PB173 Domain specific development: side-channel analysis



Seminar 12: Presentation & Grading (Last Seminar)

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Consultation: A406 Monday 14:00-





My recent work (published in 2023)

SoK: SCA-secure ECC in software – mission impossible?



Summary

"SoK: SCA-secure ECC in software – mission impossible?"

- Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper: a list of side-channel and faultinjection attacks that the implementation needs to withstand against
- The sca25519 library consists of 3 implementations of X25519 for Cortex-M4 with countermeasures against all considered side-channel and fault-injection attacks.
 - 1. Unprotected implementation (constant-time);
 - 2. Implementation containing countermeasures required for ephemeral scalar multiplication;
 - 3. Implementation containing the most countermeasures for the static scalar multiplication.
- We also performed a side-channel evaluation including a single-trace template attacks feasibility assessment.



Unprotected Algorithm

Algorithm 1 The Montgomery ladder for x-coordinate-based X25519 scalar multiplication

```
Input: k \in \{0, \dots, 2^{255} - 1\} and the x-coord. x_P of a point P. Output: x_{[k]P}, the x-coordinate of [k]P. X_1 \leftarrow 1; Z_1 \leftarrow 0; X_2 \leftarrow x_P; Z_2 \leftarrow 1, p \leftarrow 0 for i \leftarrow 254 downto 0 do \triangleright k[i] \Rightarrow p; p \leftarrow k[i] \qquad \qquad \triangleright k[i] denotes bit i of k (X_1, X_2) \leftarrow \operatorname{cswap}(X_1, X_2, c) \\ (Z_1, Z_2) \leftarrow \operatorname{cswap}(Z_1, Z_2, c) \\ (X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2) \leftarrow \operatorname{ladderstep}(x_P, X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2) return (X_1, Z_1)
```

Most protected Static Algorithm

Algorithm 3 Pseudocode of side-channel and fault-attack protected static X25519

```
Input: the x-coordinate x_P of point P. Output: x_{[k]P}.
Secure Input: a 64-bit blinding f, blinded scalar k_{f-1} = k \cdot f^{-1} \mod l, and blinding points R, S = [-k]R.

    ctr ← 0; x<sub>P</sub> <sup>8</sup>/<sub>2</sub> {0,..., 2<sup>256</sup> − 1}
    Initialize iteration counter to 0 and output buffer to random bytes

 Copy k<sub>f</sub> to internal state while increasing ctr.

                                                                        ▶ Updating ctr in a loop protects copying against FI
 3: y<sub>P</sub> ← ycompute(x<sub>P</sub>)
 4: Increase(ctr)
 5: (X_P, Y_P, Z_P) \leftarrow \operatorname{ecadd}((x_P, y_P), R)
                                                                       > Point blinding, output of addition of R is projective
 6: (X_P, Y_P, Z_P) \leftarrow \text{ecdouble}(\text{ecdouble}(\text{ecdouble}((X_P, Y_P, Z_P))))

⇒ 3 doublings to multiply by co-factor 8

                                                                  8: b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,...,\ell\}
                                                                     > Sample blinding factor of non-constant-time inversion
9: t \leftarrow r \cdot b \mod \ell

10: s \leftarrow t^{-1} \cdot b \mod \ell
                                                                                               ▷ Invert using extended binary gcd
                                                                                                       b Unblind result of inversion
11: k'_{f-1} \leftarrow k_{f-1} \cdot s \mod l

    Multiplicatively blind scalar k<sub>ℓ-1</sub>

12: k' \leftarrow k'_{f-1} \cdot f \mod l
13: Increase(ctr)

→ Multiplicatively unblind scalar k'<sub>f-1</sub> with f

14: x_P \leftarrow X_P \cdot Z_P^{-1}; y_P \leftarrow Y_P \cdot Z_P^{-1}
                                                                                           Return to affine x and y coordinates
```

Not REALLY Readable

```
34: r \leftarrow r \oplus a'
                                                                                                   \triangleright Mask the random scalar r
35: Increase(ctr)
36: (X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2) \leftarrow \text{cswaprr}(X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2, a'[64])
                                                                          Projective re-rand.+cswap based on masking a'
37: for i from 64 downto 0 do
                                                                                                   \triangleright Scalar multiplication by r
        (X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2) \leftarrow \text{cswaprr } (X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2, r[i])
                                                                            ▶ Projective re-rand.+cswap based on masked r
            (X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{ladderstep}(x_P, X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2)
             (X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2) \leftarrow \text{cswaprr}(X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2, a'[i-1])
                                                                                     ▶ Projective re-rand.+cswap based on a'
             Increase(ctr)
43: Y_2 \leftarrow \text{yrecover}(X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2, x_P, y_P)
44: (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) \leftarrow \text{ecadd}((X_2, Y_2, Z_2), S)
                                                                                ▶ Remove point blinding, add in S = [-k]R
45: x_P \leftarrow X_2 \cdot Z_2^{-1}
46: Increase(ctr)
47: if ! Verify(ctr) then
                                                                          Detected wrong flow, including iteration count
      x_P \leftarrow \{0, \dots, 2^{256} - 1\}
                                                                                         > Set output buffer to random bytes
49: Update(R, S) ▷ 2 double-and-add scalar multiplications with the same 8-bit random scalar for R and S

⇒ Generate new 64-bit random value f, securely compute f<sup>-1</sup> and update k<sub>ℓ-1</sub>


50: Randomize (k_{f-1}, f)
51: Save (R, S, k_{f-1}, f)
52: return xp
```

Static Algorithm (Extra) Countermeasures

- 1. Stored key blinding/randomization.
 - k is stored as k·f⁻¹ together with f, which is a non-zero 64-bit random factor.
- 2. Point blinding
 - Static random points R and S for input blinding, where S = [-k]R.
 - Add R, perform scalar multiplication, and subtract S.
 - Re-randomizing k·f⁻¹, f, R, and S; these secrets should be securely stored.
- 3. Inversion is blinded.
 - We use the extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) with multiplicative blinding.



Efficiency Analysis: price to pay for security (Plain → Ephemeral → Static)



The above SCA traces are from a device running at 168MHz.




Efficiency Analysis: Related Crypto Libraries.

Implementation	Cycles:
Complete unprotected [Len20]:	548 873
Our unprotected baseline [HL19]:	680 097
Complete ephemeral:	932 204
Complete static:	2338681


Library	Const.	Cycles:
	\mathbf{Time}	
wolfSSL [wol21] size:	yes	45930947
wolfSSL [wol21] speed:	yes	1974047
bearSSL i31 [Tho18]:	yes	2576639
BoringSSL [Goo21]:	yes	1591407
fixed base		
BoringSSL [Goo21]:	yes	2516476
var. base		
Arm MBed TLS	no	6 438 233
[Arm21]		

Side-Channel Evaluation

- TVLA: fixed vs. random input and scalar
- Preliminary results on Single-Trace Template Attacks
 - Profiled Device with turned-off countermeasures:



- Find POIs for single-trace attacks:
- Perform template attack
 - address mask: 63-64%,
 - masked scalar bit: 50.5%,
 - plain scalar bit: 52%





Links

- Resources:
 - https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9962 plus artifact
 - https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1003
- Repository: https://github.com/sca-secure-library-sca25519/sca25519



ORGANIZATIONAL

Organization

- Group 1: Alignment
 - https://github.com/2lol555/pb173-side-channel/tree/main
- Group 2: Parallel computations with acquisition
 - https://github.com/makuga01/pb173-sidechannels

Remaining Seminars Plan

- 7: evaluation of progress on first steps: 1 point per person per work done till today also based on the commits in GIT
- 8: evaluation of finished first steps: 3 points per group (personalized per person based on the Github) + giving the next tasks
 - 9: work in progress
- 10: 4 points per group (personalized per person based on the GitHub)
 - This seminar: real SCA setup
- 11/12: national holiday / online consultation
- 13: final **2** points for work + 2 points for presentations + 2 points for activity, grading.




FINAL SEMINAR + GRADING



Group 1: Alignment

- Installation easy
- Nice!
- Running hard
- No examples
- Did you push your recent changes to main?



Group 1: Alignment

Main:





Commits:

Excluding merges, 3 authors have pushed 14 commits to main and 14 commits to all branches. On main, 5 files have changed and there have been 221 additions and 85 deletions.



Explain work division, etc., recent inactivity in main


Group 1 Final Tasks:

- 1. Finalize Correlation Alignment on the provided traces.
 - Potentially: investigate optimizations of calculating Normalized Cross Correlation (NCC) between the static reference and target traces. Lukasz's idea: find out how it is efficiently done at https://github.com/Riscure/Jlsca. There is an efficient implementation there!
- Make Peak Correlation + Window Resampling work also for other trace sets:
 - Before 02/05/2024 I will upload two new tracesets to IS.
- 3. Help Group 2 to incorporate peak alignment into their acquisition pipeline.



Group 2: Parallel computations with acquisition


- Nice!
- Installation looks clear and nice
- I have not tried running, @Milan?
- It seems clear which script to run, but not completely clear with which target





Group 2: Parallel computations acquisition





It looks evenly distributed, but please describe the division.

Group 2 Final Tasks:

- 1. Finish comparison of various settings with respect to the number of threads and the amount of traces acquired.
 - Clarify which approach is the best on your system.
 - Possibly use a profiler (e.g., cProfile) to identify the most important bottlenecks of your solution.
 - Experiment with various numbers of samples used (or acquired). Does it matter?
- Add a peak alignment code from Group 1 to your pipeline and perform experiments.
- 3. **Optional:** add bandpass filtering to your pipeline: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12093594/how-to-implement-band-pass-butterworth-filter-with-scipy-signal-butter

Reminder: Colloquium

- To get the colloquium
 - You must be present at seminars (2 absences OK)
 - You must be active at seminars (+2 points given by me at the end)
 - You must submit and get:
 - 50%: 7 points in total (projects + presentation + activity = 14 points)



SUMMARY & PRESENTATIONS THE FLOOR IS YOURS ©




WRAPPING UP


Future Work (for me)

- I will try to run your code myself after the seminar and that will influence the grade a bit too.
- @ALL: Thank you for your hard work and participation!
- I potentiall would like to use your code in the future to help in the next year's seminars.
 - Would that be ok with you?


Still Future Reading

- For interested people
- Side-Channel Analysis blue book:
 - http://dpabook.iaik.tugraz.at/
 - The books is available at the uni.
 - Look online
- The Hardware Hacking Handbook:
 - https://nostarch.com/hardwarehacking
 - I have an epub version.





Future Subjects



- <u>PV080 (Information security and cryptography)</u>, PV079 (Applied Cryptography), <u>PA018 (Advanced Topics in Information Technology Security)</u>
- * PV181 (Laboratory of security and applied cryptography)
- * PV286/PA193 (Secure coding principles and practices)
- PV204 (Security Technologies)
- + Bachelor / Master (or even PhD) theses

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Thank you very much for attending and for your work!!!





