

# Forensic-Ready Risk Management for Software Systems

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March 31, 2022

# Why Forensic Readiness?

- Digital forensic investigation is:
  - Laborious
  - Costly
  - Time-consuming
  - Delicate
- Success is never assured
  - Data might be unavailable, corrupted, or tampered
  - Error in evidence handling jeopardies the process
- Data might be misleading

# What is Forensic Readiness?

- Original definition
  - Maximizing the usefulness of incident evidence data
  - Minimizing the cost of forensics during an incident response
- Systematic preparation for forensic investigation
- Proactive measures
  - Opposed to actual investigation, which is reactive

# What is Forensic Readiness?

- Approached as a set of general guidelines
  - Collection of evidence
  - Handling of evidence
  - Presentation of evidence
  - Staff training
  - Escalation policies
- Increases likelihood of successful investigation

# Forensic Readiness in Software Engineering

- Prepare software system during its development
  - A.k.a. forensic-by-design
- Capable of:
  - Conducting digital forensic processes in a forensically sound way
  - **Producing forensically sound evidence**
- High-level non-functional requirement
- Measures for the failure of security measures

# Forensic Readiness in Software Engineering

- It is true that software systems produce a lot of data
  - Logs
  - Documents
  - Database records
- But can we trust them?
- Are they complete?
- Will they help us during the investigation?

# Forensic-Ready Software Systems -

## Requirements

- What exactly should be implemented?
- We need some guideline to identify the requirements
- In other words, for what investigation should we prepare for?
- We can consider the reason for investigation as a risk


# Forensic-Ready Risk Management

- Risk management has been discussed within forensic readiness
  - However, there is a very little methodological support
- The focus here is to conceptualize the process
  - What do we have (assets, evidence)
  - What do we need from forensic readiness (goals)
  - What are the threats to the system (risks)
  - What it fits together (scenarios)
  - What to do with it (decisions)
  - What to implement (requirements, controls)



# Forensic-Ready Risk Management

## Domain Model




- Based on ISSRM
- Information System Security Risk Management

# Forensic-Ready Risk Management

## Asset-Related Concepts

- Anything of value
  - Business asset
  - IS asset
- Potential Evidence
  - Data that have value to the organization
- Evidence Source
  - Where the evidence come from
- Evidence Store
  - Where can you find it, if you need it



# Forensic-Ready Risk Management

## Risk-Related Concepts

### – Goal – Answer to “Why?”


- Prove an impact of a risk
- Handling disputes
- Demonstrate compliance
- Support evidence release


### – Risk

- Undesired occurrence + negative consequence

### – Scenario

- How is a Goal addressed, using the Potential Evidence and the Risk it covers
- It creates a partial ordering of Potential Evidence w.r.t. creation time






# Forensic-Ready Risk Management

## Treatment-Related Concepts

### – Treatment – “What to do next”

- Scenario Avoidance
- Scenario Enhancement
- Scenario Retention
- Scenario Transfer



### – Requirement


- Condition to be satisfied

### – Control

- Add or modify Potential Evidence/Store/Source
- Documentation
- Establish or modify Policy/Practice

# Hands-On Demo

- Try how the concepts fits together
- Identify and evaluate the scenarios
  - Fill in the available potential evidence
  - Think about completeness of the scenario
- Evaluate the potential evidence
  - Is it trustable?
  - Is there enough?



# Analysis of Forensic Readiness Scenarios

- The problem is how to evaluate and prioritize what is needed.
- Scenario coverage
  - Do we have enough potential evidence?
  - Are there any blind spots?
  - Where are the evidentiary/risk hot-spots?
- Potential evidence quality
  - Is the evidence non-disputable?
  - What is the chances of having it available?
- Validity of the model

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**Metrics**


...which are not yet defined...



# Analysis of Forensic Readiness Scenarios

## Risk Coverage Analysis


- How to be sure that we have covered everything?
  - Can we distinguish between the nominal and abnormal?
- Utilization of models
  - Forensic readiness (BPMN4FRSS)
  - Risks (Risk-Oriented BPMN)
- Simulations of the modelled scenario
  - Find the probability of potential evidence occurrence
  - Find the hot spots/indicators



# Analysis of Forensic Readiness Scenarios

## Validity and Hints Analysis


- Analysis of BPMN4FRSS models
- Check the model validity
- Provide hints to enhance the model
  - Cover the blind spots
  - Add evidence on strategic spots
  - Improve non-disputability



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
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## Validity and Hints Analysis

- Analysis of BPMN4FRSS models
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- **Provide hints to enhance the model**
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# Analysis of Forensic Readiness Scenarios

## Validity and Hints Analysis

```
(declare-sort Task)

(declare-fun flow (Task Task) Bool)

(declare-const send Task)
(declare-const receive Task)
(declare-const alone Task)

(assert (flow send receive))
(assert (flow receive send))
(assert (forall ((x Task)) (= (flow x x) false) ))

(check-sat)
// sat

(eval (= (flow send receive) true))
// true

(eval (= (flow send send) true))
// false

(eval (= (flow send alone) true))
// (= (ite (= alone Task!val!0)
// Task!val!0 Task!val!1) Task!val!1)
```

# Conclusion

- Forensic readiness is about preparation when things go wrong
  - We need to know why, what, when, who, how
  - We need to defend against or support accusations
  - We need to show that we did everything we could
  - We need to effectively support law enforcement
- Risk management
  - Determine our current status
  - Plan and prioritize what to implement
- Analysis support, validation, verification
  - Be sure that we are going the right direction