers
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Userspace
Application
(Application specific)
OS kernel
Virtual file-system
(directories, files, …)
File-system encryption
Specific file-system
(NTFS, ext4, XFS, …)
Volume Management
(partitions, on-demand allocation,
snapshots, deduplication, …)
Disk encryption
Block layer (sectors I/O)
Storage transport
(USB, SCSI, SAS, SATA, FC, …)
HW-based disk encryption
self-encrypted drives,
chipset-based encryption,
hardware security module
Device drivers
“Hardware”
Hardware
(I/O controllers, disks, …)

Clustered and distributed storage
Clustered => cooperating nodes
Distributed => storage + network
Software Defined Storage/Network (SDS, SDN)
 - commodity hardware with abstracted storage/network logic
 - encryption is “just” one logic function
 - usually combination with classic storage (and encryption)
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Distributed storage & encryption
Shared volumes (redundancy)
=> disk encryption
Clustered file-system
=> file-system encryption
Distributed Object Store
-Direct object encryption or
-Underlying storage encryption
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Cloud storage & encryption
Many users with shared storage backend
Compression & Deduplication & Snapshots …
Encryption on client side (end-to-end)
- efficiency for deduplication/compression is lost
~ in future homomorphic encryption?
Encryption on server side
- confidentiality for clients is partially lost
- server has access to plaintext
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Full Disk Encryption (FDE)
Block device – transparent disk sector level
•Disk, partition, VM disk image
•Ciphertext device / virtual plaintext device
•Atomic unit is sector (512 bytes, 4k, 64k)
•Consecutive sector numbers
•Sectors encrypted independently
l
One key decrypts the whole device
•Media (volume) key – one per device
•Unlocking passphrases/keys
•Usually no integrity support (only confidentiality)
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Filesystem-level Encryption
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File/Directory
•Atomic unit is filesystem block
•Blocks are encrypted independently
•Generic filesystems with encryption
•Some metadata can be kept in plaintext
(name, size, …)
•Cryptographic filesystems
•Metadata encrypted
•~ stacked layer over generic filesystem
Multiple keys / multiple users

File vs. disk encryption
Full disk encryption
+ for notebook, external drives (offline protection)
+ transparent for filesystem
+ no user decision later what to encrypt
+ hibernation partition and swap encryption
- more users – whole disk accessible
- key disclosure – complete data leak
- usually no integrity protection
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| PV204 File and disk encryption

File vs. disk encryption
Filesystem based encryption
+ multiple users
+/- user can decide what to encrypt
+ copied files keeps encryption in-place
+ more effective (only really used blocks)
+ should provide integrity protection (not always!)
- more complicated sw, usually more bugs
- unusable for swap partitions
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File vs. disk encryption
Combination of disk & file encryption
Distributed storage
•Must use also network layer encryption
•Difference in network and storage encryption
(replay attack resistance, integrity protection, …)
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CRYPTOGRAPHY
File and disk encryption
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Cryptography algorithms primitives
lSymmetric encryption
lblock ciphers
lcipher block mode
lhash algorithms
lKey management
lRandom Number Generators (RNG)
lKey Derivation Functions (KDF)
lAsymmetric cryptography
lDeniable encryption / Steganography
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Data confidentiality & integrity
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Confidentiality
Data are available only to authorized users.
Integrity
Data are consistent.
Data has not been modified by unauthorized user.
=> All modifications must be detected.
Note: replay attack (revert to old snapshot) detection
cannot be provided without separate trusted store
(TEC – Tamper Evident Counter, Merkle tree root hash, …)

Data integrity / authenticated encryption
Poor man's authentication (= no authentication)
•User is able to detect unexpected change
•Very limited, cannot prevent old content replacement
•
Integrity – additional overhead
•Where to store integrity data?
•Encryption + separate integrity data
•Authenticated modes (combines both)
•
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DATA ENCRYPTION MODES
File and disk encryption
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Symmetric encryption (examples)
AES, Serpent, Twofish,
Specks, Camellia, Kuznyechik, Adiantum
•
Encryption-only modes
•Storage encryption mostly CBC, XTS
•Length-preserving encryption, block tweak
•
Authenticated modes (encryption + integrity)
•Integrity protection often on higher layer.
Storage standards like IEEE 1619 and FIPS/NIST
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Propagation of plaintext changes
•
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A change in the plaintext sector should transform to randomly-looking change in the whole
ciphertext sector.
Solutions:
•Ignore it J and decrease granularity of change
=> change location inside ciphertext sector
•Use wide mode (encryption block size = sector size)
•requires at least 2x encryption loop
•modes are patent encumbered
•Additional operations
•Elephant diffuser in Windows Bitlocker
•Google Adiantum (cipher composition)

Encryption example – AES-XTS
•
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plaintext
ciphertext

Wrongly used modes – ciphertext patterns
•
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ECB mode
AES-XTS & constant IV

Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) mode
•Blocks cannot be encrypted in parallel
•Blocks can be decrypted in parallel
•Tweak must be non-predictable (watermarking!)
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ciphertext disk / file-system block …
block tweak
plaintext disk / file-system block …
AES block

XOR-Encrypt-XOR (XEX/XTS) mode
•Encryption/decryption can be run in parallel
•Tweak can be predictable nonce – sector number (offset)
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| PV204 File and disk encryption
ciphertext disk / file-system block …
block tweak

CBC and XTS change propagation
•xxx
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AES-XTS IV mode – sector# vs random
•
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IV is sector number
randomized IV
Every 64 byte changed (ciphertext differences)

Adiantum
•Low-end mobile
device disk / file encryption
•Wide “mode”
•HBSB composition:
•Hash – NHPoly1305)
•Block Cipher – AES
•Stream Cipher – XChaCha12,20
•Hash – NHPoly1305
•Key derivation
KAES|| KNHPoly = XChaCha(K,1|0..0)
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KAES
KNHPoly
K
Block #
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720
https://security.googleblog.com/2019/02/introducing-adiantum-encryption-for.html
disk / fs block

Steganography / deniable encryption
Plausible deniability:
existence of encrypted file/disk is deniable
if adversary cannot prove that it exists
Steganography
hiding data in another data object
•
Steganographic file-systems
Deniable disk encryption
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Trivial example: VeraCrypt hidden disk
•FAT linear allocation
•Hide another disk in unallocated space
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Deniable encryption problems
Side-channels
tracking activity that cannot be explained for decoy system
•Software: link to recently open documents, …
Suspicious parameters (FAT), disabled TRIM, …
•Hardware: internal SSD block allocations
(access to “unused” areas)
Social engineering / “rubber hose” analysis
Incompatibility with new drives (TRIM)
•
•
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TRIM / discard and encryption
•TRIM informs SSD drive about unused space
•Unused space is detectable
•Pattern recognition example
•Incompatible with deniable encryption
•
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http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-uxlTIKZAseE/Tkg-UjNCBiI/AAAAAAAAADg/bvsfj3SoLJ4/s1600/fig_II_C.png

KEY MANAGEMENT
File and disk encryption
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Key generation
Encryption key (~ Media Encryption Key – MEK)
•Used to encrypt device
•change means complete reencryption
•Usually generated by a secure RNG
Unlocking key (~ Key Encryption Key – KEK)
•Independent key change (MEK remains the same)
•Can be derived from passphrase
•PBKDF2 (Password Based Key Derivation)
•scrypt, Argon2 (memory-hard KDFs)
•Can use key wrapping
•
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Key storage
Outside of encrypted device / filesystem
•Another device, file, token, SmartCard, TPM, HSM
•On a key server (network)
•Protected by another key (KEK).
On the same disk (with encrypted data)
•metadata (header)
•brute force and dictionary attack resistance
Integration with key management tools
•LDAP, Active Directory, ...
Combination of above
•
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| PV204 File and disk encryption

Key removal and recovery
Key removal (wipe of key) = data disposal
•intended (secure disk disposal)
•unintended (error) => complete lost of data
•
Key recovery
•Trade-off between security and user-friendly approach
•Metadata backups
•Multiple metadata copies
•Key Escrow (key backup to different system)
•Recovery key to regenerate encryption key
•
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COMMON TOOLS
File and disk encryption
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Examples of HW-based encryption
•Self-encrypting drives (SED), OPAL standard
•Encryption on the same chip providing media access
•
•Chipset-based encryption
•Encryption on controller chip (e.g. USB bridge)
•Hardware acceleration
•AES-NI, accelerators, ASICs, GPUs, …
•
•Secure hardware / tokens
•HSM, TPM, SmartCards, ...
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Examples of HW-based encryption
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SATA disk
Encryption on USB-bridge

Examples of tools – filesystem encryption
Windows EFS
Linux
leCryptfs – stacked encrypted file-system
fscrypt API – support in ext4, F2FS, UBIFS
l
ZFS (Solaris and ports)
lsupports GCM/CCM authenticated modes
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Examples of tools – full disk encryption
Windows Bitlocker
lOptionally eDrive – self-encrypting drives
lCombination with secure boot and TPM
VeraCrypt
Linux LUKS / dm-crypt / dm-verity (Android)
MacOS FileVault
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ATTACK EXAMPLES
File and disk encryption
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Attacks always get better, they never get worse.
•Against algorithm design
•Wrongly used encryption mode
•Insufficient initialization vector
•To implementation
•Insufficient entropy (broken RNG)
•Weak derivation from weak passwords
•Side channels
•Obtaining key or passphrase in open form
•Cold Boot
•“Black bag analysis” - Malware, key-logger
•Social engineering
•“Rubber-hose cryptoanalysis”
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Integrity attacks
No integrity protection
•Inserted random block
=> undetected data corruption
•Inserted block from other part of disk
•Random error (RAM bit flip)
=> “silent data corruption”
Weak integrity protection
•Inserted previous content of (ciphertext) block
=> replay attack
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Example: Sony PlayStation attack
•No need to know the exact key value
•Device works as decryption service
•Make disk image
•Write your own file
•Make second image and make diff (location file)
•Insert data you want into file’s place
•Start PS and ask for your file
–Decrypted new data
–Key is same for all blocks
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Example: Disk encryption
•Some chipsets use ECB mode
•Weak key derivation (brute-force possible)
•Trivial unlocking mode (1-bit password is ok/bad)
•Weak key-escrow (backup key in EEPROM, …)
•SED – switch power attacks
•SED – ransomware and unconfigured passphrase
•Cold boot – key in memory
•Key loggers
•Weak RNG (key is not random)
…
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LAB
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Laboratory – FDE attack examples
Basic understanding of some tools and hw
VeraCrypt, LUKS, chip-based encryption
Scanning memory image for encryption key
ColdBoot attack principle
•
Optional: flawed algorithm and watermarking Revealing TrueCrypt hidden disk existence (CBC)
l
HW key-logger attack
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