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PV204 Security technologies
In-Memory Malware Analysis
•
•Václav Lorenc
•Security Operations Center Manager, Oracle + NetSuite

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| PV204 In-Memory Malware Analysis

https://xkcd.com/1328/

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Agenda
•Basic intro
–No x86 assembly required
–No malware (de)obfuscation magic
•How does the OS look “inside”?
–Processes and other data structures
–How the memory is organized
•Common tools used for analysis
•Searching for system “oddities”
–What are the important system indicators?
•Real samples discussed and analyzed! (Labs)
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Why memory analysis?
•It’s fun!
•Acquiring evidence for legal investigations
–It used to be different in the past
•Technical simplification of reverse engineering
–No binary obfuscation present – the code has to run
•Incident response activities
–Easy way how to learn more about the attackers
–Malicious binary may only be present in memory
–Fast: RAM is (usually) smaller than full hard-drive images
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| PV204 In-Memory Malware Analysis

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https://xkcd.com/1353/

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Challenges in Reverse Engineering (RE)
•Assembly language (for multiple platforms)
–Plus undocumented instructions (or behavior)
•Anti-debugging tricks
–Exceptions, interrupts, PE manipulations, time checking, ...
•Anti-VM tricks
–Uncommon behavior of known instructions
–Registry detections, HW detections
•Code obfuscation/packing
–The most challenging to overcome, mostly
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C:\Users\E525127\Documents\School\Prednasky\English PE Walkthrough.png
PE File Format

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| PV204 In-Memory Malware Analysis
C:\Users\E525127\Documents\School\Prednasky\PDF101 an Adobe document walkthrough.png
PDF File Format

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‘cause reverse engineering ninjas are busy
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| PV204 In-Memory Malware Analysis
MEMORY ANALYSIS…

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x86/x64 Memory organization
•Physical memory
–RAM; what we really have installed
•Virtual memory
–Separation of logical process memory from the physical
–Logical address space > physical (e.g. swap)
–Address space shared by several processes, yet separated
•Paging vs. Segmentation
–Possible memory organization approaches
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Windows 32 bit address spaces
Win32 Address Space

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Linux 32 bit address spaces
Linux Address Space

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https://minnie.tuhs.org/CompArch/Lectures/week06.html

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https://xkcd.com/138/

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Operating System Data Structures
•How the OS knows about processes, files, …?
–A lot of ‘metadata’ for important data
–Based on C/C++ data structures (see MSDN documentation)
•(Double-)linked list
–Another common data structure (not only in OS)
–Method for implementing lists in computer memory
•Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
–Used for manipulating the structures to hide malicious stuff
–
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Double Linked Lists
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http://www.catch22.net/img/editor1712.gif

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DKOM – Direct Kernel Object Manipulation
•Dozens of various (double-)linked lists in Windows
–Maintained by kernel
–Processes, threads, opened files, memory allocations, …
•DKOM is used by rootkits
–Hiding from the sight of the user
•Rootkit paradox
–Rootkits need to run on the system
–… and need to remain hidden at the same time
•Memory analysis can help to discover DKOM
–Anti-analysis techniques are known as well
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http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-04/bh-us-04-butler/bh-us-04-butler.pdf

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http://cfile3.uf.tistory.com/image/1216E3284C2755D7038CB7
Windows
Process Structures
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Interesting OS Structures
•Suspicious Memory Pages
•Processes
•Threads
•Sockets (Connections)
•Handles (Files)
•Modules/Libraries
•Mutexes
•LSA (Local Security Authority)
•Registry
•…
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Memory Pages
•Various ‘flags’
–Read/write/executable pages
–Helping OS to organize memory efficiently
•Executable + Writable pages
–Why is it bad?
•Process Injection technique
–Allocating a memory that can be modified (unpacked, decoded, decrypted) and executed.
–Used by legitimate processes too (Windows OLE)
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DLL/Process Injection
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http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-NQx0mo7wOnw/UOr00ZmbtXI/AAAAAAAABag/oGjHH1YlttM/s1600/DLL%2BInjection-Fun
ctions.png
So that Internet Explorer behaves like a malicious process…

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https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-commo
n-and-trending-process

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And now something completely…
•PRACTICAL
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https://xkcd.com/1197/

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Memory (re)sources
•Live RAM
–The most common source for analysis
–Easier to obtain from virtualized hosts
•Paging file/Swap
–Used by operating systems to allocate more memory then available RAM
•Hibernation file
•Memory crash dumps
–Limited analysis options
•
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VM?
Memory Dump
Snapshot
Clone
Running?
Hibernation File
Page File (Swap)
Crash Dumps
Got root?
Dumping locally
Remote access?
Cost / Benefits
Tool Footprint
FireWire
PCI Probes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

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Memory Acquisition
•Virtual Machines
–VMWare, VirtualBox, …
–VirtualBox –dbg –startvm “MalwareVM” (and .pgmphystofile command or vboxmanage debugvm)
•Directly from the system! (if we have permissions to do that)
–windd, fastdump, dumpit, memorize, winpmem
–Or we can hibernate the system (hiberfil.sys)
•Remotely
–Encase Enterprise, Mandiant Intelligent Response, Access Data FTK
•Common issues
–Unsupported OS (Linux, MacOS; 32bit/64bit)
–Swap (portions of memory on drive)
–Malware not running inside a virtual machine
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Memory Acquisition (2)
•Local memory acquisition notes
–Unless you have plenty of money, try to get root/admin access to the host
–Better to acquire to external storage (USB, network)
–The lower tool’s memory footprint, the better
–If you run malware in VM, better have less RAM
•Faster analysis
•.. And configure no swap for the system too
•However: malware can check for the available memory
–
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Memory Acquisition (3)
•Remote memory acquisition
–Very useful for fast Incident Response
–Requires enterprise licenses for the commercial tools
–Acquisition is done over network
–Agents already in memory, no extra memory demands
•Open source alternative?
–GRR (Google Rapid Response)
•Still in development, primarily Incident Response tool
•Allows remote memory acquisition
–Rekall (still a beta)
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Memory Analysis Tools
•Mandiant Redline
–Free, available for Windows
•HBGary/CounterTack Responder (CE/Pro)
–Community Edition available against registration
•Volatility Framework
–Open source, no GUI
•Google Rekall
–Open source, ‘Volatility done right’, GUI
–Google supported (part of GRR agent)
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Mandiant/FireEye Redline
•Free tool for Incident Response
–Not open-source, though
–.NET executable (runs only under Windows)
•Nice and simple user interface
–Very nice analysis workflow
–Perfect for searching for string information
–Rates the level of suspiciousness over processes
•Sad things
–Memory analysis not reliable, process rating as well
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Redline: Start


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Redline: Timeline


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Redline: Time Wrinkles


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HBGary Responder (Pro/CE)
•Professional Tool
–Very expensive
–Yet not very well maintained in the last few years
•Windows only
–.NET written, supports only Windows images
•‘Killer’ features
–Digital DNA
•automatic rating of suspicious processes
–Visual ‘Canvas’ debugger
•Supports the analysis of (unpacked) binaries
•Replaced with CounterTack Responder Pro
•
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HBGary Responder Pro -- DDNA
•Examples of the ‘reasoning’ behind DDNA
–Does the process communicate over TCP/IP?
–Does it manipulate with registry?
–Did the analysis reveal any known bad stuff (strings, IPs, mutexes?)
–Does the process access any other process in the system?
–Does it access some system-critical process?
–Did the analysis find any evidence of obfuscation?
•
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Obsolete and unavailable at for a long time, but it had interesting features – and there’s a
professional alternative already: https://www.gosecure.net/responder-pro
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/150964/CounterTack_DDNA_SCMagazine_030117-1.pdf?t=1495723489966&__hs
tc=&__hssc=&hsCtaTracking=18aabc2a-88fc-46f2-9de8-4de89e22de86%7Cb02adedf-d309-4687-870d-eee1b16754
55

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C:\Users\E525127\Documents\SOC\Trainings\responder-ddna.png
Responder Pro: DDNA

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C:\Users\E525127\Documents\SOC\Trainings\responder-ddna.png
Responder Pro: DDNA

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Responder Pro: Canvas

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Volatility Framework
•Open source tool
–GPL licensed
•Written in Python
–Available for variety of platforms (Linux, Windows, Mac OS)
–Can be automated; many contributed plugins
•Supports analysis of memory dumps from various OSs
–Windows, Linux, MacOS, Android
–Both 32-bit and 64-bit versions
•Command-line driven
•Two (experimental) web GUIs
•

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Google Rekall
•Another open source tool
•Supported by Google
–Included as a part of GRR (Google Rapid Response) agent
•Originally based on the code of Volatility
–Shared commands
–Different architectural concepts
•Proof-of-concept GUI
–Better workflows
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Additional Important Tools
•Strings
–Both *nix and Windows
–Extracts strings information from the file
–Can be used in cooperation with Volatility/Rekall
–Beware of text encoding! (ascii, utf-8, …)
•Foremost
–Forensic tool
–Can extract various data files from an image (or process)
•Images, executables, documents, …
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Forensic analysis of RAM?
•Are there any benefits?
•Collecting forensic evidence
–Executable images
–PDF/Doc documents
•Possible origin of the infection?
–Images
–URLs
•Getting approximate timeline
–Works better on servers (always online, higher uptime, way more RAM)
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What to search for in Operating System?
•Command & Control (C2) communication
•Hidden processes
•Process/DLL injection evidence
•Non-standard/infamous binaries/mutexes
•Open sockets and files
•Registry records
•Command-line history
•Encryption keys!
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Known Bad Mutexes
•Conficker: .*-7 and .*-99
•Sality.AA: Op1mutx9
•Flystud.??: Hacker.com.cn_MUTEX
•NetSky: 'D'r'o'p'p'e'd'S'k'y'N'e't'
•Sality.W: u_joker_v3.06
•Poison Ivy: )!VoqA.I4 (and 10 thousand others)
•Koobface: 35fsdfsdfgfd5339
•
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http://hexacorn.com/examples/2014-12-24_santas_bag_of_mutants.txt

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Known Good Processes/Locations
Process Name
Expected Path
lsass.exe
\windows\system32
services.exe
\windows\system32
csrss.exe
\windows\system32
explorer.exe
\windows
spoolsv.exe
\windows\system32
smss.exe
\windows\system32
svchost.exe
\windows\system32
iexplore.exe
\program files
\program files (x86)
winlogon.exe
\windows\system32
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Operational Security (OpSec)
•Basics of OpSec
–“Think before you act” mentality
–Limited information sharing
•Specifics of memory analysis
–You can often upload acquired executables to VirusTotal
•MD5/SHA1 of the dump is different from the executable
•This doesn’t apply for documents/HTML pages!
–However, incomplete binaries still can infect your system!
•Running in VM or other OS is recommended
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Recommended Analysis Process
•Use Internet! (Google, VirusTotal, …)
•Make notes!
–What OS is being analyzed? (imageinfo)
–Network connections? (+ whois records, …)
–Processes (hidden, odd, non-standard; timestamps, …)
–Mutexes (+ files open)
–Dump processes when needed (OpSec!)
–Strings (URIs, C-like strings %s %d, domains, …)
•Summarize your findings in final report
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More information
•Web pages of this course
–https://dior.ics.muni.cz/~valor/pv204
•Additional resources
–Public memory images for analysis
–Reverse Engineering for Beginners (amazing PDF doc)
–REMnux: All you need to start with RE
–ContagioDump blog (for additional malware samples)
–Malware Traffic Analysis (both traffic & samples)
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Answers & Questions
•Thank you for your attention.
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LAB
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D:\Documents\Obrázky\services_icon_full_bw5.jpg

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Lab Requirements
•Oracle VirtualBox
–And enough space on your hard drive (12 GB at least)
•Volatility Framework
•Mandiant Redline
•Unix tools
–strings, foremost
•Your favorite text editor for notes
•Javascript/PDF analysis tools
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Recommended Analysis Process
•Use Internet! (Google, VirusTotal, …)
•Make notes!
–What OS is being analyzed?
–Network connections? (+ whois records, …)
–Processes (hidden, odd, non-standard; timestamps, …)
–Mutexes (+ files open)
–Strings (URIs, C-like strings %s %d, domains, …)
–…
•Summarize your findings in final report
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Volatility Framework – cheat sheet
•psxview (search for hidden processes)
•apihooks
•driverscan
•ssdt / driverirp / idt
•connections / connscan (WinXP, active network connections)
•netscan (Win7, opened network sockets and connections)
•pslist / psscan (process listing from WinAPI vs. EPROCESS blocks)
•malfind / ldrmodules (code injection + dump / DLL detection)
•hivelist (registry lookup and parsing) / hashdump
•handles / dlllist / filescan (filelist / DLL files / FILE_OBJECT handles)
•cmdscan / consoles (cmd.exe history / console buffer)
•shimcache (application compatibility info)
•memdump / procmemdump / procexedump
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Analysis: xp-infected.vmem
•Recommended tools
–Volatility, Rekall (or Redline)
•Objectives:
–Get familiar with memory of your first infected system
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Analysis: win7_x64.vmem
•Recommended tools
–Volatility, Rekall (or Redline)
•Objectives:
–Get familiar with memory of Win7 x64 system
–Can you see any differences from the previous sample?
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Analysis: zeus.vmem
•Recommended tools
–Volatility, Rekall
•Objectives:
–Find suspicious network connections
–Find process responsible for the network activity
–Can you figure out what infections this
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Analysis: zeus2x4.vmem
•Recommended tools
–Volatility, Rekall
•Objectives:
–Find suspicious network connections
–Find process responsible for the network activity
–Can you figure out what infections this
–Can you dump the virus configuration?
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Analysis: bob.vmem
•Recommended tools
–Volatility, Rekall, Foremost, Strings
•Objectives:
–Find suspicious network connections
–Find process responsible for the network activity
–Can you figure out what caused the infection?
–Can you dump the initial source vector?
–What known vulnerability (CVE) has been exploited?
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More information
•Web pages of this course
–https://dior.ics.muni.cz/~valor/pv204
•Additional resources
–Public memory images for analysis
–Reverse Engineering for Beginners (amazing PDF doc)
–REMnux: All you need to start with RE
–ContagioDump blog (for additional malware samples)
–Malware Traffic Analysis (both traffic & samples)
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Answers & Questions
•Thank you for your attention.
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