PV204 Security technologies


Trust, trusted element, usage scenarios, side-channel attacks

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TRUSTED ELEMENT

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What is "Trusted" system (plain language)

- Many different notions
- 1. System trusted by someone
- 2. System that you can't verify and therefore must trust not to betray you
 - If a trusted component fails, security can be violated
- System build according to rigorous criteria so you are willing to trust it
 ...
- Why Trust is Bad for Security, D. Gollman, 2006
 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/15710661/157/3

We need more precise specification of Trust

UNTRUSTED VS. TRUSTED VS. TRUSTWORTHY

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Untrusted system

- System itself explicitly unable to fulfill specified security policy
- Additional layer of protection must be employed
 - E.g., Encryption of data before storage
 - E.g., Digital signature of email before send over network
 - E.g., End-to-end encryption in instant messaging

Trusted system

- "...system that is relied upon to a specified extent to enforce a specified security policy. As such, a trusted system is one whose failure may break a specified security policy." (TCSEC, Orange Book)
- Trusted subjects are those excepted from mandatory security policies (Bell LaPadula model)
- User must trust (if wants to use the system)
 - E.g., you and your bank

Trustworthy system (computer)

- "Computer system where software, hardware, and procedures are secure, available and functional and adhere to security practices" (Black's Law Dict.)
- User have reasons to trust reasonably
- Trustworthiness is subjective
 - Limited interface and hardware protections can increase trustworthiness (e.g., append-only log server)
- Example: Payment card Trusted? Trustworthy?



Trusted does not mean automatically Trustworthy

Trusted computing base (TCB)

- The set of all hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its security
- The vulnerabilities inside TCB might breach the security properties of the entire system
 - E.g., server hardware + virtualization (VM) software
- The boundary of TCB is relevant to usage scenario
 - TCB for datacentre admin is around HW + VM (to protect against compromise of underlying hardware and services)
 - TCB for web server client also contains Apache web server
- Very important factor is size and attack surface of TCB
 - Bigger size implies more space for bugs and vulnerabilities

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base

TRUSTED ELEMENT


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What exactly can be trusted element (TE)?

- Recall: Anything user entity of TE is willing to trust ③
 - Depends on definition of "trust" and definition of "element"
 - We will use narrower definition
- Trusted element is element (hardware, software or both) in the system intended to increase security *level* w.r.t. situation without the presence of such element
 - 1. By storage of sensitive information (keys, measured values)
 - 2. By enforcing integrity of execution of operation (firmware update)
 - 3. By performing computation with confidential data (DRM)
 - 4. By providing unforged reporting from untrusted environment (TPM)
 - 5. ...

Typical examples

- Payment smart card
 - TE for issuing bank
- SIM card
 - TE for phone carriers
- Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
 - TE for user as storage of Bitlocker keys, TE for remote entity during attestation
- Trusted Execution Environment in mobile/set-top box
 - TE for issuer for confidentiality and integrity of code
- Hardware Security Module for TLS keys
 - TE for web admin
- Energy meter
 - TE for utility company
- Server under control of service provider
 - TE for user private data, TE for provider business operation



Risk management

- No system is completely secure (\rightarrow risk is present)
- Risk management allows to evaluate and eventually take additional protection measures
- Example: payment transaction limit
 - "My account/card will never be compromised" vs. "Even if compromised, the loss is bounded"
- Example: medical database
 - central governmental DB vs. doctor's local DB



Good design practice is to allow for risk management

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RISK

TRUSTED ELEMENT MODES OF USAGE

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
Trusted (hardware) element - modes of usage

- 1. Element carries fixed information
- 2. Element as a secure carrier
- 3. Element as encryption/signing device
- 4. Element as programmable device
- 5. Element as root of trust (TPM)












Is secure hardware trusted element a silver bullet?

- Trusted element shall be small (TCB) => Not whole system => How to extend desirable security properties from TE to whole system?
- 2. The trusted element itself can still be directly attacked

Trusted hardware (TE) is not panacea!

- 1. Can be physically attacked
 - Christopher Tarnovsky, BlackHat 2010



- Infineon SLE 66 CL PE TPM chip, bus read by tiny probes
- 9 months to carry the attack, \$200k
- <u>https://youtu.be/w7PT0nrK2BE</u> (great video with details)
- 2. Attacked via vulnerable API implementation
 - IBM 4758 HSM (Export long key under short DES one)
- 3. Provides trusted anchor != trustworthy system
 - Weakness can be introduced later
 - E.g., bug in newly updated firmware

Motivation: Bell's Model 131-B2 / Sigaba

- Encryption device intended for US army, 1943
 - Oscilloscope patterns detected during usage
 - 75 % of plaintexts intercepted from 80 feets
 - Protection devised (security perimeter), but forgot after the war
- CIA in 1951 recovery over 1/4 mile of power lines
- Other countries also discovered the issue
 - Russia, Japan...
- More research in use of (eavesdropping) and defense against (shielding) \rightarrow TEMPEST



Common and realizable attacks on Trusted Element

- 1. Non-invasive attacks
 - API-level attacks
 - Incorrectly designed and implemented application
 - Malfunctioning application (code bug, faulty generator)
 - Communication-level attacks
 - Observation and manipulation of communication channel
 - Side-channel attacks
 - Timing/power/EM/acoustic/cache-usage/error... analysis attacks
- 2. Semi-invasive attacks
 - Fault induction attacks (power/light/clock glitches...)
- 3. Invasive attacks
 - Dismantle chip, microprobes...

How to reason about attack and countermeasures?

- 1. Where does an attack come from (principle)?
 - Understand the principles
- 2. Different hypothesis for the attack to be practical
 - More ways how to exploit the same weakness
- 3. Attack's countermeasures by cancel of hypothesis
 - For every way you are aware of
- 4. Costs and benefits of the countermeasures
 - Cost of the assets protected
 - Cost for an attacker to perform attack
 - Cost of a countermeasure



Where are the frequent problems with crypto algs nowadays?


- Security mathematical algorithms
 - OK, we have very strong ones (AES, SHA-3, RSA...) (but quantum computers)
- Implementation of algorithm
 - Problems \rightarrow implementation attacks
- Randomness for keys
 - Problems \rightarrow achievable brute-force attacks
- Key distribution
 - Problems \rightarrow old keys, untrusted keys, key leakage
- Operation security
 - Problems \rightarrow where we are using crypto, key leakage

Non-invasive attacks

NON-INVASIVE LOGICAL ATTACKS

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
Timing attack: principle



Timing attacks



- Execution of crypto algorithm takes different time to process input data with some dependence on secret value (secret/private key, secret operations...)
 - 1. Due to performance optimizations (developer, compiler)
 - 2. Due to conditional statements (branching)
 - 3. Due to cache misses
 - 4. Due to operations taking different number of CPU cycles
- Measurement techniques
 - 1. Start/stop time (aggregated time, local/remote measurement)
 - 2. Power/EM trace (very precise if operation can be located)



Naïve modular exponentiation (modexp) (RSA/DH...)

• $M = C^d \mod N$


Is there any dependency of time on secret value?

•
$$M = C * C * C * ... * C \mod N$$

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Easy, but extremely slow for large d (e.g., >1000s bits for RSA)
 – Faster algorithms exist

Faster modexp: Square and multiply algorithm



• How to measure?

- Gilbert Goodwill, http://www.embedded.com/print/4408435
- Exact detection from simple power trace
- Extraction from overall time of multiple measurements

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Faster and more secure modexp: Montgomery ladder

- Computes x^d mod N
- Create binary expansion of d as $d = (d_{k-1}...d_0)$ with $d_{k-1}=1$

```
x<sub>1</sub>=x; x<sub>2</sub>=x<sup>2</sup>

for j=k-2 to 0 {

if d<sub>j</sub>=0

x<sub>2</sub>=x<sub>1</sub>*x<sub>2</sub>; x<sub>1</sub>=x<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup>

else

x<sub>1</sub>=x<sub>1</sub>*x<sub>2</sub>; x<sub>2</sub>=x<sub>2</sub><sup>2</sup>

x<sub>2</sub>=x<sub>2</sub> mod N

x<sub>1</sub>=x<sub>1</sub> mod N

}


return x<sub>1</sub>
```

Both branches with the same number and type of operations (unlike square and multiply on previous slide)

 Be aware: timing leakage still possible via cache side channel, nonconstant time CPU instructions, variable k-1...

Gather data \rightarrow Analyse \rightarrow Bias found \rightarrow Impact


Run ECC operations \rightarrow MSB/time \rightarrow Bias found in ECDSA \rightarrow CVE-2019-15809



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Minerva vulnerability CVE-2019-15809 (10/2019)

- Discovered by ECTester (<u>https://github.com/crocs-muni/ECTester</u>)
- Athena IDProtect smartcard (CC EAL 4+)
 - FIPS140-2 #1711, ANSSI-CC-2012/23
 - Inside Secure AT90SC28872 Microcontroller
 - (possibly also SafeNet eToken 4300...)
- Libgcrypt, wolfSSL, MatrixSSL, Crypto++
- SunEC/OpenJDK/Oracle JDK
- Small time difference leaking few top bits of nonce
- Enough to extract whole ECC private key in 20-30 min
 - ~thousands of signatures + lattice-based attack



Example: Remote extraction OpenSSL RSA

- Brumley, Boneh, Remote timing attacks are practical
 - https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
- Scenario: OpenSSL-based TLS with RSA on remote server
 - Local network, but multiple routers
 - Attacker submits multiple ciphertexts and observe processing time (client)
- OpenSSL's RSA CRT implementation
 - Square and multiply with sliding windows exponentiation
 - Modular multiplication in every step: x*y mod q (Montgomery alg.)
 - From timing can be said if normal or Karatsuba was used
 - If x and y has unequal size, normal multiplication is used (slower)
 - If x and y has equal size, Karatsuba multiplication is used (faster)
- Attacker learns bits of prime by adaptively chosen ciphertexts
 - About 300k queries needed

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
Defense introduced by OpenSSL

- RSA blinding: RSA_blinding_on()
 - <u>https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt</u>
- Decryption without protection: M = c^d mod N
- Blinding of ciphertext *c* before decryption
 - 1. Generate random value *r* and compute r^e mod N
 - 2. Compute blinded ciphertext $b = c * r^e \mod N$
 - 3. Decrypt *b* and then divide result by *r*
 - r is removed and only decrypted plaintext remains

$$(r^e \cdot c)^d \cdot r^{-1} \mod n = r^{ed} \cdot r^{-1} \cdot c^d \mod n = r \cdot r^{-1} \cdot c^d \mod n = m.$$

Example: Practical TEMPEST for \$3000

- ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs
 - https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129.pdf
- E-M trace captured (across a wall)






(a) Attacker's setup for capturing EM emanations. Left to right: (b) power supply, antenna on a stand, amplifiers, software defined radio E (white box), analysis computer.

(b) Target (Lenovo 3000 N200), performingECDH decryption operations, on the other side of the wall.

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Example: Practical TEMPEST for \$3000

- ECDH implemented in latest GnuPG's Libgcrypt
- Single chosen ciphertext used operands directly visible




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Example: How to evaluate attack severity?

- What was the cost?
 - Not particularly high: \$3000
- What was the targeted implementation?
 - Widely used implementation: latest GnuPG's Libgcrypt
- What were preconditions?
 - Local physical presence, but behind the wall
- Is it possible to mitigate the attack?
 - Yes: fix in library, physical shielding of device, perimeter...
 - What is the cost of mitigation?

Example: Acoustic side channel in GnuPG

- RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis
 - Insecure RSA computation in GnuPG
 - https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf
- Acoustic emanation used as side-channel
 - 4096-bit key extracted in one hour
 - Acoustic signal picked by mobile phone microphone up to 4 meters away



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Example: Cache-timing attack on AES

- Attacks not limited to asymmetric cryptography
 - Daniel J. Bernstein, <u>http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf</u>
- Scenario: Operation with secret AES key on remote server
 - Key retrieved based on response time variations of table lookups cache hits/misses
 - $-2^{25} \times 600B$ random packets $+2^{27} \times 400B$ + one minute brute-force search
- Very difficult to write high-speed but constant-time AES
 - Problem: table lookups are not constant-time
 - Not recognized / required by NIST during AES competition
- Cache-time attacks now more relevant due to processes co-location (cloud)

Other types of side-channel attacks

- Acoustic emanation
 - Keyboard clicks, capacitor noise
 - Speech eavesdropping based on high-speed camera
- Cache-occupation side-channel
 - Cache miss has impact on duration of operation
 - Other process can measure own cache hits/misses if cache is shared
 - https://github.com/defuse/flush-reload-attacks
 - http://software.imdea.org/projects/cacheaudit/
- Branch prediction side-channel (Meltdown, Spectre)
 - (2 lectures later in semester)

MITIGATIONS

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Generic protection techniques

- 1. Do not leak
 - Constant-time crypto, bitslicing...
- 2. Shielding preventing leakage outside
 - Acoustic shielding, noisy environment
- 3. Creating additional "noise"
 - Parallel software load, noisy power consumption circuits
- 4. Compensating for leakage
 - Perform inverse computation/storage
- 5. Prevent leaking exploitability
 - Ciphertext blinding, key regeneration...

Example: NaCl ("salt") library



- Relatively new cryptographic library (2012)
 - Designed for usable security and side-channel resistance
 - D. Bernstein, T. Lange, P. Schwabe
 - https://cr.yp.to/highspeed/coolnacl-20120725.pdf
 - Actively developed fork is libsodium https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium
- Designed for usable security (hard to misuse)
 - Fixed selection of good algorithms (AE: Poly1305, Sign: EC Curve25519)
 - C = crypto_box(m,n,pk,sk), m = crypto_box_open(c,n,pk,sk)
- Implemented to have constant-time execution
 - No data flow from secrets to load addresses
 - No data flow from secrets to branch conditions
 - No padding oracles (recall CBC padding oracle in PA193)
 - Centralizing randomness and avoiding unnecessary randomness

How to test real implementation?

- 1. Be aware of various side-channels
- 2. Obtain measurement for given side-channel
 - Many times $(10^3 10^7)$, compute statistics
 - Same input data and key
 - Same key and different data
 - Different keys and same data...
- 3. Compare groups of measured data
 - Is difference visible? => potential leakage
 - Is distribution uniform? Is distribution normal?
- 4. Try to measure again with better precision ©

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Activity: Side-channels (10 minutes)

- 1. Power consumption of memory write instruction depends on the Hamming weight of stored byte
- 2. Time required to execute inc instruction (a++) is faster than add instruction (a+b)
- 3. Temperature of CPU increases with every instruction executed (and CPU is cooled by fan)
- For every listed side-channel, argue within the group (Google if necessary):
 - Propose an attack(s) based on the particular side-channel
 - What is the cost of required equipment?
 - What are possible options to mitigate the attack?
- Order given side-channels by
 - Seriousness with respect to security impact
 - Difficulty to systematically mitigate the side-channel leakage

CONCLUSIONS

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Morale

- 1. Preventing implementation attacks is extra difficult
 - Naïve code is often vulnerable
 - Not aware of existing problems/attacks
 - Optimized code is often vulnerable
 - Time/power/acoustic... dependency on secret data
 - Dangerous optimizations (Infineon primes)
- 2. Use well-known libraries instead of own code
 - And follow security advisories and patch quickly
- 3. Security / mitigations are complex issues
 - Underlying hardware can leak information as well
 - Try to prevent large number of queries

Mandatory reading

- Constant-time crypto: <u>https://bearssl.org/constanttime.html</u>
- Focus on:
 - What can cause cryptographic implementation to be non-constant?
 - Is there any impact by compiler?
 - How is bitslicing technique improving situation?
 - What particular techniques are used by BearSSL?

Conclusions

- Trusted element is secure anchor in a system
 - Understand why it is trusted and for whom
- Trusted element can be attacked
 - Non-invasive, semi-invasive, invasive methods
- Side-channel attacks are very powerful techniques
 - Attacks against particular implementation of algorithm
 - Attack possible even when algorithm is secure (e.g., AES)
- Use well-know libraries instead own implementation

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