Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Management How to design and manage reliable networks Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska Faculty of Informatics April 3, 2024 Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Q Basic design principles • Access control • Limited management authorization Q Critical infrastructure • Cyber-physical systems Q Infrastructure security • Physical vs. digital security o Cost of higher security requirements Q Software Defined Networks Q Clean-slate design Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managem Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design Packet switched networks • no dedicated resources within the network o no fixed route between source and destination • accommodates links with different capacity Best effort service model • no strict guarantees provided End-to-end paradigm • any features (on top of the actual packet delivery) are to be provided by the higher level protocols at source and destination nodes only Implications: • scalable and robust network • no explicit security considerations • too open to malevolent exploitation Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design • Paraphrasing from the CISCO Network Design principles o http://www.pearsonhighered.com/samplechapter/ 1587132125.pdf 9 1st step: Network requirements • 24/7 operation even if a node/service or link fails • data is transmitted in a timely manner • protect data transmitted and stored • allow for modifications and grows o fixing failures should be easy and fast • 2nd step: Requirements translated into Design goals • scalability • availability • security • manageability Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design • CISCO proposes Hierarchical design • group devices into multiple networks • organize network in a layered approach O core layer Q distribution layer O access layer • Advantages • local traffic remains local • encapsulation, different rules for different places (local networks) this also increases reliability of different layers Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design Roles of individual layers Core layer • 100% uptime • maximizing throughput • facilitate network grows Distribution layer • filtering and managing traffic flows • enforcing access control policies 9 summarizing routes before advertising them • isolating core from access layer failures Access layer 9 controls user access to the network • QoS considerations • security policies enforcement Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design o No explicit security incorporated • no field in the packet is protected • easy to forge any identity • easy to forge source address 9 No strict (hierarchical) structure of the management • local management "islands" without mutual influence • a robust solution o loss of control beyond islands' borders • Problem of security of end nodes holes in operating systems' security • devices (including the active elements on the network) with security holes and/or default passwords easy to send "untraceable" packets • tracing beyond own management edge needs cooperation Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design Improvements of Internet architecture? • Gradual improvements rather difficult • a complex interplay between protocols • Adding a "security layer" is not sufficient • one layer will not be sufficient • attacker could use not-secured layer(s) both transport and semantics of data must be secured • also end nodes can not be left unattended • Nevertheless we must do what is possible • in parallel to more ambitious plans Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A ^ . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design o In Internet, if you have physical access to the network, you are in • no access control in standard Internet protocols • Authentication • know who is speaking • know who is doing something • all not directly possible in the current Internet • but the necessary first step for access control • Authorization • "another name" for access control • restricts what can be done by whom Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A ^ . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Basic principle: minimal rights • start with an absolute minimum • rise access rights on request • and check repeatedly who is there Drawback: limited freedom • one of the major reasons why it is so difficult to make Internet more secure • remember the control part • you never know who will exert the control in the future Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Implementation of the restricted access right to the network management A very general concept • the general management theory • not restricted to networks or information technology only • need to know principle • split of decision rights among several players IT made the need for control more needed/explicit • remote decisions • no human check of the orders • extremely fast reaction time Least privilege principle • abstraction layers • start with the least privilege (access rights) • add more rights (increase the privilege) on the go as needed • usually requires repeated authentication Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Access control Limited management authorization Clean-slate design Least privilege • Several synonyms • least authority • minimal privilege • A mitigation against both • bugs and faults (fault tolerance) • malicious use (security) in both cases it increases reliability of the system • More a principle than a precise set of rules • not easy do define the minimal privilege actually needed to perform an operation • more a human decision what is needed Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure A . . , . Access control Infrastructure security .... ... r r ^ r- i h ■ . Limited management authorization Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • Abstraction layers in the active network elements • usually very limited set of layers in the standard elements • read vs. read/write access and user vs. administrator • even the read access can be dangerous • misuse of SNMP complex call requiring lot of processing power to get all the information simultaneous read requests o One source of interest for Software Defined Networks Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Cyber-physical systems US Critical infrastructure • US definition: • Critical infrastructure are the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Department of Homeland Security www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure) • many sectors, important for us are Communications and Information Technology ones • Office of Cyber security and Communications • responsible for enhancing the security, resilience, and reliability of the Nation's cyber and communications infrastructure • Understanding that attack on network (and cybersystems in general) could have very serious impacts on the whole national wellbeing (and its security) Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managem Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Cyber-physical systems • Computer systems (elements) controlling physical systems (entities) o Embedded systems a special (or predecessor) case • Examples in energy distribution, aerospace, autonomous automotive systems, process control systems in factories, (medical) monitoring etc. • The major purpose is the physical expression, not computations (the digital part) • More and more network connected • part of the Internet of Things • increased vulnerability Connectivity adds value but also risks Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • For attacker, the physical manifestation is important • but the attack is led through the digital (cyber) part • the classical physical security may not be sufficient • the cyber part deserves equal (or even higher) protection • See also http://CyberPhysicalSystems.org • the mental map on the next slide is taken from that source Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Cyber-physical systems Cyber-Physical Systems - a Concept Map See authors and contributors. http://CyberPhysicalSvstems.org POSSIBLY WITH (Cyber- Physical \ Sy ste m s J Humans in the Loop) Networked and /or Distributecl^— ( Adaptive and Predictive"') Intelligent) Real Time ) POSSIBLY WITH Wireless Sensing and „ Actuation (Resilience) P r ivacy ") ( Malicious Attacks ) Intrusion Detection^) improved Design Tools) THAT ENABLE HAVE APPLICATIONS IN Design Methodology"^ ( Communication ) ( Consumer ) C E"ergy ) (infrastructu re) ( Health Care ) ( Manufacturing ) ( Military^) ( Robotics ) (Transportation) THAT SU PPO RTS . Specification. Modeling, and Analysis Hybrid and Heterogeneous Mode f Models of ) Com putatiori J Networking) .( Interoperability ) Continuous and Dlstrete Scalability and Complexity Management Time Synchronization) ('Modularity and Composability~) - —Synthesis ) Interfacing with Legacy Systems Assurance ) *^ Certification") Simulation ) Stochastic Modeli) Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Control plane Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements Two basic abstraction layers • data plane—all the users' traffic goes here; also called forwarding plane • control plane—the network management information Usually, the data and control plane share the same physical infrastructure o very convenient, easy to implement • opened to attacks • both passive and active attack modes Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements Control plane II Situation more confused when users' step in • VPN vs openVPN • VPN part of the network management, its control (management) messages) understood by network active elements • openVPN a software product, runs within the data plane, "hidden" from the network management • IDS systems looking both for data and control packets • Don't mess with physical vs digital infrastructure • control plane part of the digital • however could run on a separate physical infrastructure Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Physical security Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements 9 Physical layer the lowest layer of any communication network o Security and reliability of the physical layer critical for all the above layers • however, with redundancy and fast recovery we may create more resilient networks even with not resilient physical layer • Physical reliability • redundant independent connections • multihome nodes and multirouting protocols • The physical security of critical nodes • limited access to the sites with • management systems • critical active elements Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Impossible to control the whole network 9 redundancy, independent paths • wired (optical) and wireless networks o Important to check whole paths for independency • e.g. a bridge aggregating all otherwise independent physical lines Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Digital security Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements • Data and control plane • Time critical information • esp. in the control plane • timeouts may lead to wrong conclusions about the state of th network • Reliable protocols • both the architecture and the implementation • software engineering practices • Ada used for mission critical systems for the USA DoD Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Digital security Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements • Authentication and authorization • distinct requirements for data and control plane • essential for the control plane • no anonymous actions/users • strict access control with the least privilege principle applied • strong authentication (two factor, .. .) for some operations • organizational policies very important • a principle of "four eyes" (two persons) is forsaken if the same person keeps both digital credentials Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements Digital security III • Encryption • both data and control packets • Specific requirements for control plane • cross domain encryption • PKI vs. symmetric keys exchange • Accounting • keep track of the actions taken • Reliability of accounting data • remote data collection size of the data/lossy aggregation over the time Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Physical vs. digital security Cost of higher security requirements Cost of higher security requirements • Explicit • less easy access to the network • more complex protocols • high processing needs (authentication, encryption) • slower response time • for (repeated) authentication • for access right decisions • for continuous control of access privilege • higher management burden • must define, implement and control policies • higher operational costs • keys, policies, accounting, ... Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure . . .. . . . , . Physical vs. digital security Infrastructure security ^ " r , ■ , r r ^ r- i h i . Cost of higher security requirements boftware Defined Networks Clean-slate design Cost of higher security requirements 9 Implicit • higher control could mean less freedom • in strictly hierarchical systems, compromising the highest layer could be disastrous • in too complex systems people start to bypass the rules and policies • a conflict between "have things done" and "check every step" • the natural world is imperfect and does not fully fit into strict mechanical rules Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design A network with clear separation between control and forwarding plane, where the control plane spans/con several devices Features: • makes control plan directly programmable • abstracts the underlying infrastructure SDNs present a reaction to • limits of vendor based solutions • requirements of more dynamic access patters (mobile remote, ...) Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • directly programmable and forwarding independent control • programmatically configurable not vendor locked • central management of several devices: the concept of network controllers that 9 maintain a (global) view of the network • provide a single interface to applications and services • mimic a single active element (switch) 9 flexible allow fast (programmed) reaction to events and changing environments • including profound changes in traffic flow (routing) Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Three different layers • the major difference is in the interaction, not the layers themselves Application and orchestration layer • focuses on expansion of network services • examples are cloud orchestration network virtualization, QoS, ... Control plane layer » logically-centralized SDN controller • exposes clearly defined APIs to Application layer performs consolidated management and monitoring of network devices Data plane layer • physical network equipment programmable Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Controllers keep the network intelligence allow to provide a central (global) view on the whole network • in contrast to the current distributed approaches • controller provides a programmatic API to the network Security benefits of a central controller for distributed attacks DDoS attack, botnet or worm propagation controller's global view allows collecting traffic information that could be fed to a specific IDS for attack recognition controller's central role allows for fast reaction at the or near real sources of attack Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design a A communication protocol • gives programmable access to the switch forwarding plane • enables to determine a path of packets through a network of switches 9 Function: Remote administration of packet forwarding tables (layer 3) Routing decisions taken by the controller • translated into rules and tables • implemented at wire speed by the device Properties • uses TCP, port 6653 • TLS mandatory Security implications • central controller a central point of attack/failure • TLS faults susceptible Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design The Open Flow Model ■.HhiN Wn. P*** ublM chn rrivuri ŕiŕ Arft r^ňi r« rh* far* vrh r*j píiiw. awl ihŕOptnHM1 pravd L>jLi' J Bfn rm*i kľ^'ff Ir ťrpvni Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • A complementary activity to SDN • not dependent, but beneficial 9 Aim is to consolidate network equipment types o leveraging visualization technology • reducing the number of network device types • exposing their functionality through clearly defined APIs • NFV support to SDN • standardized programmable network interfaces • use of commodity servers and switches Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Classical Network Appliance Approach Message Router DPI CDN 1 Session Border WAN Controller Acceleration Firewall Carrier Grade NAT Tester/QoE monitor m SGSN/GGSN PE Router BRAS Radio Access Network Nodes • Fragmented non-commodity hardware. - Physical install per appliance per site. • Hardware development large barrier to entry for new vendors, constraining innovation & competition. Independent Software Vendors j| Virtual Tirmiil «pplijmr kpphih» «ppfcln-:* ApphiiK l Vlrtkftl Vinwk lpplur.ii hpplum r hnul Orchestrated, automatic & remote instal Standard High Volume Servers St a n o^f^^^řvo^^^^^řage ■ ■ -- = = — — T- Standard High Volume Ethernet Switches Network Virtualisation Annrnarh Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managem Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • Need for fundamental changes in Internet architecture • flaws in the current Internet architecture • incremental changes may not by sufficient (see IPv6 example) • A research activity • to investigate options • RINA as an example o http: //www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/rina-security.pdf • http://irati.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ 6-Securityl30123.pdf Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • Recursive InterNetwork Architecture (Boston University) o Basic premise: Network is only Inter-Process Communication (IPC) • IPC a function to allow two processes (sender and receiver) to communicate • process names are identifiers • IPC function examples: process location, permissions determination, passing information, . .. • Security by isolation • hosts can not address any element of the ISP o no hacker can compromise ISP assets • unless ISP is physically compromised Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Distributed IPC Facility (DIF) • an organizing structure 9 9 "medium" for communication processes can communicate only if they belong to the same DIF • a layer in a standard architecture allows processes to allocate flow between them providing names for the processes • and flow characteristics (bounds on data delay, jitter, loss, reliability, ...) supports recursivity • a group of processes connected through DIF could play a role of a process in a different DIF Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design Security mechanisms • mandatory authentication before joining DIF • a process does not know any addresses nor "well known ports", all is provided after authentication by the appropriate DIF • node addresses are internal to DIF, not exposed to the applications • data connections are dynamically assigned connection-endpoints IDs • bound to dynamically assigned ports • DIFs are securable containers, so no need for firewalls o Security implications • resiliency to transport attacks • clear security borders o complexity of RINA security is lower than the security of the current Internet • much lower number of protocols and security mechanisms Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern Basic design principles Critical infrastructure Infrastructure security Software Defined Networks Clean-slate design • Secure network design • access control and the least privilege principle • redundancy • clear role separation • Critical infrastructure and cyber-critical systems • attack through the digital, not physical components • physical and digital security recapitulation 9 Software defined network • overcoming many current drawbacks • incremental changes to the network design 9 centralized control o Clear slate design and RINA • far reaching vision 9 Next session: Network monitoring and defense Eva Hladká, Luděk Matýska PA197 Secure Network Design 6. Operational Security Managern