PA197 Secure Network Design
Network Defense Mechanisms

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Content

Firewalls

- Concept of inside and outside of a network
  - different trust levels
  - different security levels
  - access control is on the boundary (perimeter)
- Firewall as the boundary keep
  - makes decisions to allow or deny passage of packets according to a specified policy
  - demilitarized zone (DMZ)
  - reference monitor
    - unbypassable, tamperproof, analyzable (logs)
  - defines security perimeter
    - access control/security imposed
    - exposure limit
  - partitions the network (security domains)

Firewall Policy

- Firewall enforces a policy
  - administrative boundaries
  - what kind of data to block/pass?
- Philosophies
  - default: allow or deny?
  - inbound or outbound traffic
  - symmetric or asymmetric (same/different rules for in/out bound traffic)
- Rules
  - generation: manual versus automatic (learning)
  - simple or complex rules?

Characteristics

- Design goals
  - all traffic between "inside" (network behind the firewall) and "outside" network must go through the firewall
  - only authorized traffic is allowed to pass
    - security/access policy
  - firewall itself is tamperproof
    - use of trusted system
    - secure operating system

Characteristics II

- General techniques
  - service control
    - what can be accessed
  - user control
    - who can use a particular service
  - behaviour control
    - how the service is used
  - direction control
    - inbound and outbound traffic treated differently

Types of Firewalls

- Packet filters
  - first generation
  - operate at the IP layer
- Stateful inspection
  - second generation
  - also called circuit-level firewalls
  - operate at the transport layer
- Application layer
  - third generation
  - also called application gateway
  - higher layers, it can "understand" the traffic
- NAT
  - only partially belongs here
  - hides internal network
    - protects against network reconnaissance

Packet Filters

- Basic properties
  - list of rules to apply
    - IP addresses, ports, protocols, flags, interfaces, ...
  - usually using data from IP (or TCP) header
    - not strictly layer 3 only
- Stateless
  - applies set of rules to each incoming packet
  - forwards or discards it
- Uni-directional
  - each direction is treated independently
- High throughput

Stateful Firewalls

- Tracks state information of connections
  - maintains table of active connections
  - passively monitors them
- Context sensitive
  - context established by preceding packets
  - dynamic change of filtering rules
- Expensive setup, cheap processing
  - inclusion of a session (TCP, UDP) into the table
  - cheap processing of packets within a session
- UDP and ICMP problems
  - not truly stateful protocols
  - end of session only through timeout

iptables and nftables

- Linux application to configure Linux kernel firewall
- Different modules:
  - iptables for IPv4
  - ip6tables for IPv6
  - arptables for ARP
  - ebtables for Ethernet frames

  Gradually replaced by nftables
- Features:
  - packet filtering
  - connection tracking (stateful)
  - NAT
  - rate limiting
  - logging

nftables—examples

- Project to provide packet filtering and classification for Linux
  - Linux kernel engine: a virtual machine optimized for network packet inspection controlled through a bytecode; also atomic rule replacement API
  - user space utility: translates rules into bytecode
- Command line tool: nft
- Examples of simple rules
- Drop TCP traffic for port 22
  - nft add rule filter forward tcp dport 22 drop
  - nft add rule filter2 input tcp dport { telnet, http, https } accept

Simple firewall

```
table firewall {
   chain incoming {
     type filter hook input priority 0;
# accept established and related connections
     ct state etsablished,related accept
# accept loopback interface traffic
     iifname lo accept
# accept icmp
     icmp type echo-request accept
# open sshd (22) and httpd (80) tcp ports
     tcp dport {ssh, http} accept
# reject everything else
     drop
   }
}
```

Application Layer Firewalls

- Proxy (application gateway)
  - the firewalls serves/looks as a proxy
  - all traffic goes through it (relay at the application layer)
  - decisions customized to the application
  - application context
  - examples: e-mail or web filter
- Deep packet inspection
  - beyond stateful inspection
  - deep knowledge of application payload
- Challenges
  - performance (induced latency)
  - complexity
  - breaks end-to-end principle—secure connections

Personal firewalls

- The original idea of secure perimeter is becoming obsolete
  - too many intentional holes in firewalls
    - VPNs, VLAN extensions
  - encrypted traffic
- Insiders' threats
  - 60–80 % attacks go from inside the network
- The "demilitarized zone" pushed to a single machine
  - each machine protected independently
  - highly adaptive (to full programs)
  - excellent context
  - performance impact

Demilitarized zone

- An environment with machines/systems deliberately exposed to the external network
- Allows to provide service to external subjects
- Also behind the firewall
  - all traffic between DMZ and internal network as well as between DMZ and external network goes through the firewall
- Single firewall solution
  - three lines from a firewall
    - to the external world
    - to the internal network
    - to the DMZ
- Two firewalls solution
  - the first firewall stands between the DMZ and the external world
  - the second firewall stands between the DMZ and internal network

Firewall shortcomings

- Bugs and errors
  - software bugs and misconfigurations occur
- Perimeter redefinition
  - WiFi and mobile devices
  - external partners with need to access internal network
  - BYOD policy
- Perimeter extension through VPN
  - weak control of the other side
- Insider threats
  - majority of attacks from inside
  - weakening the perimeter does not help
  - social engineering, phishing, allowed services exploits

Intrusion Detection Systems

- We should accept that no protection is perfect
  - the attacker will get in!
- Intrusion Detection Systems
  - monitor network activity
  - look for sign of intrusion/intrusion attempts
  - detect and then react
- Where to monitor
  - Network IDS
    - like an application gateway
  - Host IDS
    - like a personal firewall

Network IDS

- Monitors network for malicious or suspicious events
  - network tap
  - span port
  - software in promiscuous mode (tcpdump)
  - deployed across the (local area) network
- Advantages
  - low cost
  - transparent to users (and adversary)
  - isolation
  - visibility across network
    - recognizes gradual attack
- Problems
  - encryption
  - evasion techniques
    - not able to detect “normal” modes

Alerts

- IDS raises an alert if an anomaly is found
- Accuracy is of critical importance
- Correct modes:
  - True positive
    - a true attack is correctly recognized
  - True negative
    - an anomaly is correctly detected as “no attack”
- Incorrect modes
  - False positive
    - reports an attack that does not exist
  - False negative
    - attack goes unrecognized (no alert)

Detection

- Looking for anomalies
  - unexpected behaviour taken as evidence of intrusion
  - needs a model of "normal" behaviour
    - thresholds/statistical modeling/Markov-based (state)
  - statistical anomaly-based
- Used metrics
  - traffic extent, connection attempts, payload byte distribution, flows
  - selected features should characterize expected behaviour
- Advantages
  - broad coverage (learning; able to detect previously unknown attacks)
  - not easy to evade
- Disadvantages
  - need training, false positives (alerts), legitimate changes in behaviour

Misuse Detection

- Direct search for known bad behaviour
- Signature-based
  - rule-based detection
  - signatures; states, pattern-matching
  - activity patterns matching known attack or policy violation
- Database of signatures
- Advantages
  - lower false positive rate
  - could include specific alerts
- Disadvantages
  - narrow (only known attacks)
  - evasion prone
  - need constant updates (external source)

Snort

- Widely used open source NIDS
  - signature based
- Features
  - protocol analysis
  - content searching/matching
- Attack detection
  - buffer overflows
  - stealth port scans
  - CGI attacks
  - SMB probes
  - OS fingerprinting etc.
- Available at `http://www.snort.org`

IDS for Mobile Wireless Networks

- Use case will be provided based on the following articles:
  - Y. Zhang, W. Lee, Y-A. Huang (2003): Intrusion Detection techniques for Mobile Wireless Networks.
  - P.M. Mafra, J.S. Fraga, A.O. Santin (2014): Algorithms for a distributed IDS in MANETs. J. Comp. Syst. Sciences, VOI 80(1), pp. 554–570.

Honeypots

- Using deception as a defense
  - diverting attack to a secure site
  - consuming attacker's resources
  - forcing them to reveal their techniques/goal
- Pretends to be the attacker's target
- Allows to study vulnerabilities and what adversary does after gaining control
- Hig/Low interaction honeypots

High Interaction Honeypots

- Real (full) systems and services
- Allow full compromise of the target system
- Mostly virtual systems
  - easily to replace/manage
- Challenges
  - maintenance, scaling
  - risk of further attacks (originating from honeypot)
  - intrusion detection (e.g. dynamic taint analysis)
- Output
  - attack footprint (registers, memory, applications, . . .)

Low Interaction Honeypots

- Just emulate aspects of real system
  - limited interaction
  - statistics collection
- Advantages
  - simplicity, maintenance
  - easy installation
  - low risk (no attack originating from honeypot)
- Outputs similar to high interaction honeypots

Summary

- Definition of a perimeter and internal and external network
- Putting firewall at the perimeter
  - able to detect and stop open attacks
  - weak against current perimeter diffusion
  - majority of attacks from inside
- Continuous monitoring through IDS
  - could reveal attacks regardless of origin
  - adaptable to new threats
  - improper setup could be dangers (e.g. too many false positives)
- Next lecture: More extensive traffic monitoring